NAIVE EXPERIENCE, NARRATIVE SCRIPTURE, RELIGIOUS GROUND MOTIVES AND SCIENTIFIC HISTORIOGRAPHY CONCERNED WITH THE ANCIENT PAST

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Dedicated to the memory of

Glenn A. Andreas
(1916-1993)

whose many gifts of valued literature
his and Vera’s kind hospitality
his open library policy
his warm photocopier
and many discussions
have contributed
immeasurably
to my student ministry
to my personal growth and
by mention of this symposium
to this working paper
ABSTRACT

Anyone familiar with Herman Dooyeweerd's philosophy has encountered his refreshing treatment of what he termed "naive experience." His restoration of ordinary experience to its rightful status alongside "theoretical thought," in philosophical reflection, is regarded as one of his most noteworthy achievements.

This paper will explore some pressing issues surrounding the status and authority of the Bible as a book whose intentional level of address is our concrete experience. It will maintain that philosophy of religion and the doctrine of Scripture, including elenctic/apologetics, urgently need the reforming touch of Dooyeweerd's reformationally motivated distinction. The special focus will be perennial questions about the historicity of Biblical narratives--which I allege to be naive, pretheoretical, true records--entailing their consequent persuasive influence over the human heart and their evidential use in the science of historiography.

Connected with these concerns is the nature and mediating function of what Dooyeweerd termed "religious ground motives." It will be a contention of this paper that all such motives are best understood as foundational assumptions about the meaning of universal history. Their fiducial thrust concerning the future derives from an explicit or tacit narration-cum-explanation concerning the past which is regarded as unconditionally true of reality at large. Hence the motor of human behavior is ultimately (religiously) fueled by trust in one or (if dialectical) more such ostensibly nonfictional "scriptures" (all together generating a plurality of public communities of religion) serving as the basic presupposition driving adherents by raising eschatological or teleological expectations, thereby conditioning all other plans, including scientific projects. The formulaic designation of a ground motive should be an epitomizing of its narrative plot regarding the origin, structure, and destiny of cosmic history.

I will argue that such primary assumptions demand, deserve, and are in fact capable of comparative testing and authentication in accord with the canons of naive knowledge, and that this kind of justification is actually more compelling than that required for secondary assumptions of merely scientific utility. Ordinary, integral experience is of a different order and plays by different rules than are valid for theorizing, abstracting, scientific analysis. The affirmation of reliable naive knowledge opens a horizon of verifiable reality incommensurable with rationalistic, scientistic paradigms that idolatrously drive theoretical reasoning beyond its epistemic limits.

Some startling implications of these simple conclusions for reassessing the status of the Bible's narratives (including Genesis 1-11) will be drawn against the backdrop of the nature and goals of the modal science of historiography and its limitations in accessing the historical aspect of antiquity. Especially important will be the observation that the practice of ancient historiography, as a theoretical science, is itself necessarily funded by religious ground motives rooted in pretheoretical, suprascientific chronicles about primal history and chronology. Accordingly, some of the peculiar problems arising at the embattled interfaces of theoretical vs. nontheoretical and authentic vs. mythical (whether corrupt or surrogate) narratives will be dealt with. In particular, untangling the imbroglio of historical criticism of the Bible can now be undertaken by a method more radical than hitherto conceived as viable or even possible to employ.
INTRODUCTION

The subject of this workshop paper concerns a number of discrete yet interrelated topics that will be familiar to philosophers, theologians, and/or historians within the Reformational stream of scholarship that this symposium especially addresses. My title indicates the main loci of my treatment. In brief, I wish to argue that Herman Dooyeweerd’s explanation of the difference between what he termed the "naive" and the "theoretical" attitudes of thought holds especially fruitful implications for our understanding of the nature and classification of Biblical (and other religious) narratives. It also opens fresh perspectives on the comparative verifiability (historical and religious) of such narratives. This, in turn, suggests a fuller way of conceiving the nature of what he termed "religious ground motives." And since ground motives, according to him, serve as the driving force impelling also scientific or theoretical activity, then historiography as a theoretic discipline is necessarily affected as well. This raises peculiar questions which I believe can serve to illuminate some aggravated controversies that continue to impede the advance of Biblically-radical scholarship in key history-dependent fields. Finally, I propose to introduce a solution to one of the most problematic of historical puzzles: the proper interrelation of historical criticism and Old Testament narratives.¹

PART I: EPISTEMOLOGY AND SCRIPTURE

Herman Dooyeweerd testified in the foreword to his New Critique:

...The great turning point in my thought was marked by the discovery of the religious root of thought itself, whereby a new light was shed on the failure of all attempts, including my own, to bring about an inner synthesis between the Christian faith and a philosophy which is rooted in faith in the self-sufficiency of human reason.

I came to understand the central significance of the ‘heart’, repeatedly proclaimed by Holy Scripture to be the religious root of human existence.

On the basis of this central Christian point of view I saw the need of a revolution in philosophical thought of a very radical character. Confronted with the religious root of the creation, nothing less is in question than a relating of the whole temporal cosmos, in both its so-called ‘natural’ and ‘spiritual’ aspects, to this point of reference.²

What might seem an inauspicious discovery on his part had vast implications for his philosophical career as a Christian because, thus equipped, he was able successfully to straddle or transcend, at the core, not only the entire created diversity of subjects and objects, but also the great gulf between scientific "object" (Gegenstand) and ordinary experiential object – a feat that theoretical thought, due to its very limitations of structure, could not validly do. I rehearse this matter for my purpose because it bears remembering that Dooyeweerd regarded it as the great turning point of his thinking as a philosopher. It enabled him to overturn all pretensions to religious neutrality in science (the "neutrality postulate"), behind which scholars could deceptively, mischievously, give rein to a corrupting idol-worship of the merely created.
It was this turning point that also positioned him to accord full recognition to the legitimate epistemic claims of "naive" or ordinary experience. Such experience could make fair claims to genuine knowledge, but its concept-formation is directed toward things and concrete events as individual totalities, and not toward the abstract relations necessary to theoretical or scientific concepts. Moreover, it is in the descriptive language of the former rather than the definitive formulas of the latter that the Bible speaks:

The Scriptures reveal God's act of creation. In their statement of this basic truth, which transcends all theoretical thought, they do not primarily appeal to certain temporal cognitive functions of man, but to ourselves in the religious root of our existence. They do not use theoretical scientific concepts, but by means of their central basic motive they appeal to the heart of man in the language of naive experience.

In addition, its message was not mystically channeled to individuals isolated from the stream of redemptive history, chronology, and genealogy:

In the Word-revelation God addresses the human race in its religious root, and man has only to listen faithfully. As this Word-revelation was originally a revelation to a community, and not to individuals, its addressee was not each individual believer apart, but mankind in community with its first head, Adam. The function of faith can likewise again be truly directed to God only in Christ, as the Head and root of the regenerate human race. But now in such a way that only Christ is the Finisher and the Subject of the Covenant of faith (Hebr. 12:2).

The Bible has a historical taproot firmly imbedded in concrete events. Dooyeweerd makes clear in his critique of "mythical consciousness," as proposed by the great Jewish philosopher Ernst Cassirer, that myth, by contrast, is unworthy of our religious attachment by faith, nor is every fiducial view of the world to be ascribed to mythical consciousness. The mythical view implies an essential moment of fiction, but not in the same sense as a tale or a legend.

Mythical consciousness is by no means exclusively bound to a primitive stage of thought. It may have developed to a high degree of theoretic abstraction in a philosophic-theological speculation in which the viewpoint of faith is masked.

...every real myth has the (not necessarily deliberate) tendency to reveal a religious truth which is essentially related to the modal function of niatys and founded in a Divine revelation in the order of creation. In this respect it is sharply to be distinguished from a tale and a legend. Its time-aspect is that of faith, not that of aesthetic fantasy or history.

But mythical faith is characterized by its interpreting the natural Divine revelation in accordance with the fictitious conceptions of an 'autonomous' pistical fancy. This is the hybrid character of mythical consciousness by which it is sharply distinguished from the non-mythical. It is related to a truth which is necessarily misunderstood.

...Only in the opening of niatys to the light of God's Word-revelation are the mystifications of mythology penetrated. In this disclosure the boundaries of 'mythical consciousness' are broken through by the transcendent power of Divine Truth. Without this Divine illumination even theoretical self-consciousness retains the fundamental characteristics of mythology.

Dooyeweerd seems to take for granted, however, that myths themselves, of whatever sort, like Scripture, do appeal to the concrete language of ordinary experience, even when a tradition of reflection upon them may have become theoretically abstract.
For Dooyeweerd, everyday naive experience poses no "problem of knowledge" for epistemology to have to solve by methodical, theoretical analysis. Because it focuses on concrete temporal relations of created things rather than on abstract relations of their diverse modal meanings (the concern of science regarded in its largest compass – the sense of the German Wissenschaft and Dutch wetenschap), ORDINARY EXPERIENCE simply constitutes the divinely given DATUM TO BE PRIMARILY OBSERVED and THEREUPON SCIENTIFICALLY PROCESSED as well, thus making possible the theoretical abstractions both of philosophy and of the special (modal) sciences.

A humble GAZING upon the diverse fields of vision that constitute the sectors of the full circuit of our modal horizon of ordinary experience actually holds priority over the concept-formation that is generated when SYSTEMATIC THOUGHT takes over one or another sector. The only genuine a priori in the universe is that which is prior to both human consciousness and (other!) created objects, namely, the flow of the Creator’s minutely programmed power that sustains all his works alike in existence. God’s Explanation about such matters in Scripture amounts to the sufficient and indispensable a priori knowledge to grasp the creation "objectively" as a whole; it comes in a Book (however imperfectly any of us may grasp it) as a gift to humankind. All else is a posteriori knowledge – both ordinary experience, with its modal fields of vision, and scientific thought, with its abstract categories. But Scripture furnishes us with CATEGORIES FOR ORDINARY EXPERIENCE THAT OUGHT (normatively at the religious, covenantal level) TO HOLD CONCEPTUAL PRIORITY OVER THAT EXPERIENCE in preference to theoretically derived ones, and thus enable us to label its FUNDAMENTAL DIVERSITY authentically.

Accordingly, the Bible, as a concrete literary object, cannot be transformed into a scientific object (Gegenstand) as a whole, but can only be viewed scientifically in one or another facet of its meaning. It speaks in knowable, understandable, non-scientific ways to the most foundational matters of life, many of which undergird the superstructure of science and therefore need to be laid square if its construction is to proceed steadily without collapsing.

PART II: HISTORICAL NARRATIVE AND SCRIPTURE

This brings us to consider further the nature and function of Biblical narrative in our naive, everyday experience. I submit that the effect of the covenantal redemptive history in Scripture is to PRIME our faculty of faith in the direction of Jehovah. A MYTHIC HISTORY swerves around the TRUTH and misdirects faith, leading only to existential disappointment, shame, and consternation. In a proper reading of Scripture as Scripture (i.e., as covenantal history inviting us to discover the true God, our Creator, by exercising trust), our attention will not be absorbed in analysis and synthesis but will be THEORETICALLY DISENGAGED and DIFFUSE, with its "focus set on infinity" as it were – the most distant and comprehensive horizon possible. This is not to say that Scripture is not amenable to theoretical/scientific analysis, nor that its data are exempt from service to theoretic endeavors. But when we treat Scripture with such intentions we must refocus our attention "neater" in order to notice and distinguish details, and then abstract those isolates
in order to reintegrate them into some theoretical or hypothetical project. This sort of activity should not be deemed objectionable (so long as Scripture is not thereby imagined to be a textbook or compendium of scientific information), but such activity is not by any means religiously neutral, for it must itself assume some foundational ground of certitude precisely with respect to the kind of historic claims embedded in those scriptures. Clearly, this implies that not every such scientific engagement with Scripture will deliberately or self-consciously stand upon the solid truth properly derived from the fiducial focus on its historic veracity. This means that the analytic focus will have been set adrift from its proper anchorage in ordinary experience, to which every merely theoretic endeavor must necessarily return if a practical reintegration of the scientific insight attained is to be successful.

Covenantal History (Biblical narrative apprehended in its intended focus), to use other figures, constitutes the raw material that ought to fuel or the capital that ought to fund human life in every avenue. It supremely fits the created order, furnishing the key to interpret the cosmos and make it abundantly fruitful when the norms accordingly disclosed are obediently positivized into historic practice. The very ability to fructify and even compassionately heal this disrupted planet, also in our own time, is presumptive proof of its verity. The ultimate yield of an explanation of reality, such as a scripture claims to be, is the test or proof of its correctness, namely, life. This is what we require of a religious explanation of reality for its justification. It must be supremely productive or fruitful — it must bless and vivify, not just hypothetically "make sense" in sublime isolation from concrete experience.

But this kind of proof, by the nature of the case, is often only evident over the long run. Ultimately it requires some eschatological point of vindication signaling closure of the test. But this is inherently impossible for such short-lived entities as ourselves to attain. This poses an obvious existential dilemma. We cannot exceed the limits of our mortality in order to test our choice of a religious explanation to trust, yet we must.

The Biblical Explanation resolves this dilemma by passing or ascending through the horns in resurrectionary power. For the resurrection of Jesus Christ to new and indissoluble life from incontrovertible death is the most cogent proof imaginable for the specific claims he made about himself, and the most ironclad guarantee of his promise of agelong life for all who trust him.

But there's more. For the historic continuation of this same category of proof — signs and miracles, including prophecy — in answer to the prayer of trust, is the Divinely endorsed means of confirming and corroborating the proclamation of God's regime of creational restoration as solely authentic among any and all contenders for supremacy.

Roy Clouser, however, in his otherwise superlative introduction to Dooyeweerd's philosophical approach, seems to have erred in not grasping the peculiar structure of Biblical authority as true historical narrative with divine commentary. Consequently he also disparages, for instance, the acute relevance of the Genesis record of
the Deluge for the science of geology, and ascribes that sort of link to the influence of Protestant Fundamentalism with its "encyclopedic assumption" concerning the Bible's universal relevance to everything. He fails to notice that at least here, where the appeal of the fundamentalist argument is to the authoritative application of presumptively historical texts to historical geology, the tack is entirely apropos, and Fundamentalism has made perhaps its most luminous contribution to the advancement of science truly so-called, while lancing a virulent festering of doctrinaire ("it takes one to know one") scientism. It may be irritating to some Evangelicals to grant these despised "Galileans" (with apologies to Galileo) any credit whatever for a constructive engagement with modern science (perhaps since it would seem to reflect badly on their own respectability as Evangelicals all-too-recently liberated from an uncomfortable identification with their historic siblings). But it is the better part of humility to do so readily and gratefully, albeit with reservations.

Those reservations, it seems to me, should not extend to doubting the attachment of Biblical history to the historical underlayment of every scientific discipline, for here the adhesive sticks very well, and will prove itself capable of carrying much weight. Rather, we must adroitly distance ourselves from the fractious "literalism" — a Judaistic throwback, ironically — that mars its hermeneutic. For whereas a championing of the Biblical history as true may hide under the rubric of literalism, the converse is not valid. And without a careful distinction here, we are liable to throw out the Bible with the baptismal water.

There is one element of the fundamentalist doctrine of Scripture that will bear a skyscraper's worth of sound theorizing, and that is its championing of the HISTORICITY OF THE ENTIRE BIBLICAL NARRATIVE, including Genesis 1-11. They may be painfully faulty philosophers or embarrassingly flawed hermeneutists, but at this point they have surprised us all and will not be deprived of their share of laurels. Clouser has set up a straw man and to that degree vitiates his own argument.

I would hold that religious presuppositions, undergirding integral experience and abstract explanation alike, must be DEMONSTRATED or JUSTIFIED and communicated by OSTENSIVELY TRUE HISTORICAL NARRATIVES that document a DIACHRONIC RELATIONSHIP OF TRUTH between some alleged ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGN/ORIGIN OF ALL THINGS and HUMAN BEINGS. Such a COVENANTAL (or "PERSONAL") RELATIONSHIP is typical of ordinary experience and is to be strictly distinguished from an ABSTRACT-THEORETIC RELATION which bears a merely scientific character.

Such narratives are generally recognized as "religious" in character, e.g., besides the Bible, those included (to varying degrees) in the Pyramid Texts of Saqqara (ancient Egyptian), the Mahayana (including the famous Lotus Sutra; one of several major canons of Buddhism), the Vedas (Hinduism), the Tao Te Ching (Taoism), the Wu Ching (the I Ching being most famous; Confucianism), the Kojiki and Nihongi (Shintoism), the Siddhanta (Jainism), the Zend-Avesta (Zoroastrianism), the Qu'ran (Islam), the Popol Vuh (Maya), the Book of Mormon (Mormonism), the Book of Urantia (occultism), and the Divine Principle (of the Unification Church). Similarly, for such movements as Seventh-Day Adventism and Dispensationalism, supplementary narratives have proved decisive to reinterpret, in effect, an "insufficient" Bible. Such narratives are indispensable even to movements such as Freemasonry. In addition to these, the mythologies of the ancient world are often relegated to a category of generic "myth" that, as I noted, has come to be stretched beyond
propriety to cover all the above alike, without distinction, the argument being that they all possess a commonality of function in human consciousness and collective experience. Even the near-death experiences of some people, and the vaunted "previous lives" of others, along with arcane encounters with personages and entities during altered states of consciousness (all of these likely being demonic delusions allowed by God in accord with II Thess. 2:11-12 and I Tim. 4:1), may serve this function to some extent. Nietzsche's Thus Spake Zarathustra has unmistakably religious pretensions. Science fiction has often served a quasi-religious purpose, though more diffusely, for the advancement of scientism.

But the abiding requirement for verification of the character of the beings encountered in such pretheoretical stories introduces a discriminating factor to judge among the contending claimants to absolute[ness and] sovereignty. Thus the popular lumping together of all such narrative vehicles as "mythic" is both indiscriminate and prejudicial insofar as myth has traditionally been understood to denote literature conveying a fantastic and fabricated representation of cosmic origins or, more to the point, corrupt versions of primal cosmic and human history. This kind of literature is, on apostolic authority, explicitly contrasted with truth, and such contrastive usage would not have been quibbled over until the unflattering pretensions of deism, positivism, and their so-called historical-critical offspring appeared in modern times.

Nevertheless, although myth is not the generic category we seek, there is clearly a recognizable and functional similarity among such narratives within human cultures. Dooyeweerd speaks of the pistical (and James Olthuis of the confessional, certitudinal, or ultimacy) status of such religious scriptures. In any case, such stories and/or histories all make definite claims upon ultimate human trust. And they variously attempt to supply some ostensible account of the origin, nature, and destiny of the universe, including whatever prophetic promises and normative claims are to be made by the allegedly divine toward the merely human.

I hold that all such scriptures must lay themselves open, at least implicitly, to the necessity of vindicating the divine claimants and verifying their claims. Such contending must be played out on the grand scale and concrete stage of history (not here conceived of according to the canons of the aspectual and abstract special-science, but simply as the integral connection and progression of concrete events). It is on such a level that we can appreciate the eclipse of the ancient gods of bygone civilizations.

PART III: THE AUTHENTICATION OF RELIGIOUS ASSUMPTIONS

It may now be fairly easy to infer how even the seeming impasse of 'postmodernism' might be surmounted. The pluralism consequent upon the breakup of enlightenment (that is to say, rationalistic) foundationalism is a modern parallel to the ancient movement of skepticism following the fragmentation of monolithic Greek philosophical schools of thought by a vast escalation of vaporous, unverifiable speculation. The true solution for our time must be the very same as for theirs: the advent of a divinely miraculous Christianity with creature-healing power that supplants arbitrary speculation with arbitrating demonstration. This is the persuasive gift dropped in our laps by our gracious, living,
and only true God. In earlier times, a tyrannical state church establishment boasting a "consensus orthodoxy" did not need such divine intervention to prove a point. But even the vestige of such an institution in a 'postmodern' climate is not long for this earth; it's only running on fumes. The amenable shall inherit the earth, and God himself will fill those who humble themselves to keep petitioning for his Wholesome Spirit and the accompanying charismata. These are the earthly rights of those whom the Resurrected Covenant-Keeper, the last Adam, has counted as his friends and siblings because of their trust. These adopted sons of God, fellow-heirs of Christ's awarded inheritance, have temporal rights and privileges to enjoy even amid their sufferings. And this foretaste of the full vindication to come is quite enough to light up the way to agelong life within the milieu of our escalating pluralism of shadows and darks. One wonder is worth a whole wad of wise words.

Focusing on the issue of "religious proof" from another angle, we may ask once again how narrative "scriptures," which address us at a pretheoretical level, are validated. I do not propose to defend the Reformed solution to the problem, and I consider it sufficiently familiar to make a review unnecessary here. I wish, rather, to extend the implications of it to areas where it seems not to have been widely applied as yet. It would be amiss, however, regardless of personal sympathies and hesitancy to offend, if I did not point out that the lack of further application may be due to a perceived potential clash with a fiducial position of Calvinism dearly held, namely, that the Gospel does not need verification, corroboration, confirmation, validation, etc. But regardless of the conjectured reasons, or the possible confessional incompatibilities, I think the case is worthy of reconsideration from the standpoint of Dooyeweerd's achievement and needs to be reopened.

True Biblical religion is inefaceably a missionary religion because the Biblical God is not a part of his own created universe and therefore cannot be adequately known there, no matter how he is sought. Rather, Jehovah must find us somehow and then introduce himself and unveil his NAME and CHARACTERISTICS, verifying THIS REPUTATION all the while by awesome acts of NEO-CREATIVE POWER that alone could identify him as THE REAL CREATOR. His people, in turn, are to mirror him by disciplining one another into that same character and by manifesting it in all their earthly activities. Naturally welling up from God's character of love and compassion comes a strong component of reaching out to give, help, and serve. This movement should not stop short either of declaring the Explanation of conciliation with the Creator or of displaying his re-creative powers during these historic moments prior to his regeneration of the whole created universe.

But when we speak of God being "known by faith" we ought to be clearer about just what that means, since some treatments have spread a seemingly impenetrable cloud over the issue, as if such knowledge of God were ineffable. But Scripture remains clear that God is known by faith in the sense that when we exercise genuine faith, God "shows up"! He answers our prayers in often startling, historic ways. HE PROVES MUCH MORE THAN MERELY THAT HE EXISTS, HE DEMONSTRATES, BY ACTIONS THAT ONLY A GOD COULD PERFORM, WHAT HE IS LIKE; HE LEAVES TELLTALE SIGNS OF HIS IMAGE, HIS WHOLESALE CHARACTER — supremely his overcompensating JUSTICE, LOVINGKINDNESS, and covenantal TROTH — UPON HIS ACTIVITIES. This God has CHARACTER and BODY! That substantial character properly contextualizes the proofs and warrants he offers on his own behalf, both in Scripture and throughout history at large.
Thus God is "known by faith" in the sense that when we exert trust, he is pleased to 
MAKE HIMSELF KNOWN BY HISTORIC, CONCRETELY EXPERIENCED — and in principle 
EXPERIENCABLE — DEEDS. There is no mysticism here. Jehovah is a COVENANTAL 
God — one who makes and keeps PROMISES to the children of Adam, the sons of Noah, 
the seed of Abraham...the Son of David. The characteristic promise of the NEW 
COVENANT is the manifest empirical WITNESS of God’s Messianic Spirit. In Scripture, the 
knowledge of God via faith was not "mystical" but mediated by POWERFUL ACTS OF HIS 
LIBERATING SPIRIT IN THE CREATED ORDER, BOTH EVOKING AND EVOKE BY TRUST. 
The history of the unfolding explanation in the Bible carries its own convincing power to 
peoples now enormously diverged from the primal root stock of humanity surviving the 
Deluge. Yet that explanation is not to be characterized as "self-attesting," as Cornelius 
Van Til, following Calvin, habituated himself to affirm. NOTHING IN CREATION IS SELF-
ATTesting. Whatever is created is ipso facto MEANING and therefore RELATIVE, and hence an explanation concerning it necessitates CO-ATTESTATION (JOINT-testimony), COR-
ROBORATION (FURTHER-validation). God himself does not begrudge us this favor. 
I would affirm presuppositionalism/fideism in the sense that every theory, whether 
philosophically scientific (trans-modal and encyclopedic) or modally scientific, structurally 
demands ultimate assumptions that cannot be justified or demonstrated to be true by 
theoretic means (at the risk of being antinomic and self-defeating). But to insist, as 
presuppositionalists do, that such assumptions are not amenable to justification by any 
means is, backhandedly, to concede the exclusive prerogatives generally imputed to mere 
theoretic utterances (at the risk of being uncritically dogmatic). 

A more circumspect view would argue that no scientific methodology of whatever 
sort is sufficient even to discover, much less prove, the regularities of God’s own 
conduct or "behavior" with respect to his creation because of the inherent limitations of the 
theoretic — IT ONLY REFLECTS THE IMAGE OF THE ABSOLUTE ON A REDUCED AND 
RELATIVE SCALE. The so-called scientific method, rightly understood, is a stylized 
formalization of some key features of the INTEGRAL COVENANTAL RELATIONSHIP 
between God and his people - a relation we commonly [mis]label "personal," thus losing 
a grip on its cosmic nature and obscuring its full glory or meaning. 

But philosophy needs to be tackled first in order to dispel the notion — widely held 
even among us — that Scripture, to be ANALYZED at all, must be analyzed "SCIENTIFICALLY," that is to say, THEORETICALLY or ABSTRACTLY. That this latter is not 
the case is entailed in the arguments made by Roy Clouser in *The Myth of Religious 
Neutrality*. It is necessary to make this case very clearly — and Clouser has — before we 
draw some implications for historiography of antiquity. 

The explanations in Scripture, though perfectly rational and logical, are NOT 
ABSTRACT but CONCRETE or INTEGRAL. This means they are not SCIENTIFIC in the 
proper sense of that word. Moreover, they are not even HYPOTHETICAL at a 
COMMONSENSE level; they do not involve GUESSES or QUESTIONS that invite a search 
for ANSWERS or SOLUTIONS. Rather, Biblical EXPLANATIONS are addressed to the 
"QUESTIONS" raised by our INTEGRAL EXPERIENCE itself — DEITY, ORIGINS, PURPOSE, 
PERSONHOOD, LAWFULNESS, MEANING, SIN, JUSTIFICATION, EVIL, DEATH, 
ULTIMATE DESTINY, etc. — the "WHY" questions, not the "HOW" questions.
These questions do not necessarily demand high abstraction either to ask or to answer. But they do demand VERIFIABLE answers and so, contrary to Clouser's assertion, must require some satisfactory means of EVALUATION and LEGITIMATION. Granted, such a means cannot itself be scientific or it would be circular, self-defeating, question begging. And here classic fideism is vindicated against rationalistic evidentialism, for the latter has ever claimed for theoretical abstraction what it is helpless to supply – INTEGRAL PROOF sufficient to PERSUADE the human HEART (the comprehensive control-center of human nature) concerning the TRUE ANSWERS TO THOSE EXISTENTIAL QUESTIONS.

The PROOF furnished by Scripture, and which is clearly intended to be CORROBORATED ANALOGOUSLY in every subsequent generation and every geographic region, is that of God's COMPASSIONATE, LIFE-SAVING, CREATION-RESTORING, MIRACULOUS POWER (his identifying watermark) EXHIBITED IN HOLY SCRIPTURE FROM ONE END TO THE OTHER, AND SUPREMELY MANIFESTED IN THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS THE MESSIAH FROM PUBLICLY VERIFIED DEATH.

To conclude: on the concrete level of ordinary experience an immediate EVIDENTIAL means of proof is proper, while at the abstract level of theoretical thought a mediating PRESUPPOSITIONAL approach must supplement it.

PART IV: THE NARRATIVE ROOTS OF RELIGIOUS GROUND MOTIVES

Dooyeweerd accounts for the "inner" links between religion and theory in terms of "religious basic motives" and "transcendental basic ideas." Roy Clouser has provided a valuable service by reshaping the explanation of the latter in a very appealing and persuasive fashion, and with ample case studies to illustrate. However, I contend that he gives insufficient accounting for the nature and place of historical narratives per se, as well as their function in sacred scriptures generally, but within the Biblical scriptures particularly. It seems clear, even on a quick assessment, that whatever the Bible informs us about history just might have the authority to challenge whatever modern historical scholarship may boast about the same turf. Since many fields of scholarship have prominent historical components (e.g., Anthropology, Archaeology, Architecture, Art, Astronomy, Ethnology, Geography, Geology, Linguistics, Paleontology), there is clearly room for direct conflict. All of which raises the suspicion that there is more strategic territory interfacing Scripture and theory than transcendental ground ideas can or should mediate alone, certainly not until their own connection to historical truth is further accounted for. The further clarification required should not be taken to imply a repristination of Bible-prooftexting methods of anchoring our Christian philosophy. Dooyeweerd's grasp of the "inner connection" between the Explanation of God in Scripture and the theoretical task of science has proved properly liberating for scholarship, and we must not hanker for the bondage of "judaizing" externalities. It is indeed the very SPIRIT of our science – the FUNDAMENTAL MOTIVATION or GROUND MOTIVE, anchored as it is in the full redemptive storyline of the Gospel – that alone can stabilize the scholarly/scientific task and make it ever FRUITFUL OF GOOD by CONTINUOUS REPENTANCE and AMENABILITY TO INNER REFORMATION.
It may be instructive, therefore, to reflect on the way that basic motives display rootage in religious narrative traditions. Dooyeweerd’s explanation about the origin of Western basic motives (which invites, by analogy, some analysis of Oriental motives as well) reveals how all the non-Biblical motives were forged on the anvil of fundamentally religious conflict and syncretism. The ancient Greek motive of form/matter was generated in the struggle of the two prevalent Greek religions (the bastard offspring of their illicit union), the Roman Catholic motive of nature/grace and the Humanistic one of nature/freedom being further complications after Biblical religion entered the mix. All but the unadulterated Biblical motive of creation/fall/redemption through Jesus Christ in communion with the Holy Spirit were dialectical, intoxicating the cultural task so that it staggered drunk from side to side. But the fact remains that each of the elements in each of the dialectical formulas represents the summary of a distinct religious impulse that had historic roots in a traditional religion actually practiced by some human community. I maintain that each religion was nurtured on sacred texts (even though we may possess only fragments of some preserved) that relate often overpowering historic events in mythic or corrupted form.

There can be no doubt of their historic formative power, but the question of their historic validity is not thereby settled. Even so, here we have cases of culture-forming motives being distilled in some way from religious texts. In the case of Islam it seems clear, but no one can seriously doubt that even animistic religions are sustained without written records by dint of oral tradition, and these take the form of narratives. Missionaries and, following their lead, anthropologists have preserved many of these.

I say all this to suggest that although a two-word formula such as Dooyeweerd uses may serve to name a ground motive, it does not capture adequately enough the narrative essentials to clue us in on the extent to which living narrative traditions, when they are held religiously, can influence the inner direction of science in ways not hinted at when the whole broadside effect is stripped off for the sake of a convenient formula which can be wielded without that reminder.

Furthermore, the whole flowering of studies in Biblical narrative, narrative theology, and narrative ethics in recent decades has thrown light on the importance of narratives to human functioning at various levels. But although attempts have been made to come to grips with the new philosophical adjustments such an approach implies for the respective fields, I am aware of no approach comparable to Dooyeweerd’s achievement for meeting the need. Significantly, Dooyeweerd is emphatic that ground motives as such cannot be objects of theological science properly conceived, thus preserving their supra-scientific integrity against the invasion of incommensurable determinants of validity.

**PART V: THE CONUNDRUM—APPLYING SCIENTIFIC HISTORIOGRAPHY TO ANTIQUITY**

To affirm the full historicity of Scripture is not to treat it "fundamentalistically" as "a textbook for history," but simply to assert its TRUTH. For unlike other ways in which the modally qualifiable information in the Bible has been misused, it is no misuse to claim for its narratives an ACTUAL, HISTORICAL (which in current usage implies more than merely "REALISTIC") character. This can be seen when we scrutinize what the "historical"
nucleus of historiography entails. Modally qualified scientific historiography, after all, is not interested in the reconstruction of all past events, but selectively of those which contribute to elucidating the historical norms of cultural integration and societal differentiation along the line of unfolding progress. To be made a "textbook of history" would require that Biblical narratives be misconstrued as intending to reveal such a progress relating to the unfolding of histori-cultural norms. This, however, does not reflect (so far as I know) the purpose of those who have argued for the historicity of Biblical narratives. For the meaning of "historicity" in their context does not have (nor has it ever had) narrowly modal historical qualification. Therefore it has not had a scientifically historical objective serviceable to textbook-type elaboration.

We must add, to be candid, that this is said over many a fundamentalist protestation. For, traditionally, prominent Fundamentalists have often bought into the positivistic paradigm that deemed facts per se as "scientific." This error has persistently confused the discussion. And here is where Dooyeweerd's clarification of two uses of "rationality" (naive and theoretical) proves an immense boon. Thus a "fact" meant in the sense of the actuality of some historic occurrence is by no means yet "scientific." A scientific fact is one that is qualified by modal abstraction, theoretical conceptualization/contextualization, and susceptibility to probative access (in a sense much broader than any procrustean, natural-scientific reduction to experimental replication or mathematical ratiocination).

And how shall we account for the undeniable (and otherwise completely enigmatic) detailing in Biblical scriptures of the single chronological thread from Adam to the last Adam, Jesus the Messiah? This singular phenomenon betrays a teleological purpose in Biblical composition that sets it apart from all other ancient literature with no parallels whatever, and attests a suprahistorical intelligence both guiding its inscripturation and fulfilling its promises. So on the one hand, to be unwilling to put these Scriptures to the test of historiographic science is to have caved in gratuitously to the diverse but alike radical "historectomies" of Noth, von Rad, Barth, Bultmann, Mowinckel, Alt, Troeltsch, Gunkel, Wrede, Harnack, Wellhausen, Kähler, Keunen, Renan, Graf, Strauss, Feuerbach, Bauer, de Wette, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Eichhorn, Lessing, Semler, Kant, Hume, Reimarus, the Deists, Bayle, Simon, and Spinoza. Yet on the other hand, to be unwilling to measure the vaunted "objective," "neutral," and "unbiased" constructions of modern scientific and "critical" historians of antiquity against the suprascientific test of authentic Scripture is to have acquiesced in the conceits of partial and purblind scientism (for the offhand refusal to treat Biblical scriptures as containing concrete chronological evidence and reliable telltale clues for determining historical synchrony reeks of a self-interested boycott, a self-induced blindness that is culpable).

In the final analysis, to argue on the one hand that historiography is scientific, and thus a proper steward of theoretical proofs and justifications concerning abstract data that are modally qualified as historical, and on the other hand that it is ineradicably rooted in concrete events that are presupposed to be historic, but which it cannot possibly legitimize scientifically, is to risk appearing logically incoherent to a fatal degree in professional practice. Unless, that is, there exists another — an even more securely founded — method of vindicating those presupposed historical narratives that, being itself suprascientific, can bear the weight of the
WHOLE ENTERPRISE OF SCIENCE ALONG WITH COMMON HUMAN EXPERIENCE AND THEREBY PROVIDE A UNIFIED ROOT FOR HUMAN LIFE IN ITS ENTIRETY. Not to worry. As we have seen, God foresaw our need – created our nature – and has provided the requisite proofs which, though not "rational" in the medieval sense inherited from Greek apotheosis and transmitted uncritically through Anselm and Aquinas, are yet the more persuasive for what they reveal in excess of God’s mere "existence," namely, HIS CREATIONALLY REDEMPTIVE CHARACTER, FAITHFUL TO HIS HISTORICALLY UNVEILED COVENANTS PRESERVED IN ANCIENT PROPHETIC SCRIPTURES, ULTIMATELY FULFILLED AND CONFIRMED BY THE FULLY HISTORIC AND MIRACULOUS CAREER OF MESSIAH JESUS – CONCEPTION, BAPTISM, TEACHING, DEEDS, CONDEMNATION, CRUCIFIXION, BURIAL, RESURRECTION, AND ASCENSION - - IN TURN RESULTING IN HIS SENDING THE PROMISED GIFT OF THE NEW COVENANT, HIS OWN WHOLESOME SPIRIT OF POWER, TO IMMERSE AND FILL WHOEVER WILL TRUST HIM, SO THAT WE MIGHT HAVE A VITAL EXPECTATION AND WALK AS A LOYAL COMMUNITY IN THOSE SAME MIRACULOUS STEPS OF LOVE, THEREBY DRAWING A WATCHING WORLD TO ITS WAITING SAVIOR BEFORE HIS RETURN TO EARTH IN PUBLIC VICTORY AND JUDGMENT.  

Still, the insistent question intrudes, what actually happens when historiography turns its legitimate attention to early human records if perchance some of them contain information that challenges the hypothetical paradigm assumed by the researcher’s heuristic tools? What rightful epistemic claims can modern historiographic science and ancient historic chronicle make upon each other’s vital functions? If, indeed, they possess validity at different levels of operation since they are of different orders, and if, moreover, those levels are mutually related in some such manner as I have described, then how might a new discovery on one level affect knowledge on the other without disputing or jeopardizing their respective integrity?

PART VI: THE IMPENDING NEMESIS OF TRADITIONAL HISTORICAL CRITICISM

Having been primed as believers in Jesus Christ and his resurrection from the dead, please now indulge with me in a voyage of discovery into antiquity via the time machine of visualization.

Imagine that, having entered our Tardis, we are being conveyed back, back, back in time. Our target: the threshold of the 15th century B.C. Suddenly we hit a massive time warp. We know this because our retro-calibrator has been pre-synchronized with data from all the very best sources, with even a generous margin of variability embracing all the major alternative constructions, and with time to spare. Still, to our surprise, the Tardis materializes and shudders to a standstill atop a bluff overlooking a scene of carnage. On a hill nearby we recognize Moses, with
Aaron and Hur at his side holding up his hands as the Israelites inflict withering blows upon the Amalekite hordes who seem intent on entering a plague-devastated Egypt (who could have imagined it?) at the humiliating close of the Middle Kingdom, after Pharaoh Thom, according to an Egyptian record you call up on screen – as in "Pithom" or "Pi-Thom," meaning "the abode of Thom," the sister store-city to Ramses, according to Exodus, you just remember from Sunday School days – and his entire cavalry are drowned en masse in the midst of a bizarre natural catastrophe occurring in a large body of water. But that can’t be, you mumble to yourself, because it suggests that THESE "AMALEKITES" (of the Bible) ARE IDENTICAL WITH THE INFAMOUS "HYKSOS" (according to later Greek sources; the "AMU" of native Egyptian records)! You stagger momentarily as the implications of that sink in.

You doublecheck the programmed retro-calibrator log and recognize, against all professional expectations, that something must be terribly wrong. You advance the Tardis about forty years and engage the oscillating wiggle circuit to compensate for more possible variations in synchronisms during your macro-event search. Suddenly you lock on, as you hoped, to a decisive event that your professional training had led you to doubt by now. But yes! That is indeed Jericho, and there go those walls – the ones a tour guide once naively informed you were the very same as those mentioned in the Hebrew Scriptures. But surely this cannot be! For it would mean that since there was no Mycenaean pottery ever found at that level of the numerous excavations performed on the city, the entire Mycenaean civilization with all of its linked contemporaries have been logged much too early in your computer data file. You do something daring and actually readjust manually the temporal stabilizer so that it correlates with the old Bible Chronology backup you left in storage for a joke one time. This way the Tardis can float automatically from one major Biblical event to another according to its own internal clock.

You know what must come next but decide to retard the transfer function a bit to hover over the period of the Judges and check out an old question. Ah, so that’s the reason there is no reference to an Egyptian threat in the Book of Judges – that empire is still being oppressed by the Hyksos rulers...half a millennium later than your default data had metered it! Then that must mean – your heart is palpitating now – that THE EGYPTIAN NEW KINGDOM COMMENCES ABOUT THE SAME TIME AS SAUL’S REIGN. But that capsizes the unsinkable canon of Egypt’s absolute chronology; it’s unthinkable! Or is it? You flash ahead and realize what all this means for the Israelite monarchy, the divided kingdom, the exilic period, and more....

But you notice you’re running out of time much too quickly and suspect a leak in the auxiliary tanks you’ve had to switch on. You’re obliged to head back to the future – the end of the twentieth century...the threshold of the twenty-first.

IT LEAVES ONE BREATHLESS TO CONTEMPLATE THE RAMIFICATIONS OF SUCH AN EPOCH-MAKING DISCOVERY. NO ARCHAEOLOGICAL FIND IN THE WHOLE REALM OF ANCIENT MATERIAL CULTURE CAN HOLD A CANDLE TO THE NUCLEAR INCANDESCENCE YET TO BE BLAZED ABROAD BY THE FURTHER EXCAVATION OF THIS SINGLE FATEFUL ANACHRONISM IN MODERN ACADEMIC CULTURE.
This is no nostalgic rerun of Twilight Zone or Outer Limits. If we were to follow the sequence of concatenation begun with the above links, throughout the full length of Israelite history as recorded in Scripture without historical-critical adjustments of any sort, we would encounter a magnitude of synchronisms so gigantic and so cogent as to far outweigh all the correlations soberly imagined by the contending schools of modern explorers of antiquity to exist between ancient Israel and the rest of Mediterranean culture (which by common consent had been falsely calibrated to Egyptian standards, in contrast to the Mesopotamian axis, which by and large was correctly articulated with it). But in addition to unprecedented synchronizations of artifactual and textual remains (all the while collecting dust in adjacent rooms of museums!) is the startling convergence of evidence arising from the resultant vanishing of irresolvable anomalies afflicting excavation sites all over the Near East.

What I have started to play out here was discovered virtually by accident around 1940. It was painstakingly researched in quiet, often fragmentary consultation with eminent scholars of the period. One of them, Dr. Robert H. Pfeiffer, chairman of the Department of Semitic Languages and curator of the Semitic Museum at Harvard University, was kept abreast of its development throughout the decade of the '40s and candidly concluded (though even prejudicially to his own published positions) that the discoverer discloses immense erudition and extraordinary ingenuity. He writes well and documents all his statements with the original ancient sources....His conclusions are amazing, unheard of, revolutionary, sensational.

If his findings are accepted by historians, all present histories for the period before Alexander the Great...must be discarded, and completely rewritten. If [the author] is right, this volume is THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO THE INVESTIGATION OF ANCIENT TIMES EVER WRITTEN....I would like my students to read it, being convinced that only out of the discussion of opposite views may the truth, or an approximation thereto, be attained.

Hardly welcome words for most well-published professionals or eager-to-please young traditionalists aspiring to tenured chairs! Little wonder, then, that this staggering reorientation of chronology did not "take" or that conventional paradigms never shifted. But what's the long answer to why no scientific revolution transpired? Ensuing events showed that this paradigm, unlike virtually all of its predecessors, HAD INGENUOUSLY GONE FOR THE JUGULAR -- THE SACRED HISTORIES: UNIFORMITARIANISM AND GRADUAL EVOLUTION. It had dared to challenge the cherubim and seraphim hovering above the glory of Enlightenment Humanism, archangels that do its bidding. And there was war in the heavens. For once seriously entertain and soberly explore, for so much as a moment, even these two tiny assumptions taught in narrative Scripture as prima facie truth: THE VERITY OF HISTORICALLY WITNESSED CATACLYSM ON A PLANETARY SCALE, and THE EXTREME BREVITY OF HUMAN HISTORY ITSELF, and well-ensconced secularized scholarship along a wide, complacent front must experience frightful convulsions of its own, built as it is upon the sands of time immemorial and beyond calculation in recorded-history-friendly orders of magnitude. The dawning consciousness that such a past looms behind us must be resisted at all costs, even professional integrity (as events sadly proved out). Careers...nay, whole "religions" hang precariously in the balance. For IF IT DID HAPPEN, THEN IT CAN HAPPEN, THUS IT MIGHT HAPPEN AGAIN! Such an impending scenario has an aura of the Last Judgment about it.
This reconstruction was first published in 1946 in the form of 284 theses to get the new equations on public record if nothing more. But it was a mute herald. So when the first of what was then expected to be only two volumes of documentation finally appeared in 1952, only one major review was ever written by an authority in the field, and that a scathing and condescending one (in the N.Y. Herald Tribune!) by William Foxwell Albright, inaugurator of the dominant American tradition of Palestinian archaeology. None of his illustrious students, including George Ernest Wright, succeeding Pfeiffer eventually at Harvard; John Bright of Union Seminary in Virginia, who is perhaps best known for his much used A History of Israel; George E. Mendenhall, whose research into the nature of the so-called "Hittite" suzerainty treaties profoundly molded the scholarship of Meredith G. Kline, whose influence, in turn, has been great (and rightly so, I might add, despite the consequent anachronisms involved in assigning temporal priority to the extra-biblical treaty documents rather than to the Deuteronomic one) among conservative evangelical and Reformed scholars; along with David Noel Freedman and Frank Moore Cross; I repeat, none of these has given fair recognition, or scarcely a nod of public acknowledgement, that this carefully documented reconstruction even exists, much less that it might be worthy of professional attention. This remained so even when, as in the case of G. E. Wright, it could have multiplied the worthy influence of his much-hailed Old Testament theology by riveting its interpretive advances to a more sound comparative chronology, thus insuring against its subsequent undermining by the turbid effluent of raging criticism. But they felt no need, they were not desperate enough, their paradigm did not seem sufficiently threatened. Conventional standpoints weren't exactly falling like Assyrians before the heavenly blast!

All that has changed now...in principle. With the publication in 1974 of Thomas L. Thompson's The Historicity of the Patriarchal Narratives: The Quest for the Historical Abraham and in 1975 of John Van Seters' Abraham in History and Tradition the tide started to turn decisively and irreversibly against the Albright school, and now the shoe is on the other foot! Or as a professor of mine once observed with doleful resignation, "Thompson has set biblical studies back fifty years." What he meant by that remark has become increasingly clear to me, although I am more sanguine, even heartened, by the disORIENTation: one reigning version of ancient Israel's historic milieu has now been stripped of its alleged synchronic warrants, displayed by its many followers like so many talismans against the predatory advances of the more virulent, German form of the "Chronic Virus" harbored by the heirs of Albrecht Alt and Martin Noth. Yet the latter version of Israel's Near Eastern histori-chronic surroundings assumes a relative chronology linking Biblical Israel with her Mediterranean neighbors that is VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL with the former, now rapidly deconstructing, model. It is exactly their common assumption that has been challenged forthrightly by the above discovery. It calls into question every "assured result" of BOTH these camps of historical criticism pitched on ill-founded synchrony – an issue absolutely pivotal to ancient historiography as NONE other. For against an archaeological backdrop of sparse, fragile, and even "cooked" data establishing cultural co-existence, even if faith in Israel's God does not seem jeopardized at first, yet the reliability of Israel's Scriptures will seem rotten to the marrow, and its miraculous historic warrants get turned to mush along with any lingering reputation of narrative honesty and good judgment about its representation of national achievements and Near Eastern context. This is serious.
But Thompson's and Van Seters' volleys were only the first big ones in English to destabilize parity with the more conservative (but no more correct) chronology of Albright's school. Others quickly followed, notably, Norman Gottwald's *The Tribes of Yahweh. A Sociology of the Religion of Liberated Israel, 1250-1050 B.C.E.* Since then, a syndrome of more advanced stages of this degenerative process has become widespread, pervading herds of additional scholars to varying degrees and somewhat idiosyncratically, most notably George W. Ramsey, J. Maxwell Miller, Niels Peter Lemche, Gösta W. Ahlström, Richard Elliott Friedman, Robert and Mary Coote, Philip R. Davies, Marc Zvi Brettler, and Keith W. Whitelam. But what's the upshot? Could it mean that a more generalized vertigo has set in, induced by quaking religious ground motives (reflecting, as they must, communally-agreed-on, ostensibly historical assurances even about how complicated organisms — such as ourselves for instance — might credibly have originated on this globe)? If so, the time is ripe to reintroduce the discovery we began to visualize moments ago. It already has a small but significant following in both the U.S. and Britain, while the intervening years have tallied up important new advances. Nor had its pioneer been idle in the meantime. He finally amassed enough new documentation to expand the second volume to four. The last in the series was published second, then came the penultimate, although we yet again await publication of the two intervening titles announced earlier.

More likely than religious vertigo and mass repentance, however, would be the continued indiscreet celebration and triumphalistic retrenchment of the remaining party *vis a vis* its only widespread competitor, now a virtually defeated foe gingerly backpedaling to avoid yet other landmines visibly surfacing all around. This bespeaks a further, though necessarily short-lived, radicalization of the radicals — prelude to their own pet theories likewise unraveling before their eyes? Yet it is too early to carve the epitaph for old-fashioned historical criticism, although conservative scholars have been known to announce its demise prematurely.

On the other hand, the actual defection of a German critical scholar, Eta Linnemann, from lifelong Bultmannian to Evangelical, and the publication of her subsequent mature fruits of repentance in both German and English, may be another sign of things to come. Let us pray there is enough repentance to go around, or that by some miracle this commodity may be multiplied, lest the dose of calamity be doubled. For since no mainstream scholar seems even faintly to have suspected that the beckoning antidote to the crisis of Biblical authority precipitated by *ennui* in ancient history lies "simply" in a *relative* chronological shift of *over half a millennium* between two massifs of Near Eastern civilizations erroneously assumed to be contemporaneous, every established scholar and every dominant school of ancient historiography without exception has been played the fool. This unveiling will expose the secret heart-direction of many. The logical presumption that encouraged the onset of New Testament criticism, such as we have seen in the "Jesus Seminar" of recent fame (which might aptly be redubbed the "Judas Seminar" for all its loyalty to Truth), was the seeming success of Old Testament documentary criticism and its offspring, parasitically living off the crisis of Biblical plausibility brought on by widespread gullibility regarding (and virtual canonization of) dynastic Egypt's priestly claims to superior antiquity. But the psychical presumptuousness of scholars exploiting a perceived, though totally illusory, weakness in Scripture reveals a prior fiducial disloyalty that is damning.
CONCLUSION

Although it is almost irresistibly to gloat over the delectable irony that an overbearing historical criticism has been poignantly convicted, at last, of being historically uncritical itself—and to an aggravated degree—we must be chagrined by the unsettling realization that self-confessed Bible-believing scholarship likewise collaborated in that preposterous fabrication, that compromising adulteration. We must not, as an evangelical/Reformed community, let this embarrassing episode pass unexamined, for it is rich in wisdom, full of light, and will repay extended scrutiny for generations to come.

If Christian historians equipped to investigate Immanuel Velikovsky’s sober, if shocking, claims keep aloof from doing so, despite learning of their existence and faith-bolstering potential (for many who might otherwise fall for the bait of a science insufficiently self-critical of its requisite substructure and hence “falsely so called”), they court God’s personal judgment in their professional life. Forewarned is forearmed. Hard-heartedness and stubborn pride have rebuffed God’s gracious attempts to bless Christian scholars of earlier generations. If we are ever to break free of sharpening our analytic tools—some would taunt, “grinding your ax”—at Philistine grinding stones, THE TIME IS NOW, AND WITHOUT DELAY. Ancient history is but one tiny field in the vast concourse of creation, but let us faithfully plow it if it is beneath our feet. To somehow blithely expect that any plodding science will soon enough catch up with its scientifically revolutionary vanguard, like the tortoise to the hare, without personal commitment, sacrifice, and suffering to overcome the inertia of a widely recognized faith-oppressing old paradigm, is to acquiesce in the conceit of the neutrality postulate—a shroud that masks religious incompatibilities which might embarrass professional ambitions—in hopes of a relatively peaceful livelihood. This is, at best, indolence; at worst, treason against the King. I beg a reconsideration from all who may be so inclined. For a Christian scholar must occasionally take up unaccustomed arms in defense of a rare truth bound to win only ill-favor and scorn from colleagues. As Herman Dooyeweerd counseled:

[It is...obvious that those interested in the Christian foundation of [their] thought should not be concerned with personal success, which is after all of no value. Rather they should be willing to carry on a long and difficult labour, firmly believing that something permanent can be achieved with respect to the [realization] of the idea concerning an inner reformation of philosophy.

For, as a matter of fact, the precarious and changing opinion of our fellow-men is not even comparable with the inner happiness and peace that accompanies scientific labour when it is based upon Christ, Who is the Way, the Truth and the Life!]

The upshot of the foregoing exposé is not that we can one day dispense with all historical-critical methods, however. A dismissive attitude of this sort ill comports with the status of the historical dimension of our concrete human experience. In light of the solid progress made in the Reformational tradition toward elaborating an authentic philosophy “in accord with Christ,” we must expect to have to renovate historical-critical methodology from the bottom up before it can be a faithful steward to the honest science of historiography instead of a craven mistress to swaggering ideology. This will mean ejecting the antiquated chronological operating system and installing the new. As should be clear, a mere slow
buildup of new data in sedimentary fashion can no longer boast plausibility, for the true history of science is no more uniformitarian than the true history of the earth. This predictably entails a wholesale collapse of gigantic strata of spurious inferences and the reorganization of entire disciplines. For to be used fairly, the blade of historical criticism must be turned critically upon every historical discipline without exception and without partiality. This means reversing the debasing exhibition of spinning the gold of Biblical narrative into the straw of "critical history," mercifully calling a halt to an exercise in futility. It means vanquishing a long-standing paradigm-and-variations ramified throughout academia.

The failure of "conservative" attempts to wield this instrument non-destructively upon the Bible has been largely due to a faulty grip of wishful thinking and good intentions. Whereas we should ourselves have held the scalpel by the steady fingers of a deep critical historiography, instead we let it slip into the claws of a superficial dogmatic "hagiography." In the debates over a critical history we have been caught up in tight little eddies over "infallibility" that whirl around idly far above the primordial tectonic plates of comparative chronology that in the meantime have built up enough pressure to shift catastrophically. We have graciously been granted a brief reprieve; let us act expeditiously while the opportunity is ripe. For the mission herein defended — to replot more credibly and verifiably the authentic synchronous timeline for antiquity on the assumption that the Biblical narrative is historically trustworthy — was never actually aborted, just postponed until the reigning options play themselves to exhaustion or nausea. For only then can the radically amended coordinates conscientiously surveyed by Velikovsky be more widely recognized for what they are: the key to unlock the floodgates to abundant new evidence (although there all along) cascading "as if out of a horn of plenty" to attest the genuine sequence and correlation of ancient coeval civilizations.

If the coming scientific revolution of ancient historiography is to be moderately peaceful, we ourselves must learn to be the peacemakers, steeling ourselves to absorb many nasty blows and planning around pockets of resistance, using them as foils to further correct our revised model of the ancient past (instead of deftly papering over the irregularities and gaping chasms resulting from conventional gross anachronisms — the conservative reflex). This done, the coming liberation of ancient history cannot be long delayed, any more than the liberation of Eastern Europe could. For this NEW PARADIGM heralds a JUBILEE. There's a level playing field once again...and it's under new management. Truth will out.

Santayana's rueful epigram — those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat it — would be a fitting punctuation, yet I must give the last word to another. Kenneth W. Hermann wrote already ten years ago:

What was needed, and is still needed, to secure the integrity of God's claim on the whole of life, including our deepened investigation of reality, and maintain communication with the Secularists, is a comprehensive Christian world view and philosophy of science forthrightly anchored in our commitment to Jesus Christ, Who holds all things together. Such articulation would: clarify the paradigm-dependency of all 'scientific' terms; challenge the Secularists to probe their paradigms for their orienting faith commitments; maintain the integrity of God’s people in the special sciences by abandoning the search for ultimate unity with Secular paradigms; and, establish greater cultural freedom for alternative paradigms in the 'scientific' establishment. Such an approach would itself be a powerful apologetic, and would at least have the potential of Christians being recognized and respected rather than patronizingly ignored, as is so often the case at present.
SUMMARY THESES

I. Epistemology ought to distinguish ordinary experiential thinking from theoretical thought and account for the relative legitimacy of their respective knowledge claims.

II. Narrative literature comports with the concreteness of ordinary experience.

III. The qualification of narrative as "historical" implies a truth value above and beyond the ascription "mythic" or "mythical" that makes fiducial claims upon us (and not merely aesthetic/hermeneutical or moral/ethical ones).

IV. The narrative contained in the Biblical scriptures is true, non-mythical, historical.

V. The miraculous power of God chronicled in the Bible establishes the universal, unconditional validity of its didactic and chronological elements as well.

VI. The unconditionally true sacred history in the Bible entails the unconditionally true deity of Jehovah, and vice versa.

VII. Religious basic motives originate in and correlate with sacred histories and should be formulated so as to summarize their protological and teleological/futurological/eschatological thrust.

VIII. Transcendental basic ideas (concerning the coherence of reality's diversity-in-unity, the central reference-point of the human activity of thinking, and the absolute Origin of reality) are rooted (via religious basic motives) in sacred histories (or their surrogates).

IX. Every science (German, Wissenschaft; Dutch, wetenschap) must assume some transcendental basic idea.

X. Historiography, as the science of the histori-cultural aspect of reality, must also make such assumptions; hence every scientific historiography is indissolubly bound to some non-scientific sacred (or functionally equivalent) history for its structurally necessary foundation.
XI. Every such assumption ought to be kept open to further investigation and possible revision in light of a better understanding of normative Scripture, but it cannot actually be suspended so long as it remains the relatively stable, de facto religious motive of the scholar/scientist; duplicity (from dialectical motives) leads to motivational confusion and logical incoherence.

XII. A religious basic motive is the critic of every competing one and must reinterpret (dismantle, "demythologize," "deconstruct") its competitor's corresponding sacred history (including chronology) and warrants according to its own alleged superiority.

XIII. Thus far, prevailing schools of historiography concerned with the ancient Near East have equally been under the thrall of a sacred absolute chronology supplied by the late Egyptian priestly tradition of Manetho.  

XIV. Traditional historical criticism of the Bible uncritically assumes this dynastic Egyptian priestly chronology as the ostensibly critical standard by which the Bible's priestly chronology is to be judged.

XV. The Bible's miraculously attested and analogously confirmed authority as real history should give us pause before allowing any competing chronology to dispute Jehovah's veracity; moreover, it gives us the assured presumptive leverage to turn the tables and radically critique the received Egyptian sacred chronology.

XVI. The past 20 years herald a new stage in the radicalization of historical critics, if not the very eclipse of historical criticism (which did, after all, assume some historic events to underlie Biblical narratives) by a wildly freewheeling new historiography of the Levant as a whole (untethered from the albatross of having to pay respects to the Bible's historicity as being even intentional, much less integral, to its purpose) whose tone is yet more strident and triumphalistic. Speculative rewrites of the origins and history of ancient Israel have multiplied like the frogs of Egypt, imagining they have exploded the Bible's historicity all to sherds. But by performing mayhem on Scripture they have impugned the living God, and he will avenge.

XVII. Affirming that catastrophes on a planetary scale occurred within historic times accords with the sort of conclusions that can be drawn from the most natural, ordinary reading of Scripture. Such agreement must ipso facto reflect favorably also on the Bible's prophetic predictions, INCLUDING THE DESTINY OF ALL WHO REJECT GOD'S CRUCIFIED/RESURRECTED MESSIAH. This is the standing offence of the proclamation of God's
kingdom. It must topple and overcome all assailants or be wrestled to the mat by them; no compromise exists. \textit{UNCONDITIONAL EXISTENCE IS THE STATUS OF GOD; UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER ARE HIS TERMS.}

XVIII. The imperial, even imperious, might of Enlightenment Humanism behind the agency of historical criticism has at long last met its match. Truth has finally called its bluff; Wisdom calls from the gates: "The emperor has no clothes!"

XIX. Science under the tyranny of Western Humanism must tremble before the judgments of Jehovah and his son Jesus, anointed for our salvation. A science that lies helpless to assist the further ascent of mankind against the audacity of a veritable Creator who is still working miracles of salvation seems hardly worth the trouble of hiding one's presuppositions behind. Half the sport involved in belittling its challengers (such as creationists) lies in exploiting the legal indemnity courts can bestow to pass off favored ("politically correct") dogma as religiously neutral science.

XX. A grand historic challenge lying before Reformational Christian scholarship on the threshold of the 21st century \textit{anno Domini} is to become a peaceful harbor for the imperiled elaboration and scholarly fine-tuning of the correct synchronic structure of ancient history first [re]discovered by Immanuel Velikovsky (1895-1979) during the Second World War. We should offer a receptive matrix for this scarcely aborted embryonic conception, then nurture the foundling to full health within the household of Christ the Messiah, lest it fester into an embittered foe of our baptized compromise with Egyptian priestcraft and denounce not only this self-destructive traditional syncretism, but by association impugn the glory of the central, redemptive message of Scripture as well.\textsuperscript{76}

XXI. Our duty is clear; we must dare to take in this war orphan of Jewish parentage or risk betraying the heavenly birthright of our own Reformational movement as it applies to the field of ancient historiography, decisive as that is for Biblical studies and hence for the faithful integrity of generations to come.
NOTES

1. By the term "Reformational," throughout this paper, I refer to the neo-Calvinistic tradition in the wake of Abraham Kuyper, as distinguished from the Reformed or Calvinistic heritage more broadly regarded.

I am singularly grateful for the Lord's use of John Wimber's "Further Reflection," notably points #1 and #2 (see Appendix, below), at the conclusion of the 1990 Vineyard conferences notebook What Is the Holy Spirit Saying to the Church Today? (Anaheim, California: Mercy Publishing, 1990), pp. 136-38; it was the trigger that catapulted me headlong into "treasures old and new" that can only be addressed very summarily in a 40 minute workshop paper. For the following very schematic presentation and oft digressive notes I beg the indulgence of my fellow workshop participants; from you I will expect the grinding and polishing of this lens to clarify the viewpoint! Various typographic emphases have been employed to aid oral presentation. They have been retained in this tentative draft as a hermeneutical aid to the reader.

2. A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, I (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1953), v. Thereby Dooyeweerd was enabled to vanquish in principle the pernicious though perennial polarizations of realism vs. idealism, objectivism vs. subjectivism, noumena vs. phenomena, and (in a certain sense) a priori vs. a posteriori. The acute need for a study of Dooyeweerd's early philosophical development, long-awaited, has been amply and ably supplied by a recent dissertation from the Free University of Amsterdam, R. D. Henderson, Illuminating Law: The Construction of Herman Dooyeweerd's Philosophy 1918-1928 (1994). In this context, especially the fascinating fourth chapter, "Epistemology," pp. 88-117, by showing Dooyeweerd communicating "in other words" (the earlier temporary, and admittedly sometimes shaky, scaffolding for his monumental systematic construction) has enhanced my grasp and appreciation of his final sturdy theory of knowledge (see also note 30, below). I am indebted to it for new insights and bridging terminology in Part I. Available in Canada from the Herman Dooyeweerd Centre for Christian Philosophy, Redeemer College, 777 Highway 53 East, Ancaster, Ontario L9K 1J4 — (905) 648-2131; FAX (905) 648-2134; in the U.S., Dordt College Bookstore, Sioux Center, Iowa 51250, or Hearts and Minds (bookstore), 234 E. Main, Dallastown, Pennsylvania 17313.

3. New Critique, I, ..."[I]n the naive attitude of experience, our logical function of thought, so far as its intentional content is concerned, remains entirely accommodated to the continuous coherence of cosmic time. In this respect, our logical function, like all other functions of consciousness, remains completely within this coherence." (P. 41.)

"...In the total structure of naive experience, the logical aspect is joined with the non-logical aspects in an indissoluble coherence." (P. 42.)

"Through the subject-object-relation we consequently experience reality in the total and integral coherence of all its aspects, as this is given within the temporal horizon of human experience. Naive experience leaves the typical total structures of this reality intact.

"The antithetic relation of the theoretical attitude of thought, on the contrary, sets reality apart in the diversity of its modal aspects." (P. 43.)

Anyone who is familiar with the justly famous lecture "Scientific and Pre-Scientific" by H. Evan Runner, in The Relation of the Bible to Learning, 5th, rev. ed. (Jordan Station, Ontario: Paideia Press, 1982 [1960, 1967, 1970, 1973]), pp. 113-57, will know how greatly indebted is my treatment of the subject to his elucidation. I must also acknowledge my friend, Bob Hazen, who sensitized me to the desirability of replacing "pre-scientific" with "supra-scientific" for my purposes. Runner, of course, was self-consciously playing off the positivistic use of the term against a proper appreciation of NON-scientific experience.

4. New Critique, II, 52, 307. See also note 52, below.

5. John Sailhamer develops a steel-trap case for pursuing historicity all the way back to Genesis 1-2, in "Literal, Figurative, or Something Else?" Appendix 1 in Genesis Unbound: A Provocative New Look at the Creation Account (Sisters, Ore.: Multnomah Books, 1996). He dubbs Genesis 1-2 "mega-history": a revealed "history of creation in literal and realistic narratives" (p. 245), denying it the dubious status of poetry, myth, or "meta-history."
6. This adjective seems to me preferable to Dooyeweerd's own transliteral adaptation of the Greek, *pistis* (trust, faith, belief) into "pistical" to refer to this increated human faculty; "fiduciary," as proposed by Roy Clouser in The Myth of Religious Neutrality, pp. 207-8 (see note 17, below), seems too fraught with economic or financial overtones. Concerning fiduciology — from the Latin *fiducia* (trust, faith) — as designating the science devoted to the study of this modal function, see end of note 16, as well as note 27, below.


C. S. Lewis, on the other hand, for instance, was inclined to speak of myth as did his literary contemporaries. Shaw may well be reflecting this tradition, which suffers the hazard of mistaking the figurative (grand stories whose "patterns of events" grip the human spirit and imagination) for the literal (ancient stories about the behavior of entities taken to be gods, some of which may well reflect strange historical events of impressive magnitude). See the preface to C. S. Lewis, *George MacDonald: An Anthology* (New York: Macmillan, 1947), pp. 14-17. Yet Lewis was intimately familiar with the varieties of genre. His retort to a typical allegation by one school that "The Fourth Gospel is...a 'spiritual romance', 'a poem not a history', to be judged by the same canons as Nathan's parable, *Paradise Lost* or, more exactly, *Pilgrim's Progress*," was: "I have been reading poems, romances, vision-literature, legends, myths all my life. I know what they are like. I know that not one of them is like this. Of this text there are only two possible views. Either this is reportage...pretty close up to the facts....Or else, some unknown writer...without known predecessors or successors, suddenly anticipated the whole technique of modern, novelistic, realistic narrative. If it is untrue, it must be narrative of that kind. The reader who doesn't see this has simply not learned to read. I would recommend him to read Auerbach" (see note 44, below). C. S. Lewis, "Modern Theology and Biblical Criticism," in *Christian Reflections*, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967), pp. 154-55. Elsewhere Lewis observes, "In the enjoyment of a great myth we come nearest to EXPERIENCING AS A CONCRETE what can otherwise be UNDERSTOOD ONLY AS AN ABSTRACTION....[W]hat you were tasting turns out to be a UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE. The moment we state this PRINCIPLE, we are admittedly back in the world of ABSTRACTION. It is only while receiving the myth as a STORY that you EXPERIENCE THE PRINCIPLE CONCRETELY....It is not...ABSTRACT; nor is it, like DIRECT EXPERIENCE, bound to THE PARTICULAR" (bold and capitalized emphases mine), "Myth Became Fact," in *God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics*, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970), p. 66. See parts II and IV of this paper, especially note 45, below. Nevertheless, I would agree with Dooyeweerd that the label 'myth' simply does not adequately or accurately cover the cargo. He grasped the pistical or fiducial function of myth to convey truth, yet insisted it remained "misunderstood," a "mystification."


10. This form of the divine name seems to me preferable to its common modern transliteration ‘Jehovah’, not only because the latter can claim no more authenticity for its vowelization than the former (although less a fabrication), but primarily because ‘Jehovah’ retains its analogy with ‘Jesus’; it is artificial to single out the divine name for transliteration when we do this for no other Hebrew names, especially when the intended identity with
Jesus is thereby obscured.


12. The centrality of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ from among the dead is yet but barely felt by the generality of Western Christianity, both Roman and Protestant. One of the most eloquent and persistent voices arguing for the systematic (both experiential and "theological") re-centering of Christianity on Christ's resurrection is Alexander LaBrecque, editor of Evangelica (P.O. Box 61222, Pasadena, CA 91106, U.S.A.). See, e.g., his resounding treatments of it in the issues entitled "No Other Foundation," 7/1 [January 1986], "Atonement Theories and the Reality of the Gospel," 7/2 [September 1986], and "The Cross in Perspective," 7/4 [Fall 1987], besides a host of briefer specialized treatments in Evangelica Profile over the last ten years. (Their powerful journalistic precursor was Robert D. Brinsmead's special issue of The Christian Verdict entitled "A Theology of the Resurrection," Special Issue 2 (1984), as well as its many regular issues throughout 1983 and 1984. See end of note 44, below. Most regrettable, historically critical (to be taken up later in this paper), which Brinsmead absorbed too uncritically from many of the recent theological authors who have otherwise helpfully exposed the historical backgrounds of the New Testament era, slowly exerted a corrupting influence on his understanding; like termites, over time these assumptions precipitated a fiducial collapse of Brinsmead's respect for the Bible's historicity and hence, eventually, even for the valid results of these, his own earlier groundbreaking popular syntheses.) LaBrecque's definitive dissertation from the University of Sheffield, The Resurrection Faith: Paul's Somatic Soteriology Apart from the Circumcision Controversy (1995) -- a highly original and provocative study demonstrating "how Paul's view of salvation and humanity grows out of the reality of Christ's resurrection" by focusing on "what Paul's gospel looks like when he is not engaged in the first-century controversy over Judaizing" - - might well trigger an avalanche of re-examinations of tradition, in turn stirring up fresh motivation for scholarly and societal reformation. See also Cheon-Seol Han's dissertation of the same year, Raised for Our Justification: An Investigation on the Significance of the Resurrection of Christ within the Theological Structure of Paul's Message (Kampen: Kok, 1995), from the Theological University in Kampen, the Netherlands.


It is with considerable disappointment, therefore, that I must draw attention to the virtual silence
concerning the systematic significance of Christ's resurrection in the only basic textbook of Reformational theology yet to appear in English, Gordon Spykman's Reformational Theology: A New Paradigm for Doing Dogmatics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992). It appears neither in the highly ramified table of Contents, nor in the Index of Subjects (!). Far from any central role, the only noticeable treatment of Christ's resurrection is in a couple of paragraphs toward the end of the sub-sub-section on "The Resurrection Life," centrally devoted to the future general resurrection, at the very end of a book of nearly 600 pages. BUT THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS CHRIST FROM A CONFIRMED PUBLIC DEATH ON A CROSS IS THE INCANDESCENT CENTERPIECE OF THE GOSPEL OF THE KINGDOM. Therefore such systematic handling of it can only be regarded as hiding the Light under a bushel basket of merely important (and even very important) fiducial essentials. Such disproportionate thematic development is tantamount to damning by faint praise. Spykman is by no means alone in this; it is a prevailing sin. But it could well retard the spread of distinctly Reformational cultural vision, both experientially and theoretically, if not redressed. This moment in history, as no other, will require the full horsepower of God's kingdom proclamation to propel the weighty riches of this heritage before the consciousness of fellow believers outside; at present, the energy of Christ's resurrection is barely idling as a mere assumption instead of being unleashed in a thunderous explosion of resurrectionary proclamation. Enthusiastic embracing of the fuller significance of Christ's resurrection could signal a dramatic alteration of the "slow assimilation" model of church growth and yet dawn a new day for the forward march of a fully equipped Christian mind. Without a rapid refocus it is just possible that the reformation to come -- the "second Reformation" -- might even bypass the Reformational movement of neo-Calvinism; that would be a tragic irony indeed. But the recipients of earlier historic blessings can claim no guarantee that their spiritual heirs will not harden up against "embracing further light" in view of the ever-unsettling inevitability that "the Lord hath more truth and light yet to break forth out of His Holy Word" as pastor John Robinson confidently prophesied to the Pilgrims departing Holland for the New World in 1620.

13. A most original work of scholarship on the history and problematics of "cessationism" (the teaching that divine miracles and their rationale ceased after the apostolic era), which may well stand as a watershed treatment for years to come, is William DeArteaga, Quenching the Spirit: Discover the REAL Spirit Behind the Charismatic Controversy (Orlando, Florida: Creation House, 1996 [1st ed., 1992]), a refreshingly judicious tour of historical theology. DeArteaga argues the importance of an "experience hermeneutic": "a cycle of verification between the Bible and experience. Current experiences in the miraculous verify biblical accounts of miracles, and biblical accounts of the miraculous feed expectancy for miracles" (p. 81; emphasis mine). He proceeds to urge the vital importance of experiencing analogous miraculous events in our own day in order to verify the Biblically attested ones, lacking which, all "rational" defenses are limply hypothetical, mere gossamer in the gale (all emphases mine):

Protestants settled for what might be called a cessationist hermeneutic; they said miracles happened in biblical times, but those miracles can only be verified by the faith in the biblical records, not present-day experiences. This avoided the myth-making of Catholicism...but at a terrible cost. Cessationism robbed Protestants of an important means of biblical verification: analogous spiritual events. Protestant theologians expected the public to believe every miraculous event in the Bible but to reject any present-day evidence for the miraculous as false. This is counter-analogous. It is contrary to the way people normally think, which is from the known to the unknown, and from partial knowledge to fuller knowledge. [P. 88.]

...A known healing in the present verifies by analogy an unknown healing in the past. It is all based on analogous verification between events in the past and the present. That type of encouragement and verification is impossible when either biblical events or miracles of the early church are interpreted with the cessationist hermeneutic. Just how damaging the cessationist hermeneutic has been to Christendom will be discussed next. [P. 89.]

The doctrine of cessationism had tragic consequences that are only now coming to light, the most serious of which was the decline and fall of Protestantism in Northern Europe. This happened as the Reformed churches attempted to maintain their faithfulness to the gospel but denied the need for spiritual experiences or miraculous acts (such as healing), even though these were intrinsic to biblical spirituality. Reformed Protestantism eventually became a ghost-like faith because of the lack of support from any
In the course of two centuries liberal theology ran its tragic course of attempting to save the gospel by accommodating to the assumptions of the Enlightenment and became instead a destroyer of biblical faith. Without belief in the miracle accounts in Scripture, the claims of Jesus as Son of God could not be upheld. Yet the New Testament miracles of Jesus were difficult to accept without the analogies of present-day miracles.

Gordon’s *Ministry of Healing* ended with prophetic insight. Gordon argued that if the healing revival was ignored, the liberal theologians would continue to gain ascendancy and evangelical Christianity would be placed in severe jeopardy. Gordon understood that the long-standing separation between the Bible and experience brought on by radical cessationism was on the verge of overwhelming the mainline denominations as it had in the old Congregationalist church which produced Unitarianism.

By rejecting the Faith-Cure movement the mainline churches cut themselves off from the analogous evidence that could verify the biblical witness. As A. J. Gordon had prophesied, the mainline churches slid into deeper levels of apostasy in the form of liberalism and demythologizing (discrediting the miracles of Jesus and the apostles).

Presenting the "argument from DESIGN" may pass for seemingly adequate verification...until you've been proffered a demonstration of REGENERATION! For a careful study of the link between cessationism and the decline of Protestantism, DeArteaga refers his readers to Ernst Keller and Marie-Luise Keller, *Miracles in Dispute: A Continuing Debate*, trans. Margaret Kohl (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969). Sad to say, it was invariably "consensus orthodoxy" (as DeArteaga terms it), that quenched the work of the Holy Spirit during times of reviving or awakening, and not the nettling abuses and extremes which will want to tag along. For even the apostles had to face these wherever they brought to earth the veritable power of the kingdom of heaven; that's simply a housekeeping chore of all actively discerning pastors who aren't shirking their divine duties! Charles Chauncy (pastor of the leading orthodox congregation in New England but, eventually, leader of the Unitarian movement in the colonies) for the first Great Awakening, James Monroe Buckley (editor of the pre-eminent Methodist journal, *The Christian Advocate*) and Benjamin B. Warfield (Princeton theologian and author of the "crown work" of cessationism, *Counterfeit Miracles*) for the Faith-Cure movement, were the dampening influences to contend with. One and all, their chief deficiency was lack of discernment. For if all alleged present-day miracles are ipso facto bogus, the spiritual gift of discerning spirits is clearly superfluous nowadays. And so concluded the myriad readers of these popular and otherwise gifted writers, to the continuing detriment of various needful virtues in the American church: spiritual alertness, compassion, physical health, evangelistic effectiveness, to name a few. (Regarding Warfield’s not unrelated view of Scripture, see note 54, below. I believe a sound case may be made for an underlying unity and mutual reinforcement among the components of his threefold compromise with cessationism, evolutionism, and Scottish Common Sense Realism, together functioning as a single interactive syndrome.)


An excellent brief treatment is the paper by Bill Jackson, "Cessationism," and also his "What in the World Is Happening to Us? A Biblical Perspective on Renewal" (Vineyard Champaign, 1500 N. Lincoln Ave., Urbana, IL 61801; July 1994), being widely distributed especially throughout the Association of Vineyard Churches. Jackson, former pastor of the Vineyard Christian Fellowship in Indianapolis, now on staff at the Champaign Vineyard, wrote the latter as a study of the "Times of Refreshing" phenomena dating from about January of 1994 in both Anaheim, California and Toronto, Canada, and now being experienced in Vineyards (and far beyond) around the world. This phenomenon has now been documented and explored at greater length in Guy Chevreau, *Catch the Fire: The Toronto Blessing – An Experience of Renewal and Revival*, with a preface by John Arnott, Senior Pastor of the Toronto Airport [Vineyard (formerly)] Christian Fellowship (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers/HarperPerennial, 1994). A fine popular treatment by the editor of Alpha, a leading Christian monthly in England, is Dave Roberts, *The ‘Toronto’ Blessing* (Eastbourne, E. Sussex: Kingsway Publications Ltd., 1994). In
these works, like DeArteaga’s, Jonathan Edwards looms large as the pioneering Puritan-Calvinist theologian who first dealt at length with God’s sovereign revival of miraculous manifestations during the first Great Awakening of the 1730’s and early ’40’s. Of all his prolific writings, the following four carry the weight of this burden: 1) A Faithful Narrative of the Surprising Work of God in the Conversion of Many Hundred Souls in Northampton and the Neighbouring Towns and Villages of New Hampshire, in New England (submitted November 6, 1736); 2) The Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the True Spirit with a Particular Consideration of the Extraordinary Circumstances with which this Work is Attended (November 1741); 3) Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival in New England and the Way in which it Ought to be Acknowledged and Promoted (1742); 4) The Revival of Religion in Northampton, 1740-1742 (a treatise in the form of a letter, dated 12 December 1743, to a Boston pastor friendly to the revival). For those who might doubt whether the above late-20th-century phenomena share a continuity of identity with the earlier awakenings, I would recommend the workshop papers by Richard M. Riss, “The Characteristics of Revival” and especially “The Manifestations Throughout History,” delivered at the “Catch the Fire” Conference sponsored by the St. Louis, Missouri Vineyard, May 3-6, 1995 (available from the author, 290 River Road, Apt. M-1, Piscataway, NJ 08854). See also his book, A Survey of 20th-Century Revival Movements in North America (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1988).

In a class by themselves for fairness by an outsider are the articles and books by professor of theology and ethics at Ontario Theological Seminary, James A. Beverley, particularly Holy Laughter and the Toronto Blessing: An Investigative Report (Zondervan, 1995) and Revival Wars: A Critique of Counterfeit Revival (Toronto: Evangelical Research Ministries, 1997).

For extensive historical documentation and authoritative (if somewhat terse) appraisal of the factuality and evangelistic persuasive function of miracles during the first centuries of the church, see Yale historian Ramsay MacMullen’s Christianizing the Roman Empire, A.D. 100-400 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). I’m grateful to C. Peter Wagner for referring to this brief but exceedingly dense and seemingly exhaustive citation of remote but relevant sources.

14. The most important contemporary arguments for the currency and legitimacy of divine miracles originate from the Third Wave movement (so called by missiologists and church historians — the “first wave,” referring to the Pentecostal movement, originating in the first decade of the century, and the “second wave” being the Charismatic movement of the 1960’s onward, affecting primarily the Roman Catholic and mainline Protestant denominations), growing largely from evangelical roots. No small part of their "argument" derives from the documented occurrences of countless healings and miracles, not only in their churches, but also at scores of Power Healing training conferences (sponsored by Vineyard Ministries International — VMI) held around the world since the mid-1980’s. The message entitled "Divine Healing and Church Growth," given to the Christian and Missionary Alliance missionaries at Lincoln, Nebraska in 1979 by Dr. Donald McGavran, dean of the Church Growth movement, served as the trigger for John Wimber "to begin to research the area of Signs and Wonders"; it was reprinted as the introduction to the syllabus for Wimber’s first Vineyard seminar on the subject, Signs and Wonders and Church Growth (Placentia, Calif.: Vineyard Ministries International, 1984), pp. 1-6. Essential reading on this subject from this tradition would include Ken Blue, Authority to Heal (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1987), a most experientially authentic and biblically astute treatment; Editors of Christian Life Magazine with the co-operation of C. Peter Wagner, Signs & Wonders Today: The Remarkable Story of the Experimental Course MC510 — Signs, Wonders and Church Growth at Fuller Theological Seminary (Wheaton, Ill.: Christian Life Magazine, 1983), expanded from the October 1982 issue of Christian Life magazine which was entirely devoted to the course under the cover title, "MC510: Origin, History, Impact", Jack Deere, Surprised by the Power of the Spirit: A Former Dallas Seminary Professor Discovers That God Speaks and Heals Today (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1993), a most thorough and satisfying rebuttal of the seemingly desperate exegetical transgressions of cessationism; Gary S. Greig and Kevin N. Springer, eds., The Kingdom and the Power: Are Healing and the Spiritual Gifts Used by Jesus and the Early Church Meant for the Church Today? A Biblical Look at How to Bring the Gospel to the World with Power (Ventura, Calif.: Regal, 1993); Charles H. Kraft, Christianity with Power: Your Worldview and Your Experience of the Supernatural (Ann Arbor: Vine Books/Servant, 1989); David C. Lewis, Healing: Fiction, Fantasy or Fact? (London, Sydey, Auckland & Toronto: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989), a "comprehensive analysis of healings and associated phenomena at John Wimber’s Harrogate Conference" during the autumn of 1986 — a most judicious pioneering investigation by a sympathetic social anthropologist with the full cooperation of Wimber and VMI; Rich Nathan and Ken Wilson, Empowered Evangelicals: Bringing Together the Best of the Evangelical and Charismatic
Making Your Church Sick!

Vineyard finally started issuing a series of measured and judicious rebuttals: John Wimber, the authors (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1992 [1985]); idem, and Kevin Springer, Western World


Vineyard Ministries International (VMI) is now actively compiling dossiers of medically verified accounts of healing miracles. It needs to be added that AIDS, the HIV virus, gay sexual practice itself, and even the much more widespread and deep-seated disorder of homophilia are not exempt, but must be subject to this healing power the Creator has let loose in the earth. This should come as no surprise; the higher righteousness required by the New Covenant in comparison to the Old is accompanied by a higher power quotient, without which the ethic of Christ's kingship might seem to verge on cruelty. We must remind ourselves that Christ's covenant-fulfillment brought a supersession of the entire Old Covenant letter as far as its disciplinary authority over us is concerned. That has, through his death/resurrection, ushered in a new creation where OLD DISORDERS CAN BE HEALED AND THEIR VESTIGIAL SCARS TURNED TO ADVANTAGE within the enfolding community of always-repenting fellow-saints. Typically however, both elements in "HEALING COMMUNITY" are tragically missing from traditional churches. A well-tested cure for this pervasive low-grade enthusiasm is the stout tonic by Ralph W. Neighbour, Jr., Where Do We Go from Here? A Guidebook for the Cell Group Church (1990; Touch Outreach Ministries, P.O. Box 19888, Houston, Texas 77224 – (800) 735-5865). Drawing on a lifetime of teaching and worldwide experience, Neighbour comprehensively homes in on the information necessary to wean the saints from brusque, Constantinian, program-based church designs and equip them to establish outward-reaching, self-reproducing, mutually networking (lacking all of which, "house churches" can easily degenerate to navel-gazing and the impoverishing of Kingdom vision) human-scale cadres of authentic healing community.

15. Formally considered, prophecy as a spiritual endowment or charisma need not be separately considered, but because of its common misrepresentation as simply "preaching," and because it is not usually thought of as a "miracle" per se, I give it separate consideration.

Vander Stelt notes that for Archibald Alexander, the influential first professor at Princeton Theological Seminary, "Prophecies, although miraculous, differ in one important respect from general miracles, the fulfillment of prophecy can be experienced and observed in the present. Prophecies provide, therefore, better evidence of revelation than general miracles. As events that have happened in the past, general miracles recede beyond the horizon of our sensory experience, and for their proof we are compelled to rely solely on testimonial evidence. The proof of a prophecy that is fulfilled in the present is characterized by both testimonial and sensory evidence." John C. Vander Stelt, "Archibald Alexander: Inconsistent Empiricism and Theory of Scripture," in Hearing and Doing: Philosophical Essays Dedicated to H. Evan Runner, ed. John Kraay and Anthony Tol (Toronto: Wedge, 1979), p. 167. Two provisos ought to be observed here: not only are current miracles hereby denied, but in effect so are current prophecies. For by "present" experience and observation with regard to prophecies, no more is meant than that the fulfillment of an ancient prophecy may be seen, not the current fulfillment of a recent, modern prophecy. Accordingly, both gifts of God's Spirit (for so they are) become denatured in their apologetic import. Moreover, in ordinary experience even "sensory" evidence is often at one remove, and hence rendered merely...
"testimonial," for it is usually someone else's senses, even though a contemporary’s, that perceive at firsthand the eyewitnessed evidence. (Assuredly, even science has no other warrant than this, yet we credit it with far more empirical immediacy. This curious double standard, which exposes an exaggerated pandering to the hubris of the scientific establishment, is worth more reflection than we can devote to it here.)

The definitive Third Wave treatment is Wayne A. Grudem, The Gift of Prophecy: In the New Testament and Today (Westchester, Ill.: Crossway Books, 1988). Grudem, a professor at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, is active in nearby Vineyards and is regarded as one of the movement’s leading theological voices and defenders. A powerful followup from this tradition is Jack Deere’s Surprised by the Voice of God: How God Speaks Today through Prophecies, Dreams, and Visions (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996). In this vein, see also Vineyard pastor James Ryle’s Hippo in the Garden: A Non-Religious Approach to Having a Conversation with God (Lake Mary, Fla.: Creation House, 1993) and A Dream Come True: A Biblical Look at How God Speaks Through Dreams and Visions (Lake Mary, Fla.: Creation House, 1995).

A marvelous but all too brief Reformational exploration is the chapter by George Vandervelde, “The Gift of Prophecy and the Prophetic Church,” in The Holy Spirit: Renewing and Empowering Presence, ed. George Vandervelde (Winfield, B.C.: Wood Lake Books, Inc., 1989), pp. 93-118, available separately, mimeographed (Toronto: ICS, 1984). Yet, after venturing into the creationally redemptive realms of possibility in the bulk of his treatment, he inexplicably makes an about-face in his section, “The Gift and the Office,” pp. 115-17, enigmatically coming full circle back to what looks like a virtual cessationist stance. (However, during a personal conversation in the summer of 1995 he explained to me that this was not his intention.) A little familiarity with the actuality of current prophecy might have saved him such a seeming relapse. A widely hailed and very bracing shock-treatment for this condition may be found in Rick Joyner, The Harvest (Charlotte, N.C.: MorningStar Publications, 1989). See also David Pytches, Some Said it Thundered: A Personal Encounter with the Kansas City Propheys, foreword by Dr. John White, afterword by Jamie Buckingham (Nashville, Tenn.: Oliver Nelson/A Division of Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1991). This authentic revival of prophetic giftings entered the Vineyard movement in 1989. Kansas City Fellowship was adopted as Metro [Vineyard (formerly)] Christian Fellowship in 1990 (by far the largest church to transplant by that time). But regrettably, along with these revived gifts came the revivalsim Holiness movement (so-called; a 19th century strain of Wesleyanism), the doctrinal heritage of some of those so gifted. (To keep matters straight, Mike Bickle, pastor of Metro Vineyard, has gone on record as teaching against the “Perils of Perfectionism.”)

Ironically, the Holiness movement does not produce true wholesomeness so much as unhealthy introspection and self-condemnation (where not devious, self-deceptive hypocrisy) – a spirituality very similar to that from which Luther emerged and against which he ardently inveighed after rediscovering justification before God by faith alone. Still, the circumstances of the Reformation were not ideal for correcting even all doctrinal abuses. Instead of arguing that holiness too is a parallel gratuitous favor of God (which is equally so taught in the New Testament, especially in the book of Hebrews, though in non-forensic, "housecleaning" imagery of washing, cleansing, and purification – by faith alone! – rather than legal categories of judgment, imputation, and vindication), all the magisterial Reformers united on assigning to "justification" an "objective," instantaneous efficacy and to "sanctification" a "subjective," progressive operation, whereas actually both righteousness and holiness, in Scripture, have undeniable objective (external, in redemptive-historic events) and subjective (internal, within trusting human hearts) facets. Objectively (though for technical objections to "objectivity" language see note 30, below), we who trust Christ are "imputed righteous," though often sinning (despite hosting the indwelling Spirit of Christ, God’s Just One), and are "called saints" (holy or wholesome ones), though reeking of the miasma of death and sin in our vestigial fleshly bodies. The former aspect, in both cases, points outward to an unrepeatable, non-experiencable, vicarious Deed, while the latter aspect, in each case, refers inward to an infinitely repeatable and, ideally, progressing personal experience; the first was an ancient Work done freely on our behalf and accessed exclusively by trusting the FULLFILLMENT NARRATIVE OF THE NEW COVENANT, while the second is presently activated within us by the resulting COVENANTALLY PROMISED GIFT OF THE EMPOWERING WHOLESOME SPIRIT as we remain in that Explanation which generates ongoing trust (see note 27, below) and keep Christ’s directives to maturity. The one is our salvation, the other our individual elaboration of it with fear and trembling, but without condemnation by God or conscience! That spells Christian liberty. I am indebted to Robert D. Brinsmead and Geoffrey J. Paxton of Present Truth/Verdict magazine for making the classic positions of the Reformation era exquisitely clear in their essentials, even though I find it necessary to slice the conceptual territory differently from the Reformers after all (as, indeed, Brinsmead came to do as well).

The Holiness movement drew heavily from the perfectionistic elements in John Wesley’s writings –
themselves reactions to both perceived abuses and imagined faults of Reformation teaching. But insofar as the movement itself never adequately grasped the "objective," exocentric, and vicarious side of the Proclamation of God's kingdom — including our practical ongoing need to continuously appropriate it by durative faith in order to get empowered to keep resisting the internal corruption of our flesh (not to mention the external corruption of social evils and injustices) rather than just "going deeper" into the subjective side by wrongly assuming both belief and justification to be merely punctiliar facts of the believer's past life-history but obedience and sanctification to be the present and, indeed, "higher" reality of the believer's development — it returned revivalistic Protestantism, ironically, to the effete, egocentric spirituality of medieval Roman Catholicism (viz., mysticism, especially in the later adapted forms of pietism and quietism; see note 34, below). Contrast this with the stark majesty of the pre-emptive, pro-active initiative of God's saving covenants. In the sunlight of that reality, we too actually can grow upward to pro-active maturity of trust, expectation (of what we don't yet observe empirically: the actual, factual liberation and vivification of our bodies at our resurrection), and love, as well-disciplined sons and future heirs of God's kingdom. We are loving him — even though in the power of his own Spirit, the capital he invested in us! — only because he first loves us.

The Vineyard subjected itself to the sting of the alien Holiness teaching for several years (perhaps out of remnant guilt from earlier sins of certain leaders?). But to persons adept at discernment, this (guilty) association will not reflect poorly on the genuine worth of contemporary prophetic ministry anyway. A lump of gold may occasionally be found with a lump of quartz, but we don't ipso facto lump them together! Such Holiness teaching is not native to the Vineyard and may be diminishing under the beneficent ministrations of the "Times of Refreshing" which commenced almost exactly five years from the introduction of the prophetic movement (see note 13, above); this provides a present, empirically experientiable outflow (charisma) of favor — such as has been potentially available ever since Pentecost (cf. Gal. 3:1-5) — as a touchstone to corroborate analogously the past, empirically witnessed favor (charis) revealed in God's resurrecting Christ from the dead. Both alike are manifestations of the favor otherwise hidden forever in the heart of the "invisible, only, and wise God." "O, depth of wealth and wisdom and knowledge of God!" (Rom. 11:33.) God is not diminished by his generosity; his is a strategic profligacy calculated to produce much good fruit in drawing all peoples into his kingdom — to himself. The Vineyard's clearly enunciated statement of faith linking "signs and wonders" with the advancement of God's kingdom evangelistically has kept their approach to these unusual phenomena unswervingly on target, sailing them right on through innocent misperceptions, belligerent criticisms, and even inevitable outright abuses. (Such abuses, of course, never happen among those who, like the slothful servant who buried his master's talents, squeamishly or studiously neglect to use the gifts that God distributes to his saints.)

16. This robust creational theme is one of the hallmarks of the neo-Calvinist worldview. Almost all of the Third Wave books (note 14, above) include chapters on the subject of the Western worldview in order to deal with the question why, since signs and wonders are common in mission situations within the emerging nations, such phenomena are only rarely reported in Western nations and, indeed, wherever Western education has made solid inroads. But these same works leave key questions unanswered, and are not seldom caught in old scholastic formulations that raise more serious, even fiducially incriminating, questions. This explains John Wimber's appeal for others to help discover kingdom-oriented answers (see note 1, above, and Appendix). Knowing this to be a well-meant offer, I believe it is incumbent on the neo-Calvinist/Reformational tradition to rise to the occasion by reviewing its own unique heritage on this pressing subject and starting to cross-pollenate by engaging reciprocally in e-mail and other communication, mutual study, conferring together, etc. One could hope that at this moment the Reformational Institute for Christian Studies (ICS), strategically located in Toronto, could benefit from the "Times of Refreshing" being experienced so uniquely in that city, non-stop since the start of 1994 (see note 13, above), and be stimulated to return the favor by contributing from their own Spirit-endowed treasuries. If this seems an unlikely prospect for Reformed communities around the globe, consider the distinctive pattern established in the following: Johann H. Diemer, Nature and Miracle, trans. Wilma Bouma (Toronto: Wedge, 1977; originally published as Part I of Natuur en Wonder (Amsterdam: Buitjen & Schipperheijn, 1963); idem, "Miracles Happen: Toward a Biblical View of Nature," trans. Wilma Bouma, mimeographed (Toronto: The Association for the Advancement of Christian Scholarship, n.d.), originally published as Section 1 of Part II of Natuur en Wonder; Chris Gousmett, "Bavinck and Kuyper on Creation and Miracle," Anakainosis: A Newsletter for Reformational Thought 7/1 & 2 (September/December 1984): 1-19, but especially his "The Miracle of Nature and the Nature of Miracle: A Study of the Thought of J. H. Diemer Concerning Creation and Miracle," master's thesis (Toronto: ICS, 1985); Abraham...

J. H. Diemer holds the distinction of clearly showing in a Reformationally satisfying manner the invalidity of the "nature/supernature" couplet by displacing it with Biblically contextualized vocabulary orbiting around God's creation and kingdom. Already 50 years ago he beautifully answered the need enunciated by John Wimber (see Appendix, point #1) for a treatment of miracles pivoting on the radicalness of God's kingdom. So who's been hiding this stuff under a basket?! In embarking on a response to Wimber's challenge, we can do no better than start at the conclusion of Gousmett's thesis which stands at the very pinnacle of the above popular and scholarly attempts to articulate an integrated response drawing from both traditions:

The needs of the church today are two-fold: an informed and incisive analysis of its faith formulations, and a renewal of the power and life of the community of believers by Holy Spirit. One of these without the other will never bring renewal to the church. As Richard Russell has pointed out [in his "Escape from Reason" review, above] the most dynamic growing points in the church today are the Reformational movement and the charismatic movement. Both are moving away from inadequate traditional responses to Scripture, seeking truly Scriptural alternatives which demonstrate the Lordship of Christ in daily life, and yet both suffer from the weaknesses of the traditions from which they have come: intellectualising of the Gospel and neglect of the power of the Spirit in the Kingdom; and an anti-intellectual privatisation of the Gospel, with weakness in Biblical exposition and theology, and a dependence on dualistic concepts of creation and miracle.

Only as these movements discover the strengths and weaknesses of their own positions, and the complementary strengths of the other, will we see a renewal of Christian faith and thought which will both challenge the dominant spirits of the age in every area of life, and provide a powerful and vibrant alternative, rooted in both deep insight and miracle working faith. Central to this renewal is the recovery of a Biblical perspective on creation and it[es] relation to the Creator, especially as this is expressed in miracle. It is my hope that this study will contribute to the renewal of Christian faith and thought in our day. ‘Do not quench the Spirit, do not despise prophesying, but test everything, hold fast to what is good, abstain from every form of evil.’ 1 Thessalonians 4:19-22. [Pp. 175-76, emphasis mine.]

In addition to Gousmett and Russell, Brian Walsh — inaugurator of the unique Worldview Studies Program at the ICS — has likewise observed these respective snags of both the Reformational and Third Wave (see note 14, above) movements in Subversive Christianity: Imaging God in a Dangerous Time (Bristol: Regius, 1992; American reprint edition, 1994, Alta Vista College Press, P.O. Box 55535, Seattle, WA 98155).

First, an intellectualistic worldview tends to be static, encased in categories of timeless truths. This means that there can be little dynamic interplay between this worldview and the way of life that it supposedly spawns. Conflicts and tensions in our cultural day to day lives are not allowed to touch our worldview. We do not allow the reality of our lives to inform or correct our worldview.

The second problem follows upon this and could well merit a whole book to discuss it properly.
Just as an intellectually conceived worldview is static, not dynamic, so also is the God who is at the centre of that worldview static, not dynamic. Could it be that we can’t imagine our cultural reality to be radically different because we can’t really imagine God doing anything? Could it be that the God who we know as the dynamic God of history has become the passive keeper of timeless doctrinal truths and has, thereby, ceased to be active in history? Could this be why we do not really expect God to be active in our history?¹⁰

¹⁰It could well be that it is precisely at this juncture that an interface between the charismatic and Reformed traditions could be most fruitful. Perhaps the charismatic experience could transform our worldviews, setting us free from intellectualism and setting our imaginations free for cultural transformation. Unfortunately, some of the most recent work on a charismatic worldview has not been overly helpful. I think particularly of John Wimber’s *Power Evangelism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1986) which does not, it seems to me, really get us beyond the kind of dualism that debilitates the church. [Pp. 32-33, 48, bold emphasis mine.]

In 1992, *Power Evangelism* appeared in a revised and expanded edition, but the dualism Walsh observed was not a particular concern of Wimber’s even there. So the awareness he voiced in 1990 had still not come to resolution by 1992. Jan Boer, a veteran Reformational Dutch-Canadian missionary to Nigeria, was motivated by just such considerations to translate relevant sections from Abraham Kuyper’s famous *Pro Rege*:

An additional but related reason for offering you this translation is that English-speaking Evangelical Christians are trying to find alternatives to their social irrelevance of the last century, an alternative that remains true to the basics of the Gospel. For this reason, interest in Kuyperiana is increasing amongst them, for he seems to offer a kind of model to a wider Christian approach to the world – but language is a barrier. Hence, when I informed some of my friends on the staff of Fuller School of World Missions in Pasadena, California, about this project, they enthusiastically encouraged me to proceed and make this material more widely accessible.

...[M]ost Christian missionaries came from the West and were afflicted with typical Western blindness with respect to much of the spiritual world. Their blindness is part of the inheritance of many mission churches in the country and it has rendered much of the established church powerless over against the world of the spirits and helpless over against many kinds of sicknesses. The upsurge of charismatic churches is a reaction to that powerlessness inherited from Western missionaries. Kuyper challenged that blindness and powerlessness at the home front not only, but also explains it. His discussion goes far in helping us understand that weakness in the missionary movement, even though his focus was on his own culture rather than the cultures that were targets of missionary activity in his day. Charles Kraft’s book, *Christianity with Power*, represents a more recent treatment of the same missionary weakness, a very fine treatment, but lacking the comprehensive view of the work of the Holy Spirit in cultures affirmed by Kuyper. [You Can Do Greater Things Than Christ (see above), pp. 2-3. Emphasis mine.]

A recent and most thoroughgoing attempt to integrate, on both the levels of "theology" and practical "strategy," the streams popularly known as Reformed and Charismatic (the title does not make the finer distinctions of "Reformational" and "Third Wave"), is the D.Min. dissertation for Fuller Theological Seminary by Henry Lunshof, *Reformed and Charismatic: A Theology and Strategy for a Blend of Two Streams* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1993), mentored by Ray S. Anderson. Keep in mind that Lunshof was a long-time trustee of the Reformational Institute for Christian Studies. He planted, and pastored for sixteen years, what became one of the larger and most diverse Christian Reformed churches in Canada, Meadowvale CRC in Mississauga, Ontario. Introducing his dissertation, Lunshof explains:

This overview of the nature and task of the church I want to present from the perspective of a Reformed pastor who believes that there are essential elements to the Charismatic movement that are needed by the Reformed, and that the Charismatic movement will be blessed and enhanced by input from Reformed theology and practice. The two streams can be blended and, in my opinion must be blended. The blend of the two will give us a powerful dynamic body of people with a message, and a presence in this world that will make Christianity again a WAY of life second to none. [From the abstract;
I want this book to be a contribution toward the discussion between Reformed and Charismatic. I want to value my Reformed roots and practice while incorporating insights from the charismatic movement that enhance our understandings in worship, teaching, preaching, and outreach. I want to take note of the extremes within the charismatic movement and the reasons why they ought not to be incorporated into our faith expression while noting those areas within Reformed theology and practice that need expansion or alteration. [P. 2]

In tracing the roots of the intellectualism referred to by Russell, Gousmett, and Walsh, above – particularly those forms so common in the American Reformed tradition generally – we may mention the captivating paper by H. Evan Runner (then still a new professor of philosophy at Calvin College) originally delivered in Calgary, Alberta, November 9th, 1957, at the Calvinistic Study Conference of the Calvinistic Action Association, a creation of post-war Dutch immigrants: "The Development of Calvinism in North America on the Background of its Development in Europe." Remarkably on the origins of American Puritan thought, he observes:

Many of the standard authorities of the Puritans were Protestant scholastics, like Keckermann and Alsted, rather than Calvin. An intellectualism quickly arose....It was not long before men were finding their formulations of the doctrine more the matter of faith than the great Scriptural verities. There was an almost naive fascination with Reason, and the logic of Petrus Ramus was their tool. Moreover, the formulations were often more after the fashion of the Cambridge Platonists than has, until very recently, been recognized. By the beginning of the eighteenth century preaching in New England emphasized more the rationality than the personal aspect of God's dealing with men. It is now clear that in New England the theology of Calvin was modified by both English and Dutch forms of Platonism, and that Cambridge Platonism, in particular, was prevalent quite early. Even when, at the beginning of the eighteenth century we come to the outstanding and many-sided Jonathan Edwards [see end of note 53, below], we find Cambridge Platonism to be the source of his idealism. In others we find the influence of Berkeley and Malebranche. [P. 19.]

In this respect unique among perseveringly orthodox Calvinists, the incipient affinity of Dutch neo-Calvinism for the restoration of the miraculous to everyday Christian experience may be due in part to a fearlessness bred by their habituation to DISCERNMENT in the broad non-theological fields of academic life demanded by the very existence of such graduate-level research institutions as the Free University of Amsterdam, the Institute for Christian Studies (Canada), and Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education (South Africa), along with a worldwide network of like-minded scholars at other posts, linked by various organizations, conferences, and publications. This very broad empirical base has exercised the Kuyperian Dutch tradition in accepting the givenness of concrete experience as a starting platform and in paying honorable attention to what unbelieving scholarship was up to in every area of study. This translates easily into an openness to unusual phenomena, BUT FROM A SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDE OF THOUGHT THAT IS INTERESTED IN DISCERNING THE FALSE ONLY IN ORDER TO BUILD UP A TRUE UNDERSTANDING, i.e., not so much to DISprove as to IMProve, in line with Paul's admonition to be testing EVERYTHING, retaining what's FINE (I Thess. 5:21) – clearly an ACQUISITIVE process. This practice of DISCERNMENT comes with the territory of POSITIVE SYSTEM-BUILDING. Of course, such an attitude might conceivably stay sequestered in the merely academic life of those so trained, and Brian Walsh touched on that danger above. Even so, this habit-formed openness is in decided contrast to the apologetic strains of thought that breed in theological seminaries – the only type of graduate education native to most of evangelical and non-Kuyperian Reformed Christianity anywhere in the world until comparatively recently. Unlike seminaries, the above institutions had to deal with more than dismissive apologetics wherein only what is objectionable in a proposed system (usually restricted to the theological or philosophical) is highlighted. Hence an honest-to-goodness IMMANENT CRITIQUE of scientific/scholarly theories that leaves the good part intact and usable was seldom nurtured in other Protestant traditions. So even when American graduate-style universities finally opened in the 1870's-'90's, many piggy-backing on old ivy-league Protestant colleges, they only enhanced the secularizing virus that had long infected the science and "humanities" (even "divinity" not being immune) at these institutions. No branch of American Christianity – Calvinistic, revivalistic, or otherwise – had been successful at practicing much
spiritual DISCERNMENT on the more general academic front, which was left to drift amid the shoals of secularity. The explicit principal foundation of the Free University of Amsterdam, by contrast, was not left to go fallow. In fact, by 1930 – fifty years after its founding – the reformation of scholarship according to "Reformed principles" was finally heating to a rolling boil! That's the pedigree of the modern neo-Kuyperian Reformational movement.

The deeply ingrained apologetic attitude toward analysis (the condemning finger rather than the conserving snatch) characterizes the cult-watchers and self-styled gatekeepers or guard dogs of Christianity. They can easily find themselves, by their stock anathemas, inadvertently quenching the Wholesome Spirit that would awaken a LEADING EDGE of unapologetic Christian pioneers along every cultural front of civilization. DISCERNMENT MUST LEAD CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE LIKE A SCOUTING PARTY LEADS WOULD-BE HOMESTEADERS: INTO NEW FRONTIERS OF PROMISE, NOT BACK INTO THE SLAVERY OF EGYPT OR THE IDOLATRY OF OUR ANCESTORS.

Whereas "defending the faith" seems predisposed to the shrill, censorious, even captious tone, the authentic scientific impulse under the hallowing influence of God's Motivation ought to be curious, engaging, and open-hearted. Apologetics typically nurtures a reactionary trait of suspicion that actually impedes the growth of new systematic understanding. Pertinent cases in point are Charles Chauncy, James Monroe Buckley, and Benjamin B. Warfield, to which one might add more recent voices such as James Montgomery Boice, D. A. Carson, Norman Geisler, John H. Gerstner, Hank Hanegraaff, Dave Hunt, and John MacArthur, Jr. (the leaven of cessationism has spread far in our time and still reproduces unbelief and impotent neo-formalisms) who have RETARDED the advance of restoration concerning the full Biblical doctrine of miracles; see note 13, above. (And what good is "plenary inspiration" unless it becomes coupled with the fostering and restoration of plenary doctrines and plenary practice of them?) Such evidential suppression, diabolical overreaction, triumphant muckraking, and outright Scripture-twisting amount to a precarious PROTECTIONISM. While this tactic may seem understandable, it is no longer justifiable under any pretext, for surely this "CURE" is far worse than the "disease," a FAITH-CURE! In Reformational circles, one need only mention names like Gordon Clark, Lester De Koster, John Frame, John Mitchell, or Robert Morey to evoke the specter of similarly unseemly or ill-aimed attacks during the late '60s and early '70s.

A superb Reformational analysis of the type of apologetic thinking native to orthodox American Calvinists in the Presbyterian tradition is found in John C. Vander Stelt, "Archibald Alexander: Inconsistent Empiricism and Theory of Scripture" (see previous note). Of most interest for our purpose is his follow-up of the thesis that "the distinction between natural and supernatural undermines the inherently revelatory character of the natural world" (p. 160; emphasis mine), not to mention, I would hasten to add, undermining THE INTRINSICALLY NATURAL CHARACTER OF DIVINE REVELATION; for what could be more natural, expected, even predictable, than that the Creator would desire (and design a structural provision for) OCCASION-APPROPRIATE COMMUNICATION WITH (via dreams, premonitions, prophecies, visions, visitations, etc.) AND INTERVENTION FOR (via healings, miracles, powers, signs, etc.) THAT CREATURE MADE IN HIS OWN IMAGE, BUT NOW FALLEN? For a brief illuminating comparison of the contrasting approaches of Kuyper and Warfield to the placement, importance, and legitimacy of apologetics in theological prolegomena, see Gordon J. Spykman, Reformational Theology (see note 12, above), pp. 37-39. Willem J. Ouweneel extends this Reformational handling of theological prolegomena to much greater depth and breadth, and with consummate pedagogical skill, in Christian Doctrine: Old Truths in New Perspective, vol. 1, The External Prolegomena (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1995). Without question this text charts a radically new course through the labyrinth of theological foundations.

At this juncture, in the spirit of Dooyeweerd's taxonomy of the sciences, a requisition must be entered on the academic docket urging pursuit of this fresh agenda and new structure for "systematic theology" along the lines of fiduciology, the special modal science concerned with TRUST, generically considered, and its ACCREDITATION. Systematic theology/dogmatics has been pursued in often static categories uncritically and heavy-handedly endorsed by orthodox apologists, although unrecognizable from the Biblical text, thus only further escalating sectarian divisions in the church. Much progress awaits a single-mindedly concordant engagement with the native, dynamic, and vital Biblical categories, recurrent phraseology and imagery, and even internal chronology. Parenthetically, this method (a natural by-product of the concordant method of Bible translation originated by the American scholar Adolph Ernst Knoch, soon after the turn of the century, and embodied in periodically updated English and German versions along with analytical reference works kept in print by their publisher in the Netherlands), which can barely be hinted at in passing, might well prove an effective antidote against "soft relativism" (i.e., where communal consensus, although it does trump the fickleness of individual preference, comes at the expense of an overriding
norm above both — to which either might validly appeal against the other — thus simultaneously and paradoxically stagnating into a communal absolutism as well in normative hermeneutics, such as that still adhering to Vander Goof's otherwise sterling Interpreting the Bible in Theology and the Church (see note 9, above). Gary Shahinian snagged this same problem in his alert but perhaps generally too critical review of the book in Anakainosis 8/2 (December 1985): 9-11. A concordant method of interpretation would facilitate a more lucid attentiveness to the NORMATIVE CATEGORIES OR LABELS FOR OUR EXPERIENCE (cf. Part I of this paper) by which we may accurately "READ" AND RECOGNIZE the deep structure of our creational surroundings, thus furthering our effective and sustainable dominion over the creation in harmony with the teaching and Spirit of Christ, the Lord over all.

17. The Myth of Religious Neutrality: An Essay on the Hidden Role of Religious Belief in Theories (Notre Dame, Ind., and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), almost exclusively chap. 6, "The Idea of Religious Control," pp. 94-107. This is, perhaps not coincidentally, by far the shortest chapter in his book; he might have done better to expand it into a full-length treatment of "Theories and Historical Narrative" — I believe this is what it comes down to — and keep the parallel with the other two chapters in this section to boot! In this connection, see also his article, "Genesis on the Origin of the Human Race," in Perspectives on Science & Christian Faith 43/1 (March 1991): 1-13, which carries this seriously flawed line of thought into exegetical practice with, it seems to me, disastrous results. I hope to give this separate and extended treatment at another time, in conjunction with other similar approaches.

18. See his stereotypical treatment of Richard Kirwan (pp. 95-96), a comfortably distant enough (early 19th century) straw man so that Clouser does not risk personally offending his own contemporaries — a kind gesture, granted. But Kirwan is too atypical, I believe, of current custodians of the "encyclopedic assumption" to fairly illustrate Clouser's point.

19. Supplementary epic literature — especially the immense Mahabharata, including the Ramayana and, most typically, the Bhagavad-Gita — are called itihasa, meaning "this is how it was," comparable to our "real" history.


21. For Adventism, see the epic sweep of Ellen G. White's The Great Controversy Between Christ and Satan: The Conflict of the Ages in the Christian Dispensation (Mountain View, Calif.; Omaha, Neb.; Calgary, Alberta: Pacific Press Publishing Assosc., 1971 [1888, 1907, 1911, 1950]). Although she may well have been possessed of the "spirit of prophecy" in her public ministry, yet in many of her writings she has been convincingly shown to have plagiarized very extensively from numerous nineteenth century historians and health movement authors both Christian and otherwise. See Robert D. Brinsmead, Judged by the Gospel: A Review of Adventism (Fallbrook, Calif.: Verdict Publications, 1980). The "prophetic" schema that kicked off Adventism, developed by William Miller and others, is no more authentic prophecy than are the charts of Dispensationalism. These two streams are, respectively, the American and English (later to be exported and hawked very successfully in both the U.S. and Canada by John Nelson Darby via the then novel mechanism of home study group/house churches) varieties of nineteenth century apocalyptic movements. For an instructive comparison of these two movements, see Verdict 4/2 (February 1981), the issue devoted to "The Apocalyptic Spirit," written entirely by the editor, Robert D. Brinsmead. See also Verdict 3/3 (August 1980), devoted to "The Spirit of Prophecy," especially the feature article of the same title by the editor, though it suffers jubilation from his unawareness of the chronological achievement of Martin Anstey and Philip Mauro (see below and note 52).

For Dispensationalism, the similar "prophetic" authority of Margaret Macdonald's trances gave further definition to "future history" and profoundly (even where indirectly or covertly) influenced John Nelson Darby, C. I. Scofield (editor of the notes to the immensely influential Scofield Reference Bible [Oxford University Press, 1909, 1917]), Lewis Sperry Chafer (author of the first and still premier dispensational systematic theology, in 8 vols.; also founder of Dallas Theological Seminary, the first and still the largest and most single-minded seminary devoted to defending and advancing Dispensationalism) and the army of popular writers, chart makers, journalists, and radio
preachers with their capacious audiences. See Dave MacPherson's Unbelievable Pre-Trib Origin (Kansas City, Mo.: Heart of America Bible Society, Inc., 1973). Dispensationalism has had updates of its "revelation" in The New Scofield Reference Bible (Oxford, 1967) and The Ryrie Study Bible (Chicago: Moody Press, 1976, 1978) with apparatus by Charles Caldwell Ryrie, Chairman of the Department of Systematic Theology at Dallas Seminary. It is difficult to overestimate the degree to which such annotated versions of the Bible can insinuate their outlook into the popular imagination. They tend to accumulate a spurious kind of authority by association with the Biblical text, superimposing their own categories (often entirely alien to Scriptural vocabulary) upon the virgin truth of Scripture. The true and false in the notes become virtually indistinguishable, and for the initiate the artificial but imposing system becomes self-attesting and all but unassailable. It then becomes hopeless to accept such a monolithic overlay critically or only piecemeal. The system functions as a virtual "hermeneutical revelation" for properly interpreting Scripture ("rightly dividing," as Scofield termed it in his widely distributed booklet Rightly Dividing the Word of Truth (2 Timothy 2:15): Ten Outline Studies of the More Important Divisions of Scripture, first published in 1896).

The most exhaustive treatment of dispensational "prophecy" is the massive opus by George N. H. Peters, The Theocratic Kingdom of our Lord Jesus, the Christ, as Covenanted in the Old Testament and Presented in the New Testament, 3 vols. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Kregel Publications, 1972; originally published in 1884). The achilles heel of this entire house of cards is to be found in Volume 2, Proposition 160, Observation 5, footnote 10, pp. 657-58 and Observation 6, footnote 1, p. 665. Its nemesis, in principle, is the works of Anstey and Mauro (see note 52, below). The essence of the error is in trusting the prevailing Ptolemaic chronology of the ancient world instead of believing the integral and complete chronology recorded and revealed in Scripture. Thus panoplied like the fabled emperor with no clothes, Peters himself indulges in unseemly dogmatism and gratuitous condemnation of those theologians who, though, like himself, ill-equipped to challenge the uncritically received chronology, yet preferred the generally accepted Christological interpretation of Daniel 9:24-27, without which it becomes the watershed passage for launching freighter loads of futile and contentious dispensational speculations.

22. See, e.g., the weighty tome of Grand Commander Albert Pike, Morals and Dogma of the Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry (Charleston, Virginia: The Supreme Council of the Thirty-Third Degree for the Southern Jurisdiction of the United States, 1906 [1871]). To be sure, the author disclaims the "sacramental" or "dogmatic" ("in the odious sense of that term," p. iv) — what we might term canonical — status of his book, but its account of ancient religion and philosophy necessarily incorporates a narrative thread which perforce carries its dogma and morality in a tacitly "oracular" manner.

23. Cf. note 8, above.

24. E.g., by authors B. F. Skinner, Isaac Asimov, Carl Sagan. On a distant but related note, you can even find college textbooks that teach basic philosophy using the vehicle of world literature, e.g., Julian L. Ross, Philosophy in Literature (Syracuse University Press, 1949), Donald G. Marshall, ed., Literature as Philosophy; Philosophy as Literature (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1987), and Charles W. Johnson, Philosophy in Literature (San Francisco: E. M. Text, 1992). Since it is possible to extract dessicated philosophic tenets from lively prose and verse, it should come as no surprise that the even more fundamental religious tenets can hang on such texts as well.


25. This standpoint is sometimes called "Euhemerism" (even disparagingly, and hence regrettably, because in broad outline with respect to certain kinds of ancient myths found worldwide, it accords very well indeed with the Biblical picture of antiquity): "The view that explains religious myths as traditional and partially distorted accounts of historical events and personages; from Euhemerus, Cyrenaic [Sicilian] philosopher (c. 300 B.C.), who advanced the theory that the gods of mythology were deified heroes," Glenn R. Morrow in Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Dagobert Runes (New York: Philosophical Library, n.d.), p. 101. Dismissing this position for such a reason, of course, reduces to a variety of the ad hominem fallacy. Perhaps its most original and thorough modern exponent
in the English language was George Stanley Faber in *The Origin of Pagan Idolatry Ascertained from Historical Testimony and Circumstantial Evidence*, 3 vols. (London, 1816; reprint ed., New York & London: Garland Publishing, 1984). A very handy literature survey on the nature of myth is William V. Rowe, "The Character and Structure of Myth," *Anakainosis* 6/4 (June 1984): 1-9; yet, curiously, he makes no reference to Faber, although, to be sure, his magnum opus was published a decade before Rowe’s earliest citation. To be fair, it must be emphasized that the "science" of comparative mythology, like such sciences as anthropology, biology, geology, and sociology (and to a much lesser extent archaeology, which was enormously funded by a Christian public seeking confirmation of Old Testament history), all started off with a lurch in the 19th century under the steam of Enlightenment "liberation" from "religious dogma" (little did they realize...), and were compulsively anxious to "show their own faith by [their] good works" of systematically consigning sympathetically Christian achievements to oblivion.


27. James H. Olthuis, with Donald G. Bloesch, Clark H. Pinnock, and Gerald T. Sheppard, *A Hermeneutics of Ultimacy: Peril or Promise?* (Lanham, New York, and London: University Press of America, 1987). This superb essay, along with its responses and rejoinder, provides the most illuminating coverage of the hermeneutical issues surrounding my subject. Olthuis’ introductory section (pp. 11-19) touches on the same key foundational issues of religious rootage and justification, but from a fideistic stance. He says, "Final justification of ultimate faith — and faith in Scripture is such an ultimate matter — is a unique kind of justification" (pp. 14-15). But instead of appealing to the pre-theoretic engagement of the logical function with the correspondingly pre-theoretic, historic narratives of Scripture (i.e., instead of distinguishing a theoretical from a pre-theoretic "conceptualization," "rational judgment," or "process of thought" [p. 15]), he is satisfied to fend off the rationalistic penchant of evidentialism by denying "rational" foundations to the Christian position. But keeping in mind Dooyeweerd’s fundamental distinction noted above, this denial is rendered unnecessary, even a mystification. Olthuis evidently wants to deny religious faith a merely modal evidential justification, and this is correct. But modal evidence — such as he attributes to Buswell, Carnell, Montgomery, Pinnock, Henry, and Clark — does not exhaust the attention of human thought, but only of scientific thought. On this issue Olthuis speaks, with Calvin (and, for that matter, with C. van Til, Clouser, and many other Reformed authors), of our religious ground being self-evident or self-authenticating (p. 16). On the contrary, I will argue its CO-AUTHENTICATION. To this end, I find his section on "Certitudinal history" (pp. 42-43) quite amenable. Olthuis concludes, "Biblical narratives are neither myth nor general, cultural history, but historical stories both written from and for a specialized ceridutild purpose of engendering and exhorting faith. Only when we do justice to the specialized purpose of the canonic texts are we able to honor them in their received form even as we engage in critical interpretation" (p. 43; emphasis mine). But he draws nothing more from this; I would urge that it suggests that the phenomenal contours of the inspired narrative-cum-commentary actually generate that trust, and that this constitutes the fiducially qualified content of Scripture to be analyzed by fiduciology (see note 16, above) and is accordingly laden with necessary proof required by the increased fiducial faculty for the proper grounding of ultimate certitude.

A more problematic treatment of these issues is found in two otherwise excellent essays by Donald Sinnema, an early student of Olthuis. In "The Toledoth of the Sons of Noah: Genesis 10:1-11:9," a paper for the seminar in Philosophical Theology, mimeographed (Toronto: ICS, April 1973), he drives a wedge between Scriptural history as confessional and history as we "know" it (pp. 4-7). His concluding remarks (pp. 21-22) disclaiming dualism between the two is correct in intention, but, for lack of an adequate historical leverage against the pretensions of what passes for "history" per se, his previous treatment is weakened. This is clearer in his "The Uniqueness of Certitudinal Discourse, with Special Reference to the Language of Scripture," a paper for the Systematic Philosophy seminar, mimeographed (ICS, May 1975), where he says, "The designation of the first part of the Old Testament as ‘Historical books’ or as ‘historical narrative’ is very misleading. These are ceridutild, not historical writings. Historical discourse follows lines of influence and focuses on the causes and significance of events" (p. 22). And Scriptural history does not? (See notes 49-50, below.) To be sure, Sinnema does not want a rift that would eviscerate the "factuality" of ceridutild narrative, but here we see, writ small, the effects of the bad conscience of all scholars who feel constrained to admit the representations of traditional ancient histories.

Here the assertion of the "non-scientific character of the Bible's language" (p. 141) is used to challenge the integrity of its "cosmology," "thought forms," "categories," "understanding of nature and reality," and "concepts" (p. 142). My later treatment of Clouser will encompass my critique of this approach. A helpful counterweight, in part, to this approach — as yet substantially unanswered to my knowledge, although an awareness of Reformational philosophy would have spared him from various scholastic locutions — is John C. Whitcomb, Jr., *The Origin of the Solar System: Biblical Inerrancy and the Double-Revelation Theory* (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1964).

28. Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer comprehended this with rare acuity. *It is written!* (THE SCRIPTURES) and *It has come to pass!* (THE POWER OF GOD FULFILLING THAT DECREED EXPLANATION ON A HISTORIC SCALE) were grasped as mutually attesting and corroborating; see Harry Van Dyke, *Groen van Prinsterer's Lectures on Unbelief and Revolution* (Jordan Station, Ontario: Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1989), pp. xi-xii from Groen's preface, and Lecture II, "The Wisdom of the Ages," pp. 20-41. Not incidentally, it seems to me, he speaks repeatedly of "unconditional submission" to the "Word of God" (= Scripture). For this, I maintain, is the EXPECTED COROLLARY of the UNCONDITIONAL status of the deity it depicts or renders; such a deity has unconditional control over HISTORY, so why should he have to settle for — how could he possibly resort to — MYTH or LEGEND or SAGA? Why need he fabricate "historical fiction" when he authored created reality?

29. I am well aware that this task, which has usually been relegated to so-called apologetics, is generally deemed no part of the Reformational agenda. As Abraham Kuyper forcefully declared in his famous Stone Foundation lectures at Princeton University in 1898, "In this struggle [of life-systems in mortal combat and, more specifically, our determination to save the 'Christian Heritage'] Apologists have invariably begun by abandoning the assailed breastwork in order to entrench themselves cowardly in a ravelin behind it," *Lectures on Calvinism* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953 [1931]), p. 11. (This single point was argued at impressive length, and upon precisely the same Calvinistic footing, by Henry Dodwell the younger, already a century-and-a-half earlier in his widely and profoundly misunderstood and often trivially confuted masterpiece, *Christianity Not Founded on Argument; And the True Principle of Gospel-Evidence Assigned* [1741; 1743]. See note 53, below.) In fact, I myself was an early "convert" to Reformational Christianity in great part because I saw an unapologetic, exocentric, unembarrassed aggressiveness among its adherents — scholar and non-scholar alike. Timidity is no Christian virtue, I knew, but here were folk with an effortless, un-self-conscious confidence that admitted no need for "evidences." The Christian life without crutches! I was encountering the Kuyperian spirit which regarded apologetics and evidences as sub-Reformational and atavistic. One of the most striking instances of how this typically manifests itself is found in two major works by Hendrik Hart. In his dissertation for the Free University of Amsterdam, *Communal Certainty and Authorized Truth: An Examination of John Dewey's Philosophy of Verification* (Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1966), he concluded his preface with an elegant jewel of Christian confession (pp. xiii-xiv), perfectly in line with the actual thrust of his philosophic critique. Without breaking stride, he polishes off the volume with an epilogue in the spirit of brotherly admonition (pp. 142-46). Likewise in his appendix, "A Concluding Prescientific Postscript" to *Understanding Our World: An Integral Ontology* (Lanham, Maryland, New York, and London: University Press of America, 1984), pp. 325-70, he expounds on his basic confession in a manner totally refreshing. This is my idea — at least a very significant portion — of what I have come to term "UNAPOLOGETICS." It confesses Christ professionally by showing in the clearest way possible exactly how Jesus Christ is Master of one's work. BUT THE NUB OF THE MATTER IS THAT SUCH A CONFESSION NECESSARILY TAKES ON STRONGLY NARRATIVE CONTOURS — IT IS A WITNESS, A TESTIMONY! BY THIS HUMBLE VEHICLE GOD HAS ELECTED TO MARCH VICTORIOUSLY ACROSS THE BLOOD-STAINED BATTLEFIELD OF HISTORY...REDEMPTIVELY. THE MARTYRS ARE THE VICTORS!

It is most telling that Dooyeweerd's only explicitly "apologetic" production was written, to a large extent, as a single, non-stop, historical narrative surveying the subversion of the Biblical ground-motive by early synthesis with Aristotle, et al, followed by a long and generally unsuccessful history of attempts at disentanglement, usually by the leverage of some new, more modern synthesis. After such a dismal recounting, he concludes with a rousing call to arms against all such accommodation, in the expectation that science may yet be recaptured for the kingdom of God. Such ferocity of faith plunging headlong against the seemingly irresistible torrent of secular successes is awe-inspiring to behold. This is some measure of the spirited leadership Dooyeweerd gave to Reformational scholarship for more than four decades. "The Dangers of the Intellectual Disarmament of Christianity in Science

So without meaning in the least to discredit this uniquely Reformational and appropriately creative means of proclaiming Christ, it yet seems indubitable to me, and I must still urge, that contrary to Hart’s disclaimer (true also of Clouser and virtually all neo-Calvinists — being, after all, still confessional Calvinists), RELIGIOUS PRESUPPOSITIONS ARE, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, SUBJECT TO TESTING AND VERIFIABILITY/ FALSIFIABILITY. This indispensable element of unapologetics – the testimony of GOOD (ALSO SCHOLARLY, SCIENTIFIC) WORKS - does not obviate the necessity and possibility of THE MOST FUNDAMENTALLY BASIC OF ALL TESTIMONIES TO THE TRUTH: GOD'S OWN MIRACULOUS SELF-ATTERTATION WITHIN THE PROVENANCE OF CURRENT HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE. It need scarcely be pointed out that this tack does not transgress any vital element of Reformational Christianity, but should much rather fill its sails and propel it onward through uncharted waters and new ventures. This rapprochement, this future, is something worthy to be embraced. Abraham Kuyper himself saw no contradiction; here, at least, we would be hard pressed to see a sub-Reformational tendency (which has been detected – is to be expected! – in strains of his thought, no less than it may in our own). See Boer on Kuyper, note 16, above.

30. Simply to summarize, it amounts to a qualified denial that the Biblical scriptures require a "rational" defense to commend them to the human mind. It teaches rather that all evidence is inescapably interpreted by presuppositions and so is not "self-evident" or axiomatic. I can only note in passing the important chapter by Robert D. Knudsen, "Apologetics and History," in Life Is Religion: Essays in Honor of H. Evan Runner, ed. Henry Vander Goot (St. Catharines, Ontario: Paideia Press, 1981), pp. 119-33. Knudsen speaks of an "indirect" proof for the Christian faith inherent in a presuppositional apologetic – a proof manifest in the historical declension toward irrationalism and despair that is set loose to operate dialectically whenever the true transcendence point and boundary idea of Christianity is dismissed (pp. 125, 126). (Francis Schaeffer made this approach famous by drawing it out at length in his popular books, especially Escape from Reason and The God Who Is There. He spoke of the "line of despair" in this connection. It is instructive to observe that the abiding unapologetic undercurrents of his ministry were its miraculous and communally holistic contexts, documented by his wife, Edith Schaeffer, in L’Abri Story [Wheaton, Ill.: Tyndale House, 1969] and The Tapestry [Waco, Texas: Word Books, 1981] – a history of God’s miracle-working deeds making this unparalleled outreach possible to multiplied thousands of people worldwide for over four decades by now. So although they did not engage in – did not believe in! – any sort of recognizable Charismatic-style healing or deliverance ministry [what the Third Wave, in a fresh theological and operational context has come to call "power evangelism"] and regarded it as just another effluence of the abusive "super-spirituality" that has undeniably marred especially earlier attempts to restore the more spectacular gifts of the Holy Spirit, yet their modus operandi soared far beyond run-of-the-mill argumentative apologetics.) Yet "indirect" implies a contrast with a presumably more "direct" proof or confirmation of the Christian position. I believe this is a misleading [over]qualification. The kind of proof that Scripture provides is also historical (or, more properly, naive, integral, plenary, everyday, concrete, supra-scientific, and non-modal), but it is MORE SOLID AND CONFIRMED than any formal, fragmentary, partial, rarified, abstract, scientific, and modally-qualified proof could be (at least to the human heart, which demands a more fundamental, simple, overarching, and all-encompassing basis for life-as-a-whole than theoretically possible).

Moreover, Scripture contains documentary proof that supplies the necessary presumption to invite experimental proof of God’s faithfulness. None of this should be labeled "indirect" proof; it is merely DIFFERENT IN KIND, and is emphatically the right kind for its transcendent purpose. See notes 11 and 13, above.

We do not need to take "a neutral position outside of the citadel of the Christian faith" (p. 125) in order to defend it, even if we do not entirely agree with Knudsen’s (or Olthuis’s, or Clouser’s, or especially Van Til’s) presuppositional approach, for we may resort to at least equally Reformational capital to fund an alternative. Vander Goot (in Interpreting the Bible, note 9, above) has drawn out the mainlines most extensively and cogently (following Dooyeweerd) for hermeneutics, but has simply not drawn the conclusions for apologetics. Scripture is custom-fitted to common, plenary, integral human experience, and its true-storied character (cf. Seerveld’s "Contribution...Toward Reading the Bible," note 9, above) perfectly suits the nature and need of the human heart for comprehensive simplicity. For the alternatives are not neutral, usurping deduction vs. unprovable (or even "indirectly" provable), loyal leap; there is also a position that both abjures any vaunted human neutrality or
objectivity of leverage while whole-heartedly affirming the efficacious operation of extra-logical (and hence non-concluded, whether inductively or deductively, and therefore non-rationalistic) proof on the human mind; and such proof the Scriptures pre-eminently possess. Here, then, is that COSMIC "OBJECTIVITY" that humans need to make ultimate sense of their world of experience, but which humanly alleged "objectivity" can never provide or possibly attain by all its observations under the sun.

On the impossibility of human objectivity in such matters Dooyeweerd early (1923) penned the following pregnant words (quoted and translated by Henderson, Illuminating Law [note 2, above]; bold and underscored emphases mine). I pose the question whether "intuition" is the best translation for schouwen (as indeed does Henderson, note 193, where he suggests using also "reflection" when there is "a connotation of activity" in the context), in view of its English sense of non-empirical, non-experiential, a priori insight or awareness. Dooyeweerd seems to be emphasizing quite the opposite, especially when he writes about its operation "upon objective meaning." Clouser once mentioned "inspection"; I suggest "gazing," and will use it as a replacement below.

The Christian, who, on the one hand, accepts the fact of creation and, on the other, maintains the fundamental difference between Creator and creature, cannot possibly go along with the universal logical worldview and its slogan of the autonomy of thought; this is because thought itself is one part of God's creation and both the peculiar logical forms of thought and all of its matter must be drawn from the cosmically, not logically, ordered creation of God. [P. 103.]

Whoever makes objective meaning primary must assign the main job of consciousness to gazing. Proud thought has to surrender its throne to humble gazing upon objective meaning. Gazing and thought themselves become objective meaning which stands [on a "par!" – R.L.R.] in a union of being [wezenverband] with the whole world of objective meaning. Everything which exists is tied to its objective meaning, which constitutes its essence. Gazing is bound to its fields-of-view [gezichtsvelden], thought to its categories. In this connection between gazing and thought lies their objective meaning. When consciousness no longer sets anything up as autonomous, but receives everything, in every respect things are set up as objective meaning, the law of heteronomy begins to rule unlimitedly over everything which exists, even in consciousness which attributes meaning, then the question of the lawgiver, the ordering one, the Creator, comes to the surface of itself [in the sense of "by itself" – R.L.R.]. [P. 111.]

If everything exists as established meaning [vaststaande zin], it exists only in virtue of a divine meaning attribution [goddelijke zingeving]. Everything which exists is relative in comparison with this meaning attribution. Nothing exists by itself, nothing exists apart, 'apo-staat', from the divine meaning attribution, everything exists in and through the divine noesis. Between everything which exists there is a divine cosmic union of being. [P. 111.]

Calvinist cosmology comes to a halt at the recognition that the whole world of objective meaning only exists in and through divine meaning attribution (noesis), and that everywhere a union of being, exists which we are only able to know from within the fields-of-view. Thought ought to submit itself to divine revelation, but is unable to bridge the gap between our fields-of-view by the introduction of a relation, which is only applicable within particular fields-of-view. [P. 106.]

We cannot comprehend by means of thought the coherence of beings [wezenssamenhang] which lies outside of our fields-of-view. We cannot express the connection between the fields-of-view in logical relationships because the [logical] relationship only has meaning within one limited field-of-view. We are likewise unable to express in [logical] relationships the connection between meaning attribution and the gazed-upon meaning. We can only logically know the union of being within the fields-of-view. [P. 109.]

31. See note 39, below.

32. And, in fact, it has been in principle reconfigured in a uniquely Reformational way by the late Gordon Spykman, notably in his trailblazing chapter, "A New Look at Election and Reprobation," in Life is Religion: Essays in Honor of H. Evan Runner, pp. 171-91 (St. Catharines, Ontario: Paideia Press, 1981), pp. 171-91, and in Chapter
Three, "Contemporary Dilemmas," and Chapter Four, "Clarification of Basic Categories," of Part One, "Foundations," in Reformational Theology, pp. 40-75. The burden of election has been lifted from a particularistic, supralapsarian decree, and placed squarely on the broad shoulders and persuasive muscles of the Divine Explanation in Scripture, with all its historico-narrative evidence (in tandem, I would add, with the corroborative power of God manifest in current Divine acts of signs and wonders, as I have stressed above). Here the burden of agency is THE POWER OF THE PROCLAMATION/EXPLANATION OF GOD rather than either a voluntaristic human decision or a supralapsarian eternal decree (unless we mean by this only that GOD CHOSE THE MIRACLE-FRAUGHT NARRATIVE HISTORY LEADING TO AND CULMINATING IN JESUS CHRIST TO BE THE DRAWING POWER FOR INDUCING TRUST BECAUSE, INDEED, AS NOTHING ELSE, THAT ATTESTED HISTORY MUST AND WOULD HOST THE MOST STAGGERING UNVEILING OF GOD'S RIGHTEOUSNESS/JUSTICE EVER PREMIERED ON EARTH: HIS RESURRECTING OF HIS OWN UNJUSTLY HUMILIATED SON FROM AMONG THE DEAD; THIS NEW EXODUS OF THE NEW COVENANT WAS THE THEODICY THAT TOOK THE PLANET TOTALLY BY SURPRISE). Some readers may not recognize Spykman's formulation as radical innovation. More power to them, just so they do recognize it as superior to the inherited problematics!

During the 1970's, the Institute for Christian Studies came under heavy fire for propounding this same Word-of-God-centered approach to various scholarly problems. Their intentions were widely misrepresented by orthodox Reformed writers who should and could have known better. The fear of neo-orthodoxy raised red flags in the minds of casual readers, insufficiently aware of this Dutch tradition, who caught the Reformational stress on the Word of God but disingenuously guessed it hid a neo-orthodox agenda. James Olthuis, Bernard Zylstra, and Paul Schrotenboer, along with Gordon Spykman, issued various popular and technical rebuttals. Using this controversial Reformational schema, Olthuis even wrote a critique of the neo-orthodoxy of "one of Holland's avant-garde theologians" in "Ambiguity Is the Key: Remarks on H. M. Kuitert's View of the Scriptures" (Toronto: The Association for the Advancement of Christian Scholarship, 1969), reprinted from the International Reformed Bulletin 38 (July 1969): 6-16. In fact, the Christian philosophical movement of Dooyeweerd and D. H. T. Vollenhoven erected a dike against neo-orthodoxy in the Netherlands, especially among redemptive-historical preachers, who were quite conversant with it. See Herman Dooyeweerd, Roots of Western Culture (Toronto: Wedge, 1979), pp. 59-60, 143-7. There is a great gulf fixed between the neo-Calvinistic and the neo-orthodox views of the Word of God, revelation, and Scripture. Vollenhoven's philosophical ontology — which places the Word of God as the cosmic mediator between Creator and creation — is clearly visible behind the language of the "Toronto School" of Zylstra, Olthuis, and Spykman (as of Prof. Andre Troost of the Free University of Amsterdam, Olthuis' mentor) and it is radically incompatible with such positions as Barth's, Brunner's, Tillich's, et al. Vollenhoven's position on this matter was made abundantly clear in English by H. Evan Runner already in the introduction to his repeatedly used Syllabus for Philosophy 220: The History of Ancient Philosophy (Calvin College, 1958-1959), esp. pp. 16-23. See also his "Neo-Kuyperianism: Selected Readings," January 1975. I believe a careful comparison and rapprochement of this worthy position with the ontology of Dooyeweerd as presented by Roy Clouser in The Myth of Religious Neutrality may prove essential for further clarifying this pivotal component of systematic Christian philosophy.

33. Clouser has struck a vein of pure gold, yet to be extensively mined, in his "Religious Language: A New Look at an Old Problem," in Hendrik Hart, Johan van der Hoeven, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds., Rationality in the Calvinian Tradition (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1983), pp. 385-407. See also his later swipe at the same matters in the chapter, "The Need for a New Beginning," in The Myth of Religious Neutrality, pp. 167-95. Hendrik Hart dealt with this similarly in Understanding Our World: An Integral Ontology (Lanham, New York, London: University of Press of America, 1984), pp. 318-24. All language about God, Clouser maintains, is necessarily drawn from the created order. God clothes himself in language drawn from his own works. In his covenants with humans he voluntarily binds himself to such relations with us as are both entirely creaturely and entirely true. He TAKES ON, WEARS, or ASSUMES these RELATIONS, ATTRIBUTES or PROPERTIES. I would emphasize that God's ASSUMPTION of what is evidently intended as a HUMAN IMAGE or CHARACTER has a PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT framed in terms of TRUE (not merely "realistic" or "truth-like") HISTORICAL NARRATIVE, climaxing in the PERSONA of the historic Jesus as accurately chronicled in Scripture. For unless we can embed our hearts restfully in the assumption of God's prima facie REPRESENTATION of himself as performing mighty deeds on a scale of magnitude as vast as Scripture suggests, namely, UNIVERSAL, COSMIC HISTORY, then there is little warrant for us to expect any such behavior from God in OUR OWN PERIOD OF HISTORY. Most of us, in fact, do seem to have settled for a domesticated, household god of "personal experience" (if that) rather than
a rough-and-tumble God of HISTORIC CONSEQUENCE. This is the ineluctable effect of every inroad against historicity, because THE ULTIMATE DATUM AGAINST WHICH ALLEGED NARRATIVE TRUTH CAN AND MUST BE VINDICATED IS PRECISELY OUR CONCRETE, HISTORIC, PRE-THEORETIC EXPERIENCE. Against a contender from this dimension, scientific proofs cannot compete; they are in different leagues. There is no contest. I prefer to speak of THEOICONISM rather than ANTHROPOMORPHISM (Hart speaks of CREATIOMORPHIC revelation, p. 321, but this still reflects an unhappy inversion of the relation) to denote God’s assumption of human properties to communicate with us. We, after all, were created in HIS IMAGE — who is Jesus Christ, begotten before all — and not he in OUR IMAGE. An inversion is more typical of idolatrous fixations upon parts or aspects of the created order. A. E. Knoch (note 16, above) enlarged splendidly, though not without a caustic edge, upon some of these questions, and Clouser could in effect be writing the long overdue “prolegomena” to his unique treatment of the Christology of Scripture.

34. For a thumbnail covenantal assessment of mysticism that is to the point, see H. Evan Runner’s "Translator’s Introduction" to S. G. de Graaf’s Promise and Deliverance, Vol. 3: Christ’s Ministry and Death (St. Catharines, Ontario: Paideia Press, 1979), pp. 11-21. Much work is yet to be done in tracing and critiquing the baneful flow of Western mysticism from its source in Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite (drawing upon the pagan neo-Platonic philosophy of Plotinus, and given spuriously apostolic status both by the Eastern church and, via influential medieval transmitters, including Thomas Aquinas, by many in the Western church) into its myriad cisterns in later quietism, pietism, and the vast “Protestant” devotional literature that so easily seduces our hearts from the truth witnessed in the covenantal Scriptures — whether the Old Testament (for even a shadow always has an attachment to its illuminated object) or the superceding Light of apostolic tradition exclusively comprised in every authoritative essential by the New Testament documents, and which may be termed collectively "the Proclamation (Gospel)."

For a defense of this meaning of “apostolic tradition,” see Martin Chemnitz, An Examination of the Council of Trent, Part I (Vol. I), trans. Fred Kramer (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1971), especially the first two Topics, "Concerning the Sacred Scriptures," pp. 35-216 and "Concerning Traditions," pp. 217-307. First published in Latin in 1565 and going through many German editions, this remains a supreme defense of the Protestant Reformation’s view of the respective natures and mutual relations of Scripture and tradition. Although originally addressing questions surrounding the great rift in the Western church, it eminently deserves and may well receive a new lease on life in the current exchanges and overtures between Protestants (many of whom have never learned the formidable original meaning of sola scriptura, much less observed it in actual modern application) and the Eastern Orthodox, whose claims of perpetually binding authority for extrabiblical, allegedly “oral” apostolic traditions are both onerous and seductive to Western Christians disoriented by the individualism and sectarianism that afflict the post-Enlightenment West. (For a valuable explanation and critique of these conditions, see Graeme Goldsworthy, Robert D. Brinsmead, and Geoffrey J. Paxton, “The Birth, Spirit and Death of Protestantism,” Verdict 3/4 (October 1980).) The excellence of Chemnitz’s exegetical methodology in his exposé of Roman Catholic pretensions and impostures must be savored personally and in detail to be fully appreciated. It is no wonder, then, that the Second Topic, “Concerning Traditions,” was translated into English by 1582 — the only part of his Examen to be thus honored until the 1970’s!

35. We should not be surprised to perchance discover that a translation of the straightforward historic account of the first eleven chapters of Genesis — genealogies and all — into the languages of the unevangelized world might prove ever so convincing to peoples whose own native myths taught them, albeit in often confusing fashion, elements of those very same events. The LIGHT OF TRUTH, contrasting so evidently with their inherited DARKNESS OF MYTH might well have startling evangelistic efficacy in conjunction with the power-laden proclamation of God’s kingdom. The much-hailed treatments of Don Richardson, Peace Child, 3rd ed. (Ventura, Calif.: Regal Books, 1976) and Eternity in Their Hearts (Ventura, Calif.: Regal Books, 1981), are suggestive. See also Part I of the present paper. In this connection I must refer the reader also to an exquisite old volume in the apologetic genre by the Rev. Wilhelm Schmidt of the University of Vienna, Primitive Revelation, trans. Rev. Joseph J. Baierl, S.T.D. (St. Louis & London: B. Herder Book Co., 1939) which, written by a renowned anthropologist, bears more than passing attention even by modern readers, and especially in the literature of apologetics where polemics so often outstrips fundamental research. I return to Schmidt in a moment.

In a similar vein, one should not overlook the unique achievement of C. H. Kang and Ethel R. Nelson, The Discovery of Genesis: How the Truths of Genesis Were Found Hidden in the Chinese Language (St. Louis:
Concordia Publishing House, 1979). Here the structural forms of ancient Chinese ideographic writing are found to contain unequivocally, extensively, and otherwise all but inexplicably (hence highly counter-coincidentally), myriad elements of the early Genesis narrative. This is consonant with Sailhamer's view of literality (note 5, above).

Arthur C. Custance, the learned Canadian Bible scholar and anthropologist, had many apt observations on such arcane subjects. His ten-volume Doorway Papers series is a goldmine of original and critical thinking well worth exploring. His personal library is now conveniently at the disposal of Reformational scholars in the collections of Redeemer Christian College, Ancaster, Ontario. One of the treasures of his library is perhaps the most ambitious undertaking in this century by a self-consciously Christian scholar (allowing for the Roman Catholic variance) into ancient comparative religion, P. Wilhelm Schmidt, S.V.D., Der Ursprung der Gottesidee: Eine historisch-kritisch und positive Studie, 12 vols. (Münster in Westfalen: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1912-1955). Gigantic in conception and exhaustive in execution, this opus stands as a lasting tribute to the indefatigable labors of an anthropologist/theologian (like Custance himself) willing to brave the thankless task of overturning the bitterly secularized hegemony of anthropological assumptions concerning the imagined evolutionary succession of religious types. Curiously, Schmidt would appear to be performing an authentic historical-critical assault on prominent interpretations in the historiography and anthropology of religion rather than on the usual whipping boy, the Biblical scriptures. See also his more accessible "manual of the comparative history of religion," The Origin and Growth of Religion: Facts and Theories, tran. H. J. Rose (New York: The Dial Press, Inc., 1935). He incurs a debt of gratitude from Herman Dooyeweerd for refuting the prevailing evolutionary ethnology, especially as applied to the structures of families and primitive societal types (New Critique III, 331-67), who nonetheless cautions regarding a certain "lack of insight into the fundamental difference between historical and ethnological thought," a weakness of some thinkers within the *Kulturkreislehre* school of which Schmidt was a distinguished representative (New Critique III, 335-36). I am grateful to Dr. Jitse van der Meer, Director of the Pascal Centre for Advanced Studies in Faith and Science on the campus of Redeemer College, for directing me to their set of his opus magnum.

36. Dooyeweerd enlarges most helpfully upon this valuable idea in his Prolegomena to the New Critique.


38. Dooyeweerd's series of three lectures on "Philosophy and Theology," in In the Twilight of Western Thought: Studies in the Pretended Autonomy of Philosophical Thought, (Nutley, New Jersey: The Craig Press, 1965), pp. 113-72, remains the most illuminating treatment I have found in English regarding the nature and limits of theology as a theoretic discipline necessarily presupposing a religious but non-theological (and hence theologically non-justifiable) starting point. Dooyeweerd pioneered the position that theology should be the science of the pistical (fiducial) aspect of faith (see note 27, above), which included both far more than what theology traditionally encompassed, and far less. Far more because the pistical aspect pervades all human activities, and not just those that may seem "religious," and far less because theology has become a grab-bag of disparate studies without an identity anchored in a limited creational aspect of experience and possessing sui generis scientific legitimacy. In line with Dooyeweerd's insight, John C. Vander Stelt, Professor of Theology and Philosophy at Dordt College, Sioux Center, Iowa, has undertaken a massive, decade-long research study of the nature of theology as pistology (=fiduciology). This exploration promises to answer many questions that continue to stymie progress in "theology" as an academic discipline. See his earlier, "Theology or Pistology?" in Building the House: Essays on Christian Education, edited by James A. De Jong and Louis Y. Van Dyke, pp. 115-35 (Sioux Center, Iowa: Dordt College Press, 1981) and "Theology as Study of Faith-Life," Pro Rege 18/1 (September 1989): 15-23.

39. It is not surprising that fideism has found a happy haven within the borders of Calvinism. A fideism that argues against any proofs for religious presuppositions fits hand in glove – five fingers and all – with a Calvinism that has no use for means of experientially, empirically demonstrating the proofs of God's kingdom to the particularly elect or of "wasting" them on the particularly reprobate. Evan Runner was always one to distinguish emphatically between the empirical (which orientation he strongly affirms) and empiricism (which he roundly
condemns as a variety of reductionism). Denial that the general public has access to this empirical touchstone, it seems to me, is a chief shortcoming of Cornelius Van Til's apologetic. Still, this is not to deny the moment of firm truth in fideism, no matter why adopted: THERE IS NO POSSIBLE THEORETICAL, SCIENTIFIC JUSTIFICATION/LEGITIMIZATION OF BIBLICAL RELIGION, NOR OF ANY OTHER RELIGION. Here classical, rationalistic, Enlightenment foundationalism founders.

40. The Myth of Religious Neutrality, pp. 52-56. Clouser treated these above issues more at length in "The Religious A Priori of Theoretical Thought" (1977), esp. pp. 45-46, an unpublished Philosophy Supplementary Text for several courses at (then) Trenton State College. The narrative dimensions of the 'postmodern' discussion concerning ultimate justification or legitimation of founding religious stories ("meta-narratives") should play easily into the hands of astute Reformational analysts. The studies of Jean-François Lyotard are highly suggestive.

41. The changing fortunes of persuasion in post-Reformation Calvinism are ably and perceptively handled by Brian G. Armstrong in Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy: Protestant Scholasticism and Humanism in Seventeenth-Century France (Madison, Milwaukee, and London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), especially chapter 6, "The Doctrine of Faith." There he observes that Amyraut's explanations depicted humans as "simply overwhelmed, overcome and mastered by the gospel. The action is so dynamic that it is certainly less than fair to call it a simple moral suasion, and it is certainly much more than a rational persuasion," p. 257 (emphasis mine). So how shall we characterize it (modally?), or can it be explained at all? Again, he notes that "when Calvin examines the concept of knowledge as the first ingredient in the definition [of faith], he identifies it with persuasion or assurance. Knowledge of this sort, he says, is above rational comprehension, believers 'are rather confirmed by the persuasion (persuasione) of divine truth than taught by rational demonstration,' " p. 259 (emphasis mine).

Amyraut and Calvin were both sweating over the untidy (to Greek philosophical perceptions) layout of ordinary experience and knowledge. This latter knowledge is not simply randomly or arbitrarily "different" or "other," but is FULLER and ONTICALLY MORE FOUNDATIONAL than the merely "concluded" knowledge of "rational demonstration." Cf. notes 3 and 30, above. Calvin's chosen successor at the Genevan Academy, Theodore Beza, in contrast, thinking he had such matters all neatly tied up, ironically entangled Reformed orthodoxy so that it tripped and fell from the vivifying proclamation of historically-demonstrated favor into a sterile apologetic for particularistically "sovereign" grace.

42. See note 13, above.

43. Ninian Smart and Richard D. Hecht, eds., Sacred Texts of the World: A Universal Anthology (New York: Crossroad, 1982), pp. 337-47. See especially the forthcoming study by Karla Poewe, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Calgary, An Anthropology of Missions and a History of Anthropological Thought; this intriguing research was funded by the comparatively new Evangelical Scholars Program of The Pew Charitable Trusts.


45. See George W. Stroup, The Promise of Narrative Theology: Recovering the Gospel in the Church (Altanta: John Knox Press, 1981); "A Bibliographical Critique," Theology Today 32/2 (July 1975): 133-43; and "Theology of Narrative or Narrative Theology? A Response to Why Narrative?" Theology Today 47/4 (January 1991): 424-32. See also Gabriel Fackre, "Narrative Theology: An Overview," Interpretation 37/4 (1983): 340-52. In his book, Stroup takes great pains to show how NARRATIVE CAN BEST RENDER PERSONAL IDENTITY. It is not trivial, in passing, to keep in mind the distinction between NARRATIVE SCRIPTURE and NARRATIVE THEOLOGY. I am not convinced of the viability of the latter, but the former seems to be, in any case, the foundational genre of Scripture. Many of the methods and results of studying the narrative structure of Scripture have shown sterling progress in opening up the Bible (far beyond, it must be added, the yield of most so-called critical methods; see preceding note). But this validity does not transfer ipso facto to narrative theology. The common denominator of plausibility for both disciplines may well be the crisis of historicity that has overtaken Biblical studies and Biblical theology alike. And although unforeseen corridors of understanding have been opened up by both, their respective results are not equally valid. I would distance myself from the attempt to render theology or fiduciology as "narrative." This is clearly a confusion of genre, of category. The DATUM OF SCRIPTURE is, centrally, STORY, but fiduciology is THEORY.

But there remains this one troublesome fact about Hauerwas: he too is a fideist. In his case this means, for all practical purposes, that he does not bother with questions concerning the substantiation of the sacred narrative of Scripture nor with the eye-witnessed verification of Jesus’ resurrection, etc., i.e., with an “apologetic,” although his position happily lends itself to a promising unapologetic in the form of self-conscious, authentic Christian community. But to reiterate (see note 29, above), we need both. For the fruits of a more vicious, unmitigated fideism, see note 53, below.


48. “Philosophy and Theology – II,” in Twilight, pp. 132-56; cf. note 38, above. It is clearly preposterous (in the proper sense of that word) to maintain the neutrality or objectivity of human reasoning with respect to its motivating presuppostia themselves. Dooyeweerd drew out the ramifications of this, from a philosophical direction, much farther than most thinkers, such that the narrative contours of these presuppostia can faintly but unmistakably be described, thus overlapping with the more recent discoveries arising from the direction of literary disciplines.

49. Theodore Plantinga would qualify this, not by de-historizing Scripture, but by de-technicalizing ordinary history writing. That comports with allowing historiography instead (at least by default) to serve as the technical science of the historical modal aspect. This suggests a salutary distinction between a “history textbook” and a “historiography textbook” – the latter comparable to a biology textbook, introducing a formal science, and the former assigned a distinctly different function. Such a clarification of an ostensibly “simple illustration” (which was intended to vanquish the use of Scripture in scientific parlance) raises new questions not only about the varied nature and use of “textbooks” in education – which is beyond the scope of this paper, though not irrelevant to these issues – but, more pertinently, about the real connection of ordinary, true narrative history (non-scientific) to science in general and to each modal science in particular, especially that of historiography where the above confusion leads inevitably to strange encounters. Ponder the ensuing excerpts from Plantinga’s incisive Reading the Bible as History (Burlington, Ont.: G. R. Welch Co., Ltd., 1980), especially his first chapter, “A History Book”:

Just what is a history textbook? Does "history" have its own special language and concepts that can be understood only by those who have studied the subject intensively? Some historians would undoubtedly like to view their discipline in such terms, but the fact is that historical scholarship has not developed in this direction.

Anyone who knows how to read can take "history books" out of the library and understand them - at some level of comprehension. This suggests that "history" is not as mysterious and esoteric as biology and the other natural sciences. There are major differences in language and approach between history and biology.

History can be written in naive, experiential, nonspecialized language that does not differ from the language you and I speak every day. The language of history is full of metaphors, analogies and figures of speech....

Because the Bible does not speak the purified language of scientific concepts, we agree readily that it is not to be read as a biology book. But this well-founded belief does not in itself justify the conclusion that it is not a history book either. History is not so fussy about the language it uses.

The Bible, like many another book in which history is related, is written in nonspecialized, nonscientific language that does not differ greatly from the language used in history books even today. Therefore it seems that we do not have good grounds for arguing that the Bible is in no sense a history book. It is indeed a history book – and much more besides. [P. 2.]
A perspective on history may well be false and mistaken, of course, but the fact that it is a perspective does not automatically make it false — even though many perspectives on historical events are shot through with falsehood. This is an important point for any Christian understanding of history: historical truth is not just a matter of facts and details. Historical truth in the fuller sense, the kind of truth that makes history seem a living interconnected whole, is impossible apart from a perspective.

A short account of a long series of historical events need not be any less true than a longer account of the same events. [Pp. 4-5.]

The Bible is not a history textbook in any modern, twentieth-century sense, but our very salvation depends on the history it relates. That's why we must be thoroughly familiar with that history. Without such familiarity, the nonhistorical passages will not reveal their full meaning to us either. [P. 7.]

Nor is Plantinga inclined to prejudge what in Scripture is to be esteemed as "covenantal" or "religious" (unlike Clouser in "Genesis and the Human Race," pp. 4-5 and passim; cf. note 17, above), advising rather that we "open our minds and hearts fully to scriptural language and seek to be instructed without imposing our ideas and categories on the Bible" (pp. 102-3):

...A Bible-believing Christian must be willing to let God's Word and Spirit dominate his understanding of the biblical message — and he must refrain from imposing his own conditions on the form in which the message comes to him. [P. 3.]

If we are willing to join in this age-old confession about the Bible's divine origin and authority, we must let our thinking and language be shaped by the basic biblical concepts in which the message of redemption through Jesus Christ comes to us. Those concepts cannot be set out and explained within the framework of reference and meaning provided by any one scientific discipline — not even history. In this sense it is certainly true that the Bible is not a textbook. The Bible is sui generis — a book unlike any other — for it speaks to man from a perspective that transcends his own experience.... [P. 102.]

50. See Dooyeweerd's Roots of Western Culture: Pagan, Secular, and Christian Options, trans., John Kraay, ed. Mark Vander Vennen and Bernard Zylstra (Toronto: Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1979), pp. 61-87. Compare with the helpful critique of C. T. McIntire in his introduction to God, History, and the Historians: An Anthology of Modern Christian Views of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 3-26. One need not agree with Dooyeweerd's theory of history to appreciate that Scripture ought not to be required to toe the line of modern canons of history-writing — a difference, I would submit, more stylistic than essential in this case — in order to earn its wings as a certified reporter of actual events intended to be relied on as such for God's own fiducial purposes (see note 27, above).

51. Hebrew Scripture itself, in continual refrains throughout the historical narratives, refers its readers outside its own text to other specified documents if they would pursue details of military, political, or cultural history. Thus we should expect to have to do legitimate historical studies in addition to Bible study if we would understand the fuller embedding context of redemptive history as portrayed authoritatively in Scripture.

52. It could never conceivably have been intended by the Judaism of Jesus' day nor of later centuries, yet there it stands — an ingenuous pointer to the theotic origin of the Bible. See the exhaustive scholarly synthesis, still unsurpassed, by a teaching associate of G. Campbell Morgan (Charles Spurgeon's successor at London's Westminster Chapel) at the Westminster Bible School, Martin Anstey, The Romance of Bible Chronology: An Exposition of the Meaning, and a Demonstration of the Truth, of Every Chronological Statement Contained in the Hebrew Text of the Old Testament, 2 vols. (London, Edinburgh, New York: Marshall Bros., 1913), issued in successive reprints as The Chronology of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Kregel Publications, 1973). A unique feature of this work that has doubtless preserved it from datedness is the studious separation of the Biblical calculations from the sections dealing with comparative chronology of the presumably contemporaneous "secular" eras (more concerning that in Part VI, below). The presentation of these latter conclusions he left strictly open to doubt, anticipating the inevitable vicissitudes of historical interpretation and archaeological discoveries. Here is
the crowning achievement of a long tradition of mainly English chronographers. This brand of scholarship, taking for granted as it must in order to be viable at all the UNITY OF THE BIBLE, is the first item to be dumped in a historical-critical coup. England had notable scholars throughout the 19th century who resisted this takeover long enough to delay the victimization of this unique chronographic expertise until it came to full flower. (Interestingly, the profits from the English edition were donated to the work of the London City Mission.)

See also the masterful and independently worthy epitome of Anstey's system by Philip Mauro, The Wonders of Bible Chronology: From the Creation of Adam to the Resurrection of Jesus Christ (Sterling, Virginia: Grace Abounding Ministries, Inc./GAM Printers, 1987 [1922; rev. 1933]), along with the remarkable companion volume, The Seventy Weeks and the Great Tribulation: A Study of the Last Two Visions of Daniel, and of the Olivet Discourse of the Lord Jesus Christ, rev. ed. (Sterling, Virginia: Grace Abounding Ministries, Inc., 1988 [1923; 1944]), wherein he argues with consummate skill for the historical validity of the final crucial link in the continuous internal chronology of Scripture — the prophetic one stretching from Cyrus the Great to the baptism of Jesus the Messiah. Anstey and Mauro demonstrated the vacuous substance holding together the received chronology of the Persian era prior to Alexander of Macedon. Dispensationalists, Seventh-Day Adventists, and biblical critics alike, all rely in common upon extra-biblical asseverations of credibility in this regard, for their very wide-ranging hermeneutical results. So by identifying the last historic personage of Daniel 11 with Herod the Great (verses 36-45) as unequivocally as multitudes of earlier expositors had identified the preceding royal personages of that chapter with the successors of Alexander the Great, Mauro shattered, in principle, and with a single blow, the presumptive chrono-hermeneutical foundation of all three schemes of speculation. For if that last personage is indeed Herod the Great rather than a future Antichrist, then not only is the entire book of Daniel authenticated as BONAFIDE PROPHECY (since not even the most skeptical of critics would place the writing of Daniel after the time of Herod simply in order to deny the imagined impossibility of such miraculous divine prophecy), but by the same token the bulk of Daniel is additionally vindicated as FULFILLED PROPHECY, and forthwith we are forbidden from speculating fruitlessly about its awaiting fulfillment in some charted near future. For independent confirmation of this remarkable identification, Mauro refers his readers to an earlier author whom he chanced to discover only after his own work was ready for the printer — James Farquharson, Daniel's Last Vision and Prophecy: Respecting Whom Commentators Have Greatly Differed from Each Other, Showing its Fulfillment in Events Recorded in Authentic History (Aberdeen, 1838). Had the Millerites become acquainted with this book when it was first published, they might have been spared the traumatic date-setting debacles of 1843-44, and the subsequent tortured career of Adventism might have been mercifully pre-empted.

A famous American patent lawyer and member of the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, Philip Mauro was converted to Christ at age 44 in 1903. Thereafter he devoted himself to extensive concordant analysis of Scripture (see note 16, above) for more than thirty years, authoring some forty books, by a modest count (not including many titles published only in Great Britain), some translated into Dutch. Soon recognized as an able defender as well as expositor of Scripture, he was invited to contribute to The Fundamentals, the famous early bulkhead of 20th-century Protestant Fundamentalism, for which he penned his vibrant treatise, "Life in the Word," also published separately by the hundreds of thousands in numerous printings. Initially a Dispensationalist by default, by 1918 he had finally come to grips with some of its sprawling interpretive tangles and subsequently exposed many of its central errors — most notably its above-mentioned postponement, parenthesis, or gap theory of Daniel 9:24-27 — and became known as the "Champion of the Kingdom," authoring a steady stream of very cogent refutations that were simultaneously jewels of positive exposition and engaging style. He was a great admirer of Abraham Kuyper, whom he quoted often, even helping prepare for press the English manuscript of the last volume of his exposition The Revelation of St. John, trans. John Hendrik de Vries (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1935), translator's foreword. Turning his acute legal mind to other subjects, he penned the brief that William Jennings Bryan successfully defended at the famous Scopes "monkey trial" in 1925. It must be remembered that Bryan secretly disagreed with this position and, in the end, subverted it, to the lasting reproach both of himself and this cause, by presuming to "defend the Bible." ("Defend the Bible!" quipped C. S. Lewis, adapting Spurgeon, "I'd sooner defend a lion!" The alternative, evidently, is to get eaten alive by the adversary, on this occasion in the guise of Clarence Darrow.) Mauro early became a firm believer in the fact and future of divine healing, authoring several significant, controversial, and widely circulated booklets on the subject, having both experienced its efficacious functioning in his own family and witnessing its reality under the ministry of A. B. Simpson who, like A. J. Gordon, Andrew Murray, and William Boardman, were disciple by Charles Cullis, father of the Faith-Cure movement of the 1870's-80's, a distant precursor of the Third Wave movement a century later.
Pierre Bayle, the erudite 17th-century precursor of the 18th-century Enlightenment and a father of modern historiography, suffered the fate of being perhaps the most misrepresented scholar of modern times, which, it seems, he unintentionally heralded. This Huguenot refugee to Rotterdam suffered the loss of family members to the notorious revocation of the Edict of Nantes during the 1680’s. A faithful Calvinist churchman to the very end, Bayle was portrayed as the chief skeptic of his age by many of his famous epigones of the following century — such as the encyclopedists, philosophes, and deists — including Voltaire, d’Holbach, Hume, Kant, Jefferson, and countless other devoted and distinguished readers who, as might be guessed, quoted him very selectively. His chief claim to fame was his monumental and trailblazing *Historical and Critical Dictionary*, first published during the 1690’s. Building on the work of his few predecessors in the field, he pursued accuracy like a bloodhound, correcting thousands of errors in earlier works. But its unique and most recognizable feature was countless footnotes that often vastly outstripped the main text in length. (Déjà vu! It is no exaggeration to say that he often, even habitually, used obscure historical figures as the formal textual occasions to unleash his own agenda, vendettas and all, in footnotes.)

In them he would spin immensely complex networks of logic and dialectic...all to demonstrate the *vanity of human reason!* Bayle has known no equal in his penetrating aptitude for demolishing philosophical systems of every conceivable description. As Dooyeweerd aptly observed, “By means of his *sceptical arguments against the Cartesian cogito and the mathematical axioms*...the latter had undermined the very foundations of the mathematical science-ideal.” “Bayle’s nominalist doctrine of the two sorts of truth set forth an *absolute cleft between Christian faith and natural reason*. "Bayle laid bare this antithesis [between the Christian faith and the Humanistic science-ideal] in its sharpest form; he accepted a positive conflict between the Christian faith and Humanistic thought." “Bayle considered the Christian religion to be independent of, or rather in open conflict with human reason. He had sharply opposed the Idea of a ‘Vernunftreligion’. His intention had been to retain a place for Christian religion in the ‘heart’.”  (*New Critique* I, 260; emphases mine.)

For, make no mistake, Pierre Bayle was a *fideist*. Not until the 1960’s was he completely exonerated of the charge of being a radical skeptic. During that decade several scholars finally demonstrated the solidly Calvinistic historical antecedents to the major themes and arguments of his writings, placing him securely within his own proper historic milieu. See, notably, Elisabeth Labrousse, *Bayle*, trans. Denys Potts (New York: Oxford University Press/Past Masters, 1983), a brief updated English synopsis of her two-volume masterwork in French (Paris, 1963-64); Walter Rex, *Essays on Pierre Bayle and Religious Controversy* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1965); and Karl C. Sandberg *At the Crossroads of Faith and Reason: An Essay on Pierre Bayle* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1966). They agreed that his skepticism extended to virtually *everything short of faith itself*. To be sure, he was a trenchant and stylistically agile critic of the entire Roman Catholic system: its vaunted antiquity, miracles, relics, scholasticism, theology, papacy, hierarchy, inquisition, what have you. But he did not stop there; he also proceeded to devastate every high-handed intolerance among his fellow Protestants, his chief adversary being the orthodox scholastic Calvinist, Pierre Jurieu, his fellow Rotterdam refugee, former teaching colleague, and onetime friend. For Bayle maintained, in line with good French Calvinistic precedent, that the conscience was inviolable. And this maxim he applied universally, being perhaps the first to do so (even John Locke, his English contemporary, not excepted). It was especially this element of his thought that, understandably, gave it such wide appeal throughout Europe and America in the following century.

Yet his fideism was totally misunderstood. Instead of being seen as an apologist for a sort of “pure” Christianity, unencumbered (and unsupported) by the crutches of humanly rationalized political, theological, or apologetic systems, he was perceived as undermining Christianity itself. All unintentionally, yet imprudently, he overshot his mark, for his fideism — the honest legacy of his resolute Calvinism — had led him to discount even the corroborative support of true divine miracles outside of Scripture. Hence the bitter irony of this most influential of all Calvinists — John Calvin himself alone excepted — that he helped father by his calculated misstep the very movement of modernity against which his fellow-heirs of the Reformation have had to contend on virtually every cultural front ever since: the Enlightenment. He was seen as the friend of all who wrangled under the oppressions of “religion” as such. Much rather, he would have wanted the purity of true religion to stand out unsullied by empty argumentation or coercion, which he saw as issuing only in pride and hypocrisy.

By a curious further irony, his antagonist, Jurieu, became the champion (although for manipulatively hypocritical and myopic reasons of political advantage that proved tragically damaging to French Protestantism) of
the authentic but poorly shepherded Huguenot prophetic movement around the turn of the 18th century. But strange bedfellows are not exclusively the mainstay of satanic deception, they are, pedagogically, the proper domain for practicing spiritual discernment as well.

If there can be said to be "history in the modern sense," Bayle deserves credit for putting the set in the saw. He was the herald and first exemplar of that concern with "scientific" historiography that soon built momentum and finally erupted in the 19th century. It is true, his practice of it even then raised doubts about the historicity (or more often the morality) of some Biblical narratives, and thus undermined, at least to many minds (though he was not malicious, nor a radical "critic" in the later sense) the authority of Scripture as the foundation of faith — the sola scriptura of the Reformation. Yet having said that, modern historical writing, with such a pedigree, seems oddly pitted against the historic claims of a Book so "modern" in its honesty that Bayle uses it successfully to gain leverage against his contemporaries whose theological whitewashing skills only thinly covered — and often for basely personal or partisan aggrandizement — the ugly but indispensable truths reported candidly by Biblical writers.

Yet there can be no question that Bayle lent a mighty and unprecedented impulse to the early career of historical criticism as well. Dooyeweerd credits his "extremely shrewd method of achieving the facts."

In his Dictionnaire historique et critique he had **applied the Cartesian methodical doubt of every opinion to historical tradition**. He had gained the insight that historical facts have not been **given** to scientific inquiry, but that science has been **set the task** to analyse them. In a truly exemplary way scientific accuracy in establishing these facts was elevated by him to the methodical postulate of all real historical inquiry. He was guided in this by the sincere conviction that the historian can serve truth only by detaching himself from any bias of faith, education, and nationality.

There was, however, one thing he forgot: it was precisely that which is essential to a truly historical method of thought, viz. that the historian, as such, is not concerned with the 'facts' in an unqualified sense. History is concerned with the essentially historical aspect of the facts. Because of his scepticism Bayle himself had no room for an idea of development in the proper sense of the word. But for this very reason he lacks any methodical standard to recognize the historical meaning of the facts established by his analysis. The result was that the scrupulous accuracy of his investigation really missed its aim and degenerated into an uncritical accumulation of antiquarian facts without any truly historical connection....[Yet] it cannot be denied that, **guided by the science-ideal of the Enlightenment, historical thought developed in a critical direction as to the verification of facts**. In a technical scientific respect it was superior to both the constructive-theological conception of historiography and to the diplomatical view. [New Critique II, 353; bold emphaes mine.]

In addition, my preliminary research suggests that the most enigmatic tractate to appear during the deistic controversies in England around the early 18th century, *Christianity not Founded on Argument: And the True Principle of Gospel-evidence Assigned: In a Letter to a Young Gentleman at Oxford* (Large, 1741; 3rd ed., 1743; running to 118 pages), by Henry Dodwell (c. 1700-1784), son of the well-known Puritan divine of the same name, suffered a fate similar to Bayle's works, and for like reasons. The title should have been a dead giveaway. Without question it was dependent in spirit on Bayle's own work, published in an English translation during the late 1730's. It is worth observing that Bayle was a master of irony. And although his circumstances as a free citizen of Rotterdam rather than a subject of French Catholic "mercy" did not necessitate irony as a cover of political safety over his literal convictions, yet he employed it liberally nonetheless. And it was this very figure of speech which raised questions also about Dodwell's treatise as to its sincerity. Regrettably, it was summarily mis-classified, as in the words of some anonymous librarian: "Ostensibly a defense of Christianity but actually an attack on it; apparently a parody of both Methodist and deistical tracts." This deceptively trivial device is precisely the stumblingblock of Bayle's volatile style, the convincing watermark of his influence upon Dodwell. They are blood brothers; their kindred legacies of doubt are the culmination of ironical styles (in the case of Bayle, often sustained at great length and with the intention to lampoon; in Dodwell's case more occasional and muted, but arguably with a genuine, if rare in controversy, edificatory intent) operating in tandem with conscientious fideism (not deism).

The divergent careers of Bayle and Dodwell, and of their books, should give us serious pause before adopting the strategies of fideism. Its effect was not, after all, to liberate Biblical religion from false props to faith, but to cause a pernicious cleavage between Biblical narrative and real history. This permitted the former to tell their miracle-stories without any necessity of being taken seriously as history, i.e., as actually happening. In no time
though it must now be. As the plausibility of modern divine miracles diminished under the negligence of fideism and the ill-graces of cessationism, so Christianity suffered a crisis in plausibility. But happily, within three decades of Bayle’s death another Calvinist was raised up who broke decisively with the radical cessationism of Calvin, charting a new course toward another scenario for the final days of Christianity: Jonathan Edwards, the theologian par excellence of revival (see note 13, above), scholastic philosopher though he was (i.e., partitioning reality into two realms, serving two masters). Concerning this latter trait, see Runner, "The Development of Calvinism in North America" (note 16, above): "Jonathan Edwards (1703-58) is a controversial figure. Many Calvinists think of him as a great Calvinist. The fact is that he was influenced by Malebranche, Berkeley, and the Cambridge Platonists, by Locke and Newton, at least as far as the supposed sphere of Nature is concerned. The Great Awakening..., to which he so greatly contributed, was a message of redemption for the individual heart and called for individual fruits of righteousness. Of the patterns of thought at work in the social-economic life of his time Edwards had nothing to say. Yet New England was very rapidly becoming involved in the ways of the Old World...." (P. 20.)

54. The redemptive-historical approach to preaching the historical texts of Scripture, developed to a high point in the Netherlands between the world wars, was responsible in no small degree for nurturing neo-Calvinism toward its remarkable achievements both intellectually and organizationally. With fiducial integrity it staved off the inroads of destructive criticism, without falling into a dessicated propositionalism such as continues to afflict American approaches (stemming largely from Scottish Realism via the Old Princeton theologians; see infra., this note). A thorough treatment of the redemptive-historical approach in English is Sidney Greidanus, Sola Scriptura: Problems and Principles in Preaching Historical Texts (Toronto: Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1970).


Two sets of justly famous popular lectures expounding and illustrating this approach, with a keen critical eye to competing interpretations, are found in A. H. De Graaff and C. G. Seerveld, Understanding the Scriptures: How to Read and Not to Read the Bible, lectures given at the Study Conferences of the A.A.C.S. in the summer of 1968 (Toronto: A.A.C.S., 1968). Seerveld’s lectures were republished as Balaam’s Apocalyptic Prophecies: A Study in Reading Scripture (Toronto: Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1980). It has likewise served as inspiration for the Bible story book by Lowell Hagan and Jack Westerhof, Theirs Is the Kingdom: The New Testament, illustrated by Paul Stoub (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986) which clearly outstrips other treatments on the market; the mellow and sensitively nuanced realism of the illustrations (reminiscent of Rembrandt’s reverent casualness) places this in a class all its own. We await a companion Old Testament volume with anticipation!

A decisive analysis – from the philosophically Reformational and homiletically redemptive-historical tradition – of the stance toward Scripture predominating in the American Reformed tradition is John C. Vander Stelt, Philosophy and Scripture: A Study in Old Princeton and Westminster Theology (Marlton, N.J.: Mack Publishing Co., 1978). This stands undoubtedly as the most searching appraisal and critique of the Princeton theology's
doctrine of Scripture (now very widespread also among other Evangelicals) from an alternative position maintaining a high view of Scripture. Vander Stelt takes apart the Biblically alien philosophical substructure deriving from Scottish Common Sense Realism that managed to skirt the great desirability, as we have seen, of current divine self-attestation by signs and miracles — analogous proof — only to arrive at a hollow "certainty" of faith. H. Evan Runner, in his significant embryonic essay, "The Development of Calvinism in North America" (see previous note), cites to good effect the telling observation on early Arminianism by Prof. Isaak A. Dorner, eminent historian of doctrine from Berlin: "Faith, instead of resulting in a living fellowship with God and the possession of salvation, which is involved therein, is resolved into a receiving of the doctrines and commands of positive revelation; and THE SUBJECTIVITY SETS ITSELF TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF THE DEMONSTRATION OF THE SPIRIT AND OF POWER BY PROOFS FOR THE CREDIBILITY OF THE REVELATION" (p. 15, emphasis mine), i.e., sterile, not to say antiquated and obsolescent, apologetics. Runner goes on with quick strokes to assay the force of Cambridge Platonism and, in part III, to weigh the point-blank impact of Scottish Realism. This is the philosophic legacy to which B. B. Warfield was heir (see note 13, above). For since the "mighty acts of God" are out of town on holiday, despite some mighty tall talkin', about "propositional revelation," "infallibility," "inerrancy," and "plenary inspiration," when it comes down to the draw, this move comes off somehow decidedly uninspired and awkward without the certitude of God's chosen external witness of the Holy Spirit in identifiable current historic deeds of power-filled liberation. *Mene, mene, tekel, upharsin.* After all, it is precisely this external witness that is co-witnessed by the "internal witness" of that same Spirit. (Tangentially, it is no mystery why the promising "biblical theology movement" of the 1940's-60's petered out. Their grand pulpit talk about the "mighty acts of God" was not matched by analogous experience in the pew. See Brevard S. Childs, Biblical Theology in Crisis [Phila.: The Westminster Press, 1970], p. 85.)

I have Vander Stelt to thank for especially stressing to me, among other points, the necessity of thorough knowledge of historical context for a sound Biblical hermeneutic. In the same spirit, already in 1972 Spykman had issued a call for a solution to the paradoxical inevitability "that an historical method of biblical studies, stressing an approach to the Bible as history, should end in an almost total undermining of the historical reliability of biblical revelation," Gordon J. Spykman, "Scripture, Faith, and Science" (paper delivered at the Reformed Ecumenical Synod [now Council] Conference on Scripture, Sydney, Australia, August, 1972). He concluded:

...What then, is there no way of setting ourselves free for a new break-through in biblical interpretation?

What I am asking is this: is there a way out of this ambiguous position toward a more consistently Reformed method of biblical hermeneutics? I propose that Reformed scholarship place this question on its agenda as a matter of high priority. To accept this challenge would call for a hermeneutic which does full justice to Scripture both as history of redemption and as history of redemption.

Who knows, perhaps we have been called to the Kingdom for precisely such a task as this. The time is ripe for Reformed scholarship once again to assume a leadership role in biblical thinking. [P. 12.]

55. A reference to the time machine, in the unassuming form of an English police booth, commanded by the "time lord" Dr. Who, the metamorphosing start(s) of the longest-running British TV science-fiction series...of all time!


57. See the lucid analysis by R. Hooykaas, [Natural Law and Divine Miracle: The Principle of Uniformity in Geology, Biology and Theology] (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1963). Sailer's argument (note 5, above) that Genesis 1-2 draws upon "real analogies" (p. 245) between those "absolutely unique" events and everyday events that we now experience falls a hairbreadth short of grasping that Biblical and present-day miracles of Divine healing ("re-creation") pose a much more obvious analogy to those acts of creation than for us to have to fall back defensively on protecting their "unique and unrepeatable" status simply in order to prevent the "Big Bang" analogy from backing up out of the sewer of uniformitarian naturalism instead (see note 13, above, on verification by analogous events).
58. Adapting a retort from the Jewish-Italian chemist and writer Primo Levi, who was responding to astonishing denials that the Holocaust ever really happened. HISTORY is a marvelous cathartic for purging the fetid bolus of indigestible speculations, the effluvium of fermenting ruminations — the hot air — from the bowels of science. For it is precisely the veritable reports of strange occurrences, odd events, and paradoxical happenings that stimulate the cerebral peristalsis to expel over-digested paradigms and to hunger for explanations of these curious phenomena that are both more satisfying to the understanding and more nourishing to the imagination. Here, as always, truth is stranger than fiction, and History is more energizing, more invigorating, more efficacious than Myth. For History arouses and tantalizes the mind to seek solutions to real mysteries. Solutions fill us with predictive power and thus equip us to take our proper dominion over the works of God's creative hand. We are therefore more fully human when furnished with true history and more deeply conscious of our environment and its possibilities as well as limitations and resistance to our dominion. In the words of Peter Smith, a foremost British geophysicist, writing about the emerging victory of Alfred Wegener's theory of continental drift: "[If] for once it was shown beyond reasonable doubt that drift had occurred the objection based on the inability to think of a mechanism lost its force. There are no two ways about it; if drift had occurred there must be a mechanism, however difficult it may be to imagine" (emphases mine). Peter J. Smith, "Wegener's Legacy," in S.I.S. Review 5 (1981): 31 (reprinted from Open Earth).

59. Immanuel Velikovsky, Theses for the Reconstruction of Ancient History: From the End of the Middle Kingdom in Egypt to the Advent of Alexander the Great (New York and Jerusalem: Scripta Academica Hierosolymitana, 1946). Albert Einstein, a close friend and consultant of Velikovsky, as well as fellow-resident of Princeton until his death in 1955, published in this series too, which was founded by the latter's father, Simon Velikovsky (a founding father also of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem).


61. (New Haven: Yale University Press). Meanwhile, Van Seters remorselessly continues to reload and fire such missiles as In Search of History: Historiography in the Ancient World and the Origins of Biblical History (Yale, 1983); Prologue to History: The Yahwist as Historian in Genesis (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992); and The Life of Moses: The Yahwist as Historian in Exodus-Numbers (Westminster/John Knox, 1994). Such critical deconstructions may well serve as the "hammer of the Lord" (the real "Yahwist") to judge the stubbornness of the more well-intentioned (from a fiducial standpoint) conservative faction, but to give their thetical constructs any credence whatever verges on credulity — a fateful leap from the frying pan into the fire.

62. (London: SCM; Maryknoll: Orbis, 1979). This work, following the lead of George Mendenhall, has subsequently come under the gun of even more ferocious critics. See Lemche, Early Israel (following note). To sound a mildly alarmist note, such ephemeral, transitory fame — not to say rapid oblivion — may all too soon prove the fate of every new volume on this subject, whatever its fiducial persuasion, that does not break decisively with traditional relative chronology and strike out onto the still-fresh trail blazed by Velikovsky half a century ago.

64. Velikovsky also published a brilliant study comparing the circumstances surrounding the life of Pharaoh Akhnaton, Oedipus (according to conventional chronology a predecessor or contemporary of Moses) with the famous Greek tragedy cycle, Oedipus. He identifies the two ancient personages as one and the same, a conclusion not at all far-fetched (Freud and others had noticed similarities) when taken in the context of his chronological revision (verified on independent grounds). Widely and favorably reviewed, especially in Europe, it supplies strong supplementary evidence from an unexpected quarter for Velikovsky’s position, although he does not include it in his historical reconstruction series proper. Oedipus and Akhnaton: Myth and History (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960).

65. Immanuel Velikovsky, Peoples of the Sea: The Concluding Volume of the Ages in Chaos Series (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1977). The delay of a quarter century before the shuttle resumed weaving the warp of evidence with the woof of argument understandably played havoc with professional expectations — substituting a pall of forgetfulness for the fabric of promise — despite how rugged the sequels may now prove regardless.

66. Immanuel Velikovsky, Ramses II and His Time: A Volume in the Ages in Chaos Series (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1978). I have written a lengthy joint review of the three volumes published so far in this series, “An Ancient History Review,” typescript (Minneapolis, 1983). I have also compiled a categorized bibliography that arranges the available periodical literature by Velikovsky and others from Pensée (the first such journal, published from Portland, Oregon between 1972 and 1975) and KRONOS, which contributes to his full systematic reconstruction, sequencing them chronologically along with the chapters of his books on this subject. Both are available by contacting this writer. The major work to incorporate and expand on Velikovsky’s published reconstruction prior to these last two volumes is Donovan A. Courville, The Exodus Problem and its Ramifications, 2 vols. (Loma Linda, Calif.: Challenge Books, 1971). He extrapolated both forward and backward from that era, but did not anticipate certain unforeseen anomalies that Velikovsky encountered and overcame in the subsequent volumes.

Credit for being the first — and as yet only — evangelical scholar to wrestle with this system sufficiently (in its then-current stage of completion) to incorporate it into a textbook, goes to Uuras Saarnivaara, the eminent Finnish evangelical Lutheran theologian and historian, in his magnum opus of some 800 pages, Can the Bible Be Trusted? Old and New Testament Introduction and Interpretation (Minneapolis: Osterhus Publishing House, 1983).
67. The Dark Age of Greece and The Assyrian Domination. Had they bulked less, they would have been combined under the title In the Time of Isaiah and Homer. Although they were finished in typescript before Velikovsky’s death in 1979, I was informed by Ev Cochrane, editor of Aeon, now (since the discontinuation of KRONOS) the major American journal devoted to his thought, that his heirs have disagreed over what to do with the volumes, so they remain officially and professionally inaccessible for reasons of copyright law.

In the meantime, British scholars have recently struck out on their own — regretfully, without the benefit of public access to this basic research — and published their own version of part of the reconstruction yet remaining: Peter James in collaboration with I. J. Thorpe, Nikos Kokkinos, Robert Morkot and John Frankish, Centuries of Darkness: A Challenge to the Conventional Chronology of Old World Archaeology, foreword by Colin Renfrew (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1993). Running to more than 450 pages, this is a major achievement in line with Velikovsky’s challenge to established variants of traditional “secular” chronology of antiquity (see my Summary Theses XII-XV, above). Another recent work heavily dependent on Velikovsky’s reconstruction (much more, it would appear, than its author credits) is David Rohl’s On Pharaohs and Kings: A Biblical Quest (New York: Crown Publishing Group/Random House, 1996). But at least Rohl cites Velikovsky. An earlier work by John J. Bimson, Redating the Exodus and Conquest, 2nd (new format) ed. (Sheffield: The Almond Press, 1981 [1978]), doesn’t even do that much. And although it was well and widely received, it has gone the way of so many half-measures, for it did not dare to go the whole nine yards and break from the pack to score the goal. It remains a curious monument to the peril of mongrelizing incompatible reconstructions.

68. Prior to this symposium, I learned of a young Dutch scholar who is networking with the journals currently devoted to the ramifications of that growing tradition, Aeon (Ames, Iowa) and Chronology and Catastrophe Review: Journal of the Society for Interdisciplinary Studies (formerly S.I.S. Review, England). Yet a groundswell seems nowhere in sight. The most extensive and promising elaboration of which I am aware, from an openly evangelical point of departure, is that of Bradley Sparks. He has also added considerable depth to this reconstruction of human history and chronology in the period prior to the Exodus, thus extrapolating the implications of Velikovsky’s discoveries to eras, such as the patriarchal, on which he published little or nothing.

69. E.g., Gerhard Maier, The End of the Historical-Critical Method, trans. Edwin W. Leverenz, ed. Rudolf F. Norden (St. Louis, Missouri: Concordia Publishing House, 1977). It is a foregone conclusion that when historical-criticism-as-we-know-it meets its come-uppance, every other school of criticism (source, redaction, form, rhetorical, literary, etc., and, though with less force, even textual or “lower”) must reel under the impact. But this humiliation of “higher” criticism in some cases will only amount to a shaking off of sandy foundations and removal onto a solid base. It is too early to tell how these reconstituted sub-disciplines will look after their remodelling in their new neighborhood (see note 44, above). To be sure, Velikovsky devoted only a couple of pages explicitly to issues surrounding historical criticism of the Bible as such. See “Bible Criticism and the Documents of Ras Shamra,” in Ages in Chaos, pp. 194-96. But there he dares not venture a pronouncement concerning any imminent dissolution.

70. Historical Criticism of the Bible: Methodology or Ideology?, translated from the German of Wissenschaft oder Meinung? Anfragen und Alternativen (Neuhausen, West Germany: Hässler-Verlag, 1986) by Robert W. Yarbrough (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1990); idem, Is There a Synoptic Problem?: Rethinking the Literary Dependence of the First Three Gospels, translation of Gibt es ein synoptisches Problem? (Neuhausen, Germany: Hässler-Verlag, 1992) by Robert W. Yarbrough (Baker, 1992). From the present perspective, the rather artificial task of fine-tuning the micro-order of synoptic pericopes pales in comparison to the pre-eminence of resolving on the real-event actuality of the episodes regardless of pedagogical arrangement or evangelistic adaptation to intentionally different target audiences. Yet Linnemann has evidently not traced the lineage of historical criticism per se back to the spurious Egyptian chronology that lent plausibility to the basal infidelity of the whole Enlightenment project of Bible criticism (see note 75, below). Indeed, it is still an open question how she might absorb and evaluate Velikovsky’s unique historical counterthrust in view of the fact that her own change of heart was in no way dependent on it.

71. For a brief and uncommonly astute disquisition concerning the enigma why virtual semi loads of books have rolled off the presses for centuries to destructively criticize this one lone Book, fostering a veritable industry to break down its immunity to obsolescence and pry open its tenacious grip on millions of otherwise doomed
Some Evangelicals are trying to navigate a treacherous middle course. See Mark A. Noll, *Between Faith and Criticism: Evangelicals, Scholarship, and the Bible in America* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986). This venture faces the imminent tectonic shift of chronologic plates that may send a tsunami over their efforts. A glance at Noll's Afterword to the 2nd edition (1991; the only substantial difference between the two) indicates no appreciable change of heart among Christian scholars over these issues.


The famed English Egyptologist Sir Alan Gardiner refers wryly to "what is euphemistically called Egyptian history. That I have devoted so much discussion to what survives of Manetho in the corrupt excerpts of later chronographers will need no excuse for those familiar with the evolution of our science; no Egyptologist has yet been able to free himself from the shackles imposed by the native annalist's thirty dynasties, and these are likely always to remain the essential framework of our modern expositions" (emphasis mine; this likelihood having now been overturned, what remains is not a tidy list but a janitorial task with career-long potential), *Egypt of the Pharaohs: An Introduction,* corrected reprint (Oxford, 1964), vi; quoted in part by John Dayton, *Minerals, Metals, Glazing, and Man: Or Who Was Sesostris I?* (London: Harrap, 1978). Dayton has distinguished himself by challenging the assumptions of the deeply embedded scheme of "metal ages" in the modern reckoning of ancient eras. As with Claude F. A. Schaeffer, the eminent French archaeologist and stratigraphic specialist who assaulted key assumptions of comparative stratigraphy, Dayton likewise had to get a firmer grasp on the hilt of ancient mining, metallurgy, and technologies than was common in order to reach his results. The individual strength of these positions would gain immensely from a mutual summit of scholars aware of their aggregate significance. But without the golden thread of a critical comparative chronology such as Velikovsky has furnished, this realization may never crystallize. The high esteem in which Velikovsky was held by such specialists as Robert Pfeiffer, Claude Schaeffer, Etienne Drioton, and, toward the end of his life, even W. F. Albright, to name but a few notables, is some measure of the seriousness with which his discoveries deserve to be met. And in the opposite corner we have the scoffing and unruffled Goliath, long-time defending champion of Manetho's oppressive dynastic hegemony (with but inconsequential "critical" variations), University of Toronto's Donald B. Redford. See his *Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times* (Princeton University Press, 1992) - yet another fatuous exercise in spinning gold into straw.

"With the exception of Fulton Oursler, who wrote an article for the Reader's Digest [although hardly a repository of refereed scholarship] correlating Velikovsky's thesis with the Old Testament - a duplication of effort considering that Ages in Chaos is a supreme demonstration of Velikovsky's skill as a biblical scholar and historian - no Christian theologian or Old Testament scholar of any note supported consideration of the thesis that the Old Testament might be historically accurate in many respects.

"Christianity lost a chance to recoup its lost ground and assert the historical nature of its revelation. Instead, as we have seen, Christian scholars continued to view the Exodus as the glorification of romantic Hebraic legends. Was it perhaps the threat that the verification of the historical nature of the Old Testament on a world basis was also the verification of the legends of many of the competing religions? Did not the historical nature of religion frighten Christians who had not believed the Bible after all?" (emphases mine), Vine Deloria, Jr., *God Is Red* (New York: Dell Publishing Co./A Delta Book, 1973), p. 149. See especially his detailed *The Metaphysics of Modern Existence* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1979). This native-American scholar and activist is no friend to Christianity. Still, his perceptiveness concerning the reasons why this potentially "greatest contribution to the investigation of ancient times ever written" (see note 56, above) was so roundly rejected by the Christian scholarly establishment of earlier decades may well be right on target. Matters have changed little since then.
APPENDIX

FURTHER REFLECTION

Many of the contributors in this volume have had a great influence on my thinking. And I believe that their contributions in the area of theology will do much to shape the thinking of younger leaders in what is called the Third Wave. With this in mind I have given thought to areas in which I believe serious theological reflection needs to be done by qualified scholars.

Please understand that in raising these questions I neither offer answers nor do I feel qualified to discover them. I am a pastor, not a theologian. My hope is that some of these concerns may stimulate the interest of people more qualified than I, and bring new insights that will bless the body of Christ.

1. Define the kingdom paradigm. I have become uncomfortable with speaking of the "supernatural," "miracles," and "signs and wonders," as though they are abnormal events or dimensions in the "real" world of material cause and effect. In part this has to do with my growing understanding of the radicalness of the kingdom of God. It seems that when we enter Christ we come under a new rule and reign, we enter and live in the kingdom of God.

Here's my question: shouldn't we begin thinking about the kingdom of God in more radical ways, defining ultimate reality as God's kingdom, and the world in which we live as, to borrow C. S. Lewis's term, a "shadow world"? This raises questions about what it means to enter and live under the kingdom of God. For example, what does it mean to have a kingdom paradigm shift? I suspect further thinking on the kingdom of God is a key to future Third Wave theology and practice.

2. How has the scientific method infiltrated evangelical theology and practice, and what should we do about it? In the foreword to the book Power Encounters I write:

The historical-critical method itself is not responsible for this departure [the denial of the supernatural today.
by many evangelicals], though I believe at times it inclines Christians away from a deeper spirituality.
Commenting on the historical-critical method in *The Use of the Bible in Theology—Evangelical Options*, New Testament scholar Russell P. Spittler says, "The historical-critical method when applied to Scripture, is both legitimate and necessary—but inadequate,... inadequate because... the end of biblical study cannot consist in historical dates or tentative judgments about complicated and conjectured literary origins. The end of biblical study consists rather in enhanced faith, hope and love for the individual and the community" (p. 97). Reliance on this method of Scripture study, which dominates most Western conservative evangelical theological seminaries and graduate schools, can produce intellectual, but not necessarily spiritual Christian leaders. (p. xxvi.)

Now, my point isn’t to downgrade serious biblical studies. But I ask: does the historical-critical method, especially as practiced in most seminaries, produce the kind of fruit that we are looking for? Is it pointing students (especially future leaders) toward a relationship with Jesus Christ? And is it strengthening that relationship?

The historical-critical method is rooted in scientism, a way of thinking that has captured the Western mind in this century. Scientism is the principle that scientific methods can and should be applied in all fields of investigation—including religion. There is much we have to be thankful for from the scientific method; because of it many foolish and hurtful ideas have been discarded (e.g. false ideas about the races), and it has paved the way to scientific and technological discovery. But have we allowed it to invade our approach to Scripture study to the degree that it now controls our thinking, in many instances excluding from the realm of thinking and faith those things that should be a part of the Christian life?

I also have questions about how the scientific method influences Christians’ practices. For example, I have heard more than one Christian say that all healings must be validated by modern medicine before they will consider them true. I'm not fearful of modern medicine scrutinizing healings, but I am afraid of the mentality that sets science up as the standard by which Christian practice is judged. It’s as if doctors are the new priestly caste; only they are qualified to validate religious experience.

Let’s think of this a little differently. What if someone walked into a pastor’s office and said, "I have been a sinner all my life—drug user, hater of my parents, fornicator. This morning I repented and turned my heart to Christ. I feel like a new person!" Now, I ask, how many pastors would send this person to a psychologist to be tested to "prove" he was truly converted and is now emotionally well adjusted? Or would they send him to an ethicist to verify that in fact he now believes Judeo-Christian ethics? Here’s my point: our skeptical responses to reports of signs and wonders show we are more affected by
modern scientism than we want to admit.

Science has become the primary ideology in the Western world, replacing Christianity as the predominant religion. And, the religion of modern science is quite intolerant of any views that challenge its presuppositions. Certainly this is true of most colleges and universities today, as Allan Bloom argues in his book *The Closing of the American Mind*. To question modern scientific presuppositions is to commit heresy, which is one explanation for Christianity's loss of stature in Western society over the past fifty years.

Finally, the scientific method of Bible study tends to control areas of theological exploration. It does this in two ways. First, it eliminates some areas of investigation. Among many liberal Christians topics like demons and healing are not worthy of serious consideration. They are ruled out as incompatible with a modern worldview. The issue here is plausibility; some subjects are acceptable within a scientific worldview, others are not. The latter are discarded, and anyone interested in studying them is labelled a "fundamentalist" (horrors!) and narrow-minded person.

Second—and this is far more difficult to combat—the scientific method of Bible study *alters* how we study certain topics. That is, it controls the nature of our investigation. Few theologians give serious consideration to topics like healing, demons, or tongues. But if they do their approach frequently is framed in scientifically acceptable criteria. So, for example, studies of tongues may include "tongues from a psychological perspective," "the history of tongues, 1869 to present," or "the sociological affects of tongues." (In fact, I own books that treat tongues in these fashions.) Theologians who do treat a topic like tongues with the assumption that it is a supernatural gift from God that is possible to experience today lose professional stature in the eyes of their colleagues. They are especially in hot water if they suggest ways to put into practice subjects like divine healing or tongues. It’s when one adds practice to theory that you find out what people truly believe.

So, here’s my question: what are our presuppositions as we approach theology? It may be acceptable to employ psychology, sociology, anthropology, medicine, and other disciplines in the theological task, but what are our controls? If Scripture conflicts with modern medicine or modern psychology, which wins out?