History does not begin in the twentieth century. Moreover, what is true of history is surely also true of the academic disciplines and their ways of approaching things. Consequently, a research methodology which has emerged in the twentieth century is not cut off from what preceded its emergence. Rather, there is only one question to be asked in this regard, namely, what is the relationship between the method and its past.

There was a period [in the history of philosophy] in which too great a stress was laid upon methodology. It is a period which still lies fresh in some of our memories. Indeed, it was in that period that Comte and others posited that the apriori's of scholarship, even those which they recognized themselves, were no longer to be found in the researchers' understanding and judgment but in their cognitive acts. Consequently, it was inevitable that the full weight of epistemological concern should come to fall upon methodology.

Today, however, this period belongs in nearly all respects to our past. Neorationalism [that period's dominant force] has weakened, a development which owes little to the criticisms of thinkers such as Lotz warning from out of a traditional rationalist

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1 [Vollenhoven would appear to be referring here to his own early attraction to neo-Positivist theory. See, in this regard, John Kok, *Vollenhoven: His Early Development* (Sioux City, IA: Dordt College Press, 1992).]

2 [Eventually, include note citing crucial passage from August Comte, *Discours de la philosophie positive*.]
standpoint against the endless sharpening of knives, as it were, when there is nothing to cut. Rather, the development owes much to the criticisms of irrationalism which, though it shares with late rationalism the overvaluation of human activity, is barely able to grant any value at all to acts of a "rational" character.

Consequently, the author of an article about scholarly method must determine his [or her] relation to the philosophical situation [described in the preceding paragraph] before launching into his [or her] subject. Anyone who, like the present writer, views both early and late versions of rationalism and irrationalism as so many instances of subjectivism, and who wishes to prune away rationalism and irrationalism along with subjectivism, should neither overvalue apriorist method à la the late rationalists nor revile it in irrationalist fashion. Indeed, the method which I shall consider shortly does not, in fact, arise from a combining of suggestions encountered in and drawn from older methodologies. For I am unable to escape one objection to such combination, namely, that it would probably be stamped by late rationalism. Moreover, the search for such combinations would run the risk of struggle analogous to the effort of learning how to swim on dry land.

At the same time, one must also acknowledge that no scholarly activity is possible without method. Indeed, neither scholarly activity nor method may be disqualified in irrationalist fashion. But then one must also acknowledge that method should be discovered in a lawful way, i.e., it should arise from working with the matter itself. In fact, that matter remains recalcitrant so long as it is not examined in a manner fitted to its

3[Eventual note on Lotze]
nature, whereas it opens itself easily to one who is completely prepared in his [or her] approach to respond to the contours native to the chosen field of research.

As a consequence, a method, which is designed to engage in the study of the history of philosophy, should, in the first place, be philosophical in its own right. Of course, such a requirement does not thereby exclude using research aids which possess little philosophical character of their own. I am thinking in this regard chiefly of the philological tools used to secure a text and of the historian's acuity. Both require doing justice to their distinctive conditions. Nevertheless, neither of these research aids may weaken the demand that one's method manifest an essentially philosophical nature. An analogous principle holds for knowledge of the history of art, technology and scholarship insofar as they are implicated in the matter to hand. Thus, for example, Plato becomes, as it were, illegible if one lacks all knowledge of the contemporary state of affairs in theatre, in medical practice, in mathematics and astronomy. Still, [in Plato studies,] one must finally reckon with the question of which philosophical opinions were current about the matter to hand, and of what role this data actually play in the philosophical argument Plato has passed on to us.

I do not mean by any of this to argue for a speculative approach [to the history of philosophy] such as that of Hegel. Rather, my intention to avoid such an approach becomes clear, remembering that my primary demand, namely, that a method conform itself aboriginally and consistently to the matter under examination, categorically excludes such speculation.
I now offer a few words about the structure and sequence of thought in the body of the article as postscript to these introductory observations. In addition to the character of the method which we have been describing and which we will presently treat [in detail], I should also relate that I did not in any way conceive the method before embarking upon my study [of the history of philosophy]. Rather, it emerged in the course of my study, and then only slowly over time. Consequently, a certain deliberate step by step entre into this matter will not, I hope, prove unpleasant for my readers. This hope, indeed, is why I have promised in my exposition to follow wherever possible the historical lines along which I came to this method and along which I am enabled to work toward its further development. Consequently, I will begin with remarks concerning the historical background [of my method] (I); next follows a number of preparatory considerations and the method's first development (II); then follows a test of the method's fruitfulness (III); followed, in conclusion, by a laying out of certain problems (IV).

I. Historical Background

If anyone had predicted to me during the first years of university study that I would in future write something on method, I would most likely have shrugged my shoulders skeptically. Moreover, it would have seemed to me highly unlikely that I would eventually come to invest a good part of my time and effort over the years in the search for and working out of a method. For the lectures of that time which treated the ancillary disciplines included methodological introductions which were far too extensive, at least as
far as we students were concerned. In addition, it was not yet apparent to me that the history of philosophy required its own method.

On the other hand, I was swiftly confronted in my study of the history of philosophy by a broad complex of difficulties. Upon completion of my baccalaureate in philosophy (candidaatsexamen), I was most disappointed by the low level of insight I had achieved in the course of my studies to that point. Indeed, I perceived little more than uncertainty as regards both systematic philosophy and the history of philosophy. It was an uncertainty, moreover, unmitigated by any sense of internal connections, and, hence, almost impossible to formulate.

At first, I attributed the precariousness of this situation to my own limitations. After all, the subjects to hand were highly complex; further study would probably result in better counsel. After a while, however, I came to see that part of problem lay with the expositions of the history of philosophy which I had been studying. Indeed, one could hardly credited them with unfailing clarity. In fact, their lack of clarity involved principle themes as well as matters of detail. In addition, it involved exposition of the interconnections between and the division of philosophical conceptions as well as philosophical terminology. One could cite examples for each of these three problematic areas.

A. Terminology

Terminology, even in the standard histories of philosophy, is often ambivalent or worse polyvalent.
1. Let us consider, for example, the term "realism." In the exposition of ancient philosophy the term "realism" serves to typify the standpoint which Plato assumed when he posited that the cosmos could only be well understood as foreground and as correlate of the *intelligibile universalia* which lie, as it were, in the background. At the same time, one also terms as "realistic" the proposition that *universalia* exist within the cosmos. It is, however, obvious that these two senses of the term are not synonymous. But, whoever does not distinguish these meanings will eventually run stuck despite their difference. Indeed, a lack of clarity on precisely this point already plagues Plato studies. Plato certainly recognized the existence of *universalia* in the cosmos (as his doctrine of macro- and microcosm in the *Menon* makes clear), and did so before he arrived at the notion that one must assume a *cosmos noëtos* parallel to and behind the *cosmos aisthètos*.

2. One confronts a similar situation in the identification of "universalism" and "monism." Universalism is, namely, one of the three possible answers to questions regarding the interrelationship of universal and individual. As such, it stands over and against individualism and partial universalism. In contrast, monism primarily involves the conception of the vertical structure of things, which structure can be viewed, in keeping with current opinion, either monistically as the original unity which diverges vertically into contrasting species, or dualistically as a combining of two original components--the one transcendent, the other not. Universalism can, in fact, combine with monism. One thinks, in this regard, of Hesiod, Thales and Heraclites. But this very combination only underlines

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4 In this context the term's epistemological meaning--the acceptance that something knowable exists independently of the knower--should be kept to one side for now. I take my examples wholly from ontology so as not to complicate the matter needlessly.
the fact that "universalism" and "monism" are not synonymous. In any event, the combination of universalism and monism is hardly a necessary one. Plotinus, for example, is doubtlessly a universalist thinker, who embraces dualism with regard to the vertical structure of things, an embrace manifest in his sympatny for Plato's *Symposium*, *Politics* and *Timaeus*. Plotinus' position within neo-Platonism contrasts sharply with Iamblichus who thought monistically as is apparent from his orientation toward Plato's *Laws*.

3. Failure to distinguish sharply enough between dualism and duality provides another source of intellectual confusion. For, whereas the term "dualism" indicates, as we saw above, a certain conception of the vertical structure of creatures, "duality" merely names a certain "two-ness" as such. Thus, one can simply acknowledge the duality of the sexes without becoming thereby a dualist. A classic example of the unfortunate result of the indiscriminate use of these two terms is provided by a still common confusion regarding Plato. Plato became the "father of realism" by distinguishing horizontally between the cosmos as foreground and the *intelligibile* as background. When he first made this distinction (in the *Euthyphro* and the *Phaedo*), he still thought dualistically regarding the vertical structure of things. This combination, however, was not necessary; the combination of duality inhering realism and monism [as to the vertical structure of things] is equally plausible. Moreover, the *Parmenides* and the later work show that Plato did in fact come in the end to embrace monism. Now, this development of Plato's thought is unproblematic for anyone who distinguishes dualism from duality. Things stand otherwise, however, for anyone who does not keep the two terms separate. From such a standpoint, dualism and realism appear as inseparable partners. Hence, to the degree that
one insists on maintaining the confusion of dualism and duality, one must explain Plato's
development in line with two possibilities. Either one recognizes that Plato remained a
realist in the proper sense of the word and so refuses to accept his eventual move to
monism, or one recognizes Plato's embrace of monism but then also posits that Plato
simultaneously jettisoned his doctrine regarding the reality of the *intelligibile*. If one
cannot accept either of the possible solutions, one is left in doubt and to consider that the
difficulties surrounding Plato are, on this point, irresolvable. In this event, however, the
impasse cannot be attributed to Plato, but inheres, rather, the lack of terminological clarity
of Plato's exegete.

4. An overly crude use of the terms "dualism" and "monism" can also lead to
serious problems. I remind the reader of the difference between "subsistence" and
"vinculum" theory. Neither conception belongs to Aristotelian thought, narrowly
speaking. Rather, they are the fruit of Aristotelian commentary. The Aristotelian texts
pertinent to these two interpretive traditions stem from the last main period of his
philosophical development, a period in which he embraced dualism. Consequently, both
of the interpretive traditions denoted by the terms "subsistence" and "vinculum" theory
also possess a marked dualistic character. Both posit, therefore, a sharp two-ness of
"body" and "soul" as vertical components of the human unity. At the same time, however,
the two traditions differ from each other. According to subsistence theory, the two
components interrelate as matter and its proper form, which components together form a
single substance. The vinculum theory, in contrast, teaches that "body" and "soul" are
substances in their own right and thus that each possesses its own matter. In this theory
the unity of the two substances demands a separate vinculum [i.e., chain] binding the
collective principles together. The relative difference between "subsistence" and
"vinculum" theory amounts to this, namely, that the first theory conceives the human being
as a single substance whereas the second theory speaks of two substances. Despite this
disagreement, both conceptions are surely and obviously dualistic. Nevertheless, the
relative difference between the two theories is occasionally typified as an opposition
between "monism" and "dualism," a typification which is hardly confirmed once one has
distinguished clearly the meaning of terms.

5. One disentangles a double confusion in the term "psychomonism." The very
sound of the word makes one think of a functionally determined monism. Nevertheless,
psychomonism also stems from the interpretation of the late Aristotle, whose definitive
conception is manifestly implicated. This conception too bears a decisely dualistic
stamp, even though its dualistic character manifests itself less clearly in anthropology than
in the sharp opposition between the transcendent "god" of this conception and everything
else inclusive of the merely "divine," universal and actualizing spirit of thought (nous).
This nous certainly stands as a "one" over and against the "many" of human intellective
souls. Nevertheless, the unity which is intended by nous does not imply that the overall
conception in which this nous participates is a monism. Rather, the nous's unity is only
intended as an answer to the question as to whether the (world) intelligence is one or
many. In the course of the Hellenistic period a psychological type of monarchianism
comes to be placed along side of this traditional noological type, i.e., a psychological type
in which the world nous is replaced by a knowing world soul. At times this new type is
even correctly termed "monopsychism." As such, the term is analogous to terms like "monophysitism," "monoenergism," etc. Using the term "monopsychism" allows one to avoid misunderstanding the doctrine as some form or another of monism.

When dealing with the monopsychism of Berkeley, however, one must say more, for he does not call that which actualizes psyche or anima (i.e. soul) but rather pneuma or spiritus (i.e., spirit). Consequently, in his case, the appropriate term is "monopneumatism." Of course, one should also add the qualification "reduced," because he denied the existence of the somatic. Consequently, if one wishes to restrict oneself to his reduced ontology and prescind from both his annihilation of matter and his non-monistic perspective regarding the content of knowledge, his dualism amounts to the opposition between the transcendent god (Mind) and the non-transcendent universal spirit (Spirit) alone.

These examples should be enough to show how confused and confusingly terminology has been and has been handled in the study of the history of philosophy.

B. Certainly, such a penchant for confusion also impedes the illumination of interrelationships among philosophical conceptions. Indeed, frequently interrelationships are suggested which either do not exist or are wholly different than what have been suggested.

1. The philosophy of Antiquity presents us with a classic example. When, towards the end of his life, Aristotle comes to assume again the existence of a universal nous, and

5 Just imagine what confusion terms like "physical-" and "energetic"-monism would cause.
to conceive that *nous* as separate from individuals, it has thoughtlessly been claimed that 
one encounters here, in the pertinent texts, a form of "platonic realism." As a 
consequence, one scholar, in agreement with W. Jaeger, attributes the books in which 
these texts appear to Aristotle's years as a member of the Platonic Academy.\(^6\) This is, 
however, a position which gravely impedes the development of the Jaegerian, genetic 
explanation of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*.\(^7\)

Another scholar, by contrast, assumes that Aristotle undertook a return to Plato, a 
position that succeeds in muddling Plato as well as Aristotle. What results from these 
identifications of late Aristotelian doctrine concerning the universal *nous* is then a 
competition between two "solutions," neither of which is finally tenable because they both 
fail to reckon with the ambivalence inhering their use of the term "realism."

2. Another example of wrongly construing the interrelationship of philosophical 
conceptions is provided by the putative "materialism" of the Stoa.\(^8\) The notion that with 
the Stoa we confront a materialism in the sense articulated by Leucippus and Democritus 
can be dispensed with in short order.\(^9\) Indeed, from the very beginning, the Stoa opposed 
the Kepos all across the board. In fact, if the Stoics counted among their students those 
who resembled Parmenides via their Cynic texture or who followed the *pneuma* doctrine 
of Hippocrates, or who thought hylezooiastically, that is still no reason to: 1) consider the

\(^6\) [Eventual note identifying the interpreter and work alluded to and introducing Werner Jaeger.]

\(^7\) [Eventual note citing pertinent text of Jaeger.]

\(^8\) [Eventual note on the Stoics.]

\(^9\) [Eventual note on the Greek atomism.]
three groups together; then, 2) to identify them with the whole of the Stoic school; and, 3) to view the difference between Stoics and Epicureans as something incidental. Moreover, the Parmenidean, Hippocratian and hylozoistic conceptual elements to be noted among the students of the Stoa preceed the Stoa itself. Consequently, to observe their presence within the Stoa is not to point to the Stoa's characteristic features qua newly emergent school.

3. I wish to make yet another observation connected to this last point. Hylezoism, a philosophical conception driven by the theory of interaction, is characterized as a monism in and through its assumption of a moving and conscious prime matter as arché. Such a conception already existed in presocratic thought and acquired (also prior to the emergence of the Stoa) an influence upon Aristotle among others. Indeed, hylezoism's influence upon Aristotle preceeds Aristotle's break with Plato and his consequent assumption of an anti-realist dualism. The Middle Ages were surely oriented toward precisely this Aristotle [i.e., the Platonic and hylezoist early Aristotle] to the degree that they were at all peripatetic. As a consequence, the medievals were at a loss with respect to prime matter. Avicenna saw only metaphor in those passages in which Aristotle mentions prime matter. On the other hand, Albert the Great brings David of Dinant into association with Xenophanes inasmuch as David of Dinant embraces this Platonic and hylezoist doctrine of prime matter. One can look down one's nose at their

10 [Eventual note identifying the Epicureans, Cynics, Parmenides and Hippocrates.]

11 [Eventual note on Avicenna and the appropriate texts in his commentaries on Aristotle's Physics, and Metaphysics.]

12 [Eventual note on Albert the Great, David of Dinant and Xenophanes.]
attitude, but is modern thought much farther along for most people in its distinction of atomic, dialectical and historical materialism?

4. Even when we consider the interpretation of conceptions which stand much closer to our own time, there exist reconstructions of the interrelationships between philosophical conceptions which are as suspect as they are tenacious. In the case of eighteenth-century philosophy, for example, not only are Locke and Hume reckoned empiricists, Berkeley is too. This reckoning provides a basis for a plausible reconstruction of the interrelationship between these three thinkers in line with their temporal order: that Hume, as the youngest of the three, is thought to have combined Locke and Berkeley philosophically. But Berkeley is hardly an empiricist. His thought was monarchian and thus intellectualist.¹³ Moreover, he shared with Locke, quite apart from an orientation to the late Aristotle, only that scientialism which Hume qua representative of the Enlightenment was at pains to combat. Thus, upon closer consideration, the pretended reconstruction of philosophical relationship proves to be without foundation.

In all these examples, supposition of non-existent interrelationships implies a consequent misapprehension of the real historical relations and makes research into the latter all the more difficult.

C. Rubrication

Too little terminological care and the artificiality of many historiographical connections made it absolutely impossible to arrive at an appropriate rubrication [of the

¹³[Eventual note explaining the term "monarchian"]
history of philosophy]. It should be noted as well that the standard manuals such as Ueberweg, Falckenberg and Windelband took refuge in division by country when narrating the history of modern philosophy. They consequently tried to bring the philosophy of these lands under a single philosophical heading by appeal, in part, to a vague notion of national character. Thus, the English were certainly empiricists, the French rationalists and the Germans romantics or idealists. The division was determined by a momentary pattern, if, indeed, it ever coincided with a real state of affairs. Today, one might, in fact, speak with equal right of English analytics, Russian "materialism," and continental existentialism.

Dilthey and Heyman, on the other hand, presented divisions in the history of philosophy which were less national and geographical in origin but which were also highly historically qualified. Dilthey was philosophically close to Hegel, though he knew enough to maintain a certain distance. He held to a doctrine of priority which set nature over and against spirit. Nevertheless, he did so in a way that limited nature, understood in the sense of the primary impetus theory, to the organism and held spirit to be identical to the individual and the interpersonal life of the human Soul. In addition, he simultaneously viewed the organism as the vehicle of language, in conformity with the vitalistic hermeneutic of W. von Humboldt.  

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14[Eventual note citing pertinent bibliography.]

15[Eventual note identifying figures and their pertinent writings.]

16[Eventual note identifying von Humbolt and his hermeneutical writings.]
In this instance, the Soul is not dualistically conceived as a combining of elements, but monistically as a unity is, consequently, not to be "explained" causally. Rather, it is only to be "understood" with the help of descriptive analysis. Such investigation unearths three traits in every person: thought, feeling and will. Concomitantly, one trait will predominate in one person, another trait in another.

Moreover, Dilthey distinguished three types of Weltanschauung which he conceived as correlative to the above differentiation of "structural type," i.e., naturalism which accounts for the spirit in the object; objective idealism which in its excessive stress on feeling views everything as an expression of interiority; and the idealism of freedom which proceeds from volitional experience and, thus, posits the sovereignty and transcendence of spirit over body. Though Dilthey expresses his preference for a particular type of Weltanschauung--the third type--nevertheless, philosophy should, in his view, remain neutral, for it is nothing more than teaching about worldview, an activity that demarcates and describes the spectrum it discovers within its proper field of inquiry.

Consequently, identification of higher Soul with Spirit leads to a psychological basis and division of worldviews, not to a right nor to a sufficient basis and division. In fine, this identification leads to an historical relativization of philosophy.

By contrast, Heymans followed a totally different path. He worked under the influence of Land and was initially oriented toward the limited parallelism of Wundt. Later he embraced the unlimited parallelism of Fechner and Spencer. Consequently, he

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17 [Eventual note identifying Land, Wundt and their most representative philosophical works.]

18 [Eventual note identifying Fechner, Spencer and their most representative philosophical works.]
converted, as it were, to psychomonism after an extended period of agnostic reflection.

Not surprisingly, he distinguished three types of philosophy: parallelism, materialism and psychomonism. He held the interrelationship of the three types to be as follows: the first type of philosophy [parallelism] affirms the existence of psyche and soma whereas the jettisoning of psyche leads to materialism, the jettisoning of soma to psychomonism.

This term "parallelism" is obviously not to be understood in the mythologizing sense, for were one to think of Chaldean determinism with its temporal tripartition of heaven, earth and underworld, then there would be no foundation for the argument justifying the position. I only note this incidentally. What is central, in this context too, is what serves as the guarantee of the accuracy, scope and basis of this division of philosophy. As to its accuracy, I remind the reader of what I wrote above about psychomonism. Historically, this position did not arise from the renunciation of matter understood in the sense given it by parallelism. Rather, it arose in keeping with what can be called pneumatological monarchianism. Moreover, from the systematic point of view, psychomonism, because it is dualistic, cannot possibly emerge out of parallelism, for parallelism is, in fact, monistic. Nor can materialism, however one understands the term, be historically or systematically conceived as a development from parallelism. Consequently, the accuracy of this division of philosophy leaves much to be desired.

There is also something lacking in the scope of this division of philosophy. For, how is one then to place thinkers like Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Comte and Dilthey (to name only a few)? And what finally of this division's foundation? It has a different foundation than the one Dilthey gave to his division. Indeed, Heymans' foundation has
nothing to do with his doctrine of psychological types nor with the distinction of their
three fundamental traits: emotionality, activity and instinctual response. Consequently,
one cannot accuse him of psychologism. Nevertheless, one is able to sense all too clearly
the emphases of the author's own philosophical journey. Such personal experience,
though it naturally plays a role in every life's work, appears to me too narrow a foundation
upon which to distinguish between philosophical systems.

In the last few paragraphs I have been dealing with certain figures. Nevertheless, it
has not been my intention to struggle in particular against these thinkers. What I had in
mind was only to typify the climate which played an important role among students (also
in Calvinist circles) in the years between 1910 and 1920. On the one hand, one confronted
the relativization of the boundary between systematics and history. On the other hand,
even among those who wished to maintain the appropriate distinction between the two,
there existed an irremediable divergence in a rationalist direction (Lotze, Windelband,
Richert and Marburg) and in an irrationalist spirit (Bergson, Poincaré). The latter
philosophers too failed to achieve clear formulations. Caught between terminological
confusion, faulty reconstruction of the relations between thinkers and thought, as well as
division between philosophical systems, one was poorly placed to articulate clearly one's
native philosophical language much less that of another. Thus, it should no longer
surprise my readers that I saw no easy way out of the complex of difficulties I faced.
Moreover, one should bear in mind that at that time in my intellectual development the
majority of questions I have so briefly listed were for me and perhaps many others all

19[Eventual note identifying R. and the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism, Bergson and Poincaré.]
mixed through each other, and there existed hardly any way of distinguishing them.

Indeed, the necessary solutions to these questions could only come to me much later, in
some cases, only after many years. Finally one should keep in mind that in what I have
written above, I have felt compelled to use already some of the clarifications which I was
to arrive at only with time; I simply saw no other way of informing my readers of the
initial tangle which I confronted when I beheld, as it were, the philosophical ball of wool.

II Prior Considerations and First Conceptualization

To this point, I have fixed my attention upon a series of facts which served in time
to open my eyes to the internal difficulties plaguing study of the history of philosophy
some forty years ago. Such an experience of difficulty can, of course, act as a stimulus
provided it does not happen too late. In this instance, my difficulties produced the desired
result. Once I became convinced that the current situation was untenable, I understood
that it should undergo as much change as it could bear. I did not, however, have a plan as
yet. Indeed, I did not even have a clear idea of where to begin. My animating stimulus
was, consequently, restricted at first to the insight that I had found in these difficulties
themselves a task which I could not and should not long avoid.

Much more needed to happen before I could find a way out. In particular I needed
to answer two questions before I could make progress, for both related to the delineation
of my field of research. The first problem addressed a matter of theoretical principle, viz.
recognizing the boundary between systematic and historical investigation in philosophy.
The second problem touched upon a practical matter, i.e., how one harmonizes the need
to do justice to the cultural diversity inhering a given investigation with the need to limit study to a given sector of the field of investigation. Let me say just a few words about each of these matters before proceeding to delve deeper into the first concretization of my historiographic method in the study of presocratic philosophy.

1. Delineation of the history of philosophy as a field of investigation demands above all clarity as to the interrelationship of philosophical systematics and the history of philosophy. This observation brings two questions to the fore, the first methodological and the other ontological.

The methodological question centres upon the difference of method between the systematician and the historian. The systematician forms concepts for himself [or herself]. These concepts primarily regard the non-conceptual dimension of reality. In contrast, the historian of philosophy, at least in his [or her] attempt to understand the conclusions of previous thinkers, forms concepts about matters which are themselves conceptual in character. In brief, philosophical systematics deals with primary concepts whereas study of the history of philosophy is largely concerned with secondary concepts.

We should add, however, that this methodological variation is rooted in the ontic dimension of the pertinent field of research. For a given philosophical systematic results from consideration of the structure of creatures and their ontic genesis. By contrast, study of the history of philosophy examines the genesis of a subdivision within human culture. Thus, clearly, it is my opinion that history is not purely functional in its nature, but rather touches the person in his [or her] totality (in other words, in body and soul).
On the other hand, one can ask whether this view threatens to raise yet again the spectre of historicism. Is it not essential to our renunciation of historicism to conceive history as, in the first place, a functional field of scholarship? Both of these questions ought to be answered negatively, at least as far as I can see. I do not think that time is limited to what is functional. Moreover, I do not claim that analysis of anthropological structure exposes a constitutive part which is supra-temporal. But these positions are not to imply that the human person who begins with the revealed relationship of God to creature does not for his [or her] part issue forth in his [or her] relationship to God and the divine love command in prayerful obedience--thus, contributing to the establishment of "left" and "right" in human relations--and issue forth qua totality in such a way as to transcend time. Consequently, within the context of my position, the study of history and thus also the history of philosophy does not fall victim to historicism.

One must conclude, thus, that in philosophy too systematics and history are to be clearly distinguished on both methodological and ontological grounds. To be sure, one speaks here too of duality not opposition. The two scholarly practices have demonstrated their ability to mutually serve each other in the past. For a philosophical system is only really intelligible when it is subsequently confronted with its historical consequences. Meanwhile, study of the history of philosophy cannot establish historical consequences apart from systematics, for research into the perfection of philosophy in a given land or within a limited period of time is only possible in and through application of the pertinent philosophical norm and that norm is established by systematics.
2. Questions surrounding determination of the proper field of study are naturally, significantly less profound. Still, they also demand careful attention. Of course, the ideal would be a history of the philosophy of all cultural regions, a history attentive to the mutual influences between regions. Once there existed a sufficiently deep familiarity with the history of more than one cultural region, comparative study could establish agreements and differences in the development [of philosophy] within each cultural region. I will leave aside the question as to whether there already exists a sufficient basis for such a comparative study of the history of philosophy. I do so because I have never taken on such a study myself, for this reason among others, namely, that I had my hands quite full with the study of European philosophy. Consequently, my own concern for the plurality of cultures restricts itself in fact to the influence of other cultures upon European culture. Questions surrounding these influences arise above all when determining philosophy's origin and its conclusion.

As to philosophy's origin, I have tried from the very beginning, as students from the first years of my tenure as professor will remember, to treat at a fundamental level the influences of the East and the South, i.e., of Babylonian and Egyptian culture upon Greco-Roman culture. But this study of the pre-history of European philosophy was too broad. Consequently, though I consistently kept open the possibility that there was a complex cultural exchange at philosophy's origin (in an effort to avoid Eurocentrism), I decided to limit my consideration of extra-European influences to those occasions when new foreign influences arose within the course of the history of European philosophy. It was only by
means of this necessary pruning that I was able to concentrate my efforts upon the history of my own cultural region.

At this point, I will pass on to a description of the application of the methodology I am arguing for in this article to the study of presocratic philosophy. Here, too, I will limit myself to those points which I think especially deserve our attention.

A. Motive

The motive driving me to work especially on this subdivision within the history of philosophy was not the expectation of arriving at the originary source for my own systematic whether in the irrationalist sense (Heidegger) or in the rationalist way (K.R. Popper). Rather, I was moved by the simple conviction that in any historical process, what preceeds will determine what comes afterwards, in large measure if not in its entirety. The possible benefit which might accrue to systematics via study of the earliest accessible period of philosophy always seemed to me a matter of secondary concern.

B. Hellenic and Hellenistic Thought

Presocratic thought belongs to Hellenic philosophy which, in contrast to Hellenistic philosophy, is characterized by a marked ontological tendency. By "ontology" one should not think of the sense given to the term by the late Aristotle, a sense which is highly idiosyncratic and which, moreover, only first arose at the end of the Hellenic period. Here, then, I am using the term "ontological" to serve my comparison of Hellenic

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²⁰[Eventual note citing pertinent texts.]
and Hellenistic philosophy in opposition to the term "gnoseological." Indeed, throughout the Hellenic period, epistemology was granted only a secondary place though it was certainly not absent among Hellenic period thinkers.

C. The Question of [Philosophical] Completeness

In an effort to characterize more precisely my field of investigation, I posed already at the start the question as to whether presocratic thought could be conceived as philosophically complete, given the religious commitments which gave it rise. This was, I admit, an unusual point of entry. Nevertheless, its idiosyncrasy is no reason to dismiss it. For this point of entry is exactly how we operate in ordinary life. When we entertain the question whether a superficial acquaintance can grow into a friendship we consider not only what a person has to offer, but also his [or her] failings. An analogous approach is also appropriate in scholarship. Moreover, no amount of citation no matter how exhaustive can replace the insight gained by posing and answering my question about philosophical completeness.

One can, of course, relativize the faith of Christians to one faith among many. It is otherwise, however, with faith in Christ. For this faith is a trusting in the One who is trustworthy. Consequently, it is permitted to use the very breadth of Christ's Word-revelation as a criterion for judging a cultural region's origin via an overview of its philosophy. Indeed, such use is, in fact, a demand of proper method. For what gives us the right to accept Hellenic thought as trustworthy and complete without any further research? But if we are to apply the criterion that I have in mind, then it appears that a
complete systematic account should comprehend three things: God, the law posited by God, and the cosmos God creates. Of these three themes the last two are correlates of each other: there is no cosmos without law and no law without that which is subject to it.

One should make a further, more precise distinction within this correlation. For the term "law" is hardly transparent, even when it is distinguished from the lawfulness which responds to a law and from the formulation of a law (think for example of the idiom "the laws of Newton"). Indeed if one only considers philosophy, the term "law" already has a three-fold sense. First, there is structural law that holds for the cosmos via modal laws. Structural law is rooted in the divine command to exist, a command issued in the act of creation. It is correlate with the structure and modal individuation of all creatures.

The law of love exhibits another character. In its correlate creature, this law underlies not only its creaturely being but also a heart. Consequently, inasmuch as it underlies a field accessible to scholarly investigation, this law pertains exclusively to human beings both in their relationship to God and to fellow humans. Finally, positive law assumes yet another distinct place [in philosophy]. It is a rule which is not to be administered indiscriminately but rather by office-holders. It is a rule which is to mediate between the love command posited for humankind by God and the structurally determined, temporally and spatially specific social community for which office-holders bear responsibility.

If we apply the criterion of the breadth of Christ's Word-revelation to Hellenic philosophy, we find that because it arose outside of the light of Word-revelation and knew nothing of the living God, it also lacked the view of the whole in which to see law and
cosmos. Consequently, structural lawfulness is identified with law in Hellenic philosophy. The love command remained unknown and positive law, though known, to be sure, could not be viewed as the bridge between the love command and a specific situation in need of proper ordering. Readers can familiarize themselves with this way of asking questions about presocratic philosophy and the answers I gave in my *Geschiedenis der Wijsbegeerte, Deel I*. Given that that volume is still much misunderstood, I think it not redundant to focus attention upon these misunderstandings.

The first objection made against my way of approaching presocratic philosophy is that questions as to its [philosophical] completeness do not belong at the very outset of one's study. Is it not only after long study that one recognizes that one or another thesis conflicts with a given biblical text and that one can, by a process of augmentation and pruning, harmonize the discordant positions? I can understand how such an objection gets put forward. In an irenic time like ours, my method of approach easily gives the impression of being a little forced. Still, this impression is unfair. Dooyeweerd has correctly shown on more than one occasion that we establish our own integrity as well as an interior openness in scholarly debate in and through a clear choice of position with respect to central questions.²

I add to Dooyeweerd's argument yet another which addresses historical research: Religion plays a role also in the field of research. Religion, here, is not to be identified with Christianity. Rather, it is (in accord with a particular but rather generally valid

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¹ (Franeker: T. Wever, 1950).
² [Eventual note citing a pertinent passage of the *New Critique*.]
insight) something which arises among all human beings and is in fact ubiquitous. Consequently, it also appears in the pagan context and appears to have a central significance. Additionally, I remind the reader that the opposition between "right" and "left" is nowhere present with such sharp definition as within religion. Consequently, the constantly recurring attempts even in Christian circles to investigate an important segment of culture without attending to the opposition of "left" and "right" in the very field of research fall apart beyond hope of salvage into those inadequate conclusions which result from insufficient attention paid to religion.3

Struggle over whether Hellenic philosophy merely used philosophical ground-motives incorrectly or whether its ground-motives were themselves implicated in apostate thought and were consequently useless for our systematic--such struggle is not of merely secondary importance. Rather it concerns the opposition between an ever more regressive "scholarship of Christians" and a "Christian scholarship," which holds promise for the future.

The crucial importance of taking seriously this opposition, also for historiographical method, is clearly manifest in the fact that the weaknesses which Hellenic philosophy always exhibited regarding knowledge of the law dominated its development already in its initial historical period.

3 [Vollenhoven's idiosyncratic use of the terms "left" and "right" seems to be an allusion to the parable of the sheep and the goats. He seems to indicate by this usage the presence of fundamental religious antithesis between the light and dark, God and Satan, and hence the inner connection between culture and religious antithesis (specifically between philosophy and religious antithesis).]
D. The most important problems of the presocratic philosophers

At this point, one must think not only of the opposition between subjectivism and objectivism, but also about tensions surrounding conceptualization of the ontic relationship between universal and individual during the period before Hippocrates.

1. The opposition between subjectivism and objectivism

It is not surprising that presocratic thought rather quickly discovered the [theoretical] distinction between subject and object: the same process [of discovery] plays itself out in the life of every normal child. What does command attention is the dispute occasioned by acknowledgement of the difference. The dispute very soon divided presocratic thought into two sharply antagonistic camps. The very character of this division shows that there was more at stake for both groups than a difference between two succeeding phases [of presocratic thought]. Rather, difference encompassed the whole question of "nomizein", i.e., whether or not to accept something as law.

There is no avoiding this issue by insisting that the struggle between subjectivism and objectivism only comes into play in modern thought. At present[, of course,] these terms have an overwhelmingly methodological content. History, however, demonstrates that this epistemological heightening is far from original. Rather, it results from a century-long development through which Western European thought has gradually but consistently unfolded in a subjectivistic direction. Consequently, to take one's starting point in a modern understanding of the problem entangles one in a suspect anachronism that only impedes the way to historical insight.

4[Eventual note on presocratic figures and their surviving fragments.]
On the other hand, if one follows the problem-historical method, something emerges from behind the disputes which drove combatants apart, namely, that which they held in common: first, the proposition that the whole of the law was to be found within the cosmos, or more precisely, within the correlation between subject and object; and second that the problem they faced was only intelligible in light of this proposition, namely, the problem of whether the law lay in the subject or the object.

Spoken of in this way, the dispute between subjectivism and objectivism was, when viewed chronologically, a struggle between earlier and later generations. Anaximander, who began (non-mathematical) objectivism, lived several centuries after Museus and Hesiod, the fathers of subjectivism. A similar situation applies, though less extensively, with respect to the secondary struggle between non-mathematical and mathematical objectivism. Parmenides, who began the latter stream, lived four decades after Anaximander. Moreover, when viewed systematically, this second difference of opinion is less profound. Both groups shared an objectivistic starting point. They only differed in their answers to the question as to whether the object was to be conceived as law with or without metric delimitation.

As to both the sharp opposition surrounding subjectivism and objectivism as well as the less far-reaching dispute between Anaximander and his students, on the one hand, and the Pythagoreans, on the other, one must keep in mind that the disputes did not involve the law per se but rather that which presocratic philosophers saw as law. Indeed, only in such a frame of mind can study of the history of philosophy be fruitful in one's own systematics.
2. Tension surrounding the problem of conceiving the ontic relationship between the universal and individual in the period before Hippocrates.

Passions were also loosed by efforts to answer questions concerning the relationship between the universal and the individual. There were universalists who began with concrete and self-identical universals and considered individual things as their mere offshoots. There were also partial universalists who saw that universalists did not do justice to the individual and so maintained the universal as universalists understood it but placed individual things along side it. Finally, there were individualists who denied the existence of the universal as understood by universalists and partial universalists. Individualists restricted their concern to individuals and consequently conceived of the universal merely as a temporary vagueness in the understanding and denoting of individuals. These three groups opposed each other with great energy. One should not deny the significance of this struggle. The rise of the macro- and microcosm theme within partial universalism is to be attributed to this confrontation. So too are the sophist, socratic and little socratic schools.

The relationship between this struggle and the one dealt with in the preceeding section was two-fold. Viewed in terms of content, the problem of universals was less profound than that of the place of the law. Consequently, the former problem can be seen to be subordinate to the latter. Nevertheless, the problem of universals did surface within subjectivism as well as in both wings of objectivism. In each of these three contexts the order of development was the same: first came the universalists, then the partial universalists, and finally the individualists. It was for that reason that I felt it most
advantageous to a properly ordered survey to deal first with subjectivism and its three subgroups, then to treat non-mathematical objectivists, Pythagoreans and their subgroups, and to end with the minor socratics.

The question remains open to students of presocratic philosophers as to whether it is completely appropriate to speak of non-mathematical objectivist individualists as plural or whether to identify an analogous group among Pythagoreans. Indeed, further research has brought me now to a double modification. In the first stream, Socrates qua individualist comes to be joined by Xenophon while among the intellectual bed-fellows of the Pythagoreans I have long counted Cebe and Simmias as individualists (after they had heard Philaus in their native city, Thebes, both joined themselves to Socrates, near the end of his life).

E. Differences among contemporaries.

To this point, I have restricted my attention to diachronic streams and waves within philosophy. History however also suggests a second pattern. Alongside the relationship between prior and posterior generations one must also consider the relationship between synchronic figures and thought. In ordinary life, one recognizes the mutual relations between siblings as well as that between parents and children. Similarly, theory must direct its attention not only to the succession of generations, but equally to the agreements and differences between figures of the same generation. If one properly orders succession in a vertical pattern of higher and lower (in the spirit of a chronicle),
then it is useful, for clarity's sake to place figures of a single generation in a horizontal order, *beside each other*.

Furthermore, there is yet another distinction which must be kept in mind in addition to the distinction between succession and simultaneity.⁵ Time-streams which primarily concern questions surrounding the place of the law, do not repeat themselves. Rather, as will be shown, time streams call forth, as it were, different solutions [as to the place of the law]. When treating points of convergence and divergence within a single generation, one notices something which perdures. Once configurations of divergence have emerged in the series of philosophical conceptions of earlier and later generations, these configurations never quite disappear. They manifest enduring, one might say, typical characteristics. As a consequence, we can speak here too of "types."

In the mean time, one must remember that the differences between types also refer back to differences in the positing and answering of problems. Among the problems referred to here, some are implicated in all philosophical conceptions, others only in certain conceptions.

F. Problems common to all conceptions

Of the problems within this group, two are already encountered in presocratic thought: the relationship between philosophy and myth, and problems surrounding the most important opposition with respect to the vertical structure of things.

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⁵ One should not identify this distinction with the modal distinction between the arithmatic and the spacial.
1. Myth—not to be confused with Word-revelation—is the product of pistic fantasy which in a pagan context concerns the generation of the gods and the world (and emerges, consequently, as a pseudo-Word-revelation in an apostate heart). Presocratic philosophy which was never myth in its own right, had to determine its relationship to myth. One can identify a two-fold relationship. Some philosophers accepted myth as a basis for their philosophy, whereas others rejected it in no uncertain terms. In this respect then mythologizing and anti-mythologizing thought stood in utter opposition to each other.

Myth, as we saw, busied itself with the generation of the gods and people. Consequently, anti-mythologizing thought had to face the question as to what meaning it was willing to ascribe to the process of becoming. In this context, a group of philosophers—the oldest—took their reaction to mythologizing thought so far that they came to view becoming as something so secondary that their philosophical conception emerged as purely cosmological. Others, by contrast, who appeared somewhat later, posited the process of becoming as primary and did so despite their rejection of mythologizing thought. These philosophers developed a cosmogono-cosmological conception which assumed a position between mythologizing and purely cosmological thought.

As a result of this early dispute concerning the relationship of philosophy to myth, there developed three sorts of philosophy: mythologizing, cosmogono-cosmological and purely cosmological thought. What resulted was a tri-lemma, as it were.
2. The most important disputes about the vertical structure of things

Every philosophy soon confronts the interrelationship of diversity and unity. By rights, thought should easily acknowledge that here (for example in the forging of relationships like friendship) multiplicity is primary, whereas there unity is primary (for example with respect to the structure of persons and those complex things which are more than simple aggregates). Consequently, it makes no sense to have a single answer to the dilemma as to which of the two elements [i.e., unity or diversity] is prior. Presocratic philosophers thought otherwise. They thought either dualistically or monistically, also in relation to vertical structure. Dualists recognized even in their position vis-à-vis vertical structure the priority of duality. They see the ontic structure of the world as the original correlation of the transcendent and the non-transcendent. Consequently, they view unity as secondary and, in the end, not more than an "all" (pan in Greek). Monists work, on the other hand, from unity, which they conceive as a totality (holon in Greek). They consider duality to be secondary. Consequently, the dualist ascribes unity to union, whereas the monist ascribes diversity to divergence. Early on in the history of presocratic thought dualists and monists came to stand over and against one another as to the relationship between unity and diversity. But the subsidiary problem concerning vertical structure led to the actual articulation of the dilemma.

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6 This term "vertical structure" is chiefly related to the presence of retrocipations and anticipations in the modalities which are [themselves] ordered primarily with respect to their level of complication. Moreover, it lends itself to historical study which is, in my view, especially directed to illumine the distinction between the problem just mentioned [retrocipations and anticipations in modalities] and that of the structure of things. It does both in relation to the horizontal vision of the Greeks and contemporary philosophy as to questions surrounding the place of the law.
3. These two problems then—the relationship of philosophy to myth and the most important dispute concerning the vertical structure of things—must have arisen very early in presocratic thought. Even the oldest philosophical conceptions, those of universal subjectivism, exhibit the distinctive colours inherent in these problems. Because the two problems are independent of each other as, consequently, are their solutions, it is clear that mythologizing, cosmogono-cosmological, and pure cosmological thought all allow for both dualistic and monistic conceptions. As a result, six possible conceptions arise from the conjunction of the two problems. I do not mean to suggest that these six actually occurred without exception. One can say, however, that all six did occur in universalist subjectivism. For dualism followed by monism are represented in sequence—in mythologizing thought by Museus and Hesiod, in pure cosmological thought by Xenophanes and Thales, in cosmogono-cosmological thought by Empedocles (Peri physeos) and Heraclitus.⁷

G. Problems not shared by every conception

The six conceptions we have just been discussing exhaust the conceptions generated within subjective universalism. In order to become more familiar with other

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⁷ In this series it should be noted that Xenophanes and Empedocles are, qua dualists, treated before Thales and Heraclites, though the former were chronologically posterior to the latter. Already earlier (1950) I had identified Xenophanes as a dualist. In the meantime, I came to understand that the one god in his conception was an interior one. This last point has come now to seem incorrect. For the transcendent embraced in addition to a nous, also a phrēn and a demas (shape) which the presence of a soma—one should think here of the world of the “fixed” stars—underscores. Thus, the one god can only be, at most, the summation of this “all.” The “asomatōs” is an Aristotelizing interpretation which occurs in Clement of Alexandria but which must be older as the well-informed pseudo-Aristotle de Melisse Xenophane Gorgia will already have nothing of such a notion as appears in his discussion of Zeno the Eleatan (cf. Diels-Kranz I p. 135, 3 with par. 120/121—979a6f7—).
characteristics and concomitant philosophical problems of presocratic thought (excepting Hippocrates), it is necessary to descend, as it were, to a later generation, i.e., partial universalism, in which one encounters considerable variation. The set of variants is indeed complete once we bring to our consideration the analogous stream within non-mathematical objectivism.

Partial universalists prior to Hippocrates are above all characterized by an overwhelmingly horizontal tendency. The greater attention to the individual required by this conception brings partial universalists to take up the theme of macro- and microcosm. They conceive both the individual and universal otherwise than do universalists inasmuch as they conceive them as irreducible parts of the cosmos which exist as it were side by side. The universal is identified as immortal whereas the individual is mortal. We turn to the differences which emerge among the six combinations that we identified in [our analysis of] universalism.

1-2 Mythologizing thought

This way of thinking which is bound up with partial universalistic subjectivism is characteristic of Orphism. Its vision is therefore neither mysticism—for mysticism certainly always implies universalism bound to the thesis, that the individual returns to the universal upon death—nor is it necessarily dualistic since there are monistic followers of Orphism along side the dualists.  

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8 The question as to whether Orphism suffers constantly from the struggle between two theologies can be left to one side. For even the eventual establishment of a theological duality does not necessarily lead to philosophical dualism. A duality which is not philosophical in character can be dealt with in both a dualist and a monist way. Even where an obvious duality like that of the sexes plays a role within Orphism’s doctrine of the vertical structure of things, one Orphist will grasp dualistically at a myth of nuptial erotics while another grasps monistically at an eristic myth of marital divorce.
Apollo plays an important role in this vision. The vertical opposition of
transcendent and non-transcendent, which we noted already within universalist
subjectivism, comes to be intertwined with the theme of macro- and microcosm. This
intertwinement, in turn, leads to the question as to whether the theme refers itself only to
the non-transcendent or whether it also occurs within the transcendent. One understands
how important the problem is for philosophical anthropology. In the first scenario, human
beings wholly belong to the non-transcendent. In the second, however, humans can
possess something transcendent. As a consequence, one must first of all distinguish
between dualism with or without dichotomy.

a. Dualism without dichotomy

In this conception the transcendent is identified with those heavenly bodies which
have fixed courses. The non-transcendent, by contrast, is identified with those bodies with
unfixed courses. Even the microcosm of human life belongs wholly to the non-
transcendent. [For] in the beginning human life was vertically split in two by Zeus, chief
god of this philosophical conception (which split was also ascribed to the spherical
macrocosm). Zeus causes the split in order to break the power of the Titans. This is why
within Delphic-Apollonian Orphism both homosexuals and heterosexuals desire the
restoration of the original situation out of nostalgia and resentment.

b. Dualism with dichotomy

Another group of Orphic thinkers were convinced that humans too can possess
something transcendent. Consequently, for them humans are, to the degree that they
possess something transcendent, correlative with the stars. Now the stars have bodies.
Thus, these Orphic thinkers do not consider the transcendent part of a human being to be incorporeal. Rather, it is seen to embrace both psyché and soma. Human mortality touches both. Nevertheless, the psyché is considered to be less subject to death than the soma. This is the philosophical basis for the theme of temporal transmigration.

Moreover, in this context, one finds a new problem emerge which touches upon the distinction of the sexes. Do women as well as men experience this pre-, in-, and post-existence. Each of the two possible answers had their defenders. Thus, one must further distinguish between the purely andrological dualism of the Delphic-Apollonian stream and the anthropological dualism of the Egyptian-Attic stream.

2. Mythologizing monism

Dionysius is the principle god [within this branch of Orphism]. At first, I identified only two types within this branch: one with and one without castration motif. Later, I discovered yet a third type, namely, that of Chaldean astrology. In my study of presocratic philosophers I only mentioned it to illustrate how Democedes's parallelism was of a different stripe from the views of those of the two types [mythologizing monism with and without castration motif] I was working with. Only afterward did it become clear to me that parallelism was developed by Hellenic Greeks working in the Orphic spirit. I include now a remark or two about each of these three types and especially about the difference between the first and third of these conceptions.

a. Eudemus's Orphism is oriented toward Hesiod. Nux is named as the archè and seems to be identical to Chaos as [Hesiod] the poet of the Theogony treats it, in that both authors account for divergence in the same way. The primary divergence is narrated in
terms of the divorce of Uranus and Gaia. Gaia cannot be identified in this story with
Earth, for this Gaia splits into celestial heaven and earth in a second act of divergence.
This Gaia then should probably be understood as Mother Nature. The whole of the
celestial sphere is included within the lower world in this conception so that Uranus is
raised up even above the stars.

b. Cretan-Dionysian Orphism breathes a naturalist spirit so that it posits the
contrast between the anorganic and the organic.

c. The third type of mythologizing monism within Orphism names Chronos as the
origin of all. This origin diverges vertically into Ether and Chaos. The latter of these
diverges, in turn, into Geo and Tartarus. Thus, Uranus and Chaos are treated in this
narrative in a totally different way than in the narratives of Hesiod et al.. Here, Uranus is
not supratemporal, whereas Chaos is not the origin of all. Indeed, Chaos is here only the
secondary archè of the lower world in which one locates the earth and the underworld.
One clearly recognizes in this "temporalism" the three-fold heaven-earth-underworld of
Chaldean parallelism.

3-4 Pure cosmological thought

One notes a crassly anti-mythologizing character in the thesis that all becoming is
something derivative.

3. Pure cosmological monism first appears with certainty within non-mathematical
objectivism. It takes the form of the sheer materialism of Leucippus and Democritus.
They, like Thales, suppressed the genetic theme of origin and brought everything under a
single qualifying term. In their case, however, labile water is replaced by an originally
fixed corporeal realm. They find it difficult to speak of movement within this original plenitude of the many vertically and horizontally distinct atoms which are generated via division. Indeed, for them it is only possible to speak of movement by accepting as coevil plenitude's contrary, "the void." Moreover, in this conception the soul is subordinated absolutely to the somatic. In fact, the psyche consists in air, whereas the perceiving-thinking spirit consists in fire.

4. Purely cosmological dualism

While belonging to the same primary group as materialism, purely cosmological dualism can be clearly distinguished from it in a number of respects. In dualistic fashion it obviously does not proceed from a single term. Rather, it posits with respect to the vertical structure of things a sharp opposition between the transcendent and the non-transcendent. Both the transcendent and the non-transcendent are characterized by a correlation between nous and soma. But, in the transcendent sphere the two correlates are identical whereas in the non-transcendent they are not. In the non-transcendent soma consists in ever changing, tiny corpuscles, and the nous is fallible and limited to doxa. This conception, therefore, lacks not only materialism's monistic vision of the vertical structure of things. It also lacks the subordination of thinking spirit to the somatic. Moreover, this position's rejection of the need for positive law points not in the direction of anarchism, but in that of cosmopolitanism which restricts to the state the authority to disturb the peace. Similarly, its ethics are not hedonist, but precisely antihedonist.

This dualism too was unable to maintain its original unity. Its problematization was not as far developed as we saw in mythologizing thought. Here one finds only the
opposition of dualism with or without dichotomy. In this context, the former remained faithful to the line of Xenophanes whereas the latter already with Epicharmus ascribed the possession of something transcendent to both sexes, but did so in spiritualist fashion, precluding marriage from the domain of immutable philia. It must be remembered that marriage is closely associated with becoming.

5-6 Cosmogono-cosmological thought

5. This type of dualism also lacks the broad problematization found within its mythologizing analogue. Here too one notes only two types. We do not actually confront dualisms with and without dichotomy but only two forms of the second type: the distinction between pure andrological and anthropological dichotomy. Both conceptions articulate the genetic theme of temporal transmigration.


This vision manifests the richest variation. One distinguishes here not less than four variants. Of these four, the middle two are further subdivided.

a. The contradictory type wholly develops in the line of Heraclitus.

b.-d. The three remaining visions differ among themselves in their further determination of the contrasts which arise from vertical divergence. The priority doctrine gives priority to the higher over and against the lower in this sense, namely, that the higher works in one way or another upon the lower but the lower has no influence upon the higher. The interaction theory sees mutual influence of both higher and lower, whereas parallelism denies any influence upon the other to either lower or higher. The first two of these visions can be divided into a number of variants.
b. Priority doctrine

This vision is still not acknowledged in all its unity and distinction by the handbooks of the history of philosophy, despite its very unique and fascinating problematics. Consequently, it has very much deserved our interest. It distinguishes itself from all other groups and types mentioned heretofore by not counting the psychè as and by not placing it within soma. In this conception the psychè exists rather above the somatic. During the objectivist period the meaning of this first (or not) vertical contrast seems clear: it is between what is perceptible and what is imperceptible, and concomitantly within objectivism between subject and object. Here subject and object do not exist side by side. Rather, they are ordered as a contrast in terms of the scheme of "lower" and "higher". Moreover, the priority doctrine considers the somatic which is consistently identified with the object to be fixed and consequently attributes motion which comes to the soma from the outside to psychic activity.

Division among the followers of this conception occurs when they try to account for the action of the higher within the primary divergence with respect to the lower.

1) According to the priority doctrine which includes impetus theory the origin of the primary divergence is at the same time the origin of the contrast between psychè--including intellect (Gr. nous)--and soma. Consequently, the lower is wholly somatic. Moreover, the action of the higher upon the lower assumes the character of a push (Lat. impetus). Those who accept this theory disagree again in the answers which they give to the question as to whether the somatic can be termed the instrument of the psychè or whether the organic and physical ought to be distinguished within the lower.
Hermotimus and Anaxagoras held to the first position and one can thus call their position "instrumentalism". By contrast vitalistic followers of the priority doctrine such as Metrodorus of Lampsacos (the Elder) went in the other direction: the push which a psychè give to its soma--later called "life force"--was different from the push which one soma gave to another.

2) A second group rejected the theme of original impetus. According to them the lower part possesses its own intrinsic movement. Their position embraces not only a somatic act, but also a psychic act which sets the somatic in motion with a secondary impetus. The level at which the primary divergence occurs is not the same in this conception as that of the contrast of psychic and somatic. Rather primary divergence lies at a higher level. But how much higher? This group ceases to be united in its attempt to answer this last question.

The occasionalists among them (Philistion and Ecphantus) distinguish a two-fold psychè: a psychè of the secondary impetus and a higher psychè which intervenes and directs. Thus, the horse moves itself, but the knight uses the movement proper to his charger. In other words, the charger's movement gives the knight the chance (Lat. occasio) to ride and to achieve his chosen end.

The ennoetists (Archelaus and Hicetas) went a step farther. According to them psychic activity in the lower is not only moving but also directing. Consequently, in addition to the soma, the whole of the psychè falls within the lower (thus, not only space but also time). Only contemplative speculation remains associated with the act of the higher. It is however no longer the act of a higher psychè but of the nous.
c. The interaction theory posits, as I indicated above, that a mutual influence occurs between the higher and lower parts of the vertical contrast. Via this thesis interactionists can be clearly distinguished from both prioritists and parallelists. A full understanding of this theory demands that one attend to its hylezooism. Hylezooism implies, namely, that interactionist theory accepts a prime matter which diverges vertically into two mutually contrasting off-shoots. But even this does not tell the whole story. For hylezooism is not a materialist doctrine pure and simple. In the first place, it is located within a cosmogono-cosmological and not pure cosmological framework. Nor is the psyché subordinated, in this context, to the somatic. The psyché was conceived as the consciousness located in the interior which could be distinguished from matter conceived as exterior. Indeed, such a position appears equally within the objectivist spur of this conception. Consequently, interactionist theory is the only monist conception which conceives the relationship of the psyché and soma as one of interior to exterior.

But here too one notes variations. Already among the disciples of Anaximenes (the father of this conception) there were those who differed from their master as to the primary vertical divergence. Whereas Anaximenes took air to be the originary substance which became fire above and water below, these disciples identified the originary substance as either between fire and air, i.e., fiery air (gloedlucht) or between air and water, i.e., "something" between. As a result, the theories which diverged from Anaximenes' original position also differed from each other. Whereas the first group posited the originary substance at a higher level, the other looked for it at a lower level. From what has just been said, then, one identifies three types: an anthropological type (the
first divergent form), a zoological or physiological type (the position of Anaximenes), and a phytological type (the second divergent form). The objectivist development of the conception undergoes an analogous division.

In the anthropological direction, we learn that the conception posits the moon in the macrocosm and the seat of understanding in the microcosm as the point of divergence. The seat of understanding is apparently located between the head and the trunk. Not less than seven functions are ascribed to the head; four are taken up with the sensations of the eyes, ears, nose and mouth. The zoological theory associated with Diogenes of Apollonia (known for his cultural optimism) opposes plants which do not know and the *zooia* (human and animal) which do. It also distinguishes within knowing between sensation and thought. The phytological type identifies the activity of the thinking spirit with sensation through the eyes and distinguishes further not only three but rather four other species of sensation: along with the sensation of ears, nose and mouth, this conception also counts sensitivity to temperature and climactic constrasts in plants. All three types assume a consciousness in the interior which occurs only among humans (first type), among humans and animals (second type), and among plants as well (third type).

d. We encounter parallelism in the presocratic milieu only in Democedes whose conception contained the idea that consciousness and *soma* (related as higher to lower) grow and diminish simultaneously. Consequently, this type should be characterized as a "limited" parallelism, at least in comparison to the subsequent off-shoot of the theory which claimed to see parallelism as total.
H. Retrospective

If we look back at our survey of the groups which arose before the time of Hippocrates, it appears that five of the six oldest groups already to be distinguished within universal subjectivism came to subdivide over time. Only materialism assumed a unique place. I do not mean, of course, that there was no movement in this line of thought from generation to generation. One has only to compare the universalistic conception of Thales with the partial universalistic conception of Choirilus of Samos (to restrict ourselves to subjectivism). Such differences, however, come to the fore in a comparison of any two conceptions from successive time-streams or waves. What remains constant over time is not the conception as a whole but only what is "typical" within it.

Consequently, in a given conception, time-stream and type intersect. Thus, a conception can only really be understood when one has identified both its time-stream and type.

On the other hand, each conception forms (insofar as it is not the first of its type) the link between the conception of the same type which occurs in the previous and subsequent time-streams. It is in this way that conceptions play their unique role in history.

What we have been noting with respect to materialism holds equally for the types and conceptions of the other five primary groups. Nevertheless, the intersection of time-stream and type does not tell the whole story with respect to these groups. In them we find weak and strong variations within the fundamental types, variations lacking in materialism. More effort is needed to arrive at an historical determination of type. Still
the intersection is operative here too, historically as well as philosophically. Moreover analysis of these conceptions in terms of this intersection and then subsidiary analysis clearly distinguishes itself from historical rubrication which is not philosophically grounded and (or) which denies wholly or in part the historical particulars of the conceptions being researched.

On the other hand, to establish partial agreement as to philosophical problematics among two or more conceptions often appears to help in determining the place within the history of philosophy proper to a given conception (a task which is not always easily accomplished). In this way, one also occasionally identifies horizontal relations which suggest that when one factors in their temporal relation to each other, these types are elaborating upon, despite all their differences, a shared problematic. I already made use of this type of conjunction to abridge my explication of the variations within mythologizing, cosmogono-cosmological and pure cosmological thought. Similar analogies can also be noted in monism. For in the doctrine of vertical structure ennoëtism strongly recalls the first type of monistic Orphism, while the phytological variant of interaction theory recalls the second type, and limited parallelism (qua parallel theory) recalls temporalism.

Even just the consolidation of terminological agreement brings one a little farther: that Parmenides and Anaximander both term the object "being", inspite of the large differences between their conceptions, is an objectivist datum which one should not ignore, provided one also keeps the whole of both their problematics in view.
I. Hippocrates

If repeated attempts to associate a conception with other known types fail, one must assume that one is dealing with a new type of a peculiar cachet. Such indeed is the case when encountering the conception of Hippocrates. For the works of the renowned physician appear idiosyncratic both in their ontology and in their epistemology. Moreover, his school broke almost completely with its own philosophical tradition in the period of the late Aristotle, which led, in turn, to the emergence of a broad spectrum of interconnected conceptions. This complicated situation is reason enough to give attention to Hippocrates at this point.

Earlier I pointed out that Hippocrates belongs to that broad line of thinkers who joined non-mathematical objectivism with partial universalism. Nevertheless, his treatment of partial universalism goes its own way, for he rejects the theme of macro- and microcosm whereas the theme is accepted by all other partial universalists. The reason he assumed this idiosyncratic stance appears bound up with the realization that universal and individual do not exist side by side in the world but rather are both the be found with the self-same thing. Despite this acknowledgement of the phenomenon, Hippocrates remained faithful to partial universalism in a dualistic mode. For him too universal and individual are not traits but parts of the same in the sense that the two together determine the vertical structure of the thing. In this way he replaced the current schematic which co-ordinated macro- and microcosm with higher and lower.

Naturally this raised the question as to which place in the schema of higher and lower belonged the the universal and the individual. According to Hippocrates, the
universal was the lower and the individual the higher. Consequently, one discovers here a conception which (to use a Latin manner of speaking) looks to the higher component in the thing for the *principium individuationis*. Because Hippocrates further named the lower *soma* and the higher *pneuma* (life spirit), *psychē* was also to be assigned a place subordinate to the higher.

Hippocrates' conception is primarily pure cosmological and dualistic. Consequently, it is only natural to compare it first of all to the conception of the Neo-Eleatans who, above and beyond the two fundamental traits, shared the acceptance of non-mathematical objectivism and partial universalism and the rejection of materialism. Despite these several fields of agreement, there remain two points of difference. The disciples of Parmenides not only promoted a partial universalism with macro- and microcosm theme, they also accepted in keeping with all the other students of all the other dualistic types (anterior to Hippocrates) the correlation of *nous* and *soma* with the transcendent.

With the emergence of Hippocrates, pure cosmological dualism divided into two clearly distinguishable lines. The Eleatic school continued to posit a sharp opposition between nature and culture (as did the materialists). On the other hand, Hippocrates who recalls non-mythologizing parallelism in his understanding of the relationship between *psychē* and *soma*, should be placed on a horizontal line between non-mythologizing parallelism and Eleatism. Moreover, he establishes his own vertical line because of his break with the theme of macro- and microcosm within partial universalism.
Thus there turned out to be enough material for a study in the history of the philosophy of the beginning phase of Hellenic thought despite its apparent inaccessibility at first glance. In other words, there was sufficient material to lend itself to a consistently executed problem-historical approach as undertaken in the manner I have just been describing. Indeed, there proved material enough to offer the opportunity for notable refinements in and through further concentration upon this field of study over the course of the years.

III. A Test of the Method's Fruitfulness in Study of the Later Periods of Antiquity

A method of scholarly research should actually be of general use to the discipline in question. Consequently, the fruitfulness of this method should also become clear in the study of later time periods. I will avoid ranging too broadly by restricting myself to only the two most important matters at least within the context of this article: distinguishing time-streams and the identification of new types. I will further restrict myself temporally to the remainder of Antiquity, that is, to the end of Hellenic philosophy and to the Hellenistic period.

A. The End of Hellenic Philosophy

This period shares in the strongly ontological orientation of its predecessor. Its difference lies in the emergence and initial criticism of realism, i.e., the positing of a second cosmos which had previously only been recognized as background but which came to be placed in the foreground by means of a deepening of perspective.
1. The Rise of this Tendency is to be Ascribed to Plato

Plato remained a cosmogono-cosmological thinker throughout his entire life. Nevertheless, there runs through his thought about the law a significant development which evolved incrementally but over a fairly short period of time.

a. During his first period (c. 398 B.C.) he was a non-mathematical objectivist, being a disciple of Socrates. Already in these years, however, he exhibited an unusual measure of independence. The *Hippias Minor* betrays a very reserved relationship to late-socratic technicism. Indeed, he came to reject it out of hand in the *Apology of Socrates* a work which came close to the standpoint of Xenephon. Here the development of skill was conceived as ornament, not as education. Moreover, it seems that in the *Laches* he went over to a purely andrological dualism, probably as a result of making closer contact with Euclides of Megara.

b. The second period (c. 398-391 B.C.) bears a Pythagorean stamp. The *Gorgias* and subsequent works exhibit an interest in mathematics. In these years Plato breaks first with pragmatism (*Protagoras*) and later with individualism (*Menon*).

c. Shortly after the *Menon* Plato enters his third and last philosophical period, i.e., the period of realism (c. 390-347 B.C.). By realism I mean that vision which posits the existence of a *kosmos noètos* accessible only to the intellect. In the *Euthyphro* such a notion was already acknowledged. One thinks of his use of the term "species itself" (*auto to eidos*). Here the notion was still interchangeable with the Idea (*idea*), and only came to be given a much wider scope in the *Phaedo*. In the *Phaedo* Plato first develops a wholly new idea of cause while considering the relationship of the intelligible to the visible. Both
the *Euthyphro* and *Phaedo* are clearly dualist and exhibit the andrological type of the school of Tarentum (Archytas and Timaeus), as do all anterior works from the *Apology* on. This last point is apparent from the *Symposium*, *Politics*, *Timaeus* and the *Critias*. In connection with his growing interest in astronomy the intelligible comes to include as distinct from and contiguous with the Ideas, numbers-in-themselves which are correlate with the speeds of astral motion rather than the virtues in the foreground.

Up to this point, the idea as well as the ideal forms the norm. But concomitant with his move to the monism of the priority doctrine (c. 377 B.C.), he works certain changes in this assumption. In keeping with his critique of the dualistic "hen" concept in the *Parmenides*, the somatic is from then on placed wholly in the lower. Given the analogy between the structure of the intelligible and that of the foreground, it follows that within the intelligible numbers-in-themselves will compare to ideas as lower to higher. Consequently, the ideas were from then on only correlate with the insensible part of the foreground. They were no longer ideal forms but only norms.⁹

⁹ In problem-historical perspective the monistic years are especially interesting. Plato's thought underwent still more development after 377. Moreover, the development occurred in no less than four phases. In addition, the historical order appears to have been analogous to that order which we discovered in our systematic thinking through of the doctrine of priority among the presocratics (see above pp. 41-42). In other words the order corresponds (in a realist spirit to be sure) to the conception of each phase of its Pythagorean analogue.

1. The *Parmenides* and *Lysis* (c. 377) replaced the logic of relations of dualism which had been worked out among other places in the theory of "colligantia" of the *Timaeus*, with the logic of instrumentalistic monism. This replacement occurs under the influence of Socrates the Younger and Theatus, both of whom taught in Athens.
2. In the next phase (ad 366), Plato developed successively in a vitalistic spirit his vision of language (*Cratylus* and *Euthydemus*), sensation (*Theaetetus*) and of the conjunction of the two in rhetoric (*Phaedrus*). Plato was, at the end of this phase, in contact with Eudoxus whom he had entrusted temporary leadership within the Academy in the context of his second trip to Sicily.
3. After becoming acquainted with Philistion (and the school of Ecphantos) three works came to interpret the occasionalistic vision (366-c. 355). In any event, Plato continued to place movement within the lower (Sophists), grasped for the divine hand that was guiding in this movement (*Republic*) and rejected Eudoxus' theory of lust depite accepting Eudoxus' theory of exhaustion. It was this latter theory which broke through the impasse of the mutual incomensurability of round and square in the geometric and by which the mutual incomparability of number and space was ended, an incomparability indicated by the contemporary terms "horista" and "ahorista" (*Philebus*).
Meanwhile, the most important advance which Plato's philosophical development gained for the history of philosophy remains his broadening of the Greeks' horizontal concept of law. For Plato, the law lay neither in the subject nor in the object (seen as opposed to the subject). Rather, law lay behind both.

2. Aristotle's philosophical development followed a very different path. Initially, (I) he was a follower dependent upon the Pythagoreans first of all and then around 366 of Plato (cf. Physics VII). From c. 353, however, he embarked upon his own way (II).

At first (II A) he kept faith with total realism, though he did place numbers-in-themselves along side the ideas inasmuch as they were concerned with higher matter (Metaphysics N, Physics A). The latter move was in keeping with his shift toward (anthropological) interaction theory.

But around 346 he embraced zoological interaction theory. Consequently, he came up against a problem associated with the technicism joined to this conception by the late Socrates. Indeed, Aristotle's acceptance of virtue as a skill (technè), should by rights have led him to embrace the existence of an idea for every distinct technè. To do so, however, was something which he, as a member of the Academy was loathe to do in light of Plato's very early rejection of technicism. It is this dilemma which lay behind his rejection of the ideas (Ideas, Metaphysics A, Physics II--beginning and end).

4. The Laws (355-347) preached the geo-excentric world-picture of Hicetas' ennoeticism, as is clear in the distinction of two earth movements.
Consequently, the intelligible came to include only the numbers-in-themselves, and he exchanged his total realism for semi-realism (II B).\(^\text{10}\)

Aristotle broke completely with realism in time. During this breakthrough period (II C) he championed a non-mathematical objectivism with respect to the place of the law. Moreover, he accepted a dualism with respect to the vertical structure of things, a dualism which clearly sided with the school of Hippocrates in its dispute with the Neo-Eleatans. In this context, while embracing the same philosophical type, Aristotle varied from the Hippocratean version in a number of subordinate but important respects.

In the first years of this period, he saw the asomatic higher only as individual. In this, he was like the school of Kos. He differed from the Hippocrateans at first (II C 1) only in holding to a divergent thesis about the soma: soma was lacking external breath but not the spirit of life (pneuma). Somewhat later (II C 2) soma was seen to exhibit traits which were also proper to animals.

The third shift of this period was more far-reaching. In *Metaphysics* A, the higher no longer appears only as individual: the individual becomes in this text (semi-mystically) an off-shoot of the intellectually conceived divinity, which actualizes the lower (II C 3).

In the final phase (II C 4) the distance between Aristotle and Hippocrates increases. *Metaphysics* Z—beginning and end, H and Phi, and *Physics* VIII distinguish both a composite substance and a simple substance. The simple substance is god, understood deistically as the thought of thought. For everything else, this god is, in

\(^{10}\) For a closer analysis of the development of Aristotle during phases I, IIA and IIB1-2, compare H.E. Runner, *The Development of Aristotle Illustrated From the Earliest Books of the Physics* (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1951).
monarchian fashion, nothing more than a pure final cause. The composite substance, on the other hand, consists of a concrete universal and actual thinking spirit (nous) which Aristotle calls "divine," but which also belongs to the composite. That which is even lower than this spirit is, in its capacity as correlate to the nous, potential and individual, and includes the psychè as well as the soma. The latter two components relate to each other as form and matter, while matter is in this context the principle of individuation. The relationship between nous and the lower is, therefore, the relationship between an actualizing universal and the individual that is to be actualized. Actualization stops at death which signifies the utter end for the individual person. That which continues to exist is only the universal nous which comes to be joined to persons of the following generation.

If we scan this pattern of development, it appears to us that we discover something new in each of the primary stages: semi-realism in his doctrine of the law and one virtually new and three completely new types with respect to the vertical structure of things. This present discussion should serve to show how the problem-historical method succeeded in illuminating philosophically the development of both of the chief figures of Hellenic philosophy. It did so by refining the Aristotelian problematics exposed by W. Jaeger (1913 and 1923) and F.J.C.J. Nuyens (1939) among others.\footnote{[Eventual note citing pertinent bibliography.]}

B. The Hellenistic Period

This period in the history of philosophy is still largely approached by comparing the two "ethical" sects, the Cepos (the materialist school founded by Democritus) and the
Stoa. Both of these schools were in turn oriented at least in part toward the thought of the lesser socratics. In contrast to this predominant approach it seems more important to me to distinguish Hellenistic from Hellenic philosophy in terms of the Hellenistic accentuation of epistemology in its treatment of the law. Moreover, it worked more or less eclectically to fashion a number of new philosophical types. Indeed, these distinguishing contrasts have already been raised in other contexts above.

1. Accentuation of Epistemology

This characteristic feature of Hellenistic thought exhibits itself in two ways: scepticism and in the apriori-theme. Though the change which this feature manifests is very important, nevertheless, it does not signify a fundamental break with the philosophy of preceding periods. Both scepticism and the apriori-theme do work upon philosophy to effect a global shift in the way in which philosophers thought about the place of the law.

Just taking scepticism under consideration, it did not merely set for itself the limited task of opposing one or another incredible story in philosophy. Rather it brought to the table, so to speak, nothing less than the intelligibility of the law. In our view, the various schools did not agree at all on this point. For in all the schools in which scepticism appeared the same question rose to the surface, namely whether what Hellenic philosophy held to be law was more intelligible than other dimensions of reality. But each school came to its own conclusions.

a. Among the materialists scepticism raised doubt about the priority which Democrites has recognized in the object with relation to the subject. Thus, the scepticism of Nausiphanes worked so that the second generation of materialists already (Epicurus et al.) denied the
object's priority and embraced subjectivism. One seeks in vain within Hellenic philosophy for an analogous shift in philosophical terrain as a result of epistemologically founded criticism.

b. By contrast, in the Academy, doubts about the intelligibility of the law arose with respect to the priority accorded the intelligible background and principally the Ideas. The school of Plato responded to this attack quite differently than had the materialists of Cepos. But here too scepticism resulted in the jettisoning of old opinions about the place of the law, specifically the Ideas. The doubt of Arcislaus about their intelligibility resulted for Carneades in the jettisoning of the criteria for good and evil. However, development within the Academy did not stop with Carneades' semi-realism. For the following generation came to the conclusion that one could not do without such laws [as the criteria for good and evil]. Still they did not simply backtrack. Rather, there remained this outlet, at least in this generation's way of thinking: to assign a different place to the law, even while [re]affirming its existence. And how better was one to secure the law against scepticism than to bring law within the art of knowing itself? Of course, the law's distinction qua law from experiential knowledge gained in discursive reasoning and in sensation needed to be maintained. The search for experiential knowledge was indeed dependent upon the validity of laws. Consequently, it was necessary to acknowledge laws as apriori concepts prior to all others. It is in this way that the Academy's criticism of scepticism was to be established, but such establishment took into it elements which led to fatal consequences.

12[Eventual note on the Academy and scepticism.]
Thus, it is understandable that early Middle Platonism under the leadership of Antiochus of Ascalon (c. 110 A.D.) defended a semi-realism. This semi-realism however differed from the older version of Aristotle. In addition to positing a different account of the vertical structure of things, it accepted the existence of apriori ideas in the knowing spirits of both macro- and microcosm.

Change which resulted from this last move was far-reaching. The understanding which was equipped for the first time with apriori's became "reason." The articulation of *ideae innatae* had, for example, for Cicero an immediate consequence: the appearance of the term "*ratio*." Indeed, it was Cicero who brought this legacy of Greek thought into Latin.

c. Mathematical objectivism travelled a similar road under the influence of scepticism. It replaced the metric limits of things with apriori concepts in the knowing spirits of the macro- and microcosm. As a result, from about 100 A.D. this neo-Pythagoreanism differed from non-mathematical objectivism only in the acceptance of a mathematical apriori.

d. Via this last Pythagorean development a way was cleared for a new sceptical assault upon the Academy. Once the intelligibility of the numbers-in-themselves was questioned, scepticism succeeded by c. 160 A.D. in transforming the Academy in such a way that it jettisoned the remainder of the intelligible under Atticus' leadership and ended up embracing a position near to the old Pythagorean anti-realism. Nevertheless, Plato's school did not restrict itself to such a negative project. Late Middle Platonism under the

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13[Eventual note on Middle Platonism.]
leadership of Harpocation (c. 180 A.D.) distanced itself from pure mathematical
objectivism by positing a second apriori, i.e., that of the numbers-in-themselves.

2. It is now time to have a look at another feature of the philosophy of the
Hellenistic period: its eclecticism. At first blush this time period makes a dreary
impression, for its philosophers are uncounted as are the hair-splitting distinctions they
maintain. One is tempted to cry out, "There is so much!" Still, one is able to trace out
some definite lines of filiation even when considering the period's eclecticism, and these
lines make the period much more intelligible.

a. I am thinking in the first place of the Lyceum inasmuch as it maintained faith with the
late Aristotle (II C). We earlier noted the similarity of the conception of the disciples of
Hippocrates to the three Aristotelian types attributed to Aristotelian texts of this period.
In light of this similarity some thinkers within the Lyceum moved from one of the several
truly Aristotelian types to replace psychè with pneuma, so that a Hippocraticizing type
took its place within the Lyceum along side of the authentic Aristotelian types.¹⁴

In time, an analogous development occured with respect to Platonism. Because
the Aristotelianism implicated in this development was dualistic, it could only borrow
Platonic thematics from the dialogues of Plato's dualistic period. The Politics and
Timaeus came in for special attention. Of course the conjunction of such heterogenous
elements was not successful for people like Theos of Smyrna and Numenius without
undergoing a fundamental reworking. The theme of macro- and microcosm had to be put
aside, and what was left adapted to the spirit of the Lyceum.

¹⁴[Eventual note on Hellenistic Aristotelianism.]
As a consequence of this eclectic development, one can say in fine that there emerged within the Lyceum along side of the three purely Aristotelian types a Hippocraticizing and an early or late Middle Platonizing conception.

Monarchianism underwent an even richer flowering. There was the old type, i.e., the definitive conception of Aristotle, which was represented with exceptional gift by Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200 A.D.). Along side this conception and the Hippocraticizing or pneumatological type of Aristocles there arose a psychological type represented by Herminus. This type emerged already prior to Alexander. Moreover, along side this non-Platonizing wing there developed a Platonizing wing of similar complexity. Thus, by around 200 A.D. analogous to the non-Platonizing monarchians--Aristocles, Herminus and Alexander--there arose among the Platonizing wing Galenus, Albinus and Claudius Ptolemaeus (who was renowned for his world map).

This Platonizing monarchianism took from early Middle Platonism the theme of apriori ideas in the thinking spirit. Moreover it maintained in essence the theme of micro- and macrocosm such that the thinking spirit of the individual person encompassed apriori's as also the macrocosmic world soul. Because the theme of macro- and microcosm was in fact foreign to the definitive conception of Aristotle, he had had no room for the current distinction within the Academy as to the spirit. Consequently, in the Lyceum apriori's were only spoken of with respect to the divine spirit.

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15 For the material distinction being alluded to here I refer the reader to the first section of this article.
b. It is probable that this last tendency within monarchianism influenced, in its turn, early neo-Platonism—the conceptions of Ammonius Saccas et al. These conceptions are to be distinguished for example from late neo-Platonism via its restriction of apriori's to the macrocosmic spirit. As a result, it followed that microcosms could only have access to knowledge in and through intuitions of these apriori's in the macrocosmic spirit. It was in this way that epistemological and horizontally directed mysticism entered the Academy, which was later developed in an ecstatic direction by Plotinus and Iamblichus. Plotinus accomplished this in conjunction with Plato's Symposion, Politics, and Timaeus, thus in an anthropological-dualist way. Iamblichus, however, worked in an ennoetic-monist way in keeping with Plato's Laws.

c. During this neo-Platonic phase, the Academy influenced anew the dualistic wing of the Lyceum. In the interest of brevity I shall restrict myself to the influence of the ecstatic tendency, thus, to the influence of Plotinian dualism. To be sure, only the semi-mystical tendency of the penultimate stage of Aristotle's thought within the Lyceum was at all open to this influence. Already with the Platonizing type articulated during the period of Middle Platonism, Numenius had transformed the horizontal mysticism of the Academy into a vertical one. Now the new Platonic influence radiated from Porphyry who began as a contemplative neo-Platonist. He later spent years in Rome in close proximity to Plotinus. Nevertheless, already before Plotinus' death, he had left the Plotinian circle in order to develop a Platonizing-Aristotelian mysticism which wrapped the conception of Numenius in neo-Platonic meaning.

16 [Eventual note on neo-Platonism.]
3. Eclecticism was tied closely to the epistemologically founded change in teaching regarding the place of the law. For that reason, I treated this phenomenon immediately after the influence of scepticism and the rise of the apriori-theme in the most important philosophical schools. Meanwhile there also occurred a progressive formation of independent and new types during the Hellenistic period which came eventually to have a great deal of influence. All of these types are characterized by an anti-mythologizing pattern of thought.

a. The oldest of these types is monistic. It dates from the early Hellenistic period and was probably first represented by Aristarchus of Samos who is known in the history of astronomy as the "father of the heliocentric world picture." Philosophically, he assumed parallelism, but did not limit it (in contrast to Democedes et al.) to the interrelationship of psychè (in the sense of consciousness) and soma. Rather, he also involved inanimate substances in his parallelism. This change required importing a secondary vertical divergence in both the primary lower and the primary higher. In the primary lower the physical (conceived in terms of atoms) contrasted with the biotic-somatic (conceived as a constellation of atoms). In the primary higher, feeling was contrasted to consciousness. Thus, the double parallel was located in this conception, namely, that atoms and equally the physical things "in" them were thought to possess [i.e., existed in connection with] feeling. Furthermore, among plants, animals and human beings, the somatic and consciousness were thought to be parallel to each other. Now according to Aristarchus, both the lower and higher in all things possessed "limits" in the Pythagorean sense. These limits were metric in the lower, arithmatic in the higher. Consequently, both the physical-
sensing and the somatic-conscious unities were "monads." In this view plants, animals and human beings had both sorts of monad in them. Consequently, the material relations between the two sorts was to be determined in each of the appropriate "kingdoms."

Aristarchus viewed the relationship in such a way that only one somatic-conscious monad was necessary for every multiplicity of physical-feeling monads, and was indeed sufficient to rule them. All in all this type of thought ran along the lines of a partial universalism with the macro- and microcosm theme. In monistic fashion, the macrocosm assumed the position of centre. By contrast, the microcosms were to be found on the periphery. This reminds one of a prototype of the conception of Galileo during his last years and of the conception of Leibnitz. One of the connecting links to them was Synesius of Cyrene.

b. There arose much later another group of new types. They are close to the dualistic way of the Lyceum. Still, they belong neither to the genuine Aristotelian conceptions, nor to the Hippocraticizing and Platonizing filiated types within the Lyceum. Rather these new types found their roots in the tradition of Aristotelian commentary. During the "first synthesis" in Christian context (in the time of the emperors and the Church Fathers) one distinguishes already two visions. The first is the subsistence theory, the second the vinculum theory. We discussed both already in the introductory portion of this article. In pagan Hellenistic thought one encounters the first of these visions already with Themistius whose labour was not to provide commentaries upon the works of Aristotle but rather who left us paraphrases. I am not yet able to identify a "father" of the vinculum theory. Were he to be identified with the predecessor of Nemesius then a subsequent problem would arise. We would be forced to ask whether both subsistence and vinculum theory
were represented from the beginning in their respective Platonizing Aristotelian and
voluntarist wings and that, consequently, their respective intellectualist wings arose only
later.

As one can see, it is also possible with the help of the consistent problem-historical
method to present fairly clearly a number of Hellenistic strands of thought in the history of
philosophy and to do so despite the initially daunting opaqueness of that period.

IV. A Number of Reservations [about the Problem-Historical Method].

After initially posing the need for thorough-going methodological reflection upon
research in the history of philosophy against an historical background (I), I went on to
sketch the emergence of the consistent problem-historical method in relation to the
presocratic materials (II). I then proceeded to illustrate the method's fruitfulness for the
following two periods in the history of philosophy (III). In the meantime it is patent that
even this fruit of Calvinistic philosophy would come up against suspicious reservations.
Consequently, I wish to use the concluding section of this article to treat the foremost of
these criticisms.

The reservations and objections which the method has encountered rest in part
upon misunderstandings of its terminology. Thus, for example, I remember one review
which proceeded from the assumption that I shared with the reviewer the sense that
Christianity too necessarily faced the dilemma of monism and dualism and should, in the
event, choose for the latter. The ascription of such a position to me obviously misses the

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mark altogether. Problems of this type, I would like to leave to the side, even though I have no wish to deny them. After all, they do not touch upon the method itself.

A. One of the questions which does touch upon the method and which was asked already early on, concerned the matter of whether I proceeded from the assumption that every philosophical possibility must have been actually realized. This has never been something I have ever tried to defend, nor does it even fit within the trajectory of my thought. For any concept at all is always the result of actual thought which has actually occurred to someone at one time or another, perhaps even as a result of the best choice made from out of some previously assumed dilemma or trilemma. Consequently, the position ascribed to me would amount more or less to an anthropology which binds our thought to the problematics rooted in a Hellenic milieu, and which has not sufficiently recognized the responsibility for either acting in continuity with or breaking away from this basic framework of thought.

But even leaving aside or avoiding the matter posed in this terribly important question, there is still no reason from my point of view to posit that every conception which can be thought within the history of philosophy must have occurred or must still occur. Of course, the opposite is also impossible to prove in a given instance. Indeed, that is why one does well not to give up too quickly in one’s search for an eventual representative of a given conception. It is always possible that one will still be found. After all, no one knows every thinker. Moreover, it can surely happen that one suddenly
sees a conception which one has long sought in vain in the work of an author which one already knows, but whose thought one initially viewed mistakenly.

Even less ought one to lock a thinker into one of the conceptions of contemporary philosophy. Even in the case of those who were not able to escape from the contemporary climate of opinion, several thinkers changed time-streams and/or types. Moreover in many instances, they did not limit themselves to a single change. Consequently, whoever is seriously engaged in study of the history of philosophy should proceed from a view of history which leaves room for the possibility of such realities.

B. A second critical observation accepts the answer to the criticism raised in the previous section but asks whether the method lays too much stress on the conceptions while effacing more or less those people who put the conceptions forward. I can understand how such a suspicion can arise from examination of my study of the presocratics. Of course, I too made grateful use in that study of biographical data, at least inasmuch as they were trustworthy. But frequently these data helped far more to discover important geographical and chronological matters than to discover details that cast light upon the philosophical oeuvre. And it is, of course, that oeuvre which is the central focus of study. One sees this last point clearly in the fact that it is possible to identify the historical place of a conception without even knowing the name of the responsible author. Think, for example, of the first and second variant forms of the conception of Anaximenes. Moreover, someone's oeuvre frequently gained influence in circles with which he had no contact. Moreover this influence often occurred long after the thinker in question had left
the scene. Consequently, I was slow to discount biographical data from the presocratic period, at least as long as they were pertinent. But I was even less inclined to overvalue such data.

In contradistinction to the paucity of biographical data from the presocratic period, things often stand otherwise in later times. Concerning Plato, Aristotle and Porphyry, Augustine, Thomas and Roger Bacon, Leibnitz, Vico and Schelling, Brentano, Husserl and Croce, Nietzsche, Berdyaev, and Heidegger (to name only certain well-known figures from the various major periods), there exist rather a lot of trustworthy data which can also serve us to understand better the philosophical pattern of their development. But then in the study of such thinkers I too root around in these sources as fully as possible.

C. A third difficulty touches upon the demand made in this method to start as close as possible at the beginning and to conceptualize and thereby to follow the development of problematics and the answers such problematics give rise to before coming in the end to our own time. Is it not more useful to proceed in the opposite way? asks more than one critic (the conjunction is not coincidental). Should one not rather begin with the questions of our own day and move from there back in time? One should distinguish here above all between teaching and study. If one is responsible to provide a first introduction to the history of philosophy within the parameters of a short course, one can, in my view too, proceed in the way just outlined so as to create more interest and so awaken concern for matters which would otherwise be too strange. Many geographers too received elementary instruction in which they began not with the globe but with a map of their own
village or city. But would one not entrust the task of teaching in this instance to someone who not only knew more but who had also learned to see for him [or her]self the limited material which needed to be communicated in light of the whole.

A similar situation also obtains here. I have no problem with a didactic approach as described above as long as the teacher does not stick with such a method in his [or her] own study. For, in such a case, one arrives at (staying with the analogy to geology) a doctrine of space à la Mach which begins with the sense perceptible empty space of our environment, i.e., with the psychic object function of ontic space, and as a result finds it hard to connect to geometry and even disqualifies it existentially. Something analogous would happen to a history of philosophy which egocentrically views its own time as the only important one and condescendingly looks down on the past for its strongly ontological emphasis. Whereas it is in fact the case that one only really sees one's own time well to the degree that one sees it not as the beginning but (as it is in reality) as the conclusion of centuries of development in which the past speaks strongly, and which one denies at one's peril. For if this first insight is lost sight of, very serious dangers threaten, not only for ones teaching but also for study of the history of philosophy. I need not recall to you the Plato-interpretation of Natorp or a work such as Mahnke's. Indeed this week I read an existentialist approach to Plato's _Lachès_ which was enough to make one's flesh crawl.

D. Finally, there is still the question as to whether there lies hidden in the approach to the history of philosophy argued for here a heavy dose of academic perfectionism. I think not.
For one who illumines an author must see him and show others what one has seen in light of the whole. And one does so whether in a summary overview or in a thick monograph. Otherwise we return to the circumstances of a half century ago when it happened that someone would have to admit after faithfully attending lectures on Fichte for two years that he had still not truly "seen" Fichte!

Now, the identification of time-stream and type belongs to the treatment of the singular instance in light of the whole. To keep such a method before the history of philosophy is not symptomatic of an impossible specialization. Rather, it only indicates an awareness of the absolutely minimum conditions for the acuity such study requires.

In the circle of Calvinistic philosophy we have taken this demand seriously so as to further the study of the history of philosophy as much as possible. We will I trust continue to do so in the future too. For this reason, I thought to use this Jubileum edition of our "Society" to ask in all earnestness for consideration of this method even beyond our own rather small group.