Existentialistic Communication

In the present day vocabulary of philosophers, theologians, and even of the common people, the word "communication" has come into vogue. Since the publication of Dr. H. Kraemer's studies regarding communication, this word has forced itself also into the vocabulary of the Christian. But to the best of my knowledge, this word has become a specific term for and of our age by virtue of the fact that Karl Jaspers has introduced it in his many writings in which he defends the idea and practice of communication with warmth and vigor as a deeply human and essential necessity. Dr. Kraemer has followed Jaspers, at least as far as the word "communication" is concerned, and has allowed him to show the way.

In order, therefore, to discern clearly the meaning, breadth, climate, and scope of this word, it will be necessary first of all that we sit at the feet of Jaspers and listen carefully to what he has to say.

We shall do well to distinguish Jaspers' idea of communication from his concept of the practice of communication. Even though Jaspers in his writings has the avowed intention to communicate with his readers by means of the idea of communication, nonetheless, this intention cannot preclude the fact that the idea does not coincide with its practice.

This idea of communication appears to have more than one indispensable presupposition, the sine qua non of communication. Everyone who desires to understand Jaspers' idea of communication will have to find and uncover these underlying presuppositions of communication.

The Presuppositions Underlying the Idea of Communication

1. The Experience of Freedom.

As we have already stated, Jaspers' idea of communication demands a number of presuppositions which must be complied with. Without them the idea of communication would become impossible and have to disappear.

The first of these presuppositions, as we see it, is what Jaspers calls man's experience of freedom. This experience cannot be transmitted from one person to another. In fact, it is incommunicable since by its very nature it is intensely personal. The incommunicability of this experience is substantiated further by the very fact that as soon as this experience is expressed in words and concepts, it takes on more than one meaning.

According to Jaspers, man's deepest freedom lies beyond the grasp of all conceptual knowledge which he likes to call the general consciousness (das Bewusstsein überhaupt). For this reason this experience is beyond our understanding and beyond the acquisition of the special sciences. At the same time, it would be meaningless to write about the experience of freedom, unless it would appeal to our making of judgments, to our reflection and understanding. All philosophizing, including his own, Jaspers claims, must make use of the general consciousness and thus is helplessly surrendered to an eventual misuse of the understanding's knowledge of the experience of freedom, namely the fixation of thought and an a fortiori conception of the experience of freedom concerning and out of which one must philosophize. It is an experience which transcends the objective and gegenständliche concepts of human thought. This philosophizing and this experience of freedom, according to Jaspers, transcend every concept and the general consciousness as well. The verbal articulation of the words "experience of freedom" transcends its own articulation and in any case intends something else than that which one by conceptual analysis may think it to be. A word is a sign that only points to something beyond all conceptual acquisition of knowledge. A word can be understood only by the reader who knows from his own
experience the thing intended by it. So also with the expression "experience of freedom". The use of this expression as a sign is therefore a venture (Wagnis) on the part of the writer. He runs the risk, as it were, of casting pearls before swine which can regard the pearls to be everything except pearls.

Have we now arrived at a completely esoteric area of thought? Are there perhaps only a few, perhaps no one else besides Jaspers, who really understand what he means by the experience of freedom? Is Jaspers ready to say: since what is universally valid is merely that which appears to the general consciousness as an object over against the knowing universally valid consciousness, and then only insofar as it appears as a phenomenon, therefore it is impossible to speak of a personal experience of freedom which incidentally cannot be present in others? Is it not possible that everyone misunderstands Jaspers and that he speaks in utter loneliness of something which no one else knows and shares?

At this point we are confronted with one of the most fundamental problems of Jaspers' thinking, a problem which not he but others have seen (a very serious indication of uncritical thinking), a problem from which there is no escape. Whenever the final questions, or rather the primary words and presuppositions of his thinking are discussed, Jaspers withdraws himself from the discussion, since these matters lie beyond the scope of the universal validity of the scientific consciousness. However, for these matters Jaspers at the same time demands a higher degree of truth than for a highly personal witness concerning an intensely personal experience. He even claims the right to say that here precisely is the philosophical, deep, radical, irrefutable, and indubitable primum verum. To illustrate: "The basic experience of his being (i.e. of MAN and of man in general) transcends all knowledge and comprises at one and the same time its incompleteness and its infinite possibility, its fetteredness and its freedom."

Here not a word is said of the highly individual witness of a strictly personal experience, but Jaspers does speak in this quotation of the experience, yes even of the basic experience of man himself, no one being excluded.

Later we shall see that Jaspers attributes special importance to the distinction between universal validity, which in his opinion belongs to the scientific knowledge of the general consciousness, and the unconditionedness (Unbedingtheit) which he thinks belongs to the self-experience of freedom. But he does not reflect upon the nature of the distinction between universal validity and unconditionedness qua distinction. Nor does he ask concerning the proposition quoted above whether this basic experience of man is universally valid or unconditioned. Nor does he seek an answer to the question: what is the nature of this Grunderfahrung? The answer of course is nothing else than the experienced freedom and its unconditionedness.

In the meantime, however, this basic experience qua basic experience is not less than a necessary presupposition underlying the whole of Jaspers' thought on communication, the essence of man, et cetera.

Granted that the "truth" both of this experience and of the philosophizing of this experience is of another nature than that which Jaspers admitted for the relativized universal validity of scientific knowledge, we may not fail to observe that this is one of the presuppositions of his thought, a presupposition which sets itself beyond all doubt and which will not allow itself to be discussed. This presupposition he never inserts as a theme for discussion and cannot be disputed in the communicative conversation to which he would lead us.

In fact, Jaspers vindicates a priori that there can be no communication and no real conversation between coexisting beings except upon the footing of this basic experience and of one's philosophical "faith" in this basic experience.
According to Jaspers, the guilty party who is responsible for frustrating the conversational communication is he who misunderstands this basic experience of freedom together with the philosophizing that arises from the Grunderfahrung. This is the person who does not accept Jaspers' presuppositions to be self-evident and universally, essentially, and existentially human. Indeed, such a person can excuse himself by shrugging his shoulders and laconically declaring: "I simply am ignorant of this basic experience!"

Jaspers, however, would point out that this is nothing less than a nihilistic betrayal of the humanity of man.

But why is it excluded apriori that one should say: I recognize this basic experience in myself, but I know it as an invoked, self-misleading basic experience? But who gives the right to clothe this basic experience with the mantle of infallibility in order consequently to proceed to the order of the day, that is, to the communication as Jaspers conceives it only to be possible? Is it not about time to expose this uncritical and consequently tyrannical dogma? It must be established that there are also other dogmas present in Western thinking of which we must be critical (besides those which Jaspers mentions) which proceed in his opinion from a hodge podge of the general validity of the understanding with its results and of the absoluteness of freedom with its postulates.

The answer that Jaspers would give to this criticism most likely would be nothing more than a repetition of his already proposed thesis. Thereby the case would be closed. He would consider the proposition that this basic experience is undergone as an experience to be invoked, is an assault upon the humanity of man and no less than a complete transformation (Verwandlung) of existing man who is of the opinion that he knows such an experience. In this way Jaspers would rescue this coexisting man for his true humanity, and thereby also for communication. Here again, Jaspers' unlimited intolerance, his zeal for winning converts, his sense of mission and proclamation of the antithesis come to expression.

In this respect, Jaspers is not alone in his thinking. He is quite in accord with his age and his situation. He is a child of the modern age, the modern situation, and the modern understanding of self-consciousness. Jaspers is a man of modernity who will not allow the accomplishments of modern man to be attacked. He stands in the fellowship of the millions of Western modern men whose primum verum is the same basic experience and who have set the seal of inviolability upon this experience and upon the image of man that fits it. Even though this inviolability is of a different nature than general scientific validity and is different from the absoluteness of the self's self-positing, nonetheless it unmistakably bears the nature of faith. For this faith Jaspers incorrectly demands the predicate "philosophical", since this faith is not philosophical in itself but rather determines the philosophy that proceeds from it. Likewise, the basic experience which he describes as the experience of freedom is directed by this faith. Consequently, it is nothing less than arrogance to disqualify all philosophical thinking that is not directed by this faith as unphilosophical thinking. This is, however, the arrogance of modern man, who in his modern conception of self assumes that he simply by virtue of being modern, bears the seal of truth upon his forehead.

We know the motives which have led Jaspers to distinguish sharply the experience of freedom and the experience of the unconditionedness of freedom from the universal validity upon which the judgments of the special sciences make claim (as he sees it, justly). Basically, it is his outspoken opposition against the positivistic conception of man and reality. According to positivism, man is no more and no less than that which the knowledge of the special sciences
ascribe to him. According to this self-same positivism, all of reality is exhausted when the special sciences in their acquisition of knowledge in principle have reached a definite picture of reality. One condition for this pursuit then is that the subjects of this scientific knowledge be interchangeable so that this knowledge may be called generally valid and objective.

This is why Jaspers in his teaching concerning the general consciousness (Bewusstsein überhaupt) allows a place for this scientific knowledge and its pretense of truth. Jaspers has not challenged the claim of universal validity of positivistic-scientific thought in order to preserve room in his own thinking for areas of reality in which the knowledge of the special sciences appears to be impotent and of which the general consciousness by itself has no apprehension. In this Jaspers leans toward Immanuel Kant who has given us the fundamental distinction between the area of practical reason which waves its wand over all that is beyond our sensuous perception. He is in agreement with Kant who set limits to theoretical reason with the purpose of making room for faith, namely, in human freedom. This division of reality is heartily endorsed by Jaspers.

Consequently, his opposition against the monopolistic demands of positivistic rationalism is not such that he bluntly rejects the claims of the special sciences to general validity. As a modern thinker, he does not want to lose the rights and benefits of that which he subsumes under the general consciousness.

His existential philosophy of freedom merely clips the wings of that which he sometimes calls scientific superstition, namely, the belief that there are no limits to scientific knowledge and thought and that the reality of the "Transcendent", of man, and of the world coincides in principle with what the special sciences are able to investigate.

This self-understanding of modern man, which, though reserved for a specific area, allows the technical sciences the final word, is also clearly present in Jaspers' thought. In a certain place he writes that he gladly allows room for faith, even the faith of the Biblical religion first and foremost. But this faith, in order to be real, may not conflict with empirical and rational insight. What this involves in the concrete situation appears from what Jaspers on the basis of empirical and rational insight, quite unabashed, has written, namely that man cannot be God (with reference to Jesus Christ) and that a corpse cannot arise from the dead (with reference to the resurrection of Jesus Christ). There are established limits to the freedom of faith. The true freedom of (philosophical) faith is neither irrational nor unscientific, but supra-rational and supra-scientific. And man's basic experience of freedom, including the freedom of faith and the believed freedom accords with the image of modern man and present reality. Jaspers' idea of communication is built upon this modern idea of the basic experience of human freedom and does not tolerate any meddling with this image of modern man and reality. Jaspers is of the opinion that Kierkegaard has exposed and interpreted the Christian religion (sharply distinguished by Jaspers from Biblical religion) in its true nature; and by advocating its irrationality, Kierkegaard has delivered the death blow to the Christian religion and has unmasked it as something impossible. In this the Christian religion is dashed to pieces upon, among other things, the rock of positivism to which Jaspers unreservedly clings when it concerns non-existent reality of man and the world. Jaspers complains at times that he finds the theologians inaccessible. This might be a matter to discuss. But in any case he has militated resolutely against the whole Christian faith in the mysteries of redemption, the Magnalia Dei, on positivistic and rationalistic grounds. A requirement for communication then, is the indirect acceptance of the positivistic image of man and world, in so far as it concerns empirical reality which (according to Jaspers, correctly) falls within the domain of the rationalistic and scientialistic general consciousness.
After this necessary excursium into Jaspers' limited acceptance of the positivistic image of man and world (a phenomenon in existentialism not adequately recognized, because one generally becomes blinded by the anti-positivistic and anti-scientialism of existentialistic philosophers), we would once more return to our original subject.

Our theme was that Jaspers more than any other philosopher understands and operates with the general validity of scientific thought and knowledge and the totally other Unbedingtheit of human freedom, the sole source of true philosophical thinking. He knows of a philosophical "like father, like son". Not only when it concerns the area which he allows to the sciences but also when it concerns the existential experience of freedom which cannot be confined to any concept and which is misconstrued by every concept and verbal expression, but which is in its strict individuality the selfexistence (Selbstsein) and self-ness (Selbstheit) of man.

It appears then that this experience of freedom and this self-existence of man is common to all men and therefore, according to Jaspers, belongs to the essential structure of man himself. This idea may not be scientifically and universally valid in his own eyes, but as an idea it is nonetheless more than and different from the unconditionedness by which Jaspers experiences his own self-existence as freedom. This belongs to the image of man, which Jaspers does not design merely of himself and solely for personal use, but which does justice to every man and indicates the similarity of all men in their deepest root. This idea itself pretends (if not scientifically, then at least philosophically) to be universally valid. Whoever would deny its philosophical universality, cancels out his own humanity and thereby makes himself incapable of communication. Communication is only possible between selves (Selbstheiten), which root themselves in their own selfness, which, as has already been observed, posit themselves. But according to Jaspers' philosophical faith, this does not involve any excommunication, since it is always philosophically universally valid, and as such beyond all doubt so unassailable that man himself is in principle a selfness (albeit a selfness in process) and that every man is in principle capable of communication. It is Jaspers' conviction that all men possess limitless opportunities. No one need produce an entrance pass to enter the forum of communication; his humanity in itself is his pass. I believe that I may state it as follows: only he who naturally refuses to ground himself in his uninhibited selfness on the basis of his free selfness (though he does in fact root himself therein), and enslaves himself to forces which hinder from further self-development, is excluded from the possibility of communication. It is not Jaspers who ex-communicates these people, but they ex-communicate themselves. But in spite of themselves, Jaspers can communicate with them in principle, because of their basic experience of freedom. However, if these people block his attempt to communicate, Jaspers, after a final appeal to their universal-human structure of selfness, must let them go. But it is not his fault.

In practice, it means that Jaspers undergoes the painful experience time and time again that it is impossible to communicate. There are but few "modern" men who have been delivered from the clutches of positivism. This means that he can communicate really only with existentialists who are modern in the same way in which he is modern. He can communicate only with those who have the same basic experience, the same basic idea, the same image of man.

Jaspers goes so far in this respect, that he is of the opinion that the masses are unable to enter this ecclesia invisibilis simply because they need supports and certainties which violate the self's positing of self. In his treatise on philosophy and religion (Chapter 4 of Der philosophische Glaube) he gives testimony to this. The masses need religion and cannot do without it.
They would deteriorate if they were not bound by religion to corporeal things. The *ecclesia invisibilis* can only exist in practice if there is a church, a cultic community, or something analogous to bind the masses together. In such a situation then, the "church within the church" (*ecclesiola in ecclesia* - my expression, S.U.Z.), the fellowship of modern man, can flourish. The majority of people are incapable of communication.

2. Freedom Bestowed

A second indispensible requirement for communication is the following: the man who is able to communicate, must not only live from, and develop and realize the basic experience of his own unconditional freedom of positing himself from his own origin and originality, from his own possible existence and infinite possibility of freedom (as power of freedom) which is not subject to any universally valid lawfulness that is discovered and imposed upon it by scientific thought and power; but this man must also realize (innewerden) that this unconditioned freedom has been given to him. Man must realize that he derives this from himself, but not through himself. He must realize that he is able to remain outside of himself simply because the gift of freedom can be absent. Existential freedom means that man stands in a relationship to himself and thereby to his own transcendency.

Jaspers teaches that within the existential self-experience is implicated an experience of one's own freedom as a freedom which we have not given to ourselves but has come from elsewhere. But Jaspers does not stop here. He does not limit himself to this "negative anthropology" but consciously goes beyond it by declaring that this freedom of being oneself in positing one's self comes to us as a gift of the Transcendent. There exists more than man and world; there is also the Transcendent which is neither man nor world. Whoever would deny this falls into an immanentism which contradicts itself and desaparages man.

Jaspers' proposition that God, the godhead of the Transcendent, exists, is the content of faith, even of philosophical faith. This is for him not merely the arbitrary content of an arbitrary faith, but the indispensible content of philosophical faith; and should man ever relinquish this presupposition, an end would be made to all philosophy and philosophizing.

This does not mean that Jaspers would not accept the devastation of the proofs of God's existence. He acclaims Immanuel Kant as the chief architect of this devastation. Jaspers' "modern" humanity moves entirely within the modern Western tradition which has been formed since the days of Kant. No proof of God's existence is possible in the sense of a scientifically compelling proof (*Der Philosophische Glaube*, p.33). He expresses it even more forcefully by saying: a proven God is no God. But over against this we must say that only the person who begins with God can seek Him. Certainty concerning the existence of God is a presupposition and not a result of philosophizing.

For Jaspers this philosophical faith is beyond discussion. This faith cannot therefore become a subject for communication, since this faith first makes communication possible in enabling man to be man and conscious of his being. For this Transcendent is Being, real Being.

Over against the world and its complete finitude or endlessness (both of which are opposites of infinitude), man becomes conscious of his own infinitude in his existential consciousness of self and freedom. This consciousness bears an unconditional character. However, at the same time man becomes aware in his self-certification that in this infinitude a new infinitude hides. Thus he realizes that his own existential situation is temporal, since man does not derive the unconditionality of his freedom from himself. Man is not of himself
originally himself. His self has been given to him by the Transcendent. The fact that man is independent and absolutely free, is gotten from the intangible hand of the Transcendent which man can feel only in his freedom (idem. pp.59,60). This palpability is the basis of experience, the sure ground of one's certainty of the Transcendent. Upon this rests the philosophical faith that the Transcendent exists.

Jaspers speaks of coming into touch with the Transcendent, "Eine Berührung der Transcendenz".

It is very necessary to point out that Jaspers, who teaches in various ways and nuances the relativity of human knowledge and the limitness of human experience, and understands doubt and despair as the necessary entrance gate to the certification of self, at the same time teaches an original and unassailable certainty regarding the proposition: God exists and the Transcendent exists. This certainty is simultaneously the origin and destiny of all philosophizing. If it were not the origin, there could be no certification of self, and hence also no destiny. Between the original certainty regarding the Transcendent and the final achievement of certainty regarding the Transcendent (im Scheitern das Sein erfahren) man usually stands in an unexplainable "lostness" (idem, p.61). This lostness brings him into a situation of extreme despair. But it is also at the same time the source from which his task and the possibility of his freedom arise (idem, p. 161). Jaspers would not be able to make this last claim were it not that he has earlier asserted that man stands in relation to himself and to the Transcendent, not accidentally, but by reason of the structure of his being. And in his consciousness of freedom exists at the same time his consciousness of Being, i.e., his consciousness of God. It remains an open question: whence suddenly this lostness and this sense of lostness? It is likewise an open question whether Jaspers' entire doctrine of doubt and despair, and the experience of despair therein subsumed, are to be taken as seriously as it would appear. At any rate it cannot be denied that in man's origin and in his existential coming-to-himself the Transcendent presumes to be the ground of this freedom.

In any case, is it not true that the proposition, that man's task and possibility of freedom arise from his despair first of all, is but a half truth for Jaspers? Is it not also true that Jaspers knows better and teaches otherwise, namely, in the case of the revelation of Being which occurs in every existential experience?

In our opinion we can show from Jaspers' works that his entire Odyssey of man exists by permission of the original, unassailable, unsinkable, never threatened: the Transcendent exists. Man, in this Odyssey comes out of his experience of lostness and proceeds onward in his experience of lostness toward his certification of being. He follows, and of necessity must press on, in this tiring pilgrim journey which is like a sea voyage in which shipwreck follows shipwreck in order that, at the eleventh hour when the distress is deepest, (that is, the impossibility to attribute any meaning to the shipwreck, for it is meaningless) and in spite of all the setbacks seeks to achieve his experience of the Transcendent and reaches thereby the haven of this destination. As he himself testifies: philosophizing originates from this original experience and thereby stands or falls.

The imposing interlude of the Odyssey gives Jaspers occasion to take seriously and to defend nihilism, i.e., the unbelief in the existence of God, for instance, against those who proudly despise this nihilism (idem, p.226). But this cannot deter Jaspers without any uncertainty from writing: "Wer der eine Satz gegenwärtig ist: Gott ist, da musz all dieses Falsche (among others, nihilism and, to put everything together, so-called unbelief) wie Nebel vor der Sonne vergehen" (idem, p.127). In this quotation the word Falsche is not
excluded and the black-white contrast between falsehood and truth is present as a radical non-polar opposition -- as the antithesis. Here the Odyssey goes to pieces on the rocks.

Jaspers makes it easy for himself when he immediately relegates those who dispute his philosophical faith in the proposition: "God exists" to the category of those who do not understand what is meant because they lower the proposition to the terrain where people ask for the finite things "in the world". Their proof that God does not exist would necessarily have to amount to this, that they do not know what Jaspers speaks about when he says God exists. This is so because he precisely does not designate and consider God as the Immanent, but rather as the Transcendent. Only as such is he conscious of God. (idem, p.121).

But when he does this, he proceeds very uncritically and hastily. In a certain sense he may have the right to dub all philosophy that does not start with his philosophical faith as unphilosophical and thereby disqualify and reject it as philosophy. But he does not have the right (with an appeal to his qualification of himself as "The thinking individual", "the modern man") to neglect to mention the opposition that arises precisely from the existential experience of freedom to which he makes his appeal and in which he finds the basis for his philosophical faith. He shows his inner weakness when he does not hesitate to allow the existence which is man to coincide or to develop into, or to disintegrate into, existence and Transcendence (idem, p.19). "Ich bin als Existenz: Existenz und Transcendenz." But aside from this dubious and pregnant passage, what can Jaspers say against a modern thinker, such as Merleau-Ponty who (like Sartre) proceeds from the freedom experience of man who posits himself and assures himself and maintains as certain that therefore, in addition to man and world, there is nothing, nothing transcendent, and therefore surely no Transcendent? Jaspers goes beyond the experience of freedom and the experience of absoluteness in his experience of freedom when he considers that therein is implied, that he knows himself as a bestowed freedom and when he thinks that this implies that God wants him to be free.

Do not misunderstand me. If he had given "testimony" that his personal experience of freedom always appears to him to be such that he always at the same time experiences that this freedom is granted to him by the Transcendent in such a way that he is his own origin, then we could take account of it. Then everyone would have the right to think of it as he pleases. But on the contrary, he pretends and asserts that it belongs to the humanity of man that he in his experience of freedom is aware that this freedom is granted to him by the Transcendent. His position is that his freedom and therefore his existential humanity and the process of becoming human (the entire Odyssey included) are not derived from himself. Incidentally, no existentialist, not even Sartre would dispute with Jaspers when he describes his humanity as a child without a mother. But he claims that his humanity itself comes from the Transcendent. With this claim the hairs of countless existentialists begin to stand on end and in the name of freedom and the self's positing of self and the humanity of man they cannot help but protest. And their protest is not in the name of a rationalistic or positivistic view of man which considers man and the world alike and make them both perspicuous to the insight of the special sciences. The existentialistic philosophers would object, and, in my opinion, from their standpoint, correctly: if the experience of freedom must include more than the experience of its own possibility and power and seeks to design itself according to its own choice and by its own power to project its own destiny in the inner activity of freedom, then Jaspers speaks without warrant about what he thinks is the experience of freedom, but which, in reality, is another experience, namely that of contact with the Transcendent. Then he testifies from a faith that stands or falls with itself and really can be found only with Jaspers and his fellows. Actually, Jaspers is aware that he is overstepping the bounds. After he has rejected all
the proofs of God's existence and has declared that all faith is incapable of proof (idem, p.126) and after he has made the plea that one can with greater right be nihilist than overlook the experiences that lead to nihilism, Jaspers goes on to say: "Und doch sind meine Vorlesungen durchgehends ein Versuch, den Nihilismus abzuwehren. Ich rede gerade das, was ich eben zu verwerfen scheine, rede von Gott. Darum meine Zurückhaltung. Ich habe nichts zu verkündigen. Es bleibt der Anspruch an den Hörer, dass dieser aus seinem eigenen Wesen prüft, den Sätzen des Vorliegenden nicht einfache Folge, vielmehr sie bestenfalls nur zum Anlass nehme für eigene Vergewisserung" (idem, p.127).

Is Jaspers here exposing his philosophical faith? Is he offering it voluntarily to the reader or hearer? But is Merleau-Ponty not right in protesting that he is called an atheist because he would not believe in God and thus....? Merleau-Ponty retorts quickly that there is no God in Whom to believe, that it is beneath the standing of a self-respecting modern thinker to think or speak about the question of the existence of God, and that it is least of all respectable to orientate oneself to this question about God or to allow one to orient another in that manner.

But then Jaspers cannot call this nihilism any more or he is prejudiced by something else than the idea of freedom. And of greater and deeper consequence is this: he may no longer speak about der philosophische Glaube, at least not in the contemporary world. He must rather seek for ways and means to communicate with his contemporaries about the thorny question: where does he obtain the right to assert that in the freedom experience of man who in his inneres Handeln experiences himself as coming out from himself and being his own origin and his own Lord and Master, who allows no one and nothing to legislate to him -- how can this be interwoven with the experience of one's own freedom as having been given and willed by the Transcendent? He does not communicate about this matter. But, as we have noted already, he assumes that it is possible to philosophize only on the basis of the philosophical faith that the Transcendent exists. The same applies to his idea of communication. He thinks that the idea of communication presupposes that of the Transcendent. For this reason, should the person who is addressed (idem, p.127) answer, "As I judge from my own being, your speech is no occasion for me to certify for myself that the Transcendent exists", then for Jaspers the possibility to communicate will have been lost. Whose fault is it that Jaspers runs the chance of being the voice of one crying in the wilderness when he writes: "Im Existentiellen ist der Mensch er selbst nur, wenn er im Selbstsein sich geschenkt wird. Freiheit ist ein Sichgegebenwerend aus der Transzendenz. Diese Freiheit ist...ein von allem Zwang losgelöstes Wollen, das transzendentes Müssen ist"? (idem,p.133).

Jaspers takes this chance. He even excommunicates from his communication all who do not recognize with him a sense of freedom and thereby also a sense of self in which the untrammeled liberty experiences itself as a transcendent necessity. As he himself writes as an aside: (Daher gilt der Satz) nur glaubenden können Kommunikation verwirklichen (idem,p.157).

Let us look at this ex-communication. It is performed by a thinker who passionately strives to communicate. Even he does not do without the ban of excluding persons from the congregation, i.e., the ecclesia invisibilis of those who are competent to communicate. All those who do not recognize that their freedom is granted by the Transcendent are excluded. They are the ones who busy themselves with the deification of man, with demonology or nihilism, that is, with what is non-philosophy.

Look carefully at this excommunication. It belongs to the good graces and the axioms of modern man to consider himself limited by nothing and to call himself to this openness in order to call everyone who does not proclaim this openness regarding himself intolerant and worthy of excommunication. He does it in order to forget that modern man, even when he excommunicates (as Jasper does here) considers himself entirely innocent, and of course would never excommunicate anyone and does not recognize any antithesis, but only an unlimited
openness! Modern man admits no black-white pattern.

Jaspers' attempt to ground his philosophical faith in man's experiencing of freedom is, in my judgment, ambiguous. For even if the experience of freedom by modern man coincides with the inner imperative and the experience of the imperative, there still is no reason to consider that müssen, a transzendentes Müssen. Where does the transcendent come from? Where does this self-revelation of the Transcendent, which must be distinguished from the revelation of human freedom to the self as freedom which is self originating, come from?

Jaspers mentions one of the sources himself. The philosophy of this freedom cannot do without Biblical religion and without religion in general. That Biblical religion stands within the self-revelation of the one only true God. By relying on this religion and by secularizing it, Jaspers is able to get a grasp of the Transcendent. Without this support all philosophy and, according to Jaspers, all philosophical faith, would disappear.

The establishing of the Transcendent in man's experience of freedom is a result of and a symptom of Jaspers' modernity. For himself at least, he would lose face entirely if he did not root his faith in the Transcendent in the self's positing of itself. For this faith in the self, which he calls a philosophical faith in the self, he shares with all existentialists and with all who since the Renaissance have at the start bartered their souls for faith in the regenerating power of man who by his own power humanizes himself and discovers, invents, and creates his real self in his own selfcreating process of becoming man.

By this time the second indispensable condition for communication has become visible: Communication is possible only between those free selves (Selbstheiten) which experience themselves and their freedom as a gift and who in this experiencing of self attain to knowledge of the One and Only, The Being, The Transcendent, the godhead, God.

It appears that fewer and fewer persons are able to communicate.

3. There is no Communication with the Transcendent.

A third condition, which is as necessary for communication as the first two, is that the godhead does not reveal himself, and surely not in an unequivocal way. Man cannot communicate with the Transcendent.

In the third volume of his Philosophie, Jaspers develops a complete metaphysics of the revelation of the Transcendent. Among the existentialists, he is the only one with a metaphysics of revelation. This is a Jasperian exclusive. It intends to be a philosophy of religion and also a philosophy of the philosophies of all ages.

In a thorough study of the philosophy of the Chiffre as found in this volume (in later works Jaspers calls it the Chiffer), Kaufmann shows convincingly in the large book that is dedicated to Jaspers and is entitled Karl Jaspers that Jaspers' Chiffre metaphysics finally flows back into his Existenzerhellung (illumination of existence) and therefore into the self-revelation of human existence. In this self-revelation, which man derives from himself and gives to himself, the revelation of Being of the Transcendent must find a dwelling, an instrument and an organ of revelation for itself. Outside of this self-illumination of existence there is no passable way for the Transcendent to reveal its being.

The final Chiffre, which Jaspers also calls the deepest Chiffre, which makes all others possible and thinkable, and comprises the Chiffres of myths, dogmas and philosophical systems which have been fixed in history, is the Chiffre of failure. This all-comprehensive and all-carrying Chiffre is illegible,
ununderstandable, and unmeaningful for all metaphysical-existential reading of the Chiffre. The reading of the Chiffre becomes stranded on the Chiffre itself. In vain it seeks to decode it. At this point the entire existential metaphysics in principle becomes stranded. Fortunately Jaspers also disposes over another vessel with which he can proceed on his journey. This vessel does not choose the sea of the Transcendent's revelation of Being in the Chiffres but it sails upon the sea of the existential, unmetaphysical Berührung with the Transcendent. Therefore, Jaspers can still offer us the hope that we will not be destroyed in the storm at night, for even in this failure, as in all failures, Being, i.e., the Transcendent, can be experienced. So he returns to his existential starting point in which he taught that the Transcendent "exists" only for existence. This is the starting point that in and with the experiencing of freedom the contact with the Transcendent in principle is given.

The Chiffre is therefore only a pseudo-revelation of the Transcendent. We are finally even in the midst of the countless number of the Chiffres, thrown back upon our experience alone. Jaspers will teach us this by extensive repetition.

Consequently we shall have to retreat out of the "world" and the field of inquiry of the world and of the Chiffre that must be an object for investigation in the world, but which as a field of inquiry is always out of reach, and we shall have to draw back to the pure existential selfness and its understanding of self, the "Ime werden der Selbstheit". This we shall have to do if we are even to come into contact with the Transcendent. The field of inquiry which is beyond our reach, (das ungegenständlich Gegenständliche) appears to be not a navigable sea, but a crag that dooms us to shipwreck as we sail toward the certification of being. Therefore the reading of the Chiffre is really only a provisional activity and turns out to be nothing, for it is doomed to fruitlessness.

In this temporary activity Jaspers teaches that we must concern ourselves in an existential-metaphysical way with the sharp distinction between Gestalt and Gehalt (form and content). The entire field of enquiry -- and that includes all which is not existential in its selfness and its becoming -- is mere appearance and as appearance finite, provisional, and bound to disappear. As tradition it may have authority, in so far as tradition can have authority, and this authority may be acceptable and even indispensable, but it participates in the finiteness and endlessness of all that which is mere "appearance" in the world. It lacks the unconditionedness which alone can have radical and final authority for the existential or modern man in his consciousness of self. The temporary authority of the forms (Gestalten) of myths, religions, etc., waits therefore for the existential verification by the absoluteness of existential appropriation. This appropriation is a kind that it takes in, not the form, but the hidden content. In any case, the content does not contain what the form shows us. This content (Gehalt) is inexpressible and cannot possibly become the form and must wait for the revelation which is interpreted by means of the reading of the Chiffre from the side of the existential and is attributed to the form by the power of the existential. For this reason, already in the provisional character of the metaphysical self-revelation of the Transcendent, this revelation is trampled under foot by still another revelation which by means of existential power of the Chiffre reader is attributed to the Chiffre. Yes, even in the Chiffre the Transcendent does not reveal itself, but therein the Chiffre reader reveals himself and thereby also the Transcendent. His existential power overagainst the Chiffre is unassailable.

Opposite to the power of the Chiffre-reader is the impotence of the Transcendent to reveal itself in its autonomous power. The Transcendent does not reveal itself and is doomed to come to revelation only in the external forms. That is, it is doomed to be revealed in mysteries and concealments, in appearances which qua talis hide, but do not disclose.
And even then we deal only with provisionalities. For when it comes down to it, it appears that all these forms are destroyed in the one great meaninglessness of failure. And no one is able to read the slightest content into them. They are empty.

We may ask ourselves, what meaning does this all have for Jaspers to develop in all of volume three his metaphysics of the revelation of Being via the numberless forms of the things in the world? The only answer which we have been able to find is that in this way he puts himself in a position to relativize all religions and all systems of philosophy to mere "forms" of truth in order that he, after the relativizing, can recognize them eclectically in an existentially responsible way by presenting them to the human sovereign power as Chiffres which require existential deciphering. There is no room for a real self-revelation of the Transcendent. The Word of God also as such is merely a Gestalt, a human word, and thus not a Gehalt. But as form it is accessible to the existentially deciphering person, who in his unconditionedness has to give it meaning from his own existence, and in this way to reveal. The Chiffre takes the place which Kierkegaard has given to Jesus Christ as the paradoxical and once-for-all revelation of God. Jaspers thinks that he has an open mind for all the religions of the world, also for the Christian religion, but then only after he has relativized and denied every claim to revelation from the side of God in what in the religions is respected as divine revelation. Therefore, for Jaspers it is impossible that the Son of God became man and that Jesus Christ is the way, the truth, and the life. Jesus Christ and the entire Word of God are mere Chiffres, human phenomena and appearances. So it is possible for Jaspers with passion and severity to engage in combat with the claim to exclusiveness which he finds especially in the Jewish, the Christian, and the Islamic religions. He states on the basis of his distinction between Gestalt and Gehalt that there is a great error to be found in these religions: the Gestalt is taken for the Gehalt, the appearance for the thing appearing, the field of inquiry for that which cannot be inquired after. According to him, the dreadful result is that the unconditionally free existence of man is tied down to dogmas, tradition and worldly phenomena. But at the same he thinks that he can respect all the "truth" of the various religions and also the philosophia perennis which is present in all philosophical systems as the content of these systems. In a relative, finite and a principally endless way they give expression to the "revelation" of the Transcendent, to the existential person and thereby to the experiencing of the transcendent imperative (Hassen) which is implicated in every real experiencing of freedom. They also give expression to the presence (Gegenwart) of the Transcendent before the face of existence and to the therein implicated presence of existence before the face of the Transcendent. They give expression to Jaspers' idea of existence and transcendence and to what he thinks is in principle the universally human experience of freedom in which man, as he comes to himself, knows himself to have been given by the Transcendent. They give expression to the consciousness of being which finally can be reproduced with the most simple and deepest comfort for existence, namely, "Being exists". With this the last word has been said.

Certainly we have asked ourselves in vain: what else -- according to Jaspers -- could the Transcendent reveal to us than that we have been given to ourselves, and that we therefore have been given in venture in order that our life may be formed as a venture in freedom? It can only produce in us the inner transformation by which our eyes are opened for our own possible existence as existential possibilities and for the many, endless forms in the world which, bottomless in themselves, can only appear in order to disappear. Our eyes are opened also for their possibilities and for the appearing-disappearing character of their reality, and (we shall speak of this later) with the dialectic in the relationship of existence and non-existential worldly reality. This relationship Jaspers signifies as geschichtlich, which must be distinguished from the historical. Finally our eyes are opened for the Transcendent as the Unreachable.
One that is present in its absence, but in the high moments of life is near us as that One and Only. Every other conceivable content of revelation from the side of the One and Only is apriori excluded.

There is no more to say and nothing more can be revealed, for the many can only play a role outside the One and Only. According to him the many indicate already a brokenness and a lostness. For this reason he speaks of the brokenness of being (Zerissenheit der Seins). Existence has been separated from the world; existence and the general consciousness are also separated. But worst of all, the One and the many are separated. The world has no bottom. Surely, multiplicity of existences and the absoluteness of the existential do recognize, he thinks, the force of attraction that comes from the transcendent One towards this unity (philosophical faith and philosophical reason are incited by this force of attraction), but this attractive power is time and time again doomed to fail, even in the communication between existing subjects. At the most it produces a disappearing presence of the One and Only, and that only for a moment. This occurs only in the high moments of life. Existential communication is therefore born of need. There is no existence that does not participate in a lostness between its own origin and its own destiny, a lostness that, as it were, has fallen away from the Transcendent and therefore is appointed to seek for communication with fellow man. And so the opposite side of this revelationless One and Only is that communication is possible only between existents and that this communication is indeed necessary, for all existence contains a piece of lostness in itself.

But alongside this necessity as a matter of deepest need which must drive us on to seek for fellowship with our fellowman, inasmuch as fellowship with the Transcendent is excluded, there is also a second motive which drives Jaspers to think that communication with the Transcendent is excluded.

He writes more than once that every relation with God that does not realize itself as existential communication between man and man is a betrayal of man. And he furnishes ample examples of men who were men of prayer, but not fellowmen. Communication requires that the godhead does not lend itself for communication and that the silence of the One and Only as it were casts us back upon ourselves and upon each other. Therefore truth is present only in inter-human communication, and the principal loneliness of modern man who posits himself cannot be broken except by means of an inter-human communication.

The statement of Lenin, that God is the biggest threat that man has, plays an altered role in Jaspers' thought. He must excommunicate the communication between the One and Only and man. For he is inspired, not by the Kingdom of God, but by the kingdom of humanity. The Transcendent is a function that is subservient to the kingdom of man. And when the One overpowers the many and would overpower the many existences (and Jaspers leaves this open as a possibility) then the humanity of man and the inter-human humanity will be destroyed. Jaspers does not allow for a third possibility. Therefore he excommunicates prayer and the divine world-revelation.

He does appeal to "Biblical Religion" and to the commandment not to make graven images. This commandment is right to his liking for it excludes all direct revelation of God which would give rise to images of God. He does, however, interpolate the Old Testament prophets when they nevertheless attribute faith to what they consider the word revelation, and therefore do not see the Word as an image of God (which may not be made), which man may only portray in order that it may immediately disappear. He does make it difficult for himself by forgetting that this commandment also is a word of God and as such only an image that has to disappear, for else there still would be a fixed divine revelation. Therefore his appeal to "Biblical Religion" is mere sham.
As if God forbade Himself also to make images of Himself and to become flesh! Yes, Jaspers forbids God to do this. He forbids it for the sake of the kingdom of man which cannot tolerate the claim to exclusiveness in the divine self-revelation, for it prevents the "modern" way of inter-human communication to which Jaspers has sold his heart. And so in the name of existential communication and its undisputable priority and exclusiveness he seals the book of divine word-revelation with seven seals, even as he does with Jesus Christ. "God cannot become man". "A corpse cannot rise from the dead". The claim of exclusiveness which Christian believers attribute to Christ the Preacher on the mount is therefore intolerance and fanaticism. Jaspers sees himself compelled to answer their intolerance with intolerance.

The Transcendent is not a person. Prayer makes no sense, unless it is transformed into contemplation. The statement: "God is Truth", can have no meaning whatsoever. The same applies to the statement: "God is love". It is therefore better to speak of the godhead than of God and better still to speak of the Transcendent, or the One and Only. Now for the first there is room available for world-wide and modern communication. Now, after this excommunication of the divine self-revelation, after disrobing God so that He retains merely the right and the possibility to pose as the One and Only, Jaspers teaches us to take nihilism seriously and to discard our certainties. But he himself proceeds from the basic certainty that the Transcendent is the Transcendent, that the One and Only is the One and Only, and that this may not and cannot be otherwise. Else the existential freedom of man would be impaired, and with this existential freedom, the existential communication between man and man. Then the claim to exclusiveness (Ausschließlichkeitsanspruch), the divine self-revelation and faith therein irrevocably intrude between man and man, even as they already have intruded between man and himself in a disturbing way that is unworthy of man.

For this reason, Jaspers considers Christian missions unjustifiable and an attack upon the humanity of man and upon true essential inter-human communication. Communication used as a means to conduct missions in his eyes can be no more than a hypocritical misuse of the modern image of man in the service of the non-modern image of man in which the divine self-revelation still plays a significant part.

Whoever would consider Jaspers' idea of communication and its corresponding practice of communication or who wants to bring this communication into practice, may not fail to see that this excommunication of the God who discloses Himself and of the belief in this self-disclosing God and His revelation as expressed in the word of John's gospel: "The word became flesh," is the indispensable condition for inter-human communication. Not only cannot the Transcendent reveal itself unequivocally, but in addition, it has nothing to reveal. It is not truth nor love nor mercy. It is only BEING! Or again: The transcendent imperative in the self-experience of freedom and in the self-experience of communication between communicating persons. It functions only to take away the arbitrariness from the experiencing of freedom and from the arbitrariness of inter-human communication and then to give this communication the validity of the Great Commandment.

For Jaspers this is all indubitable. It is unassailable. It cannot become a topic for discussion in the communication between man and man and surely cannot thereby be rendered disputable. This works out in two directions: (1) In the direction of what in Jaspers' eyes is a nihilism which will recognize only man and the world and which in its exclusive immanence denies the existence of the Transcendent in unbelief. (2) In the direction of a dogmatism which claims to know more about God than that the One and Only is the One and Only, the Transcendent is the Transcendent, the basis of freedom, and that the One and Only is that Reality in which there is neither room nor
possibility for more reality or possibility. It is dogmatism for instance to claim
that God is Love, Truth and Mercy, or that He has revealed Himself in flesh, for
that is to put faith in divine self-revelation and divine word revelation
as more than philosophical faith. Both directions (that toward "nihilism" and
that toward "dogmatism") make the adherents unable to communicate, and if they do
not excommunicate themselves, then they are excommunicated by Jaspers because only
believers (philosophical believers, that is) can become partners in communication.

In this connection I gladly point to the answer of Jaspers to a passage of an
article of John Hennig Karl Jaspers' Einstellung zur Geschichte in the symposium
mentioned earlier, which was edited by P.A. Schilpp and entitled Karl Jaspers.
There Hennig writes: "In separating the Biblical religion between what can become
philosophical content and what cannot, Jaspers remarks: 'No man can be God'.
This sentence hardly produces the real meaning of Christology. It presents itself
as universal truth. It breaks off communication with at least fifteen hundred
years of our spiritual history and with a hundred million of our contemporaries.
This sentence is not a question of faith but the admission of a non-transparency,
a phenomenon that in general does not receive enough attention in existential
philosophy. The distinction between admitting the non-transparency and the
universal pointing-of-the-way-back is the soul of historical training."
(op.cit., p.57).

To this Jaspers reacts in the same book as follows: "This I now passionately
contradict. I admit the non-transparency of that dogma for me, but I do not
in any way reject it for others" (idem, p.763).

One would have to conclude from this that Jaspers therefore leaves the way open
that others retain faith in Christ as the incarnate Son of God and that he can
indeed communicate with them; even though this "dogma" is not transparent to him,
he nevertheless will gladly accept that it is acceptable to others. We would add,
that if we are to speak of real communication between him and the others in this
way, then the acceptance or rejection of this dogma must be placed existentially
out of play. Then those who communicate in respect to this "dogma" of the Christ
of God at the most will take note that the one does and the other does not
recognize himself and his God thereby. It is a riddle how existential communication
is possible for a believer in Christ if during the communicating he must set
aside his faith-relation with Christ, of which he testifies: "It is no longer I
that live, but Christ liveth in me", and, "The life that I now live, I live
through faith in Him who gave Himself for me." He has thereby eliminated from
play both himself as a Christian and the Son of God as the Son of God.

But we are not quite finished with Jaspers' passionate protest against the
statement of Hennig that Jaspers in his attack upon faith in the mystery of the
incarnation breaks off communication with Christianity and with Jaspers' rejection
that this is not the case at all, for although he rejects this faith for himself,
he does not reject it for others. For he follows up his answer by writing that
the philosopher is always urged to contradict when religion makes a declaration
about things in the world which actually can be checked and sets up demands
according to which man must conform in his activities in the world. In such a
case philosophy checks these claims scientifically and clarifies them
philosophically and in many many cases rejects them. But this has nothing to
do with true faith, for true faith meets the following demands: it does not
threaten itself in matters of empirical reality. It desires no sacrifice of the
intellect. It requires no unethical activity (idem, p.762).
A little further on we read: "That... if it is pure faith, it is not an object of inquiry for historical research" (p. 763). The meaning of this appears clearly from what follows. What millions of people testified through the ages as the content of faith, was certain for them, but "it does not attain to an iota of knowledge regarding the historical event. Certainly the consent of faith e.g., the bodily resurrection of Jesus, is not a historical reality (although as a symbol of a historical reality it need not lose any of its significance) but the historical reality is only this, that people have believed it and still believe that a real witness did exist" (pp. 763, 764).

From the foregoing it appears that Jaspers requires of faith that, if it is to be real, it must stay outside the area of the knowledge of the empirical, natural sciences and outside the area of that which is historically verifiable. He follows in the footsteps of Kant and even makes an advance upon him in making a division of goods between the area of what is scientifically knowable (to which belongs not only that which is known by the natural sciences but also now that which is known from history) and the area of "faith". True faith limits itself to that area where neither the natural sciences nor the historical sciences operate. In these areas of the sciences the universal laws of the scientific general consciousness apply, and these laws implicate, among other things, that a corpse cannot arise from the dead. That is a universality of the natural sciences. It implicates also that the historical reality of "it came to pass" has only a finite or endless reality in which neither eternity nor the infinite nor the Eternal One can reveal itself as such. When Jaspers protests then against the claim of Hennig that he cannot communicate with believing Christendom, he adds that if this Christendom really wants to believe, then naturally it will not believe in the reality of the incarnation of the Word of God nor in the resurrection of the Son of God, but will only speak of the incarnation and the resurrection of Christ in symbols that have another meaning than the incarnation and the resurrection.

Who is right? Hennig or Jaspers? In my opinion, Jaspers is entirely in the wrong for the Christian believer does not believe in the incarnation and the resurrection as symbols, but as reality. And when Jaspers nevertheless says that he does communicate with them, then this is only because he has first recast and de-Christianized these Christian believers and then communicates with these de-Christianized believers as such. They must first submit to the yoke of the universally valid laws of the teachings of natural and historical science and of the teaching of positivistic and neo-positivistic science, and then only according to Jaspers are they acceptable as true believers with whom he can communicate. Hennig is right in judging that he thereby destroys their faith and therefore does not communicate with them as Christians. He has first recast them into "modern" men, who have yielded to the belief in the claim of universal validity and of such natural and historical sciences which apriori exclude the possibility of a divine self-revelation in nature and history. This faith in the natural and historical sciences which excludes the miraculous power of God is for Jaspers as a modern man infallible. And following the pattern of the demands of this faith in science and the corresponding view of reality he cuts up the Christian faith and the divine Word-revelation. In other words, the Christian faith is not true faith. It is acceptable only after reinterpretation. This reinterpretation explains the faith-content of the incarnation and the resurrection of Christ as symbols of man's certification of being, namely, that the Transcendent exists and that the Transcendent is present as the eternity, which never, and surely never exclusively, dips down into time. Hennig is completely correct when he declares that Jaspers cuts off communication with this Christian believer as Christian believer. And Jaspers is correct, provided one bears in mind that Jaspers wants to communicate with the Christian believer only after he has re-formed and re-cast him into a "modern" man who at the most can accept that the Transcendent exists for existence and the existing man, but does not exist for the general consciousness as the God-with-us, the Immanuel who appeared in nature and in history, the Son of God, who became like his brethren in all things.
Why does Jaspers protest so passionately? Why does he set up such stipulations for communication that he excommunicates the Christian believer as Christian believer? He makes such stipulations that he "of a truth" knows of a contradiction between what he calls reason and catholicity. Concerning this contradiction he says emphatically that it is not a polar, but an absolute contradiction. Here it applies: Either the one or the other, and he consciously chooses against catholicity and for reason. This reason gives to Caesar what is Caesar's; that is, it gives to natural and historical sciences what they demand for themselves in the modern self-consciousness. This demand is that there can be nothing within nature or empirical reality that is not finite and endless and that is not accessible to rational, scientific perspicuity.

The only answer to the question is this: because Jaspers demands for himself that he is boundlessly open for every fellow-man, and cannot tolerate the truth that he would ever excommunicate anyone. He is the tolerant one, the co-existing, the communicator himself. But everyone who does not tolerate him after the fashion of his toleration, his coexistence, and his communication is in his eyes intolerant, fanatical, and excommunicating. The only answer to this question is that Jaspers' existentialistic faith, in which he includes (though in a relativized way) the pretentions of the positivistic and neo-positivistic view of the natural and historical sciences, is such that he feels so sure of himself and so modern that, without knowing it, he traps himself in the following contradiction: I allow the truths of faith, the dogmas which others think are valid, to be valid also for me, according to their understanding, but I do not recognize as true faith what does not comply with my modern existentialistic understanding of self. In his answer to Hennig he tries to jump over his own shadow and to make his ideas apply as universal and axiomatic, as universally human. This image of the self he cannot do without, for he believes in himself and in his philosophical faith with indubitable certainty.

But for all that, Hennig is correct. Jaspers actually excommunicates all faith and all believers who believe more about "the Transcendent" than that it is the Transcendent, the One and Only, that it is Being, Reality-without-possibility, who believe that God is the Truth, that He is Love, and that He in that entirely exclusive way loved the world that He sent His only begotten Son.

To this Jaspers does have an answer. It is his final word. He is of the opinion that in this situation he must affirm that he is intolerantly confronted by such unmodern believers who do not attribute to the universal validity of the general consciousness which this consciousness deserves, and who will not give in to what he thinks is down to earth, irresistible "scientific fact" nor to the empirical reality which as such is always finite and endless. And this they do when he calmly wants to communicate with them! Should they harden themselves in their intolerance, or should they toss away Jaspers' world, or should they contemplate by their propaganda and their mission -- often with the help of the sword -- to toss the world away for Jaspers and his communication, then, however much it pains him, he finds himself compelled to become intolerant. With the intolerant, one can only be intolerant. Even such a universally tolerant man like Jaspers can only be intolerant. He even calls others to join in with his intolerance against the intolerant. Here there is no longer any mention of communication, but only of excommunication. And the "rational" excuse is at hand. He excommunicates only those who excommunicate themselves and therefore only those powers which make communication impossible. The only guilty one is the excommunicated excommunicator, who still has listed among his debits that he makes Jaspers and all communication-minded people undergo the painful experience that their modern, enlightened deeply-human searching for communication is broken by their stubbornness and their counterfeit faith. Thus Jaspers in excommunicating him, washes his hands in innocence.
History repeats itself. We know of the same procedure of the old liberalism of the previous century. It also, in the name of the enlightenment and of the modern man's understanding of self as a modern man, in the name of the immovable achievements and rights of natural and historical science and of a rationality that built the kingdom of a universal world brotherhood, found itself obliged, alas, to call the tough, old-fashioned, unenlightened opposing powers to the order of their world brotherhood. To their sorrow they had to place them under the ban and until they showed improved deportment, place them for the time being outside the movement of humanity as those who had no right, or rather who by virtue of their nature and reward, had no rights. With Jaspers there is still a trace of uncertainty. He writes that the advocates of catholicity do not see reason as the advocates of reason see it. Conversely, the advocates of reason do not see catholicity as its advocates see it.

Here the path to a real communication could be opened. This could come for the sake of clarification on both sides. But Jaspers does not proceed in that direction. He merely affirms this "factuality" in order to proceed in his own way to the excommunication of the excommunicating and intolerant advocates of the non-rational and irrational ideas and procedures of catholicity. He comes with the dictation of his communication and offers the only possible way out: communication is possible only for believers, that is, for those who in the spirit of Jaspers understand their own unconditionedness and find the understanding of their own unconditionedness grounded in a transcendent imperative.

It is thus possible only for men who have the same modern understanding of the self and recognize the very same image of man as theirs, and who demand universality if not validity, for this image.

The select number who are capable of and adaptable to communication grows even smaller. In principle, no one needs to be excluded. In fact, nearly everyone is unable and disallowed. For the number of these who know themselves as selves that posit themselves and experience the Transcendent is limited to those who, with the exception of Jaspers himself, are Jasperians. All the others are excluded.

4. Man in His Situation.

The number of presuppositions needed to communicate has not yet been exhausted. Now a fourth requisite requires our attention. Here we come to the inner essence of all existential philosophy. In our judgment, this can be understood by directing our attention to the anthropology of this philosophy and then discover that its basis is found in the thesis that man as such is always in a situation. More precisely, we must add, that man as such is always free, has autonomous power, and his situation is always contingent. When one unwraps man, abstracts him from this situation, he gets a false idea of him and a warped understanding of the self. For man to be man, then, he must be related to a concrete, contingent situation.

Jaspers orients this concept of the situation especially to history and the science of history. The latter has as its field of investigation both history and the historical. It studies these in abstraction from their being "in" the human existential autonomy. Historical science, therefore, does not study the essence, not what is fully concrete, nor that which makes up "Geschichte" and "Geschichtlichkeit". To understand Jaspers, it is necessary always to keep in mind his distinction between what is historical and what is geschichtlich. Everything is historical which falls within the scope of the general consciousness, or -- in somewhat wider terms -- within the totality of the mind. To the
historical belong such things as documents, mores, customs, organizations, forms of law, moral laws, philosophical systems which are accessible to us by means of tradition, religions, et cetera. Though this historical material cannot be explained in an exact, causal or scientific way, yet it can be understood in the way of historical science and so made transparent. It is by nature finite and endless. It appears temporarily, is confined to universal temporality, and therefore can never lay claim to general validity nor to existential absoluteness. It is not existential, but is at most a phenomenon of what is existential; it is not transcendent, but at most a sign (Chiffre) of what is transcendent. The historical is neither eternal nor timeless but endures only for a while and has only temporary validity.

Jaspers' view of the historical is by and large the view of historicism. Historicism says that there is authority in history and in tradition, but then only limited historical validity and a traditional authority. The historical cannot claim absolute authority but must always leave room for the exception, even as a historical phenomenon. For this reason it is in every respect always relative. Philosophical systems as such are only relatively true; philosophical ideas are even false if they claim absolute validity, absoluteness, or timelessness. The same applies to religious dogmas, systems of law, et cetera. All that is historical is as much contingent. In this sense it is merely by way of accident that the following questions may even be asked: Why is tradition exactly what it is? Why is it not entirely different? The only answer is: Because! Because it just happens to be there and because all other conceivable and possibly things just are not there and did not happen. Man who really exists in his situation bears a historical aspect. Man's Geschichtlichkeit consists of the interwovenness of his existential, absolute, non-historical selfness with this historical situative contingency. It consists of this dialectical relation between existence and historicity, between existence and "the world", between the autonomous power of freedom and a contingency which is essentially alien to this existential autonomy and over which this autonomous power by means of an inner activity must dominate. The Geschichtlichkeit of human existence is in the last analysis the situative depth (Situationsmachtigkeit) of the existential autonomous power. The non-abstracted situation escapes the view of the historian and the general consciousness. The situation is permeated with existence because that is where it is -- in existence -- and because existence has dominion over it. But on the other hand, the Geschichtlichkeit of autonomous existence is of such a nature that its authority is co-determined by the situation in which this autonomous power necessarily manifests itself and realizes itself. Existence, therefore, is situative and the situation is existentially determined. One of the aims of the existential philosophy of Jaspers is to escape from the stranglehold of historicism which maintains that man is his own history, his own time, is historically exhaustive determinable. Existence, therefore, is existentially determined. His essence is his historicity.

Karl Jaspers himself went through a historistic period. He has retained this much of it, that he recognizes a "world" which is historically determined, a world of historical and relative phenomena, a world in which nothing has universal validity and nothing is unconditional. This is the world of man as a phenomenon (Erscheinung), which is fully exposed to a historical approach and in which all that is essential at the same time is fading away. It is the world in which all that is valid has to make room for what is new and will have a sequent validity which in its turn has to make room for what will be new and valid after that. And so it goes in endless repetition. It is the world of "bottomlessness". But Jaspers is an existential philosopher and knows how man can escape from this relativity or historicity. The existence of man in principle has nothing to do with the world. Existence does not belong to man's world of phenomena (Erscheinungswelt), it is extra-temporal, extra-historical, supra-temporal and supra-historical; to it the world of history is only the "foreground" with which man is not to be identified. The world of historical phenomena is a world in which existence functions, in which it realizes itself, but with which it is not identical.
This world is its own situation, but is not existence itself. Existence itself is inwardness, i.e. an inner activity which is independent of the situation, even of its own historically-determined situation. Existence relates itself to this situation in an autonomous way. Not being determined by the situation and its tradition, it determines itself, is self-originating; it creates itself and its own norms, values and laws. It chooses itself and its own situation.

As an existence that occurs in a certain contingent situation, it does not originate from this situation, but it lives from its own unconditionedness and endlessness, which occurs nowhere else than in the relation of existence to itself and to its own self transcendency. Existence in its own unconditionedness is its own supreme authority which is independently related to all traditional authority and all authority of tradition. It returns to its own loneliness and is itself its self-origination, self-creation, and self-construction.

Only against the background of these ideas, first, concerning existence and its autonomous power, its absoluteness, its self-origination and its endlessness, and, second, concerning the historical world of phenomena, which makes all that is human relative and finite and tradition-determined, can Jaspers idea about man's Geschichtlichkeit be understood. This idea is the dialectical bridge between two worlds. Man's Geschichtlichkeit means that he is more than just a historical phenomenon: he exists existentially and stands in a sovereign relation to himself in his task of perpetually becoming himself. It also means, however, that man is never himself and is never related to himself in a sovereign relation, without being at the same time "in" a contingent situation, in a certain tradition, in a certain finiteness and in a process of being confined. However sovereignly he may determine himself, he can not escape the fact that he is compelled to effectuate this self-determination in a historical, phenomenological world and to confer on it a historical realization. Considered from the viewpoint of existence, the mere act of this self-realization-in-situation is unconditional, unassailable and absolute. But from the viewpoint of historical reality it has aspects which are conditional, relative and disputable.

To every existentially living human being this act is absolute in its depth, but relative and conditional in its breadth. The transcendent compulsion which incites to an existential act in freedom and sets a seal of invincibility upon it, goes only so far, that "to me" a certain historically growing and fullgrown act was and remains indisputable, inwardly necessary, and unconditional. But at the same time every man, if considered from the viewpoint of historical breadth, as a totality, i.e. as an autonomous-man-in-historically-contingent situation, is vulnerable, finite, relative and "bottomless".

As soon as the existential depth fades away from the "fullgrown" act and its relevance and has become an "objective" fact, this fact belongs to history and is existentially inferior. One may easily be deceived by these "facts" which are already present in the expression "the objective word" and one may nail down the existential man with his inner ability for action to this historical factuality. The result then is that one will absolutize that which is relative as well as man. Thus, a philosophical system such as that of Spinoza is as a system and as a product/thought and language something different from the philosophia perennis in which Spinoza in his existential philosophizing took part. It is historical, and no longer geschichtlich. The history of philosophy as the history of traditional data is consequently not a real history of real philosophy. In real history an existential communication with the history-transcending aspect (Geschichtlichkeit) of Spinoza's philosophizing is at stake. In this communication the documents and writings and even the system of Spinoza's thought can provide at the most an occasion, a springboard, from which to communicate by means of a scientifically incomprehensible "jump" out of the historically-determined practice of science with the history-transcending aspect in Spinoza's philosophizing and so, as it were, with Spinoza himself.
In this connection Jaspers states even that entrance into the field of phenomena, into history with its finitude, its endlessness, its relativity, etc., means necessarily that the real event of philosophizing from the underlying philosophical creed is misdrawn, discoloured and even misdirected. What is said and what is thought is precisely not the issue, namely, what is transcendent of history (Geschichtliche) and meant to be unconditional. It hides what is meant and what has happened existentially, and so requires an interpretation which translates backwards, and contrary to the text. It is an interpretation that enables us to understand what his expressions and the system of his thought meant to Spinoza at the time when he was turning from the unconditional, endless, inward act to the finished product of his thinking and writing. At the time of his transition Spinoza correctly considered philosophy and the act of philosophizing as binding, as being absolute, unconditional, as a true philosophia perennis. Moreover, Jaspers presupposes that this viewpoint of the "autonomous existence in a contingent situation" is self-evident and will win the approval of every rational human being.

But, as we said already, this holds not only for philosophy and philosophizing, but also for all that is human and for the totality of man. Man’s totality is dialectical and not systematic; into his totality intrudes the aspect of his being lost in what is contingent and in what is fixed or can be fixed. Man in his totality does not possess himself, is not able to express himself unequivocably, and is tied dialectically to the historicity of the situation. One of the human "border situations" is this, that man, whether he wants it or not, is always determined in his totality by the situation. But he still has the choice as to which situation to tie himself down as being "situative". Also in this respect Jaspers’ philosophy is related to Nietzsche’s amor fati (love of fate). He thinks Paul’s experience on the road to Damascus was dangerous: such people who are radically uprooted out of their tradition usually become fanatic and inhuman. For this reason existential man, in spite of his autonomous power with regard to his situation and in spite of his freedom of choice with regard to the concrete situation, actually has little choice left than to accept as his own the tradition in which he grew up. Though he may do this autonomously, he must appropriate this situation to his own use. Therefore an exception is an exception and not an example. Therefore Jaspers' philosophy in general boils down to this, that everybody has to appropriate to himself the tradition to which he happens to belong, in its absolute self-originating power. But at the same time, he also has to allow room for two more things: (1) for the insight that his "historicity is just one among many possible things and therefore is itself relative, open to attack and deserves to disappear; (2) he should not identify the historical appearance in which other people come to meet him, with these people themselves. Rather he has to take into account that though their historicity is "to them" existentially absolute and unconditional, yet their Geschichtlichkeit and therefore also their humanity-in-depth lies a foot deeper than their historical appearance would (wrongly) let you presume.

So on the one hand we can say of the existentially living human being that he enters his situation because of inner necessity of freedom and that he situates himself in such a way that to him this is strictly unconditional, absolute and endless. But on the other hand he should be aware of the fact that not one single act of making history from his own Geschichtlichkeit is absolute, unconditional and endless, but relative, conditional, finite, and temporal. He may and must presume, however, that this holds for all human beings. Herewith a universality, a structural law of the humanity of man, has been disclosed. Thus every human being, who, as he chooses the situation in his own Geschichtlichkeit and who, in this way, accepts or molds a certain historical tradition, can be sure that this act of entering a situation originates from an unassailable unconditionality. At the same time there is no one about whom it would not be true (if he be considered, not from the viewpoint of depth but of breadth), that the way in which he enters into the situation is evidently only relative, finite and contingent. Thus man is as well unimpeachable as impeachable, as well
assailable as unassailable, as well responsible as irresponsible, etc. He always "is" more than what he is when he enters into the historical situation, when he expresses himself, when he asserts himself, and when he makes his appearance. He constantly transcends his historicity. At the same time he, even while transcending, is his transcended historicity and situation and so stands helpless in his "border-situation"; he exists inescapably in his situation and historicity.

Historicity and situativity are, like an indispensable and necessarily fateful mask behind which the Geschichtlichkeit of man makes its appearance. To unmask this mask is one of the driving motives of Jaspers' life's work. He thinks he has a special calling to unmask his fellowmen who refuse to submit themselves to this philosophical surgery by the philosophical physician (Jaspers by name) and do not want to have anything to do with either the system of historism or of existential philosophy. Men deny their humanity by identifying themselves with their mask or by over-estimating their mask to be more than finite, temporal and disappearing. The mask can claim neither general validity nor absoluteness. This indicates also the dogmatical narrow-mindedness of some people. They, to borrow the words of the Christian believer, do not confess their faith from which the mask of a historically-determined and contingent creed originates, but do believe their creed, and thus, in so doing, try to turn upside down their own existential and autonomous power.

Now Jaspers' view of historicity and tradition (which on the one hand are power which determine situations and are contingent, and, on the other hand comprise man's Geschichtlichkeit, which as powers have their origin in the absoluteness of the human competency to decide, given to man by a transcendental imperative, who, out of this origin, repeatedly jumps down into the historical phenomenal world, is an indispensable presupposition needed both to understand Jaspers' idea of communication and also to practice the communication, which Jaspers wants to pursue. In communicating we may not concern ourselves with the controversy between philosophical systems or between religious trends, or with confessional differences and movements. With regard to these controversies it should be clear beforehand to each communicator, that they who are historically determined are bound by the situation, are limited, finite and ultimately "bottomless", i.e., they function in a contingency which devours everything. The Geschichtlichkeit of those who communicate may not be assailed in the act of communication for in their Geschichtlichkeit they are once-for-all, unconditional, irreplacable, incomparable, original and even absolute. In the act of communication the fact has to be accepted a priori by those who communicate, that each one who takes part in the communication is and has to be tied to certain traditions, for each one is standing in his border-situation as his own border-situation. Consequently, each one must be willing to regard his opinion, his view of life, his view of man, of religion, of morals, and of customs as just one of the many, endless possibilities, which are not timeless, are not generally valid and are not unconditional. Therefore he must be willing to consider them as being without validity and must be ready to eliminate them at the outset. Whoever is not willing to assume this broad attitude of "reasonable understanding" according to Jaspers may not participate in the communication, for he is unruly and incapable. In communication these relative, non-essential and receptive views, systems, dogmas, etc. are not the issue at stake, nor should they be. In communication we are concerned only with the encounter of the existing geschichtliche persons in their existentiality and in their Geschichtlichkeit. Each one of the participants knows beforehand -- and must be willing to admit -- that his view is valid only for himself and then of course not for the others. Similarly the view of others is valid only to them and not to him. This matter should be the issue if there is to be communication at all. That is to say, each person who communicates has to be a semi-historist and an existentialist in the same way Jaspers is. From a historical point of view the idea of communication and its practice became possible only after the rise of historism and the birth of existential philosophy which acknowledges the relative right of this historism in order later to overcome it. The idea is truly ultra-modern.
Communication therefore can have no bearing upon the dogmas which one believes or does not believe, nor upon the philosophical systems, to which one adheres or does not adhere. Such a dogmatical and rationalistic-metaphysical standpoint should be discarded as completely outmoded, if the communication Jaspers intends will ever get started! Communication can have bearing only upon the Geschichtlichkeit in so far as it is ready to jump down and incarnate itself in history. It can have a bearing only upon that which stands in front of the foreground. It has bearing upon the autonomous existence of the whole man in the contingent situation as he crosses the dynamic, incomprehensible line of motion from existence into being.

Again we make the remark, that Jaspers is uncritical in failing to discuss the question whether this idea of man and reality is true. He proceeds on the assumption that it has universal validity. He does not discuss his idea about man and reality, but makes it the indispensable basis of communication, the only valid foundation for its reality and its realization. From his standpoint he distinguishes between views such as nihilism, dogmatism, scepticism, non-philosophy, "Widervermunft" et cetera. He may relinquish the term "general validity" to the general consciousness and the acquisition of knowledge by the special sciences, which has its basis in this consciousness, yet he demands universal validity for his own philosophical image of man and reality. These he considers necessary to open the way for such philosophizing and communicating as he advocates. To him these ideas are self-evident and are not open to discussion. His philosophy about philosophizing and about the philosophy which is the underlying principle of his idea of communication are the only gateway to the communication which he wants all people to have. But about these he does not want to communicate with anyone. This means that he does not want to discuss this unbridled philosophical dogmatism, not even as an anti-dogmatism. It is a dogmatism in which he absolutizes his philosophical creed and then grants to himself and others the opportunity to discuss, but then, only, from the standpoint of this philosophical creed, and not with himself or in opposition to himself about this philosophical creed. His philosophical creed is the philosophical creed and the only basis for an inter-human communication on the highest level and in the "deeper" humanity of man. We should limit ourselves to this, according to Jaspers.

This is all there is to it. It is true just as Jaspers says, according to what he thinks is the basic experience of man's humanity. It is a basic experience, however, which came to the fore in Western thought and self-consciousness only after the arrival of historicism and existential philosophy. But now, without any self-criticism, he cuts and depicts man's reality of every time and place according to this pattern.

Whoever gives himself to this kind of communication should be aware that he has already bowed his head to the semi-historism and to the doctrine and life of existential philosophy. He should know that now he is considered to be so deeply existential that his own freedom to posit himself is unassailable. He should know also that he must relegate everything that is not typically human-existential to the world which is bottomless and therefore contingent, as having neither basis nor origin. He should know that he, with the exception of this one view of Jaspers, should not take any view more seriously than he would a basically futile attempt to articulate what can not be articulated to think what can not be thought. Therefore he cannot take it as seriously as it is being taken or has been taken by its adherents throughout the centuries in the history of religion and philosophy. He should know that in principle
he is at the point where mankind has been always, namely, he has reached the pretension, that he himself stands outside of the discussion, that he has to bring under discussion all that deviates from this view and has to judge it as disputable and even "false". He should know that, if he with Jaspers invites men to a boundless openness and to a willingness to communicate, he is thereby asking only for an openness for his own view of man and the world and that he within the scope of this view starts to crusade for communication. At the same time he crusades against all that is not in harmony with this. It goes the way of the Roman army, which brings peace everywhere. But of course the defeated ones have to forget that it is a pax romana! All that is historical is disputable, relative, finite, temporal and conditional. The totality of mankind possesses in addition an indisputable element -- the core of freedom and its history-transcending character; it possesses Geschichtlichkeit. It always possesses, according to Jaspers, another aspect also which is necessarily disputable, but this again has one exception: this thesis itself must be considered unassailable, and would excommunicate all who disagree, because this thesis would not have in it anything that is violable, temporal, relative or finite. It has unconditional validity and claims universality. And this is the conclusion, "Schlusz", according to Jaspers.

5. The Loneliness of Communication

A fifth condition for true communication is this: those who communicate must leave each other untouched in their Geschichtlichkeit and must consider each other as unimpeachable and must respect each other in the depth of their humanity. The co-humanness of communication consists primarily of this, that one is deeply convinced that human beings are in the last analysis unable to help each other. Each one has to actualize himself out of his own originality and out of his own unconditionality in his own once-for-all geschichtlich even that allows no substitution. Consequently we have to accept as a condition for communication, that we can be at best an occasion to the other person, or at the very most, we can appeal to him to become more like himself. And this holds reciprocally. Apart from positing his own self and apart from his very own strictly personal Geschichtlichkeit, there is nothing left for man either to obtain or to provide as far as his own true humanity is concerned. But to be himself and to realize himself depends to such an extent on his own self-origination and his own unconditionality, that no one else may be of any assistance. And if someone else still tries to help, then he becomes a brutal intruder who lacks respect for his fellow-man as well as his own humanity. In communicating we are only able to be an incentive to each other to be and to become more and more ourselves, each one for himself. In this way communication can never be more than the drama of the dialogue in which and through which each communicator realizes himself and his own humanity more and more. The fundamental loneliness remains as the necessary condition, both for and in communication. Should anyone force his way through this loneliness, it would be at the expense of the selfness of one of the two communicators, while the other one acts in a violent and disrespectful way. One can in communication only be an incentive to the other in his own selfness and his ultimate loneliness.

For Jaspers it is excluded that in and through communication a communion would arise which would include and enclose the communicating parties so that they would become "members" of this communion. For thereby, injustice would have been done to the self and to his own self-originating, self-realization.

Kaufman points out (op.cit., P.A.Schilpp) that for Jaspers the necessity to communicate originates from the plurality and the tatterness of the manifestations of the Transcendent. He states that Jaspers' primary experience is the loneliness of the self and of the "brokenness of existence" (Zerissenheit des Seins). At any rate it is connected to Jaspers' thought that a person who communicates can put himself in the other's situation. At the same time, this mutual "understanding" has its limits. In this way it is possible to understand that the total humanity
of the "other" is intertwined with a particular situation, for he also has to live in and from a certain tradition and realize himself therein. People may reciprocally take others into consideration and show them warm interest, and even mutually understand that the existence of each of the participants is possible only within a certain traditional situation in which he happens to be. They can understand that each one has to appropriate this situation as the only one possible and valid to him in his own unconditionality and from the point of view of his own self-origination and autonomy. Yet in this understanding the mutual acknowledgment: "And so it is not for me!" has to be included also. The contingency of what is situative is (in its abstraction) a welcome datum for free, individual existence, for hereby it is enabled to realize itself in such a way that it can not be copied, -- it is once-for-all and unique, and so is enabled to express its own originality and selfness. Thereby any uniformity of self-realization is excluded. Where such uniformity does occur it appears that man is suffering from a lack of real selfness and even though he acts freely in his misuse and violation of this freedom, he enslaves himself to a rationalistic pattern. The Massman is a pitiable example. Jaspers goes so far in limiting the possibility of communication by requiring that one must strictly be himself and become himself that he teaches that in communication one can testify only from and out of his own selfness and his own Geschichtlichkeit. Such testimony for the other party can only mean that thereby, as it were, a spark somehow, unexplainably, jumps across and as a result the partner begins to be immersed, not in the other person or in the selfness of the other person, but in himself and in this way comes to himself both inwardly and richly. Every possibility is excluded that he reach the other person or the other person reach him. Thus there are two worlds which meet, and it is necessary that they remain such, namely, two worlds. This is an indispensable prerequisite for communication and co-existence. And since putting things into words involves objectifying and "secularizing" them, communicative language, according to him, reaches its culmination in silence. In this silence each one comes to himself and people generally become aware of each other and each one comes to himself and experiences one of the "highest moments of life" in the presence of the Transcendent. This Transcendent is present also only silently. Thus the condition for communication is that one, thereby, all by himself, intends only to come to himself. At the most, however inexplicable it may be, he becomes the occasion that the other person comes to himself. This then works reciprocally.

It now appears that the Transcendent together with the transcendental "imperative", which occurs in the experience of knowing that man has been given to himself, is present at the same time as the experience of being and is refracted into a plurality. Jaspers writes more than once that each self has its very own Transcendent. In this way, he can even take up the cudgels for the elements of truth in polytheism, which run the danger of getting lost in monotheism. The transcendental imperative may have universal validity, yet in concrete cases it is individualized to the same extent as there are individual, existential persons. In his love for his fellow man, one can, while communicating, love him only according to the manner in which he himself exists existentially and totally. This love however does not create a "we", which includes both parties. Therefore no communicator may steer in the direction of such a "we consciousness", for thereby he would wreck the basis of communication and so break it down. Love for the co-existing party is never love for what is familiar or recognizable, but for what is strange and hidden. These elements are displayed by the co-existing one himself. Each person, according to Jaspers, should be to the other a homo absconditus (a hidden man) even as the Transcendent itself is and remains a Deus absconditus (a hidden God). This accounts for the fact that communication does not establish communion and at best can only contribute to the increase of its own becoming and its own inner coincidence with itself in the totality of its selfness. Only in this way is the dialogue of communication possible.
At this point the question comes to mind: what meaning does communication actually have? The mysterious jump of the spark in communication may never occur. What is more, man comes to himself even without communication and thereby becomes aware that he is only himself and not someone else and truth is truth for him only, not for anybody else. He also becomes aware that the absoluteness of his self-realization is met by the counter-weight of the historical aspect in which this self-realization takes place. Moreover, the conditions of communication require that each one realize himself more and more. No one can really help him in this. Man is thrown back upon himself also in communication; he is handed over and "given" to himself. This means loneliness:

For the moment we leave the question of the meaning of communication unanswered. What we shall do is call attention to the fact that Jaspers has declared that in communication none of the communicators may try to penetrate the depths of the other. If he were to do so, he would alienate the other from himself. Self-alienation, if not the very worst, is surely one of the most grievous sins in Jaspers' index of sins. In the depth of his existential self-ness, in his Geschichtlichkeit that originates from this depth with absolute necessity, in his historicity as he accepts it, and even in his totality, man is inviolable. No one has the right or the calling to come to him with missionary motives to "convert" him. In this climate and under the discipline of this "bill of rights" communication must take place. To each human being belongs his own transcendental imperative, his own inaccessibleness, and his strangeness to the other.

The requirement that in communication one should steer clear of the cliff of reciprocal self-estrangement, means that communication can take place only on the level of equality. Differences of standing, of class, of rank, or of race should not enter into the picture. The communicators have to behave as world-citizens who are conscious of no advantage over or disadvantage overagainst others. They must be weaned from all feelings of superiority. And whereas for Jaspers existential communication means the realization of the ideal and only permissible way of inter-human relationship, it goes without saying that Jaspers declares that all such interhuman relations, such as those between higher and lower or between sire and servent, in which the level of mutual equality has not been reached, alienate parties necessarily from their own selves and prevent them from coming to themselves.

People who feel the need of the authority of other people are, according to Jaspers, not yet able to travel the way of existential self-realization. Consequently they are not yet able to become existential partners in communication. Again and again Jaspers will confront these people and describe them. Even religion is to him a phenomenon which presupposes this need of human authority and complies with it. And since the vast majority of people needs such an authority and also bearers of authority, Jaspers provides room for religion and for religious institutions. These institutions, however, have meaning only on a sub-existential level and should honor the inexorable demand that they provide at least such elbow room as is necessary for those who are existentially related to themselves and to the Transcendent and who therefore as competent co-existing persons can enter into the real and authentic method of communication. Jaspers is an aristocrat. He is familiar with the distinction between the elite and the masses. His existential communication is only for the elite. This is not due to the fact that the elite maintain a forced closed shop but because the great majority of people are not yet able to come to existential independency and to real human maturity. Communication is limited to mature people who live from their own originality. Only on this level will one be able to reach the level of equality. Here the differences between race, standing, and class disappear completely. There need not even be a conscious or intentional acceptance of equality. The equality is self-evident. On this level one assumes, and that of his own accord, that each existential communicator exists in a wholly unique, free and autonomous relation to himself and to the Transcendent. Of the other he presupposes nothing more.
Closely connected with Jaspers' idea of equality is his view of charity (caritas) and mercy. As long as the one only really helps the other, the level of equality has not yet been reached and consequently the condition for existential communication has not been met. On the level of real communication he is aware that no one can help the other. An absolute loneliness prevails between those who communicate. At the same time however, charity and mercy mean that the man bows down to and comes to the help of his fellow. The needy person owes humble thanks of the help received. Kaufmann has pointed out in the article we cited earlier that the God of the Bible is a condescending and merciful God and that mercy is the heart of the biblical revelation. He has pointed out that Jaspers has no organ of sense for such mercy and consequently denies the essence of the Biblical religion even while he maintains that he agrees with it. We might add that it is not by chance that the one gift of God which Jaspers is willing to receive is the freedom by which we are given to ourselves. This gift rules out once and for all God the Giver as the God of all mercy. The divine gift Jaspers allows is precisely the gift by which God forever makes Himself superfluous as giver and is condemned to play the role which is not different essentially from that of the Aristotelian deity: kinei hoos erosomenon. He is the mover toward that for which eros strives. But in this movement God is not essentially involved. To view the Transcendent in this way is for Jaspers the inescapable demand of communication.

6. The Brokenness of Being

The sixth condition for the idea of communication is Jaspers' doctrine of the brokenness of being. Without it communication is robbed of its meaning. Negatively this means that Jaspers rejects any "harmonious worldview". With special delight he speaks about the "antinomy-structure" of the world and the many antinomies which belong to man and the world.

This does not mean that Jaspers would not accept a certain order and a certain structurality. He recognizes, for instance, different levels out of which the humanity of man is constructed. The lowest level is that of the vital just-there-being (Dasein); next follows the level of consciousness in general ("Bewusstsein uberauf") then that of the human spirit and its totality of ideas, and finally the highest level, namely, human existence. According to Jaspers no free existential realization of the self is possible except on the basis of the vital "just-there" being, of the general consciousness, and of the spirit. Of greatest importance in this regard is the self-realization on the deepest level, that of Dasein. This is as far removed from the Transcendent as possible. The Transcendent "exists" only for existence. Therefore the Dasein as such is totally alien to the Transcendent.

It is obscure and, like the whole of nature, foreign and far away. It is a bottomless pit to man who, as a knowing and existential being, exists in relation to himself and to the Transcendent. It is governed by the law of self-preservation, by the uncircumcised will to its own just-thereness. It is entangled in the struggle for life and driven by dark passion which irrationally hands over every living being to the struggle for existence by means of a struggle for life. In principle there are no rules of this struggle except one: the struggle for power and the expansion of power. Seen from the viewpoint of the norm of love for his neighbour, every human being hereby becomes involved in debt. This debt is unavoidable. He who does not have to fight against his neighbour in this struggle with all available means, may not take pride in himself for this, for his safe position is doubtlessly the heritage of former generations. In the struggle for life men wrongly have attained so much power for themselves and their descendants, that the latter live from the polluted, captured capital and can thus assume a condescending, benevolent and helpful attitude. But as soon as the need presses, they cannot escape the law of the jungle: homo homini lupus (every man a wolf to man).
Jaspers is of the opinion that even upon the lowest level some communication is possible; he calls it the communication of Dasein. It occurs when people combine their efforts in a well-understood self-interest to strive unitedly for a concrete purpose and to strengthen their position in the struggle for life. But this communication remains a poor alloy and does not escape the inevitable guilt. It goes without saying that this guilt-consciousness, which Jaspers develops in his metaphysics of the Dasein, does not lead to repentance and sorrow, nor open the way to conversion. It is impossible for anyone to set himself free from these iron laws of Dasein except by suicide. However, there is an aestheticism of this guilt-consciousness. This tragedy of life is accepted by making it aesthetical. This aestheticizing naturalism is the basis of Jaspers' existential philosophy of freedom. Existence which is built in these "nature-aspects" of human nature cannot, as "possible freedom" and the power for freedom prevent the substructure from being permanent. In fact, without this substructure of the "nature-aspects" of human nature, existence becomes an unreal and a chimerical notion. Existential communication in which the selves freely fight a fight of love, can occur only on the basis of this Dasein where each one considers his neighbour in principle a potential or real enemy. Among the many things we discover in the nature aspects of reality, the aspect of hostility is inherent and so forms the counterpart of the One and Only: the Transcendent.

And so we come to the brokenness of reality. All formation of community therefore, with the exception of existential communication, is of cheap alloy, for it belongs to this "dark" side of being (Dasein). His description of what he calls "political manners" (Philosophie II, page 702) is a sinister example. All people have their own interests in their Dasein and these interests necessarily collide with each other. Even existential communication and the willingness to communicate existentially are not able to reform. Therefore the brokenness of being continues relentlessly. This means that Jaspers' philosophizing lacks a central focal point as well as a central starting point within the philosophizing self. Jaspers is a dualist. Being the philosopher of "das Umgreifende" (that which encloses), like the Dasein the general consciousness, the spirit, the existential selfness and the Transcendent, he acknowledges more than one enclosing aspect. So if he calls the Transcendent the enclosing aspect of all enclosing aspects and the transcedency of all transcendencies, this has to be taken cum grano salis, for he denies that there is a single original root to all being. Even his doctrine of the existential self, though it mentions the past as being pure origin and the future as pure transcendency, teaches that what is in between this eternal past and this eternal future is the integral part of being's lostness. This theme of lostness is essentially related to his doctrine of the darkness and strangeness of the Dasein. He even considered it an indispensable stimulus for seeking to communicate between those who exist. From the urgency of this lostness a virtue has to be made by means of an existential communicative pilgrimage. So the existential communication is somewhere in between the lower Dasein and the high and unreachable Transcendent: it cannot loose itself from the lower element nor attain to the supremely Transcendent. It is, as we shall see, lifted up by the "attractive power" of the One and Only, the Transcendent. We should note at this point that, according to Jaspers, real communication can take place only between "selves" in their existential being; and there is no communication between man and the Dasein, not even on the level of that being which is just there, nor yet between man and the Transcendent, not even within the Transcendent Itself. Every man has to conquer through his own Daseinwille his own existential "purity" again and again, all the while knowing that he never can come to a definite victory. So every man has to be taken up again and again into the "attractive power" of the One and Only by the force of reason; but he always falls back again into the vital Dasein passions, needs and satisfactions. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, with regard to the relation which existential being sustains to the general consciousness and to the spirit of totality. There is no end to the brokenness of being nor to the road of existential self-realization.
It should be added that Jaspers views this so-called empirical Dasein as a captive of the temporality of coming and going, of appearing and disappearing, as having a radical perishableness. Existential communication can only be built in within this perishableness. It even participates in it. And this holds even more for the Dasein itself, because the existential selfness and the existential communication between self and self, can exist only for a limited time. When this period is past, the Dasein, the general consciousness, and the spirit once more dominate the whole field.

It should be seen therefore, that to Jaspers the existential self is definitely not the central focal point, the core in which the whole being of man has been concentrated. The brokenness or tornness of being cuts through the concrete individual man. That he be himself existentially is an elite phenomenon in which the total man never can be concentrated. This holds also with respect to existential communication which is the exception rather than the rule, more an ideal than reality, more an inviting perspective than an attainable goal, more a last retreat than a world-wide humanity.

This crass irrationalism is to Jaspers the prerequisite for his doctrine of communication between free, self-positing selves. The omnivorous power of the bare and brutal just-there being continues to stand as big as life before us and is to Jaspers inflexible: there is no existential communication which can come to our rescue to reform or transform things. In this connection, an amor fati is Jaspers' last word and answer, in spite of all his moralistic and moralizing sermons in which he admonishes one and all. As a moralizing sermonizer he always arrives too late. Either the address cannot be found, or one can always make it impossible to find it because of the inflexible brutality of the just-there being. Jaspers' appeal is returned to him marked "undeliverable". His own irrationalistic doctrine of the Dasein justifies this fully.

We are of the opinion that Jaspers in this way gives expression to those feelings of deep and pervasive impotence and of non-addressability which we find especially in Europe after the two worldwars. The doctrine (dogma) of the brokenness of being is metaphysical. But as we have already noted, Jaspers presents it as something totally different from a metaphysical dogma. When he in his existential communication wants to throw everything on the scales and writes in his Rechenschaft und Ausblick that he is ready to loose everything, if only he may remain with people, he forgets that he has set his doctrine of communication within a metaphysical and irrationalistic framework, which is similar to the early Greek motive of a chaotic world as the counter part of the ordering celestial powers. He forgets that he can not throw this conception upon the scales of existential communication, for the loss of it would change radically the very nature of communication as well as its purpose and motive. Therefore his existential philosophical doctrine of communication is outwitted and dominated by his doctrine of that which encloses (Das Umgreifende). This doctrine he has worked out fully in his Philosophical Logic. It is actually a non-existential old-fashioned metaphysics, clothed in the garment of modern irrationalism. As he repeatedly asserts, the lawless, arbitrary, evil, and dark Dasein is a necessary condition for existence and communication of those who co-exist.

But this condition causes an unavoidable and permanent frustration which will drive the existential communication into the corner of the exception and become a mere possibility which can be realized only in exceptionally high moments of life and then only between two persons. What is more, communication is strictly eschatological and has only eschatological value. It is no wonder therefore that whereas the "Dasein", the selfwill, the struggle for life and the will for power which govern individual men and all mankind and yet have no inner limitation form a necessary condition. Jaspers' doctrine of communication is overtaken and governed by his doctrine of the inevitable frustration. All that remains for communication is the call to unreserved willingness to communicate and the recognition, that only an "active endurance" can reach out above this permanent failure of existential
communication. He means such an active endurance whereby not only the Transcendent but also the communicators themselves are condemned to silence. They too, as Jaspers teaches, fail when they try to understand the meaning of frustration.

7. The Place of the General Consciousness.

The next condition which, according to Jaspers, is indispensable for the idea and practice of communication is the role which Jaspers assigns to "the general consciousness" and to the knowledge and research of the sciences.

This general consciousness is the supra-personal subject of all rational knowledge and study. As such it is able to make its results supra-personal, impartial, generally valid and neutral. Since the days of Kant and Positivism, this is seen as giving to science the right to present its results as the undeniable "truth" and its knowledge as compelling. For Jaspers also the subject of such scientific studies is interchangeable and scientific studies are marked by the interchangeability of the individual subject, because the real subject of scientific studies is not a person, but the general consciousness.

But this general subject is according to Jaspers unreal. It hovers in the air above reality and does not take part in the struggle of Dasein nor in the will to be oneself. It does not choose sides. All of these are significant for reality. It is a center of infallible ordering and possesses apriorimethods of learning which apply to every time and place. By acknowledging this supra-personal subject of thought, Jaspers makes room for the relative right of rationalism and for the rationalistic concept of science. As a good existentialist, Jaspers opposes the rationalistic dogma which adores science and subordinates all knowledge and all reality to this general consciousness. For him the contradiction between scientific and philosophical knowledge is fundamental. This does not mean, however, that he would not give to Caesar what is Ceasar's nor that he would refuse to bow his head to the claims of scientific methods and knowledge as being undisputable, generally valid, and compelling in character. Jaspers' philosophy needs a scientific insertion. This insertion reminds us strongly of Aristotle's doctrine of the supra-personal mind, which takes its position in between the deity on one side and man and world on the other.

For his philosophical knowledge, Jaspers pays toll to this idea by stating that philosophical knowledge cannot do without the medium of the general consciousness. But his real existentialism comes to the fore when he teaches that the real subject of philosophical knowledge is not the general consciousness, but the existential man who himself transcends both the Dasein and the general consciousness. Therefore this real subject is not related to his supra-personal and generally-valid general consciousness to transcend this medium. Philosophical knowledge and way of thinking are always busy putting to use the forms of the general consciousness, but then, of course, only to say thereby something different and to grasp and to understand something different than one would expect if he would attach philosophy to the forms of the general consciousness. In philosophy one always means something else than one would expect if he depended on the medium of the general consciousness. Whoever does not acknowledge this transcendental use of the general consciousness, does injustice to every philosophical thought and statement. A truly philosophical thought cannot be thought or expressed adequately. Hence there is a principal cleavage between philosophy and the sciences. Existential philosophizing is totally different from what is generally valid or suprapersonal. It is strictly personal, deeply-existential and, like existential living itself, is its own origin. This latter has nothing to do with general validity, but is based upon the absolute, (not in knowledge) but in conscience. Just as Kant wished to rescue practical reason from the grasp of scientific reason and therefore took up the cudgels for the autonomy of practical reason and tried to fix boundaries for scientific reason, so Jaspers, consciously following Kant, would rescue existential reason. He tries to emancipate it from the general consciousness and to put it on its own feet by the use of a razor-keen contrast between general validity and unconditionedness.
For this reason existential communication falls outside the grasp of scientific knowledge and transcends all scientific communication. Only there beyond science and scientific discussion can existential communication exist. This communication is frustrated by everyone who would try in a scientific way to analyze, fix, or explain the ideas, statements, words, or lines of thought that are used for communication. But whereas on the other hand this existential communication cannot take place without the medium of the general consciousness, Jaspers judges that communication remains forever a "venture". Communication, unable to defend itself, has to expose itself to scientific analysis and thereby to a permanent misunderstanding. The ideas, the judgments, the words, the meaning, and the relationship which were used all have a different meaning for existential communication than the generally accepted meaning as it is known by the general consciousness. But this meaning cannot be interpreted by ideas and words. It is un-translatable. It waits for a "concept" which is not a concept, for a listener or reader, who from his own existential self and from his own relatedness to the Transcendent "understands" that which cannot be said and what cannot be heard. Such is the venture of existential communicative language. In each instance what was said was never meant. There is no communicative contact in this communication as long as one is of the opinion that what was said was meant and that what was meant could be understood.

One of the reasons why Jaspers emphatically depreciates the knowledge and the power of the general consciousness is that he wants to defend the existential freedom of man. This freedom would be killed if the existent thing and the existential philosopher could be fixed scientifically by the ideas, judgments, words, and sentences he uses. He would be deprived of his hiddenness and of his freedom. Being a good existentialist, Jaspers depreciates scientific knowledge and the power of knowledge on behalf of the freedom of man. This depreciation is "fixed" by Jaspers by his distinction between the "general validity" obtained by the general consciousness on the one hand, and by the "absoluteness" which belongs to the nature of free existance and thus to existential communication on the other hand.

The consequences of this are weighty and many. All that can be formulated has to be downgraded just because it can be formulated, for existence and existential living, as well as existential communication, are creative and original. They are born in an initial jump, which can neither be formulated nor be predicted by a universally valid scientific knowledge in the way of scientific prognosis. The act of formulation and the understandable formula can only pertain to matters which do not essentially touch the existential communication. The absoluteness of the existential "inner act" lies beyond the general validity of those truths which can be formulated. Existential truth is existential truthfulness and can be measured only by its absoluteness which originates in the existential act. The general consciousness has no instruments to measure this. The origination of the existentially truthful act from its original absoluteness can in no way be distinguished from individual arbitrary power, i.e., from existential mendacity. But so much is clear to Jaspers that each existence which would try to express itself in formulable judgments, and identify itself with these, lives existentially untruthfully and is unworthy of man's humanity.

In this way, Jaspers arrives at his radical antithesis between catholicity and reason. Catholicity believes that the highest "truths" can be formulated as if they were objective, generally-valid, and supra-personal. It thus enslaves free existences to these formulae and these truths which can be formulated. This holds for philosophical idealism surely, but not less for dogmatic and orthodox Christianity. Jaspers rejects them all antithetically. Truths which can be formulated are unworthy of human existential freedom, and even more so of the Transcendent. Over against this catholicity he promotes and fights for "reason", i.e., for the attractive power of the One and Only with which autonomous existence is related. Reason is supra-scientific and surpasses scientific judgments' conceptual formulation. This reason is entirely different from the concepts of the understanding which belong to the general consciousness. It delivers existential man from his own isolation, and distinguishes his existential freedom principally
from his vital will to promote his own Dasein. It thereby stimulates him to love existential communication.

This radical antithesis between reason and catholicity is therefore closely related to Jaspers' view of the relation of existence and the Transcendent on the one side and the general consciousness on the other. Existence is essentially connected with that which transcends this supra-personal consciousness and the Transcendent is essentially connected with existence. Here real philosophizing takes place, here we find real communication, here is the true positing of the self. Here real "love" functions, although only to give elbow room for freedom. Even in existential communication the solitude remains; in fact a new one originates.

Catholicity, however, deprives man of his free existence, his originality and his absoluteness. It subjects him to the laws of the rational general consciousness. The idea of existential communication implicates and presupposes, therefore, that no divine Word-Revelation could ever reveal, because, together with its words, it belongs to the domain of the general consciousness and does not reveal what it should reveal. Every one who believes in what is said to be knowable and distinguishable truth, is guilty of taking the shadow for the substance. Existential communication presupposes that all orthodox faith is a betrayal to man, because man binds in his faith himself to what can be formulated and has brought what must remain absolute down to the level of the general consciousness. It presupposes also that every creed, as far as its content is concerned, does not profess what it intends to profess and may not try to profess what it professes. That which is actually professed and formulated and made understandable, can never be what it was intended to be. That is inexpressible.

Jaspers is therefore opposed to missions. They represent an attempt to bind other people to the Bible and to the church's doctrine and confessional standards and thus deprive them of their existential freedom and their "rational" approach to the One and Only. Missions tempt men to betray their own true humanity.

In existential communication, each one of the communicators should have the courage to place his own view and everything which pertains to his personal knowledge and convictions in the balance. Otherwise he makes the way to communication impossible from the start.

It is of importance to direct all our attention to these presuppositions which Jaspers considers necessary. Every Christian believer, who, in order to converse with others, follows the road of Jaspers' existential communication, should know that he has already abandoned the Christian faith and has condemned it as essentially unworthy of man. He is playing with fire.

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We would point to a problem in Jaspers' thought which he has not been able to solve. If philosophy by nature consists of an existential communication-conversation and if in this conversation philosophizing must proceed from its own free and sovereign origin, then "philosophia perennis" is nothing more than this never ending philosophizing in its originality and novelty. It goes without saying that for Jaspers no philosophical system can be anything more than a sediment which never can contain this original philosophizing, because this residue comes to rest within the general consciousness. Jaspers considers engaging in the science of the history of philosophy as quite different from acquiring knowledge from literature or documents or from the search for the connection between these different conceptions. He even calls the latter an intellectual "barbarism". Jaspers' study of the history of philosophy is an attempt to communicate with the deceased philosophers. In this attempt, however, he gets no further than to a certain co-philosophizing in which his own philosophy (how could it be otherwise?) is the dominating factor.
This is true not only of his own act of philosophizing but also of his own philosophy. For though Jaspers wishes to open the way to existential communication and to a communicating philosophizing, at the same time he confronts us with a very specific philosophical system which he does not want to put upon the scales of existential communication. We would ask: what is the nature of this view of the general consciousness and of the relation between existence and communication to this general consciousness? Is it "unconditional" or merely generally-valid? If it is "unconditional", then at the most it expresses an existential testimony, which, according to its own witness, may not dominate any other testimony and must, moreover, be convinced of its own historical relativity. If it is generally valid, how would this philosophical conception differ essentially from the knowledge of the special sciences? Should we not say then, that Jaspers confronts us with two kinds of philosophy: (1) his philosophical "logic", and (2) real philosophizing which has nothing to do with this doctrine of the enclosing and in which the one who is philosophizing comes to himself existentially and so to his self-realization? Jaspers gives us a very definite philosophical system, though it be an "open" system. But this open system is more than systematic philosophizing for it would give us insight into the structure of man and the world. And this doctrine of structure now appears to be the indispensable condition for his existential philosophical communication. At any rate, this doctrine itself is not the fruit of nor the object for communication, but takes its place outside of it and above it. It is, to use a term of Jaspers, catholic. An existential philosophizing on the basis of this non-existential, catholic system of thought is possible only to him who accepts this catholic philosophy. If other existential philosophers do not agree with Jaspers, it is partly because they reject this catholic system of thought and replace it with a different system. Jaspers can have no existential communication with them because they do not accept his apriori's. He does not, however, submit his apriori's to debate.

In this regard Kaufmann has pointed out that Jaspers publishes one monologue after the other. He has written thousands of pages of the results of philosophizing in which he endlessly repeats himself. He offers these "philosophoumena" to the public, but this results in no communication with the reader but only in a propogation of certain philosophical ideas and conceptions. Whoever therefore starts out with Jaspers' "existential reason" but disregards his "philosophoumena", understands neither Jaspers nor his place in the history of philosophy. He ignores unjustly the fact that Jaspers' communication is useful only to Jasperian philosophers, in spite of the fact that Jaspers does not desire disciples but only wants to admonish everyone to philosophize from his own existence and originality. But even this moral admonition would be senseless unless it is understood within the system of thought which Jaspers has elaborated. Anyone who does not accept this system in its totality is therefore no longer able to communicate existentially with himself, or with others. Least of all with Jaspers.

8. Communication as a Struggle.

The next condition for existential communicating according to Jaspers is that it must always retain its struggling character. Existential communication is "a struggle of love".

We have met the struggle element already in Jaspers' doctrine of the Dasein. The vital life of men which is dominated by man's passion for his own preservation, is a struggle for life, it is a battle for the preservation of interests which necessarily collide. Both the defeated and conquered struggle; but the one who prepares for the battle dominates the field. How could it be otherwise?
Because existential communication cannot take place apart from its interwovenness with the Dasein as well as with the general consciousness, therefore the element of struggle also enters into the picture of existential communication. But as with the use of the general consciousness, the existential inner act which wants to realize itself only uses this struggle of the Dasein to free itself from it. It therefore is different in nature.

This different character Jaspers explains with the help of the idea of solidarity. In existential communication this solidarity is obtained between partners. In solidarity the men chivalrously extend to each other the right to use their weapons. In existential communication, one fights not so much against the other as with the other against both himself and the other for the sake of the truth, as truthfulness. Only on this basis do the communicators oppose each other. In contrast with political and diplomatic struggles, this contest is open: one reserves nothing for himself. He does not even spare himself but tries to reveal himself and to realize himself in this self-revelation. Though in principle persons can not help each other, they yet try to help each other in this struggle by taking away all such obstacles as would prevent one of the partners from coming to himself. Therefore this solidarity-struggle is a struggle of love. In this love, however, the participants only help each other reciprocally on the way toward self-deliverance and self-realization by which each communicator reveals and realizes himself. If now we take into account that the Dasein is dark, then we can also imagine what self-revelation consists of: existence becomes more and more conscious of its own self as the power of freedom, and experience itself more and more as a self-given freedom. In his self-revelation and self-realization which takes place in successful communication, each communicator finds himself facing his own transcendency and his own foundation. The fact that this Transcendent in the final analysis is one and the same, gives basis to the possibility of love and solidarity, but according to Jaspers one can get hold of unity only in diversity in which each one of the existential partners experiences his own transcendency as his own. Consequently strife is unavoidable. The identity of each must stand over against that of the other. The possibility of creating a community between existing persons of which each one would be a member is excluded. Even in and by means of communication the loneliness remains. It is still a necessary condition. Solidarity in communication therefore means that each one holds himself responsible for the independent and non-transferable responsibility of the other and for the fact that each fights with the other for the sake of the latter's realization and revelation of his responsibility in his loneliness.

In communication no one may reveal himself to the other. This is in fact impossible, for then both self-revelation and freedom would be lost. The existential communication which does occur can at the most mean to the receiving party, not that he now learns to know the one who is communicating, but that he in an unexplainable way is ignited as by a spark, comes to himself, realizes himself and reveals himself before the face and presence of the Transcendent. In spite of the indirect communication, each party remains a homo absconditus, but to himself he becomes a light. He becomes his own lamp and a real but disappearing realization of the authority and power of his freedom.

It appears that Jaspers stipulates this character of struggle as a condition for real communication, because he can appreciate communication with the other only as a communication of each one of the partners with himself. If one asks, what is the meaning of the communicating for Jaspers? then he receives as reply that it is not communication, but the usefulness of communication to each one's individual existential self-realization. Self-interest and self-concern comprise a central religiously-consecrated theme in his thinking. In this regard his dependency upon Kierkegaard, the arch-individualist, becomes evident. Man's being is his concern with being, also in communication. For this reason the love of solidarity finds its boundary and norm in existential self love and
and self interest. This interest in itself has a religious dedication. Similarly
the self and its being. Communication contributes to the self-realization of the
partner. Jaspers would not say that I am indispensable for communication but, on the
contrary, communication is indispensable for me.

Self interest and self love are both indispensable conditions for communication.
They show difference to the personal value and worth of one's own personality which
makes a venture, but then, only to win itself.


We have already referred in passing to Aristotle's idea of god and to his
teaching that the deity is "kinei hoos eroomenon". This doctrine reappears in a
modern version in the philosophy of Jaspers who has stressed it increasingly, since
he gave his lectures in Groningen in 1935 entitled Existen und Vernunft.

Though Jaspers would not agree with Heidegger's enigmatic expression "science
does not think", he is nevertheless in accordance with Heidegger that in science
not reason by the "lower" intellect functions. Reason enters the picture only by
transcending the general consciousness. This reason is, as it were, the absolute
anti-pode of the vital self-will or will to power, of the dark, irrational passion,
which underlies all reality. It finds its origin in the One and Only, the
Transcendent; it is a light-principle. This reason stands in opposition to the
multiplicity which in the Dasein presents itself as the normal enmity between one
and another person. Reason seeks to connect and to unite and so to elevate from low
to high, from darkness to light, from the destroying and confusing diversity to
the coherence and the union of the many. Its intended destination is the One and
Only, the Transcendent which is beyond the Dasein, beyond the rational-scientific,
but necessarily partial ordering. Reason is the attractive power of the Transcend-
ent, which, being itself unmoved, without love or mercy, always absolutely
identical with itself, seeks to draw the many to itself. This reason finds a toe
hold outside the Transcendent and in existence. Existence which proceeds toward
itself, is also, according to Jaspers, always proceeding toward Being, i.e. toward
the One and Only, the Transcendent. Existence is concerned with the certification
of self which is itself the certification of being.

All premature anticipation of such a certification of self and of being must
be withstood with force, and must be unmasked and exposed. So, for instance, the
scientific superstition that an ordered unity can be obtained by the power of
science and technological ability. Such domination of science and technocracy
deprives us of our free selves, of our free choice, and of our free self-
determination. They also narrow our horizon because they enclose us within the
limited world of the general consciousness. The irrationalistic doctrine of the
Dasein already delivered a painful blow to scientific rationalism and optimism:
the Dasein refuses to be ordered and transformed rationally. It never looses its
brute, chaotic struggle character and its relation of enmity. But now, in addition,
the doctrine of existence, of existential communication, and the Transcendent delivers
a second blow to the unrestricted belief in the enlightenment of science. The blow
comes not from below, but from above. Like all existential philosophers, Jaspers
knows of the problem how to safeguard himself as a free human being from the
strangling chains of the scientific power of organization, of the sociological
domination of mankind, and of the psychological (also Freudian) tarnish on human
glory. Thus existential self realization and existential communication take place
beyond the reach of science: they are superior and therefore beyond scientific
grasp. Here only does reason find its real point of contact. Reason as it were,
draws existence up above the Dasein, and above the general consciousness and the
spirit. It generates in all who exist the upward motion out of diversity to unity;
out of the world of phenomena and sensuous things to the supra-temporal world;
out of the world of the rational truths with their compelling and correct judgments
to the world of existential truthfulness, which moves in the direction of its own
fulness and at the same time toward a singleness of being.
This has a retroactive effect on the worlds of the lower "enclosing" aspects of reality. Reason is the bond that ties all these enclosing aspects together. This does not, however, deny a certain continuing autonomy to each of the enclosing aspects. There are differences among them. We must still speak of a "brokenness of being". But the drawing power of the One and Only has this effect from above via the human existence, that e.g., in the midst of the struggle for existence, existence itself is used to produce an existential solidarity. The strict and compelling methods and results of science are used to give to existence the opportunity in the midst of the scientific orderings, to strive for the free order of the communicative communal encounter. In the same way reason works between existents as such. It attracts them from within to a mutual understanding which may perhaps develop into the miracle of existential communication. In this communication existence comes closer to itself, but also closer to the One and Only, to Being. It thus experiences the presence of the One and Only, the Eternal. This experience has more than one meaning. Each existent has its own transcendence. The Transcendent which exists behind and in the many transcendencies of the individual existing ones, can be experienced only as the one and the same in a "historical" way, in which each existent has its own character which cannot be transferred or compared. Yet in the diversity of the existential experience of the self, (in its own way, of course) the unity of the Transcendent is experienced as the One-and-the-Same. Hereby man reaches the top of the ladder, i.e., the highest possibility within the framework of time and his radical perishableness. In communication the self is lifted up above itself into the certification of being which surpasses all individual limitations, for in this way, the individual limitations are not only understood and relativized but also accepted. Though the certification of one's own being cannot be exchanged for that of someone else, nevertheless reason means that existence recognizes the certification of its being as being strictly its own. For itself it is the only possible or real one that there is. But for the other it is un-acceptable and strange. Nevertheless, it accepts this certification of being existentially so that it experiences, as from a distance, the One and Only as that which is experienced and "known" in so many different existential ways.

This is one of the predicaments of Jaspers' philosophy. His existential philosophy is historical in nature. He sees this historism as a postulate of reason. It means that the one and the same Transcendent Being presents itself in innumerable ways, in fact, in just as many ways as there are existential people. It means also that each existential person can have contact with the Transcendent in only one way. At the same time, however, reasonable insight is able to unite these many ways of contact with the One and Only by providing to each existing person the insight that to him belongs his own Transcendency, without the Transcendent breaking up into a multitude of transcendencies. In this light, the solidarity of the lovers' struggle becomes clear. It means that one knows and accepts as reasonable concerning the other, that he (the other) experiences in his own way and from his own origin and basis that he is existentially related to the Transcendent. One can even help the other so that the latter on his own and in his own way may come to such a relation with the Transcendent. At the same time each one, with regard to himself, respects the ways in which the other is related to the Transcendent and approaches the One and Only. For him they are impassable and impossible.

It is easily understood that this "historical" reason is in direct conflict with Christianity's positive claim to be the only way. Jaspers vehemently takes exception to Christianity's claim to exclusiveness. To him it is the acme of intolerance, and must be opposed by intolerance. Nevertheless, he is able to explain this claim: it is rationalistic and originates from a monopolistic position, which sometimes is accredited to the general consciousness. Therefore it is a form of unacceptable and inhuman rationalism. It is unworthy of man. It is irrationality itself. It is a barricade which blocks the entrance to the road of existential communication.
Jaspers is perfectly right, assuming, that is, that his doctrine of the silent deity is true and that the divine Revelation must be replaced by the drawing power of the One and Only, and that the Biblical Christian doctrine of the divine Word-revelation must be replaced by his Aristotelian doctrine of the deity, which is only "kinei hoos eroomenon".

Here, to say it gently, dogma confronts dogma. Considering the time in which we live, and the divine revelation in Jesus Christ as the incarnated Word, we must see this as more than Aristotelian opposition to the Gospel. Pardon the anachronism. Jaspers opposes the Gospel, with an Aristotelian neo-paganism. His doctrine of reason therefore has been called an "incarnatio inversa", (an inverted incarnation). It is the antipode of the revelation of the incarnation of the Son of God.

His own proclamation of the antithesis between catholicity and "reason" here finds its deepest origin. Therefore every Christian must realize that were he to enter into partnership with Jaspers and engage in his idea and practice of existential communication, he would thereby be seeking to establish a synthesis between an Aristotelian way of thinking, which itself has declared war on Christianity, and a Christian belief which kneels down, and worships in adoration the mystery of the incarnation of the Word. This supposed synthesis contradicts itself all along the line. Only pious deceit can help us across this abyss, but however pious it may be, it is and remains deceit.

10. The Presence of the Transcendent.

Jaspers considers communication with the Transcendent impossible, as well from the side of the Transcendent as from the side of existence. We as human beings are for this reason forced to turn to each other, for there can be no communication with the Transcendent. To this may be added a polemic objection against communication with the Transcendent: there are people who say that they are able to pray with each other but unable to talk together. Communication with the Transcendent all too often hinders communication among people. It is therefore a hindrance to true humanity.

And yet the meaning of this communication does not lie in communication itself, but in the "presence" of the Transcendent, which appears each time that this communication takes place. Therefore it delivers us from the lost condition and it offers us what we have lost: the Presence of the Transcendent. This presence is experienced in the certification of one's self and being, which are inter-related as twin-sisters. This certification of being consists of the self-certitude: "das Sein ist" (being is). As for the brokenness of being and the relatedness of man to all the many heterogeneous, mutually exclusive modes of being, this experience represents something unique and exceptional. Hereby one as it were experiences eternity as an eternity which stands vertically related to time but never enters into time. This experience can take place only in high moments of life, and afterwards disappears immediately. It urges man to seek again the certification of himself and of his being. Existential communication is limited to these high moments of human life. Man can try again and again to effect this communication and meanwhile wait till such a high moment of communication returns.

In addition to this "eschatology" of an eternity which is vertically related in time and which in the fulfilled present is present to us mortals only for a while, Jaspers recognizes also a second eschatology; namely, the eternity which is not yet present but in the future will become present. For each individual man, this future is limited by death. Jaspers does not doubt the radical mortality of man. "A corpse can not arise". This is known from experience and science. With this fact, existential philosophy may not tamper. The future eternity is the
presence of the Transcendent, which an increasingly greater number of the human race who live in the willingness to communicate may anticipate. If this willingness grows, then the failure of communication will decrease more and more; and if this willingness is found in an ever widening circle, then also the presence of the Transcendent will take place in the future in an ever widening circle. Note the faint echo here of the idea of progress of the last century.

It is decisive that the issue at stake in communication is these high moments in life which at the time of the communication extend to each communicator, although to each in his peculiar way.

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Like his idea of truth, Jaspers' idea of communication is eschatological. It is an idea of the "nunc aeternum" (eternal present) of a time fulfilled in the present, a time which itself remains a part of temporality and never can be delivered from its essential perishableness.

Let it be stressed once more that Jaspers' idea of communication has no meaning apart from this "eschatological" idea. His actualistic eschatology is the only comfort he can give to mortals, who are and remain mortal. If it is clear anywhere that the core of Jaspers' idea of communication is self-interest, it is here. The issue at stake in communication between people is the acquisition by each communicator on his own of the ever-fleeing and ever-vanishing awareness that "being is". Being is present eschatologically.

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For the rest the Dasein remains Dasein, the struggle for life remains the struggle for life, the rational and rationalistic ordering of the world and man by the technologists of the special sciences remains a rational and rationalistic ordering. Existential communication, being as powerless as it is, does not effectuate any essential change.

The Transcendent changes things even less. This Transcendent is present only to existence, but for the rest it is the far off Transcendent which, though it is "Being", itself is not able to terminate its own brokenness. To all other being it remains at a great distance and is very strange. It is "das ganz Andere" (the totally other). This never changes.

The charge Jaspers has made against others should be reversed; he is guilty of the presumption of exclusiveness. This holds for all the necessary conditions for Jaspers' idea and practice of communication. Not one of them will he venture to cast into the scales of communication. He dare not. His ideas about man, reality, and the image of "god" are as firm as a rock. They are the modern ideas of a man who first of all wants to be modern and then somehow, as from a distance, sees himself somewhat related to Christendom for he can not do entirely without an idea of god. Somewhat. By underscoring this word, we more likely say too much than not enough.

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