A brief Marcuse bibliography

1932 Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit.
1941 Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. (Abbreviation: RR)
1955 Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud.
1967 The Critical Spirit: Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse (including a bibliography up to April 1, 1967).

A brief biography

Most of us had never heard of Herbert Marcuse until the paperback edition of One-Dimensional Man (1964) reached the New Left Movement a few years ago. Since then he has been in the forefront of the debate concerning the foundation and direction of advanced industrial society. Who is he?

Marcuse has lived the life of a scholar, not that of the angry anarchist with hand-grenades in his belt. His life embodies the rule of human history: ideas precede action. Commitment to central, integral views about the nature of man and society is a requisite for social change, for meaningful social change.

He was born just before that great nineteenth-century gave way to an even greater era in the history of human civilization: our era, in which the battle for direction of men's allegiances is no longer national but global. He was born in Berlin: the center of Prussian autocratic regimes, the citadel of Bismarck, the civitas terrena where world wars were planned, executed and - thank God - lost. He was one of the many great German
scholars who fled Hitler's regime to find refuge in the United States. Once in America, his scholarly life continued, first in New York, then at Harvard, Brandeis, and of late in California. In 1941 he published a learned book on Hegel and the rise of social theory. It went largely unnoticed - after all, America was fighting a war for freedom and democracy. But the title of that book, in its directness and simplicity, summarizes the entirety of Marcuse's thought: Reason and Revolution. New books followed much later: in the fifties he published one on Freud and another on Soviet Marxism. But then, twenty-five years after he arrived in the United States, he wrote a book about it - one that made him famous. What does he say about the most 'advanced industrial society' in the world?

The alienation of one-dimensional man

In our society, Marcuse argues, men become things. We pride ourselves in being part of the freest, wealthiest, and most democratic society history has ever known. Over against this misconception into which we have been ideologically brainwashed, Marcuse repeats the indictment of Marx and Engels and Lenin:

The executive of the modern state is simply a committee for managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie.
(Communist Manifesto, 1848)

Democracy for an insignificant majority, democracy for the rich - that is the democracy of capitalist society. If we look more closely into the mechanism of capitalist democracy, everywhere . . . we shall see restrictions upon restrictions of Democracy. . . . (I)n their sum these restrictions exclude and thrust out the poor from politics and from an active share in democracy. Marx splendidly grasped the essence of capitalist democracy when . . . he said that the oppressed are allowed, once every few years to decide which particular representatives of the oppressing class are to represent and repress them in Parliament.
(Lenin, State and Revolution, 1917)

Marcuse himself describes our society as one

- which compels the vast majority of the population to "earn" their living in stupid, inhuman, and unnecessary jobs,
- which conducts its booming business on the back of ghettos, slums, and internal and external colonialism,
- which is infested with violence and repression while demanding obedience and compliance from the victims of violence and repression,
- which, in order to sustain the profitable productivity on which its hierarchy depends, utilizes its vast resources for waste, destruction, and an ever-more methodical creation of conformist needs and satisfactions.
(An Essay on Liberation, 62)

This society, in his view, is essentially totalitarian. The technical apparatus "imposes its economic and political requirements for defense
and expansion on labor time and free time, on the material and intellectual culture." (OEM 3) For 'totalitarian' does not only refer to a political coordination of society; it can also refer to a "non-terroristic economical-technical coordination which operates through the manipulation of needs by vested interests." The technical productivity "mobilizes society as a whole, above and beyond any particular individual or group interests." (idem)

This advanced industrial society has become one-dimensional; that is, the requisite dimension of critique and transformation is largely eliminated. The technical apparatus of production and distribution "determines not only the socially needed occupations, skills, attitudes, but also the individual needs and aspiration. It thus obliterates the opposition between private and public existence, between individual and social needs. Technology serves to institute new, more effective, and more pleasant forms of social control and social cohesion." (ODM xv) This one-dimensional society is "capable of containing qualitative change for the foreseeable future." It can, by sheer force, contain the possibility for a meaningful re-direction: for a change from quantity to quality, from unfreedom to freedom, from injustice to justice. It can do so since it can effectively suffocate those needs which demand liberation while it sustains and absolves the destructive power and repressive functions of the affluent society. In this totalitarian context even the notion of 'liberty' can become a powerful ideologically weapon of domination, of maintaining man in his condition of alienation - alienation from one's true self, from one's fellow-man, and from the product of one's labor. For

The range of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and what is chosen by the individual . . . Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves. Free choice among a wide variety of goods and services does not signify freedom if these goods and services sustain social controls over a life of toil and fear - that is, if they sustain alienation. (ODM 7, 8)

At the same time, because of the dialectical character of human society, there are also "forces and tendencies . . . which may break this containment and explode the society." (ODM xv) The potentialities for liberation and justice are present in the historical continuum. How can man become conscious of these potentialities? How can they be recognized, seized, and realized? How can reason become revolution?

The weakness of positive thinking

Before these questions can be answered Marcuse must expose the weakness of positive thinking. It is present in the sterility of Aristotelian formal logic, in Aquinas, in the rationalism and empiricism of the early modern period, in contemporary mathematical and symbolic logic, and in language analysis. (ODM 139)

It is an old way of thinking, this 'positivism,' perhaps finding its source in primitive religions. Primitive man found gods and spirits and fates
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everywhere; in the brooks, in the rivers, in the forests; in sun, moon and star. In the measure that man deified nature man was not truly a subject, conscious of himself. In that measure, too, man did not really live as man - in autonomy, in freedom - but he was being lived, controlled by external forces which he had not mastered.

In a philosophical context, we note a similar juxtaposition in the relation between man and the world, subject and object, reason and fact. The domain of 'the world,' objectivity, factuality, and human 'experience' is given an independence external to the mind of man, the subject, and its Reason. This externalization has two detrimental results: a) the world of facts assumes a life of its own; and b) human thought assumes a life of its own. This was first clearly evident in the contrast between Plato's dialectical and Aristotle's formal logic, couched in the ir-relevant context of a bios theoreticos:

In this formal logic, thought is indifferent toward its objects. Whether they are mental or physical, whether they pertain to society or to nature, they become subject to the same general laws of organization, calculation, and conclusion - but they do so as fungible signs or symbols, in abstraction from their particular "substance." This general quality (quantitative quality) is the precondition of law and order - in logic as well as in society - the price of universal control. (ODM 136)

Formal logic is thus the first step on the long road to scientific thought - the first step only, for a much higher degree of abstraction and mathematization is still required to adjust the modes of thought to technological rationality.

The methods of logical procedure are very different in ancient and modern logic, but behind all difference is the construction of a universally valid order of thought, neutral with respect to material content. . . .

Formal logic foreshadows the reduction of secondary to primary qualities in which the former become the measurable and controllable properties of physics. The elements of thought can be scientifically organized - as the human elements can be organized in the social reality. (ODM 137, 138: emphasis added)

The consequence of this 'positive thinking' is a shift in authority from reason to fact, from subject to object:

From Hume to the present-day logical positivists, the principle of this latter philosophy has been the ultimate authority of the fact, and observing the immediate given has been the ultimate method of verification. . . . The protagonists of this positivism took great pains to stress the conservative and affirmative attitude of their philosophy: it induces thought to be satisfied with the facts, to renounce any transgression beyond them, and to bow to the given state of affairs. (AR 27; emphasis added)
Positivism, by accepting the 'common-sense stability of the world' (RR 127), leaves the world as it is. This status quo attitude of positivistic epistemology leads to a 'conformist skepticism' in the entire development of the social sciences in the twentieth century (RR 256 f), since it amounts to "giving up the real potentialities of mankind for a false and alien world". (RR 113) Why is this so?

The positivist attack on universal concepts, on the ground they cannot be reduced to observable facts, cancels from the domain of knowledge everything that may not yet be a fact.... The universal is more than the particular. This signifies in the concrete that the potentialities of men and things are not exhausted in the given forms and relations in which they actually appear. (RR 113; emphasis added)

The positivistic opposition to the principle that the matters of fact of experience have to be justified before the court of reason... prevented the interpretation of these 'data' in terms of a comprehensive critique of the given itself. Such a criticism no longer had a place in science. In the end, positive philosophy facilitated the surrender of thought to everything that existed and manifested the power to persist in experience. (RR 327; emphasis in original)

On this basis Marcuse arrives at a devastating critique of what goes on in the modern university. This institution has all the 'facts' at its 'disposal.' The student is confronted - in the natural as well as in the social sciences - with data, information, techniques, skills. But the student is not in control of the facts: they control him, since they controlled the professor before him. Why? Because the facts are not placed in a context which gives them meaning. The factors behind the facts are totally overlooked: the facts are accepted as given, as they are. For this reason the university defends the status quo: it has totally adjusted to the given situation of the one-dimensional society. Its critique of the given situation is always from within the system. It does not have an Archimedean point. And within the labyrinth of the modern multi-versity students get lost. Though proclaiming the 'supremacy of thought,' the university is an instance of the 'impotence of thought.' (ODM 135) It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that students burn - with anger, with fire.

There is no time here to enter an analysis of Marcuse's critique of the ways in which 'positive thinking' is evident in the various movements: in operationalism, behaviorism, symbolic logic, and linguistic analysis. Against all these streams of thought he comes with his indictment that they tragically ignore the universal, larger and denser context in which men speak and act and live - a context which gives meaning to human speaking and acting and living. He means serious business. For what is this larger context of human existence?

This larger context of experience, this real empirical world, today is still that of the gas chambers and concentration camps, of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of American Cadillacs and German Mercedes, of the Pentagon and the Kremlin, of the nuclear cities and the Chinese
communes, of Cuba, of brainwashing and massacres. But the real empirical world is also that in which all these things are taken for granted or forgotten or repressed or unknown, in which people are free. It is a world in which the broom in the corner or the taste of something like pineapple are quite important, in which the daily toil and the daily comforts are perhaps the only items that make up all experience. And this second restricted empirical universe is part of the first; the powers that rule the first also shape the restricted experience.

(ODM 180)

The scientist and the philosopher - Marcuse asserts - cannot deal with any supposedly neutral fact 'outside of the human mind' unless he views it in its meaningful context. I agree with Marcuse up to this point, though the ultimate context from which 'facts' derive their meaning-coherence will be radically different for him that it is for me. Marcuse is a Marxist humanist; I am a Christian. But I am willing to learn a good deal from him, keeping in mind not only Romans 1:18 but also 1:25. How can facts be meaningfully understood? With Hegel Marcuse tells us: "The real field of knowledge is not the given fact about things as they are, but the critical evaluation of them as a prelude to passing beyond their given form." (RR 145)

Or again: "The truth cannot be gleaned from the facts as long as the subject does not live in them but rather stands against them. The world of facts is not rational but has to be brought to reason, that is, to a form in which the reality actually corresponds to the truth." (RR 156)

The power of negative thinking

Marcuse published his major work "in the hope that it would make a small contribution to the revival, not of Hegel, but of a mental faculty which is in danger of being obliterated: the power of negative thinking." (RR, 1960 Preface, vii) Hegel defines the matter thus: "Thinking is, indeed, 'essentially the negation of that which is immediately before us.'" (idem)

In the present context I am not interested in the first place in the correctness of Marcuse's use of Hegel's categories, but in the place they occupy in his own system.

Before entering an altogether too compact summary of that system, one might 'place' the notion of negation thus: Positivistic thought finds the gods in the facts, which must be 'obeyed.' Negative thought finds god in thought itself, in human reason, in the subject: and that god, that reason, must govern and master the facts. Negative thought must break down the given reality in order to create a new world by transforming these facts so that they are adjusted to reason. This process of negation is not merely epistemological and ontological, but also sociological and ethical. "Epistemology is in itself ethics, and ethics is epistemology." (ODM 125)

When man as philosopher locks around he is not confronted with a rational and orderly world, governed by laws inherent in its being nor by laws proceeding out of the mouth of a Creator. Rather, when man looks closely at the environment that encompasses him he discovers that the world contradicts itself. There is 'nothing' to the 'world out there' until it
becomes a part of man's world: the object is meaningful only in relation to the subject. The stone is 'nothing' until it becomes a building-block for the house: the 'reality' of the stone must be negated before it is affirmed. The seed must be destroyed before it can grow into a powerful oak. There is a dialectical process in reality, a process between a finite now and a realization of a greater potential tomorrow. "Finite things are 'negative' - and this is a defining characteristic of them; they never are what they can and ought to be. They always exist in a state that does not fully express their potentialities as realized. The finite thing has as its essence 'this absolute unrest,' this striving 'not to be what it is.'" (RR 65f) The philosopher, confronted with the contradictions in the world of facts, must negate that world, must destroy 'the fixed and secure world of common sense' (RR 48), because in that world of ordinary experience there is an element of negativity, an antagonism between the apparent 'real' and the not 'realized' potential. (RR 66)

In *Reason and Revolution* Marcuse shows his dependence upon the Hegelian dialectic in developing this thought. But he also goes beyond Hegel to the birth of western philosophy, for the 'different modes of thought which clash with each other' (ODM 124) have been with us from the beginning. It must be noted here that Marcuse does not go back to the Hebrew-Christian mind, in terms of which he might have been able to overcome both a) the neutrality of objective fact by accepting the scriptural view of reality as creation and b) the dialectic conception that reality displays an 'antagonistic structure' by accepting the scriptural view of a Redeemer in whom all things cohere.

Since he does not pursue this path he must attach himself to a different framework of reference which determines the direction of his philosophic conception:

To the extent to which the experience of an antagonistic world guides the development of the philosophical categories, philosophy moves in a universe which is broken in itself (déchirement ontologique) - two-dimensional. Appearance and reality, untruth and truth, (and, as we shall see, unfreedom and freedom) are ontological conditions.

The distinction is not by virtue or by default of abstract thought; it is rather rooted in the experience of the universe of which thought partakes in theory and practice. In this universe, there are modes of being in which men and things are 'by themselves' and 'as themselves,' and modes in which they are not - that is, in which they exist in distortion, limitation, or denial of their nature (essence). To overcome these negative conditions is the process of being and of thought. Philosophy originates in dialectic; its universe of discourse responds to the facts of an antagonistic reality. (ODM 125)

We must be highly obliged to Marcuse for being an honest, authentic philosopher: in one paragraph he reveals his commitment, his view of reality, his view of the destiny of reality, and the role of philosophy in reaching that destiny.
For what are the criteria by means of which man can distinguish between the 'modes of being' which make for genuine humanity and those 'modes' which involve enslavement? Classical Greek philosophy, Marcuse asserts in much too generalizing a manner, relied largely on 'intuition,' that is, "a form of cognition in which the object of thought appears clearly as that which it really is (in its essential qualities), and in antagonistic relation to its contingent, immediate situation." (ODM 125/6) Marcuse suggests that the 'notion of the essence of man' serves to illustrate the function of intuition; analysis reveals that man is in possession of certain faculties which would enable him to live a 'good life,' free from toil, dependence and ugliness: "to live in accordance with the essence of nature of man." But how do we know what the 'good life' is? Marcuse is candid:

To be sure, this is still the dictum of the philosopher; it is he who analyzes the human situation. He subjects experience to his critical judgment, and this contains a value judgment - namely, that freedom from toil is preferable to toil, and an intelligent life is preferable to a stupid life. It so happened that philosophy was born with these values. (ODM 126)

The philosophic quest proceeds from the finite world to the construction of a reality which is not subject to the painful difference between potentiality and actuality, which has mastered its negativity and is complete and independent in itself - free.

This discovery is the work of Logos and Eros. The two key terms designate two modes of negation; erotic as well as logical cognition break the hold of the established, contingent reality and strive for a truth incompatible with it. Logos and Eros are subjective and objective in one. Logos and Eros are in themselves the unity of the positive and the negative, creation and destruction. In the exigencies of thought and in the madness of love is the destructive refusal of the established ways of life. Truth transforms the modes of thought and existence. Reason and freedom emerge. (ODM 127)

These crucial passages, in my view, reveal an even more fundamental 'dialectic' in Marcuse's thought - as well as that of the entire tradition of western philosophizing - than he himself is willing and able to admit. That is, 'willing and able' after he has rejected the revealed Truth about the human predicament. Philosophy, autonomous human thought, now becomes the source of revelation: it reads the tension between creation and the fall back into antagonistic 'modes of being' while admitting that (subjective) "philosophy was born with these values." And the philosopher becomes the Redeemer: "The struggle for truth is a struggle against destruction, for the 'salvation' (szozein) of Being." Marcuse puts all of his cards on the table. Life - philosophical life, that is - is indeed Religion: "Inasmuch as the struggle for truth 'saves' reality from destruction, truth commits and engages human existence. It is the essentially human project. If man has learned to see and know what really is, he will act in accordance with truth. Epistemology is in itself ethics, and ethics is epistemology." (ODM 125)
Man occupies the central stage in the historical dialectical process. Man is indeed finite. But his finitude is not that of the 'bad' religious and theological idealism which "held the view that the world was a finite one because it was a created world and that its negativity referred to its sinfulness." (RR 136) Hegel delivered us from that type of idealism by showing that the finitude of the world is its 'inherent quality' not requiring the transfer of its truth and meaning to some exalted Beyond. "Things are finite in so far as they are, and their finitude is the realm of their truth. They cannot develop their potentialities except by perishing." (RR 137)

Here the Hegelian concept of man as subject appears. He is as it were 'absolute negativity,' that is, man "has the power to negate every given condition and to make it (his) own conscious work." (RR 95) Man can start from scratch, without taking into account either the given facts or the (created) conditions that shape these facts. Man is thus engaged in self-creation: he is the result of his own labor. (RR 115) In that way man can find genuine humanity in freedom; in that way the negation can be negated: in that way the tension between subject and object is removed; in that way the chasm between man and the external world is bridged. For man recognizes himself in the creation now fashioned after his own image.

...behind the appearance of things is the subject himself, who constitutes their very essence. Hegel's insistence that the subject be recognized behind the appearance of things is an expression of the basic desire of idealism that man transform the estranged world into a world of his own. (RR 110; emphasis added)

Marx's unrealized reality: the proletariat

Reason involves universality. With concepts as his instruments the thinking subject can discover the universal laws that govern particular conditions. In this way he discovers the potentialities that are common to a multitude of particulars. These universal concepts must become the organon, the rule of practice that alters the world in its historical unfolding.

In line with the entire idealistic tradition, both Hegel and Marcuse insist that the subject of thought is one and the same for all men. Here lies the fundamental basis of equality. (Cf RR 255; ODM 129) The 'rationality' of the thinking subject is thus the basis for the rational re-organization of society. This re-organization in the western world, Marcuse claims, has been mainly confined to the world of nature. Because of the influence of Descartes' mechanistic philosophy, Hobbes' materialist political thought, and Spinoza's mathematical ethics, western man may have been led to master the world of nature, but he has not mastered the social and spiritual world. In view of this onesided development, man tends to become the slave of his natural products: his world has become a commodity market. (Cf RR 255f) Hegel's contribution lies in this, that he went beyond this synthesis to the social world. But especially after his appointment to the chair of philosophy in the University of Berlin in 1817, he became utterly 'conservative' since he filled the categories of his dialectical system with the social reality of
his own - reactionary - time. In short, Hegel's own idea of reason was no longer dialectical: he was of the opinion that his system spelled the end of the dialectical process. Karl Marx broke through this 'immature' identity of Reason and reality.

While Hegel's social and economic categories are philosophical throughout, the tables are turned in Marx. His philosophical categories are social and economic. This leads Marx to say that Reason had not reached its final destiny in Hegel's time: if the truth of reason is a whole that must be present in every single element, if truth is indeed integral, then it must include the reality of the proletariat. Its existence is a 'negation' that must be negated:

The existence of the proletariat contradicts the alleged reality of reason, for it sets before us an entire class that gives proof of the very negation of reason. The lot of the proletariat is not fulfillment of human potentialities, but the reverse. If property constitutes the first endowment of a free person, the proletarian is neither free nor a person, for he possesses no property. If the exercises of the absolute mind, art, religion, and philosophy, constitute man's essence, the proletarian is forever severed from his essence, for his existence permits him no time to indulge in these activities. (RR 261)

This paragraph reveals the shift from Hegel to Marx. While one might say - simplistically - that for Hegel reality is thought, for Marx it is labor. Hegel could still, with Aristotle, escape in an irrelevant *bios theoreticos* - partly because Lutheran pietism allowed for the internalization of thought as well as of faith. (Cf RR 14 and 199; compare this indictment against German pietism with the irrelevance of American evangelicalism.) This internalization is impossible for Marx. After all,

The proletariat originates in the labor process and is the actual performer or subject of labor in this (bourgeois) society. Labor, however, as Hegel himself showed, determines the essence of man and the social form it takes. If the existence of the proletariat, then, bears witness to 'the complete loss of man,' and this loss results from the mode of labor on which civil society is founded, the society is vicious in its entirety and the proletariat expresses a total negativity: 'universal suffering' and 'universal injustice.' The reality of reason, right and freedom then turns into the reality of falsehood, injustice and bondage. (RR 261)

With this Marxian reduction of man to a laboring animal it is possible to 'locate' the negative 'modes of being.' The development of the individual and the range of his freedom depend on the extent to which his labor satisfies a genuinely social need. Therefore, we must leave philosophy - it must be negated - and turn to a study of the labor process in order to discover the potentialities for realizing human freedom and reason. That - and not Hegel's idealism - yields the final theme of philosophy. The intellectual instrument of repression as well as the political instrument of oppression must 'wither' away. And we must turn to the theme with which we started: the process of alienation. (Cf RR 272 ff)
With this the 'pieces' of the puzzle begin to fall into place. We begin to see why Marcuse is the prophet of the New Left. He is different from other 'prophets': He is not a Galbraith who argues that we have to spend less in the private and more in the public sector. He is not a Noam Chomsky who argues that intellectuals must assume their social responsibility so that the truth about public affairs can be revealed - not 'intellectuals,' but the intellect, the human historical spirit, embodied in the reason of us all, must 'guide' our destinies. Nor is he a Kennedy who champions the rights of the poor and the black. And Marcuse, though a prophet, is not a Billy Graham who argues of late that besides individual salvation the Gospel also has some social side-effects.

Marcuse argues for a total transvaluation of western values - and for the (revolutionary) embodiment of new values in the political arena. The entire 'system' that permits the existence of a new proletariat, a technologically directed culture in which man becomes a slave of Madison-avenue created 'needs,' an international order in which nuclear balance guarantees 'peace' - that entire system must be negated. The dialectical process of history must continue until reality is realized in its full potential; until not merely some men, but all men are free; until the inequities between rich and poor, north and south, are annihilated; until the interests of the whole will indeed be expressive of the individual needs of each; until individual and social existence will have merged (Cf RR 283). In short, there is a task in history until the idea of Happiness for all has filled the abstract notion of Reason. (RR 293)

A double tragedy

Can that transvaluation of values come today? Can man again discover his true self? Marcuse is not so sure. The rationality of our way of life is its irrationality, climaxed in the reality - the irreality - of the atom bomb which in one moment could cause the negation beyond which there are no possibilities.

But if man wants to be truly free, then he has to be a real subject, conscious, aware of his enslavement. The first step is the 'absolute refusal' (Cf An Essay on Liberation, ix) to accept the 'system.' This is where Marcuse speaks as the prophet to the students on today's campuses: with the passion of the early Christians the new generation refuses to accept the 'pagan' life of America. But a transvaluation of values is not sufficient. Hence Marcuse's last essay: not on the abstract notion of 'liberty' as the nineteenth-century thinkers could still discuss it, but on liberation, on setting man free from his chains. For theoretical consciousness must be politically translated: epistemology is indeed ethics. If the true historical subject once obtains an integral insight, he must begin to integrate, break open the potentials of freedom. Reason becomes revolution.

At this point the political theorist enters the scene: Whose hand wields the power in history that must create the society of equal happiness? And what happens to those whose ultimate allegiance makes them reject Marcuse's vision
of autonomous individuals? The very title of that famous essay supplies the answer: "Repressive Tolerance." He writes thus:

... the realization of the objective of tolerance would call for intolerance toward prevailing policies, attitudes, opinions. ... In other words, today tolerance appears again as what it was in its origins, at the beginning of the modern period - a partisan goal, a subversive liberating notion and practice. (81)

Marcuse has not said much more about the decisive moment: when theoretical reason becomes political revolution. But in my view the implementation of the ideal of a society of equals can only be accomplished by totalitarian political repression of oppositional forces. (Of my From Pluralism to Collectivism, Humanities Press, 1968, 156 ff) The movement, the Bewegung of a revolution can never stop. The 'utopia' of the 'first love' must be endlessly repeated: there is no 'rest' for the 'wicked' in the dialectical process of history. There will be ever new invasions into Prague and the trains toward Siberia will keep on rolling if Marcuse's view is taken seriously in its ultimate Leninist sense: man is creator and re-creator. When man is not first 'constituted' by a Creator but must engage in the 'constituting' himself, then there is no end: the prison doors will never close. In terms of the young Hegel: "Reason cannot govern unless reality has become rational in itself." That is an impossible assignment to man in history.

Here lies the first tragedy. Marcuse's humanism can only be implemented by anti-humanism. That is the message we must learn from a tradition that began with Robespierre in Paris after the first revolution to liberate man had commenced - a tradition that ends with Jean-Paul Sartre: at some stage humanism and terror become friends. The Christ will 'make room' for the Anti-christ.

But there is a second tragedy. There is no hope for the west in terms of Marcuse's solution. There is also no hope for the west on the basis of the principles on which it is 'organized' today. There are no immanent forces in history that can give the necessary re-direction to the Atlantic community. The 'American way of life' is sick. At least Marcuse is correct in his diagnosis. Man cannot redeem himself (John 3:7), cannot discover genuine 'humanity' on his own - which is why the world is heading for final disaster or for a new 'dark age.' Unless the Way, the Truth, and the Life again be revealed in our midst. And those in our lands who call themselves Christians again become confessors of the Name.