A NEW CRITIQUE
OF THEORETICAL THOUGHT
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VOLUME I
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FOREWORD (ABREVIATED) TO THE FIRST EDITION

The appearance of this first systematic presentation of my philosophy fills me with a deep sense of appreciation to God for the strength He granted me to overcome innumerable difficulties. I would also like to acknowledge my indebtedness to the Board of Directors of the Dr Kuyper Foundation (Kuyperstichting) whose support made the publication of this work possible.

The first rudimental conception of this philosophy had ripened even before I came to the Kuyper-foundation (1921).

Originally I was strongly under the influence first of the Neo-Kantian philosophy, later on of Husserl’s phenomenology. The great turning point in my thought was marked by the discovery of the religious root of thought itself, whereby a new light was shed on the failure of all attempts, including my own, to bring about an inner synthesis between the Christian faith and a philosophy which is rooted in faith in the self-sufficiency of human reason.

I came to understand the central significance of the “heart”, repeatedly proclaimed by Holy Scripture to be the religious root of human existence.

On the basis of this central Christian point of view I saw the need of a revolution in philosophical thought of a very radical character. Confronted with the religious root of the creation, nothing less is in question than a relating of the whole temporal cosmos, in both its so-called ‘natural’ and ‘spiritual’ aspects, to this point of reference. In contrast to this basic Biblical conception, of what significance is a so-called ‘Copernican’ revolution which merely makes the ‘natural-aspects’ of temporal reality relative to a theoretical abstraction such as Kant’s ‘transcendental subject’?

From a Christian point of view, the whole attitude of philosophical thought which proclaims the self-sufficiency of the latter, turns out to be unacceptable, because it withdraws human thought from the divine revelation in Christ Jesus.
The first result of the Biblical point of view with respect to the root of all temporal reality was a radical break with the philosophical view of reality rooted in what I have called the immanence-standpoint.

The discovery of the transcendental ground-Idea at the foundation of all philosophical thought, made it possible to display the different theoretical views concerning the structure of reality, as developed by the dominant immanence-philosophy, in their dependence upon a supra-theoretical a priori. It made the inauguration of criticism possible upon a much more deeply lying plane than a supposed merely theoretical one.

If temporal reality itself cannot be neutral with respect to its religious root, if in other words the whole notion of a static temporal cosmos ‘an sich’, independent of the religious root of mankind, rests on a fundamental misconception, how can one any longer seriously believe in the religious neutrality of theoretical thought?

One of the fundamental principles of this new philosophy is the cosmological basic principle of sphere-sovereignty. Its development was suggested by (the famous Dutch thinker and statesman) Abraham Kuyper, but depends upon the introduction of a religious Christian foundation into philosophy. On this principle rests the general theory of the modal law-spheres developed in Volume II. The first conception of this theory was gained after the discovery of the inner structure of the modal aspects of human experience which I could explain even in my inaugural address The Significance of the Cosmonomic Idea for Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (1926). In the elaboration of this theory difficulties arose, not only because it could nowhere find a point of contact in the immanence-philosophy, but also because it cannot become fruitful apart from a close contact with the special theory of the modal law-spheres, which investigates the basic problems of the various special sciences in the light of the Christian transcendental ground-Idea.

For this reason in my earlier publications I discussed the theory of the modal law-spheres always in connection with my own field of special science, i.e. jurisprudence. I wished to assure myself that this philosophical theory has a principial

Translator's note. The meaning of this terminology will become clear in the course of the discussion.
value for special scientific thought before I drew any provisional systematic conclusions.

The theory of the structures of individuality which I have developed in the third volume has also given rise to many systematic problems. Even in my work *The Crisis in the Humanistic Theory of the State* (1932) I have not only indicated the importance of this theory with respect to the view of the structure of naive experience, but I have also shown its significance for sociology and jurisprudence.

In its earlier stage this theory had not yet been worked out to a sufficient degree. Its significance is not limited to the sciences, but it touches the fundamental structures of empirical reality.

I am strongly convinced that for the fruitful working out of this philosophy, in a genuinely scientific manner, there is needed a staff of fellow-labourers who would be in a position independently to think through its basic ideas in the special scientific fields. It is a matter of life and death for this young philosophy that Christian scholars in all fields of science seek to put it to work in their own specialty.

I am also very thankful that from the outset I found at my side my colleague Dr Vollenhoven, professor of Philosophy at the Free University of Amsterdam, whose name has been inseparably joined to my own. It was a great joy to both of us to find an enthusiastic independent fellow-worker in Prof. Dr H. G. Stoker, whose publications made our movement known in South Africa, and who in his profound constructive criticism has called attention to various points which require further working out.

And although I cannot see through Stoker’s peculiar concepts in their full compass, and at first sight have certain objections to them, yet this does not prevent me from rejoicing greatly over the fact that Stoker is making his philosophical gifts, of which he already gave evidence in the circle of Max Scheler, serviceable to a further independent construction of this new philosophy. His cooperation is to be esteemed of great value, particularly in his own special field of psychology.

And finally I am further encouraged by the rise of a circle, though it be still modest, of scientific adherents, each of whom endeavours in his own department to make the newly developed philosophy fruitful.

Bound by one and the same Christian faith, equally inspired by the stimulating effect of the Christian root of life in the practice of science, a first circle of scientific workers has thus
attached itself to this philosophy. God grant that this modest group may grow and that many that should be our adherents, but who still resist the Christian Idea of science, may be convinced that the question is not a matter of a ‘system’ (subject to all the faults and errors of human thought) but rather it concerns the foundation and the root of scientific thought as such.

In conclusion let me make two final remarks. The first is addressed to my opponents on grounds of principle. I am fully conscious that any method of criticism which tries to penetrate to the religious motives of a thinker is in danger of causing an emotional reaction and giving offense. In tracking down a philosophical train of thought to its deepest religious foundations I am in no way attacking my adversaries personally, nor am I exalting myself in an ex cathedra style. Such misunderstanding of my intention is very distressing to me. An act of passing judgment on the personal religious condition of an adversary would be a kind of human pride which supposes it can exalt itself to God’s judgment seat. I have continually laid emphasis on the fact that the philosophy which I have developed, even in the sharp penetrating criticism which it exercises against non-Christian immanence-philosophy, constantly remains within the domain of principles. I wish to repudiate any self-satisfied scientific attitude in confronting immanence-philosophy. The detailed criticism of the Humanistic immanence-philosophy in the second part of the first volume, must be understood as self-criticism, as a case which the Christian thinker pleads with himself. Unless this fact is understood, the intention of this philosophy has not been comprehended. I should not judge immanence-philosophy so sharply were it not that I myself have gone through it, and have personally experienced its problems. I should not pass such a sharp judgment on the attempts at synthesis between non-Christian philosophy and the Christian truths of faith, had I not lived through the inner tension between the two and personally wrestled through the attempts at synthesis.

My second observation is of a more formal character. Many have been deterred from the study of this new philosophy by its supposed obscurity and complexity, and especially by its new terminology. They desire a popular form which makes a direct appeal without requiring effort. To these and similar objections I have but one reply to make. This philosophy, to be sure, is diffi-
cult and complicated, just because it breaks with much traditional philosophical views. He who will make it his own must try to follow step by step its turns of thought, and penetrate behind the theoretical structure to the religious basic attitude of this whole mode of philosophizing. To those who are not ready in reading to free themselves from the traditional views of reality and epistemology and who look at merely isolated sub-sections of the work, this philosophy will not open its meaning.

But nobody can get rid of this view by ignoring it. As little as Christian thought can isolate itself in an attitude of negation toward non-Christian philosophy, so little may the latter adopt such an attitude toward this trend of Christian philosophy.

It has always been a law of human knowledge that the truth is gained only in the conflict of opinions. May then the conflict about this philosophy be carried on merely for the sake of truth, and thus in a chivalrous fashion.

I do not consider it to be a disadvantage if this philosophy does not enjoy a rapid and easy success. No one less than Kant declared in the foreword of his Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik: ‘allein Popularität hatte ich meinem Vortrage (wie ich mir schmeichele) wohl geben können, wenn es mir nur darum zu tun gewesen wäre, einen Plan zu entwerfen und dessen Vollziehung andern anzupreisen, und mir nicht das Wohl der Wissenschaft, die mich so lange beschäftigt hielt; denn übrigens gehörte viel Beharrlichkeit und auch selbst nicht wenig Selbstverläugnung dazu, die Anlockung einer früheren, günstigen Aufnahme der Aussicht auf einem zwar späten, aber dauerhaften Beifall nachzusetzen.’

If the elaboration of the Kantian philosophy was deemed worthy of this self-denial it is certainly obvious that those interested in the Christian foundation of theoretical thought should not be concerned with personal success, which is after all of no value. Rather they should be willing to carry on a long and difficult labour firmly believing that something permanent can be achieved with respect to the actualization of the idea concerning an inner reformation of philosophy.

For, as a matter of fact the precarious and changing opinion of our fellow-men is not even comparable with the inner happiness and peace that accompanies scientific labour when it is based upon Christ, Who is the Way, the Truth and the Life!

Amsterdam, 1935

The Author.
FOREWORD TO THE SECOND (THE ENGLISH) EDITION

The first (Dutch) edition of this work, published in the years 1935 and 1936, has been long out of print. I am pleased to see that both in the Netherlands and in other countries the lively interest manifested in the philosophy expounded in it has necessitated a second edition, this time in the English language. To me as well as to the translators the new edition has given very difficult problems to solve.

Naturally, the evolution of my conceptions has not been at a standstill since 1936, so that on various points important additions and far-reaching alterations proved to be unavoidable. On the other hand, the book being designed as a rigorously self-contained whole, there was but little scope left for this revision. I had to restrict any changes to what was absolutely necessary, if I did not want to write an entirely new work. The same limitations also apply to the digestion of recent literature on the subject. Notwithstanding all these restraints, however, it proved to be inevitable to increase the volume of the original work considerably.

The translators were up against great difficulties in rendering the phrasing and unusual terminology of the Dutch text in correct, current English; they had to remain in contact with me throughout. The greatest difficulties, however, will have to be overcome in the next two volumes, which contain the positive exposition of the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea. I thank them sincerely for the devotion with which they have accomplished the translation of the first volume now published. In these thanks I want to include especially Mr H. de Jongste, who will be the co-translator, together with Mr Freeman, of volumes II and III, and who will draw up the Index of authors and subjects dealt with. He has already taken an intensely active share in the revision of the English text of the first volume.

Finally, I tender my sincerest thanks in the first place to the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Zuiver Wetenschappelijk Onder-
zoek, whose considerable support in the form of a subsidy has made the revised edition of this voluminous work possible; and in the second place no less to my publishers H. J. Paris of Amsterdam and The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, who undertook substantial risks and have brought out such an excellently produced work.

The Author.

Amsterdam, July 1953.
TRANSLATORS' PREFACE

The year 1926 marks a milestone in the development of Christian philosophy. On October 15th Dr Herman Dooyeweerd became professor of philosophy and history of law in the Free University of Amsterdam. In his inaugural address, Dooyeweerd, seeking a distinctively Christian foundation for his own special field of Jurisprudence, found himself involved in more general philosophical questions. Between 1926 and the present, Dooyeweerd has been instrumental in the founding of a new movement in Christian philosophy. A rather extensive literature has appeared during these years, the chief works being Dooyeweerd's *De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee*, 3 Volumes (1935—36), (of which this work is a translation with the author's revisions), a small work in English, *Transcendental Problems of Philosophic Thought* (1948), and the first volume of a new trilogy, *Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte* (*Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy*) (1949), several works by Prof. Dr H. Th. Vollenhoven, including *De Noodzakelijkheid eener Christelijke Logica* (*The Necessity of a Christian Logic*) (1932) and *Het Calvinisme en de Reformatie van de Wijsbegeerte* (*Calvinism and the Reformation of Philosophy*) (1933) and the first volume of a series on the History of Philosophy (1950), a quarterly journal *Philosophia Reformata* (1936—1953), as well as a number of smaller works, including J. M. Spier's splendid introduction to the philosophy of Dooyeweerd, which has been translated into English under the title, *An Introduction to Christian Philosophy*, published by the Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company.

Though Dutch in its inception, this new Christian philosophy has proved itself to be international in character. Its adherents are to be found throughout the world. But up until now only those who read the Dutch language could acquire a substantial knowledge of the movement.

The publication of Volume 1 is to be followed by Volumes 2,
3 and 4. Volume 2 is devoted to an analysis of the inter-relationships of the various aspects of our world and to a detailed treatment of epistemology. Volume 3 sets forth an elaborate theory of individual things and social structures. Volume 4 will contain an extensive index of the entire work.

Dooyeweerd was a student at the Free University of Amsterdam, under Professors Fabius, Anema and P. A. Diepenhorst. He received the doctor's degree in jurisprudence at the age of 22, with a thesis on "The Cabinet in Dutch Constitutional Law."

Before his acceptance of his post at the Free University he served as manager of the Abraham Kuyper Foundation and established the political quarterly, Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde. As a systematic philosopher Dooyeweerd displays tremendous intellectual powers which assure him a place among the leading contemporary philosophers.

American and English philosophers of many persuasions, who are often annoyed by the disparagement of science on the part of some contemporary continental philosophers, will find Dooyeweerd's respect for science refreshing. Students of modern philosophy will be interested in his historical analysis of the development of modern Humanistic thought. Dooyeweerd's own positive contribution will be of special interest to those concerned with the problems of Christian philosophy and the philosophy of religion. But not to these only, since it has raised new problems in ontology, epistemology, anthropology and science which are of great concern to every thinker generally. From the standpoint of the history of ideas anyone who wishes to know the significant tendencies of current modern thought, must take cognizance of this movement.

In translating we have sought, in compliance with the wishes of the author, to give as literal a translation as is in keeping with ordinary English usage. The presence of new philosophical terms in the original has led us occasionally to coin words in English which are not a part of a general philosophic vocabulary. Part I and chapters 5 and 6 of part II have been translated by Professor Young. The remainder of part II and part III have been translated by Professor Freeman. Inasmuch as the translators are indebted to each other for advice and aid, the work is a joint undertaking in its entirety.

The support of the Dutch Government, in the form of a subsidy given by the Nederlandse Organisatie voor zuiver Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek, greatly encouraged the publication of this
Foreword

English edition. Grateful acknowledgement is also due to Dr. Samuel G. Craig, President of the Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, whose interest in the work has been cultural rather than mercenary.

The translators are under great obligation to Professor Dooyeweerd, for reading the rough draft of the translation and making many suggestions and corrections; to Professor William Wermers, of Cornell University, to Professor George P. Rice, George Barber and Gordon H. Clark, of Butler University, to Professor Elizabeth Flower, of the University of Pennsylvania, to Mr. Joseph Zimbrot, for their advice and criticism on matters of English style; to Mr. H. de Jongste, for his assistance in proofreading; to Rev. Harold Andersen and Miss Gloria Erickson for their help with the typing; and to Mrs Freeman, for her aid with certain Dutch idioms.

The Translators:
David Hugh Freeman,
Wilson College.
William Young,
Butler University.

1953
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PART I

PROLEGOMENA
INTRODUCTION

THE FIRST WAY OF A TRANSCENDENTAL CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT

If I consider reality as it is given in the naive pre-theoretical experience, and then confront it with a theoretical analysis, through which reality appears to split up into various modal aspects¹ then the first thing that strikes me, is the original indissoluble interrelation among these aspects which are for the first time explicitly distinguished in the theoretical attitude of mind. A indissoluble inner coherence binds the numerical to the spatial aspect, the latter to the aspect of mathematical movement, the aspect of movement to that of physical energy, which itself is the necessary basis of the aspect of organic life. The aspect of organic life has an inner connection with that of psychical feeling, the latter refers in its logical anticipation (the feeling of logical correctness or incorrectness) to the analytical-logical aspect. This in turn is connected with the historical, the linguistic, the aspect of social intercourse, the economic, the aesthetic, the jural, the moral aspects and that of faith. In this inter-modal cosmic coherence no single aspect stands by itself; every-one refers within and beyond itself to all the others.

The coherence of all the modal aspects of our cosmos finds its expression in each of them, and also points beyond its own

¹ Here are meant the fundamental universal modalities of temporal being which do not refer to the concrete “what” of things or events, but are only the different modes of the universal “how” which determine the aspects of our theoretical view of reality. For instance, the historical aspect of temporal reality is not at all identical with what actually happened in the past. Rather it is the particular mode of being which determines the historical view of the actual events in human society. These events have of course many more modal aspects than the historical. There does not exist a purely historical reality. The same holds good for all other modal aspects.
limits toward a central totality, which in its turn is expressed in this coherence. Our ego expresses itself as a totality in the coherence of all its functions within all the modal aspects of cosmic reality. And man, whose ego expresses itself in the coherence of all its temporal modal functions, was himself created by God as the expression of His image.

Meaning as the mode of being of all that is created. This universal character of referring and expressing, which is proper to our entire created cosmos, stamps created reality as meaning, in accordance with its dependent non-self-sufficient nature. Meaning is the being of all that has been created and the nature even of our selfhood. It has a religious root and a divine origin.

Now philosophy should furnish us with a theoretical insight into the inter-modal coherence of all the aspects of the temporal world. Philosophy should make us aware, that this coherence is a coherence of meaning that refers to a totality. We have been fitted into this coherence of meaning with all our modal functions, which include both the so-called “natural” and the so-called “spiritual”. Philosophy must direct the theoretical view of totality over our cosmos and, within the limits of its possibility, answer the question, “Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt”.

Philosophical thought in its proper character, never to be disregarded with impunity, is theoretical thought directed to the totality of meaning of our temporal cosmos.

These single introductory theses contain in themselves the entire complex of problems involved in a discussion of the possibility of genuine philosophy.

1 We shall subsequently see why this deeper totality necessarily transcends the mutual coherence of all modal aspects of temporal reality, just as our selfhood transcends the coherence of its functions in these aspects.
2 This was wiped out when man intended to be something in himself. Cf. the splendid pronouncement in CALVIN’s Épitre à tous amateurs de Jésus Christ 1535, (ed. J. Pannier, Paris; 1929) p. 36: “Car il lavoit formé à son image et semblance, telleme(n)t que la lumière de sa gloire reluysoit clairement en lui... Mais le malheureux voulant estre q(uel)Que chose en soymesme... son image et semblance en estoit effacée...”
3 Translator’s note: In the original Dutch text this passage reads: “De zin is het zijn van alle creatuuriijk zijnde”. “Het zijn van het zijnde” has no more an equivalent in English than MARTIN HEIDEGGER’s “das Sein des Seienden,” which is its German equivalent.
Philosophical thinking is an actual activity; and only at the expense of this very actuality (and then merely in a theoretic concept) can it be abstracted from the thinking self.

This abstraction from the actual, entire ego that thinks may be necessary for formulating the concept of philosophical thought. But even in this act of conceptual determination it is the self that is actually doing the work. That ego is actually operating not merely in its thought, but in all the functions in which it expresses itself within the coherence of our temporal world. There is no single modal aspect of our cosmos in which I do not actually function. I have an actual function in the modal aspect of number, in space, in movement, in physical energy, in organic life, in psychical feeling, in logical thought, in historical development, in language, in social intercourse with my fellowmen, in economic valuation, in aesthetic contemplation or production, in the juridical sphere, in morality and in faith. In this whole system of modal functions of meaning, it is I who remain the central point of reference and the deeper unity above all modal diversity of the different aspects of my temporal existence.

The direction of philosophical thought to the totality of meaning implies critical self-reflection.

Can philosophy — which ought to be guided by the Idea of the totality of meaning — then ever be possible without critical self-reflection? Evidently not. A philosophy which does not lead to this reflection must from the outset fail to be directed to the totality of meaning of our cosmos. Γνῶθι σεαυτόν, “know thyself”, must indeed be written above the portals of philosophy.

But in this very demand for critical self-reflection lies the great problem.

To be sure, the ego is actually active in its philosophical thought, but it necessarily transcends the philosophical concept. For, as shall appear, the self is the concentration-point of all my cosmic functions. It is a subjective totality which can neither be resolved into philosophical thought, nor into some other function, nor into a coherence of functions. Rather it lies at the basis of all the latter as their presupposition. Without conceptual determination, however, we cannot think in a theoretical sense, and consequently we cannot philosophize.

How then can self-reflection be possible, if it does not transcend the concept and consequently the limits of philosophical thought?
However, there seems to be a way out of this difficulty.

There is no sense in requiring philosophical thought to exceed its immanent limits in order to attain to self-reflection.

If it be granted, that in philosophical thought the ego is active when actually thinking, it follows that this thinking must be concentrated from the outset upon the selfhood, only in so far as the latter functions in the logical sphere as a subjectivity which is no longer to be eliminated. This thinking ego then is the residue of a methodical elimination of all those moments in the concrete “individual self” functioning in “time and space” which I can still make into a “Gegenstand”\(^1\) of the ultimate subjective logical function of thought.

The supposed reduction of the selfhood to an immanent, subjective pole of thought.

That which remains is a so-called “transcendental-logical subject”. It no longer has anything individual in itself and does not transcend the boundaries of our logical function. It is conceived of as an immanent, subjective pole of thought, in opposition to which the entire experienceable reality recedes into the counter-pole of “Gegenständlichkeit”. As such it is considered to be a transcendental pre-requisite of all concrete theoretical knowledge. For all knowledge is necessarily related to an ultimate “I think”. And the latter is nothing but the ultimate logical unity of the epistemological subject.

However, in taking cognizance of this experiment of thought, there appears to us the ghost of the “blessed Münchhausen”. For, in point of fact, the so-called transcendental logical subject of thought is here again abstracted from the ego which is actually operative in its logical function. It is even isolated to the greatest conceivable degree of abstraction, since it is the product of a methodical process of elimination by which the thinker imagines, he is able, ultimately, to set the logical function of thought apart as a self-sufficient activity.

\(^1\) Translator's note: “Gegenstand”: this German term commonly translated by “object” in epistemological discussions, is used by Dooyeweerd in the sense of the non-logical aspects of reality which in the theoretical attitude of thought are opposed to the logical function. It is sharply contrasted by him with the “object”, the meaning of which will be explained in a later context. W. Y.
The transcendence of our selfhood above theoretical thought. The so-called transcendental subject of thought cannot be self-sufficient as a theoretical abstraction.

But this entire reduction of the thinking ego to the would-be “transcendental logical subject”, executed in the process of thought, can be performed only by the selfhood. This latter, which thinks theoretically, cannot itself in turn be the result of the abstraction formed by thought. The “transcendental logical subject,” in the supposed sense of universal subjective logical pole of thought, is, in the final analysis, nothing but the bare concept of the subjective logical unity of thought which presupposes the thinking ego. Besides, this is a pseudo-concept, since it is supposed to be incapable of analysis.

Philosophical thought, however, cannot isolate itself in its subjective logical function, because it has no selfhood as mere thought, as so-called “reines Denken.” All actuality in the act of thinking issues from the ego, which transcends thought. The actual “transcendental-logical subject” remains an abstraction, produced by the thinking ego. And it is, moreover, a meaningless abstraction involved in internal contradictions. For the actual logical function of thought never can be “an sich”. Apart from the transcending ego, it simply is not actual, or rather has no existence at all.

Philosophical self-reflection then supposes in any case, that our ego, which transcends the limits of theoretical thought, should direct its reflecting act of thought toward itself. Philosophical thought does not return to itself, in the process of reflecting, but it is the ego which in the process of philosophical thinking should return to itself. And this actual return to oneself in the reflecting act of thought must finally transcend the limits of philosophical thought, if indeed the desired self-reflection is to be arrived at. This same conclusion may be reached along a different road. It may be drawn from the idea of philosophical thought as theoretical thought of the totality.

How does philosophical thought attain to the Idea of the totality of meaning?

The proper character of philosophical thought, as we have said, may never be disregarded with impunity. Philosophical thought is theoretic thought directed towards the totality of meaning.
Therefore, I must first give my thought a fixed direction in the *idea* of the totality of meaning.

If this *idea*\(^1\) is not to remain completely without content, if it is to succeed in showing a direction to my philosophical thought, then it must be possible that I, who am to practise philosophy, should *choose my standpoint in this totality of meaning of our temporal cosmos*. For, unless such a standpoint can be found, the latter will remain strange to me. In my central selfhood I must participate in the totality of meaning, if I am to have the *idea* of it in my philosophical thought.

To speak in a figure: In the process of directing my philosophical thought in the idea towards the totality of meaning, I must be able to ascend a lookout-tower above all the modal speciality of meaning that functions within the coherence of the modal aspects. From this tower I must be able to survey this coherence with all the modal diversity of meaning included in it. Here I must find the point of reference to which this modal diversity can be related, and to which I am to return in the process of reflecting thought. In other words, if I am not to lose myself in the modal speciality of meaning during the course of philosophic thought, I must be able to find a standpoint which transcends the special modal aspects. *Only by transcending the speciality of meaning, can I attain to the actual view of totality by which the former is to be distinguished as such.*

The Archimedean point of philosophy and the tendency of philosophical thought towards the Origin.

This fixed point from which alone, in the course of philosophical thought, we are able to form the idea of the totality of meaning, we call the *Archimedean point* of philosophy.

However, if we have found this Archimedean point, our selfhood makes the discovery that the view of totality is not possible apart from a view of the origin or the *αξίωμα* of both totality and speciality of meaning.

The totality in which our selfhood is supposed to participate, may indeed transcend all speciality of meaning in the coherence of its diversity. Yet it, too, in the last analysis remains *meaning*.

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\(^1\) *Translator's note:* "Idea" is used here in the technical sense of a "limiting concept" which refers to a totality not to be comprehended in the concept itself. W. Y.
which cannot exist by itself, but supposes an ἀρχή, an origin which creates meaning.

All meaning is from, through, and to an origin, which cannot itself be related to a higher ἀρχή.

The genetic relativity of meaning, the fact that it is not self-sufficient, lies in its very character. And if it is impossible that philosophical thought be something different from theoretical thought directed to the totality of meaning of our cosmos, then the direction toward the ἀρχή is necessarily included in its tendency to totality.

All genuine philosophical thought has therefore started as thought that was directed toward the origin of our cosmos. From the outset, non-Christian philosophy sought this origin within the realm of meaning itself, although it gave many exalted names to it. However, for the present I am not concerned with this fact. My sole concern at this moment is to place in the forefront the basic genetic tendency of philosophical thought as thought directed to the origin.

The introduction of the critical question as to the limits of our knowledge would be premature at this stage. The epistemological problem: What are the limits to our knowledge? presupposes, in fact, some insight into the meaning of knowledge as necessarily related to the ego. So long as this insight has not been achieved, the appeal to the epistemological inquiry is premature; it may seemingly banish the whole of the basic genetic tendency from philosophical thought, but this verdict can never be peremptory.

The opposition between so-called critical and genetic method is terminologically confusing, because it is not clearly defined in its sense.

For the basic tendency mentioned above is so essential to philosophy that it makes its appearance at the heart of all epistemological questions. In its reference to the apriori conditions of all human knowing, the critical question how universally valid knowledge of our cosmos is possible may need to be sharply distinguished from all questions relating to the non-apriori moments of our knowledge. Yet it is to a high degree terminologically confusing to speak of a critical, in opposition to a genetic mode of thought, as is usual in certain currents of the neo-Kantian philosophy.

For the critical question, after a little reflection, necessarily
leads to the genetic: What is the origin of our knowledge and of knowable reality?¹

The only thing that matters is the question about the meaning of the genetic problem, and no sooner has this question been raised, than it is seen to imply the problem of how a theory of knowledge is at all possible.

Meaning, as we said, constantly points without and beyond itself toward an origin, which is itself no longer meaning. It remains within the bounds of the relative. The true Origin, on the contrary, is absolute and selfsufficient!

Suppose now, that one or more of our cognitive functions in their apriori structure are from the outset theoretically regarded as independent, i.e. thought of apart from all further possible determinedness (as is done by a certain idealistic trend of philosophic thought, which is falsely called critical). In that case these functions are necessarily elevated to the rôle of apriori origin of our knowable cosmos.

If philosophic thought comes to a halt at this assumed $\theta\varphi\chi\gamma$, the question as to the meaning of our knowledge is automatically precluded. For the $\theta\varphi\chi\gamma$ is transcendent to all meaning. In this case, the knowable cosmos rather derives all its meaning from the supposedly self-sufficient apriori structure of the cognitive functions.

At this stage of the preliminary fundamental questions which concern the foundation of philosophy, philosophic thought has come to rest in the pretended origin of all knowable meaning.

Thus for example, from the standpoint of the neo-Kantian of the Marburg School, there is no sense in inquiring after the origin of transcendental-logical meaning, in which this philosopher supposes he can understand the whole of cosmic reality. According to him, the very origin of our knowable world is transcendental-logical in nature. Thus reality derives all its possible meaning from transcendental-logical thought!

If, however, the thinker finds no rest in logical meaning, he is necessarily driven further into preliminary philosophical questions. The pretended $\theta\varphi\chi\gamma$ appears not to be the true origin, but rather to exist merely as meaning, which points beyond itself towards its true origin.

¹ The 'critical' Marburg school, for instance, even speaks of an origin of being in a transcendental-logical sense. "Nur das Denken kann erzeugen, was als Sein gelten darf" (Cohen). Here one can clearly see how critical and genetic problems coincide in a transcendental logical sense.
Thought will not be set at rest in the preliminary philosophical questions, until the ἀρχή is discovered, which alone gives meaning and existence to philosophic thought itself.

Philosophic thought cannot withdraw itself from this tendency towards the origin.

It is an immanent conformity to law for it to find no rest in meaning, but to think from and to the origin to which meaning owes its ground and existence. Only after the raising of questions ceases to be meaningful, does philosophic thought attain to the Origin, and is it set at rest.

The restlessness of meaning in the tendency of philosophic thought towards the origin.

This restlessness, manifests itself in the tendency of philosophic thought to move toward the origin. It is essentially the restlessness of our ego which is actually operative in philosophic thought. It issues from our own selfhood, from the root of our existence. This restlessness is transmitted from the selfhood to all temporal functions in which this ego is actually operative.

Inquietum est cor nostrum et mundus in corde nostro!

Our selfhood is actually operative in philosophic thought. As certainly as philosophic self-reflection is impossible apart from the direction towards the ego, so certainly does it require to be directed towards the ἀρχή of our selfhood and of the totality of meaning. The ego must participate in this totality, if genuine thinking in terms of totality is to be possible.

Philosophic thought as such derives its actuality from the ego. The latter restlessly seeks its origin in order to understand its own meaning, and in its own meaning the meaning of our entire cosmos!

It is this tendency towards the origin which discloses the fact, that our ego is subjected to a central law. This law derives its fulness of meaning from the origin of all things and limits and determines the centre and root of our existence.

Thus, a two-fold pre-supposition of philosophic thought is discovered at the outset. In the first place, philosophic thought pre-supposes an Archimedean point for the thinker, from which our ego in the philosophic activity of thought can direct its view of totality over the modal diversity of meaning. Secondly, it presupposes a choice of position in the Archimedean point in the face of the ἀρχή, which transcends all meaning and in which our ego comes to rest in the process of philosophic thought.
For, if the attempt is made to go beyond this \( \Delta \), the formulating of any question has no longer any meaning.

The three requirements which the Archimedean point must satisfy.

The Archimedean point should satisfy these three conditions: First - It may not be divorced from our own subjective self. For it is our self that is actually operative in philosophic thought. And only in this centre of our existence can we transcend the modal diversity of meaning.

Second - It may not be divorced from the concentric law of the ego's existence. Without this law the subject drops away into chaos, or rather into nothingness. Only by this law is the ego determined and limited.

Third - It must transcend all modal diversity of meaning and be found in the totality and radical unity of the latter. Our ego must participate in this totality, if it is to have an idea of it in the process of philosophic thought.

The immanence-standpoint in philosophy.

The prevailing conception accepts the self-sufficiency of philosophic thought in accomplishing its task, notwithstanding the fact, that for the rest there exists a great divergence of opinion about the nature, task and methods of philosophy. While regarding this autonomy of reason as the alpha and omega of philosophic insight, many thinkers are sure to concede the necessity of the Archimedean point. DESCARTES in his "cogito" supposed that he had found the only fixed point in the universal methodical scepticism with respect to all reality present in experience. Since this great thinker the necessity of an Archimedean point has generally been recognized by modern philosophy, at least so far as the latter realizes the necessity of critical self-reflection. But modern philosophy will have to rise with might and main against our position, that this Archimedean point cannot be sought in philosophic thought itself. In regard to the Archimedean point of philosophy, it must cling tightly to the immanence-standpoint. Consequently it rejects every support that is found in something which transcends the immanent boundaries of theoretic thought, as such. At the utmost it will agree that — within the latter — the theoretic intuition ("Wesensschau") is the ultimate ground of philosophical certainty.

Every attack against this immanence-standpoint will mean
an attack on the scientific character of philosophy itself. Or — in so far as the very field of philosophic inquiry is considered to be of a supra-scientific character — it will be regarded as an attack on the freedom of philosophic thought.

The immanence-standpoint does not in itself exclude the so-called metaphysical way to that which transcends human thought.

In itself the acceptance of the immanence-standpoint does not in any way imply the rejection of the so-called metaphysical way to that which transcends human thought. Classical immanence-philosophy was even entirely based upon a metaphysical prima philosophia.

This metaphysical road to the totality of meaning and the ἀγχύ, at least in the rationalistic currents, involves the attempt to overstep the boundaries of philosophic thought in the idea of an absolute deified thought. The latter should comprise in itself the fulness of being, it should be the νόησις νοητοκός, the "intellectus archetypus" in a purely logical sense.

In other words, the rationalistic-metaphysical way to an ἀγχύ that transcends human thought absolutizes the logical function of thought.

Deified thought, the νόησις νοητοκός, becomes the ἀγχύ; human thought in its assumed participation in divine reason, is understood to be the Archimedean point. The totality of meaning is sought in the system of the Ideas immanent in thought.

The immanence-standpoint, however, does not necessarily imply belief in the self-sufficiency of the logical function of human thought, in contradistinction to the rest of the immanent functions of consciousness.

The age-old development of immanence-philosophy displays the most divergent nuances. It varies from metaphysical rationalism to modern logical positivism and the irrationalist philosophy of life. It is disclosed also in the form of modern existentialism. The latter has broken with the Cartesian (rationalistic) "cogito" as Archimedean point and has replaced it by existential thought, conceived of in an immanent subjectivistic historical sense 1.

We employ the term immanence-philosophy in the widest possible sense.

Thus we do not take the term immanence-philosophy in the

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1 We are only referring to the Humanistic philosophy of existence.
usual narrow meaning of philosophy which sees all reality as immanent in consciousness and has broken every bridge between the functions of human consciousness and an extra-mental "Ding an sich". Rather we mean it in the wide sense of all philosophy that seeks its Archimedean point in philosophic thought itself, irrespective of its further understanding of this latter, whether in a rationalistic, irrationalistic, metaphysical, transcendental-logical, vitalistic, psycho-logical or historical sense.

On this standpoint, the task of philosophy can be viewed more broadly or more narrowly. Thus there exists in modern immanence-philosophy a current which stresses the purely theoretical character of philosophic inquiry and recognizes, that the theoretical is merely one of the many aspects from which we may view the cosmos, even though it be the only one from which we can really grasp it in the view of totality.

Alongside of the theoretical cosmos, the religious, the aesthetic, the moral and other a-theoretical "worlds" are recognized. To philosophy is expressly denied the right to claim the monopoly of value for its "theoretical cosmos".

So much the more powerfully, however, does this school of philosophy bring to the fore the self-sufficiency of "transcendental" thought as Archimedean point for philosophy and at the same time as Archimedean point for the "theoretical cosmos".

The theoretical cosmos, on this standpoint, is really the "creation" of philosophic thought. The latter must first of all demolish methodically everything a-theoretical, leaving a chaotic material of consciousness, which is to be ordered as a cosmos in the creative forms of philosophic thought (Ricke).

The immanence-philosopher has the sincere conviction, that the scientific character of philosophic thought can only be maintained in this conception of philosophy. What would become of the "objectivity", of the "universal validity", of the controllability of philosophic thought, if philosophy were to bind itself to presuppositions which go beyond its own immanent boundaries? Religious and "weltanschauliche" convictions may be highly respectable; indeed, a philosophy that understands its limits, will guard against attacking them. But, within the domain of philosophy, their claims cannot be recognized. Here it is not a matter of believing in what exceeds "the limits of our cognitive faculty". But it is solely a question of objective theoretical truth, valid alike for everyone who wants to think theoretically.

Observe the presence in this same connection of the so-called
neutrality-postulate in respect to religious conviction and personal life-view. However, this postulate is in no sense inherent in the immanence-standpoint. It is accepted only by those currents in immanence-philosophy which deny to the latter any dominion over personal life.

All the acumen which the advocates of this standpoint have at their disposal is brought to bear on the demonstration of the correctness of this neutrality-postulate. When later on we enter upon a more special discussion of the relation of philosophy to a life-and-world-view, we shall have to face two of the most acute modern pleas in its behalf, those of Heinrich Rickert and Theodor Litt.

The inner problematic situation of the immanence-standpoint.

In this Introduction it suffices for us to bring to the fore the inner problematic nature of the immanence-standpoint. It will suffice to show, how the choice of this standpoint is not possible, unless the limits of philosophic thought are actually transcended.

At this point we proceed from that which we learned above to be essential to the Archimedean point of philosophy. The latter, as we demonstrated, must be elevated above the modal diversity of meaning. Should the Archimedean point itself be enclosed in this diversity, then it would be per se unsuitable as a point of reference, from which the view of totality must be directed over the different modal aspects of our cosmos.

Furthermore, the Archimedean point, as we previously observed, must also transcend the coherence in the diversity of the modal aspects. Of this thesis we are now to render a further account.

Why the totality of meaning cannot be found in the coherence of the modal aspects.

Why can the totality of meaning not be found in the immanent coherence of meaning among the different modal aspects? Because the immanent coherence among all special aspects of meaning of our cosmos lacks in itself the inner concentration-point in which these latter meet in a radical unity. This truth becomes immediately evident to us in the act of self-reflection.

In this Introduction we began by observing, that our ego expresses itself in all special modal aspects of our existence. This is possible only because the latter find their concentration-
point in the ego. Now the self is elevated above the modal diversity of meaning and is thus transcendent with respect to it. Our selfhood does not coalesce with the mutual coherence among all functions which we have in the cosmos.

The modal diversity of meaning exists only in the coherence of all modal aspects, but it is the expression of a totality of signification which through the medium of time is broken up into a modal diversity of aspects.

The totality or fulness of meaning is the necessary transcendent centre where, in their mutual coherence, all modal aspects converge into the unity of direction towards the Origin, towards the Ἀγωγή of all meaning.

The Archimedean point as concentration-point for philosophic thought.

Thus, in connection with the preceding, the Archimedean point of philosophy must truly be the concentration-point for philosophic thought and as such it must transcend the modal diversity of meaning even in its coherence. Can this concentration-point be found in philosophic thought itself? In other words, can we, discover anywhere in theoretical thought a point that really transcends the modal diversity of meaning?

Does the so-called transcendental subject of thought satisfy the requirements for the Archimedean point?

With all sorts of terms not properly analysed in their meaning, the attempt is made to suggest to us, that we possess such a unity beyond the diversity of meaning in philosophic thought. The “transcendental consciousness”, the “transcendental cogito”, the “transcendental unity of apperception”, the “transcendental logical ego” and such like are conceived of as the subjective pole of thought, to which the empirical world is related as “Gegenstand”.

This unity is thought of as a logical unity of the thinking consciousness which does not imply any multiplicity or diversity of moments. Instead, every special synthesis of a multiplicity of perceptions should be necessarily related to this unity.

Consequently, the latter should also transcend the coherence of the modal aspects. For, indeed, this inter-modal coherence of meaning, too, presupposes the transcendental subject of thought as central logical point of reference.

However, this argument rests upon a serious misunderstanding
which is caused by the pitfall concealed in the conception of the "transcendental cogito" itself.

For the latter neglects the basic transcendental problem concerning the relation of the ego and its logical function of thought. It may be true that I myself transcend the coherence of all modal aspects of meaning, but this does not hold good for my logical function of thought. The unity of the ego which thinks cannot be of a transcendental logical character. For the ego is the concentration-point not only in respect to my logical, but to all of my modal functions. The logical unity of the thinking subject remains a unity within a multiplicity of moments. For the logical aspect together with all other aspects is also bound to the inter-modal coherence of meaning. As we shall show in detail in a later context of our inquiry, this coherence is expressed in its own modal structure, and the latter is the very transcendental condition of our logical function of thought. Consequently, the logical function of the act of thought does not transcend the modal diversity of meaning, and therefore it must lack that unity above all multiplicity which characterizes the central ego. But, it will be objected, is not the very diversity of meaning which is in view, a state of affairs that is meaningful only for thought that makes distinctions? Thus it may be true, that the logical function of thought, so far as it is still conceived as an aspect of experienced reality, is confined to the diversity of meaning. But this does not prove, that the transcendental logical subject of thought (understood as the ultimate subjective pole of thought) is unable to transcend the coherence of the modal aspects. On the contrary, does it not appear, just at this point, that all modal diversity of meaning is irreversibly dependent upon this transcendental subject of thought, and does it

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1 "Pure transcendental thought" is always meant in a logical sense. For the other modal aspects of the real act of theoretical thinking e.g. the psychical or the historical, do not satisfy the requirements of "pure thought" in the sense which is meant here. Only the linguistic aspect is usually comprehended in it, but in a strict conception of "pure thought" that aspect, too, should be eliminated, because it cannot be "pure" in the sense ascribed to "transcendental reflexive thought", "Linguistic signification", taken in its modal meaning, remains always bound to time, and to the coherence with the other modal aspects of temporal reality. Only by reducing the linguistic aspect of meaning to a purely logical one can it be maintained as belonging to supposed "pure thought". However, we shall see, that the logical function of thought itself is nothing without the inter-modal coherence of meaning.
Prolegomena

not appear that in respect to the latter we can in fact speak of a "Transcendenz in der Immanenz"? At this juncture we have indeed approached a very fundamental point in our discussion with the adherents of the so-called "transcendental" immanence-standpoint.

In the last objection we meet a new pitfall, which we have to lay bare carefully, in order that it shall not catch us again and again.

We must attribute logical meaning to the subjective pole of thought under discussion in so far as it is conceived of as an ultimate logical unity of our thinking self-consciousness; and more precisely, in so far as it is presented as a subjective logical pole of philosophical thought, we must attribute theoretical logical meaning to it.

Now in the sequel, we shall demonstrate in still further detail, that in theoretical thought we are constantly active in an opposition of the non-logical aspects to the logical aspect of meaning. It is from this very opposition that the theoretical problem is born.

The theoretical synthesis supposes the modal diversity of meaning of the logical and the non-logical which is its opposite.

In this process of theoretical thought, characterized by its antithetical attitude, every correct formation of concepts and judgments rests upon a sharp distinction among the different aspects of meaning and upon a synthesis of the logical aspect with the non-logical aspects of our experience which are made into a "Gegenstand"\(^1\). This synthesis is in itself a basic problem of philosophy.

However, in every case it supposes the inter-modal coherence as well as the modal diversity of logical and non-logical meaning.

Consequently, the logical meaning of the assumed subjective pole of thought is different from all non-logical aspects of meaning. But at the same time it is fitted with the latter in an indissoluble coherence.

Now there is a logical diversity which is immanent in the logical meaning of thought, but which could not exist apart from a cosmic modal diversity of meaning, within which the

\(^1\) We must observe that the modal aspects of our experience are at the same time the modal aspects of all reality in its integral empirical sense. Empirical reality is by no means exhausted in sensory perceptions. We shall have to return to this point in different later contexts.
logical side itself functions. A closer discussion of this state of affairs will follow in a later context.

The pitfall in the conception of the so-called transcendental subject of thought as Archimedean point: cosmic diversity of meaning and diversity in the special logical meaning.

The pitfall in the last objection made by the adherents of transcendental logicism consists in the identification of cosmic diversity of meaning with diversity in its logical or analytical sense.

How could the fundamental modal diversity of meaning, to which the logical function of thought necessarily remains bound, itself be of logical origin? If this supposition were dealt with seriously, it should destroy itself at the outset in the following antinomy: the proclamation of logical meaning as the origin of the cosmic diversity of meaning is tantamount to the elimination of the modal diversity, and consequently to the abandoning of theoretical thought itself. For the latter is possible only in the process of analysis and inter-modal synthesis of meaning. This consequence was inferred by some Sophists from the logicism of Parmenides.

The so-called transcendental subject of thought cannot be maintained, unless, from the start, the inter-modal synthesis is introduced into the logical aspect itself. But, as soon as this occurs, the “transcendental-logical subject of thought” is thrown back into the midst of the modal diversity of meaning. For the inter-modal synthesis presupposes the modal diversity and the mutual coherence of the logical and non-logical aspects of meaning. Consequently how could an Archimedean point be given within theoretical thought?

Misunderstanding of the intermodal synthesis of meaning as a transcendental-logical one.

Transcendental logicism can be maintained apparently only by a curious shift of meaning, which interprets the truly inter-modal synthesis as a so-called transcendental-logical one, as an act of the would-be self-sufficient transcendental subject of thought.

What really happens in this first choice of a position is an absolutizing of the transcendental-logical function of theoretical thought and this absolutization is not to be explained in terms
of a purely theoretical conclusion from the inner nature of reflecting thought itself. Consequently, \( \Delta \chi \) and Archimedean point coincide in this transcendental logicism.

The rationalistic metaphysics which distinguished \( \Delta \chi \) and Archimedean point absolutized the logical aspect of actual thought only in the \( \Delta \chi \), regarded as Intellectus Archetypus.

The necessary religious transcending in the choice of the immanence-standpoint.

By this original choice of a position, the attempt is made to detach the logical function of theoretical thought (whether only in the \( \Delta \chi \) or in the \( \Delta \chi \) and Archimedean point alike) from the inter-modal coherence of meaning and to treat it as independent. In the nature of the case, this choice is no act of a "transcendental subject of thought", which is merely an abstract concept. It is rather an act of the full self which transcends the diversity of modal aspects.

And it is a religious act, just because it contains a choice of position in the concentration-point of our existence in the face of the Origin of meaning.

In the choice of the immanence-standpoint in the manner described above, I myself elevate philosophic thought, whether in the transcendental-logical or in the metaphysical-logical sense, to the status of \( \Delta \chi \) of the cosmos. This \( \Delta \chi \) stands as origin, beyond which nothing meaningful may be further asked, and in my view no longer occupies the heteronomous mode of being which is meaning. It exists in and through itself.

This choice of a position in the face of the \( \Delta \chi \) transcends philosophic thought, though in the nature of the case it does not occur apart from it. It possesses the fulness of the central self-hood, the fulness of the heart. It is the first concentration of philosophic thought in a unity of direction. It is a religious choice of position in an idolatrous sense.

The proclamation of the self-sufficiency of philosophic thought, even with the addition of "in its own field", is an absolutizing of meaning. Nothing of its idolatrous character is lost by reason of the thinker's readiness to recognize, that the absolutizing \( \nu \alpha \) \( \varepsilon \chi \nu \) which he performs in the theoretical field is by no means the only rightful claimant, but that philosophy should allow the religious, aesthetic or moral man the full freedom to serve other gods, outside the theoretical realm.

The philosopher who allows this freedom to the non-theo-
retician is, so to speak, theoretically a polytheist. He fights shy of proclaiming the theoretical God to be the only true one. But, within the temple of this God, no others shall be worshipped!

Thus the first way of our critique of philosophical thought has for a provisional conclusion:

Even on the immanence-standpoint the choice of the Archimedean point proves to be impossible as a purely theoretical act which prejudices nothing in a religious sense.

In truth the selfhood as the religious root of existence is the hidden performer on the instrument of philosophic thought. Only, it is invisible on the basis of the immanence-standpoint.

Actually, philosophic thought in itself offers us no Archimedean point, for it can function only in the cosmic coherence of the different modal aspects of meaning, which it nowhere transcends.

The immane[..] Ideas of the inter-modal coherence of meaning and of the totality of meaning are transcendental limiting concepts. They disclose the fact, that theoretical thought is not self-sufficient in the proper field of philosophy, a point to which we shall have to return in detail.

No other possibility for transcending the inter-modal coherence and the modal diversity of meaning is to be found, except in the religious root of existence, from which philosophic thought also has to receive its central direction.
CHAPTER I

THE TRANSCENDENTAL CRITICISM OF THEORETICAL THOUGHT AND THE CENTRAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA FOR PHILOSOPHY

§ 1 - THE PROBLEM OF TIME

In our “Introduction” we argued that no philosophical thought is possible without a transcendent starting-point. We contended that even the philosopher who believes, that he can find such a point in theoretical thought itself, despite all his protestations to the contrary, must exceed the limits of theoretical thought in order to discover its true Archimedean point.

1 RICKERT (System der Philosophie, p. 241) observes: „Gewisz zeigt das heterologische Princip” (in our train of thought, the requirement that the modal diversity of meaning be distinguished theoretically) „bei der Frage nach der letzten Welteinheit die Grenze unseres Denkens, aber gerade dadurch eröffnet es uns zugleich die Möglichkeit, uns von seinen Fesseln zu befreien. Sind wir imstande, durch Denken die Grenze des Denkens fest zu stellen, so müssen wir auch imstande sein, diese Grenze zu überschreiten.” [It is certain, that the heterological principle marks the limits to our thought in the problem of the ultimate unity of the world. But in this way it creates the possibility of liberating ourselves at the same time from its fetters. If we are able to determine the boundaries of thought through thinking, we must be able, too, to exceed these limits].

On the immanence standpoint, this conclusion contains an overt contradiction: Thought determines its own boundaries and is thereby able to exceed these limits! Can it under these conditions continue to be pure transcendental thought? It is here unavailing to distinguish with RICKERT between a merely “heterological” and a “heterological-monological” thought, in which the latter would exceed the limits of the former alone. Where this sort of monological thinking autonomously attempts to conceive of the unity of the cosmos in the subjective meaning connecting “reality” and “value”, it exceeds the immanent limits of the activity of thought quatalis. And it involves itself in the antinomy which RICKERT himself honestly lays bare in his pronouncement (op. cit. p. 260): „So bringen wir das in einem Begriff, was wir streng genommen in einem Begriff
This apriori transcends the immanent limits of philosophic thought.

RICKERT’s conception of the self-limitation of thought.

RICKERT, one of the leading thinkers of the South-West German school of neo-Kantians, holds, that we can never become conscious of the limits of thought by taking a stand beyond the latter and, looking down from that point upon thought, learn to know it in its limitedness: “As soon as we are beyond thought, we do not know anything”\(^1\). Indubitably correct. We can even go further and say: it is entirely impossible for us, in the actuality of our self-consciousness, to stand beyond our thought; for, apart from thought, our human selfhood cannot disclose itself in the temporal coherence of our world. But RICKERT on the immanence-standpoint lacks an appreciation of the transcendence of our selfhood. And our selfhood, as we have seen, is never to be eliminated from the act of thinking\(^2\).

To be sure — if we want to learn the limits of our thought — we must, while thinking, come to a transcendental theoretic

\(^1\) System der Phil., p. 247: „Sobald wir ausserhalb des Denkens sind, erkennen wir nichts.”

\(^2\) See also his essay: Wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Weltanschauung in Logos, Bnd. XXII, Heft I (1933), pp. 56f: „Wer das, was er als theoretische Erkenntnis der Welt in ihrer Ganzheit nicht nur logisch zwingend zu begründen vermag, sondern es zugleich abzugrenzen gelernt hat gegen die Lebensüberzeugungen, die seine auszerwissenschaftliche Weltanschauung formen, der wird auf Grund seiner universalen Erkenntnis, die als Philosophie notwendig auch den ganzen Menschen mit zum „Gegenstande” macht, indem sie sich über ihn stellt zugleich am besten einsehen, weshalb die auszerwissenschaftliche Stellungnahme zur Welt, so lange sie nicht, wie die theoretische Wahrheit, den Anspruch auf Geltung für alle erhebt, neben der wissenschaftlichen Philosophie unangefochten bestehen bleiben kann.” [Anyone who is able not only to establish stringently on a logical foundation that which he has learnt as theoretical knowledge of the world in its totality, but also to delimit it at the same time from those views of life that form his non-scientific view of the world, will be best in a position to understand, why the non-scientific attitude towards the world, so long as it does not claim universal validity for all, like theoretical truth, can hold its own by the side of scientific philosophy. For his universal knowledge which as philosophy necessarily makes the entire man also its object, transcends man himself.]
Idea of the limits. But on this account, it is not to be supposed, as Rickert does, that these limits are set by thought. Nor can they be known by a thought which would be abstracted from its religious root and from the inter-modal coherence of meaning.

After we have recognized the necessity of transcending, we may advance another step.

The intent of philosophy is to give us a theoretical insight into the coherence of our temporal world as an inter-modal coherence of meaning. Philosophic thought is bound to this coherence, within which alone it has meaning.

It is a temporal coherence. Man transcends it in his selfhood, it is true, — but within this coherence he exists in a status of being-universally-bound-to-time. Man is bound to time together with all creatures that are fitted with him in the same temporal order.

The immanence of all modal aspects of meaning in time.

As we observed in the Introduction, within this temporal coherence reality displays a great diversity of modal aspects which are essentially modalities of cosmic meaning. We mentioned the aspects of number, space, motion, energy, organic life, feeling and sensory perception, the logical analytical and historical aspects, the aspect of symbolic signification, that of social intercourse (ruled by norms of fashion, courtesy, ceremony etc.) the economic, aesthetic, jural, moral, and faith aspects.

This is a very rough preliminary schema of the fundamental modalities of meaning, not yet investigated in the refined theoretical analysis of their modal structures. But it may serve as a provisional orientation into the modal diversity of our temporal cosmos.

All these modal aspects are interwoven with one another in a cosmic order of time which guarantees their coherence of meaning. As we shall see below, time-order is necessarily related to factual time-duration. And only this indissoluble correlation of order and duration can be called cosmic time, in distinction from all its special modal aspects. Nowhere else do we actually transcend this cosmic time, except in the religious centre of our existence. Neither in the concept as to its intentional meaning, nor even in the transcendental Idea as a limiting concept qua tali.
In the first orientation into the modal diversity of our cosmos, we see ourselves compelled to set this conception in contrast to that of immanence-philosophy. For, in consequence of its starting-point, the latter has lost the insight into the universal inter-modal character of time and into the coherence of meaning among its different modal aspects.

I have treated the problem of time in detail in a separate work. In the present connection some introductory remarks may suffice to prepare our further investigations.

The influence of the dialectical ground-motives upon the philosophical conceptions of time.

Here I am obliged to anticipate for a moment the results of later critical investigations in order to make clear the influence of the dialectical ground-motives upon the philosophical view of time from the immanence-standpoint.

Even in classical Greek thought this view was entangled in a falsely posed dilemma, i.e. whether time has a subjective mental or rather an objective physical character. In the brief treatise that Aristotle devotes to this question in his Physics IV 10, 217 b. 29ff, he develops the conception that time is the measure (the number or rather the numerability) of motion according to the χρόνον καὶ πρότερον; the problem is posed here in the framework of the Greek form-matter motive, the dialectical religious character of which will be explained presently. According to Aristotle, motion (which is treated here exclusively in the sense of change of place) is a striving of matter after form and from potentiality to actuality. As long as it has not attained its form, it is a flowing plurality of earlier and later. It is without unity and consequently without actual being, because being implies unity. The psyche, however, can give unity to this plurality in the subjective synthesis of the act of counting. Therefore, time cannot actually exist outside the soul. Does it then, in the local movement of things, have only a potential existence in the plurality of phases of the earlier and later? Aristotle's exposition fails to provide a clear answer to this question.

1 Het tijdsprobleem in de Wijsbegeerte der Welsidee (The problem of time in the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea). This treatise is also published in the review Philosophia Reformata (publisher J. H. Kok, Kampen), 5th year 1940, pp. 160ff. and pp. 193ff.).
A quite different view from the Aristotelian was found in the old Ionian nature-philosophers. Whereas Aristotle deified the form-motive in identifying deity with pure Form, the latter, on the contrary, deified the matter-motive of the ever flowing Stream of life which cannot fix itself in any form. Time is viewed here, especially in Anaximander, as a divine order of dikè avenging the injustice of things which have originated in an individual form, by dissolving this latter in pure matter and carrying back all things to their form-less Origin.

The dilemma posed by Aristotle could not arise here, since the Ionian thinkers made no difference between the physical and the mental spheres. According to them “matter” was animated. Aristotle, on the contrary, held that the psychè is the form of the material body and that “matter” is only a potentiality. It cannot have actual being without a form which guarantees the unity of being.

In consequence of the inner dialectic of the form-matter-motive, medieval Aristotelian scholasticism was also broken up into diametrically opposed trends with respect to its view of time. Albert the Great, in his commentary on the Physics, defended an objective physical conception and ascribed to the movement of things, independently of the soul, a form and structure of its own, in the so-called numerus formalis. Thomas Aquinas veers toward the opposite subjectivistic psychological position. In this he follows Augustine. Time as the numerical measure of motion can have real existence only in the soul, although Thomas concedes, that it has a fundamentum in re in the motion of matter.

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1 Albertus Magnus, Physicorum L. IV tr. 3 c. 16: “Ad numerare tria exiguntur, scilicet materia numerata, et numerus formalis, et anima efficienser et formaliter numerans: ergo si non est anima adhuc numerus est secundum esse formale et secundum numerum numeratum; ergo, quo numeratur est duplex, scilicet quo numeratur efficienser, et quo numeratur formaliter.” Time is such a numerus formalis.

In modern times the same conception is found again in the neo-Thomist P. Hoenen S.J., in his Philosophie der anorganische natuur [Philosophy of inorganic nature] (Antwerpen-Nijmegen) 1940, p. 284.

2 Augustinus, Confessiones L. XI, 33: “Inde mihi visum est nihil alium esse tempus quam distentionem: sed cuius rei nescio, et mirum, si non ipsius animae.”

3 Thomas, De Instantibus, Cap. I. Opusc. XXXVI. Cf. on this point my treatise: De idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch
In modern Humanistic philosophy, the problem of time is posed in the framework of the Humanistic ground-motive of nature and freedom. The latter is to be subjected to a detailed investigation in the second part of this volume.

The inner dialectic of this basic motive drives philosophical thought at the outset toward a conception of time orientated rationalistically toward mechanical motion as it was conceived of by classical physics. And subsequently it drives it toward an irrationalistic vitalistic, psychological or historical view (dominated by the freedom-motive). Here too, one comes across the opposition of objectivistic and subjectivistic views.

In Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, time is viewed as a transcendental form of intuition of sense experience, in which the objective-physical as well as the subjective-psychical impressions of consciousness are ordered in succession. Time is coordinated here with space as the other form of intuition.

In the twentieth century, the philosophical discussion is set in motion once more by the development of Einstein's relativity-theory, which views time as a fourth dimension of the physical world-space (the ordering system x, y, z, t).

Bergson alleges against Einstein that in the theory of relativity time is denatured to a spatial line. “True time”, according to him, is the psychical duration of feeling, in which we immediately enjoy a living experience of the creative freedom of the “élan vital” (inaccessible to natural-scientific thought). This actual “durée” is of inner psychical character and lacks mathematical uniformity of successive parts. All moments here penetrate one another qualitatively.

Psychical “durée”, according to Bergson, is the absolute time.

Modern phenomenology also speaks of “true time” as an “Erlebnisstrom”, in opposition to the objectivistic conception of time in modern mathematical natural science. Dilthey and Heidegger conceive of time in an irrationalistic historical sense, but in Heidegger historical time has a dialectical existential meaning.

In all these philosophical discussions of the subject, it strikes us again and again that time is unwittingly identified with one

substantie-begrip, II [The idea of the individuality-structure and the Thomistic concept of substance] (Philosophia Reformata 9th and 10th years. 1944/5), pp. 1f.
of its modal aspects or modalities of meaning. As long as philosophical thought proceeds from a dialectical ground-motive and is caught in a religious dualism, an integral conception of time is excluded.

The integral character of cosmic time. The correlation of temporal order and duration, and the subject-object relation in the latter.

The idea of cosmic time\(^1\) constitutes the basis of the philosophical theory of reality in this book. By virtue of its integral character it may be called new.

According to this conception, time in its cosmic sense has a cosmonomic and a factual side. Its cosmonomic side is the temporal order of succession or simultaneity. The factual side is the factual duration, which differs with various individualities.

But the duration remains constantly subjected to the order. Thus, for example, in the aspect of organic life, the temporal order of birth, maturing, adulthood, aging and dying holds good for the more highly developed organisms.

The duration of human life may differ considerably in different individuals. But it always remains subject to this biotic order of time. No man can come into this world as an adult. Temporal order and duration are each other's correlata and so they may not be dissociated. Consequently, the opposition between rationalistic and irrationalistic conceptions has lost its foundation for us. For the former absolutizes the cosmonomic side and the latter the factual-subjective side of time.

The duration discloses itself further in a subject-object relation, which will be subjected to a detailed analysis in volumes II and III, and to which we shall return presently in a provisional way.

For the moment, we must be satisfied with the observation that the objective duration can never actually exist independently of the subjective in the subject-object-relation. This is of essential importance for the problem of the "measurement of time". Consequently, the polar opposition between subjectivistic and objectivistic conceptions is also meaningless from our standpoint.

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\(^1\) The term "cosmic" may not of course be understood in a natural-scientific sense.
All structures of temporal reality are structures of cosmic time.

We must further observe, that all the basic structures which we shall discover in temporal reality in the course of our inquiry (in vol. II and III), the modal structures of the various aspects as well as the typical totality-structures of individuality, are grounded in the order of cosmic time. They are all specific structures of time and as such necessarily related to the factual duration of transitory beings, events, processes, acts, social relationships and so on.

The entire empirical reality in its overrich diversity of structures is enclosed and determined by universal cosmic time. In each of its modal aspects, the latter expresses itself in a specific modality of meaning with respect to temporal order as well as duration.

But its cosmic character discloses itself precisely in the indissoluble inter-modal coherence of meaning into which it fits the modal aspects.

As a matter of fact we shall see, in the second volume of this work, that the modal aspects are bound by cosmic time in an order of before and after, which is expressed in their very internal modal structure.

This order discloses its temporal character, namely, in the empirical opening-process of the modal aspects of reality (to be investigated more closely in vol. II). In this process, anticipatory structural moments come to be developed; and these moments disclose their inner coherence of meaning with the modal aspects that are later in order. The complex of anticipatory structural moments is, for example, lacking in the as yet closed structure of the logical aspect as we discover it in the pre-theoretical attitude of thought. Anticipatory structural moments find expression within this aspect only in the theoretical attitude of thought. Only in the latter is disclosed the inner connection with the historical, linguistic, economic and later aspects. Thus — to give another instance — in a closed primitive juridical order, the anticipating connection with morality — as expressed in the principles of equity, good faith, good morals, punishment according to guilt etc. — is absent.

The opening-process, intended here, has temporal duration and comes about according to the inter-modal temporal order of the aspects. We shall go into all these points in detail in vol. II.
The transcendental Idea and the modal concepts of time. The logical aspect of temporal order and duration.

We can form a theoretical concept of the separate modal aspects of time. But time itself, in its all-embracing cosmic meaning can never be comprehended in a concept, because the former alone makes the concept possible. It can only be approximated in a theoretical limiting-concept in critical self-reflection as to the necessary pre-supposita of the theoretical attitude of thought. We then get a transcendental idea of cosmic time-order in the theoretical discontinuity of its different modal aspects. This discontinuity is caused by logical analysis.

In the logical or analytical aspect, itself, cosmic time discloses a modal-analytical sense.

The logical order of simultaneity and of prius and posterius is as much a modal aspect of the integral order of time as the physical. It has meaning only within the cosmic time-order in the coherence of all its modal aspects. Therefore, it is meaningless to set the logical prius and posterius in opposition to the temporal before and after, as if the former had no authentic meaning as time-aspect.

The theoretical concept joins in logical simultaneity the analyzed characteristics of that which is defined in it. It is thereby subjected to the logical principles of identity and contradiction, which give expression to the analytical (normative) temporal order of simultaneity in the sense of logical implication and exclusion. Likewise the theoretical logical movement of thought follows the analytical temporal order of prius and posterius (the premises are logically prior to the conclusion), as being subjected to the principle of the sufficient ground.

The logical movement of thought has subjective duration in the real act of thought and is subjected to the logical order of prius et posterius with respect to the logical aspect of this act. From the side of psychologists it is objected that actually the process of logical concluding does not follow explicitly the logical order of prius et posterius. However, it is at least not to be doubted that it does so, when we draw a syllogistic inference in theoretic logical form. This is only possible in a real act of theoretical thought, which does disclose explicitly the logical aspect of time which is present only implicitly in pre-theoretic logical conclusions and which has also a logical aspect of duration. It must be observed, that the logical order of succession differs fundamentally from that of mathematical movement in its original modal sense. For in the analytical succession of thought the former stages do not disappear, be-
Nowhere, hence not in the logical aspect either, does cosmic time in itself offer a concentration-point that could serve as a point of departure for philosophic thought.

In time, meaning is broken into an incalculable diversity, which can come to a radical unity only in the religious centre of human existence. For this is the only sphere of our consciousness in which we can transcend time.

cause the inference implies its premises. Besides, the analytical order of prius, et posterius is a normative one, which ought to be followed in a theoretical logical syllogism if the inference is to be correct.

1 It has become apparent to me that some adherents of my philosophy are unable to follow me in this integral conception of cosmic time and its relationship to the concentration-point of philosophic thought.

Some seek the concentration-point of human existence in time and suppose, that this religious centre must certainly be pre-functional but not supra-temporal.

But, at least within the horizon of cosmic time we have no single experience of something “pre-functional”, i.e. of anything that would transcend the modal diversity of the aspects. We gain this experience only in the religious concentration of the radix of our existence upon the absolute Origin. In this concentration we transcend cosmic time. How could man direct himself toward eternal things, if eternity were not “set in his heart”? Even the idolatrous absolutizing of the temporal cannot be explained from the temporal horizon of human existence. For the latter nowhere provides a point of contact for an idea of the absolute, unless it be related apriori to the supra-temporal. This act of concentration presupposes a supra-temporal starting-point in our consciousness.

This, however, is not to say that the religious centre of human existence is found in a rigid and static immobility. That is a metaphysical-Greek idea of supra-temporality. It found, for example, sharp expression in Parmenides’ conception of the eternal divine form of being and in Plato’s original conception of the transcendental world of the θεός and of the immortal soul, enclosed entirely in the pure form of theoretical thought (cf. Plato’s Phaedo).

In the case of the founder of the Eleatic school, this conception originated from an absolutizing of the modal spatial aspect, an aspect bound to the horizon of time. The eternal being, which has no coming into being nor passing away is in his view enclosed in the ideal static-spatial form of the sphere. In his dialectical dialogue Parmenides, Plato himself has laid bare the inner antinomies involved in this absolutization.

The spatial is not in the least supra-temporal since it implies simultaneity in the modal meaning of continuous dimensional extension, and the spatial relations in temporal reality have subjective-objective duration of time. So far as the spatial relationships in abstract geometry are viewed apart from transitory things and events, i.e. according to their
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Only from this supra-temporal concentration-point are we in a position to gain a veritable notion of time. Beings that are entirely lost in time lack that notion.

No static conception of the supra-temporal. Is the acceptance of a central trans-cosmic time desirable?

If we say, that we transcend cosmic time in the root of our existence, we must guard against metaphysical Greek or Humanistic conceptions of the "supra-temporal". We shall later on see, that the central sphere of human existence is in the full sense of the word a dynamic one. Out of it the dramatic conflict between the civitas Dei (city of God) and the civitas terrena (earthly city) takes its issue in the history of the world. We can even call it the central sphere of occurrence, for that which occurs cannot be distinguished too sharply from the historical aspect of cosmic time, which is only one of its temporal modalities of meaning.

I have considered whether — in order to cut off all misunderstanding respecting the term “supra-temporal” — it would be recommendable to introduce the expression “central trans-cosmic” time.

But this would lead to a duplication of the temporal horizon, modal structure alone, they, nevertheless, always continue to express the spatial temporal order of greater and less in simultaneity. A spatial order of time, can exist only in the coherence of meaning with all other aspects. The same holds good for the + and — order of numbers, which is no less a modal aspect of the order of time and is in temporal reality continuously related to factual duration, because the numerical relations as well as the spatial ones are, in reality, constantly subjected to change. The + and the — directions in the order of numbers, however, maintain themselves in every factual temporal duration of numerical relationships, because they express an arithmetical order of time, which determines the place and value of each of the numbers.

This must be my answer, if other adherents of my philosophy are of the opinion that cosmic time does not find expression in the numerical and spatial aspects as such. This would even spell a regress in face of the view of Kant, who made number originate from a schematizing of the logical category of quantity in time; also in face of the insight of Hamilton who defined arithmetic as the science of pure time or order in progression. (Cf. J. Alexander Gunn, The Problem of time (London, 1939), p. 92); also in face of the intuitionistic school in mathematics, which makes all natural numbers originate from a synthesis of the original intuition of time and the original ideas of one and addition.
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in connection with which it would become necessary to use the word in two fundamentally different senses. Furthermore, the general explanation “duration determined by the order of succession or simultaneity” would no longer prove serviceable to cover both meanings. I would not know what criterion would have to be accepted for a “trans-cosmic” time. Consequently, the meaning of this term would remain entirely in the dark. For these reasons, I still prefer to reserve the term “time” for the cosmic one and its different modal aspects.

The eschatological aspect of cosmic time in faith.

To be sure, cosmic time has its limiting aspect in faith and there is a temporal order and duration in the special meaning of the latter. The modal meaning of faith, as we shall see in the second volume, is by its nature related to divine revelation. In this eschatological aspect of time faith groups the “eschaton” and, in general, that which is or happens beyond the limits of cosmic time. In this special sense are to be understood the “days of creation”, the initial words of the book of Genesis, the order in which regeneration precedes conversion etc.

Theology will always need this limiting aspect of time in which the cosmic temporal order is indissolubly connected with the revealed supra-temporal realm. However, I cannot agree with the tendency of some modern Christian theologians, who identify the eschatological aspect of time with the historical and reject the supra-temporal central sphere of human existence and of divine revelation.

Naïve and theoretical experience of time.

In the naïve pre-theoretical attitude of experience, we have an immediate integral experience of cosmic time in the uninterrupted coherence of all its modal aspects, inclusive of the normative ones, and in concentric relatedness to the selfhood. If I hasten to my work and look at my watch, then time has for me not only an abstract objective aspect of movement, but I experience it in the continuous coherence of its aspects of number, space and movement, with the stream of organic life, duration of feeling and the normative social aspects. When I let a person go first who is ranked higher in the social scale, intuitively, I am aware of the temporal aspect of symbolic significance and of the social intercourse-aspect of temporal order. This holds like-
wise for the economic and juridical aspects of time, when I spend the scanty time that I have at my disposal in a definite economic manner or guard myself against mora in the performance of my legal obligations. The implicit experience of normative aspects of the temporal order in the notion of being "too late" is one of the most evident indications of the integral character of the naïve consciousness of time.

But it is no less certain, that in naïve experience the different modal aspects do not explicitly come to consciousness, but only implicitly and conjointly. The continuity of cosmic time here completely covers the modal boundaries of its aspects.

In the philosophical-theoretical attitude of thought, on the contrary, we can approximate time — and temporal reality — only in an analytical setting-asunder of its modal aspects, which nevertheless continue to express their coherence of meaning in their very intrinsic structure.

§ 2 - THE TRANSCENDENTAL CRITICISM OF THEORETICAL THOUGHT AND THE DOGMA CONCERNING THE AUTONOMY OF THE LATTER. THE SECOND WAY TO A TRANSCENDENTAL CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY

Here a second way is opened to subject philosophic thought to a transcendental criticism. In the "Introduction" we chose the way from above: we started from the position that it is the nature of philosophy to be directed to the totality of meaning of temporal reality and to the selfhood, and we then came immediately to the problem of the Archimedean-point and to that of the $\Delta \varphi \chi\iota$.

But in this line of thought, we had to start from a supposition about the character of philosophy, which is not at all universally accepted in philosophical circles. Besides, it might seem, that a due account of the transition from the theoretical basic problem of philosophy to the central religious sphere was lacking.

Therefore, since the appearance of the first (i.e. the Dutch) edition of this work, I have directed all my attention to a sharpening of the method of transcendental criticism, whereby the objection, mentioned above, might be met. The conceptions of the task of philosophy are extremely divergent and every apriori choice of a position in this matter may be esteemed dogmatic. Consequently, if our transcendental critique is actually to embrace every possible conception of the philosophic task,
it must necessarily examine the *theoretical attitude of thought as such*. For no veritable philosophy whatsoever can escape this attitude

The dogmatic positing of the autonomy of theoretical thought.

Immanence-philosophy in all its nuances stands or falls with the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought. However, hitherto it has been simply posited, that this autonomy follows from the nature of such thought, without justifying this assertion by means of a really critical investigation of the inner structure of the theoretical attitude of thinking itself. Not only traditional metaphysics, but also Kantian epistemology, modern phenomenology and phenomenological ontology in the style of Nicolai Hartmann continued in this respect to be involved in a theoretical dogmatism. Essentially supra-theoretical prejudices were thus treated as theoretical axioms, and no account was given of the fundamental significance of these prejudices for the whole theoretical vision of empirical reality.

The different views of the autonomy of theoretical thought and the origin of this difference.

There was, however, actually every reason to make the so-called autonomy of theoretical thought a critical problem. In the first place, it cannot be denied, that in Greek philosophy it had a meaning entirely different from that in Thomistic scholasticism. In both of these, again, it was viewed entirely otherwise than in modern Humanistic thought. As soon as one penetrates to the root of these fundamentally different conceptions, one encounters a difference in religious starting-point, which is at the basis of the pretended autonomy of thought.

When Greek philosophy begins to claim its autonomy over against popular faith, it does so because, in its estimation, *theoria* is the true way to the knowledge of God. *Pistis* (faith), which continues to cling to the sensory mythological representations, gives only a doxa, an uncertain opinion. As early as the time of Parmenides' didactic poem, these two ways are set sharply in opposition to one another. Plato said, that it is exclusively destined for philosophers to approach the race of the gods.

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1 In a later context we will explain the fact, that so-called existential philosophical thought also retains a theoretical character.
But the whole philosophical theoria of the Greeks, as I have shown in detail from the sources in the first volume of my *Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy*, continues to be dominated by the same religious ground-motive which was also at the bottom of the popular faith and which, since the time of *Aristotle*, was called the *form-matter motive*.

On the other hand, the Thomistic vision of the autonomy of the naturalis ratio is unintelligible, unless its religious background is apprehended, namely, the scholastic *basic motive of nature and grace*. This motive was entirely foreign to Greek thought. Similarly one cannot approach the modern Humanistic conception of autonomy in its fundamental difference from Thomism, without having understood its religious background in the Humanistic ideal of science and personality. This religious background finds expression in the ground-motive which since *Kant* has been called that of *nature and freedom*.

The Thomist claims that, in the proper use of natural reason, philosophy can never come into contradiction with the supernatural truths of grace in the church doctrine. This standpoint implies an *accommodation* to the ecclesiastical dogma of the Aristotelian metaphysics and view of nature (accepted as a product of natural reason). The Kantian or Hegelian will show as little understanding for this typical scholastic striving after accommodation as would have been the case with *Aristotle* himself, had he been acquainted with Thomism. Thus the dogma concerning the autonomy of theoretical thought can never account for the fundamentally different conceptions of it. Thereby it loses its right to serve as an unproblematic starting-point of philosophy.

The dogma concerning the autonomy of theoretical thought as an impediment to philosophical discussion among the various schools.

It appears again and again, that this dogma impedes a mutual understanding among philosophic schools that prove to be fundamentally opposed in their true (though hidden) starting-point. This is a second ground for doubting its character as a purely theoretical axiom.

For if all philosophical currents that *claim* to choose their standpoint in theoretical thought alone, actually had no deeper presuppositions, it would be possible to convince an opponent of his error in a purely theoretical way.
But, as a matter of fact, a Thomist has never succeeded by purely theoretical arguments in convincing a Kantian or a positivist of the tenability of a theoretical metaphysics. Conversely, the Kantian epistemology has not succeeded in winning over a single believing Thomist to critical idealism.

In the debate among these philosophical schools, one receives the impression that they are reasoning at cross-purposes, because they are not able to find a way to penetrate to each other's true starting-points. The latter are masked by the dogma concerning the autonomy of theoretic thought. The same holds, for example, in the debate conducted by a positivist of the Vienna school with a Hegelian thinker or a Spinozist.

This simple fact of experience, in the nature of the case, does not yet prove the impossibility of autonomous theoretical reflection in philosophy. But it is quite sufficient to show, that it is necessary to make the autonomy of theoretical thought a critical problem and no longer to pass it off as a scientific axiom.

This problem should be posed as a quaestio iuris. It touches the empirical sciences as well as philosophy, since both imply the theoretical attitude of thought.

The necessity of a transcendental criticism of the theoretical attitude of thought as such. The difference in principle between transcendent and transcendental criticism.

The proper answering of the question raised above requires a transcendental criticism of the theoretical attitude of thought as such. By this we understand a critical inquiry (respecting no single so-called theoretical axiom) into the universally valid conditions which alone make theoretical thought possible, and which are required by the immanent structure of this thought itself. In this latter restriction lies the difference in principle between a transcendent and a transcendental criticism of science and philosophy.

The former does not really touch the inner character and the immanent structure of the theoretical attitude of thought, but confronts, for instance Christian faith with the results of modern science and with the various philosophical systems, and thus ascertains, whether or not factual conflicts exist.

It remains dogmatic, however, as long as it fails squarely to face the primary question, whether the theoretical attitude of
thought itself, with reference to its inner structure, can be independent of supra-theoretical prejudices. With such a dogmatic, merely transcendent criticism, one constantly runs the risk of regarding as the result of unprejudiced science and philosophical reflection, something that appears upon critical inquiry to be the consequence of a masked religious prejudice and an anti-Christian attitude of faith. Besides, there is another ever present danger. What is actually a complex of philosophical ideas dominated by unbiblical motives, may be accepted by dogmatic theology and accommodated to the doctrine of the church. The danger is, that this complex of ideas will be passed off as an article of Christian faith, if it has inspired the terminology of some confessions of faith. Transcendent criticism, in other words, is valueless to science and philosophy, because it confronts with each other two different spheres whose inner point of contact is left completely in the dark. One can then just as well proceed to exercise criticism of science from the standpoint of art or politics!

In order to guarantee from the outset a really critical attitude in philosophy, transcendental criticism of theoretical thought should come at the very beginning of philosophical reflection.

§ 3 - THE FIRST TRANSCENDENTAL BASIC PROBLEM OF THEORETIC THOUGHT. THE "GEGENSTAND-RELATION" VERSUS THE SUBJECT-OBJECT-RELATION.

How is the theoretical attitude of thought characterized, in contrast with the pre-theoretical attitude of naïve experience?

Our introductory survey of the problem of time has shown us the way which must necessarily lead to the solution of this question.

It became evident, that in the theoretical attitude of thought we analyze empirical reality by separating it into its modal aspects. In the pre-theoretical attitude of naïve experience, on the contrary, empirical reality offers itself in the integral coherence of cosmic time. Here we grasp time and temporal reality in typical total-structure of individuality, and we do not become aware of the modal aspects unless implicitly. The aspects are not set asunder, but rather are conceived of as being together in a continuous uninterrupted coherence.
The antithetical structure of the theoretical attitude of thought in its purely intentional character and the origin of the theoretical problem.

Theoretical thought has a typically antithetic attitude in all of its positive forms. Here we oppose the logical, i.e. the analytical function of our real act of thought, to the non-logical aspects of our temporal experience. The latter thereby becomes "Gegenstand" in the sense of "opposite" (Widerstand) to our analytical function. These non-logical aspects, as well, belong to our real act of thought in its temporal concreteness and are consequently not to be sought exclusively outside the full temporal structure of the latter. In other words, the antithetic structure of the theoretical attitude of thought can present itself only within the temporal total-structure of the act of thinking.

The first structure is only an intentional one; it does not have an ontical character.

The non-logical aspects stand in an intentional antithesis to the logical function of thought. Any attempt to grasp the former in a logical concept is met with resistance on their part. From this resistance the theoretical problem originates.

In logical analysis the aspect which is opposed to the logical is distinguished theoretically from the remaining aspects. Con-

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1 Translator's Note: The term "intentional" is used here in the sense of a merely mental directedness towards the "Gegenstand", a sense akin to that of the phenomenological usage (BRENTANO, HUSSERL). W. Y.

2 By the logical aspect of our act of thought, we understand the aspect of analytical distinction; distinction in the sense of setting apart what is given together.

At this juncture I must once more mention, that logical analysis is not the only mode of distinction. Secondly, I must recall, that logical or analytical diversity supposes a cosmic diversity of meaning which is at the basis of all analysis. So far as the first point is concerned, it is sufficient to refer to animals distinguishing their mates, food, etc. The distinction made by animals is certainly not of a logical nature. So far as the second point is concerned, we must observe, that logical analysis would have nothing to distinguish apart from a previously given cosmic diversity of meaning. In other words, logical analysis would in this case become meaningless. For we may not forget, that the logical aspect can reveal its logical sense only in the coherence of meaning with all other aspects.

3 Translator's Note: The term "ontical" is not intended in the sense in which HEIDEGGER employs it, nor in a metaphysical sense in general. It is exclusively related to empirical reality in its integral sense which includes all modal aspects and individuality-structures. W. Y.
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sequently, if we designate the opposed aspect by the symbol "x" and the remaining aspects by the symbol "y", then "x" will also stand in an antithetic relation to "y".

This theoretical antithesis does not correspond to the structure of empirical reality. It is only a consequence of the necessary theoretical abstraction of the modal aspects from cosmic time. This latter links up the aspects in a continuous coherence of meaning and can never be eliminated from reality.

Now we have seen, that the non-logical aspects of experience offer resistance to a logical analysis of their structure. This resistance arises from the fact that, even when theoretically abstracted, the modal structure of the non-logical aspect x which is made into a "Gegenstand" continues to express its coherence (of meaning) with the modal aspects y which have not been chosen as the field of inquiry.

Theoretical abstraction of the modal aspects from cosmic time is necessary for a theoretical insight into the modal diversity of meaning as such.

As soon as we have realized, however, that the theoretical attitude of thought arises only in a theoretical abstraction, we can no longer consider theoretical reason as an unproblematic datum.

\[1\] In this context, I must remark, that the modal structure of the analytical aspect itself is given as a whole and not in analyzed moments. However, in the theoretical attitude of thought we can analyze the structure of the analytical aspect; but only in its theoretical abstraction and opposition to the non-logical aspects. For the analytical aspect, like all others, expresses in its modal structure the temporal order into which the different aspects are fitted. Consequently, this structure is a unity in a multiplicity of analyzable moments. The theoretical act in which we perform this analysis is, of course, not identical with the abstracted modal structure of the logical aspect. The subjective analytical function of this concrete act remains bound to its modal structure in its temporal coherence with the other aspects. In its theoretical abstraction this modal structure has only an intentional existence in our act of thought, and can be made into the "Gegenstand" of our actual logical function. It is, consequently, not the latter which can be made a "Gegenstand", but only the abstracted, purely intentional, modal structure of the logical function. We never arrive at a "transcendental logical subject" which can be detached from all modal structures of time and can be sovereign and "absolute" in this sense.
The first transcendental basic problem as to the theoretical attitude of thought.

The first transcendental basic problem with which we are confronted is exactly the theoretical “gegenstand-relation”.

We can formulate this problem as follows: “What do we abstract in the antithetic attitude of theoretic thought from the structures of empirical reality as these structures are given in naive experience? And how is this abstraction possible? Those who reject the integral conception of cosmic time developed above must seek another solution to the critical problem we have proposed. But if we seriously confront the theoretical attitude of thought with the pre-theoretical attitude of naïve experience, the problem itself can no longer be brushed aside.

A closer confrontation of the naïve attitude with the theoretical.

The naïve attitude of thought in principle lacks an intentional antithetic structure. Consequently, it knows of no theoretical problems. This subject cannot be treated in its full scope prior to the third volume. Nevertheless, in our Prolegomena, we must elucidate more closely some essential states of affairs with relation to the attitude of naïve experience in so far as this is demanded by our present transcendental criticism of theoretical thought.

We have previously observed, that in the naïve attitude of experience, our logical function of thought, so far as its intentional content is concerned, remains entirely accommodated to the continuous coherence of cosmic time. In this respect, our logical function, like all other functions of consciousness, remains completely within this coherence.

In naïve experience we grasp reality in the typical total structures of individual things and concrete events. All modal aspects are grouped and typicalized \(^1\) in a characteristic manner and in an unbroken coherence of time within an individual totality. This occurs without involving any analytical distinction of the modal aspects. The naïve process of concept-formation is not directed toward the latter, but toward things or concrete events

\(^1\) Translator’s Note: For the Dutch term “getypiseerd” Prof. Dooyeweerd himself has coined the English term “typicalized”, which could be rendered “ordered according to types”. It should be noted, that a “typical” structure is never identical with the full “individuality” of reality.
as individual totalities. It is not concerned with abstract relations of number or space, nor with the effects of energy as such, but with things which are countable, spatial and subjected to physical-chemical changes. In the total structure of naïve experience, the logical aspect is joined with the non-logical aspects in an indissoluble coherence. Consequently, the logical aspect is conceived of as an inherent, but implicit component of concrete reality itself. The same is true of the aspect of sensory perception, the historical culture-aspect, the aesthetic, and so on. But how is this to be understood?

The subject-object relation in naïve experience.

Naïve experience can have this integral character only by virtue of the subject-object relation inherent in it. In this relation, objective functions and qualities are unreflectingly ascribed to things and to so-called natural events within modal aspects in which it is not possible for them to appear as subjects.

Thus, as adult men who have outgrown animistic representations, we know perfectly well, that water itself does not live. Nevertheless, in the aspect of organic life, we ascribe to it the objective function of being a necessary means for life. We know that a bird's nest is not alive, but we can conceive of it meaningfully as a thing only in relation to the subjective life of the bird. Thus we conceive of a bird's nest as a typical object of life. We know, that a rose does not feel or think or engage in aesthetic valuation as a subject. Nevertheless we ascribe to it respectively, objective qualities of sensory colour and odour, objective logical characteristics, objective cultural qualities and objective beauty. Further, this subject-object relation in the attitude of naïve experience and thought is grasped as a structural relation of reality itself. That is to say, the objective functions belong to things themselves in relationship to possible subjective functions which the things do not possess in the aspects of reality involved.

The sensory colour red is ascribed to a rose, not in relation to my, or your, individual sense-perception, but in relation to any possible normal human perception of colour. Similarly water is a means of life for every possible living organism. But then too, when the subject-object relation in the biotic aspect is wholly individualized, as in the case of the bird's nest, naïve experience still ascribes the objective functions in question to the things themselves. It ascribes these objective functions to them in
structural relation to the subjective life of the animal concerned. The objective qualities which are ascribed to this thing in the logical and post-logical aspects are undoubtedly related to subjective functions of human nature. But they are related in such a manner that, here too, the typical structure of individuality of the thing, which is characterized by a specific relation to animal life, finds expression. The bird's nest remains a bird's nest with respect to its objective logical characteristics. It remains a bird's nest, even though it is a possible object of human culture and has an objective symbolic signification expressed in its name, and objective aesthetic qualities.

The metaphysical substance-concept, the concept of a "Ding an sich" is in principle foreign to naive experience. So is also the abstract enclosing of the reality of things in those modal aspects which form the field of inquiry of physics, chemistry and biology.

Through the subject-object-relation we consequently experience reality in the total and integral coherence of all its aspects, as this is given within the temporal horizon of human experience. Naive experience leaves the typical total structures of this reality intact.

The antithetic relation of the theoretical attitude of thought, on the contrary, sets reality apart in the diversity of its modal aspects.

Dogmatic theory of knowledge, which considered the theoretical attitude of thought as an unproblematic datum, consequently eradicated the fundamental difference between the theoretical and the pre-theoretical attitude of thought, and finally identified the subject-object-relation with the antithetic gegenstand-relation.

Thus naive experience itself was misinterpreted as a theory about reality, and identified with the uncritical theory of "naive realism" or the "copy theory". Then, in alliance with modern natural science and the physiological theory about the "specific energies of the senses", modern epistemology undertook the task of refuting this "naive realism"! At present, it is not necessary to enter further into this fundamental misconception. We will deal with it more fully in the third volume.

For the moment it is sufficient, that we have made clear the fundamental difference between the naive and the theoretical attitude of thought, so that we can fully realise the in-escapability of the first transcendental problem with respect to the latter.
The consequences of ignoring the first transcendental basic problem in the traditional conception as to the relation of body and soul in human nature.

The dogmatic ignoring of this problem has had far-reaching consequences for the entire vision of temporal reality. Even in philosophical and theological anthropology these consequences may be demonstrated. For example, the traditional dichotomistic conception of human nature as a composition of a material body and an immortal rational soul is doubtless connected with the misconception, that the antithetic relation in the theoretical attitude of thought answers to reality itself.

Aristotle, in accord with Plato, tried to prove, that the theoretical activity of thought (the nous poiētikos, i.e. active intellect) in forming logical concepts must be wholly independent of and separated from the organs of the material body. The active intellect must be separate from the body, because it can grasp everything other than itself in logical universality and abstraction. The theoretical activity of thought is here hypo-statized in its logical aspect as an immortal ousia or substance.

Thomas Aquinas accepted this Aristotelian argument, but accommodated it in scholastic fashion to the doctrine of the church. Consequently, he held, that the entire rational soul, which was considered to be characterized by the theoretical activity of thought, must be an immortal and purely spiritual substance!

A direct conclusion is here drawn from the purely intentional antithetic structure of the attitude of theoretical thought to a real separateness of the logical function from all pre-logical aspects of the body! This conclusion was directed by the dualistic form-matter motive, which impeded an integral view of empirical reality.

But it is of no avail to ignore the problem implied in the theoretical antithesis. For new transcendental problems arise, as soon as we try to account for the way we follow, in the theoretical attitude of thought, in order to overcome the intended antithesis.

We cannot stop at the theoretical problem, born out of the resistance offered by the non-logical “Gegenstand” to our logical function in its analytical activity. We must proceed from the theoretical antithesis to the theoretical synthesis between the logical and the non-logical aspects, if a logical concept of the non-logical “Gegenstand” is to be possible.
§ 4 - THE SECOND TRANSCENDENTAL BASIC PROBLEM: THE STARTING-POINT OF THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS

Now, however, a second transcendental problem arises which can be formulated as follows:

*From what standpoint can we reunite synthetically the logical and the non-logical aspects of experience which were set apart in opposition to each other in the theoretical antithesis?*

This question touches the kernel of our inquiry. By raising this second basic problem, we subject every possible starting-point of theoretical thought to a fundamental criticism. In this way we must finally settle the question whether the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical reason is compatible with the intensional structure of the theoretical attitude of thought.

Now it is evident, that the *true* starting-point of theoretical synthesis, however it may be chosen, is in no case to be found in one of the two terms of the antithetic relation. It must necessarily transcend the theoretical antithesis, and relate the aspects that theoretically have been set asunder to a deeper radical unity (or in the case of a dualistic standpoint, perhaps to a pair of assumed radical unities). For one thing is certain: the antithetic relation, with which the theoretical attitude of thought stands or falls, offers in itself no bridge between the logical thought-aspect and its non-logical "Gegenstand". We saw earlier, that even cosmic time, which guarantees the indissoluble coherence among the modal aspects, does not present an Archimedean point to theoretical thought.

This seems to imply at the same time, that the latter has in itself no *starting-point* for the theoretical synthesis.

Even here the dogma as to the autonomy of theoretical reason appears to lead its adherents into an inescapable *impasse*.

The impasse of the immanence-standpoint and the source of the theoretical antinomies.

In order to maintain the pretended self-sufficiency of theoretical thought, the advocates of this dogma are compelled to seek their starting-point in theoretical reason itself.

But the latter, by virtue of its very antithetic structure, is obliged to proceed in a synthetical way. Now there are as many modalities of theoretical synthesis possible as there are modal aspects of a non-logical character belonging to temporal experience.
There is a synthetic thought of mathematical, physical, biological, psychological, historical, and other character. In which of these possible special scientific points of view may the theoretical vision of empirical reality seek its starting-point? No matter how the choice is made, it invariably amounts to the absolutizing of a special synthetically grasped modal aspect.

The various -isms in the theoretical vision of reality.

This is the source of all -isms in the theoretical image of reality. The attempt must constantly be made to reduce all other aspects to mere modalities of the absolutized one. These -isms play their confusing rôle in the different branches of science as well as in philosophy.

Now such -isms (as materialism, biologist, psychologism, historicism etc.) are uncritical in a double sense. In the first place they can never be justified theoretically. The antithetic structure of the theoretical attitude of thought offers resolute resistance against every attempt to reduce one of the aspects to another. It avenges the absolutizing by involving theoretical thinking in internal antinomies. In the entire theoretical sphere there is no place for the absolute, because the theoretical attitude of thought is itself grounded in an antithetical relation.

Theoretical synthesis cannot cancel this relation. Such would be tantamount to the cancellation of the theoretical attitude of thought itself. In every theoretical synthesis, logical analysis remains bound to the modal structure of the opposite non-logical aspect. And the synthesis is, consequently, partly of a logical and partly of a non-logical character. The theoretical synthesis is, to be sure, a union, but not the deeper unity of the logical and non-logical.

It pre-supposes a supra-theoretical starting-point which must transcend theoretical diversity.

Consequently, what we have said also holds for every special scientific synthetic point of view. And with this we touch the second ground of the uncritical character of all -isms in the theoretical conception of reality.

In each of them the second transcendental basic problem returns unsolved. The absolutizing itself cannot issue from the theoretical attitude of thought. It points to a supra-theoretical starting-point, from which the theoretical synthesis is performed.

But, the objection will be raised, we sought after a starting-point for the theoretical synthesis.
Imperceptibly this problem has been identified with that of a starting-point for the theoretical vision of reality. Has not the problem been entirely shifted in this way? Does science indeed require a theoretical vision of reality? Is this, for example, necessary for pure mathematics, for logic, for ethical theory?

The problem of the basic denominator for the theoretical comparison and distinction of the modal aspects.

In order to answer this question, I may first recall, that the theoretical attitude of thought consists in setting apart the modal aspects of temporal reality in opposition to one another. It consists primarily in the opposition of the logical aspect of our act of thinking to all aspects which are of a non-logical character. Every theoretical distinction of the latter aspects supposes an insight into their mutual relationships and coherence. Or, in other words, it supposes a basic denominator, under which the non-logical aspects can be brought in order to be compared with one another. For they could not be distinguished, unless they have something in common. On our own standpoint, the modal aspects have no other common denominator than the cosmic time-order. From our point of view, the latter expresses itself in the modal structure of each of the aspects, and is the guarantee of its coherence of meaning with all the rest. On the immanence-standpoint, another denominator of comparison must be sought, for example, in the way already discussed, by reducing all other aspects to modalities of a special (absolutized) one, or, as was usual in Greek and scholastic metaphysics, by accepting the metaphysical concept of being as a so-called "analogical unity", lying at the basis of the diversity of special aspects. Now, the theoretical vision of the mutual relationships and coherence of the aspects in every case implies a theoretical vision of reality. For the latter is nothing but the vision of the abstracted modal aspects in the totality of their coherence.

The rôle of the -isms in pure mathematics and in logic.

Neither a special science nor philosophy can escape such a theoretical vision of reality.

In pure mathematics, the problem immediately arises: How is one to view the mutual relationship between the aspects of number, space, movement, sensory perception, logical thought
and symbolical signification? Different schools in pure mathematics such as logicism, symbolistic formalism, empiricism and intuitionism arise in accordance with their respective theoretical visions on this basic problem. These differences are not restricted to the philosophy of mathematics. The famous Dutch mathematician, Brouwer, the chief representative of the intuitionistic school abolished an entire branch of special scientific work which had been built up by the logicist and formalist theories (the theory of the so-called transfinite numbers).

The first three schools, logicism, symbolistic formalism and empiricism, try to reduce the aspects of number and space to the logical, the linguistic and the sensory-perceptual aspects respectively.

Even in logic itself we observe the rise of a great diversity of theoretical schools. Here, too, this difference as to the nature and limits of the field of inquiry is determined by a theoretical vision of reality in its modal aspects. It is determined by a theoretical conception of the place that the logical aspect occupies in the entire order and coherence of the modal aspects (psychologism, mathematicism, symbolistic-conventionalism, dialectical historism, etc.). Invariably the starting-point which is chosen for theoretical synthesis in general, remains decisive for the vision of the mutual relationship and coherence of the modal aspects.

That this is also the case in normative ethics, aesthetics and theology, may be demonstrated convincingly. Yet we would have to anticipate too much of our later inquiries, were we now to elaborate all these points. Especially the current conceptions as to the field of inquiry for ethics are still vague. They are ill-defined to such a degree, that an adequate discussion of ethics would require a detailed exposition, which would exceed the compass of our transcendental criticism of the theoretical attitude of thought.

Provisional delimitation of the moral aspect.

In the present context, therefore, we will only establish the fact that ethics, so far as it lays claim to a field of inquiry distinct from theology and the philosophy of law, can have no other “Gegenstand” than the moral aspect of temporal reality. This aspect is characterized as that of the temporal relationships of love as differentiated more precisely by the typical structures of temporal society as conjugal love, love of parents and children,
love of country, social love of one's fellow-man, and so on. It is again evident, that this aspect has its own modal meaning only in the coherence with all other modal aspects of temporal reality. The theoretical vision of this coherence is then again decisive for the conception which one has of the moral norms, and this vision, in its turn, is dependent upon the starting-point of the theoretical-ethical reflection.

From the above it is quite evident, that each special realm of theoretical inquiry, whether or not it is called "empirical" in the narrower sense, pre-supposes a theoretical vision of temporal reality. And such a theoretical vision of reality must necessarily exceed the boundaries of any special science and exhibit a philosophical character. Consequently it appears at the same time, that no single special science can possess an essential autonomy with respect to philosophy in the sense of a theory of reality. For the rest we shall revert to this subject in the last part of this volume.

But have we at all proved definitely, that theoretic thought itself, with respect to its inner character, is dependent on a supra-theoretical starting-point, by which the autonomy of this thought is excluded? We may not accept this too hastily. For KANT, the father of the so-called critical-transcendental philosophy, supposed that he could lay bare a starting-point in theoretical reason itself, which would rest at the basis of every possible theoretical synthesis, and consequently would not be gained by the absolutizing of a special scientific point of view. Can the autonomy of theoretical thought be actually demonstrated along the way of KANT's critique of knowledge?

The starting-point of theoretical synthesis in the Kantian critique of knowledge.

This was the question which in our Introduction was raised at the very outset of the first way of our transcendental critique. Here we argued, that philosophical thought, as theoretical thought directed to the totality of meaning of our temporal cosmos, cannot arrive at a transcendental idea of this totality without critical self-reflection. But the very critical problem appeared to be

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1 The "disposition of the heart", which is rationalized by KANT and proclaimed as the criterion of morality in his "Gesinnungsethik", is actually of a central-religious character and so can, as such, never be related exclusively to the moral aspect; KANT's conception in this matter hangs together with his religious absolutizing of morality.
the relation between the thinking ego and its theoretical-logical function of thought. At first sight, it might seem, that the problem is here formulated in an unsatisfactory functionalistic manner. Why must we direct our attention solely to the logical function and why not to the integral act of theoretical thinking? To be sure, the latter may be characterized by its theoretical-logical aspect, but it can by no means be identified with the latter. We are now able to reply to this question, since in the second way of our transcendental critique we have engaged in an enquiry with respect to the inner structure of the theoretical attitude of thought. It is precisely the antithetic structure of the latter which obliged Kant and his followers to oppose the logical function to the other modal aspects of the integral act of thought. The only, but fundamental, mistake in their argument was the identification of the real act with a purely psychical temporal event, which in its turn could become a "Gegenstand" of the ultimate transcendental-logical "cogito". For we have seen, that the "gegenstand-relation" can only be an intentional relation within the real act of theoretic thought between its logical and its non-logical aspects. The real act itself can never be made the "Gegenstand" of its logical function, since the latter can be actual only within a real act of our consciousness, and does not have any actuality in a theoretical abstraction. But the identification of this real act with its psychical aspect is not tenable, and is an indicant of a dualistic view of reality. And the latter cannot be explained in terms of a purely theoretical epistemology.

The second way of our transcendental critique of philosophy involves resuming the investigation of Kant's conception concerning the transcendental cogito, notwithstanding the fact that, already in our Introduction, we did lay bare the pitfalls concealed in it.

The second investigation seeks to arrive at a critical formulation of the third transcendental basic problem. This problem is involved in the theoretical attitude of thought with respect to critical self-reflection. In this inquiry we wish to account critically for our transition from the theoretic to the central religious sphere. This involves also a deeper critical inquiry into the transcendental problem of the origin in philosophical thought. For, in our Introduction, it could appear, that this problem was introduced as a "deus ex machina", the necessity of which was unaccounted for in the course of our first critical inquiry. Finally our second investigation seeks to arrive at the
ultimate stage of our transcendental critique, which was not yet reached by the first way explained in our Introduction.

The problem of the starting-point and the way of critical self-reflection in theoretical thought.

In order to discover the immanent starting-point of all special synthetic acts of thought in which these latter find their deeper unity, we must, according to Kant, look away from the "Gegenstände" of our knowledge and exercise critical self-reflection in theoretical thought. It must be granted, that this hint indeed contains a great promise. For it may not be doubted that, as long as theoretical thought in its logical function continues to be directed merely to the opposed modal aspects of temporal reality which form its "Gegenstand", it remains dispersed in a theoretical diversity. Only when theoretical thought is directed to the thinking ego, does it acquire the concentric direction towards an ultimate unity of consciousness which must lie at the root of all modal diversity of meaning. If you ask the special sciences active in the field of anthropology: What is man? you will obtain a diversity of items from physical-chemical, biological, psychological, cultural-historical, linguistic, ethnological and sociological points of view. These items are valuable. But no special science, nor an encyclopaedic sociology, can answer the question, what man himself is in the unity of his selfhood. Human I-ness functions, to be sure, in all modal aspects of reality. But it is, nevertheless, a central and radical unity, which as such transcends all temporal aspects. The way of critical self-reflection is, consequently, the only one that can lead to the discovery of the true starting-point of theoretical thought. Even Socrates realised this, when he gave the Delphic maxim, ICYO

As soon as this transcendent character of the ego is overlooked, and the ego is conceived of as a merely immanent centre of its acts, its radical unity disappears and the ego is viewed as a merely structural unity in the diversity of its mental acts.

This is clearly seen from Scheler's explanation of human personality in his The place of man in the cosmos ("Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos", p. 75) as a "monarchical arrangement of acts, one of which at every turn takes the lead" ("eine monarchische Anordnung von Akten, unter denen jeder die Führung und Leitung besitzt"). As a matter of fact, the central position of the ego as to its temporal acts is not to be maintained in this way. The selfhood is dissolved in the structure of its acts.
§ 5 - THE THIRD TRANSCENDENTAL BASIC PROBLEM OF THE CRITIQUE OF THEORETICAL THOUGHT AND KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY OF APPERCEPTION

But here there arises a new transcendental problem, which we can formulate as follows:

How is this critical self-reflection, this concentric direction of theoretical thought to the I-ness, possible, and what is its true character?

It cannot be doubted, that an authentic transcendental problem resides here, if it is borne in mind, that the theoretical attitude of thought, with respect to its internal structure, is bound to the previously investigated antithetic relation.

Neither phenomenology, founded by EDMUND HUSSERL, nor modern existentialism has been able to dissociate its theoretical attitude of thought from this "Gegenstand-relation".

Phenomenology, following in the footsteps of FRANZ BRENTANO, has even posited the intentional relatedness of every act of consciousness to a "Gegenstand". However, this view is not our immediate concern now.

For it is evident, that the term "Gegenstand" cannot be meant in our sense, when BRENTANO and HUSSERL ascribe also to feeling an intentional relation to a "Gegenstand" (for instance a melody!)

However, the intentional antithetical structure, inherent in all theoretical thought, is doubtless present in the phenomenological attitude itself, which opposes the absolute "cogito" (in the sense of the "absolute transcendental consciousness") to the "world" as its intentional "Gegenstand" which is dependent on the former 1.

SCHELER considers the "gegenstand-relation" (by which the human mind can oppose itself not only to the "world", but can even make into "Gegenstand" the physiological and psychological aspects of human existence itself) as the most formal category of the logical aspect of mind (GEIST) 2.

1 Cf. HUSSERL, Ideen zu einer Phänomenologie and phänomenologischen Philosophie, p. 92.
2 SCHELER, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, p. 58. "Gegenstand-Sein ist also die formalste Kategorie der logischen Seite des
Modern Humanistic existentialism, too, can grasp existence as the free historical ex-sistere only in its theoretical antithesis to the “given reality of nature” (for HEIDEGGER, “Dasein” as the “ontological” manner of being against the “given world” as the “ontical”; for SARTRE, “le néant” as against “l'être”}). Indeed, HEIDEGGER, too, is a phenomenologist, although his phenomenological method is an irrationalistic one in the hermeneutical sense of DILTHEY's historicism; and phenomenology, as we have seen, implies the theoretical antithesis.

In the face of this antithetical attitude of existential thought, it is of no consequence, that the philosophy of existence wishes to create a great distance between existential thinking as authentically philosophical on the one hand, and all scientific thought which is directed to a “Gegenstand” on the other. For the term “Gegenstand” has in our critique another meaning than that here intended, viz. “given object” („das Vorhandene”), although naturally science, too, is bound to the “gegenstand-relation”.

For the present, then, it is not to be understood, how the concentric direction of theoretical thought to the ego could arise from the theoretical attitude of thought itself.

KANT, however, did not wish to abandon the autonomy of theoretical reason. He supposed, as we have seen, that in the logical function of thinking (the “Verstand”) a subjective pole of thought may be demonstrated, which is opposed to all empirical reality, and which, as the transcendental-logical unity of apperception, lies at the basis of all synthetic acts of thought as their starting-point. The “I think”, so he says, must be able to accompany all my representations (KANT means here doubles “synthetic concepts of empirical “Gegenstände”), if they are to be my representations. This was to be a final transcendental-logical unity of consciousness, which itself can never become a “Gegenstand”, because every theoretical act of knowledge must proceed from this “I think”. It is the “transcendental-logical subject of thought”, which would have to be viewed as the universally valid condition of every scientific synthesis. It is, consequently, in no way identical with our empirical, real act of thought, which, according to him, can be again made a “Gegenstand” of this “transcendental subject”. It is only a merely-logical point of unity of the consciousness, which lacks

Geistes” [Being a “Gegenstand” is therefore the most formal category of the logical side of the mind].
all empirical individuality. Kant denies also, that we would possess real self-knowledge in this transcendental-logical concept of the thinking ego. For, according to his epistemological conception, human knowledge can have relation only to impressions, given in sensory perception ("Empfindung"), which have been received in the transcendental forms of intuition of space and time and are ordered by logical categories to an "objective reality of experience".

Has Kant now succeeded in demonstrating a starting-point, immanent in "theoretical reason" itself, which satisfies the requirements of a genuine transcendental criticism of theoretical thought? In our Introduction we answered this question negatively.

In the second way of our critical inquiry we can strengthen the grounds for this reply. For we saw, that the true starting-point for the theoretical synthesis is never to be found within the antithetical relation which characterizes the theoretical attitude of thought. Kant's transcendental-logical ego remains caught in the logical pole of this relation, which, according to his own conception, finds its counterpole in the non-logical aspect of sense perception. If, as he himself explains emphatically, the logical aspect of thought and the aspect of sense perception are not reducible to each other, then it follows in a stringent way, that in the former no starting-point can be found for their theoretical union.

As we shall show in still greater detail in the epistemological part of the second volume, Kant, in consequence of his axiom that every synthesis should proceed from the logical function of thought, has abandoned the critical way of inquiry and has eliminated the authentic problem of synthesis by means of a dogmatic statement. The dogma as to the autonomy of "theoretical reason" forced him to do so. But, by reason of this theoretical dogmatism, the true starting-point of his theory of knowledge remained hidden.

The third basic problem formulated by us is, just as the first, ignored by Kant. As a result he was unable to bring the second problem to a critical solution.

If then, in theoretical thought as such, no starting-point for the inter-modal synthesis is to be found, the concentric direction of this thought, necessary for critical self-reflection, cannot have a theoretical origin. It must spring from the ego as the individual centre of human existence.

We have said in our Introduction, that the selfhood cannot
give this central direction to its theoretical thought without concentrating itself upon the true, or upon a pretended absolute origin of all meaning. That is to say, that self-knowledge in the last analysis appears to be dependent upon knowledge of God, which, however, is quite different from a theoretical theology. Can we account for this statement?

In the first place, we must grant, that both self-knowledge and knowledge of the absolute origin or pseudo-origin, exceed the limits of theoretical thought, and are rooted in the “heart” or the religious centre of our existence.

Nevertheless, this central supra-theoretical knowledge does not remain enclosed in the heart, but must by its very nature penetrate the temporal sphere of our consciousness. Theoretical thought, too, is concerned in this central knowledge, in the transcendent process of self-reflection, in the concentric direction of the theoretically separated aspects of the gegenstand-relation to the thinking self.

For we have seen, that without veritable self-knowledge the true starting-point of theoretical synthesis cannot be discovered, and that theoretic self-reflection in thought presupposes this central knowledge, since the concentric direction of theoretical thought can start only from the ego. Kant as well as modern phenomenology, has overlooked this truth. The empirical fact, that self-knowledge appears to be dependent on knowledge of God is established by Ernst Cassirer in the second volume of his Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, on the basis of a wealth of anthropological and ethnological data.¹

But a real account of this fact is rendered only by the Biblical Revelation concerning the creation of man in the image of God. God reveals Himself as the absolute Origin excluding every independent counter-power which may be His opposite. He has expressed His image in man by concentrating its entire temporal existence in the radical religious unity of an ego in which the totality of meaning of the temporal cosmos was to be focused upon its Origin.

The fundamental dependence of human self-knowledge upon the knowledge of God has consequently its inner ground in the essence of religion as the central sphere of our created nature.

¹ We shall return to this point in detail in the second volume in the discussion of the problem concerning the relation between faith and history.
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The alleged vicious circle in our transcendental criticism.

The question could now be raised, whether our transcendental criticism in its third stage does not make an unwarranted leap by explaining the concentric direction of theoretical thought as an effect of the central religious sphere of consciousness. Has this in fact been proved stringently, and what then is here understood by religion?

Finally, if our criticism should actually prove something stringently, does it not move in a vicious circle? For does a proof not suppose this very autonomy of theoretical thought, the impossibility of which our criticism tried to demonstrate?

To these questions I must reply as follows:

What is stringently proved, in my opinion, is the thesis, that the concentric direction of thought in its self-reflection cannot originate from the theoretical attitude of thought itself, and that it can issue only from the ego as a supra-theoretic individual centre of human existence.

It would be an uncritical petitio principii to pretend, that our criticism even at this point moves in a vicious circle by abandoning the autonomy of theoretical self-reflection. Up to now it has remained strictly within the theoretical sphere, and has laid bare structural states of affairs which had been ignored under the very influence of the dogma as to the autonomy of theoretical reason. However, these states of affairs, once they have been discovered, may no longer be ignored by anyone who appreciates a veritably critical standpoint in philosophy.

It is of course impossible, that this transcendental criticism — although up to the question of self-knowledge being of a strictly theoretical character — itself should be unprejudiced. For in this case it would refute its own conclusions. But what shall we say, if the very supra-theoretical presuppositions hold here, which free theoretical thought from dogmatic “axioms” standing in the way of a veritable critical attitude? If, as we have demonstrated, theoretical synthesis is possible only from a supra-theoretical starting-point, then only the contents of the supra-theoretical presuppositions implied thereby, can be questionable, but not the very necessity of them.

Hitherto, however, the demonstrative force of our critique has been negative in character, so far as it, taken strictly, can only demonstrate, that the starting-point of theoretical thought cannot be found in that thought itself, but must be supra-theoreti-
cal in character. That it is to be found only in the central religious sphere of consciousness, is no longer to be proved theoretically, because this insight belongs to self-knowledge, which as such transcends the theoretical attitude of thought. We can only say, that this self-knowledge is necessary in a critical sense, because without it the true character of the chosen starting-point remains hidden from us. And this would be fatal for the critical insight into its true significance in respect to the inner direction of philosophic thought.

What is religion?

To the question, what is understood here by religion? I reply: the innate impulse of human selfhood to direct itself toward the true or toward a pretended absolute Origin of all temporal diversity of meaning, which it finds focused concentrically in itself.

This description is indubitably a theoretical and philosophical one, because in philosophical reflection an account is required of the meaning of the word “religion” in our argument. This explains also the formal transcendental character of the description, to which the concrete immediacy of the religious experience remains strange.

If, from out of the central religious sphere, we seek a theoretical approximation of it, we can arrive only at a transcendental idea, a limiting concept, the content of which must remain abstract, as long as it is to comprehend all possible forms in which religion is manifested (even the apostate ones). Such an idea invariably has the function of relating the theoretical diversity of the modal aspects to a central and radical unity and to an Origin.

The impossibility of a phenomenology of religion.

The ex-sistent character of the ego as the religious centre of existence.

There is one thing, however, on which we cannot lay too much stress. As the absolutely central sphere of human existence, religion transcends all modal aspects of temporal reality, the aspect of faith included. It is not at all a temporal phenomenon which manifests itself within the temporal structure of human act-life. It can be approximated only in the concentric direction
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of our consciousness, not in the divergent one, not as a "Gegenstand".

Therefore, with respect to its inner essence, religion can never be described "phenomenologically". It is no "psychological phenomenon", it is no emotional feeling-perception; it is not to be characterized, as is done by Rudolph Otto, as experience of the "tremendum". It is the ex-sistent condition in which the ego is bound to its true or pretended firm ground.

Hence, the mode of being of the ego itself is of a religious character and it is nothing in itself.

Veritable religion is absolute self-surrender. The apostate man who supposes, that his selfhood is something in itself, loses himself in the surrender to idols, in the absolutizing of the relative. However, this absolutizing itself is a clear manifestation of the ex-sistent character of the religious centre of our existence, which, to be sure, expresses itself in all modal aspects of time, but never can be exhausted by these. Even in the religious

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1 This does not hold as to belief and its different contents. For we have seen, that the faith-function is bound to cosmic time and to the temporal coherence of meaning with the other modal functions of our existence. It should not be identified with the religious centre of this latter. Nevertheless, the direction and contents of faith are not to be understood apart from the religious ground-motive by which it is directed and from a divine Revelation, no matter whether the latter is understood in its true meaning or is misinterpreted in an apostatic sense.

2 I use here a term well known in modern existence-philosophy. However, it is evident, that it is not meant here in the Humanistic sense.

3 Therefore, modern existence-philosophy, so far as it considers time to be an existential trait of the "authentic" human ego, remains entangled in the diversity of meaning of the terms 'ego' and 'selfhood' which comes to light, as soon as we lose sight of the religious radix of human existence.

We can project an idol of our "true ego" and elevate this idol to an "ideal selfhood" which is placed over against our "empirical" I-ness, considered as the "objectivation" of our self in the "past" and subjected to the natural law of causality. If in this case our "ideal selfhood" is related to the freedom of the "present" and the "future", there is born a dialectical time-problem in the existential conception of the ego, due to the dialectical ground-motive of nature and freedom. But the "authentic", the "fundamental" I-ness (or whatever you will name it) will ever recede from our view, as long as this latter is dispersed in time. A truly critical hermeneutic method in philosophical anthropology has the task to lay bare the origin of these dialectical problems as to the ego and true selfhood of man, and to unmask the temporal idols projected about it. A purely temporal ex-sistere may never be identified with the ex-sistent
absolutizing of the historical aspect of our existence in the self-surrender to an aspect of time, we transcend the latter.

Nevertheless, the autonomous ex-sistere of the ego which has lost itself in the surrender to idols, must be broken down by the divine ex-trahere from the state of apostasy, if man is to regain his true ex-sistent position.

After having given an account of what we understand by religion, we can establish the fact that the concentric direction in theoretical thought must be of religious origin. It must be of a religious origin, even though it always remains theoretical in character, because of its being bound to the antithetic gegenstand-relation. It springs from the tendency to the origin in the centre of human existence, which tendency we previously discovered in the Introduction. But now we have made clear the inner point of contact between philosophic thought and religion from the intrinsic structure of the theoretical attitude of thought itself. Critical self-reflection in the concentric direction of theoretical thought to the ego necessarily appeals to self-knowledge (which goes beyond the limits of the theoretical gegenstand-relation). Consequently we may establish the fact, that even the theoretical synthesis supposes a religious starting-point. Furthermore, we have now explained, that it is meaningless to ask for a theoretical proof of its religious character, because such a proof presupposes the central starting-point of theoretical thought.

The supra-individual character of the starting-point.

We must now proceed to the final and decisive stage of our transcendental critique.

We have established the necessary religious nature of the starting-point and have learned of the intrinsically ex-sistent character of the selfhood. Therefore, we can no longer seek the true point of departure of philosophic thought in the individual ego alone. We observed in our Introduction that the I-ness must share in the Archimedean point, but that in this latter must be concentrated the total meaning of the temporal cosmos.

The ego, however, is merely the concentration-point of our individual existence, not of the entire temporal cosmos. Moreover, philosophy is as little as science in the narrower sense character of the religious centre of human nature which is implied in its tendency towards its divine Origin.
merely a matter of the individual. It can be cultivated only in a community. This, too, points to the necessity of a supra-individual point of departure.

Critical self-reflection in theoretical thought is, to be sure, the necessary way to the discovery of the starting-point of philosophy. It is indeed the individual ego which gives to its thought the concentric direction. However, true self-knowledge discovers the ex-sistent character of the selfhood also in the fact that the ego is centrally bound with other egos in a religious community. The central and radical unity of our existence is at the same time individual and supra-individual; that is to say, in the individual I-ness it points beyond the individual ego toward that which makes the whole of mankind spiritually one in root in its creation, fall and redemption.

According to our Christian faith, all humanity is spiritually included in Adam. In him the whole human race has fallen, and in mankind also the entire temporal cosmos, which was concentrated in it. In Jesus Christ, the entire new humanity is one in root, as the members of one body.

Our I-ness is, in other words, rooted in the spiritual community of mankind. It is no self-sufficient "substance", no "windowless monad", but it lives in the spiritual community of the we, which is directed to a Divine Thou, according to the original meaning of creation.

The meaning of the central command of love.

This is the deep meaning of the central command of love: Thou shalt love God above all and thy neighbour as thyself. This command in its indivisible unity is of a religious and not of a moral character. For the moral relations of love to our fellow-men are merely a modal aspect of temporal society. In their modal speciality of meaning, they have sense only in the coherence with all other aspects of this society. They are also differentiated necessarily according to the diversity of social relationships in conjugal love, parent- and children-love, social love of the neighbour, love of the fatherland, and so on. But the religious command of love understands the neighbour as a member of the radical religious community of mankind in its central relationship to God, who created man after His image. Therefore, it is in truth the radix of all modal aspects which unfolds the divine law in temporal reality.
The spirit of community and the religious basic motive.

Now a religious community is maintained by a common spirit, which as a *dynamis*, as a central motive-power, is active in the concentration-point of human existence.

This spirit of community works through a *religious ground-motive*, which gives contents to the central mainspring of the entire attitude of life and thought. In the historical development of human society, this motive will, to be sure, receive particular *forms* which are historically determined. But in its central religious meaning it transcends all historical form-giving. Every attempt at a purely historical explanation of it, therefore, necessarily moves in a vicious circle. For, by virtue of the inner structure of the theoretical attitude of thought, the historical explanation itself supposes a central and supra-theoretical starting-point, which is determined by a religious basic motive or ground-motive.

Since the fall and the promise of the coming Redeemer, there are two central main springs operative in the heart of human existence. The first is the dynamis of the Holy Ghost, which by the moving power of God’s Word, incarnated in Jesus Christ, re-directs to its Creator the creation that had apostatized in the fall from its true Origin. This dynamis brings man into the relationship of sonship to the Divine Father. Its religious ground-motive is that of the Divine Word-Revelation, which is the key to the understanding of Holy Scripture: the motive of *creation, fall, and redemption by Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Ghost*.

The second central main spring is that of the spirit of apostasy from the true God. As religious dynamis (power), it leads the human heart in an apostate direction, and is the source of all deification of the creature. It is the source of all absolutizing of the relative even in the theoretical attitude of thought. By virtue of its idolatrous character, its religious ground-motive can receive very diverse contents.

The Greek form-matter motive and the modern Humanistic motive of nature and freedom.

In Western thought, this apostate spirit has disclosed itself chiefly in two central motives, namely, (1) that which has dominated the classical Greek world of culture and thought, and which has been brought (since the time of Aristotle)
under the fixed designation of the form-matter motive, and (2) that of the modern Humanistic life- and world-view, which, since the time of Immanuel Kant, has been called the motive of nature and freedom. Since the 18th century, this latter motive came more and more to dominate the world of Western culture and thought.

The former motive originated from the encounter of the older pre-Homeric Greek religion of life (one of the different nature-religions) with the later cultural religion of the Olympic gods. The older religion of life deified the eternally flowing Stream of life, which is unable to fix itself in any single individual form. But out of this stream there proceed periodically the generations of transitory beings, whose existence is limited by an individual form, as a consequence of which they are subjected to the horrible fate of death, the anangkè or the heimarmenè tychè. This motive of the form-less eternally flowing Stream of life is the matter-motive of the Greek world of thought. It found its most pregnant expression in the worship of Dionysus, which had been imported from Thrace.

On the other hand, the form-motive was the main spring of the more recent Olympian religion, the religion of form, measure and harmony, which rested essentially upon the deification of the cultural aspect of Greek society (the Olympian gods were personified cultural powers). It acquired its most pregnant expression in the Delphic Apollo as law-giver.

The Olympian gods leave mother earth with its ever flowing Stream of life and its threatening anangkè. They acquire Olympus for their seat, and have an immortal individual form, which is not perceptible to the eye of sense. But they have no power over the fate of mortals.

The form-matter motive itself was independent of the mythological forms which it received in the old nature-religions and the new Olympian culture-religion. It has dominated Greek thought from the outset.

The autonomy which philosophic theoria demanded, in opposition to popular belief, implied, as we have observed in an earlier context, only an emancipation from the mythological forms which were bound to sensory representation. It did not at all imply a loosening of philosophic thought from the central religious ground-motive which was born out of the encounter of the culture-religion with the older religion of life.

The modern Humanistic ground-motive of nature and freedom,
which we shall presently subject to a detailed investigation in the transcendental criticism of Humanistic philosophy, has taken its rise from the religion of the free autonomous human personality and that of modern science evoked by it, and directed to the domination of nature. It is to be understood only against the background of the three ground-motives that formerly gave the central direction to Western thought, namely, the form-matter-motive, the motive of creation, fall and redemption, and the scholastic motive of nature and grace. The last-named motive was introduced by Roman-Catholicism and directed to a religious synthesis between the two former motives.

It is not surprising, that the apostate main spring can manifest itself in divergent religious motives. For it never directs the attitude of life and thought to the true totality of meaning and the true radix of temporal reality, because this is not possible without the concentric direction to the true Origin.

Idolatrous absolutizing is necessarily directed to the speciality of meaning, which is thereby dissociated from its temporal coherence, and consequently becomes meaningless and void. This is the deep truth in the time-honoured conception of the fall as a privatio, a deprivation of meaning, and as a negation, a nothingness.

Sin as privatio and as dynamis. No dialectical relation between creation and fall.

However, the central dynamis of the spirit of apostasy is no "nothing"; it springs from the creation, and cannot become operative beyond the limits in which it is bound to the divine order of meaning. Only by virtue of the religious concentration-impulse, which is concreated in the human heart, can the latter direct itself to idols. The dynamis of sin can unfold itself only in subjection to the religious concentration-law of human existence. Therefore, the apostle Paul says, that without the law there is no sin and that there is a law of sin.

Consequently, there can be no inner contradiction between creation and fall as long as they are understood in their Biblical sense. A contradiction would exist, if, and only if, sin were to have not merely an imaginary but a real power in itself, independent of creation.
The dialectical character of the apostate ground-motives.

Religious and theoretic dialectic.

On the contrary, it belongs to the inner nature of the idolatrous ground-motives, that they conceal in themselves a religious antithesis.

For the absolutizing of special modal aspects of meaning, which in the nature of the case are relative, evokes the correlata of these latter. These correlata now in religious consciousness claim an absoluteness opposed to that of the deified aspects.

This brings a religious dialectic into these basic motives, that is to say, they are in fact composed of two religious motives, which, as implacable opposites, drive human action and thought continually in opposite directions, from one pole to the other. I have subjected this religious dialectic to a detailed investigation in the first volume of my new trilogy, Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy. And I demonstrated, that this dialectic is quite different from the theoretical one which is inherent in the intentional antithetical gegenstand-relation of theoretic thought.

For theoretical antithesis is by nature relative and requires a theoretical synthesis to be performed by the thinking "self". On the other hand, an antithesis in the religious starting-point of theoretical thought does not allow of a genuine synthesis. In the central religious sphere the antithesis necessarily assumes an absolute character, because no starting-point beyond the religious one is to be found from which a synthesis could be effectuated.

The uncritical character of the attempts to bridge the religious antithesis in a dialectical starting-point by a theoretic dialectic.

Every philosophical effort to bridge such a religious antithesis in the starting-point by means of a theoretical logical dialectic is fundamentally uncritical. This was the way, however, of all so-called dialectical philosophy, from Heraclitus up to the Hegelian school, in so far as it aimed at an ultimate synthesis of its opposite religious motives.

The theoretical syntheses which pretend to fulfil this task, are merely illusory at the very point here mentioned. They are subjected to the intrinsic law of all religious dialectic, that is to say, as soon as philosophy returns to the path of critical self-reflection, they are necessarily dissolved again into the polar antithesis of their starting-point. Against Hegel's synthetical
dialectic which attempted to think together the antithetic motives of nature and freedom, PROUDHON directs the verdict, earlier pronounced by KANT and later repeated by KIERKEGAARD: "L’antinomie ne se résout pas" (The antinomy cannot be solved).

Even in Greek antiquity the efforts to reconcile the religious antithesis between the form- and the matter-motive by means of a dialectical logic were dissolved in a later evolution of Greek thought into a polar antithesis 1.

The religious dialectic in the scholastic motive of nature and grace.

A more complicated religious dialectic is exhibited by the scholastic basic motive of nature and grace, introduced in philosophy and theology by Roman Catholicism, and taken over by Protestant scholasticism.

It originally aimed at a synthesis between the central motive of the Word-revelation and that of the Greek (especially the Aristotelian) view of nature (the form-matter motive). But it lends itself as well to a combination of the former with the Humanistic ground-motive of nature and freedom. In this attempt at synthesis, the Christian basic motive necessarily loses its radical and integral character.

For nowhere in the scholastic vision of human nature is there a place for the Biblical revelation of the heart as religious centre and radix of temporal existence. Therefore, Thomistic scholasticism could proclaim the autonomy of natural reason in the "natural sphere" of knowledge, without being aware of the fact that in so doing it handed philosophy over to domination by another religious motive. And the latter could not be rendered harmless by a simple accommodation to the doctrine of the church.

The Greek or the Humanistic basic motive, which here dominates the vision of nature, has in its turn undergone a certain scholastic accommodation to the Christian doctrine of creation or to that of creation and fall, respectively. In the dialectical tension between "nature" and "grace" is concealed, as a component, the inner dialectic of the Greek or Humanistic basic motive, respectively.

In scholastic anthropology this component finds a clear expression in the dichotomist conception of the relation of body

1 See my analysis of the Platonic dialectic in my Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, vol. I.
and soul. The latter is dominated either by the motive of “matter” and “form” or by that of “nature and freedom”.

The inner dialectic of the ground-motive of nature and grace drove scholastic thought in the 14th century from the Thomistic (pseudo-) synthesis (Natura praebulba gratiae) to the Occamist antithesis (no point of contact between nature and grace according to William of Occam, the leader of the nominalist scholasticism of the 14th century).

In the most recent time it has disclosed its polar tendencies in the “dialectical theology”. The conflict between Karl Barth and Emil Brunner was entirely dominated by the question whether in “nature” there may be accepted a “point of contact” for “grace”. Against Brunner’s “yes”, going in the synthetic direction, Barth set his inexorable “no”.

The development of the religious dialectic of the form-matter motive in Greek philosophy and the dialectic unfolding of the motive of nature and grace in the scholastic Christian philosophy have been investigated in detail in the first and second volumes of my Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy. The second part of book I of the present work will be dedicated completely to a transcendental criticism of modern Humanistic philosophy, in which the dialectical development of the motive of nature and freedom will be traced.

The ascription of the primacy to one of the antithetic components of the dialectical ground-motive.

In default of a basis for a real synthesis between the antagonistic religious mainsprings which are operative in a dialectical ground-motive, there remains only a single way out, viz. that of ascribing the “primacy” or the religious precedence to one of the two.

In so far as a philosophic current has become conscious of the religious antithesis in its starting-point, such an ascription will increasingly go hand in hand with a depreciation of and withdrawal of divine attributes from the other mainspring. The ancient Ionian natural philosophy held to the primacy of the matter-motive. It originated in the archaic period in which the old nature- and life-religion, which had been pushed back by the public Olympian religion of the polis broke forth again

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1 This extremely antithetical conception as to the relation of nature and grace is no longer maintained in Barth’s Kirchliche Dogmatik.
openly in religious revivals, in the remarkable Dionysian and Orphic movements.

Consequently, the Ionian thinkers must have been fully aware of the religious conflict in the form-matter motive. The form-principle in this philosophy is entirely deprived of its divine character. According to these thinkers the true God is the form-less, eternally flowing stream of life, generally represented by a “moveable element” (water, fire, air), but in Anaximander conceived of as an invisible “apeiron”, flowing in the stream of time and avenging the injustice of the transitory beings which have originated from it in an individual form, by dissolving them in their formless origin. The deepest conviction of these philosophers may perhaps be expressed by quoting in a typical Greek variant the famous words of Mephisto in Goethe’s Faust:

„Denn alles was (in Form) besteht,
„Ist wert das es zu Grunde geht.”

With Aristotle, on the contrary, in whose philosophy — in accordance with Socrates and Plato — the primacy has passed over to the form-motive, the deity has become “pure Form”, and “matter” is completely deprived of any divine quality by becoming the metaphysical principle of imperfection and “potentiality”.

In the late-medieval scholasticism of William of Occam, which had become keenly conscious of the antagonism between the “nature”- and the “grace-motive”, “natural reason” has become entirely tarnished. There is no longer place here for a metaphysics and a natural theology, although the autonomy of natural reason is maintained to the utmost. The grace-motive retains the primacy, but not in a synthetic hierarchical sense as in Thomism.

In the modern Humanistic philosophy there is originally wanting the clear notion of the religious antithesis between the motive of dominating nature by autonomous science and that of the autonomous freedom of human personality. But scarcely had this notion awakened in Rousseau, when he depreciated the ideal of science and ascribed the primacy to the freedom-motive which is the mainspring of his religion of feeling. Kant, who follows Rousseau in this respect, deprived “nature” (in the natural-scientific sense) of all divine character and even denied its divine origin. God is, according to him, a postulate of practical reason, i.e. a postulate of autonomous morality
which is completely dominated by the Humanistic freedom-motive.

In modern philosophy of life as well as in the Humanistic existence-philosophy, there is seen a still deeper depreciation of the motive of the autonomous control of nature. The freedom-motive here has the absolute religious primacy, even though in a form which is quite different from what it possessed in Rousseau and Kant.

The meaning of each of the antithetic components of a dialectic ground-motive is dependent upon that of the other.

Finally we must observe, that the meaning of each of the antithetic components of a dialectic ground-motive is dependent upon that of the other.

Consequently, it is not possible to understand the meaning of the Greek matter-motive apart from that of the form-principle, and reverse. In the same way, the signification of the scholastic nature-motive and that of the grace-motive determine one another mutually. And so do the Humanistic nature-motive and the freedom-motive.

It is of great consequence for a critical study of the history of philosophic thought that one does not lose sight of this state of affairs. In Greek thought the term “nature” had a very different sense from that which it has in modern Humanistic philosophy. In a Thomistic discussion of the problem of freedom and causality the term freedom may not be understood in the Humanistic sense; as little as the Thomistic concept of causality may be conceived in the sense of the classical-Humanistic motive of nature-domination.

§ 6 - THE TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA OF PHILOSOPHY

The three transcendental Ideas of theoretical thought, through the medium of which the religious basic motive controls this thought.

With the exposure of the religious ground-motives as the true starting-points of philosophy our general transcendental criticism of the theoretical attitude of thought has completed its chief task.

At present, there remains only the question as to the way in which these religious motives control the immanent course of philosophic thought.
To this question the answer must be: through the medium of a triad of transcendental Ideas, which correspond to the three transcendental basic problems of the theoretical attitude of thought. Theoretical thought hereby gains successively its concentric direction to the presupposita which alone make it possible, no matter if a thinker has become aware of them in a really critical way of self-reflection.

For while the theoretical concept of a modal aspect is directed to the modal diversity of meaning and separates the aspect concerned from all the others, the transcendental theoretical Idea is directed to the coherence, the totality and the Origin of all meaning, respectively.

This theoretical Idea does not cancel the theoretical separation and antithesis of the modal aspects, and thus it retains a theoretical character. But within the theoretical attitude of thought itself, it relates the analytically separated and opposed aspects concentrically to their mutual relationship and coherence of meaning, to their integral — or else dialectically broken — radical unity and Origin. It relates them in other words to the presupposita which alone make possible the theoretical concept of the modal speciality and diversity of meaning.

The triunity of the transcendental ground-Idea.

The transcendental Ideas, which are related to the three stages of critical self-reflection in theoretical thought described above, form an indissoluble unity.

For the question, how one understands the mutual relation and coherence of meaning of the modal aspects as theoretically set apart and opposed to one another, is dependent on the question whether or not one accepts the integral religious unity in the root of these aspects, which brings their totality of meaning to concentric expression. Furthermore, this last question is dependent upon the following: how the idea of the Origin of all meaning is conceived of, whether this idea has an integral or rather a dialectically broken character, i.e., whether only one Archè is accepted, or whether two principles of origin are opposed to one another.

Therefore, we can view the three transcendental Ideas, which contain the answer to these fundamental problems, as three directions of one and the same transcendental ground-Idea.

This is the basic Idea of philosophy, but indirectly it also lies at the basis of the various special sciences. The latter ever remains
dependent on philosophy in their theoretical conception of reality, and in their method of forming concepts and problems.

The contents of this Idea, so far as it is directed to the Origin and to the unity (or duality respectively) in the root of the temporal diversity of meaning, is directly determined by the religious basic motive of theoretical thought.

The transcendental critique of theoretical thought and the dogmatic exclusivism of the philosophical schools.

What now is the fruit of this transcendental critique of thought for the discussion among the philosophical schools?

It can pave the way for a real contact of thought among the various philosophical trends. For — paradoxical as it may sound — this contact is basically excluded on the dogmatic standpoint of the autonomy of theoretical reason. Our transcendental critique wages a merciless war against the masking of supra-theoretical prejudices as theoretical axioms which are forced upon the opponent on penalty of his being viewed as an outsider in philosophical matters. In other words, it aims its attack against the dogmatic exclusivism of the schools, all of which fancy themselves to possess the monopoly on philosophical truth.

A sharp distinction between theoretical judgments and the supra-theoretical pre-judgments, which alone make the former possible, is a primary requisite of critical thought.

To this end a painstaking investigation is necessary, as to the transcendental ground-Idea of a philosophical line of thought, with which one intends to enter upon a serious discussion.

An apriori which is binding on all philosophic thought is undoubtedly contained in this basic Idea of philosophy. But what does it avail immanence-philosophy to withdraw from critical self-reflection with respect to this transcendental ground-Idea, if after all this latter manifests its apriori influence in the formulation of every philosophic problem?

Every philosophic thinker must be willing to account critically for the meaning of his formulation of questions. He who really does so, necessarily encounters the transcendental ground-Idea of meaning and of its origin.
The metaphysical-analogical concept of totality and the transcendental Idea of the totality of meaning. Transcendental critique of the metaphysical conception of the *analogia entis*.

Thomistic metaphysics will deny the religious foundation of the transcendental Idea of totality and origin of the modal diversity of meaning in its inter-modal coherence. As to the transcendental Idea of totality, it will argue, that our thought does have an immanent and autonomous transcendental concept of totality, as of a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. Granted, but in what sense is this concept to be understood? Does there not hide in this very concept the whole transcendental problem concerning the relation of modal diversity to the totality and radical unity of meaning? Is not the geometrical concept of totality quite different from the physical-chemical (e.g. that of the atom), from the biological, the psychological, the linguistic, etc.?

The totality in its relation to the modal diversity and inter-modal coherence of meaning cannot be truly approximated by such essentially special scientific concepts which are bound to the modal aspects of meaning, unless I am willing from the outset to steer my philosophic thought into the channels of the different -isms which our transcendental critique has un-masked.

I think, Thomistic metaphysics will agree with this argument. However, it will say, that the transcendental concept of totality is implied in the metaphysical concept of being, which is not of a generic and specific but of an analogical character. Consequently, when we say, that being is a whole in which everything participates, we must conceive of the concept of the whole in this transcendental analogical sense. It is as such a metaphysical pre-supposition of all generic and specific concepts of totality. However, it does not satisfy the requirements of a transcendental Idea in the true critical sense. For, a purely analogical concept of totality lacks as such the concentric direction which is inherent in the transcendental ground-Idea of meaning. It does not direct the modal diversity of meaning in theoretic thought to its unity of root, but remains dispersed by this diversity. For this very reason it cannot replace the transcendental ground-Idea. Moreover, the metaphysical concept of being in its Aristotelian sense is not at all an autonomous concept of theoretical thought, as is pretended here. As soon as we subject it to a radical trans-
cendental critique, it appears to be ruled by the dialectical form-matter motive, which is of a religious character.

Pure matter and pure Form are the two poles in the first (so-called transcendental) distinction of being. Pure matter is the principle of potentiality and imperfection; pure Form is identified with God as pure actuality and unmoved Mover of material nature. This Aristotelian concept of deity is of course accommodated to the Christian doctrine of creation. Here the metaphysical Idea of being and totality results in a transcendental Idea of the Origin which lies at the foundation of a "natural theology". The existence of God as unmoved Mover is proved in various ways, all of which apparently start from empirical data in nature, but which — besides their logically untenable leap from the relative to the absolute — pre-suppose the very conception of God which should be proved. The Ionian philosophers of nature and Heraclitus, who deified the matter-principle of the eternally flowing stream of life, could never ask for an unmoved Mover as prime cause of empirical movement. This was not a logical mistake on the part of these thinkers, but is to be explained only in terms of their holding to the religious precedence of the matter-motive.

In the Thomistic system autonomous metaphysics should replace the transcendental critique of theoretical thought. However, all its metaphysical axioms and "proofs" are nothing but religious pre-suppositions in a dogmatical theoretical elaboration, masked by the dogma concerning the autonomy of natural reason.

It may be supposed, that Aristotle himself was fully aware of the religious character of his form-matter motive, as can be seen from the truly religious manner in which in his Metaphysics he speaks about the mystical moments of union of human thought with the divine pure Form through theological theoria. Thomas could not be aware of this, because his view of the autonomy of natural reason (ruled by the scholastic motive of nature and grace) implied a meaning of autonomy quite different from that of the Aristotelian conception.

Our conclusion must be, that the metaphysical concept of the whole and its parts, implied in the analogical concept of being, is a pseudo-concept. It does not explain in what manner the theoretic diversity of meaning can be concentrated on a deeper unity. A purely analogical unity, as implied in the analogical concept of being, is no unity at all, but remains dispersed in the diversity of the modal aspects of meaning.
It cannot even explain the coherence in this modal diversity, because this coherence is the very pre-supposition of a true analogy

An analogical concept cannot be useful in philosophy, unless it is qualified by a non-analogical moment of meaning which determines its special modal sense. But this state of affairs cannot be explained before the development of our theory of the modal aspects of meaning. And this is reserved for the second volume of this work.

The so-called logical formalizing of the concept of totality and the philosophical Idea of totality.

Now EDMUND HUSSERL has supposed in his Logische Untersuchungen (II, 1 p. 284 fl.) that one could pass beyond the modal diversity [of meaning] of the totality-concept by means of the logical formalizing of the latter.

In this way he arrived at the “formal logical” relation, “whole and its parts”, which is to be purified from all non-logical speciality of meaning. And in regard to this formal relation there can, according to him, be formulated different purely logical propositions and definitions by means of the formal concept of “logical foundation” (logische Fundierung). I must reserve basic criticism of these so-called purely analytical definitions and propositions until, in the course of the discussion of the problem of knowledge in vol. II, KANT’s distinction between synthetic and analytic judgments is subjected to a critical investigation. I must,

I have not discussed here the theological use of the analogia entis. For this subject I may refer to my recent treatise in the quarterly review “Philosophia Reformata”, 17th year (1952) entitled: “The transcendental critique of theoretical thought and the Thomistic theologia naturalis.

There is no place in our philosophy for an analogical concept of being in its metaphysical-theological sense.

Being is only to be ascribed to God, whereas creation has only meaning, the dependent mode of reality or existence. A true concept of being is impossible. The word being has no unity of meaning. When, in our Introduction, we called meaning the being of all that has been created, the word “being” designed only “essence”, which does not transcend the boundaries of meaning. Only the transcendental ground-Idea which is ruled by the central motive of the divine Word-Revelation, can relate the different modal aspects of meaning to the divine Being of the Origin. But this Idea is not an autonomous concept, and it is incompatible with every form of natural theology.

That the proposition: “the whole is more than its parts” should be purely analytic, is to be disputed on good grounds. It can even be disputed
however, even in the present context observe, that even a logically formalized concept “whole”, granted that it has any sense, would remain ultimately enclosed in the modal speciality of signification, namely in that of the modal-analytical aspect, which itself supposes the inter-modal coherence of meaning, especially that between the analytical and the linguistic aspect.

For this very reason, this concept is unfit to occupy the place of the transcendental Idea of totality. On the contrary, it must be dependent on a transcendental Idea of meaning.

Only the latter can, as a limiting concept, point beyond the modal diversity to the temporal coherence and the supra-temporal totality of meaning. Yet, this transcendental Idea is nothing apart from a content which philosophic thought is incapable of deriving from itself.

Every attempt at a sufficient determination of the meaning of philosophical concepts necessarily discloses, in the process of critical self-reflection, the transcendental ground-Idea of the philosophical course of thought.

The principle of the Origin and the continuity-principle in Cohen’s philosophy.

Hermann Cohen, the founder of the Marburg neo-Kantian School, for example, starts by interpreting philosophic thought (the “Vernunft”) as self-sufficient “thinking of being” and of its origin. To this thought, as thought of the origin („Ursprungs-denken”), he sets the task of creating reality from this thought itself, namely, in a transcendental-logical process according to the “principle of continuity”. With reference to such a program the following critical problems must be raised: Where do you actually find your Archimedean point in that “Vernunft”, which you yourself break up into the modal diversity of logical,

on the basis that the question whether every whole implies the existence of parts is not to be answered in terms of pure logic. Even the linguistic meaning of the term “whole” is not of purely logical character. The term may in itself very well be used in opposition to “existing in parts”. This holds in particular for a concentric whole as the human I-ness, in which the entire temporal human existence is concentrated.

For the rest, it appears from Husserl’s explanation that his formalized concept of the whole is conceived in the special sense of pure mathematics and that, according to him, the latter is to be reduced to pure logic. Consequently, his logical formalization of the concept “the whole and its parts” is based upon a transcendental Idea of the relation and coherence of the modal aspects of meaning.
ethical, and aesthetic reason? What meaning do you ascribe to the principle of the origin and to that of continuity, with which you intend to bridge the modal diversity of meaning referred to?

These questions are not to be evaded in philosophic thought! COHEN's system suggests to us, that the “principle of truth” („Grundsatz der Wahrheit“) implies a continuous coherence between logos and ethos. Nonetheless, thought and volition are to have different meanings. Therefore, it is no use transferring the principles of “origin” and “continuity” from the “Logic of Pure Knowledge” to the “Ethics of Pure Will”. The coherence in the diversity of meaning may not be sought in the speciality of meaning. To be sure one can strike on the anvil of the “unity of reason” 2. But, as long as this unity is not shown to us in a totality beyond the diversity of meaning, implied in its different functions, the “unity of Reason” remains an Asylum Ignorantiae 3. As soon as COHEN's principle of continuity itself is reduced to its origin, it turns out to be a principle with a

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1 COHEN himself recognizes this question as a special problem of philosophy. See his *Logic of pure Knowledge (Logik der reinen Erkenntnis)*, 3rd Ed., p. 17. Actually it is rather the basic problem of his philosophy, with respect to which only critical self-reflection as to his logicistic ground-Idea could bring clarity. For, apart from a transcendental ground-Idea, the unity of consciousness cannot be grasped philosophically.

2 Remarkably we find this sort of mystification in the strongest degree in KANT, who in his criticism has contributed most toward the dissolution of this would-be unity in the dualism of theoretical and practical reason, which in substance (essence) he never bridged. In the Preface of the *Kr. der R. V.* (1st Ed.) he writes: „In der Tat ist auch reine Vernunft eine so vollkommene Einheit, dass, wenn das Prinzip derselben nur zu einer einzigen aller der Fragen, die ihr durch ihre eigene Natur aufgegeben sind, unzureichend wäre, man dieses immerhin nur wegwerfen könnte, weil es alsdann auch keiner der übrigen mit voller Zuverlässigkeit gewachsen sein würde.“ [“Indeed, pure reason is a perfect unity to such an extent, that, if the principle presented by it should prove to be insufficient for the solution of even a single one of those questions to which the very nature of reason gives birth, we must reject it, as we could not be perfectly certain of its sufficiency in the case of the others”].

In the Preface, p. 19, of his *grundl. zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, he speaks of „am Ende nur eine und dieselbe Vernunft, die bloß in der Anwendung unterschieden sein mag“ [“ultimately it is one and the same Reason that may show diversity only in its application”].

3 As in COHEN’s expression: „Das Denken, das die Bewegung mit sich führt, verwandelt sich selbst in Wollen und Handlung.“ [*Ethics of Pure Will;* 4th Ed., p. 110: “Thinking in which movement is inherent, transforms itself into will and action.”] *Ethik des Reinen Wollens*, 4th
special mathematical sense, which is absolutized to an transcendental Idea of the inter-modal coherence in the modal diversity of meaning! Here a supra-theoretical motive manifests itself and also determines the contents of Cohen's Idea of totality.

Theoretical thought remains imprisoned in the modal diversity of meaning and therefore does not become truly philosophic thought, so long as it not directed by a transcendental Idea of the totality which is dependent on a supra-theoretical basic-motive.

Being and Validity and the critical preliminary question as to the meaning of these concepts.

The so-called South West German School in neo-Kantian philosophy proceeds to introduce into philosophic thought the opposition between being and validity, reality and value. Behind this opposition there crops up anew the transcendental problem as to the mutual relations of modal speciality, inter-modal coherence, and totality of meaning. For the question arises: In what sense are being and validity understood here? Are they intended as transcendental logical determinations, originating from thought, as basic categories? If so, can a basic category of "being" in its transcendental-logical sense bridge the modal diversity of the different aspects which, even in an abstract naturalistic conception of empirical reality as defended by Kant, cannot be eliminated? In Kant's epistemology "reality" was only one of the "categories of modality". Is "validity" also to be understood in the sense of such a category? If so, can it bridge in this logical sense the fundamental diversity of meaning in the "realm of values"?

It is of no avail for Rickert to reserve the term "meaning" exclusively for "culture", as a subjective relating of "reality" to "values". The fundamental philosophical distinction between "being" and "validity" pretends to have a meaning. The critical question is whether these "categories" embrace the totality of meaning of empirical reality and of the realm of values, respectively, or only their logical aspect.

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Ed., p. 110. Cohen seeks the deeper unity in the "Methode der Reinheit", but this method can bridge the fundamental diversity of meaning only for a logicistic outlook.

1 In fact derived from the infinitesimal calculus.
Genericity of meaning versus totality of meaning.

If the category does not possess this totality of meaning, what then is its relation to the totality and to the coherence of meaning among the modal aspects? By ascribing a mere *generic meaning* to the "logical categories", I do not advance a single step.

Levelling of the modal diversity of meaning in the *generic concept* rests upon an uncritical misjudgment of the special meaning in the logical aspect.

In a special science, to be sure, one may form so-called *generic concepts* (class-, genus-concepts, etc.) in order to join together the individual phenomena *within* a special modal aspect of reality. But the irreducible *modal meaning* of the different aspects themselves does not permit itself to be levelled down logically by any *generic concept*. This levelling out always implies, that the specific meaning of the logical aspect is ignored. In theoretical thought every attempt by means of a "generic concept" to gloss over the diversity of meaning of the logical aspect of thought and the modal aspects set in opposition to it, betrays the influence of a transcendental ground-Idea. For, in such a generic concept, I ascribe to the special modal meaning of logic the power to bridge the modal diversity of meaning in the theoretical *gegenstand-relation*. This exceeds the limits of genuine logic and attributes to a pseudo-logical concept the function of a transcendental Idea of totality.

The most seductive way in which the transcendental ground-Idea of philosophy is masked is that of dialectical logic. This may finally be illustrated by the philosophical standpoint of another famous German thinker in respect to the relation of logic and reality.

The masking of the transcendental ground-Idea by the so-called dialectical logic. THEODOR LITT.

THEODOR LITT, who in this respect intends to continue the tradition of post-Kantian idealism, supposes, that he has found the Archimedean point of his philosophic thought in the "pure reflection" of theoretical thought on its own activity. In the course of his inquiries he proceeds to introduce a dialectical identity of the "thinking ego" (the "pure thought in its self-reflection") and the "concrete ego" (the ego as real individual "totality" of all its physical-psychical functions "in space and time").

However, in the critical consideration of this dialectical con-
ception, we are obliged to raise the following questions: In what sense do you understand this “dialectical identity” and in what sense the “concrete ego”?

Then it appears forthwith, that the “dialectical identity” is intended in a transcendental-logical sense; for Litt teaches us: “In the unity of the thinking I and the concrete I, the former gains the mastery”\(^1\).

The “thinking ego” is conceived here in the reflexive-logical sense of Fichte’s “Wissenschaftslehre”. It is the “transcendental-logical subject of Kant’s epistemology which has its “Gegenstand” in the “empirical ego in time and space”, but, in a second reflexion should overcome this antithesis which in Kant was definitive. Only in “pure thought”, according to Litt, does the “concrete ego” come to itself. For the latter does not transcend the former. The relation is just the reverse “It” (i.e. the concrete ego) “has the standpoint of possible self-assurance absolutely beyond itself, and is thus absolutely not ”übergreifend” (i.e. capable to conceive the transcendental ego)\(^2\).

The critical question is, however, whether the “pure” (i.e. abstracted) logical function of human thought can transcend the modal limits of its aspect in a dialectical way, and whether the deeper unity beyond the modal diversity of meaning can be of a dialectical-logic character. Here we again touch the transcendental problem of the “Archimedean point”, discussed in our Introduction.

In this “Archimedean point” the modal diversity of meaning, which at first sight is confusing, must be overcome. For from this point our selfhood must direct the philosophical view of totality over the modal and typical diversity of meaning in its theoretical distinction.

In Litt, however, the theoretic relating of the modal diversity of meaning to its integral unity of root has become impossible as a result of the hidden dualism in his religious ground-motive. Therefore he introduces a dialectical idea of unity which must relate this modal diversity to the two antithetic motives, each of which for itself pretends to express an ultimate unity of meaning (scl. nature and freedom).

\(^1\) “In der Einheit von denkendem und konkretem Ich eignet dem ersteren die übergreifende Macht.”

\(^2\) Einleitung in die Philosophie (1933), p. 162: „Es hat den Standort möglicher Selbstvergewisserung durchaus jenseits seiner selbst, ist also durchaus nicht übergreifend.”
Modal diversity and radical identity of meaning. Logical identity has only modal meaning, PARMENIDES.

All diversity of meaning in temporal reality supposes a temporal coherence of meaning and the latter in its turn must again be the expression of a deeper identity. We have seen, that the transcendental Idea of coherence of meaning is the necessary basic denominator, under which I must theoretically bring the modal aspects in order to be able to compare them with one another in their diversity.

For if they were to have nothing in common with each other, they could not even be distinguished from one another. On our own standpoint, as I have previously observed, only the transcendental Idea of time can serve as such a basic denominator. For the cosmic order of time expresses itself alike in the modal structure of all aspects, and brings them into indissoluble coherence of meaning, without derogating from their mutual irreducibility.

But the temporal coherence of meaning of the aspects supposes their deeper identity in a religious unity of root. For we have seen, that without this latter, there would still be lacking the necessary starting-point for the comparison, and consequently for theoretical synthesis. The denominator of comparison cannot itself furnish us with this point of departure.

But the unity-and-identity, taken in its dialectical-logical sense, is not the unity-and-identity to which the transcendental ground-idea of philosophy can be directed.

For, the logical or analytical unity-and-identity, on which PARMENIDES supposed he could build his entire metaphysical doctrine of being, is not the unity-identity sought for beyond the temporal diversity of meaning.

It is only by a metaphysical identification of “pure” reflexive logical thought and being that LITT assumes a dialectical unity-and-identity of the “concrete ego” and the “transcendental logical ego”.

Here LITT disagrees fundamentally with KANT but is in keeping with FICHTE and HEGEL. By means of a dialectical logic he attempts to overcome the dualism in his hidden starting-point: the dialectical ground-motive of nature and freedom. The “concrete ego” is conceived here as a “physical-psychical individual” belonging to the realm of nature. The “pure thinking ego”, or the “reflexive-logical subject” is nothing but the theoretical expression of the freedom-motive, in the pure reflexive act
of thought. It has the free and autonomous power of opposing itself to the whole "concrete ego" which is dispersed in the diversity of its functions. It has also the sovereign power of transcending the modal limits of the logical aspect and its analytical laws. Consequently, it is identical with the "concrete ego", but identical in a dialectical-logical sense.

However, this dialectical Idea of unity-and-identity is a pseudo-logical one. It is nothing but a masked transcendental ground-Idea, expressing the supra-theoretical presuppositions of Litt's philosophy. It is conceived in an uncritical synthetic form, which in the transcendental process of critical self-reflection must necessarily be reduced to an antithetic one. For the dialectical ground-motive of nature and freedom does not allow of a real synthesis of its antagonistic components. Nevertheless, the freedom-motive has the inner tendency to absorb the opposite one, just as the motive of the domination of nature has the tendency to absorb the freedom-motive. This is also demonstrated

1 See op. cit. p. 74: „Das seelische Leben so der umfassenden Kausalität des Naturgeschehens einordnen — das heiszt dieses Seelenleben aufs offenkundigste „vergegenständlichen“. Geh man von diesem Aspekt in die Tiefen der Reflexion zurück, so sieht man die genannte Schwierigkeit alsbald in nichts zergehen. Denn einmal erweist sich hier die Ansicht, die das seelische Leben dem gegenständlichen Denken darbietet, als durchaus bedingt und der Korrektur sowohl fähig als auch bedürftig, womit an Stelle der „Freiheit“ die angebliche „Notwendigkeit“ höchst zweifelhaft zu werden beginnt. Diese Anzeiflung aber verwandelt sich in Verneinung, sobald ein Weiteres bedacht wird: das unanfechtbarste Zeugnis dafür, das das seelische Leben der Erhebung über jede Art von „Notwendigkeit“ fähig ist, liegt — in eben dem Denken selbst, das sich in der Reflexion seiner bewusst wird... „Freiheit“, die alle Verkettung von Ursache und Wirkung unter sich lässt, ist überall da verwirklicht, wo gedacht wird, also u.a.auch da, wo „Notwendigkeit“, „Kausalität“ gedacht wird.“ [“The inclusion of psychic life into the comprehensive causality of natural events is most manifestly objectivizing psychic life. If from this aspect we turn back to the depths of reflection, the difficulty just mentioned passes into nothingness. For here it appears, that the aspect that psychic life presents to objectivizing thought, is always and in every respect one of being conditioned and capable of correction as well as needing it, so that instead of “freedom” it is the so-called “necessity” which begins to be most doubtful. This doubt turns into a denial, as soon as a further thought presents itself: The most irrefutable evidence of the fact that psychic life is capable of transcending any kind of “necessity” is to be found in thought itself which becomes conscious of itself in reflection... “Freedom”, leaving all manner of connection between cause and effect behind, is realized wherever there is thought, hence a.o. also there where “necessity”, “causality” is thought.”]
by Lrrr's important sociology, in which the pattern of thought of natural-science is completely replaced by a dialectical phenomenological one.

Dialectical logic is an uncritical attempt to solve the transcendental basic-problem of the theoretical synthesis. It intends to overcome the theoretical antithesis by a dialectical-logical idea of unity, which turns out to be no unity at all. For Lrrr does not actually solve the transcendental problem concerning the unity in the root of the modal diversity of meaning in its theoretical distinction. He does not and cannot explain how the "pure thinking ego" and the "concrete ego" which is its theoretic opposite (Gegenstand), can be one and the same. This identity cannot be a logical one. For in this case the "gegenstand-relation" would be eliminated, whereas Lrrr wants to maintain this latter emphatically. Now we saw, that in default of a transcendental idea of the integral unity in the root of human selfhood — which is excluded by Lrrr's dialectical ground-motive —, dialectical logic furnishes philosophy with an apparently autonomous dialectic idea of unity. However, the transcendental critique of philosophic thought does not permit itself to be led astray by theoretical dogmatism. Dialectic logic, no more than scholastic metaphysics, can replace it.

Logic itself is to be set by philosophy within the complex of problems involved in the relation between modal speciality, diversity, temporal coherence and totality of meaning.

Whoever does not want to fall into the uncritical error of logicism, should admit, that the logical aspect of thought is itself enclosed within the modal diversity and the inter-modal coherence of meaning and — at least in that respect — has no philosophic advantage above the other aspects. At this very point, the Biblical religious conception of the centre of human existence unfolds its full critical signification for philosophy.

Lrrr intends not only a logical but a real identity of the pure thinking and the concrete ego, in order to save the real identity of the selfhood in the antithesis of the gegenstand-relation.

However, he cannot accept the religious transcendence of the I-ness in respect to its pure logical thought. He holds to the opinion, that the ego by elevating itself to the abstracted function of "pure thought" has reached the ultimate limit of its inner possibilities.

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Consequently, according to him, the real identity of the “concrete” and the “pure thinking” ego must be a dialectical-logical one, because the concrete ego “comes to itself” only in pure reflexive thought. This is a dialectical-metaphysical logicism, although Lrrr emphatically rejects the metaphysical Aristotelian conception of pure thought as a substance which is absolutely separate from the “concrete ego”.

§ 7 - THE TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA AS HYPOTHESIS OF PHILOSOPHY

The theoretical character of the transcendental ground-Idea and its relation to naïve experience.

The question may now be raised, why I conceived the contents of the transcendental ground-Idea of philosophy only as a fundamental determination of the relation between origin, totality and modal diversity of meaning in the coherence of the different modal aspects. Is this not much too abstract a conception of this basic Idea?

We have seen, that naïve experience has not yet arrived at the level of theoretical analysis of the different modalities of meaning; therefore it does not explicitly conceive the modal aspects of temporal reality. Reality presents itself to the pre-theoretic view exclusively in the typical total-structures of individuality, which encompass all modal aspects together; but the latter are not conceived here in theoretical distinction. Now it appeared, that naïve experience is in no way inconsequential for philosophy. Therefore, it seems insufficient to point the transcendental ground-Idea only toward the theoretical antithesis of the modal aspects of temporal reality.

sich zum Ich des reinen Denkens zuspitzt und emporsteigt, das Äusserste und Letzte seiner inneren Möglichkeiten erreicht: denn erst als solches wird es Subjekt der Reflexion und damit mächtig der „übergreifenden“ Denktät. In seinen Gesichtskreis fällt von nun an grundsätzlich alles, was das konkrete Ich nur immer tun und erleiden mag; es ist im Besitz der Souveränität, die es ihm gestattet, sich dem Ganzen seines konkreten Erlebens, dieses sein denkendes Tun eingeschlossen, gegenüberzustellen.”
[“This is to say that only in rarefying and elevating itself into the -I- of pure thought can the -I- reach the utmost limits and the last of its inner possibilities — for only as such does it become the subject of reflection and consequently able to “comprehensive” thinking. Everything that the concrete -I- can ever do or suffer, falls within its range of vision; it is in possession of the sovereignty that enables it to oppose to itself the whole of its concrete experience, that of its thinking act included.”]
Every philosophic view of empirical reality ought to be confronted with the datum of naïve experience in order to test its ability to account for this datum in a satisfying manner. Therefore, is it not also necessary to direct the contents of the transcendental ground-Idea toward the diversity and coherence of meaning in the typical structures of individuality?

The datum of naïve experience as a philosophical problem.

This question I will answer as follows. Philosophy must convert the datum of naïve experience into a fundamental philosophic problem. For it is evident, that by maintaining the attitude of naïve experience one would never be able to account for that datum philosophically. Consequently, since philosophy is bound to the theoretic attitude of thought, its transcendental ground-Idea is also bound to the theoretical gegenstand-relation in which temporal reality is set asunder in its modal aspects.

Therefore, philosophy cannot examine the typical structures of individual totality without a theoretical analysis of their given unity. These structures, too, must be made a philosophical problem, and this problem can be no other but that of their temporal unity in the modal diversity of meaning, manifesting itself in the different aspects of reality. Their typical character and their relation to concrete individuality does not derogate from this state of affairs.

Besides, the transcendental ground-Idea of meaning implies a relation to the cosmonomic side as well as to the factual subject-side of temporal reality. And the latter is by nature individual. In other words, this transcendental Idea is also a ground-Idea of type and individuality, but it is always bound to the theoretical gegenstand-relation.

The naïve concept of the thing and the special scientific concept of function.

On the level of modern scientific thought the naïve concept of the thing is in the process of being broken up into functional concepts. This is done in order to gain knowledge of the functional coherence of the phenomena within a special modal aspect. Under the influence of the classic Humanistic ideal of science, which we shall examine presently in detail, there was even an evident tendency to eliminate the typical structures of
individuality and to dissolve the entire empirical reality into a continuous functional system of causal relations. This was, to be sure, an absolutizing of the scientific concept of function and it could only lead philosophical thought astray. However, this consideration does not derogate from the value of the concept of function as such.

The gain accruing from its application in the different branches of science was enormous. One by one, the modal aspects of temporal reality, especially the mathematical and physical ones, opened to penetrating scientific analysis the secret of their immanent functional relations and laws.

But the more deeply special scientific thought penetrated into its "Gegenstand" (i.e. the abstracted special aspect of reality which limits its field of research), the more sharply was revealed the fundamental deficiency of theoretical thought in comparison with naïve experience.

By being bound to a special scientific viewpoint, a special science loses the vision of the whole with respect to empirical reality, and consequently the integral empirical reality itself is lost from its grasp. If special science were to be entirely autonomous, this void could never be filled and special science would be impossible for lack of a veritable view of reality. For temporal reality is not given in abstracted modal aspects; it does not give itself "gegenständlich". Special science is never in a position to account for our naïve experience of things; it cannot even render an account of its own possibility.

Naïve experience has an integral vision of the whole, so far as it conceives of temporal things and events in their typical structures of individual totality. Furthermore, so far as it is rooted in the ground-motive of the Christian religion, naïve experience also has the radical and integral view of temporal reality by which the latter is concentrically conceived in its true religious root and in its relation to its true Origin. But its view of the whole is a naïve one, which for lack of a theoretical insight into the modal diversity of meaning does not satisfy the requirements of the transcendental ground-Idea as hypothesis of philosophic thought. The concrete unity of things is not a problem to naïve experience.

Philosophy, special science, and naïve experience.

Only philosophy has the task of grasping in the view of totality the different modal aspects of meaning as they are set asunder
by theoretic thought. In this way, philosophy has to account for both naïve experience and special science.

Therefore, even where naïve experience is made into a theoretic problem of philosophy, the transcendental ground-Idea of the latter can have no other contents but that which we have found in our transcendental critique.

Methodically, philosophic inquiry as to the modal structures of the abstracted aspects of temporal reality must necessarily precede the philosophic analysis of the typical structures of individual totality. For the latter imply the theoretical problem of the structural temporal unity in the diversity of its modal aspects. Special science, as such, in its different branches can neither have an autonomous conception of the modal structures of the different aspects nor of the typical structures of individual totality.

For, a theoretical analysis of these temporal structures requires the theoretic view of totality which is in the nature of the case a philosophic one.

The modal structure of a special aspect is a temporal unity in a diversity of modal structural moments, which can display their modal meaning only in their structural coherence and totality. Besides, we have seen, that within the modal structure of a special aspect there is expressed the inter-modal coherence of cosmic time-order, so that the former cannot be conceived of theoretically without a transcendental idea of its coherence with all other modal aspects and of the radical unity of the modal diversity of meaning. Special sciences — with the exception of pure mathematics — are pointed to the examination of the functional coherence as well as the typical character (and in differenter branches of science also the individuality) of transitory phenomena within a special modal aspect of temporal reality. The very modal structures of temporal reality are not to be conceived theoretically by means of special scientific concepts, which in their turn must be made a philosophic problem. When, for instance, Einstein's theory of relativity handles the concepts of time and space, the special synthetic meaning of these concepts in relation to those of other special sciences as biology, psychology, history, etc. remains hidden.

This meaning can be made clear only in a philosophic inquiry as to the modal structure of the physical aspect, which requires the theoretical view of totality.

Nevertheless, a philosophic conception of this modal structure
Prolegomena

is an implicit hypothesis of physics, because its special branch of inquiry is limited in principle by the structure of the physical aspect of experience and empirical reality.

"Reflexive" thought versus "objective" thought in recent philosophy. The confusion of "object" and "Gegenstand" in this opposition.

It is not right, that philosophy must or can abandon the antithetic relation (gegenstand-relation) which we found to be inherent in the theoretic attitude of thought. This is supposed by that current in modern immanence-philosophy which opposes philosophy (as reflexive thought, introverted to the "transcendental logical subject of pure thinking") to all "gegenständliches Denken". This latter should be the "naïve" manner of thought proper to special science, entirely lost in the study of its "objects" without reflecting about the activity of the pure thinking ego, which can never be made into a "Gegenstand". We have met this conception of the difference between philosophical and "objective" scientific thought in the discussion of Theodor Litt's standpoint as to the relation of "thinking ego" and "concrete ego".

It is evident, that it is based upon a fatal confusion of "object" and "Gegenstand" and of the really "naïve" and the theoretical attitudes of thought. In fact, it appeared, that Litt's "pure thinking ego" could not be detached from the gegenstand-relation.

What distinguishes philosophy from special science cannot be the abandoning of the antithetical relation, but rather the focusing (of the former) towards the totality and unity in the root of temporal meaning. We have seen, that this concentric direction of theoretic thought is possible only by means of truly critical self-reflection which must break through the theoretic horizon in order to gain religious self-knowledge.

The transcendental ground-Idea as hypothesis of philosophy.

Consequently, we arrive again and again at the transcendental ground-Idea as the real hypothesis of philosophic thought. The supposition, that philosophy might refrain from giving an account of the conditions of its possibility has appeared to be uncritical in the highest degree.

In the first place, philosophy itself requires its transcendental
foundation, its ἱπόθεσις. A vicious circle is involved in making special science a philosophic (epistemological) problem, while withdrawing from a critical consideration of the pre-suppositions of philosophical thought itself. For the main transcendental problem involved in special science, viz. the possibility of an inter-modal synthesis of meaning, is implied a fortiori in philosophic thought. The latter is immediately confronted at every stage of its inquiry with the fundamental problems concerning the relation of origin, totality, modal diversity, and inter-modal coherence of meaning.

Now since philosophic thought cannot become its own “Gegen-stand”, philosophy, in the basic critical question as to its own possibility, encounters its immanent limits within cosmic time. These limits can be accounted for only in the concentric direction of theoretical thought to its supra-theoretic pre-suppositions.

Truly reflexive thought, therefore, is characterized by the critical self-reflection as to the transcendental ground-Idea of philosophy, in which philosophic thought points beyond and above itself toward its own apriori conditions within and beyond cosmic time.

As soon as reflexive theoretic thought is conceived of as a “free” act which transcends all structural limits, because the latter can belong only to the “gegenständliche” world, we arrive once more at the illusory conception of the sovereignty and autonomy of philosophic reflection.

The pitfall in this conception appeared to be the identification of “Gegenstand” and “temporal reality”, due to the lack of insight into the true character of the “gegenstand-relation” and of cosmic time as hypothesis of the latter. The structural limits of philosophic thought transcend the gegenstand-relation, because they are founded in cosmic time, which cannot be determined by thought, since it is the very pre-supposition of the latter.

Only in reflection on its transcendental ground-Idea is philosophy urged on to its insurmountable apriori limits which give philosophic thought its ultimate well-defined character in the universal cosmic coherence of meaning. It is not philosophic thought that determines its apriori conditions in self-sufficiency, but the very reverse: philosophic thought is determined and limited by its transcendental focusing toward its presupposita. It is limited by being bound to its intentional as well as to its ontical structure in cosmic time.

In the basic Idea of philosophy we are engaged in reflection
while thinking to the limits of philosophic thought. This Idea is therefore in the full sense of the word, a *limiting-concept* "par excellence", the final transcendental *foundation* or ἐπόθεσις of philosophy, in which we retire into ourselves when thinking. We can reflect critically upon the limits of philosophic thought, only because *in our selfhood* we transcend them as limits of *philosophic* knowledge. The pre-supposita of philosophy, toward which the basic idea of philosophy points, are themselves infinitely more than *Idea*. Idealism, which elevates the Idea itself as totality of meaning, is possible only upon the immanence-stand-point. But its *transcendental foundation*, its philosophic *ground-Idea* continues to point beyond the *Idea* to that which exceeds the transcendental limits of philosophy, inasmuch as it alone *makes philosophic idealism possible*. The immanence-stand-point merely prevents philosophic thought from proceeding to this last stage of critical self-reflection.

The relation of transcendent and transcendental points of view and the original meaning of the transcendental motive.

We can thus provisionally summarize our point of view with reference to the limits of philosophy:

The religious pre-suppositon of philosophy, toward which the ground-Idea as transcendental foundation of philosophy is directed in its contents, toward which as Idea it *points*, is of a *transcendent* nature, whereas philosophic thought is itself of a *transcendental* character. The choice of the Archimedean point necessarily crosses the boundary line of the temporal coherence of our world. Philosophy itself, *though directed* by its ground-Idea, remains within this boundary line, *because it is possible only by virtue of the temporal order of the world*.

*Transcendent* and *transcendental*, taken in this sense, are thus no "either-or". For the actually transcendental direction of theoretic thought pre-supposes the transcendent and central sphere of our consciousness from which this direction starts, since this starting-point is not be found in theoretic thought itself.

Only in this view as to the relation of transcendent and transcendental conditions of philosophy is the original *critical meaning* of transcendental thought given its due.
Kant's opinion concerning the transcendental Ideas.
Why did Kant fail to conceive of these Ideas as \[\text{prothesis},\] of his critiques.

The real transcendental direction of Kant's epistemology in this original critical sense does not disclose itself until the necessary function of the transcendental Ideas of theoretical reason are discussed in the "transcendental dialectic". Here Kant clearly explains, that these Ideas point to an absolute totality which transcends the immanent limits of "objective experience", and at the same time in their theoretical knowledge remain bound to the immanent limits of theoretical knowledge itself. Here, also emerge the three transcendental Ideas which in their triunity must be considered as the transcendental ground-Idea and the real \[\text{prothesis}\] of every possible philosophy, namely, the Idea of the universe which — although in Kant restricted to the sphere of "nature" — corresponds to our Idea of the integral coherence of meaning in cosmic time, the Idea of the ultimate unity of human selfhood and that of the absolute Origin (Urwesen).

Nevertheless, Kant does not accept these transcendental Ideas in their triunity as the real hypothesis of his "critical" philosophy. He does not see that, in their very theoretical use, they must have a real content which necessarily depends upon supra-theoretic pre-suppositions differing in accordance with the religious ground-motives of theoretic thought. He restricted their significance theoretically to a purely formal-logical one; they have, according to him, only a regulative, systematic function in respect to the use of the logical concepts (categories) which are related apriori to sensory experience. Why did Kant at this critical point abandon the real transcendental motive?

Naturally one could answer: because he held to the autonomy of theoretic thought, and this would not be incorrect. But the deeper reason is to be found in the fact that he had become aware of the unbridgeable antithesis in the ground-motive of nature and freedom, and now rejected every attempt at dialectical synthesis.

Nevertheless, he did not see, that his theoretical epistemology itself remained bound to a transcendental ground-Idea, whose contents were determined by this very religious basic motive. His conception of the autonomy and spontaneity of the transcendental logical function of thought is doubtless ruled by the Humanistic freedom-motive, whereas the nature-motive finds clear ex-
pression in his conception of the purely receptive character of the sensory function of experience, and of its subjection to the causal determinations of science. **Kant** accepted the synthesis between natural necessity and freedom in his epistemological conception concerning the apriori relatedness of the transcendental categories to sensory experience, whereas he rejected this synthesis in his ethics. Nevertheless, we shall see in the more detailed investigation of his theory of knowledge, that he could not account for the possibility of the synthesis between the logical and the sensory function of consciousness, because of his dualistic starting-point. This is consequently not to be explained in terms of a purely theoretical critique of human knowledge. But it is dependent on the fundamental dualism in his religious ground-motive.

It was **Fichte** who tried to remove the difficulties involved in the Kantian dualistic conception.

In the first edition of his „Wissenschaftslehre“, **Fichte** made „practical freedom“ the hypothesis of his theoretical epistemology and introduced a dialectical logic for the sake of bridging the Kantian gulf between epistemology and ethics. This, too, is not to be understood from a purely theoretical standpoint, but only from **Fichte’s** new conception of the transcendental ground-Idea of Humanistic thought. In this conception the postulate of continuity, implied in the freedom-motive, broke through the boundaries which in the Kantian conception were accepted with respect to the theoretical use of the transcendental Idea of freedom.

Anyhow, the very transcendental motive implies the focusing of theoretic thought by self-reflection on its transcendental ground-Idea which points beyond and above its own theoretical limits to its transcendent pre-supposita.

In **Kant**’s „dialectic of pure reason“ the transcendental Ideas within their theoretical limits do point, indeed, to a transcendent realm of the „noumenon“, in which at least the Ideas of free autonomous will and of God have „practical reality“. **Kant** did not accept limits of theoretical thought which are not set by thought itself, except its being bound to sensory perception. The transcendental Idea of freedom in its dialectical relation to the category of causality is, in fact, the hypothesis of his transcendental logic, although he did not acknowledge it as such. This is the same Idea which in **Kant’s** „Critique of Practical
Reason" obtains "practical, reality" for "reasonable belief".

If this essential function of the transcendental idea as hypothesis in its pointing beyond the limits of theoretical thought is lost sight of, the very transcendental motive hidden in Kant's criticism cannot be understood.

The decline of the transcendental motive in the Marburg methodological logicism, in Litt's conception of reflexive thought, and in Husserl's "egology".

In the (so-called critical) logicistic idealism of the Marburg School this motive fades away into the merely methodological postulate of logical purity and continuity in the system of knowledge.

When Cohen says, that the transcendental Idea is nothing but the "self-consciousness of the (logical) concept", this pronouncement lacks the very transcendental meaning of Kant's conception, because in Cohen, the pointing of this Idea towards a transcendent sphere has disappeared. The tendency toward the origin on the part of philosophic thought, which in his "Logik des Ursprungs" (Logic of Origin) is very evident, here fails to lead to critical self-reflection in the true sense of the word. The same must be said with respect to Litt's conception of the pure self-reflection of theoretical thought and with respect to Edmund Husserl's so-called "ego-logy", both of which exclude the existence of limits for the "transcendental cogito" ("I think"). No matter how these latter conceptions of the "cogito" may differ from one another, both deny the transcendence of the ego in respect to transcendental thought or transcendental (phenomenologically purified) consciousness, respectively. The very transcendental Idea, pointing beyond and above itself to the pre-suppositions of philosophical thought, has no sense here.

The basic Idea of philosophy remains a subjective \( \text{πρόφασις} \). The criterion of truth and relativism.

In its entire transcendental function the basic Idea of philosophy remains only a subjective — although necessary — \( \text{πρόφασις} \) (hypothesis) of philosophy. This hypothesis may not dominate truth in a relativistic fashion. The truth of this hypothesis, on the contrary, is accountable to the forum of an ultimate judge.

In the very inquiry as to the universally-valid criterion of truth, we shall have to fight the decisive battle with those cur-
rents in immanence-philosophy which suppose, that only the inmanence-standpoint guarantees such a criterion.

If we succeed in proving, that it is in fact the immanence-standpoint that leads to a complete relativizing of this standard, then these currents in the immanence-philosophy, by way of immanent criticism, are ejected from their position as guardians of "objective truth".

In the present context, in which we are discussing the necessary apriori function of the basic Idea of philosophy, we intend only by anticipation to cut off the misunderstanding to the effect that our philosophy would turn over the criterion of truth to relativism.

The transcendental limits of philosophy and the criterion of speculative metaphysics.

Philosophic thought, in its transcendental direction toward the totality and Origin of meaning, remains bound to cosmic time. Cosmic time is its pre-supposition, and in this time, philosophy is bound to a cosmic order (to be explained later).

Every philosophy which fails to appreciate this limit, necessarily falls into speculative metaphysics. In all its varieties, the latter characteristically seeks the absolute and supra-temporal within the cosmic time-order through the absolutizing of special modes of meaning.

In the above mentioned sense, every form of absolutizing the theoretical-logical function of thought is speculative-metaphysical. A speculative metaphysical character also belongs to the position that the laws of special modal aspects of our cosmos, (e.g. laws of number, space, logic, morality, aesthetics) possess absolute universal validity, even for God. What we have said applies both to the ancient Platonic doctrine of Ideas and to the modern theory of absolute values, the doctrine of "truths in themselves" and "Sätze an sich", and the "absolute consciousness" in HUSSERL's phenomenology. It is equally applicable to the traditional metaphysical doctrine of the immortal soul (viz. as complex of truly temporal functions!). The modern hypostatization of the "Geist" in the higher (non-sensory) psychical, logical, and post-logical functions of mental acts is also speculative and metaphysical irrespective as to whether this hypostatization unfolds itself in a rationalist or irrationalist sense.

All such speculative and consequently uncritical theories fail
to appreciate the immanent limits of philosophic thought. They rest upon an absolutizing of modal aspects abstracted by theoretical thought from the temporal coherence of meaning. They disturb the absolutized realm of meaning by ascribing to it the mode of subsistence of the \( \Delta \chi \), regardless of whether this mode of subsistence is thought of as "being" or as non-substantial actuality, or as "validity" and regardless of whether the absolutizing respects the actual-individual subject-side or indeed the cosmonomic side of the special realm of meaning. When we proceed to examine more closely the inseparable coherence of all special aspects of meaning of our temporal cosmos, the inner hollowness of such metaphysical speculations will become completely clear to us.

**Calvin’s verdict against this metaphysics.**

Calvin’s judgment: "Deus legibus solutus est, sed non exlex", ("God is not subject to the laws, but not arbitrary") touches the foundations of all speculative philosophy by laying bare the limits of human reason set for it by God in His temporal world-order. This is the alpha and omega of all philosophy that strives to adopt a critical position not in name but in fact.

I have laid all emphasis upon the transcendental character of authentic critical philosophy, because I wish to cut off at the root the interference of speculative metaphysics in the affairs of the Christian religion. An authentic critical philosophy is aware of its being bound to the cosmic time-order. It only points beyond and above this boundary line to its pre-supposita. Its task, worthy of God’s human creation, is great; yet it is modest and does not elevate human reason to the throne of God.

§ 8 - THE TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA OF PHILOSOPHY AS COSMONOMIC IDEA (WETSIDEE)

The Origin of this terminology.

From the start, I have introduced the Dutch term *wetsidee* (*idea legis*) for the transcendental ground-Idea or basic Idea of philosophy. The best English term corresponding to it seems to be "cosmonomic Idea", since the word "law" used without further specification would evoke a special juridical sense which, of course, cannot be meant here.

This term was formed by me, when I was particularly struck by the fact that different systems of ancient, medieval and modern philosophy (like that of Leibniz) *expressly* oriented
philosophic thought to the Idea of a divine world-order, which was qualified as lex naturalis, lex aeterna, harmonia praestabilita, etc.

In this cosmonomic Idea, which implied a transcendental Idea of subjectivity, an apriori position was actually chosen with respect to the transcendental basic problems of philosophic thought.

In the systems we have in mind this cosmonomic Idea was generally conceived of in a large measure in a rationalistic and metaphysical manner. Hence it became a very attractive task to show, that each authentic system of philosophy is actually grounded in a cosmonomic Idea of this or that type, even when its author does not account for it; and the execution of the task intended here was bound to succeed. For it is not possible, that philosophic thought, which is intrinsically subjected to the temporal world-order, should not be burdened with an apriori view as to the origin and totality of meaning of this cosmic order and its correlative subject. And philosophy must have an apriori view with respect to the mutual relation and coherence of the different aspects of meaning in which the divine order and its subject disclose themselves.

Objections against the term "cosmonomic Idea" and the grounds for maintaining it.

Yet it may not be denied, that the choice of the term "cosmonomic Idea" can lead to misunderstanding.

Thus Dr H. G. Stoker, professor of philosophy at the University of Potchefstroom, in his interesting writings, *The New Philosophy at the Free University* (1933) and *The philosophy of the Idea of Creation* (1933), thought he had to contrast the cosmonomic Idea as a narrower basic Idea with the Idea of creation as the all-embracing. Later on the famous Dutch philosopher and scientist Dr Philip Kohnstamm joined this opinion after his transition to the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea.

Nevertheless, there are special reasons for maintaining the first term as a designation for the transcendental basic Idea of philosophy. In the first place, in pointing to the preliminary questions of philosophic thought, the basic Idea of philosophy must be so conceived, that it actually catches the eye as a necessary condition for every philosophic system. This implies, that the universal term by which this basic Idea is designated
may not include special contents derived from the ground-motive of the Christian religion. The determination of the contents of the transcendental basic Idea is to be a subject of subsequent discussion.

A cosmonomic Idea is actually at the basis of every philosophical system. On the other hand, an Idea of creation will be rejected as a transcendental basic Idea of philosophy by each thinker who denies creation, or in any case supposes, that it must be eliminated from philosophic thought.

Besides, if one wants to determine the contents of the Christian basic Idea for philosophic thought, the term “Idea of creation” is certainly insufficient to this end.

For in the central motive of Christian religion, which dominates these contents, the fall and redemption through Jesus Christ in the community of the Holy Ghost also play an essential rôle.

In the second place the term “cosmonomic Idea” has in its favour the fact, that in its pointing to the origin and meaning of the cosmic nomos or order, and to its relation to subjectivity, it gives expression from the outset to the limiting character of the basic transcendental Idea.

For the nomos is, as even Socrates argued in Plato's famous dialogue Philebus, ex origine, limitation of a subject.

Viewed thus, the term “cosmonomic Idea”, because of its critical focusing of the preliminary questions concerning meaning (in its origin, totality, and modal diversity) toward the relation of the cosmic order (nomos) and its subject, really designates the central criterion for the fundamental discrimination of the different starting-points and trends in philosophy. In the transcendental basic Idea of cosmic order there runs the boundary line between the immanence-philosophy in all its nuances and the Christian-transcendence position in philosophy. It is here that the criterion for truly transcendental philosophy resides, which recognizes its immanent cosmonomic boundaries, and speculative metaphysics, which supposes it can transgress the latter. Here, within immanence-philosophy is to be found the criterion of rationalism which absolutizes the natural and ethical laws at the expense of individual subjectivity, and irrationalism which, on the contrary, attempts to reduce the nomos to a dependent function of individual creative subjectivity.

Finally the misunderstanding as to the import of the term “cosmonomic Idea” may easily be cut off by a short explanation of its meaning.
Considered from the linguistic point of view, it may appear to refer only to the nomos-side of the cosmos. However, it actually occupies a position just as much with reference to the subject-side of reality in all its individuality. For the cosmic "nomos" has meaning only in indissoluble correlation with the subject-side of the cosmos.

In other words, the cosmonomic Idea implies the Idea of the subject, which points toward the factual-side of reality according to the basic relation among totality, diversity and coherence of meaning.

For the rest, I can attach no very great value to a discussion about the name that is to be given to the transcendental basic Idea of philosophy. In the last analysis, what matters is not the term, but that which is signified by it.

Let anyone then who has an objection against the term "cosmonomic Idea" avoid it and use the term "transcendental ground-Idea" or "transcendental basic Idea".

In the Netherlands, however, it has become quite current to indicate this whole philosophic movement by the term "Wijsbeggeerte der Wetsidee" (Philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea) \(^1\).

As yet the question raised especially by Stoker (who otherwise accepts the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea) remains open as to whether created reality is not more than meaning.

Misunderstanding of the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea as meaning-idealism.

Here there is the threat of a possible misunderstanding to the effect that the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea, in its concentration upon the problem of meaning might drift into the water of an "idealism of meaning" (Stoker). In this context, I am not yet able to cut off this serious misunderstanding by the roots. To this end it is first necessary to confront our conception of meaning with that of immanence-philosophy.

From the start, however, our inquiries should make clear the ultimate character of meaning as the mode of reality of the

\(^1\) Translator's Note. The author is referring to a school of philosophy which has developed in the Netherlands and elsewhere, and which was inspired by the publication of the Dutch edition of this work in 1935-36. This school has already exerted influence in Holland and special chairs devoted to the study of the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea have been established at the Universities of Utrecht, Leiden, Groningen, at the School of Economics in Rotterdam, and the Technical School at Delft. D. H. F.
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whole of creation, which finds no rest in itself. Meaning-idealism, as we are able to note it, for example, in Rickert, issues from a distinction between meaning (Sinn) ascribed to reality subjectively by the absolutized transcendental consciousness by means of reference to values („Wertbeziehung”), and reality as such that is meaningless in itself. But Rickert views “reality” only in the abstract sense of its psycho-physical aspects. From our point of view, meaning is universally proper to all created things as their restless mode of existence. As meaning, reality points toward its Origin, the Creator, without Whom the creature sinks into nothingness.

It is objected, that meaning cannot live, act, or move. But is not this life, this action, this movement, with respect to the mode of existence of created reality, itself meaning, pointing beyond itself, not coming to rest in itself? Only God’s Being is not meaning, because He alone exists by and through Himself.

Hence, even the totality of meaning, which transcends philosophic thought, necessarily has its correlate in the Being of the 'Ae2y' and in every transcendental basic Idea a position is taken with reference to this 'Ae2y'.

In fact, nobody who speaks about modal aspects of reality, or even about concrete things, can understand them otherwise than in their meaning, that is in their relative mode of reality which points to their temporal coherence, to a totality in the root, and to the Origin of all relative things. If the pre-logical aspects of temporal reality were not aspects of meaning, standing in relation to the logical aspect, then thought could not even form a concept of them.

Such is the preliminary justification of our terminology.

Cosmonomic Idea, modal concept of laws and modal concept of subject and object.

The special modal concepts of laws and of subject and object used in the different branches of science depend upon the cosmonomic Idea in its broad import, including the transcendental Idea of subjectivity and objectivity.

The modal concepts of laws and of subject and object are essentially limited to a special aspect. Unlike the cosmonomic Idea, these modal concepts do not in themselves point beyond the diversity of meaning toward the transcendent origin and totality. But, whatever special meaning these concepts may possess, according to the modal aspects of reality comprehended by
The dependence of the modal concepts of law, subject and object upon the cosmonomic Idea.

In pure mathematics, for example, the logicistic trend conceives of the numerical and spatial laws as purely analytical, and the series of real numbers is considered to be continuous by reason of the logical continuity of the principle of progression; this concept of mathematical laws is grounded on a cosmonomic Idea of a logicist and rationalist type. The mechanist trend in biology conceives of the special laws of organic life merely as physical-chemical ones; this concept of biotic law is entirely dependent on a cosmonomic Idea founded upon the deterministic Humanist ideal of science in its classical form.

In the so-called „reine Rechtslehre” (pure theory of law) of the neo-Kantian scholar HANS KELSEN, the legal rule is identified with a logical judgment in the form: “If a... there ought to be b” and the juridical subject and its subjective right are dissolved into a logical complex of legal rules; this juridical concept of law is grounded on a cosmonomic Idea of a dualistic Humanistic type: according to this Idea there is an unbridgeable gulf between two ultimate kinds of laws, namely natural laws and norms, originating from fundamentally different logical categories of transcendental thought which “create” the scientific fields of research. This dualistic cosmonomic Idea is ruled by the dialectical ground-motive of nature and freedom in a typical antithetic conception which, however, does not agree with the genuine Kantian view.

Besides, it may be observed, that the three special scientific concepts of laws, mentioned above, are of a rationalistic type: the subject-side of reality within the special modal aspects is reduced to the nomos-side.

The laws of the special aspects concerned in biological and juridical investigation are conceived of in a purely functionalistic sense. There is no room here for typical laws corresponding to the structures of individuality. This, too, finds its ground in

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1 In pure mathematics the typical structures of individuality are, of course, not yet in order, because typical numerical and spatial relations are to be found only in concrete reality.

Nevertheless, the question concerning the relation between the law-side and the subject-side of the numerical and spatial aspects cannot be eliminated in pure mathematics. Numbers and spatial figures are subject
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the cosmonomic Idea which lies at the base of these special scientific concepts.

We shall return to this state of affairs in a later context.


Now what positive content does the transcendental ground-Idea of philosophy receive from the central motive of the Christian religion?

The Archimedean point of philosophy is chosen in the new root of mankind in Christ, in which by regeneration we have part in our reborn selfhood.

The lex as boundary between the “Being” of God and the “meaning” of the creation.

The totality of meaning of our whole temporal cosmos is to be found in Christ, with respect to His human nature, as the root of the reborn human race. In Him the heart, out of which are the issues of life, confesses the Sovereignty of God, the Creator, over everything created. In Christ the heart bows under the lex (in its central religious unity and its temporal diversity, which originates in the Creator’s holy will), as the universal boundary (which cannot be transgressed) between the Being of God and the meaning of His creation. The transcendent to their proper laws, and they may not be identified with or reduced to the latter. This distinction is the subject of the famous problem concerning the so-called “actual infinity” in pure mathematics. The principle of progression is a mathematical law which holds good for an infinite series of numbers or spatial figures. But the infinite itself cannot be made into an actual number.

1 From the theological side some have raised an objection against the conception of the lex as the boundary between God and the creation. This objection can arise only from a misunderstanding. The term “boundary” merely intends to indicate an essential distinction between God and the creature with respect to their relation to the lex.

As sovereign Origin, God is not subjected to the law. On the contrary this subjectedness is the very characteristic of all that which has been created, the existence of which is limited and determined by the law. Christ Jesus also, with respect to His human nature, was under the law, but not with respect to His Divine nature.

But if every creature is under the law, then the limit which the latter sets for the creature’s existence can never be transgressed.

Calvin has expressed the same conception as to the relationship of
totality of meaning of our cosmos exists only in the religious relation of dependence upon the absolute Being of God. It is thus no eidos in the sense of the speculative Platonic metaphysics, no being set by itself, but it remains in the ex-sistential mode of meaning which points beyond itself and is not sufficient to itself.

Sin is the revolt against the Sovereign of our cosmos. It is the apostasy from the fulness of meaning and the deifying, the absolutizing of meaning, to the level of God's Being. Our temporal world, in its temporal diversity and coherence of meaning, is in the order of God's creation bound to the religious root of mankind. Apart from this root it has no meaning and so no reality. Hence the apostasy in the heart, in the religious root of the temporal world signified the apostasy of the entire temporal creation, which was concentrated in mankind.

Thus the disruption of the fall permeated all temporal aspects of meaning of cosmic reality. There is no single one of them that is excepted in this respect, neither the pre-logical aspects of temporal reality, nor the logical, nor the post-logical ones.

This becomes evident, as soon as we have seen, that they are fitted by the cosmic time-order in an indissoluble coherence of meaning which is related to a radical religious unity. The semblance of the contrary can only originate, when we have lost sight of this coherence.

The logical function of thought in apostasy.

In this context the Biblical conception must be especially maintained against every effort to exempt the logical function from the fall. For in every effort in this direction Christian thought leaves open a wide door of entry to the dialectical ground-motives of immanence-philosophy. We shall return to this point in a later context.

By the fall of man, human thought (νοῦς), according to St Paul's word, has become νοῦς τῆς σαρκός, the "carnal mind" (Colos. II :18), for it does not exist apart from its apostate religious root. And thought includes its logical function.

Of course the logical laws of thought or the modal structural law of the logical aspect are not affected by sin. The effects of

God to the law in his earlier quoted statement "Deus legibus solutus est, sed non exlex"; in which he intended at the same time to refute any notion that God's sovereignty is despotic arbitrariness.
apostasy disclose themselves only in the subjective activity of thought, which is *subjected* to these laws. In the apostate attitude, we are continually inclined to make the logical aspect of meaning independent, and to set it apart from its coherence with all other modal aspects, which implies a lack of appreciation of its modal boundaries.

The re-formation of the cosmonomic Idea by the central motive of the Christian religion.

From the Christian starting-point the cosmonomic Idea of our philosophy obtains the following contents: To the ultimate transcendental question: What is the Αξη of the totality and the modal diversity of meaning of our cosmos with respect to the cosmonomic side and its correlate, the subject-side? it answers: the sovereign holy will of God the Creator, who has revealed Himself in Christ. To the second transcendental question, with respect to its cosmonomic-side: What is the totality of meaning of all modal aspects of the cosmic order, their supra-temporal unity beyond all modal diversity of meaning? it answers: the requirement grounded in God’s sovereignty, of the love and service of God and our fellow-creatures with our whole heart. To the same question, with respect to its subject-side, it answers: the new religious root of the human race in Christ (in which, indeed, nothing of our created universe can be lost) in subjection to the fulness of meaning of the divine law. To the third transcendental question: What is the mutual relation between the modal aspects of reality? it answers: *sphere-sovereignty*, that is to say: mutual irreducibility, yet in the all-sided cosmic coherence of the different aspects of meaning, as this is regulated in God’s temporal order of the world, in a cosmic order of time.

In order to bring this cosmonomic Idea, *in its theoretical focusing upon the modal aspects of meaning* of our cosmos, nearer to the vision of those not schooled in philosophy, I use a very old symbol, which of course should not be interpreted in a physical sense.

The light of the sun is refracted through a prism, and this refraction is perceived by the eye of sense in the seven well-known colours of the spectrum. In themselves all colours are dependent refractions of the unrefracted light, and none of them can be regarded as an integral of the colour-differentiation. Further, not one of the seven colours is capable of existing in the spectrum apart from the coherence with the rest,
and by the interception of the unrefracted light the entire play of colours vanishes into nothing.

The unrefracted light is the time-transcending totality of meaning of our cosmos with respect to its cosmonomic side and its subject-side. As this light has its origin in the source of light, so the totality of meaning of our cosmos has its origin in its 'Αλάχε through whom and to whom it has been created.

The prism that achieves the refraction of colour is cosmic time, through which the religious fulness of meaning is broken up into its temporal modal aspects of meaning.

As the seven colours do not owe their origin to one another, so the temporal aspects of meaning in face of each other have sphere-sovereignty or modal irreducibility.

In the religious fulness of meaning, there is but one law of God, just as there is but one sin against God, and one mankind which has sinned in Adam.

But under the boundary line of time this fulness of meaning with reference to its cosmonomic-side as well as to its subject-side separates, like the sunlight through the prism, into a rich variation of modal aspects of meaning. Each modal aspect is sovereign in its own sphere, and each aspect in its modal structure reflects the fulness of meaning in its own modality.

The modal spheres of laws and their sphere-sovereignty.

Every modal aspect of temporal reality has its proper sphere of laws, irreducible to those of other modal aspects, and in this sense it is sovereign in its own orbit, because of its irreducible modality of meaning.

The acceptance of the basic philosophic principle of modal sphere-sovereignty consequently has an indissoluble coherence with the Christian transcendence-standpoint ruled by the religious ground-motive of creation, fall into sin, and redemption.

The immanence-standpoint is incompatible with this cosmonomic principle.

This incompatibility is not due to an inability of immanence-philosophy to recognize, that the totality and deeper unity of meaning must transcend its modal diversity, and that the modal aspects which it admits as such cannot originate from one another.

For every scientific thinker must necessarily distinguish diffe-
rent modal aspects of temporal reality, and guard against jumbling them together.

However, we have seen in our transcendental critique of theoretic thought, that the immanence-standpoint must necessarily lead to an absolutizing of the logical function of thought, or to an absolutizing of a special theoretical synthesis.

The theoretically abstracted modal aspect which is chosen as the basic denominator for all the others or for a part of them, is torn out of the inter-modal coherence of meaning of temporal reality. It is treated as independent and elevated to the status of an \( \Delta \) which transcends meaning. This occurs whether or not the thinker realizes it. Over against this unrestricted sovereign authority, the remaining aspects of meaning of our cosmos are unable to validate any sphere-sovereignty. Mathematical logicism will admit only logical realms of thought with relative autonomy. Psychologism allows only psychological realms (whether or not understood transcendentally) which are not reducible to one another; historicism accepts only different realms of historical development, etc. etc. If the thinker has become aware of the implacable antithesis in his hidden religious starting-point, his philosophic system will exhibit an overt dualism. Instead of one single basic denominator there will be chosen two of them, which will be conceived of in an antithetic relation. The transcendental ground-Idea in all its three directions will disclose the dualistic character of the religious basic motive without any attempt to bridge this dualism. But in this case, too, there will be no acceptance of a modal sphere-sovereignty of the different aspects and their proper law-spheres.

Because of the choice of its Archimedean point immanence-philosophy is forced to construct various absolutizations of modal aspects. In our analysis of the modal structures of the different spheres of laws, we shall show why these absolutizations can seemingly be carried out. On the immanence standpoint, now, the Christian starting-point may be reproached conversely with an absolutizing of religious meaning. But this objection, upon somewhat deeper reflection, is not tenable even on the standpoint of immanence-philosophy.

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1 See e.g. the typical instance of HEYMANS' psycho-monism with its elaboration on all realms of meaning of our cosmos. *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (Introduction into metaphysics), p. 33ff. and pp. 334ff.

2 Cf. SPENGLER'S *Untergang des Abendlandes* (Decline of the Occident).
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Christian religion does not allow of any absolutizing with respect to its fulness of meaning.

In the first place, the Christian religion, by virtue of its fulness of meaning, does not admit of any absolutizing: it is religio, i.e. connection between the meaning of creation and the Being of the 'Agé̂, the two of which may not be brought on the same level.

He who tries to make the religious totality of meaning independent of its Archè, becomes guilty of a contradiction in terms. But any one who should contend, that at any rate God is absolutized does not know, what he says.

In the second place, there is usually at the basis of the said reproach the confusion between the temporal meaning of the faith-aspect, which is actually contained within a modal sphere, and the fulness of meaning of religion, which transcends the boundary of cosmic time and cannot possibly be enclosed in a modality of meaning.

Let it be borne in mind, finally, that also unsuspected opponents of the Christian transcendence-standpoint in philosophy, such as Heinrich Rickert, admit, that religion within its fulness of sense does not tolerate a coordination with special realms of meaning as law, morality, science and so on. It can hardly be denied, that the view of religion as an "autonomous categorial realm of thought" destroys its meaning. On the other hand, the contention, that a recognition of necessary religious pre-suppositions of philosophical thought would destroy the meaning of this latter, ought to be demonstrated more stringently by immanence philosophers. Their (religious) confession of the self-sufficiency of theoretic reason is not sufficient in this respect.

Sphere-sovereignty of the modal aspects in their inter-modal coherence of meaning as a philosophical basic problem.

As a transcendental basic principle the sphere-sovereignty of the modal aspects therefore stands in indissoluble connection with our transcendental Ideas of the Origin and of the totality and radical unity of meaning. Moreover, this principle is indissolubly linked up with our transcendental Idea of cosmic time. For this latter implies, as we have seen, a cosmic coherence of meaning among the modal aspects of temporal reality. And this coherence is regulated, not by philosophic thought, but by the divine temporal world-order.
It is, however, a highly remarkable state of affairs which is disclosed in the sphere-sovereignty of the modal aspects of meaning. For it might appear, as if sphere-sovereignty were incompatible with the inter-modal coherence of meaning guaranteed by the cosmic order of time.

In fact there is hidden a philosophic basic problem of the first rank, which cannot be solved, before our general theory of the modal structures in the second volume has been developed.

In the present context we can say only, that the key to this solution is to be found in the modal structure of the different aspects, which is of a cosmonomic character.

The same cosmic time-order which guarantees the modal sphere-sovereignty does in fact also guarantee the inter-modal coherence of meaning between the modal aspects and their spheres of laws.

Potentiality and actuality in cosmic time.

We have said in an earlier context, that all structures of temporal reality are structures of cosmic time. As structural laws they are founded in cosmic time-order and are principles of temporal potentiality or possibility. In their realization in individual things or events they have time-duration and actuality as transitory factual structures.

Everything that has real existence, has many more potentialities than are actualized. Potentiality itself resides in the factual subject-side; its principle, on the contrary, in the cosmonomic-side of time. The factual subject-side is always connected with individuality (actual as well as potential), which can never be reduced to a general rule. But it remains bound to its structural laws, which determine its margin or latitude of possibilities.

Cosmic time and the refraction of meaning. Why can the totality of meaning disclose itself in time only in refraction and coherence of modalities?

Prof. Dr H. G. Stoker, and lately also Prof. Dr Ph. Kohnstamm ¹ have raised the question, why it should be precisely

¹ Prof. Dr Ph. A. Kohnstamm, in his essay, *Pedagogy, Personalism, and Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea* (in the anniversary papers in honour of Prof. Dr J. Waterink, Amsterdam 1951), pp. 96f., in which the author, an outstanding Dutch thinker who died shortly thereafter, made known for the first time his adherence to the *Philosophy of the*
in cosmic time that the totality of meaning is refracted into coherent modal aspects. The reason is, in my opinion, that the fulness of meaning, as totality and radical unity, is not actually given and cannot be actually given in time, though all temporal meaning refers beyond itself to its supra-temporal fulfilment.

It is the very signification of cosmic time in its correlation of order and duration to be successive refraction of meaning into coherent modal aspects.

Sphere-sovereignty of modal aspects and their modal spheres of laws makes no sense in the fulness and radical unity of meaning.

In the religious fulness of meaning love, wisdom, justice, power, beauty, etc. coincide in a radical unity. We begin to understand something of this state of affairs in the concentration of our heart upon the Cross of Christ. But this radical unity of the different modalities is impossible in time considered as successive refraction of meaning.

Hence, every philosophy that tries to dissolve this totality of meaning into Ideas of reason, or absolute values, always ensnares itself in antinomies by which the cosmic order of time avenges itself on theoretic thought which tries to transgress its boundaries.

The logical function is not relative in a logical but in a cosmic sense.

Also the attempt to approximate cosmic time otherwise than in a limiting concept must necessarily lead to antinomies, because cosmic time is the very pre-supposition of the concept. With regard to its fundamental analytic aspect the concept is necessarily discontinuous, and is incapable of comprehending the cosmic continuity of time, which exceeds the modal boundaries of its aspects. The logical function in its modal speciality of meaning is indeed relative, but its relativity is not itself of a logical, but of a cosmonomic temporal character. If philosophy should attempt to interpret the cosmonomic coherence of

Cosmonomic Idea. He had a reservation, however, so far as the conception of time was concerned.

This hangs together with his thought, in itself altogether correct, that the Bible ascribes not even to God any supra-temporal in the Greek metaphysical sense. But the conception of the supra-temporal defended by myself is radically different from the Greek, as I have previously established with emphasis.
meaning in a dialectical-logical sense, it must begin in each case with a logical relativizing of the fundamental principles of logic, and thereby sanction the antinomy.

The elimination of cosmic time-order in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.

By the hypostatization of "theoretical reason" as the self-sufficient Archimedean point of philosophy, the cosmic order of time is eliminated from philosophic thought, particularly from epistemology. In this way the critical basic question of all philosophy, namely: How is it itself possible? is relegated to the background. This elimination was also a source of subjectivism in the development of philosophic thought.

Kant's so-called Copernican revolution in epistemology (or, should one accept Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, which in our opinion is by no means convincing, — in "ontology") is the direct proof of the impossibility of a truly critical critique of theoretic reason apart from a transcendental insight into the cosmic order of time. In his Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik § 4 (W.W. Cass. IV, p. 23) the philosopher of Königsberg writes of The Critique of Pure Reason: "Diese Arbeit is schwer und erfordert einen entschlossenen Leser, sich nach und nach in ein System hinein zu denken, das noch nichts als Gegeben zum Grunde legt, auszer die Vernunft selbst" (I italicize) "und also, ohne sich auf irgendein Faktum zu stützen, die Erkenntnis aus ihren ursprünglichen Keimen zu entwickeln sucht".

What the reader is asked to do here is simply an abdication from the preliminary questions of critical thought. "Theoretic reason", according to Kant's transcendental conception a manifest product of theoretical abstraction, should be accepted as given. The question as to how philosophic thought is possible is thereby cut off. For the cosmic order of time, by which the relations of meaning of this thought are guaranteed, is lost sight of.

1 Kant's Prolegomena to every future Metaphysics (Works, Cass. Ed. IV, p. 23).
["This work is difficult and requires a resolute reader to think his way gradually into a system, which sets at its foundation nothing as given except reason itself, and thus, without supporting itself upon any fact, seeks to develop knowledge from its original seeds."]
§ 10 - THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR COSMONOMIC IDEA IN RESPECT TO THE MODAL CONCEPTS OF LAWS AND THEIR SUBJECTS

Modal concepts of the lex and of its subject.
The subject as subject to laws.

Through the cosmonomic Idea grounded in the Christian starting-point which we have set at the basis of our philosophic thought, the concepts of laws and their subjects, with which we shall operate further in their modal speciality of meaning, acquire their pregnant content. We have seen, that in this transcendental ground-Idea the lex is recognized as originating from God's holy creative sovereignty, and as the absolute boundary between the Being of the 'Αγίος and the meaning of everything created as "subject", subjected to a law.

Consequently, this transcendental meaning of the relation between the divine law and its subject will find expression in every concept of a modal aspect with respect to its special cosmonomic- and its special subject-side.

The fundamental importance of this conception will disclose itself in the second and the third volumes of this work.

In the present context I must remind the reader emphatically of my earlier explanation, that the subject-side of cosmic time implies the subject-object relation which we have discussed provisionally in connection with naive experience.

The question whether this cosmic relation finds expression in all of the modal aspects or in a part of them only, cannot be investigated before the development of our general theory of the modal structures of the aspects and their modal law-spheres.

In every case I must establish the fact that in every modal aspect where this relation is to be found, the subject-side embraces both the subjective and the objective functions, which temporal reality discloses in this aspect.

The disturbance of the meaning of the concepts of the modal laws and their subjects in the Humanistic immanence-philosophy.

In the Humanistic immanence-philosophy, in its rationalistic as well as in its irrationalistic trends, this concept of the modal subject in its relation to the modal laws has been entirely lost and must necessarily be lost — to the incalculable injury of the philosophic analysis of reality.

The subject becomes sovereign — either in the metaphysical
sense of “substance” (noumenon), or in a transcendental logical or phenomenological sense.

In Kant’s “theoretical” philosophy, for example, the subject is only subject in an epistemological sense, and as suchapperceived of the form of the theoretical laws of nature; the “transcendental subject” is itself the law-giver of nature in a transcendental-logical sense.

The pre-psychical aspects of reality were, after the destruction of the traditional metaphysics of nature, dissolved into a synthesis of logical and sensory functions of consciousness; their modal structural-laws were replaced by a-priori transcendental forms of theoretical understanding and of subjective sensibility in an apriori synthesis.

That numbers, spatial figures, energy-effects and biotic functions are really modal subjects, subjected to the laws of their own modal spheres, is a conception far removed from modern immanence-philosophy.

In Kant’s so-called “practical” philosophy, the subject in the metaphysical sense of homo noumenon (pure will) becomes the autonomous law-giver for moral life. In accordance with the dualistic conception of his transcendental ground-Idea he does not accept a radical unity of the order of creation above the polar opposition between laws of nature and norms.

Two features typify the theoretical concept of the subject in immanence-philosophy, since it gave up the earlier metaphysics of nature.

1 - It is conceived only in the special sense of the epistemological and ethical functions of consciousness. The empirical things and events are taken into consideration only as objects of sensory perception and of theoretical or practical thought. This was the necessary consequence of the resolution of so-called “empirical” reality into the logical and psychical aspects of consciousness abstracted by theoretical thought from the cosmic temporal coherence of meaning. This resolution was attended by the elimination of the cosmic order of time, and by the proclamation of the so-called critical “Satz des Bewustseins”, to be discussed later on, according to which the possibility of our knowledge is limited to our subjective and objective contents of consciousness, received merely by sensory perception and formed by logical apperception.

2 - In this view, the subject lacks its original meaning of
"sujet", being subjected to a law which does not originate from this subject itself. In the last analysis, in its function as a "transcendental subject" or "ideal subject" respectively, it has received the crown of autonomous, self-sufficient law-giver in accordance with the Humanistic ideals of science and of personality (to be discussed later).

In the classical rationalist conception, the empirical subject is reduced to a complex of causal relations by which it should be completely determined.

The "laws" are identified here with the "objective". Consequently the empirical subject is conceived of as an "object", which in its turn is identified with "Gegenstand" of the ultimate "transcendental subject of thought".

Modern so-called "realistic" positivism understands the concept of the lex (in relation to norms as well as to the so-called laws of nature) in the sense of a scientific judgment of probability. Here, too, this concept is completely dissociated from the modal structures of the different spheres of laws and from the typical structures of individuality, which are founded in the cosmic time-order.

This positivism conceives of laws as "autonomous" products of scientific thought, which tries to order by way of a "logical economy" the "facts", understood as merely sensory data.

Quite different from the rationalist concepts of the laws and their subjects are those of the irrationalist trends of Humanistic thought.

Rationalism as absolutizing of the general rule, irrationalism as absolutizing of individual subjectivity.

We have seen in an earlier context, that the rationalist types of immanence-philosophy tend to dissolve the individual subjectivity into a universally valid order of laws, the origin of which is sought in sovereign reason.

The irrationalist Humanistic types did not tamper with the conception of the "laws" as a product of thought or reason, but fell into the opposite extreme of seeing in this "theoretical order" merely a pragmatically falsification of true reality. The latter in its creative subjective individuality, is not bound to universally valid laws and mocks at all "concepts of thought". Thus the absolutizing of the laws in the rationalist types is replaced by the absolutizing of the subjective individuality in
the irrationalist types of the Humanistic immanence-philosophy. This irrationalism is ruled by an irrationalist turn of the freedom-motive.

The concept of the subject in the irrationalistic phenomenology and philosophy of existence.

As a typical phenomenon in the philosophy of most recent times, we point to the conceptions of subject and selfhood in the modern irrationalist trend in phenomenology (Scheler), and in the philosophy of existence (Heidegger, and a number of others).

Here the reproach is made against Kant, that he still conceived of selfhood or "personality" as law-giving subject in substantial terms and consequently did not yet penetrate to the pure actuality of the selfhood.

As Heidegger expresses it in his Being and Time (1927, a Reprint from Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 8, p. 320): "For the ontological concept of the subject does not characterize the selfhood of the Ego qua self, but the sameness and constancy of something already extant. To determine the Ego ontologically as Subject, means to estimate it as something already extant. The being of the Ego is understood as the reality of the res cogitans (thinking substance)".

Scheler also in his standard work, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (Formalism in Ethics and the Material Ethics of Value, 3rd Ed., 1927, p. 397ff.), in a manner that leaves nothing to be desired as to clarity, has qualified personality as "pure actuality" which as such is transcendent to the cosmos as "world of things" (resolved into the abstract physical-psychical aspects of temporal reality!).

In discussing "the place of man in the cosmos" we shall find occasion to enter more closely into these conceptions. We shall see that the actuality which is brought again so sharply to the fore by modern phenomenological thought, does not stand in opposition to subjectivity, but rather constitutes its very kernel. In other words, it belongs in all modal aspects of our cosmos

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1 Heidegger: Sein und Zeit, p. 320: „Denn der ontologische Begriff des Subjects charakterisiert nicht die Selbstheit des Ich qua Selbst, sondern die Selbigkeit und Beständigkeit eines immer schon vorhandenen. Das Ich ontologisch als Subject bestimmen, besagt es als ein immer schon Vorhandenes ansetzen. Das Sein des Ich wird verstanden als Realität der res cogitans.”
Prolegomena

(even the pre-logical) to the subject-functions (functioning in them) with respect to their meaning. For the entire conception to the effect that temporal reality should be something *statically* given, a fixed "Vorhandenenes", rests upon a fundamental failure to appreciate the *dynamic* character of reality in the whole coherence of its different modal aspects. In our view, this dynamic character is guaranteed by the mode of ex-sistence of all created things as meaning, finding no rest in itself, and by the opening-process of temporal reality which will be explained in vols. II and III.

On the other hand Scheler as well as Heidegger accept the static conception of reality with respect to the "given world of things" and do reject this conception only as to "free personality" or "free human existence" respectively.

From this very view of the concept of the subject and of the "Dingwelt" in general, it appears, that also modern phenomenology and Humanistic existentialism move in the paths of immanence-philosophy. By choosing their Archimedean point in the "transcendally purified actual consciousness" or in "existential thought", respectively, they make the "transcendental ego" sovereign.

It is the Humanistic ground-motive of nature and freedom whose dialectical character is responsible for the different conceptions of the laws and their subjects hitherto discussed.

The concept of the lex and the subject in ancient Greek thought and its dependence on the Greek form-matter-motive.

Quite different from the Humanistic conceptions of the lex and the subject were those of ancient Greek thought, dominated by the form-matter-motive in its original religious sense. The modern concept of causal natural law, as well as the modern concept of the autonomous subject, conceived in the Kantian sense of law-giver, are unknown here.

At the outset, under the primacy of the matter-motive, the law of nature has the juridical sense of justice (*dikē*): every individual form must be dissolved into "matter" according to a standard of proportionality. This *dikē* is conceived of as an *Anangkē*, an unescapable fate to which the form-things are subjected.

Under the primacy of the form-motive of the later culture-religion the concept of the law in its general sense of order assumes a teleological sense in respect to all "natural subjects".
This conception is introduced by Socrates and elaborated in a metaphysical way by Plato and Aristotle. It was opposed to the extreme Sophistic view of the purely conventional character of the nomos in human society and the complete lack of laws in “nature” as a stream of flowing becoming.

In Aristotle’s Metaphysics the subject is identified with “substance”, composed of form and matter. Natural law rules the striving of every matter to its proper substantial form. In Plato’s Philebus, the natural law is conceived of as the peras, setting a limit to the apeiron, the formless stream of becoming, which thereby receives the character of a genesis eis ousian, a becoming to being. This Pythagorean conception is maintained also with respect to ethical law.

Just as the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom, the Greek form-matter-motive, in view of its dialectical character, could never lead philosophic thought to a transcendental cosmonomic Idea in which the divine law was conceived in its radical religious unity. For the same reason there was no room here for a radical unity of the human subject above all its temporal functions in their modal diversity. The transcendental Idea of the origin, too, remains bound to the polar dualism of matter and form. It lacks the integral character founded in the Biblical creation-motive. Therefore, according to the Greek conception, the subject can never be viewed as “sujet”, subjected to divine law in the integral Biblical sense. In Plato and Aristotle the teleological law of the form-principle finds its original opposite in the Ἀναγκῇ of the matter-principle. At the utmost, “natural law” in its Greek sense, is conceived of as a subjective participation of the rational material substances in divine thought, as the origin of all cosmic forms. But this conception is, properly speaking, rather a Thomistic interpretation of the original Aristotelian view.

Finally, the Christian-scholastic concepts of the lex and the subject in the modal diversity of meaning, are dominated by the dialectical ground-motive of nature and grace. They rest upon an accommodation of the Greek or the Humanistic conceptions, respectively, to the Christian ones. We shall return to this scholastic view in the first part of this volume in the explanation of the rise of Humanistic thought.
CHAPTER II

PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE- AND WORLD-VIEW

§ 1 - THE ANTITHETIC POSITION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE COSMONOMIC IDEA IN RESPECT TO THE IMMANENCE-PHILOSOPHY AND THE POSTULATE OF THE HISTORICAL CONTINUITY IN PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT CONTAINED IN THE IDEA OF THE "PHILOSOPHIA PERENNIS"

The philosophy of the cosmonomic idea requires, as we have seen, a radical self-critique on the part of those who engage in philosophic inquiry.

By its transcendental critique of theoretic thought it leads to the discovery of a radical antithesis between the transcendental ground-Idea of a philosophy which is entirely ruled by the central motive of the Christian religion, and that of immanence-philosophy in all its various trends. This antithesis may not be bridged by any compromise and runs along a line of separation entirely different from what has hitherto been supposed.

The necessity of this radical break with the immanence-stand-point could not be understood, before our transcendental critique had laid bare the all-controlling position of the transcendental ground-Idea in respect to the inner development and direction of philosophic thought.

Genuine Christian philosophy requires a radical rejection of the supra-theoretical pre-suppositions and "axioms" of immanence-philosophy in all its forms. It has to seek its own philosophic paths, prescribed by its proper transcendental ground-Idea. It cannot permit itself to accept within its own cadre of thought problems of immanence-philosophy which originate from the dialectic ground-motives of the latter.

The basis of cooperation between Christian thought and the different trends of immanence-philosophy.

Nevertheless, this radical rupture with the starting-points and transcendental ground-Ideas of immanence-philosophy does
not mean, that an intrinsically re-formed Christian philosophy should intend to break off philosophical contact with Greek, scholastic, and modern Humanistic philosophy. On the contrary, because of its radical-critical standpoint, the Christian philosophy developed in this work is enabled to enter into the most inward contact with immanence-philosophy. It will never break the community of philosophical thought with the other philosophical trends, because it has learned to make a sharp distinction between philosophical judgments and the supra-theoretic prejudices which lay the foundation of every possible philosophy. The danger of breaking this community of thought is, as we saw in an earlier context, always caused by the philosophical dogmatism, which makes its religious pre-suppositions into theoretic “axioms”, and makes the acceptance of the latter the necessary condition for philosophical discussion.

Meanwhile, the question remains: On what basis can philosophical trends, differing radically in their religious ground-motive and their transcendental ground-Idea, cooperate within the framework of one and the same philosophical task? What can be the common basis for this cooperation? As regards this point we will in the first place consider a popular argument against the entire Idea of a Christian science and philosophy, an argument which could just as well be raised against the general result of our transcendental critique of theoretical thought focused in the thesis, that theoretical thought is always dependent upon a religious ground-motive.

A popular argument against the possibility of Christian science and philosophy.

The popular argument, referred to here, runs as follows: $2 \times 2 = 4$, no matter whether a Christian or a heathen passes this judgment.

Doubtless, this argument is a poor affair, if it should be brought up against the results of our transcendental critique of theoretic thought. Nevertheless, at the same time it draws our attention to undeniable states of affairs that must necessarily form the basis for a cooperation of the different philosophical schools and trends in the accomplishment of a common task. Let us for a moment consider these two aspects of the argument more closely.
Partial truths are not self-sufficient. Every partial
truth is dependent upon truth in its totality of
meaning.

The proposition $2 \times 2 = 4$ is not “true in itself”, but only in
the context of the laws of number and the logical laws of
thought. This context is, as we have seen, possible only in the
all-sided coherence of meaning of all modal law-spheres and
supposes a totality of meaning of which both the numerical and
the logical aspects are special modal refractions in cosmic time.
There exists no partial truth which is sufficient to itself. Partial
*theoretical* truth is truth only in the coherence of the theoretical
truths, and this coherence in its relativity pre-supposes the ful-
ness or the totality of truth.

Consequently, also the philosophical view of the mutual rela-
tion and coherence of the numerical and the logical aspects —
and thereby of the modal meaning of number and of logical
concepts — is influenced from the start by the transcendental
ground-Idea of philosophical thought and by the religious ground-
motive which determines its content.

The undeniable states of affairs in the structures of
temporal reality.

On the other hand, however, it must of course be granted,
that the judgment $2 \times 2 = 4$ refers to a state of affairs in the
numerical relations which is independent of the subjective
theoretical view and its supra-theoretical pre-suppositions. Not in
the sense, however, that this “state of affairs” is a “truth in it-
self” and has an “absolute validity”. For just like the proposition
by which it is established, this “state of affairs” is dependent
upon the cosmic order of time and the inter-modal coherence of
meaning guaranteed by the latter. It has no meaning outside of
this temporal order.

Nevertheless, it is founded in this *order*, and not in a theoreti-
cal view of the numerical aspect and its modal laws. Well then,
this cosmic order with all temporal laws and structural states
of affairs founded in it, is, indeed, the same for every thinker,
no matter whether he is a Christian, a pagan or a Humanist.
Structural states of affairs, as soon as they are discovered, force
*themselves upon everybody*, and it does not make sense to deny
them. It is the common task of all philosophic schools and trends
to account for them in a philosophic way, that is to say in the
light of a transcendental ground-Idea. They must learn from one
another, even from fundamental mistakes made in the theoretical interpretations of the laws and the structural states of affairs founded in the temporal order of our cosmos. Immanence-philosophy can discover many states of affairs which had up to now been neglected in a philosophy directed by an intrinsically Christian transcendental ground-Idea, and vice versa.

In the philosophical effort to account for them in the context of a theoretical view of totality, there may be a noble competition between all philosophical trends without discrimination. We do not claim a privileged position for the Christian philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea in this respect. For even the Christian ground-motive and the content of our transcendental ground-Idea determined by it, do not give security against fundamental mistakes in the accomplishment of our philosophical task. On the contrary, for the very reason that in the Christian ground-motive the fall into sin is an essential factor, the possibility is excluded that a veritable Christian philosophy should lay claim to infallibility in the respect. The danger of ascribing infallibility to results of philosophic investigation is much greater on the immanence-standpoint, especially on the Humanistic, insofar as it seeks the ultimate standard of truth in theoretic thought itself. We shall return to this point presently in the discussion of the problem of truth.

The Idea of the perennial philosophy.

Meanwhile, there remains another objection against our conception concerning the radical antithesis between the Christian and the immanence-standpoint in philosophy, an objection which is not yet entirely refuted by our previous argument. For the question may be raised, what then is left — in the cadre of our philosophy — of the time-honoured Idea concerning the "philosophia perennis" which even modern Thomistic thought, in its relative isolation, zealously maintains?

By adopting an antithetic attitude against the entire immanence-philosophy in its evolution from Greek thought to the latest time, is not, for an authentically Christian philosophy, all connection with the historical development of philosophic thought cut off? That is to say, does not the latter place itself outside this historical development? If this were really so, then at once the sentence of doom would be pronounced over the attempt undertaken in this work at a reformation of philosophic
thought from the Christian point of view. Reformation is not creation out of nothing.

How is the Idea of the “philosophia perennis” to be understood? Philosophic thought and historical development.

But if an appeal is made to the Idea of the “philosophia perennis”, one should know, what is to be understood by it. Philosophic thought as such stands in an inner relationship with historical development, postulated by our very philosophical basic Idea, and no thinker whatever can withdraw himself from this historical evolution. Our transcendental ground-Idea itself requires the recognition of the “philosophia perennis” in this sense and rejects the proud illusion that any thinker whatever, could begin as it were with a clean slate and disassociate himself from the development of an age-old process of philosophical reflection. Only let not the postulate of the “philosophia perennis” be turned against the religious ground-motive of philosophy with the intention of involving it (and not only the variable forms given to it) in historical relativity.

For he who does so, will necessarily fall into a historical relativism with respect to truth, as is encountered in Dilthey's philosophy of the life- and world-views or, in a still more striking manner, in the case of an Oswald Spengler.

Whoever takes the pains to penetrate into the philosophic system developed in this work, will soon discover, how it is wedded to the historical development of philosophic and scientific thought with a thousand ties, so far as its immanent philosophic content is concerned, even though we can nowhere follow the immanence-philosophy.

The philosophical elaboration in this book of the basic principles of sphere-sovereignty for example would not have been possible apart from the entire preceding development of modern philosophy and of the different branches of modern science. Nevertheless, it is just with the philosophic Idea of sphere-sovereignty that we turn on principle against the Humanistic view of science. In like manner it can be said, that our transcendental critique of theoretic thought has an inner historical connection with Kant's critique of pure reason, notwithstanding the fact that our critique was turned to a great extent against the theoretical dogmatism in Kant's epistemology.
What is permanent, and what is subjected to the historical development of thought. The scholastic standpoint of accommodation forever condemned.

The elaboration of our philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea is thus necessarily bound to historical development. Insight into the wealth of meaning of the cosmic order may grow, even through the work of schools of thought against which our own is set in an irreconcilable antithesis. Nevertheless, the religious starting-point, and consequently the whole direction which philosophic thought acquires thereby by means of its threefold transcendental ground-Idea, remains consistent. This starting-point may no longer be abandoned by any single phase of Christian philosophic thought, if it is not to fall back into a scholastic standpoint of accommodation which has proved to be fatal to the idea of a philosophia christianæ reformata.

Every serious philosophic school contributes to the development of human thought to a certain extent, and no single one can credit itself with the monopoly in this respect.

No single serious current of thought, however apostate in its starting-point, makes its appearance in the history of the world without a task of its own, by which, even in spite of itself, it must contribute to the fulfilment of the Divine plan in the unfolding of the faculties which He makes to perform their work even in His fallen creation. In the development of the basic features of our philosophy of history we shall further elaborate this point.

We cannot discuss the immanent historical meaning of God's guidance in history, until we are engaged in the philosophical analysis of the modal structure of the historical aspect. Our opinion concerning the historical task of immanence-philosophy pre-supposes indeed the acceptance of this guidance, but this acceptance involves very complicated problems for philosophical thought which we cannot yet solve at this stage of our inquiry.

We can only say, that it implies the biblical-Augustinian idea of the continuous struggle in the religious root of history between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena. This Idea shall guide us, when we enter into the confusing labyrinth of the history of philosophic thought. It can indeed guide us, since we have gained insight into the all-controlling influence of the religious starting-points in respect to the inner development of philosophic theories.
The conception of the antithesis of standpoints in the immanence-philosophy as “Weltanschauungslehre” (theory of life- and world-views).

In itself, the Idea of the antithesis of standpoints is not at all foreign to immanence-philosophy, namely in its modern form of “Weltanschauungslehre” (theory of life- and world-views).

On the contrary, many antitheses are constructed here, of which that between idealismand naturalism belongs to the most ancient. In this matter, curiously enough, idealism, in its Kantian and post-Kantian forms of transcendental “critical” idealism, insists on the opinion that this antithesis may be resolved in its favour by way of pure theory of knowledge. Consequently, no freedom-belief transcending the boundaries of theoretical reason need be called in aid at this point. For one need only reflect on the very operation of thought in order to see immediately, that every effort to reduce theoretical thought to a natural object pre-supposes a “transcendental subject of thought” or a “transcendental consciousness”, without which objective experience of natural phenomena would be impossible 1.

Besides, various modern thinkers have tried to neutralize the conflict of the different standpoints within philosophic thought by making philosophy itself into a neutral “theory of the life- and world-views”, without allowing it to take sides in the various antitheses.

Thus Dilthey 2 came to set up three types of “philosophic world-views” which he holds to recur repeatedly in the historical development, viz.: 1. Materialistic positivism (Democritus, Epicurus, Hobbes, the Encyclopaedists, Comte, Avenarius); 2. Objective idealism (Heraclitus, the Stoics, Spinoza, Leibniz, Shaftesbury, Goethe, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Hegel); 3. Freedom-idealism (Plato, the Christian philosophy, Kant, Fichte, Maine de Biran).

Much more differentiated is Rickert’s 3 classification of the

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1 It must be evident in the light of our transcendental critique of theoretic thought, that this pretended purely epistemological refutation of naturalism is based on supra-theoretic pre-suppositions. We have seen in an earlier context, that the so-called “transcendental subject” is nothing but an absolutization of the logical function of thought, and that this absolutization is inspired by the Humanistic freedom-motive implying the autonomy of human thought.

2 Dilthey: Die Typen der Weltanschauung in “Weltansch.” Berlin 1911.

3 System der Philosophie. In the South-West German school of the
“life- and world-views”, oriented to the Neo-Kantian philosophy of values.

He offers us a detailed outline in which the following types are analysed from the philosophic point of view of value: 1. Intellectualism. 2. Aestheticism. 3. Mysticism. 4. Moralism. 5. Eudemonism. 6. Eroticism. 7. Theism, Polytheism.

What is typical of these and similar classifications of the “life- and world-views” is that they, being construed from the immanence-standpoint, obliterate the only really radical antithesis, i.e. that between the immanence- and the Christian transcendence-standpoint, and attempt to subsume the Christian starting-point in philosophy under one of the many -isms of immanence-philosophy. At the same time, so far as the thinker who makes such groupings does not present himself as a complete relativist with respect to a life- and world-view, the relative oppositions on the immanence-standpoint are proclaimed as absolute.

The first insight that the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea gives us with respect to the “Weltanschauungslehre” of the immanence-philosophy is that all “weltanschauliche” oppositions on the immanence-standpoint are completely relative, and that they become irreconcilable only by religious absolutizing, due to a dialectical ground-motive.

We shall learn to recognize idealism and naturalism in modern Humanistic philosophy as a polar opposition which lay hidden from the outset in the basic structure of its common transcendental ground-Idea, and originates from the antithesis in its central religious motive as an inner antinomy between the ideals of science and personality — nature and freedom.

Aestheticism and moralism are not even polar oppositions, but originate simply from the hypostatization of special modal aspects of meaning, which in the Humanistic basic motive are only different manifestations of the free and autonomous human personality.

Even in the so-called “theistic” type, the immanence-standpoint is only apparently abandoned. This appears clearly from the fact that “theistic philosophy” from the start was built upon a metaphysical Idea of God, which found its origin in the hypostatization of the Nous. Consider only ARISTOTLE’s theistic philo-

Neo-Kantians, even WINDELBAND had proclaimed philosophy to be the science of the life- and world-view ("Wissenschaft der Weltanschauung"). See his Einführung in die Phil. (2d Ed. 1920), pp. 19ff.
Prolegomena

sophy. The divine υπέρ as actus purus, ("pure actuality") and "pure Form", first transcendent cause, unmoved mover and final end of the cosmos, is nothing but the hypostatization of theoretical thought, ruled by the Greek form-motive, and concealed behind a theistic disguise. It is the idol-Idea of this immanence-philosopher.

Things are not different in the case of the "theistic" philosophy of Descartes or Leibniz. However, with these thinkers the hypostatization of theoretical thought is ruled by the Humanistic ground-motive of nature and freedom, which gives an entirely different character to their "theism".

Finally, what has such a philosophic "theism", ruled by the religious ground-motives of ancient Greek or modern Humanistic thought, respectively, in common with the radical Christian attitude with regard to the philosophic questions of life and the world?

The consequence of our transcendental critique for the history of philosophy.

It must be very confusing in the study of the history of philosophic thought to classify ancient Greek, medieval scholastic and modern Humanistic thinkers after the abstract schematism presented by Dilthey and Rickert without considering the different religious ground-motives of the philosophic systems.

The philosophical meaning of terms as idealism, materialism, intellectualism, mysticism and so on, is entirely dependent upon the different transcendental ground-Ideas of philosophic thought and the religious ground-motives which rule the contents of the latter. Greek idealism for instance, ruled by the primacy of the religious form-motive, is completely different from the mathematical idealism of Leibniz which is ruled by the modern Humanistic science-ideal, implied in the dialectical motive of nature and freedom. The terms "matter" and "nature" have in Greek thought a sense entirely different from that in modern Humanistic philosophy. Anaximander and Anaximenes were materialists in the sense of the Greek matter-motive, not at all in the sense of Hobbes, whose materialistic metaphysics was ruled by the mechanistic science-ideal of pre-Kantian Humanism. Democritus was not at all a materialist in the modern Humanistic sense. His "atoms" were "ideal forms" in the sense of the Greek form-motive which was only conceived here in a mathematical sense. The Greek ideal of the καλόκαγαθος (the beautiful and good)
cannot be identified with the modern Humanist aestheticism of a Schiller, which is ruled by the religious motive of nature and freedom, as little as the Kantian moralism has a deeper affinity with Socrates' ethical thought.

There is a great danger hidden in a pretended purely theoretical analysis of ancient Greek or medieval philosophical trends after general schemes of classification which are construed apart from the religious ground-motives of Western thought. For, unawares, ancient and medieval thinkers are interpreted in this case after a pattern of thought prescribed by the modern Humanistic ground-motive of nature and freedom. Neither Dilthey nor Rickert have escaped this pitfall.

Thus, our transcendental critique of philosophic thought is of great importance also for the history of philosophy.

The only possible ultimate antithesis in philosophy.

In the light of the transcendental ground-Idea, there exists only one ultimate and radical anti-thesis in philosophy, viz. that between absolutizing, i.e. deifying of meaning, in apostasy from God on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the return of philosophic thought in Christ to God, which leads to the insight into the complete relativity and lack of self-sufficiency of all that exists in the created mode of meaning.

If, however, this antithesis is the ultimate one, there is no further room alongside of it for equivalent antitheses of another kind.

Naturally, it is true, that there is a radical difference between the religious ground-motives of ancient Greek and modern Humanistic thought. However, it can hardly be said, that these motives could have an antithetical relation to one another in the same final and radical sense as that between the Christian and apostatic ground-motives. As to the religious antithesis which we have discovered within each of the dialectical ground-motives themselves, we were able to establish that they had the character of a polar tension between the two components, which is quite different from the relation between the Christian and the apostatic starting-points.

Such polar tensions are radically excluded in the transcendental ground-Idea of every really Christian philosophy. Therefore, in all philosophy that is rooted in the Christian transcendence-standpoint, there can be no question on principle of idealism or naturalism, moralism or aestheticism, rationalism or irrational-
lism, theism or mysticism; for all such -isms can be grounded only in the immanence-standpoint.

Consequently, so far as such -isms have actually gained access to Christian philosophic thought, for lack of an integral Christian cosmonomic Idea, they appear as atavisms in the literal sense of the word, rudiments of apostatic thought, which can in no way prove to be compatible with the basic Christian attitude.

§ 2 - THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE- AND WORLD-VIEW AND THE CRITERION

Must then the life- and world-view really be blended with philosophic thought? Is the relation between philosophy and life- and world-view perhaps this, that philosophy is nothing but an elaborate life- and world-view, perhaps an „Anweisung zum seligen Leben” (a guide to the blessed life) under the disguise of philosophic theory? Granted, that for the life- and world-view the absolute antithesis, as above formulated, is really inescapable, must not philosophy, if it is to maintain its theoretical character, for that very reason refrain from a choice of position, lest it should obliterate its boundaries with respect to the former?

In such questions we once again find on our path the dogma concerning the autonomy of theoretic thought. They compel us to form a clearer Idea of the relation between philosophy and a life- and world-view.

The boundaries between philosophy and a life- and world-view as seen from the immanence-standpoint.
Disagreement as to the criterion.

Meanwhile, it is very difficult indeed to enter into discussion with the immanence-philosophy on this point. For from its point of view there are strenuous divergences of opinion concerning the question: What exactly do you mean by a life- and world-view, and does it stand in opposition to philosophy? For example, Heinrich Rickert wants to approach the nature of the life- and world-view axiologically from his theoretical philosophy of values, and sees the essential characteristic in the personal a-theoretical commitment with respect to the question: What is for you the highest value? Another defender of the autonomy of theoretic philosophy, Theodor Litt, upbraids Rickert for having transgressed the very limits of philosophy in his theoretical phi-
philosophy of values. According to him, value is ex origine a-theoretical, and consequently all foundation of theoretical truth, as to its absolute validity, in a value (as RICKERT does), is to be rejected. LITT seeks the criterion between philosophy and a life- and world-view in this very point, that in philosophic thought no single valuation may be "either one of the determining factors or even the decisive factor;" that valuations put in a word is for him, "conclusive evidence for the fact that the subject has not sacrificed its concretely personal relation to the totality of reality to the striving after pure knowledge" 1.

Measured by this criterion, immanence-philosophy in its age-long development was full of life- and world-views, and the process of purification is still scarcely begun in any proper sense. In NIETZSCHE's philosophy of life, however, just the reverse is the case. To philosophy is ascribed the task of determining the practical "ordering of values according to rank". In his Genealogy of Morals (p. 38) the philosophers are called „Befehlende und Gesetzgeber” (commanders and law-givers). Philosophy thus becomes an "art of living", which merely shares the expression in concepts with theoretical science.

Also the modern so-called "existential philosophy", strongly influenced by SÖREN KIERKEGAARD, proceeds along the same line in its conception of the relation between philosophy and a life- and world-view.

According to KARL JASPERS, philosophy was from the start more than a mere "universal theory". "It gave impulses, drew up tables of values, made human life meaningful and purposive, it gave him the world in which he felt safe, in a word it gave him: a view of life and the world" 2. Only "prophetic philosophy" that gives a world-view, in that it constructs tables of value as norms, in his esteem deserves the name of philosophy. But this name, according to him, has at present become customary for that which can better and more clearly be called universal logic, sociology and psychology, which as theory refrain from all

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1 Einleitung in die Philosophie (Leipzig und Berlin 1933) p. 261: „der bündige Beweis dafür, dass das Subjekt sein konkret-persönliches Verhältnis zum Ganzen der Wirklichkeit nicht dem Willen zu reiner Erkenntnis aufgeopfert hat.”

2 „Sie gab Impulse, stellte Werttafeln auf, gab dem Menschenleben Sinn und Ziel, gab ihm die Welt, in der er sich geborgen fühlte, gab ihm mit einem Wort: Weltanschauung.”
valuation. For this very reason, Jaspers calls his well-known book that intends to give only a theory of possible life- and world-views, and to understand the meaning of these latter psychologically, not a “philosophy”, but a “Psychology of the Life- and World-views”\(^1\).

We can thus establish the fact that, on the one hand, philosophy and life- and world-views are distinguished most sharply according to an axiological criterion, while, on the other hand, they are identified with one another. Within the first school of thought, again, there is a dispute over the question, whether philosophy may orient itself at any rate to a theoretical value, or whether every attitude of valuation must be excluded.

However this may be, we continue for the moment to stand somewhat aloof from such an axiological criterion as has been referred to, for, as we shall see, it is heavily burdened with the transcendental basic-idea of the thinkers in question.

A “concept of value”, taken in an objective idealistic, or indeed in a subjective-psychologistic sense, betrays its origin in immanence-philosophy. How shall the “philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea”, which starts by raising the question as to the possibility of philosophy and thereby urges to critical self-reflection as to the transcendental ground-Idea, accept off-hand a criterion that has originated from a philosophy which is not aware of the importance of its own transcendental ground-Idea?

Litt calls it “a lack of logical integrity”, to require for a life- and world-view the “universal validity”, which ex origine belongs only to “theoretical truth”\(^2\). But even this “argument ad hominem” is not capable of making an impression, when it appears that Litt’s conception of the meaning of theoretical truth bears the stamp of a transcendental basic Idea which is born of a supra-philosophical choice of position, according to his own view, perhaps from a life- and world-view!

Life- and world-view as an “individual impression of life”, Theodor Litt and Georg Simmel.

Each man, thus says Litt, has his individual “life- and world-

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\(^1\) Psychologie der Weltansch. 3d Ed. 1925, pp. 1—7.

\(^2\) The opposition: life- and world-view, on the one hand, and theoretical truth on the other is, in addition, impure and misleading. The true opposition must be: life- and world-view and philosophy, both of which are subjected to a norm of truth.
view”. The latter is nothing but an individual impression of life, which arises in closest contact with the conception of experienced reality, formed by the community, in which the man lives. All community-life creates an atmosphere of common convictions which make themselves felt, wherever something of importance is said, thought or done, without such convictions being subjected to any criticism. Such community-conceptions of the problem of world and life display the most varied forms from the image-world of the myths to the dogmas of religion and the profane wisdom of the popular outlook on life. In its origin, philosophy is undoubtedly still interwoven most closely with such life- and world-views. To preserve a pure scientific conscience, however, it must distinguish itself most sharply from them. For it is concerned with the universally valid theoretical truth which finds its place only in the realm of theoretical thought.

Curiously enough, Litt’s characterization of the life- and world-view as an “individual impression of life” agrees rather well with Georg Simmel’s characterization of philosophy as “a temperament, seen through a picture of the world”, and as the revelation of “what is deepest and final in a personal attitude toward the world in the language of a picture of the world”.

We notice this agreement for the present with special interest, since Simmel is an adherent of the historicistic and relativistic philosophy of life, to which Litt, as we shall see, also exhibits a strong approximation, in spite of the semblance of the contrary.

Litt’s vision on life- and world-views, too, does not help us any further, since, as we shall see in the sequel, the same prejudices are again brought into play here as in the case of the criterion of value. In other words, the determination of the relationship between philosophy and a “life- and world-view” is ruled by a transcendental ground-Idea, of whose importance the thinker has not been fully aware in critical self-reflection.

The relationship as seen from the Christian transcendence-standpoint.

How shall we then from our standpoint, determine the relationship between philosophy and a life- and world-view?

We begin by setting on the foreground that the concept “life-

1 Hauptprobleme der Philosophie (Chief Problems of Philosophy), pp. 23, 28.
and world-view” is raised above the level of vague representations burdened either with resentment or with exaggerated veneration only if it is understood in the sense that is necessarily inherent in it as a view of totality. An individual impression of life, fed from a certain sphere of convictions, is no “life- and world-view.”

The genuine life- and world-view has undoubtedly a close affinity with philosophy, because it is essentially directed towards the totality of meaning of our cosmos. A life- and world-view also implies an Archimedean point. Like philosophy, it has its religious ground-motive. It, as well as philosophy, requires the religious commitment of our selfhood. It has its own attitude of thought. However, it is not, as such, of a theoretical character. Its view of totality is not the theoretical, but rather the pre-theoretical. It does not conceive reality in its abstracted modal aspects of meaning, but rather in typical structures of individuality which are not analyzed in a theoretical way. It is not restricted to a special category of “philosophic thinkers”, but applies to everybody, the simplest included. Therefore, it is entirely wrong to see in Christian philosophy only a philosophically elaborated life- and world-view. To do so would be a fundamental misunderstanding of the true relationships. The Divine Word-revelation gives the Christian as little a detailed life- and world-view as a Christian philosophy, yet it gives to both simply their direction from the starting-point in their central basic motive. But this direction is really a radical and integral one, determining everything. The same holds for the direction and outlook which the apostate religious motives give to philosophy and a life- and world-view.

Therefore philosophy and a life- and world-view are in the root absolutely united with each other, even though they may not be identified.

Philosophy cannot take the place of a life- and world-view, nor the reverse, for the task of each of the two is different.

They must rather understand each other mutually from their common religious root. Yet, to be sure, philosophy has to give a theoretical account of a life- and world-view, of which something will be said later.

§ 3 - THE NEUTRALITY-POSTULATE AND THE “THEORY OF LIFE AND WORLD-VIEWS”

It is intensely interesting to trace in the neutrality-postulate,
the influence of the personality-ideal, which we shall discuss later on as a basic factor in the transcendental Humanistic ground-Idea. We have repeatedly established the fact that by means of this postulate various modern currents in immanence-philosophy attempt to avoid self-reflection as to the transcendental ground-Idea of their philosophic system. It finds its origin in Kant's sharp separation between theoretical and practical reason and in his attempt at the emancipation of the free and autonomous personality from the tyranny of the Humanistic ideal of science, which was itself evoked by the religious freedom-motive of Humanism. The intended postulate is really not of a theoretical, but of a religious origin.

First of all, the theoretical arguments which have been introduced for the defence of this neutrality-postulate will be faced.

Rickert's defence of the neutrality-postulate.

Rickert has indeed developed them in the greatest detail in his System der Philosophie ("System of Philosophy")¹. Accord-

¹ From the same author there has appeared: Grundprobleme der Philosophie (Basic Problems of Philosophy, 1934), which to a large extent treats of the same problems.

No new points of view are opened by Rickert's essay Wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Weltanschauung (Scientific Philosophy and World-view) in Logos, Vol. 22 (1933), pp. 37f., which is aimed against the modern existence-philosophy of Heidegger, Jaspers, etc. Rickert's opponents demand an existential mode of philosophical thinking in opposition to a purely theoretical one.

The essay referred to intends to demonstrate that the totality of the cosmos is accessible only to theoretical thought, while from the total man, seen by Rickert — in the strain of all immanence-philosophy — as an individual complex of functions, this cosmic totality must remain hidden.

This whole argumentation stands or falls with the immanence-standpoint itself and with its transcendental ground-Idea for which Rickert does not account, in consequence of which his standpoint becomes uncritically dogmatic, or rather "doctrinaire".

That the selfhood as totality of human existence cannot be sought in the temporal coherence of its functions remains hidden from him.

"Individual man in the totality of his existence necessarily restricts his interest to one or more parts of the cosmic totality. Any one who tries to think in a universal way and notwithstanding this wishes at the same time to philosophize as an "existing thinker", badly understands himself and his own existence. Only after he has detached himself from it, with the aid of philosophy, his view is able to be free
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ding to him, philosophy, so far as its inner nature is concerned, is the theoretical science which has to understand the entire cosmos theoretically as a totality, even though this cosmos is sharply separated by theoretical thought into the two spheres of temporal-spatial (sensibly perceptible) nature-reality and timeless values which have absolute validity.

It has no life- and world-view to preach as "persuasion", or "faith" or "imperative". It must restrict itself scrupulously to a theoretical attitude of knowledge. Imperatives, norms are not the business of theory. The concept of a normative science is internally contradictory.

"Reality" (for Rickert exhausted in its psycho-physical aspects) is not considered by philosophy in the objectivizing sense of the special sciences. The special sciences must establish what reality is as "mere reality". Philosophy has nothing to say about that. Reality studied by the special sciences is the immanent, conscious, given reality, the "psycho-physical". No other reality exists (loc. cit. p. 179).

Yet reality to Rickert is more than "mere reality". As theoretical form, in which the understanding conceives an empirical sensory material of consciousness, reality is a category of thought, which is not itself real, but has validity ("Geltung") only.

Kant adopted this "critical" standpoint with respect to reality, when he proclaimed the "universally-valid" transcendental subject, stripped of all individuality, in the synthesis of its forms of thought and intuition to be the formal origin of the real "Gegenstand" of knowledge. Only the sort of "validity" or "value", on the basis of which the subject builds up his "world" epistemologically, is decisive for the "objectivity" of reality gained on the basis of critical philosophy (loc. cit. p. 175).

Still more clearly does the theoretical Idea of the totality of

and wide enough to comprehend the totality of the cosmos in his vision and in his truthful judgment."

[„Der ganze Mensch beschränkt sich mit seinen Interessen notwendig auf einen oder mehrere ihrer Teile. Wer universal zu denken sich bemüht und trotzdem gleichzeitig als ganzer Mensch oder als existierender Denker philosophieren möchte versteht sich selbst und seine eigene Existenz schlecht. Erst wenn er sich von ihr mit Hilfe der Theorie losgemacht hat, kann sein Blick frei und weit genug werden, um das Ganze der Welt überschauend und wahr urteilend zu erfassen.”]
reality, viewed by Kant essentially as an infinite task for thought, show its value-character. What makes this totality to be “absolute totality” is only the value that holds (p. 175).

For the problem of the “totality of reality” to be susceptible of philosophical solution, it must be understood as an epistemological problem. Philosophy does not deal with reality as “mere reality”, but with the problem of the knowledge of reality. It seeks to understand the theoretical values which are not really, but which hold good and which lead the knowledge of reality so that this latter thereby acquires anchorage and coherence. The philosophic problems of reality, in other words, are to be understood only as questions of the theory of knowledge, as theoretical problems of meaning and value. Theoretical philosophy of reality is an epistemology. It wants to interpret the meaning of knowledge and this is possible only on the basis of values.

Meanwhile, it would be altogether inadmissible to restrict the task of philosophy to the investigation of these merely theoretical values. Philosophy, which is essentially a theory of values, must be directed toward the “Voll-endung” (fulfilment), toward the totality, and must thus necessarily include the universe of values in its horizon. It must strive after a philosophic system of values. Consequently, it must also investigate the a-theoretical ones, which, according to the traditional view, are distinguished as morality, beauty, and holiness, in order to be able to interpret the meaning of all of life theoretically.

According to Rickert’s view, the system of values with respect to its material content cannot be deduced from general axiological forms. To set up such a system, one needs a material, in terms of which for the first time we have to gain an insight into the multiplicity of the “values”. How is philosophy to track down this multiplicity? To this end it must orient itself to the historical life of culture.

To understand this line of thought, we must observe that, according to Rickert, philosophy, as the theory of totality, has the task of re-uniting in thought the “worlds” of “natural reality” and “values that hold”, which “worlds” by theoretical thought were absolutely separated at first. When we are not thinking, we immediately experience this unity “free from concepts” and philosophy would not veritably become philosophy of the “Vollendung” (fulfilment), if it stopped with an unreconciled dualism in theoretical thought.
So there is needed a theoretical connecting-link between values and reality, a *third realm*, which joins the two into one. This third realm is understood theoretically in the concept of *meaning*, which to RICKERT is “logically prior” to the theoretical separation into reality and value. Meaning is itself neither real nor effective value, but the synthetic union of both, constituted in the valuating act of the subject. Meaning, “significance” ("Bedeutung"), belongs to all “acts”, so far as the subject chooses a position in them with respect to values. In the “immanent meaning of the act”, value and reality are synthetically together. The immanent meaning is not itself *value*, but reality is here related to values by meaning. It is reality to which “values cling” in meaning.

In the concept of *meaning*, the distinction between values and reality has not been dropped, but they are joined in a higher synthetic unity. “Value”, too, for RICKERT is *meaning*, but transcendent, timeless and absolute in character. *Meaning* as the intermediate link between value and reality is, on the contrary, “immanent meaning”. Only in this third realm of immanent meaning does the subject find its place in RICKERT’s view. “Reality” is merely the object of the transcendental epistemological subject, and in the realm of values there is no subjectivity at all.

Well then, for the discovery of the multiplicity of the values, philosophy must orient itself to the realm of immanent meaning which has precipitated itself solely in the historical life of culture in the cultural goods as “the truly objective” and which is understood by historical science theoretically and objectively.

The science of history has to do with *culture* as “reality to which values cling” („wertbehaftete Wirklichkeit“), although in its procedure, it looks away from the absolute values. Thus it presents philosophy the matter which the latter requires for its systematic value-theory. From the historical cultural "goods", philosophy must abstract the general *values*, in order to delimit the problems which arise for philosophy as a doctrine of the *meaning of life*. In so doing, it must necessarily work with an “open system”, which leaves room for new values which were not previously discovered.

Now the absolute universal validity of the theoretical value of truth alone can be demonstrated in a manner convincing to all thinking beings. It alone possesses a self-guarantee for this validity. The relativistic view of this value cancels itself theoreti-
cally, because it must require absolute truth for its own standpoint, if it is to be taken seriously.

On the contrary, the a-theoretical values, such as Rickert conceives them in his open system (beauty, personal holiness, impersonal holiness, morality, and happiness) are not to be proved in their universal validity just because proof resides in the theoretical realm. Philosophy as theoretical science of totality must suffice with providing us with theoretical insight with respect to these values. It can bring them only into a theoretical system, whereby nothing is said as to the practical priority of one of these values, but only a formal order of the “stages of value” is given.

As theoretical science of totality it cannot proclaim a certain value to be the highest. It would thereby fall into a “prophetism” which would be incompatible with its un-prejudiced theoretical starting-point. It would become a life- and world-view, even if it declared the theoretical values which dominate its own field of research to be in this sense the highest, dominating all of life. In this case, instead of thinking philosophically in theoretical style, it would preach an intellectualism, such as was the case in the philosophy of the Enlightenment.

Nevertheless, philosophy must really include the life- and world-views in its theoretical inquiry. For the object of philosophy is the totality of the cosmos and to this totality also belongs the subject, i.e. the whole man and his relation to the cosmos, the subject that chooses a position in life with respect to values. Hence philosophy necessarily becomes also a theory of the life- and world-views, “Weltanschauungslehre” or theory of the total meaning of life („Theory des vollendeten Lebens“), and in this very capacity is it philosophy of values.

As “Weltanschauungslehre”, philosophy has simply to develop theoretically the various possible types of life- and world-views, that is to say, to point out the consequences of elevating one of the various values to the highest rank. It has, in other words, only to furnish us with theoretical clarity as to the meaning of each life- and world-view. “For the rest it leaves to the individual man to choose that view of life and the world that suits his personal extra- or super-scientific nature best”.

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1 „Im übrigen wird sie es dann dem einzelnen Individuum überlassen die Weltanschauung zu wählen, die am besten zu seiner persönlichen ausser- oder überwissenschaftlichen Eigenart passt” (op. cit., p. 407).
Criticism of the fundamentals of the "Weltanschauungslehre".

It would lead us too far and would also be superfluous in the present context to pursue the development of the method of Rickert's "Weltanschauungslehre" further.

We are here concerned only with rendering a critical appraisal of its fundamentals and its critical arguments.

These fundamentals seem to be strongly grounded. Rickert appears zealously to defend the boundaries of theoretical philosophy against all attempts at usurpation which wish to make of theory something more than theory. In the rejection of an intellectualistic foundation for philosophy, the separation between philosophy and a life- and world-view appears to be really maintained consistently. Furthermore, Rickert shows himself so little confined by intellectualistic prejudices, that he theoretically recognizes the necessity for religion to penetrate the whole of life and never to allow itself to be satisfied with a coordination of other values and the value that dominates it. He recognizes, too, that the axiological point of view cannot exhaust the essence of religion.

Nevertheless, a pitfall, fatal to Rickert's entire conception of the essence, task and place of philosophy, is concealed in his plea for the theoretical neutrality of philosophy.

The neutrality-postulate would have meaning and in that case also have complete meaning, only if the "theoretical truth-value", which — according to Rickert — solely and exclusively is to dominate philosophy, possessed validity in itself, independent of a cosmic temporal order, independent also of the other values, independent namely of the religious fulness of truth.

Now the pitfall lies concealed in the apriori identification of "truth" with theoretical correctness and in the further apriori pre-supposition that truth thus interpreted rests in itself as an absolute "value": "We see in philosophy a theoretical attitude of mind, and seek in it nothing but that which we call truth. We thereby pre-suppose, that truth possesses a value of its own, or that there is a meaning in striving after truth for the sake of truth. In this lies the further pre-supposition, that there is truth that is timelessly valid, and even this pre-supposition will arouse opposition in our times. It includes the conviction that there is truth resting in itself or absolute truth, by which all philosophical views of the universe are to be measured" ¹.

¹ Rickert, loc. cit., p. 39: „Wir sehen in der Philosophie ein theoreti-
It would be trifling to play off the word “conviction” against the author and to object, that, according to his own conception, “convictions” are not a matter of philosophy but of a life-view. For Rickert is indeed of opinion that the truth-value is the only one in the realm of values, the absolute universally-validity of which may be proved theoretically.

Yet the opinion that the absolute validity of the “theoretical truth-value” can be proved theoretically is hardly to be sustained. For does not every theoretical proof suppose a norm for its correctness? (I would not like to say an absolute truth-value, possessing its validity in itself!).

How can that be proved which is pre-supposed in the proof? To this point, however, I shall devote separate attention below.

Immanent antinomy in Rickert’s philosophy of values.

For the present I will only demonstrate, that the absolutizing of theoretical truth to an absolute value, resting in itself, viewed from Rickert’s own standpoint, leads to an insoluble antinomy.

Rickert himself desires to relate philosophic thought to the “totality of values.” In contradistinction to this totality, the “truth-value”, according to Rickert’s own theoretical view, is only a species of transcendent meaning in the (transcendent) diversity of values. That being granted, the theoretical truth-value is in no case to be set by itself. In any case, it supposes the totality of values. The idea of an absolute theoretical “truth-value” resting entirely in itself is thus internally contradictory and dissolves itself.

Furthermore, the diversity of values supposes a coherence of meaning among them.

For how could they otherwise belong to the same totality of values? That being granted again, what meaning is to be ascribed to the postulate of “theoretical purity” for my philosophic
thought, if the “theoretical truth-value” which alone could give meaning to this thought, cannot satisfy this postulate without cancelling itself?

For, can a special value, torn out of the coherence of meaning with all the others and set by itself, escape from becoming meaningless?

If not, then the postulate of the self-sufficiency of theoretical thought is also reduced ad absurdum and in this way too, it is demonstrated that in “pure” theoretical thought the true Archimedean point of immanence-philosophy cannot be found.

The test of the transcendental ground-Idea.

If we apply the test of the transcendental ground-Idea, then Rickert’s metaphysical concept of value immediately turns out to be ruled by a specific supra-philosophical choice of position with respect to \( \alpha \gamma \zeta \) and totality of meaning of the different modal laws, especially of the modal norm-spheres. The line of thought is as follows: the norm as lex (imperative) is necessarily related to a subject, is thus relative and consequently cannot be the absolute \( \alpha \gamma \zeta \) of meaning. Since the referring of the norms to God’s sovereignty comes into conflict with the secret religious proclamation of the sovereignty of human personality, an Idea of reason must be hypostatized as a value sufficient to itself. This value now appears to be elevated to the position of \( \alpha \gamma \zeta \) of the laws. In truth, however, the apostate selfhood in the Idea of value proclaims the so-called “practical reason” to be the sovereign \( \alpha \gamma \zeta \).

The absolute “value”, sufficient to itself, is, as we saw, nothing but the hypostatization of the norm (in its modal speciality of meaning), which to this end is dissociated from the subject on the one hand and from God as \( \alpha \gamma \zeta \) on the other hand and now rests in itself as a Platonic Idea. However, this “value” is not conceived of, as by Plato, as a “being”, a pattern-form in respect to the perceivable cosmos, but as a “holding good”.

1 August Messer, Deutsche Wertphilosophie der Gegenwart (German Value-Philosophy of the Present), 1926, pp. 2ff., supposes that he can satisfactorily cut off the reproach of hypostatization, directed against the philosophy of values, by pointing to the sharp distinction between value and reality. Only a “realism of values”, such as was recognized in Plato’s doctrine of Ideas could be said to rest upon hypostatization. But we noticed previously, that the hypostatization is in itself independent of the
The true root of this metaphysical axiological theory is the *Humanistic ideal of personality* as a basic factor in the central religious motive of Humanism, which ideal of personality in Kant's "primacy of the practical reason", after a long struggle, gained the ascendency over the *Humanistic science-ideal* of the intellectualistic "Aufklärung" (Enlightenment), about which our further discussion will follow in the next part. Theoretic philosophy may not dominate the autonomous freedom of human personality in the choice of its life- and world-view.

A religious ground-motive is at the basis of Rickert's postulate of theoretic neutrality, a ground-motive which has expressed itself in a transcendental ground-Idea; the apriori influence of the latter upon Rickert's thought can be demonstrated in his concept of the law and the subject, his view of reality, his metaphysical idea of value, his conception of time, and so on.

The philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea does not judge about matters over which no judgment belongs to man, but leads to fundamental self-criticism of the thinker.

As one sees, the referring of a philosophic system to its transcendental ground-Idea leads to a radical sharpening of the anti-thesis in philosophic thought and to the discovery of really stern truths. But immanence-philosophy may not complain about this, for it, too, requires of philosophic thought to seek the truth and nothing but the truth. On its part, it offers sharp opposition to every attack upon the self-sufficiency of theoretical thought. Moreover, it should be kept in mind, that the radical criticism which the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea exercises may in no part be understood as a judgment as to the personal religious condition of a thinker. Such a judgment does not belong to man and lies entirely outside the intention of our philosophy. We know, after all, that in the heart of the Christian himself the apostate selfhood and the selfhood redirected to God wage a daily warfare.

But this full truth will be impressed by the radical self-criticism which the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea requires of the thinker: The proclamation of the self-sufficiency of philosophic thought signifies the withdrawal of that thought from Christ as the new religious root of our cosmos. This cannot proceed from

question, whether it is understood in terms of "being" or rather of "holding good".
Prolegomena

Him, but necessarily issues from the root of existence which has fallen away from God.

§ 4 - SEQUEL: THE PRETENDED SELF-GUARANTEE OF THEORETICAL TRUTH

Litt's argument concerning the self-guarantee of theoretical truth.

We may not stop at Rickert's plea for the neutrality-postulate. Indeed, it has not escaped other defenders of this postulate, that Rickert's very foundation of the notion of neutrality in his philosophy of values exceeds the limits of "purely theoretical" thought. In an earlier context we pointed to Theodor Litt, who reckons the value-Idea as such to the territory of a "life- and world-view."

We must, therefore, try to penetrate to the gist of the argument which is adduced in support of the neutrality-postulate, and which in fact is not necessarily connected with the conception of philosophy as a theory of values. This gist is to be found in the pretended self-guarantee of "theoretical truth" in respect to its absoluteness. We saw, that Rickert, too, pointed his entire demonstration in the direction of this "self-guarantee", but showed his weak side by reason of the axiological turn of his argument. We will therefore pay no further notice to this axiological turn, and devote our attention exclusively to the question, whether in some other manner the "self-guarantee of theoretical truth" is to be maintained as the basis of a "purely theoretical" conception of philosophy.

We previously observed, that this pretended self-guarantee can in no case be proved theoretically. Theodor Litt, too, has discovered the pitfall which is hidden from the defenders of the absoluteness and self-guarantee of "theoretical truth" in the conception, that it should be possible to demonstrate it in a theoretical way.

Nay, he goes so far as to charge those who consider this "self-guarantee" to be demonstrable, with relativism, in as much as they attempt to refer "truth" to something that is not yet itself truth, something other than truth, if possible more than truth.

The only point really capable of theoretical demonstration in his view is the internal contradiction in which every form of a relativistic view of truth must involve itself.

This would really signify not much, or rather nothing, for the defence of the self-sufficiency of theoretical thought, if Litt did
not also start from an aprioristic identification of the absolute self-guaranteeing truth with theoretical correctness.

For if truth is not regarded as being exhausted in its relation to theoretical thought, but in "theoretical verity" there is seen only a refraction of meaning (not sufficient to itself) of the fulness of all truth, i.e. of its religious fulness, then the demonstration that "relativism" is self-destructive turns immediately against such as deny this fulness of verity.

LITT, however, has armed himself at the very outset against all misunderstanding of his opinion on this point by making self-sufficient truth hold good exclusively in correlation to the "cogito", to the "I think (theoretically)". By this means he intends also expressly to cut off all "hypostatization" of verity as an Idea or "value" which has being or validity apart from all subjectivity.

In other words, the "absolute, self-sufficient truth" holds only in and for theoretical thought! Yet this judgment is ostensibly self-contradiction incarnate! How can a truth be absolute and self-sufficient, the validity of which is relativized to theoretical thought?

The philosophy of values, at any rate, escaped from this contradiction by hypostatizing truth as an absolute value, elevated in itself above all relationship to subjectivity. By restricting the validity of truth from the outset to the theoretical thought-relation, LITT falls here into a fundamental relativism, which he supposed he had just cut off at the root in his absolutizing of theoretical truth.

It is interesting to see how LITT now seeks to justify himself against the reproach of relativism as to verity.

Such a relativism for him is in all its possible forms an internally contradictory scepticism, which in its argumentation must simultaneously pre-suppose and annihilate the authentic concept of truth: "Annihilate: for that which they call ‘truth’ in express words is not truth; pre-suppose: for the act of annihilating is a spiritual deed, which is meaningful only if ‘truth’ in the original sense is accepted as possible and attainable”.

This antinomy would remain hidden from scepticism, only

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1 Einleitung, p. 29: „Vernichten: denn das, was sie expressis verbis „Wahrheit” nennen, ist nicht Wahrheit; voraussetzen: denn dieser Akt der Vernichtung ist ein geistiges Tun, das nur dann sinnvoll ist, wenn „Wahrheit” im ursprünglichen Sinne als möglich und erreichbar angenommen wird.”
because it has not advanced to the last stage of self-reflection on the part of theoretical thought. It asks only reflectively after the claim to validity which is inherent in the judgments of thought directed to “Gegenstände”, but forgets that the judgments of this reflective thought also make a claim of absolute validity as to truth! In other words, it has not attained to the reflective introspection of thought, wherein thought is directed exclusively toward itself and not toward its “Gegenstände”.

If biology, psychology, and even anthropology investigate the thought-function scientifically, then they can examine it only as a special aspect of reality in full relativity to the other aspects. They remain then in the sphere of “objective thought”, for which thought itself signifies a piece of “reality”, a “Gegenstand”.

But in all biological, psychological and anthropological thought the actual “I think”, which can never be made into a “Gegenstand” of thought, remains hidden. It is pre-eminently the task of philosophical thought, as thought directed to self-reflection, to set in the light this subjective antipole of all objective reality; it is its very task to demonstrate how the validity of truth, which the judgments of objectivizing scientific thought claim for themselves, remains dependent upon the absolute validity of truth of the pronouncements of reflective thought.

Well then, if the binding of the absolute validity of truth to the thought-relation really were to signify, that truth was limited to real thinking beings, then, but only then, according to Lrrr, would his conception of truth have slipped down into the paths of sceptical relativism. But this is not the case. For by the “cogito” (I think), to which absolute truth in its validity is restricted, there is here to be understood only “pure thought”, i.e. “that thought of which we said above, that it ‘springs back’ again and again into the counter-position to the ‘Gegenstand’ thought of.” This “thought” is no longer an aspect of concrete temporal reality. It is the transcendental subject of thought, itself universally valid, the self-consciousness that has arrived at determinateness in reflective thought, which is not inherent in individual reality, but in “Denken schlechthin” (mere thought as such). For all temporal and spatial reality, the full concrete ego (self) as individual experiential reality included, is in the epistemological relation only the “objective antipole” of this transcendental “I think”, so that the “cogito” in this transcendental sense can never be subsumed under it.

The introduction of absolute truth into the thought-relation
thus conceived of should not actually lead to the consequences of relativism, since the attempt is not here made to deduce "truth" from something else. Rather there is accepted, in Litt's view, a strict correlation between truth and (transcendental) "cogito". "Here there is consequently a strict balance between the members, which are united by this relation: just as 'truth', is determined in view of the 'thinking being', so the 'thinking being' is determined in view of 'truth', and only in view of it". A correlation of this absoluteness should not allow the least scope to "relativism".

Critique of Litt's conception.

We have deliberately reproduced Litt's conception of the absoluteness and self-guarantee of theoretical truth in as detailed a fashion as possible, and as far as possible in his own words, in order to do full justice to his argument. Every link in the argument actually counts, if in our criticism we are not to pass our opponent and find merely a fancied refutation.

We again plan to begin with immanent criticism.

Let us hold to the strict correlation in which the author sets theoretical thought and truth. It is clear, that the relativizing of the fulness [of meaning] of verity to a merely theoretical truth, which beyond possible contradiction is involved in the intended correlation, at best could not detract from the absoluteness and pretended self-guarantee of verity only in case the "transcendental cogito" could lay claim to the same absoluteness as truth itself. This would mean, that they are one and the same, identical in a logical sense. Indeed the argument must result into such an identification. After all, the entire demonstration respecting the self-guarantee of "theoretical truth" must serve to save the unconditional, "purely theoretical" character of philosophic thought itself. For what is involved here in the first place, is not the self-sufficiency of "truth", but the self-guarantee, the self-sufficiency of philosophic thought. Litt may emphatically reject the Idea that he would deduce the "truth" from philosophic thought. Yet he will not be able to deny, that the supposed absoluteness and self-sufficiency of theoretical verity stands or falls with that of philosophic thought itself.

1 „Hier besteht also ein strenges Gleichgewicht zwischen den Gliedern, die durch die Relation verbunden sind: wie die „Wahrheit“ im Hinblick auf das „denkende Wesen“, so ist das „denkende Wesen“ im Hinblick auf die „Wahrheit“ nur im Hinblick auf sie bestimmt.”
It is entirely in Litt's line, that we seek to approximate the meaning of the *correlation* intended by him from the subjective philosophic pole of thought. For, according to him, it does not make sense to speak about that which I cannot grasp in a *concept* when thinking *subjectively*. Consequently, this holds also with regard to "absolute truth". However, it may not be denied, that in this very way a serious danger has arisen for the absoluteness of verity, and that in the course of further reasoning this absoluteness threatens to be dissolved into the absoluteness of philosophic thought. For now "absolute truth" appears also to require theoretical logical determination by philosophic thought. Otherwise, how could it be "purely theoretical"?

In contradistinction to this, the determination which philosophic thought would have to receive from the side of "absolute truth" appears to be logically *un-determined* to the highest degree.

If "absolute verity" does not appear to be identical with the "absolute cogito" in its dialectical development of thought, it sinks back in Litt's own line of thought to the level of the "Gegenstand" of thought, which must receive all its determination from *thought* itself.

The first pitfall in Litt's demonstration: the unconditional character of the 'transcendental cogito'.

However, when we pass on to the *subjective pole of thought*, to the 'transcendental cogito' — which in Litt's Kantian opinion maintains itself in contradistinction to all *reality* as its absolute opposite — then, in the conception of the "unconditional character" of this pole of thought, the pitfall laid bare in our Introduction reappears.

For the "cogito" is nothing but the *selfhood* in its logical thought-activity. It is altogether impossible to dissolve this *selfhood* in the modal meaning of *its logical function*, unless we have left a bare *concept*, which is itself merely a product of the thinking *ego*.

This pitfall was, indeed, observed by Fichte, the father of the entire dialectical-reflective way of thinking, when he spoke of a necessary tension between "absolute ego"¹ and "thinking ego."

Litt, on the contrary, who intends to follow in Fichte's foot-

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¹ This is something entirely different from Litt's "*full concrete ego*", intended as "object" of thought.
steps, has not observed the antimony of “unconditioned thought”, for he hypostatizes theoretical thought in the Humanistic sense of value-free reflection. Fichte, in his Kantian phase, refused to do so, because he did not seek the root or the selfhood of human existence in “theoretical”, but in the so-called “practical reason”, i.e. in Kant’s “homo noumenon” as synthetic hypostatization of the ethical function of personality. In other words, to him theoretical thought was ethically determined from the outset. In Litt, the full ego is identical with the concrete, individual complex of its functions in temporal-spatial reality and so can be determined only by the transcendental absolute thought! However, in this so-called “full, concrete ego” the selfhood which transcends all thought is not really to be found.

Thus Litt’s conception of the absolute self-guarantee of the “merely-theoretical truth” dissolves itself into a speculative hypostatization of thought; this latter disintegrates into internal contradictions and cannot again be rendered harmless by a dialectical turn of thought by which it recognizes itself in the last analysis as logically identical (in the opposition) with the “full ego”. With the acceptance of the unconditioned character, the self-sufficiency of philosophic thought, the actual I-ness falls. This I-ness persists in its religious actuality which determines all thought, in contradistinction to all logical concepts. With the denial of the actual I-ness or self-hood, however, the possibility of knowledge and the possibility of forming concepts must be lost. Litt would actually have to come to these destructive consequences in his system, if in it he had consistently followed the postulate of the purity of philosophic thought. The fact that he has nonetheless developed a philosophical system, proves that he was far from thinking “purely theoretically”!

The second pitfall: the opposition of transcendental thought and full reality.

A second pitfall in Litt’s conception of the transcendental “cogito”, already laid bare in an earlier context of our transcendental critique, is the supposition that, in the antithetic relation of theoretic thought full temporal reality — in opposition to the subjective pole “I think” — would spring back into the antipole of “Gegenständlichkeit” (for Litt, identical with objectivity!).

This supposition is completely incorrect and contradictory, since it neglects the temporal coherence of meaning, to which
the logical function of thought remains bound even in its ultimate actuality which may not be objectivized.

In our transcendental critique of theoretical thought we have shown, that the antithetical relation from which alone the epistemological problem of the "Gegenstand" can arise does not correspond to reality. Consequently, reality itself, can never be made into a "Gegenstand" of thinking in its actual logical function, but is only a merely intentional abstraction performed within the real theoretical act of our consciousness. In the absolutizing of the "transcendental logical subject" it is entirely overlooked that theoretical thought is possible only in an inter-modal synthesis which pre-supposes the cosmic coherence of meaning in time, and consequently cannot be of a purely logical character.

The second misconception, however, which we must lay bare in Litt's argument, grounded in the first, is, that the selfhood should be determined only by "pure" thought, i.e. by dialectical logic.

The "self-refutation of scepticism" reduced to its true proportion.

So the self-refutation of scepticism, in which Rickert and Litt alike focus the force of their argument, can actually have nothing to do with a pretended self-guarantee of merely theoretical truth. Let us try to reduce it to its true proportions. Then the state of affairs appears to be that logical thought in its subjectivity is necessarily subjected to the logical laws, in casu — the "principium contradictionis" (principle of contradiction).

If anybody is to think theoretically, he ought to begin by recognizing the validity of this principle, which is in no sense absolute and "unconditioned", but rather of a cosmic-temporal character. Does this mean, that other creatures, or God Himself, could set aside the principle of non-contradiction in their thought? If this question is to have a meaning, one must proceed from the supposition that God Himself, or e.g. the angels, also would have to think in a cosmic temporal fashion. For, as a matter of fact, human thought is able to proceed in setting aside the principle of non-contradiction; e.g. the whole "dialectic logic" does so. But whoever would suppose this "thought" in the case of God and the angels, supposes at the same time, that they are included in the cosmic temporal order and that they are subjected to the laws that rule therein, although they can transgress them in so far as they have a norm-character. Quod
absurdum! and with respect to the sovereign God: Quod blasphemium!

From the time of Greek Sophism, sceptical relativism has been characterized by its primary denial that thought is subjected to a norm of truth. It is an irrationalism in the epistemological field.

Actually this denial must necessarily lead to antinomy, so far as the judgment: “There is no truth” must itself be tested by the norm of verity. Does, however, this judgment in its claim to truth, imply the validity of an absolute, self-sufficient theoretical verity? In no way! He who says: “There is no truth”, intends this statement in the first place against the validity of a norm of verity in the temporal coherence of meaning. Furthermore, he directs it in the most absolute sense also against the supratemporal totality and Origin of truth. Thereby, he necessarily entangles himself in the antinomy, that his very judgment makes claim to a verity, which must be the full one.

Litt’s proclamation of the self-sufficiency of theoretical truth, however, must lead to the same sceptical relativism and consequently to the same antinomy. Consistently thought out, it can recognize no norm which dominates the absolutized “transcendental-logical subject”, since it declares the subjective ‘cogito’ to be sovereign and proclaims it to be the absolute origin of all meaning and order.

How could subjective theoretical thought still be viewed as self-sufficient, if it were acknowledged, that it is subject to a law, which it has not itself imposed?

In Litt’s line of thought, the “transcendental cogito” does not belong to the full temporal reality in its indissoluble correlation of cosmonomic side and subject-side. Reality in the “Gegebenheitskorrelation” [i.e. the datum-correlation] is seen only in the absolutized individuality, which is ascribed to the “concrete ego” itself. It is as little subjected to laws, as the “transcendental ego”, but is understood as the absolute irrational which can be objectivized only in the “Erkenntniskorrelation” (correlation of knowledge) and conceived by the “transcendental-logical ego” in universally valid thought forms.

Nowhere in Litt’s philosophy does the cosmic law really have a place in its original inseparable correlation to the individual subjectivity that is subjected to it. The “pure thinking subject” with its reflective and objectivizing thought-forms is itself the “universally valid” and the origin of all universal validity.
The "theoretical universal validity" originating from the "autonomous" selfhood (which identifies itself with its transcendental-logical function in the will to "pure thought") is the substitute for the cosmic order and its different modal law-spheres to which all individual subjectivity is subjected according to God's law of creation.

However, here arises a dialectical tension, a veritable antinomic relation between universal validity and individuality; between absolutized theoretical thought with its would-be self-sufficient absolute truth and individual subjectivity in the 'datum-correlation' ("Gegebenheitskorrelation"); between "thinking ego" and "living (experiencing) ego"; between philosophy as a universally valid theory, and a life- and world-view as an entirely individual impression of life on the part of the sovereign personality, not subjected to any norm of truth!

In its dialectical thought philosophy has, according to LITT, eventually to establish this lawlessness of individuality. In the irrationality of life, it has to recognize its dialectical other which possesses no universal validity. It has to establish in a "universally valid manner" the individual law-lessness of personality in its life- and world-view, in order eventually to understand its dialectical unity-in-the-opposition with that life- and world-view! For actually, dialectical "purely theoretical thought" and a "life- and world-view" as a norm-less "individual impression of life" are, in the light of LITT's transcendental ground-Idea, two dialectical emanations from the same ego, which lives in a relativistically undermined Humanistic ideal of personality.

The absolutizing of the "transcendental cogito" to a self-sufficient, "unconditioned", "sovereign" instance implies, that "pure thought" is not subjected to a cosmic order, in which the laws of logical thought too, are grounded. Since theoretical reason also tries to create the coherence of meaning between its logical aspect and the other modal aspects of our cosmos, the result is a dialectical mode of thought, which relativizes in an expressly logical way the basic laws of logic as norms and limits of our subjective logical function.

How can such "dialectical thought" subject itself to a veritable norm of truth that stands above it? The absolutizing of theoretical truth, which amounts to the dissolution of its meaning, is the work of the apostate selfhood, that will not subject itself to the laws established by the 'Aozý of every creature, and therefore ascribes to its dialectical thought a sovereignty sur-
mounting all boundaries of laws. To Litt, the criterion of all relativism resides in the denial of the self-sufficiency of "purely theoretical" truth. By this time, we have seen how the proclamation of this self-sufficiency is in truth nothing but the primary absolutizing of theoretical thought itself, which is the fountain of all relativism, since it denies the fulness of meaning of verity and up-roots theoretical thought.

The "self-refutation of scepticism" is at the same time the self-refutation of the neutrality-postulate and of the conception of theoretical thought as self-sufficient!

But that self-refutation may not be overestimated in its proportion. For, in the last analysis, it proves no more than that whoever will think theoretically has to subject himself to a theoretical norm of truth which cannot have originated from that thought itself; for this norm has meaning only in the coherence of meaning and in relation to the totality of truth, to the fulness of verity, which, exactly as fulness, must transcend theoretical thought itself, and thus can never be "purely theoretical".

That self-refutation which manifests itself in the contradiction, in which logical thought turning against its own laws necessarily entangles itself, cannot of itself lead us to the positive knowledge of verity.

It is merely a logical criterion of truth, which is not self-sufficient.

For in the conception of the full material meaning of truth, philosophy exhibits its complete dependence upon its transcendental basic Idea as the ultimate theoretical expression of its religious ground-motive.

The test of the transcendental ground-Idea.

In applying the test of the transcendental ground-idea to Litt's philosophical system, we come to the surprising result, that there is still less question of an authentic rationalistic bent with him than with Rickert. In his dialectical thought, Litt rather inclines to the pole of the irrationalist philosophy of life, which he has simply brought under dialectical thought-forms. The absolutizing of dialectical thought that is considered to be elevated above a "borniertes gegenständliches Denken" (a narrowly restricted kind of objective thought holding itself to the principle of non-contradiction) points, in the light of Litt's conception of individuality, to the opposite of a rationalistic hypostatization of
universal laws. In this respect Lrrr actually exhibits a strong
kinship with Hegel, whose so-called “pan-logism” is as little to
be understood rationalistically, but discloses its true intentions
only against the background of the irrationalist turn of the
Humanistic ideal of personality in Romanticism! In general,
dialectic thought has an anti-rationalist tendency.

Lrrr's dialectical philosophy, measured by its own criterion,
is an “irrationalist life- and world-view” in the would-be univers-
ally-valid forms of dialectical thought, an irrationalistic logi-
cism, oriented historically.

But we, who apply another criterion, can recognize no diale-
tical unity of philosophy and a life- and world-view, but rather
find the deeper unity of the two in their religious ground-motive.
The content of Lrrr's transcendental ground-Idea is determined
by an irrationalist turn of the Humanistic freedom-motive in its
dialectical tension with the motive of scientific domination of
nature, which has undergone a fundamental depreciation in his
philosophy.

§ 5 - THE TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA AND THE MEANING
OF TRUTH

The impossibility of an authentic religiously neutral
total theory of the life- and world-views. The concept of
truth is never purely theoretical with respect to its
meaning.

On account of its immanent theoretical character philosophy
has to give a theoretical account of a life- and world-view, with
which it is, however, united in its religious root. It cannot
accomplish this task, however, until it attains to critical self-
reflection with respect to its transcendental ground-Idea.

As little as it can be religiously neutral itself, so little can it
give a neutral theory of the life- and world-views.

No single philosophic “Weltanschauungslehre” is neutral, inasmuch as it cannot be neutral with respect to the material
meaning of truth, not even in a sceptical relativism that upsets
all foundations of philosophic theory.

Lrrr considers life- and world-views, as bound in “a dialectical
unity” with philosophy (loc. cit. pp. 251ff) and interprets them
as concrete personal confessions of the individual struggle
between person and cosmos. Philosophy, which should remain
a science of a universally valid character, must, according to
him, surmount the content of these confessions regarded as
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"something merely concrete, i.e. purely individual and limited", although the impulse to philosophic thought has originated out of this same concrete "view of life". The irrationalist Humanistic ideal of personality which is the basic factor in the transcendental Idea of Lrrt's dialectical system at once discloses itself in this secularized irrationalist and personalist outlook on a life-and world-view.

To be sure, Lrrt may in this manner interpret his own life-and world-view; but if he claims "universal validity" and "absolute truth" for this philosophic outlook on every life- and world-view, then in the nature of the case there is no question of "theoretical neutrality", and there can be no question of it, since otherwise he would have to abandon his own Humanistic vision as to the meaning of truth.

The whole hypostatization of "pure" dialectical thought serves only to release human personality, in its interpretation of life, from every norm of truth, and to loosen its individuality from the bond of a law. Hence the conflict against all "universally-valid norms and values" by which a rationalistic or semi-rationalistic Humanism still wished to bind that individuality in the human person.

We find as little neutrality in Rickert's theory of life-and world-views.

In him, too, there exists a religious unity in the meaning that he ascribes to his theoretical concept of truth, and in his proclamation of the sovereignty of personality loosed from the norm of truth in the choice of its life- and world-view. Only he stops half-way on the road to irrationalism, and still holds fast to formal universally-valid values and norms of reason.

By wresting the life- and world-views into the theoretical scheme of his philosophy of values, in the nature of the case he theoretically falsifies the meaning of every life- and world-view that rejects the religious starting-point of this philosophy.

How can one, for example, interpret the Calvinistic life- and world-view theoretically as a "theistic" one, grounded in the choice of the "value of holiness" as "highest value", to which as subjective commitment ("Subjectsverhalten") "piety" answers and as "good" the "world of gods" (thus Rickert's sixth type)!?

It is evident, that here, in a religious aprioristic manner, a Humanistic-idealist meaning is inserted in the transcendental theoretical Idea of truth, which in advance cuts off an unpre-
judiced understanding of a life- and world-view with a different religious foundation.

The dependence of the meaning which a philosophic system reads into in the theoretical concept of truth, upon the transcendental ground-Idea appears from a confrontation of the various conceptions of verity, which immanence-philosophy has developed. By way of illustration, compare the nominalist view of Hobbes with the realistic and metaphysical conception of Aristotle. In Hobbes truth and falsehood are considered only as attributes of language and not of "things". According to Hobbes the exact truth consists only in the immanent agreement of concepts with each other on the basis of conventional definitions (cf. Leviathan, Part I, 4). In Aristotle truth consists in the agreement of the judgment with the metaphysical essence of the things judged. Also compare Kant's transcendental-logical, idealistic concept of truth with Hume's psychologistic one; or the mathematical concept of truth of a Descartes with the dialectical view of a Hegel or Litt, to say nothing of the pragmatic concept of scientific verity in the modern Humanistic philosophy of life, and in existentialism.¹

The supposition that, if the validity of truth is but restricted to pure theory, the meaning of verity can be determined in a "universally-valid fashion", is based on self-deception.

The consequence of the postulate of neutrality would actually have to be the allocation of the concept of truth to a personal choice of a life- and world-view.

Immanence-philosophy recognizes no norm of truth above its transcendental ground-Idea.

Actually, immanence-philosophy recognizes no norm of truth above its transcendental ground-Idea. In fact, the dogma concerning the autonomy of theoretical reason — especially in its Humanistic sense — hands truth over to the subjective commitment of the apostate personality. Therefore it is in vain that transcendental idealism attempts a refutation of the relativistic view of verity by means of logical arguments only.

Truth admits of no restriction to the theoretical-logical sphere

as regards its fulness and temporal coherence of meaning. The
validity of truth necessarily extends as far as the realm of judg-
ments extends.

The distinction between theoretical and a-theoretical
judgments. The inner contradiction of a restriction
of the validity of truth to the former.

The consequence of Litt's conception (which Rickert also
had to take, although he persisted in calling all judgments
theoretical 1) is, that a sharp distinction must be made between
theoretical judgments on the one hand, and a-theoretical judg-
ments of valuation on the other, and that only the former can
lay claim to universal validity of truth. Measured by this crite-
rieron, the judgment "This rose is beautiful", for example, or the
judgment "This action is immoral" is withdrawn from this
universal validity.

This entire distinction, however, (which goes back to Kant's
dualistic transcendental ground-Idea with its cleavage between
theoretical knowledge and apriori rational faith) is untenable
and cancels itself when it is thought out.

For there exists no meaningful judgment of valuation, which
does not at once, as a judgment, lay claim to validity of truth.
An aesthetic or moral judgment as formulated above, with
respect to its full intention must run as follows: "This rose is
in truth beautiful" and "This action is in truth immoral", respect-
vively. For these judgments imply the supposition: there exists
a universally valid standard of aesthetic and moral valuation
and to this rose and this action, respectively, the predicates
"beautiful" and "immoral" are truly ascribed in my judgment 2.

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1 Cf. e.g. System der Phil., p. 388. But it may not be denied that, for
example the expression: "Truth is the highest value" is a judgment,
which, in Rickert's own view, can never be called a theoretical judgment,
because it proceeds from a life- and world-view. Besides, as is well
known, for Rickert the theoretical judgments too are oriented to a
(theoretical) value.

2 Rickert, loc. cit. p. 388 supposes that the explicit assertion that
something is beautiful, insofar as we seek to found this judgment theore-
tically, should be a theoretical judgment about the "aesthetic value", and
that in such a judgment the characteristic aesthetic attitude, which
according to him lacks a universally valid standard, is in fact abandoned.
The art lover, however, who is not at all related theoretically to the work
of art, but who, in the full contemplation of the work, asserts the judg-
ment "This work of art is beautiful" wants just as well, and necessarily so,
This is the case, even though he who asserts the judgment is incapable of rendering a theoretical account of this supposition.

Whoever denies this state of affairs, which is rooted in the fact, that no single modal aspect of our temporal cosmos is self-sufficient (but rather each refers to the inter-modal coherence of meaning), denies thereby the meaning of aesthetic and moral judgments themselves. He cuts through the coherence of meaning among the logical, the aesthetic and the moral law-spheres and can no longer allow even the principle of contradiction to be valid for the so-called “a-theoretical” judgments.

If a man standing before Rembrandt's "Night-Watch", in opposition to the predominant conception, were to call this masterpiece un-aesthetic, un-lovely and at the same time would claim: "There exists no universally valid norm for aesthetic valuation", he would fall into the same contradiction as the sceptic who denies a universally-valid truth. He can try to defend himself, by making the reservation: I for one think this painting unlovely. But then it has no meaning to set this subjective impression against the generally predominant view. If this critic should also concede this, and so refrains from pressing his opinion upon others, then his judgment becomes meaningless as an aesthetic judgment. In other words, it is then no longer an aesthetic judgment, since it lacks aesthetic qualification and determinateness.

Every subjective valuation receives its determinateness by being subjected to a norm, which determines the subjectivity and defines it in its meaning! There exists no aesthetic subjectivity apart from a universally valid aesthetic norm to which it is subjected.

Let it not be objected here, that the beauty of the "Night-Watch" is so thoroughly individual, that it cannot be exhausted in universally valid aesthetic norms.

For individuality is proper to the subjective as such, and the "Night-Watch", without possible contradiction, is the objective realization of a completely individual, subjective-aesthetic conception. But this is not the point here. The question is only to imply the truth of his assertion in this non-theoretical judgment. To claim, with Rickert, that such a non-theoretical aesthetic judgment is impossible, is simply untenable. Besides, if aesthetic valuation were to know no tension between norm and aesthetic object, as Rickert pretends, why then do I distinguish beautiful and ugly in my a-theoretical appreciation of art?
whether the judgment: "The "Night-Watch" is beautiful", really has a universally-valid *meaning* or not. If not, then it does not make sense either to say, that the "Night-Watch" is a great work of art. If so, then the judgment must necessarily make claim to universally-valid truth. Tertium non datur!

Theoretical and non-theoretical judgments. The latter are never a-logical, but merely non-"gegenständlich".

As we have shown before in our transcendental criticism of theoretic thought, the matter stands thus: theoretical judgments are abstract, distinguishing and combining modal meanings. They embody theoretical knowledge, which exists in an intermodal synthesis of meaning between the logical aspect of thought and the modal meaning of an a-logical aspect of our experience which has been made into a "Gegenstand".

These judgments are subjected to the norm of theoretical truth, which holds for scientific knowledge.

The non-theoretical, so-called "practical" judgments are not *a-logical* — no judgment can be a-logical — but merely non-"gegenständlich", i.e. not grounded in the theoretical attitude of knowledge, which *sets* the logical aspect of thought in contrast to the abstracted a-logical aspect of experience.

They are subjected to the norm of pre-theoretical truth, which holds for pre-scientific knowledge but possesses *universal validity* as well as the norm of theoretical truth 1.

As all temporal truth is based on the temporal coherence of meaning of the logical and the non-logical aspects of reality, it points out beyond itself to the fulness of meaning of verity, which is given only in the religious totality of meaning of our cosmos in its relation to the Origin.

With respect to its meaning every judgment appeals to the fulness of truth, in which no temporal restriction any longer has meaning. For verity does not allow any limitation as to its *fulness of meaning*.

He who thus relativizes its validity to a would-be "pure" theoretical thought, and at the same time recognizes that the theoretical scientific judgments do not exhaust the realm of judgments, falls into the logical self-refutation of scepticism.

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1 In our treatment of the problem of knowledge, we shall show, that theoretical truth cannot stand alongside of the pre-theoretical, but that they make appeal to each other in a deeper sense.
For, on the one hand, he denies the fulness of truth by relativizing this latter to the special realm of the theoretical, in distinction from the non-theoretical. Yet, on the other hand, he requires for his conception full validity of truth without any restriction.

LITT's distinction between theoretical and "weltanschauliche" truth and the self-refutation of this distinction in the sense in which LITT intends it.

LITT makes a sharp distinction between truth in its proper sense of theoretical universally valid verity and the "so-called" "truth of a life- and world-view". In itself, this distinction might make good sense, were it not that LITT actually denies all "weltanschauliche Wahrheit".

For, used with the latter signification, the word "truth" in his view would be merely a predicate, applied to assertions of a life- and world-view, in order thereby to express: "the unmutilated integrity with which a thinker makes confession of his interpretation of life to himself and to others, the inner consistency with which he develops it, the convincing force, with which he knows how to represent and support it and... the agreement between it and his actual behaviour in life".

The inner contradiction of this dualism. The meaninglessness of judgments, which are alleged not to be subjected to the norm of truth.

However, as soon as we attempt seriously to carry through this conception, it appears to dissolve itself in inner contradiction. For, if the judgments which a life- and world-view provides are not subjected to a universally-valid norm of truth,

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1 This antinomy goes back to a basic antinomy in the transcendental idea of the thinker. For, on the one hand, he cannot locate the totality of meaning in the theoretical, because, in that case, the personality-ideal with its a-theoretical "values" would be relegated to a corner. But, on the other hand, he supposes he can find his Archimedean point in theoretical thought. A merely logical antinomy does not exist, as we shall see later.

2 loc. cit., p. 255: "Die ungeschminkte Aufrichtigkeit, mit der ein Denker sich vor sich selbst und anderen zu seiner Lebensdeutung bekennen, die innere Folgerichtigkeit mit der er sie entwickelt, die überzeugende Kraft, mit der er sie vorzutragen und zu begründen weiss und... die Übereinstimmung zwischen ihr und seiner tätigen Bewährung im Leben."
they lose all meaning. They are really no judgments, and so cannot contain an individual “interpretation of life”.

For a subjective “interpretation of life” which is expressed in a series of judgments, makes sense only, if our temporal cosmos in which we live, actually exists as a coherence of meaning. If this is the case, the judgments in which that interpretation is given are necessarily subjected to a universally valid norm of truth, in accordance with which my subjective interpretation should agree with the true state of affairs; in other words, the question is whether or not the judgment is true with respect to the meaning of our cosmos. However, if there is no universally-valid truth with respect to the latter, then I can give no subjective “interpretation of life” either. For I can interpret only that of which I can judge truly that it has a meaning, even though I should personally leave undecided the verity of my individual interpretation.

LITT now supposes, that he can escape these destructive consequences of his standpoint by making theoretical truth in its universal validity the judge as to essence, meaning and limits of the so-called “weltanschauliche Wahrheit”. Thus the judgments of the life- and world-view again appear to be subjected to the really mysterious “universally valid theoretical truth” — but only in order immediately to release them again from every norm of verity. For, the universally valid truth in this respect turns out to be that the judgments of the life- and world-view, as assertions of a merely individual impression of life, are situated “beyond truth and falsity”.

For LITT, by reason of the transcendental basic Idea of his philosophical system, is, as we saw, still more averse to an intellectualistic philosophy than RICKERT. “Truth” must be restricted to the theoretical realm, if theoretical thought is not again, in the old intellectualistic way, to dominate the life- and world-view of the sovereign personality.

If, however, he persists in the view that, for example, the judgments: “God is the Creator of the world, which He has created to His glory”, and indeed: “Religion has to give way to science”, are situated “beyond truth and falsity”, because they comprise merely individual interpretations of life, then it is necessary to draw the full consequences of this conception. For in this case there cannot even exist any universally valid truth with respect to the totality of meaning of our temporal world either (which indeed according to LITT’s own admission is more
than merely theoretical) and its relation to the modal diversity of meaning.

If this consequence too is accepted, then the meaning of a life- and world-view as well as that of philosophic theoretical thought must be denied together with the meaning of “theoretical truth”. Theoretical thought has then annihilated its own foundations.

For philosophic thought is directed to the totality of meaning. However, if there exists no universally valid truth as to the relationship of totality, particularity and coherence of meaning, then philosophic thought has no norm of truth either, by which it may be tested.

The pole of absolute scepticism is hereby attained, and consequently the pole of complete self-refutation.

The concept of an “absolute merely theoretical truth” dissolves itself in inner contradiction. Our transcendental critique, however, penetrates behind the logical contradictions, in which the doctrine of the self-sufficiency of “pure theoretical truth” is entangled, to the root of this doctrine and exposes the relativistic bottom on which it builds its theoretical system. Only on the basis of its relativistic religious attitude, can the emphasis be explained, with which this school in modern times tries to safeguard at least theoretical truth against the invasion of relativism, which for a long time has undermined its life- and world-views.

An intrinsically Christian philosophy does not need to learn from the Humanistic ideal of personality, that theoretical thought cannot dominate religion and a life- and world-view. But Humanistic philosophy may learn from our transcendental criticism that, on the contrary, philosophic thought is dependent upon the religious ground-motive of the thinking ego.

§ 6 - CLOSER DETERMINATION OF THE RELATION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND A LIFE- AND WORLD-VIEW

In what sense does philosophy have to give an account of the life- and world-view?

It has to bring the latter to theoretical clarity by rendering a theoretic account of its pre-theoretic picture of the world. So far as it includes in its horizon life- and world-views which possess another religious foundation than that which finds expression in its own transcendental ground-Idea, it must try to approximate this foundation in a transcendental ground-Idea, which is equal to the task of the theoretical illumination of these life- and
world-views. This is the only way in which it is really possible to do justice to the various types of life- and world-views.

The life- and world-view is no system and cannot be made a system without affecting its essence.

At this juncture, the problem also necessarily emerges, why philosophy will never be in a position to replace the life- and world-view. It cannot do so for the same reason that prevents it from replacing naïve experience by theoretical knowledge. There is left a residue of living immediacy in every life- and world-view, which must necessarily escape theoretical concepts.

An authentic life- and world-view is never a system; not that it should be lost in faith or feeling, but because in it thought must remain focused in the full concrete reality. This is exactly what theoretical, systematic thought as such cannot do.

As soon as a life- and world-view is made into a system, it loses its proper universality, it no longer speaks to us out of the fullness of reality. It now speaks out of the distance which scientific abstraction must preserve in opposition to life, if it is to furnish us with theoretical knowledge.

A life- and world-view has no universality in the sense of a (philosophic) system. It does not bear a "closed" character, as Litt supposes. It must rather remain continuously open to each concrete situation of life, in which it finds itself placed. Its deeper unity lies only in its religious root.

To the Calvinistic life- and world-view, as developed by Dr A. Kuyper in the Netherlands since the last decades of the nineteenth century, belongs undoubtedly also the radical Christian view of science. But how is this view of science born? Not from a philosophical or systematic tendency, but rather in the midst of a concrete situation of life. The pressure of the scholastic notion of science on the one hand, the necessity for defence against the ruling Humanistic view of science on the other, stimulated young neo-Calvinism to a consideration of its religious calling in the realm of science.

While Christianity in the Roman Empire was still being persecuted with fire and sword, its attitude with respect to politics and worldly culture in general was, in the main, a negative one. There could be a positive commitment with respect to the task of the Christian in this territory, only when the possibility of exercising influence in these realms had been created.

Apart from the concrete influence of the rationalistic thought
of the “Enlightenment” upon all realms of life, the reaction of
the ideal of personality would never have disclosed itself in
Humanistic circles. This reaction has been an important turning-
point in the development of the Humanistic life- and world-
view. That is to say, the requirement of the neutrality of science
with respect to personal commitment in a life- and world-view
would never have been born apart from this concrete situation.

Many more instances may be adduced in favour of our thesis.
We constantly find the development of a life- and world-view
in immediate contact with concrete situations in the fulness of
life. These things will remain so, because this immediate rela-
tion to the latter is essential to the life- and world-view.

On this account we must repeat, that it is entirely erroneous
to conceive of Christian philosophy as nothing but a theoretical
elaboration of a Christian life- and world-view.

A life- and world-view may not be “elaborated” philosophi-
cally. It must elaborate itself in the sequence of immediate life-
and world-situations.

Is it then peculiar to the concrete individuality and so pre-
vented from laying claim to “universal validity”?

What is the meaning of the concept “universal-vali-
dity”? The Kantian conception is determined by the
critical Humanist immanence-standpoint.

For this question to be answered satisfactorily, it is first
necessary to render an account of the correct meaning of the
concept “universal validity”. Up to the present, we came to
know this concept only in the dogmatic cadre of a pretended
“unconditioned pure thought” in which it really took the place
of a standard of truth.

Kant, as is well known, was the first to give to it an apriori
epistemological meaning. “Universally valid” means to him:
independent of all “empirical subjectivity”, valid for the “trans-
scendental consciousness”, the “transcendental cogito”, which is
itself in its apriori syntheses the origin of all universal validity
in the field of experience. In this sense, the synthetic apriori,
which makes objective experience possible, is universally valid.

On the other hand, perception has merely “subjective validity”,
since it is dependent upon sensory impressions, on which no
objective, necessary validity can be grounded.

Kant has applied this contrast to judgments, by distinguishing
the latter into mere judgments of perception and judgments
of experience. "So far as empirical judgments have objective validity, they are judgments of experience. Those, however, which are only subjectively valid, I call mere judgments of perception. The latter require no pure concept of the understanding, but only the logical connection of perceptions in a thinking subject. The former, however, at all times require, in addition to the representations of the sensory intuition, special concepts originally produced in the understanding, which bring it about, that the judgment of experience is objectively valid."¹

Kant illustrates this distinction with the following examples: The judgments "The room is warm, the sugar is sweet, wormwood is revolting" and "The sun heats the stone" are merely subjectively valid judgments of perception.²

The last-named judgment, however, becomes a judgment of experience, with a genuine claim to universal validity, if I say, "The sun causes the heat of the stone", for here "to perception is added the concept of the understanding, i.e. causality, which necessarily connects the concept of the sunshine with that of heat, and the synthetic judgment becomes necessarily universally valid, consequently objective, and is transformed from a perception into experience."³

This whole view of universal validity stands or falls with the critical Humanist immanence standpoint and with the vision which it determines as to the structure of experience and of temporal reality.

¹ Prolegomena zur einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik (Prolegomena to any future metaphysics) W. W. Grossherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausg. IV, S. 422 (Works, Grossherzog Wilhelm Ernst ed. IV, p. 422): „Empirische Urteile, so fern sie objektive Gültigkeit haben, sind Erfahrungsurteile; die aber, so nur subjektiv gültig sind, nenne ich blosse Wahrnehmungsurteile: Die letztern bedürfen keines reinen Verstandesbegriffs, sondern nur der logischen Verknüpfung der Wahrnehmungen in einem denkenden Subjekt. Die ersteren aber erfordern jederzeit über die Vorstellungen der sinnlichen Anschauung noch besondere, im Verstande ursprünglich erzeugte Begriffe, welche es eben machen, dass das Erfahrungsurteil objektiv gültig ist."


³ note p. 426: „kommt über die Wahrnehmung noch der Verstendesbegriff der Ursache hinzu, der mit dem Begriffe des Sonnenscheinskens den der Wärme notwendig verknüpft, und das synthetische Urteil wird notwendig allgemeingültig, folglich objektiv, und aus einer Wahrnehmung in Erfahrung verwandelt.”
The break with this immanence standpoint makes necessary also a break with this view of the universally valid. In the light of our transcendental basic Idea the universal validity to which a judgment lays claim, can merely be conceived in the sense of the agreement of the judgment with the divine law for the cosmos in its modal diversity, inter-modal coherence and fulness of meaning, apart from the validity of which no judgment would have meaning.

The possibility of universally valid judgments depends on the universal supra-subjective validity of the structural laws of human experience.

The possibility of universally valid judgments rests only and exclusively on the universal validity (raised above all individual subjectivity) of the structural laws of human experience.

"Universal validity" is a normative qualification, which supposes, that the judging subject is subjected to laws which can never take their origin from a so-called transcendental-logical subject, and with which the judging subject can come into conflict. As such it is connected very closely with the structure of truth.

Consequently, we can investigate the problem of universal validity in an all-sided manner only in the more particular treatment of the problem of knowledge. In the present connection we must still be content with introductory observations.

In the first place, then, we observe, that universal validity cannot be limited to the judgments of theoretical thought, for the very reason that the laws of theoretical thought do not hold "an sich", but only in the cosmic coherence of meaning and in dependence on the religious root-unity of the divine law.

Universal validity is ascribed to every judgment to which each judging subject ought to assent, so not to a judgment that has meaning only for the individual subject who judges. The judgments, "I do not believe in God" and "I do not think the Night Watch of REMBRANDT beautiful", can never have universal validity, because they express only a subjective opinion, which is restricted in the subjective function of the judgment to the individual ego.

On the other hand, it is indifferent for the universal validity of a judgment, whether it makes an assertion about a concrete individual state of affairs beyond the subjective function of the judgment, or indeed about abstract theoretical states of affairs.
The judgment of naïve experience, “This rose which stands on my table is red”, if it is to be taken seriously, at once lays claim to concrete truth and universal validity for every human subject of judgment perceiving at this moment, since it is not restricted in the subjective function of the judgment to the individual ego, but has an objective sense.

Its universal validity depends, however, on the structural laws of pre-theoretical experience, in which thought lacks the intentional “gegenstand-relation”.

Undoubtedly, there are structural differences in the universal validity of judgments. In the first place, between theoretical and pre-theoretical ones.

The universal validity of a correct judgment of perception.

The validity of a judgment of perception, as formulated above, does not depend on the concrete hic et nunc (here and now) of the subjective-sensory aspect of perception.

If this were the case, then indeed, as Kant taught, the judgment of perception would be of merely subjective validity, and could not lay claim to universal validity. As we observed previously, however, the structural laws of naïve experience (at the same time structural laws of temporal reality itself, as will appear to us in the discussion of the problem of knowledge) are the laws that guarantee the universal validity of a correct judgment of perception.

These structural laws also regulate the subject-object relations in naïve experience, which we have to investigate more amply in a later context. They guarantee the plastic structure of the experience of things, also with respect to its subjective-objective sensory and logical aspects, and only make the universal validity of a concrete judgment of perception possible.

That Kant can ascribe only subjective validity to these judgments, finds its ground in his construction — which falsifies the entire structure of naïve experience — of the datum of experience as a chaotic sensory material, which must first be formed by a transcendental consciousness to an objective coherent reality, ordered in a universally valid manner. It is further grounded on the old — indeed metaphysical — prejudice that the so-called secondary qualities of things (i.e. the sensory qualities which cannot be measured and weighed) are merely subjective in character and do not belong to the “objective”
reality of things. Above all it is rooted in the circumstance that, from his criticistic standpoint, KANT has totally wiped out the structural differences between theoretical knowledge and naïve experience.

In the nature of the case, we cannot elaborate all these points in detail until later.

The criterion of universal validity of a judgment concerning supra-theoretical states of affairs and the unconditional validity of the religious law of concentration of human experience.

There is, in the second place, a fundamental difference between a judgment concerning a supra-theoretical religious state of affairs as: "God is the Creator of the world" or "All laws are grounded in absolute Reason", on the one hand, and the judgments which make an assertion about cosmic or cosmological states of affairs within the temporal boundary of the universe, on the other hand.

The universal validity to which the first judgments lay claim, depends on their agreement or disagreement with the central religious unity of the divine law, as it is revealed in the Word of God, and to which the judging self-hood in the heart of its existence is subjected, as to the religious concentration-law of its temporal existence.

All universal-validity to which a judgment lays claim depends, in the final instance, upon the universal, unconditional validity of this religious law of concentration. No single modal law, not

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1 Cf. Prolegomena (Ed. cit.) § 19 Note, where KANT observes with reference to the examples of judgments of perception given by him: “I gladly confess, that these examples do not represent such judgments of perception as could ever become judgments of experience, even if a concept of the understanding were to be added, since they are related merely to feeling, which everyone recognizes to be merely subjective and which consequently can never be attributed to the object, and so can never become objective.” (“Ich gestehe gern, dass diese Beispiele nicht solche Wahrnehmungsurteile vorstellen, die jemals Erfahrungsurteile werden könnten, wenn man auch einen Verstandesbegriff hinzu täte, weil sie sich bloss auf Gefühl, welches jedermann als bloss subjektiv erkennt und welches also niemals dem Objekt beigelegt werden darf, beziehen und also auch niemals objektiv werden können.”)

This subjectivistic view of the so-called secondary qualities we cannot refute until in the 2d Book we deal more closely with the subject-object relation.
even the cosmic order of time itself (which maintains the coherence of meaning between the modal law-spheres) is self-sufficient to guarantee the universal validity of any human judgment, since the universal validity of these laws has meaning-character and the law is nothing apart from the bond with its Origin. It must consequently be clear, in the light of the Christian cosmonomic Idea, that the universal validity of a religious judgment of the Christian life- and world-view cannot be dependent upon the greater or smaller circle that assents to it; nor can it be derogated from by the circumstance that through apostasy, human thought is withdrawn subjectively from the fulness of meaning of truth and that man is incapable by himself of directing his thought again toward the absolute verity.

The so-called “transcendental consciousness” as hypostatization of theoretical human thought in its general apostasy from the fulness of meaning of truth.

By the hypostatization of the so-called “transcendental consciousness” as Origin of universal validity, the basis of the validity of truth is really undermined.

For in this hypostatization, truth is made dependent upon the really general apostasy of thought in the immanence-philosophy.

It makes no sense to suppose, that the immanent laws of human knowledge should draw theoretical thought away from the religious fulness of meaning of verity. It is rather the apostate self-hood in the grip of its dialectical religious ground-motive that attempts to dissociate these laws from their coherence of meaning and from their religious root and thereby subjectively falsifies their signification in the judgment. The concept “normal consciousness’ is not identical with the “norm of consciousness”.

The truth and universal validity of a judgment do not find their criterion in an apo-state “normal-consciousness”.

The great diversity and divergence of life- and world-views is, according to Lrrr, an indication that they are only individual impressions of life, and that they lack a universally valid standard of truth. But any one who sets out in this way renders no service with his arguments to the view, that only judgments of theoretical thought can make claim to universally valid truth. A simple reference to the dividedness of philosophi-
cal and even of special scientific theories among themselves may be a sufficient stimulus to hastily abandon this by-way.

Impurity of the opposition "universal-validity" and individuality as a contradictory one.

For the rest, in dealing with the problem of knowledge, we shall show, that the opposition: universal-validity in theoretical thought versus concrete individuality in the life- and world-view, is impure, since even in theoretical thought the individuality of the thinker may in no way be eliminated. The view that in theoretical thought there should be no place for the individual is a remnant of the rationalistic view of science of the period of the "Enlightenment".

We pointed out, that a life- and world-view can follow no systematic tendency in its development, but must remain in immediate proximity to the concrete situations of life, even though it rightly gives a general formulation to its judgments. Focused in the full temporal reality, it, or rather its adherent, directs the religious vision of totality toward the reality of life in its concrete structure. Historical evolution, too, the tempo of which it ought to follow in its thought, is not conceived by it in scientific style, but in its continuous involvement in full temporal reality as a not yet theoretically distinguished component of the latter.

In this way, Lrrr's thesis as to the unscientific individual character of the life- and world-view is reduced to its proper proportions.

But how do matters stand with regard to his view, that a life- and world-view, in distinction from philosophy, lives in a sphere of common convictions?

Neither life- and world-view, nor philosophy is to be understood individualistically.

A life- and world-view is not individualistic, but truly social in origin. It is ex-origine the common conviction, subjected to the norm of the full truth, of a human community bound together by a central religious motive.

We have seen, however, in our transcendental criticism of the theoretical attitude of thought, that philosophy, too, necessarily issues from such a religious ground-motive, which rests at the basis of a particular philosophical community of thought.

In philosophy as well as in a life- and world-view, social
prejudices of an illegitimate character can show themselves, which hang together with the limitation of vision (view) of the social environment and consequently should be overcome (class- and racial prejudices, prejudices of a limited church group, etc., etc.). Modern sociology of thought (Scheler, Karl Mannheim, Jerusalem and others) has cast a penetrating light on this state of affairs. But since philosophy, by reason of its theoretical attitude of thought in general, comes sooner to a critical standpoint with respect to such illegitimate prejudices, it can at this point exercise a wholesome influence on the pre-theoretical reflection. For it is impossible, that philosophy and a life- and world-view should not influence each other mutually.

Philosophic thought should find in the life- and world-view of the thinker a continuous actual stimulus to religious self-reflection. Conversely, a life- and world-view should come to theoretical clarity in philosophic thought.

But as little as philosophy may fall with impunity into the concrete tone of the life- and world-view, as little may the life- and world-view accept with impunity the distance from the full reality which is suitable to theoretical thought.

One in root, making mutual appeal to each other, and influencing each other, they, nevertheless, should remain sharply distinguished, each according to its own task and essential character.
PART II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BASIC ANTINOMY IN THE COSMONOMIC IDEA OF HUMANISTIC IMMANENCE-PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER I


§ 1 - INTRODUCTION: HUMANISTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMANISTIC VIEW OF LIFE AND THE WORLD

At least in its dominating trends modern Western immanence-philosophy is rooted in a common Humanistic ground-motive of a religious character, which we learned to know in our Prolegomena as the motive of nature and freedom. The various forms of the transcendental ground-Idea of the different schools in which this central religious motive has found its theoretical expression may at first sight seem somewhat confusing by their great diversity. Nevertheless, this transcendental Idea possesses a fixed basic structure, which can be seen in each variation.

Of course historical connections between modern Humanistic philosophy and medieval and ancient systems are present everywhere. However, the former displays a new character, which is not to be explained in terms of a purely historical development of human thought.

In this philosophy the connection between the basic structure of the transcendental ground-Idea, and that of the pre-theoretic Humanistic world- and life-view has gradually developed to such an extent, that the boundaries between the theoretic and the pre-theoretical attitude of thought seem to have been wiped out. As a result, in most instances, the Humanist is unable to account for his cosmonomic Idea in philosophy. He thinks it is possible to philosophize in an unprejudiced fashion, because his religious presuppositions are accepted by the world- and life-view of Humanism, as self-evident and indubitable.

The autonomy of human reason was not — as in the ancient Greek world — a postulate of theoretic philosophy only. It was
The development of the basic antinomy in the
from the outset proclaimed by the Humanistic life- and world-
view, itself. The dogmatic reliance on theoretical thought was
not undermined until the modern crisis in the foundations of
the Humanistic world- and life-view began to cast its shadow
upon philosophical reflection. Modern existentialism was born
out of this crisis. It broke with the scientific conception of philo-
osophy and sought to play the same rôle that had previously been
filled by the now uprooted world- and life-view.

Ancient and medieval philosophy respectively were balanced
by the counterpoise of the religious world- and life-view of the
people and the church. The latter could criticize and stimulate
philosophical thought from the practical, pre-theoretical point of
view. Humanistic philosophy, on the other hand, does not find
any counterpoise in its own world- and life-view. At the time
of the Enlightenment and of the natural scientific positivism of
the last century, Humanistic philosophy invaded the latter in
popular form and imprinted upon it its quasi-scientific mask.

This theorettization of the world- and life-view of Humanism
led to the serious eradication of the boundary between the
scientific and naïve attitude of thought which we noticed above;
and it undermined all sense of responsibility in the personal
religious commitment implied in every philosophic standpoint.
Modern existentialism has sharply taken exception to this im-
personal attitude of philosophic reflection.

The undermining of the personal sense of responsi-
bility in the religious commitment.

During the Enlightenment the Humanistic world- and life-
view appealed to science as the crown-witness of sovereign
reason. The personal responsibility involved in the choice of
one's religious position was shifted without question upon the
shoulders of "Reason", the impersonal divinity which had been
elevated to the throne.

Here could be observed a noteworthy interaction between the
rationalistic philosophy and the world- and life-view of Huma-
nism. At its beginning, at the time of the Renaissance, the latter
was completely aware of its real religious motive. However, in
the eighteenth century when Humanistic philosophy had been
popularized, this notion gradually began to fade away. The
Humanistic world- and life-view lost the impulse to arrive at
religious self-consciousness in its pre-theoretical attitude. It now
believed in the impartiality and sovereign infallibility of the-
theoretical thought. Even when philosophy chose to express itself in a metaphysical theology, it had lost the stimulus to religious self-consciousness. For it no longer had a counter-poise in a Humanistic world- and life-view which was conscious of its religious ground-motive.

The Humanistic world- and life-view allowed itself to be deprived of its initial vitality without offering the slightest opposition. It lost the notion of the irreplaceable significance of the naive attitude toward reality. It preferred to be quasi-scientific and became static and abstract. No longer did it retain any proximity to life, but it made its pronouncements as from a theoretical distance. Neither did the Humanistic view of the world and of life protest against the falsification of naïve experience by the theoretical interpretation of rationalistic philosophy. This was only possible, because the Humanistic world- and life-view had itself been made into a theory.

It is true, that in the period of Sturm und Drang, and in the subsequent period of Romanticism, the Humanistic ideal of personality strongly reacted against rationalistic philosophy. But, this reaction was too much drenched with theoretical philosophical motives to keep a sufficient distance from Humanistic philosophy. And, just as the Renaissance, this reaction was too aristocratic in character to find any real echo among the larger classes of society. Its failure to appeal to the masses was most times the weak point of the Humanistic world- and life-view, and in this respect the latter was at a positive disadvantage, when compared with the Christian view.

Undoubtedly Humanism acquired an influence on the masses during the Enlightenment and in the period of natural scientific positivism by popular scientific literature, belles lettres, and other means of propaganda. However, this influence came from above, viz. from philosophy which was popularized. This was also the case at the time of the French revolution and in the rise of socialism as a mass-movement. Humanistic philosophy has never found a fruitful and deep inner religious contact with a life- and world-view which, as the Christian one, lives sponta-

¹ To be sure, in so far as the Christian world- and life-view had not been unduly influenced by immanence philosophy, it vehemently opposed the latter. However, Humanistic philosophy does not have a common root with the Christian world- and life-view.
The development of the basic antinomy in the

neously in the heart of the simple man and calmly retains its pious certainty against all errors of theoretical thought.

The Dutch Christian statesman and thinker, Dr Abraham Kuyper, discovered this weak point in the relationship between the philosophical theory and the life- and world-view of Humanism. And, in his struggle against the enlightened liberalism of the last century, he concentrated his attack upon this very point.

It is true that, in the first decades of the XXth century, especially under the influence of the Kant-renaissance, a strong impulse was revealed to delineate the boundary between philosophical theory and a life- and world-view. We have paid full attention to this tendency in the latter part of the Prolegomena. In this very period, however, the undermining influence of philosophical historicism and relativism had penetrated into the latter. And this relativism has led to the modern crisis in Humanism. A historicistic philosophy of life was born out of this crisis. And especially in the period after the first world war, it began to produce a new outlook \(^1\) in syndicalistic and fascistic movements. This new outlook was concerned with the suggestion of the masses rather than with questions of truth.

The synthetic standpoint of Thomistic philosophy and the disruption of this synthesis by the nominalism of late scholasticism.

To gain an insight into the basic structure of the cosmonomic idea of Humanistic thought we must go back to the period of the origination of the latter. I treated the genesis of the Humanistic outlook in detail in my study-series entitled, *In den Strijd om een Christelijke Staatkunde* (In the struggle for a Christian Politics)\(^2\). Here I described the way in which the religious starting-point of Humanism was gradually applied to philosophic thought in the basic structure of a new cosmonomic Idea. Consequently, I shall now confine myself to a very short sketch of the main lines of this historical development.

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\(^1\) *Translator's note:* Henceforth the term "outlook" shall be used instead of the longer expression *world- and life-view.*

\(^2\) I began this series in the first issue of the review "Anti-Revolutie
naire Staatkunde" (published by the Dr A. Kuyper foundation). The gradual clarification of my insights in this study will not escape the reader. I am no longer in complete agreement with what I have written in the first part of this study; it is too strongly under the influence of Troeltsch's and Dilthey's view of the Middle Ages and the Reformation.
cosmonomic Idea of Humanistic immanence-philosophy

The Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy and medieval culture.

The Renaissance, which displayed such a varied picture in the different countries, began as a spiritual movement of a modern Humanistic character. It began when the medieval ecclesiastically unified culture had collapsed. The latter had found its best philosophical expression in Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy.

Following his teacher ALBERTUS MAGNUS, THOMAS AQUINAS sought to adapt to Christian doctrine the speculative Aristotelian philosophy in interrelation with neo-Platonic, Augustinian, and other philosophical motives that had already become the common property of Christian thought in the patristic period. He sought to effectuate this accommodation by curtailing the excessive pagan branches of speculative Greek philosophy. By so doing he followed the example given by AVICENNA and MAIMONIDES who similarly sought to effect a synthesis between Aristotelianism and the doctrines taught in the Koran and in the Old Testament, respectively.

In his transcendental basic idea, the "lex aeterna", with its subjective counterpart in the "lex naturalis", Christian and pagan Ideas were brought to a seemingly complete convergence. Through the "lex naturalis", the creation, in its essential nature, has a subjective part in the eternal law of reason of the divine worldplan.

The integral and radical character of the religious ground-motive of creation, the fall and redemption in the Biblical sense.

In order to enable the reader to understand, that this convergence is not actual, it is necessary to give a more detailed account of the integral and radical character of the central ground-motive of the Christian religion in its Biblical sense, the motive of creation, the fall into sin, and the redemption through Jesus Christ in communion with the Holy Ghost. To this end I may first recall the chief points of the explanation devoted to this subject in the Prolegomena.

As the Creator, God reveals Himself as the Absolute and Integral Origin of the "earthly world", concentrated in man, and of the world of the angels. In the language of the Bible He is the Origin

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1 This term is frequently used by TRÖLTSCH; it designates the period in which the Church directed all human activity in the family, political life, science and art, school and business. It refers to the period in which all of culture bore an ecclesiastical stamp.
of heaven and earth. There is no original power which is opposed to Him. Consequently, in His creation we cannot find any expression of a dualistic principle of origin.

The integral character of the Biblical motive of creation is superbly expressed in the majestic 139th psalm:

"Wither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence?
If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there.
If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea;
Even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me.
If I say, Surely the darkness shall cover me; even the night shall be light about me.
Yea, the darkness hideth not from thee; but the night shineth as the day: the darkness and the light are both alien to thee."

This is certainly the radical opposite of the Greek dualism of the form- and matter motive.

In the revelation that God created man according to His image, He discloses man to himself, in the religious radical unity of his created existence, and in the religious solidarity of mankind, in which was integrally concentrated the entire meaning of the temporal cosmos.

The integral Origin of all things according to God's plan of creation has its created image in the heart of man participating in the religious community of mankind. The latter is the integral and radical unity of all the temporal functions and structures of reality, which ought to be directed in the human spirit toward the Absolute Origin, in the personal commitment of love and service of God and one's neighbour.

This Christian view cut off at the very roots the religious dualism of the Greek motive of form and matter, which came to a head in anthropology in the dichotomy between a material body and a theoretical rational substance of a pure form-character.

Moreover, the creation implies a providential worldplan, which has its integral origin in the Sovereign Will of the Creator. We have indicated this world-plan in the transcendental Idea of the cosmic temporal order. Naturally, Divine Providence is not restricted to the law-side of the temporal world. However, in so far as it embraces also the factual side, this Providence is hidden from human knowledge, and therefore not accessible to a Christian philosophy.

The revelation of the fall into sin is inseparably connected with that of creation. Sin, in its radical Biblical sense, does not play any rôle in the dialectical basic motives of Greek and Humanistic thought. It cannot play such a part here, because sin can only be understood in veritable radical self-knowledge, as the fruit of Biblical Revelation.
Sin and the dialectical conception of guilt in Greek and Humanistic philosophy.

The Greek religious consciousness only recognized the conflict between the principles of form and matter in man. Humanism only acknowledged the conflict between sensory nature (determined by the mechanical law of causality) and the “rational autonomous freedom” of human personality. This latter opposition, even in its Kantian conception, only arrived at the recognition of an evil moral inclination of man to substitute in place of the moral law (the categorical imperative) the sensory desires as a motive for action.

Both the Greek and the Humanistic oppositions do not touch the religious root of human existence, but only the temporal branches of human life. They are only absolutized here in a religious sense. Their concept of guilt, in consequence, is of a merely dialectical character. It consists of a depreciation of an abstract complex of functions of the created cosmos over against an other abstracted and deified complex.

In its revelation of the fall, however, just like in that of creation, the Word of God penetrates to the root, to the religious centre of human nature.

The fall is the apostasy of this centre, of this radix of existence, it is the falling away from God. This was spiritual death, because it is the apostasy from the absolute source of Life. Consequently the fall was radical. It involved the whole temporal cosmos, since the latter had its religious root only in mankind. Every conception which denies this radical sense of the fall, (even though it uses the term “radical” as in Kant’s conception of the “radical evil” in man), is diametrically opposed to the basic motive of Holy Scripture. Since, as we have seen, the revelation of the fall does not in any way mean the recognition of an antithetic principle of origin which is opposed to the Creator, sin cannot be thought of as standing in a dialectical relation to the creation.

And because of the radical character of sin, redemption in Christ Jesus must also be radical.

The Divine Word, through which, according to the pronouncement of John’s gospel, all things were made, became flesh in Jesus Christ. The Word has entered into the root and the temporal ramifications, in body and soul, of human nature. And therefore it has brought about a radical redemption. Sin is not dialectically reconciled, but it is really propitiated. And in Christ as the new root of the human race, the whole temporal cosmos, which was religiously concentrated in man, is in principle again directed toward God and thereby wrested free from the power of Satan. However, until the return of Christ, even humanity which is renewed in Him still shares in the apostate root of mankind. Consequently, the struggle of the Kingdom of God continues to be waged against the kingdom of darkness until the “consommatio saeculi”.

God maintains the fallen cosmos in His gratia communis (common grace) by His creating Word. The redeemed creation shall finally
The development of the basic antinomy in the

be freed from its participation in the sinful root of human nature
and shall shine forth in a higher perfection.

Once again the inner reformation of philosophic thought.

When the central motive of the Christian religion, which we have
just described, rules theoretical thought, this must, as we stated
in the Prolegomena, necessarily lead to an inner reformation
of the theoretical vision of temporal reality. The integral and
radical character of this ground-motive destroys at its very roots
any dualistic conception of the coherence and mutual relation of
the theoretically abstracted modal aspects.

There is no longer room for a so-called dichotomy between the
pre-logical aspects on the one hand, and the logical and post-logical
on the other. There is no place for a dichotomy between "sensory
nature" and "super-sensory freedom" or for a hypostatizing of the
so-called natural laws in opposition to norms which are set in
contrast with each other without any mutual coherence and deeper
radical unity.

On the contrary, in the structure of every aspect of reality is
expressed the unbreakable integral coherence with all the others.
This is explained by the fact that the aspects are one in their
religious root and Origin, in accordance with the Biblical motive
of creation.

And this motive will constantly stimulate theoretical thought to
the discovery of the irreducible peculiar nature of the modal aspects,
as well as of the total structures of individuality, because God also
created the former according to their own nature.

The motives of the fall and redemption, which cannot be under-
stood apart from the creation, shall then operate in the theoretical
vision of reality, in the struggle against every absolutizing of the
relative, by which the apostate religious motives withdraw thought
from the radical unity and integral Origin of the temporal cosmos.
They shall also find expression in the complete recognition of the
conflicts in temporal reality which exist because of sin, and which
cannot be cloaked or reasoned away by any rationalistic theodicy.

However, these conflicts shall never be ascribed to the cosmic
order, as is done by dialectical irrationalism under the influence
of an irrationalist turn of its dialectic ground-motive. The law of
creation has remained the same in spite of sin. In fact, without the
lex, sin would not be able to reveal itself in the temporal cosmos.

And finally the motive of sin will guard Christian philosophy
from the ἐπιθυμία (pride) which considered itself to be free of
theoretical errors and faults, and which believes itself to have a
monopoly on theoretical truth.

Because of the solidarity of the fall and of the conserving opera-
tion of common grace, philosophical schools dominated by apostate
ground-motives must be taken seriously. And in general the Biblical
ground-motive will stimulate philosophic thought to an extremely
critical attitude against the disguising of apostate super-theoretical prejudices by clothing them in the form of universally valid theoretical axioms.

If the central ground-motive of creation, the fall and redemption is to have the above-sketch reforming influence upon philosophical thought, this motive must, as we have shown in our transcendental critique, determine the content of our cosmonomic Idea and must exclude all dialectical motives which lead thought in an apostate direction.

However, Christian philosophy did not follow this course in the patristic or medieval period.

In the very first centuries of the Christian church, the latter had to wage a life-and-death struggle in order to save the Biblical ground-motive from being strangled by that of the Greeks. In this struggle was formulated the dogma of the Divine essential unity (homoousia) of the Father and the Son (this was soon to include the Holy Spirit) and the dangerous influence of gnosticism in Christian thought was broken.

The speculative logos-theory.

Before this period, we find in various apologists, especially in the Alexandrian school of CLEMENS and ORIGEN, a speculative logos-theory derived from the Jewish Hellenistic philosophy of PHILO. This logos-theory basically denaturalized the Biblical motive of creation (and so also the motives of the fall and redemption). It conceived of the divine creating Word (Logos) as a lower divine being which mediates between the divine unity and impure matter. The Alexandrian school thereby actually transformed the Christian religion into a high ethical theory, into a moralistically tinged theological and philosophic system, which as a higher gnostis was placed above the faith of the Church. Similarly, Greek philosophical theology had placed itself above the pistis of the common people.

It is in this period that the Church maintained unequivocally the unbreakable unity of the Old and New Testament in opposition to the gnostic division (which was also defended by MARCION in the second century A.D.). It thus overcame the gnostic religious dualism which had driven a wedge between creation and redemption, and thereby had fallen back into a dualistic principle of origin.

Philosophy as ancilla theologiae in Augustinian scholasticism.

In the orthodox patristic period philosophical thought reached its highest point in AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, who left his stamp upon Christian philosophy until the 13th century, and who even since then has exerted an important influence.

However, no one was yet able to express the central motive of the Christian religion in the transcendent ground-Idea of philosophy without the interference of the Greek form-matter motive. Besides,
the relation between philosophy and dogmatic theology was not clarified, because the inner point of contact between the religious ground-motive and philosophic thought had not yet been accounted for.

The Christian character of philosophy was sought in its subservient attitude toward dogmatic theology. Philosophy was to be the "ancilla theologiae". All philosophic questions were to be handled in a theological framework. Philosophy was denied an independent right to exist.

This denial is included in AUGUSTINE's famous statement: "Deum et animam scire volo. Nihilne plus? Nihil omnino." AUGUSTINE's denial of the autonomy of philosophy with respect to the divine light of revelation is in this way robbed of its critical significance. For philosophic thought itself was not intrinsically reformed by the Biblical ground-motive of the Christian religion, but in its theoretical vision of temporal reality it remained orientated to Greek philosophy (especially toward the Neo-Platonists and the Stoics). AUGUSTINE did not clearly see the religious character of the ground-motive of Greek philosophy, and therefore started on the path of scholastic accommodation of Greek thought to the doctrine of the Christian church.

The scholastic character of AUGUSTINE's cosmonomic Idea.

Even in the Augustinian cosmonomic Idea (the lex aeterna with its expression in the lex naturalis) we encounter the neo-Platonic conception of the descending progression of degrees of reality accommodated to the Idea of the divine Sovereignty of the Creator. This latter, however, was again joined with the neo-Platonic logos-theory, after this theory had been accommodated to the dogma of the divine Trinity. In this way theology itself was encumbered with Greek philosophy. Even Genesis 1:1 was interpreted by AUGUSTINE in the cadre of the Greek form-matter motive!

In spite of all this, however, the integral and radical character of the central ground-motive of the Christian religion remained fore-

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1 This conception of philosophy as "ancilla theologiae" is not Christian in origin, but is derived from ARISTOTLE's Met. B. 996 b 15 where the Greek thinker proclaimed metaphysical theology (as the science of the end of all things and of the supreme good) to be the queen of the sciences. The other sciences are thus "the slaves of theology and may not contradict it". This Aristotelian conception is now simply taken over and applied to the relationship between Christian theology and philosophy.

2 Cf. De Civitate Dei, x11, 3: "Naturas essentiarum gradibus ordinavit" and his neo-Platonic theory of the "esse" and "minus esse". Cf. also his neo-Platonic theory of the different levels of the mystical elevation of the soul to God.
most in the theological conceptions of the great church-father. This motive found expression in the strong emphasis which he laid upon the absolute creative Sovereignty of God, and in his rejection of any position which would attribute original power to evil. The central motive of Christian religion is also in evidence in Augustine’s acceptance of the radical character of the fall and in his rejection of the autonomy of theoretical thought, because of the insight that the Word of God is the only firm ground of truth. However, this insight was only won from the central religious standpoint. It could, as we observed above, not yet lead to an inner reformation of philosophical thought for lack of a critical insight into the inner point of contact between religion and theoretical thinking.

Augustine’s increasing reserve with respect to Greek philosophy is also to be explained in terms of his growing understanding of the radical character of the Christian religion. At the very least, the great Church-father regarded Greek philosophy as a natural foundation for a “super-natural revealed knowledge”. In his conception of world-history, developed in his famous work De Civitate Dei, an undeniably original Christian line of thought is followed. The central theme: the conflict between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena, is entirely dominated by the Biblical ground-motive.

The radical antithesis between the Christian religion and the ancient heathen world is openly and sharply laid bare, so that there is not the slightest suggestion of a religious synthetic point of view.

However, here too, the Christian ground-motive could not yet find expression in a genuine philosophy of history. To be sure, Augustine was the first to break radically with the Greek Idea of time, and to pave the way for an authentic Idea of historical development. But the periods of this development were not conceived in an intrinsically historical sense: rather they were construed from sacred history in a speculative theological way!

The entrance of the dialectical ground-motive of nature and grace in Christian scholasticism.

The situation became quite different when the dialectical ground-motive of nature and grace made its entry into Christian scholasticism. This occurred in the period of the Aristotelian Renaissance, in which, after a bitter struggle, the Augustinian-Platonic school was pushed out of the dominating position that it had hitherto enjoyed. Roman Catholicism now strove consciously to effect a religious synthesis between the Greek view of nature (especially the Aristotelian) and the doctrines of the Christian faith.

This synthetic standpoint found its most powerful philosophical and theological expression in the system of Thomas Aquinas. The two foundational tenets of this system were the positing of the autonomy of natural reason in the entire sphere of natural knowledge, and the thesis that nature is the understructure of super-natural grace.

Thomas took over the Augustinian pronouncement that philosophy is the ancilla theologiae, however, he gave it an entirely different
The development of the basic antinomy in the

meaning. For he considered that philosophy belonged to the sphere ruled by the natural light of reason, and ascribed to it independence of revealed theology. This would have been a gain for Christian philosophy, if THOMAS had not withdrawn "natural thought" from the central ground-motive of the Christian religion. The latter was now replaced by the form-matter-motive in its Aristotelian conception, but not without an accommodation of this pagan religious motive to the ecclesiastical doctrine of creation.

In this scholastic way of accommodation, required by the Roman-Catholic ground-motive of nature and grace, the form-matter motive lost its original religious sense. But at the same time the Biblical creation-motive was deprived of its original integral and radical character.

Creation as a natural truth in THOMAS' theologia naturalis.

Creation is proclaimed to be a natural truth, which can be seen and proven by theoretical thought independent of all divine revelation. And we have seen in the Prolegomena, that the five ways of this proof presupposed the axioms of the Aristotelian metaphysics, and especially the Aristotelian idea of God as "pure Form" opposed to the principle of "matter".

This signified, ultimately, the elimination of creation in its Biblical sense as the religious motive of theoretical thought.

The elimination of the integral and radical meaning of the Biblical motive of creation in THOMAS' metaphysics.

The Greek form-matter motive in all its different conceptions excludes in principle the Idea of creation in its Biblical sense. The sum total of Greek wisdom concerning the Origin of the cosmos is: "ex nihilo nihil fit" (from nothing nothing can originate). At the utmost, Greek metaphysical theology could arrive at the Idea of a divine demiurg, who gives form to an original matter as the supreme architect and artist. Therefore, the scholastic accommodation of the Aristotelian concept of God to the Church-doctrine of creation could never lead to a real reconciliation with the Biblical ground-motive. The unmoved Mover of Aristotelian metaphysics, who, as the absolute theoretical nous, only has himself as the object of his thought in blessed self-contemplation, is the radical opposite of the living God Who revealed Himself as Creator. THOMAS may teach, that God has brought forth natural things according both to their form and matter, but the principle of matter as the principle of metaphysical and religious imperfection cannot find its origin in a pure form — God.

Nor could the Aristotelian conception of human nature be reconciled to the Biblical conception concerning the creation of man in the image of God. According to THOMAS, human nature is a composition of a material body and a rational soul as a substantial
form, which, in contradistinction to Aristotle’s conception, is conceived of as an immortal substance. This scholastic view has no room for the Biblical conception of the radical religious unity of human existence. Instead of this unity a natural and a supernatural aspect is distinguished in the creation of man. The supernatural side was the original gift of grace, which as a *donum superadditum* was ascribed to the rational nature.

The elimination of the radical meaning of the fall and redemption. The neo-Platonic Augustinian trend in Thomas’ natural theology.

In accordance with this conception of creation, the view of the fall was also deprived of its radical meaning. Sin merely caused the loss of the supernatural gift of grace, and did not lead to a corruption of human nature. The latter was simply injured by its loss of the *donum superadditum*.

Redemption in Christ Jesus can no longer have a relation to the very religious root of the temporal cosmos, but it can only bring nature to its supra-natural perfection.

In his natural theology Thomas connected the Aristotelian Idea of God with the neo-Platonic-Augustinian Idea of creation. Just as he took over the Augustinian doctrine of the logos with its eternal Ideas, so he strongly developed the metaphysical theory, with respect to the analogical concept of Being (*analogia entis*), in the direction of negative theology. All this only led to new antinomies, because this trend of thought came into conflict with the foundations of Aristotelian metaphysics.

The Aristotelian cosmonic Idea.

According to the scholastic ground-motive of nature and grace, the Thomistic cosmonic Idea has a natural and a supra-natural side.

The former rules Thomas’ philosophy, the latter his theology of revelation. The natural component is the Aristotelian transcendental ground-Idea, accommodated to the Augustinian Idea of the lex aeterna.

According to the Aristotelian cosmonic Idea all of nature is dominated by a dual teleological order: every natural substance strives according to its nature toward its own perfection, which is enclosed in its *essential form*.

In their relationship to each other the substantial forms are arranged in a hierarchical order in which the lower is the

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1 See my treatise in *Philosophia Reformata* (vol. 8, 9, 10), “De idee der individualiteits-structuur en het Thomistisch substantiebegrip”, (The idea of the structure of individuality and the Thomistic substance-concept).
The development of the basic antinomy in the matter of a higher form. This is the content of the lex naturalis. As pure actual form the deity can be accepted as the origin of the motion which proceeds from matter toward form as its goal. However, there is no way in which the deity can be considered as the origin of the principle of matter, with its blind arbitrary ávāyavj. Even the Aristotelian theory of categories is permeated with the dualism of its dialectical ground-motive. It makes a fundamental distinction between the specific categories of matter (spatiality, number) and those of form. The concept of substance, as the central category of being, pretends to unite into an absolute unity the form and matter of natural beings. But it cannot accomplish this union, because it lacks a real starting-point for this synthesis. To attain this desired result it would be necessary to have a deeper radical unity above the opposed principles of form and matter. And, as we saw in the Prolegomena, the metaphysical (transcendental) concept of being can only bring them into an analogical unity.

The content of the Thomistic cosmonomic idea.

In Thomas' cosmonomic Idea the Aristotelian lex naturalis, which is immanent to natural substances, is related to a transcendent lex aeterna as the plan of creation in the divine Mind. The latter is the Origin of the former. In conformity with the Aristotelian Idea of God, the lex aeterna was now considered identical with divine reason. As a compromise with the Augustinian conception, only the obligating force of the lex naturalis (what is here thought of is only the natural ethical law) is derived from the sovereign will of the Creator. The Christian Idea of divine providence in the order of creation is now transformed into the Aristotelian Idea of the teleological natural order, with its hierarchy of substantial forms, which conforms to the religious form-matter motive.

In the typical transcendental ground-Idea of Thomism the divine Origin of the natural order was conceived of as the

1 Apparently Aristotle tried to relativize the absolute contradiction between the two poles of the Greek ground-motive by conceiving of them in the modal meaning of the cultural aspect. In this modal aspect form-giving is related to a material which as "cultural object" has a potentiality to cultural shapes. The orientation of the relation between matter and form to culture is entirely in keeping with the ascription of religious primacy to the form-motive of the culture-religion.
first cause and final goal of the whole temporal movement in nature from matter to form, from means to end. And the supra-natural sphere of grace, in which the divine Origin is conceived in the light of Revelation and in which the lex naturalis finds its supra-natural complement in the lex charitatis et gratiae, was placed above the natural order as a higher level. It is this view that became the speculative philosophic expression of the Idea of synthesis which typified the entire ecclesiastically unified culture.

The intrinsic dialectic of the scholastic basic motive of nature and grace and the nominalism of the fourteenth century.

However, the intrinsic dialectic of the motive of nature and grace in scholastic philosophy soon became evident.

As long as the Roman Catholic church was strong enough, the artificial synthesis between the Christian and Greek world of Ideas could be maintained, and the polar tendencies in the ground-motive of nature and grace could not develop freely. Ecclesiastical excommunication was sufficient to check the development of these tendencies in philosophy and in every day affairs.

In the critical period of the Late Middle Ages however, as we shall see in the following paragraph, the ecclesiastically unified culture began to collapse. One secular sphere after another began to wrest itself free from ecclesiastical domination.

Since the 14th century the nominalism of the late scholasticism under the leadership of William of Occam, turned against the artificial compromise between Christian and pagan lines of thought in the Thomistic system. This reaction commenced after the Averroistic Petrus Aureoli and Durandus of St. Porcain, in a somewhat different philosophical and theological orientation, had taken up the nominalistic tradition of earlier centuries.

Before the 14th century nominalism had been always suppressed by realistic scholasticism with its doctrine of the reality of the universal forms ("universalia"). It had repeatedly received the official condemnation of the church. In the 14th century, however, nominalism became a cultural factor of world-sigificance. It was able to pave the way for modern philosophical thought, since the church had lost its dominating influence on philosophy.

The Thomistic cosmonomic Idea required the realistic-meta-
The development of the basic antinomy in the physical conception of the Aristotelian "substantial forms". As soon as this conception would be abandoned, the whole Thomistic-Aristotelian Idea of the natural order, as an understructure of the supra-natural order of grace, was doomed to break down. And the same holds good in respect to natural theology as an understructure of the sacred theology of revelation.

At this very point Thomism was subjected to the criticism of Occam's nominalism, which, in the last analysis, was founded on an extremely nominalistic conception of the "potestas Dei absoluta". It cut off every metaphysical use of natural reason by denying that the universal concepts of thought have a "fundamentum in re".

It joined forces with the so-called terministic suppositional logic as presented in the seventh treatise of the "Summulae" of Petrus Hispanus and conceived of "universalia" as only being "signs", which in the human mind stand for (supponunt) a plurality of individual things, but which themselves possess no reality "in" or "before" the latter. In so far as they do not rest upon arbitrary convention, as the "voces", the "universalia" are "conceptus" or "intentiones animae" formed by the understanding. They function merely as copies of the corresponding traits of individual things and only have a subjective value for knowledge. When Occam limited scientific knowledge to the logical judgment and the universalia, he thereby intended to depreciate science and not the Christian faith.

Faith, in a positivist manner bound to Holy Scripture — here conceived in a pseudo-juridical sense, as an ecclesiastical law book — and to the tradition of the Church, may maintain the

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1 It may be observed in this connection that Occam started from the traditional metaphysical opposition between the logical thought-function and "reality in itself"; and that the only sources of our knowledge are to be found in sensory perception and logical understanding. We have seen in the Prolegomena, that this metaphysical pre-supposition excludes the insight into the integral horizon of our temporal experience.

2 Under the title "de terminorum proprietatibus", later expanded to a separate textbook under the title "Parva Logicalia". This part of the Summulae did not stem from Aristotelian logic. And in opposition to Prantl, recent investigations have established, that it was even less of Byzantine origin. The "Moderni" grounded themselves just on this treatise, whereas e.g. Duns Scotus chose the whole book of Petrus Hispanus as the foundation of his logic, and joined the 7th treatise with realistic metaphysics.
realistic conception of “substantial forms”. But philosophical thought can only hold to a completely sceptical attitude with respect to the reality of universals. This position destroyed the realistic metaphysical concept of truth.

The “primacy of the will” in the nominalistic school of thought versus the “primacy of the intellect” in the realistic metaphysics of THOMAS AQUINAS. There is no essential connection between realism and the primacy of the intellect.

The brunt of the attack upon the Thomistic conception of the “lex aeterna” lay in the nominalistic turning of the doctrine of the primacy of the will against the Thomistic doctrine of the primacy of the intellect. This whole controversy can only be understood in the light of scholastic and patristic syncretism. It is meaningless in a philosophy which in its transcendental ground-Idea holds to the integral and radical ground-motive of the Christian religion.

The conflict between the primacy of the will and the primacy of the intellect was originally unrelated to the conflict between realism and nominalism. Realists of the Augustinian school had contended for the primacy of the will. And JOHANNES DUNS SCOTUS, the great opponent of THOMAS AQUINAS, was essentially a more consistent realist than THOMAS. Nevertheless, in his doctrine of the Potestas Dei Absoluta, he gave a new stimulus to the conception of the primacy of the will.

The primacy of the will in the cosmonomic Idea of AUGUSTINE.

We have seen, that even in the cosmonomic Idea of AUGUSTINE the risky attempt was made to reconcile the Christian conception of the Absolute Sovereignty of God’s Creative Will with the neo-Platonic basic Idea of the hierarchical ordination of reality in higher, more real and lower, less real spheres, in which pure matter formed the lowest level. In AUGUSTINE’s later period we find priority being given to the Christian conception of God’s Will als Creator and to the insight into the obfuscation of human reason by the fall. This Christian conception became involved in the proclamation of the “primacy of the will”, because it had

\footnote{Cf. De civitate Dei XII, 2: “naturas essentiarum gradibus ordinavit” and his neo-platonic doctrine of the “esse” et “minus esse”. Compare also his neo-platonic levels of the mystical elevation of the soul to God.}
to wrestle with the competitive realistic metaphysics which sought its Archimedean point in theoretic reason.

Nominalism was related to the Augustinian tradition by way of Franciscan thought. However, Occam changed the doctrine of the primacy of the will in a radically irrationalistic manner. He totally deformed the Christian confession of God’s Sovereignty as Creator.

The potestas Dei absoluta in Duns Scotus and William of Occam.

In Duns Scotus the potestas Dei absoluta, as distinguished from the potestas Dei ordinata, was bound to the unity of God’s holy and good Being (essence). According to him, the lex aeterna also originates in the essence of God. And absolute goodness and truth are grounded in the divine Being. Consequently, the Scotist conception of the potestas absoluta cannot have any nominalistic purport. It had no further intention than to account for the fact that sometimes in the Old Testament God seems to give “dispensation” of some commands of the second table of the Decalogue. This was doubtless a scholastic-juridical conception of the latter. However, in Duns the potestas Dei absoluta, too, is always the expression of God’s holy and good Being.

William of Occam abandoned the idea of a lex aeterna and a potestas absoluta “being bound to God’s Being”. In Aristotelian fashion the speculative-metaphysical theology had viewed the essence of God as pure Form. Nominalism now conceived of the potestas Dei absoluta in a sense which had some affinity with the unpredictable Anangkè of the Greek matter-motive. And by so doing, it separated itself from the integral Self-Revelation of God.

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1 Cf. the following statements of Scotus: “Intelligere non est primum in Deo, sed primum dans esse est ipsum ens, tum quia potentia non potest esse prima ratio essendi, tum quia intellectus praesupponit rationem objecti et potentiae sicut per se causas ejus vel principia” (R. P. I d. viii q. 1). “Deus est agens rectissima ratione” (R. P. iv d. 1 q. 5, n. 9).

“Quidquid Deus facit, propter se facit — omnia enim propter seipsum operatur est Altissimus — et ex charitate perfectissima quae ipse est, facit; ergo ejus actus est ordinatissimus, tame ex fine quam ex principio operativo” (Ox. II d. xxvii, q. I, n. 2).

“Nomine legis aeternae intelligimus judicium divini intellectus, qui producens omnia in esse intelligibile, subinde dat unicum primum esse intelligibile, atque in eis omnes veritates relucet, adeo ut intellectus pervadens terminos necessario intelligat veritates omnes in illis involutas, tam speculativas, quam practicas” (Ox. I, d. iii q. 4).
God in His Word, to an even greater degree than the Thomistic realism had done in its theologia naturalis. It abstracted the Will of God from the Fulness of His Holy Being and conceived of His sovereign power as an orderless tyranny. In his *De Trinitate* Augustine had expressly warned against isolating the Will of God and the "ratio divina".

The nominalistic conception of the potestas Dei absoluta entirely contrary to its own intention places God's Creative Will under the boundary-line of the lex.

This functionalistic, theoretical mode of contemplation is only possible under the boundary-line of the cosmic temporal order. Consequently, God's will was actually placed under the lex; a result entirely in conflict with the intention of Occam. In relation to religious and ethical laws we can only speak of "arbitrariness" in the sense of an anti-normative behaviour, which supposes a norm. This is exactly what Occam does, when he allows for the possibility that God could have just as well sanctioned with His Will an "egoistic" ethics, and when he even conceives of the central religious commandment included in the first table of the decalogue, as a mere product of divine arbitrariness. Idolatry, too, presupposes a religious norm, which is transgressed by it.

As we observed in the Prolegomena, the concept "possibility" only has a reasonable sense, if we pre-suppose the necessity of a law in relation to which subjective individuality retains its full latitude but nevertheless remains subject to the necessary determinations and limitations imposed by it.

The nominalistic critique effectuated a radical disruption between the Christian and pagan motives in medieval scholasticism.

Nevertheless, nominalistic thought served as a liberator at least in one respect. Under its sharp critique the Christian and pagan motives, which had apparently been most effectively synthesized in the Thomistic transcendental ground-Idea, were radically disrupted. "Nature" and "grace" were completely separated. Thus after a short time, Humanism could consistently develop the line of "autonomous natural thought". This it did in a new manner based upon the dialectical ground-motive of nature and freedom. It might be expected, that the Reformation would have developed an essentially Christian philosophy, based upon
The development of the basic antinomy in the central ground-motive of Holy Scripture. That this did not occur for several centuries, is due solely to the fact that the Reformation was quickly captured by the scholastic ground-motive of nature and grace. This latter motive again led theological and philosophic thought along a scholastic path. We shall return to this point in part three of this volume. For the present we need only concern ourselves with the significance of late medieval nominalism as a condition for the rise of modern Humanistic thought.

As long as nominalistic scholasticism subjected itself in a positivistic faith to the dogma of the Church, it rested in an unreconciled dualism between faith and natural knowledge. In the late Middle Ages, however, some representatives of nominalism gave it a form which prepared the way for a complete secularization of the life- and world-view.

Secularization of nominalism in late scholasticism.

This process of secularization was introduced by John of Jandun and Marsilius of Padua, which, just as Petrus Aureoli at an earlier period, belonged to the school of Averroistic nominalism

§ 2 - THE RISE OF HUMANISTIC PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

In the meanwhile the ecclesiastically unified culture broke down. It was no longer dominated by the high medieval conception of the "Corpus Christianum". This breakdown was partially prepared by the powerful influence of nominalistic spheres of culture. They undermined the medieval hierarchical Idea of social life and they revealed individualistic tendencies wherever they unfolded

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1 In my work entitled *In den Strijd om een Christelijke Staatkunde* (*In the Struggle for a Christian Politics*), Chap. I, XII (A.R. Staatk, 1st year, pp. 617 and following), I have established in detail the fact that we may speak of an Averroistic nominalism in these thinkers. In my analysis of the document *Defensor Pacis* I also showed the secularization of nominalistic thought.

2 In this connection see the important study of Paul Höningheim, *Zur Soziologie der mittelalterlichen Scholastik* (Die soziologische Bedeutung der nominalistischen Philosophie) in Hauptprobleme der Soziologie, Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber (1923), S. 173—221. [On Sociology of Medieval Scholasticism (The Sociological Significance of Nominalistic Philosophy, in Chief Problems of Sociology, Memorial Gift for Max Weber (1923), pp. 173—221].
The hierarchical institutional Roman Catholic Church had undermined its own influence by secularization. Political life and economy now broke loose from its unifying grasp. And science, art, ethics, and the faith of the individual soon followed suit.

The collapse of the ecclesiastically unified culture.

National states began to form which re-conquered piece by piece the terrain lost by the Church. They employed the most unscrupulous means to strengthen and maintain their power. Economic life emancipated itself by all sorts of evasion of the canon law's prohibition of interest and of the doctrine of the *justum pretium*. Supported by the discovery of the new gold- and silver mines, finance assumed an increasingly central position. The rise of large-scale industry and business brought about an expanded establishment of credit. An early capitalism arose with all of its social problems. And the discovery of the sea routes to America and India opened unlimited perspectives for the future.

Medieval society, impregnated with the organic guild-idea, saw its foundations methodically undermined. The process of social differentiation and individualization began: the individual began to feel free and independent in all spheres. The contact with the East, established by the Crusades, brought contact with other religions. Presently, when in the general process of secularization, the absoluteness of the Christian religion was relativized by philosophy to the highest stage in the development from natural religion, this contact became the stimulus of a strongly neo-Platonic and mystic-theosophically tinged "universal theism". In Italy the prophet of this theism was GEORGII GEMISTHOS PLETHON, the spiritual father of the Platonic academy at Florence. In Germany, the movement was led by MUTIANUS RUFUS, the Erfurter humanist.

After the discovery of the pure sources of Greek and Roman culture an additional resentment was present in the struggle against the barbarian linguistic forms of scholasticism. This resentment arose against the mutulation of the ancient world-and life-view due to its synthesis with Christianity. Especially in Italy, the first cradle of the Humanistic Renaissance, the side of the ancient world-view was often taken without reserve.

The transition to a new historical period announced itself in this revolutionary ferment. A great Humanistic spiritual move-
The development of the basic antinomy in the

tent arose. It soon methodically built its secularized outlook
upon a new cultural basis and impressed its own religious mark
upon philosophy.

In Germany, and especially in the Netherlands, the paths of
a so-called Biblical Humanism and Reformation temporarily
crossed; yet the tendencies to complete the secularization of
Christian doctrine were present from the start in a prepondera-
tingly moralistic interpretation of the Holy Scripture, as it was
found in Erasmus and other Biblical Humanists. In my previously
cited work, "In the struggle for a Christian politics", this whole
development has been treated in detail. In the present context it
was only necessary, that we should prepare our inquiry into the
basic structure of the transcendental ground-Idea of Humanistic
thought.

A closer consideration of the religious ground-motive
of Humanism: the motive of nature and freedom.

We have seen, that this transcendental Idea is determined by
the religious ground-motive which since Kant must be designated
as the motive of nature and freedom. We must now pay closer
attention to the latter.

This new dialectical motive rests upon an absolute seculariza-
tion of the Biblical motive of creation and Christian freedom
(as a fruit of redemption). After introducing a fundamental
change in their original religious meaning, it assimilated also
the central motives of Greek and scholastic philosophy. We
shall subsequently discover the form-matter motive and the
motive of nature and grace in an entirely new Humanistic
sense in the philosophy of Leibniz and Kant.

The ambiguity of the Humanistic motive of freedom.

Unlike that of the Greeks and the scholastic thinkers, the
inner dialectic of the Humanistic ground-motive is not born out
of a conflict between two different religions. The deepest root
of its dialectical character lies in the ambiguity of the Huma-
nistic freedom-motive. The latter is the central driving force
of the modern religion of human personality. And from its own
depths it calls forth the motive to dominate nature, and thus
leads to a religion of autonomous objective science in which
there is no room for the free personality. Nevertheless, the
religious self-surrender to autonomous science is, in the last
analysis, nothing but the religion of autonomous human persona-
lity itself, which splits itself up into two opposite directions, not to be reconciled in a really critical Humanistic self-reflection. This is the result of the Humanistic secularization of the Christian motives of creation and freedom in Jesus Christ. By this secularization the insight into the religious radical unity of human personality is entirely lost.

In its motive of freedom, Humanism requires absolute autonomy for human personality. This implies a rejection of all faith in authority and of any conception according to which man is subject to a law not imposed by his own reason. However, this secularized freedom-motive displayed various tendencies which came into conflict with one another.

Modern man wished to have his destiny in his own hands, and therefore he wished to free himself from all faith in "supernatural" powers. Humanism applied the Copernican revolution in astronomy to the sphere of religion. The latter must concentrate on man and his religious needs. It must no longer require man to surrender completely to a Sovereign Creator and Redeemer, it could no longer be based upon a "heteronomous" Divine Revelation.

The Idea of a personal God could be accepted only in so far as the autonomous personality has need of it. This Idea could be accepted as a metaphysical foundation for the truth of mathematical thought (Descartes), as a postulate of practical reason (Kant), or as a requirement of religious feeling (Rousseau). It may be accepted in any other Humanistic form, but it may never be held to be the fruit of the self-revelation of a sovereign God.

The new ideal of personality of the Renaissance.

In the Renaissance the new religion of personality also secularized the Christian idea of regeneration. The ideal of personality preached by the Renaissance in its first appearance in Italy required a renascimento of man which should ring in a new period. This ideal of personality is permeated with an unquenchable thirst for temporal life and with a Faustian desire to subject the world to itself.

The individualistic orientation of the new Humanistic freedom-motive during the first phase of its development led the nominalistic tendencies of late scholasticism in a new direction.

The Occamist depreciation of natural reason was replaced by a truly religious confidence in its liberating power.
The development of the basic antinomy in the

The new ideal of personality expressed itself originally in a strongly aristocratically tinted life- and world-view. And it scarcely wished to mask its antithesis with the ecclesiastically bound outlook of the Middle Ages.

In Italy in the 15th century this ideal of personality had become the watchword of the new period which, as we observed above, expected a "renascimento" in a Humanistic sense. The Idea of the "uomo universale" is voiced in Leo Battista Alberti's autobiography as well as in the figure of Leonardo Da Vinci. This new ideal was soon to spread over all the lands which were bearers of the culture of the Renaissance. And even at the start it was filled with a Faustian spirit, which looked forward to the progress of culture, and sought this progress in the subjugation of nature by scientific investigation which knows no authority higher than science.

The motive of the domination of nature and the ambiguity of the nature-motive.

For from the very beginning the Humanistic motive of freedom led to a revolution in the modern view of nature.

The Greek vision of physis was, as we saw, dominated by the religious motive of matter and form. In the light of the form-motive nature bears a teleological character, and gives expression to the Greek Idea of the good, the true, and the beautiful.

The motive of matter with its unpredictable and orderless anangké led the Greek view of nature to the extreme counterpole of the super-sensory form: the mysterious depths of life and death in the eternal process of growth and decay.

The Biblical Christian view of nature was dominated by the central motive of creation, fall, and redemption. The revelation of the radical depravity of nature due to sin casts an infinitely darker shadow over the temporal cosmos than that of the Greek motive of matter.

Humanism broke in principle with both the Greek and the Christian view of nature. It had intended to free human personality from all faith in super-natural powers. It also intended to emancipate nature from the bonds of this faith. Modern autonomous man considers the "immeasurable nature" external to himself in the same way that he thinks of himself. That is to

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1 See Jacob Burckhardt's *Kultur der Renaissance in Italien*. Ch. II in 14, pp. 143 ff.
say, the same ambiguity which is inherent in the Humanistic motive of freedom will also reveal itself in the motive of nature. “Unmeasurable nature” can be viewed as a macrocosmic reflection of the autonomous freedom of human personality. In this case Humanism yields to an aesthetic enjoyment of the “creating freedom” which reveals itself in nature. But nature can also be viewed as a reflection of the Faustian domination-motive, which permeated the Humanistic ideal of personality from the very beginning. In this case nature can only be viewed as an object that can be dominated by autonomous science.

The motive of nature now becomes a new motive of domination, which can only lead to a deterministic theoretical view of reality. Galileo and Newton laid the foundations for modern mathematical natural science. Grasping the phenomena of nature, according to their mathematical aspects and their aspects of movement and energy, in a system of functional causal relations, natural science actually pointed towards the way which would enable us to rule natural phenomena.

After these foundations had been laid, Humanism embraced this new scientific method with a religious passion, and elevated it to a universal model for thought. All of reality should be construed in terms of this new method. To this end, all modal structures of individuality, which are grounded upon the divine order of creation, must be methodically demolished. Autonomous theoretical thought will now recreate the cosmos by means of the exact concepts of mathematical natural science. It will bring forth a structureless view of reality, in which all phenomena are ordered in a continuous causal series. At this point the dialectical tension between the motive of nature and that of freedom is directly in evidence.

Nature conceived of in this way does not have any place for an autonomous freedom of human personality.

This religious dialectic was henceforth to dominate Humanistic philosophy. In our transcendental critique of theoretical thought we have become familiar with the general lines of this process. We have seen how primacy is alternatively ascribed to either of the antagonistic motives, and how the attempt is made to draw a line of demarcation between their two separate spheres of validity while recognizing their polar antithesis. We have become familiar with the attempts to bridge over this religious antithesis by means of a dialectic manner of thought, and we are acquainted with the subsequent disruption of this apparent synthesis.
The development of the basic antinomy in the

The Renaissance did not explicitly develop the model of thought of modern natural science. Nevertheless, it displayed, in its developed ideal of personality, the germ of the ambiguity that we have indicated above. At least, we are safe in saying, that it contained the tendencies of a new science-ideal, which was directed toward the domination of nature. Naturally, as long as this motive of domination did not lead to a deterministic view of nature, the conflict with the motive of freedom was not in evidence. But this domination-motive was predisposed to a deterministic view of reality according to its religious meaning, and in time could only develop with an inner necessity in this direction.

Late scholasticism had lost itself in endless conceptual distinctions. The rising Humanism turned away from such “formalist hairsplitting” and wished to show its sovereign power over the cosmos. The watchword “to the things themselves” was given; not only in critical philology, but also in the research of endless nature, in which, since Copernicus' introduction of the heliocentric view of the world, the earth had lost its central position. The autonomous human personality wished to test its unlimited power of expansion in the endless spaces of the universe.

The πέρας and the ἀπείρον. The antithesis with the ancient ideal of life.

For modern man the πέρας, the limited, is no longer the highest principle that it was for the contemplative classical metaphysics of Greece. The highest principle is rather the ἀπείρον, the endless, the Platonic μῆ ὄν. Modern man is obsessed and enticed by the endless, and believes, that he can rediscover himself in it, in his boundless impulse of activity (Cusanus, Bruno).

This tendency towards the infinite is not a passing attitude of the Renaissance. It became more deeply entrenched in the following period. In Leibniz, the limited even became “metaphysical evil”.

1 In this connection the comparison is interesting which Windelband makes in his Geschichte der neueren Phil. I, 508, between the metaphysics of Leibniz and that of Plato, Aristotle and Neo-Platonism: “das Chaos der Kosmogonien, das μῆ ὄν des Platon, die ὄν des Aristoteles, das βάδος des Neu-platonismus — sie sind in der rationalistischen Philosophie
Even though the difference on this point remains within the immanence-standpoint and therefore is relative, this characteristic of the modern ideal of personality cannot be explained in terms of the conception of personality found in antiquity.

In the flourishing period of Greek and Roman culture, personality was considered as being harmoniously bound to an objective rational world-order. And in accordance with its appointed destiny it was dedicated to the all embracing state. Nominalistic subjectivism and individualism are here phenomena of decadence which were viewed as a mortal danger to the polis.

The Humanistic ideal of personality, however, was born in close contact with the Christian Idea of freedom. Humanism secularized the latter and animated its ideal of the free autonomous man with a strong belief in a great future of mankind.

The Cartesian “Cogito” in contra-distinction to the theoretic nous as the Archimedean point of Greek metaphysics.

After much preparation in various sorts of directions (especially in the system of NICOLAUS CUSANUS) the principles of Humanistic philosophical thought received their first clear formulation in the system of DESCARTES. The cogito in which this thinker supposed he had found his Archimedean point, is in no sense identical with the “logos” or “nous” of classic Greek philosophy. In the latter, human reason was conceived of as bound to an objective metaphysical order of being, in which the thinking subject only has a part. This metaphysical order was considered as the standard of truth in respect to theoretical thought. Quite different from this Greek conception of reason is that of the founder of Humanistic philosophy.

By means of the “cogito”, DESCARTES called to a halt the universal methodical scepticism with respect to all the data of experience. The given world should be broken up in a methodical theoretical way in order to reconstruct it from autono-

zu der “région des vérités éternelles” als der bindenden Möglichkeit der Weltschöpfung geworden.” [“The “Chaos” of the cosmogonies, the µῆδος of Plato, the ἐληκτὸς of Aristotle, the βάδος of Neo-Platonism — therefore, in rationalistic philosophy, have become the “région des vérités éternelles” (the region of eternal truths), as the binding possibility of the creation of the world”). And yet WINDELBAND in an inconceivable manner speaks of a “Platonic idealism” in LEIBNIZ.
nous mathematical thought. It is the new ideal of personality which is active behind this philosophical experiment. It does not accept any order or law that the sovereign personality of man had not itself prescribed in rational thought. Although DESCARTES substantialized this cogito to a "res cogitans" and thereby seemed to fall back upon scholastic metaphysics, no one should fail to recognize, that in his new regulatives for methodical thought the Humanistic motive of freedom and of the domination of nature is the driving force.

From his "cogito, ergo sum" the French thinker directly proceeds to the Idea of God, and therein discovers the foundation of all further knowledge. This Idea of God is nothing but the absolutizing of mathematical thought to divine thought, which cannot mislead us. The whole Idea of God serves to imprint upon the new mathematical method the mark of infallibility.

The Jansenists of Port Royal who accepted Cartesianism as an exact method of thinking, supposed they had found an inner affinity between DESCARTES' founding of all knowledge in self-consciousness and the immanent Idea of God, and AUGUSTINE'S "Deum et animam scire volo". This was a grave error.

There is no relationship between DESCARTES' and AUGUSTINE's Archimedean point. The misconception of the Jansenists of Port Royal on this issue.

For this inner affinity does not exist, in spite of the appearance of the contrary. In an unsurpassed manner CALVIN expounded in his *Institutio* the authentic Christian conception of AUGUSTINE which made all knowledge of the cosmos dependent upon self-knowledge, and made our self-knowledge dependent upon our knowledge of God. Moreover, CALVIN dissociated this conception from AUGUSTINE's scholastic standpoint with regard to philosophy as "ancilla theologiae". This view is radically opposed to the conception of DESCARTES. In his "cogito", the latter implicitly proclaimed the sovereignty of mathematical thought and deified it in his Idea of God, in a typically Humanistic attitude towards knowledge.

Consequently, there is no inner connection between AUGUSTINE's refutation of scepticism by referring to the certainty of thought which doubts, and DESCARTES' "cogito, ergo sum". AUGUSTINE never intended to declare the *naturalis ratio* to be autonomous and unaffected by the fall.
The connection between DESCARTES' methodological scepticism and the discovery of analytical geometry. The creation-motive in the Cartesian "cogito".

Let us not forget, that DESCARTES' universal scepticism with respect to the reliability of all experience except selfconsciousness, was very closely connected with his discovery of analytical geometry. The latter became for him the methodological model of all systematic philosophy. By the introduction of coordinates it became possible to determine every point of space by three numbers and every spatial figure by an equation between the coordinates of its points. In this way geometrical propositions were proven by means of arithmetical calculation apparently without any pre-supposition other than the laws of arithmetic. And the origin of the latter was sought in sovereign thought.

DESCARTES found the original pattern for clear and distinct thought in this method. According to the latter, thought does not take as its foundation anything which it did not itself produce in a supposed logical process of creation. In the Preface to his De Corpore the English thinker THOMAS HOBBES describes, completely in terms of the story of creation in the first chapter of the book Genesis, the methodological demolition of all given reality executed by human reason in order to reconstruct the cosmos out of the simplest elements of thought. The logical activity of the philosopher must create, just like the artist or as God, Who gives order to chaos. This motive of logical creation — inspired by the deification of mathematical thought in the Idea of the intellectus arche-typus — was continually carried through in the first phase of Humanistic philosophy, especially by LEIBNIZ.

This motive is modern and Humanistic. It is not found in ancient, patristic, or medieval philosophy. It can only be explained in terms of a secularization of the Christian Idea of creation in the Humanistic ideal of personality.

Modern philosophy proclaimed sovereign reason to be the origin of the theoretically construed cosmos. But, in this conception of sovereign reason, the two mutually antagonistic motives of "nature" and "freedom" were active. And the polar tension between them reveals itself evermore intensively in the further development of Humanistic thought.

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1 Opera latina, Vol. I, De Corpore Praef. The biblical conception of creation is evidently confused here with the Greek Idea of the divine demiurge.
The development of the basic antinomy in the

The polar tension between the ideal of personality and the ideal of science in the basic structure of the Humanistic transcendental Idea.

As we observed above, the ideal of personality is itself the religious root of the classical naturalistic science-ideal. As soon as the former began to unfold its tendency to dominate nature, it evoked this philosophical science-ideal with an inner necessity. However, the latter soon became the bitterest enemy of the ideal of personality.

To be sure, at the outset Humanism borrowed many motives of its life- and world-view from the Stoic ideal of the self-sufficient sage, from Epicurean ethics (Valla) and from other sources. But because of its inherent Faustian impulse to dominate nature, it had an inner predisposition to a deterministic view of the world of an entirely new character. Since the rise of mathematical natural science, the new mathematical ideal of knowledge became the transcendental ideal of cosmic order. It appeared to endow philosophical thought with the scepter of legislator of the world. In this way the new science-ideal only gradually became a basic factor in the Humanistic transcendental ground-Idea. It is true, that the thirst after the newly discovered infinite nature, with all its mysteries, had from the very first manifested itself in the painting and poetry of the Renaissance.

It is true also, that before the rise of the new natural science, the Faustian passion to dominate had revealed itself in a flourishing growth of alchemy, by which it was hoped, that the mysteries of nature could be laid bare.

The French thinker Petrus Ramus had even developed a new semi-Platonic mathematical method in logic in which — in contradistinction to the Aristotelian syllogism — “invention” should play a main part. This Ramistic method, which soon acquired a great influence, doubtless manifested a new spirit in scientific thought.

Nevertheless, originally, nature was not in any way conceived of as a mechanical system, but as filled with beauty, force, and life. Even Leonardo da Vinci, who anticipated Galileo’s mathematical-mechanical analysis of empirical phenomena, conceived of nature as a teleological whole animated with life.

Lorenzo Valla had deified nature as the sphere of expansion of the ideal of personality: “Idem est natura, quod Deus, aut fere idem” (De Voluptate I, 13).

Since the Copernican revolution in astronomy unlimited pos-
sibilities seemed to be opened to the investigating mind. Modern
man discovered in nature a macrocosmos which found its reflected image in his own personality as microcosmos.

The tendency towards infinity in Giordano Bruno's pantheism.

Giordano Bruno, in his pantheistic philosophy, joined Nicolaus Cusanus' doctrine of the infinite and his metaphysical mathematical doctrine of the coincidentia oppositorum; he religiously interpreted Copernicus' theory in a dithyrambic glorification of the infinity of the universe, and of its reflection in human personality as a monadic microcosmos. Here we see how the Humanistic ideal of personality becomes conscious of its power of expansion. The immeasurable space of the cosmos waited to be ruled by man. "Nature" as "natura naturata" is the self-development of God (natura naturans). The new ideal of personality here discloses itself in the original aesthetic character of the Italian Renaissance. It does not yet experience the close oppression of the deterministic science-ideal. The seeds of modern-astronomical thought are still shrouded in the aesthetic phantasy of the poet. Bruno's system is only a prelude to the development of the classic Humanistic ideal of science. The new ideal of personality assumes the new view of "infinite nature" without perceptible tensions.

The entire opposition between the "Jenseits" and the "Diesseits" of Christian dogmatics was considered here as anthropocentric (in the sense of the astronomical theory which had been refuted by Copernicus) and ascribed to the standpoint of sensory appearance and imagination, a standpoint that ought to be conquered by philosophic consciousness.

In this view the religious freedom-motive is still in complete accordance with the nature-motive.

The former permeated the new Humanistic view of nature which as yet betrayed nothing of its later mechanization. The future tension between the ideal of science and the ideal of personality is at best intimated in Bruno by the trouble he takes to reconcile the unity and homogeneousness of infinite nature in all its parts to the Idea of the creating individuality

1 Compare what Cassirer in his Erkenntnisproblem I, 18 and following, observes concerning the relation between the new Humanistic concept of the ego and the new concept of nature.
The development of the basic antinomy in the of the monads, in which Idea the new ideal of personality is concentrated.

The decisive turn did not come before the mathematical conception of natural phenomena, which the Renaissance ascribed to Plato and Democritus, was made fruitful in an exact method of analysis and synthesis capable of dominating nature by means of the functional concept of mechanic causality.

Henceforth, the ideal of the free self-sufficient personality acquired a veritable counter-pole in the mechanical view of nature.

The proclamation of the creative sovereignty of the mathematical method implied the intention to logically construct the coherence of the world out of the continuous movement of thought. Directly after the rise of mathematical natural science the latter became the sheet-anchor of the new ideal of knowledge, which originally had been entirely orientated to this methodical pattern.

§ 3 - THE POSTULATE OF CONTINUITY IN THE HUMANISTIC SCIENCE-IDEAL AND THE BASIC ANTINOMY IN THE HUMANISTIC COSMONOMIC IDEA

The new mathematical and naturalist science-ideal was typified by a particular postulate of continuity.

We have pointed out how the cosmic time-order grounds the modal aspects of reality in their sphere-sovereignty and brings them, at the same time, into a continuous temporal coherence. However, this cosmic order is eliminated, if mathematical thought is declared to be unconditionally sovereign in philosophy. For, if mathematical thought is sovereign, it can itself construe the coherence in the modal diversity of aspects. It need only eliminate the obstacles which the inner structures of the modal aspects of reality place in its way.

The cosmic temporal continuity in the inter-modal coherence of these aspects is then replaced by the mathematical-logical continuity in the movement of thought.

The same postulate of continuity of the mathematical ideal of science hides behind Descartes’ universal methodical scepticism

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1 Translator's note: Since meaning is the mode of being of all created existence, a temporal coherence is a coherence of meaning. However, for stylistic reasons I shall use the abbreviated form "temporal coherence" in italics.

D. H. F.
and Hobbes' experiment of thought mentioned above. Both sought theoretically to demolish the cosmos to a chaos, in order that it should be reconstructed, in a continuous procedure of mathematical and natural scientific thought, as a theoretical cosmos.

This postulate of continuity pre-supposed that, by virtue of its methodical sovereignty, mathematical thought has the power to surpass the modal boundaries of the diverse aspects of experience and temporal reality.

Modern natural science, founded by Kepler, Galileo and Newton, turned away from the Aristotelian-Thomistic concept of substance which was rooted in the Greek form-matter motive. Such in order to scientifically investigate the physical aspect of reality by means of analytical and synthetical mathematical thought. With its concept of function, modern science wished to grasp the functional coherence of physical phenomena in mathematically formulated natural laws.

It had — correctly in its own field — cleared away the old obstacles that had impeded the application of mathematical methods in natural-scientific research. Modern natural science discarded the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian view of the universe with its distinction between the sublunary and supra-lunary world. It also discarded the Aristotelian "qualitates occultae" and it proclaimed the universality of the laws of motion for the entire physical aspect of the cosmos. The Humanistic science-ideal, however, could not accept the limitation of this special scientific postulate of continuity to the field of physics.

Galileo's postulate for the modern physical method implied a reduction of all qualitative distinctions, in the sense of scholastic "qualitates occultae", to mathematically determined differences of motion. According to its science-ideal, Humanistic philosophy now sought to apply this postulate to all other aspects of reality in order to construe a continuous mechanical image of the world.

The concept of substance in the new Humanistic metaphysics is quite different from the Aristotelian-Thomistic or Platonic one.

In its first phase the science-ideal pointed towards the development of a new metaphysics. It was supposed that the true essence,
The development of the basic antinomy in the

the super-temporal substance of “reality in itself” could only be grasped by the new mathematical method of thought. However, even in the Monadology of Leibniz, this new concept of substance does not have anything to do with the substantial forms of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, which were grounded in a lex aeterna.

The new concept of substance, if it is viewed in the light of the new Humanistic science-ideal, has in essence a nominalistic background. It is nothing but the hypostasis of the concept of function of the new scientific method. And this concept of function specifies the common denominator under which the science-ideal wishes to bring the different modal aspects of reality. It is, as it was defined by Leibniz, the hypostasis of the modern functional concept of law. The functional coherence between variant phenomena, construed by thought, becomes the “invariant”, the substance of reality.¹

Do not let us forget, that the new mathematical natural science had its precursor in the Occamistic school at the University of Paris during the 14th century. Remember, that before Galileo the new concept of the law of motion was formulated in full mathematical precision by Nicolaus of Oresme who also anticipated the discovery of Copernicus and invented the method of analytical geometry before Descartes. The whole functionalistic conception of reality was rooted in a nominalistic tradition.

The fact, that the “substance” of nature was still conceived of as “Ding an sich”, in spite of the choice of the Archimedean point in the mathematical cogito, proves, that before Kant Humanist philosophy had not yet arrived at critical self-reflection and was unaware of the very root of its science-ideal. It proves, that Humanistic thought was still formally wed to ancient and medieval thought; but it proves nothing against the new character of this concept of substance!

Therefore, one must be extremely careful in drawing consequences from an external agreement in the scholastic-Aristotelian and modern-Humanistic definition of this concept.

When Descartes defines substance as “res quae ita existit, ut nulla alia re indiget ad existendum” (Princ. 1, 51), this definition sounds rather the same as the one we find, for example, in Johannes Damascenus (Dial. 4, 1 p. 538) and later on in

¹ Thus, explicitly in Leibniz’ Hauptschr. 11 S., 292f. and 340, where substance is defined as the “abiding law for a series of changes”.


SUAREZ (Disp., xxx, p. 299). And the definition which DESCARTES gives in his *Rationes more geometrico dispositae* (p. 86 V and VI): “omnis res cui inest immediate, ut in subjecto, sive per quam existet aliquid quod percipimus, ... vocatur substantia,” is to be found again in rather the same formulation in ARISTOTLE’S *Categ.*, c. 5, a 12.

In itself this agreement only indicates, that the metaphysical concept of substance ever rests upon the hypostatization of theoretical abstractions. But, even in view of this, we may not close our eyes to the new peculiar sense which the concept of substance acquires in Humanistic philosophy. It is the basic structure of the Humanistic transcendental ground-Idea which is responsible for this new meaning. In this Humanistic philosophy the criterion of truth is not sought in an agreement between thought and “the essence of reality outside of our mind.” It is sought in thought itself with the “*more geometrico*” attained clearness and distinctness of concepts. This thought no longer finds its supposed fulcrum in a transcendent world of ideas reposing in itself, nor in the Aristotelian entelechies, which in a teleological world-order are inherent in the world of material things as its substantial forms. Thought now granted to itself a logically creating sovereignty. According to its own intention, it only rests upon a mathematical method which freely rules over “empirical” reality. The clear mathematical concept is above everything else.

Besides, the metaphysical concept of substance is absolutely not essential to the Humanistic ideal of science. When the Humanistic metaphysics of nature collapsed under the critique of BERKELEY, LOCKE, HUME and KANT, the mathematical concept of function or the transcendental form of thought rendered the same service as the common denominator under which philosophical thought could subsume the aspects of reality. In keeping with the Humanistic ideal of science reason must employ the method of continuity as the scepter of its absolute sovereignty. It must exceed all modal boundaries.

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1 Even in NICOLAUS CUSANUS this changed attitude toward knowledge is evident. See my *In the Struggle for a Christian Politics*. In DILTHEY I have encountered a relative agreement with my conception of the modern “cogito” as Archimedean point. (See A. METZGER, *Phänomenologie und Metaphysik*, 1933, pp. 17ff.). However, DILTHEY sees a Christian metaphysical background behind this “cogito”.

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*cosmonomic Idea of Humanistic immanence-philosophy*
The development of the basic antinomy in the

The lex continui in LEIBNIZ and in the Marburg school of Neo-Kantians.

LEIBNIZ, still entirely caught in the pre-critical Humanistic metaphysics, even elevated this method to a metaphysical law: the lex continui. He gave it a scientific foundation in the differential calculus, his great discovery in mathematics. In the XXth century the anti-metaphysical neo-Kantian Marburg school, radically broke with the Ding an sich, but, nevertheless, elevated the "lex continui" to the basic law of philosophical thought.

The Humanistic ideal of science can call into play its postulate of continuity in various forms; in the form of Humanistic metaphysics, in that of the transcendental "critical" thought, and also in the form of the positivistic philosophy of the last century (Comte). It can ground this postulate in a metaphysical concept of substance, but also in the continuity of the movement of thought which arises out of a basic correlation of abstracting and combining (Natorp), or in a positivistically conceived natural scientific method.

In all these forms this postulate of continuity opposes the subjection of philosophical thought to the cosmic-temporal order originating in the Divine plan of creation. However, the sphere-sovereignty of the modal aspects did not permit itself simply to be eliminated by the supposed continuity of a scientific method. The Humanistic science-ideal has led philosophy into a maze of antinomies. Every time philosophical thought tried to surpass the modal boundaries of the different aspects by means of a mathematical or mechanistic method, it punished itself by becoming involved in antinomies. In tracking down these intrinsic antinomies we shall later on discover a method of testing the correctness of our theory of the modal aspects of experience.

The fundamental antinomy in the basic structure of the Humanistic transcendental ground-Idea.

At this stage we only wish to point out, that the consistent following out of the naturalistic ideal of science must reveal a fundamental antinomy in the basic structure of the Humanistic transcendental ground-Idea. This science-ideal, evoked by the ideal of personality, acknowledged no limits to the application of the new natural scientific method. Had not scientific thought been emancipated from the cosmic order and declared "unconditionally" sovereign?
But the moment must come when personality, the new sovereign in the Humanistic ground-motive which had glorified itself in its absolute freedom, must itself fall a prey to this ideal of science. Personality had been absolutized in its temporal functions of reason. The physical and biological functions had been subjected to the domination of the mathematical and mechanical method of thought. The postulate of logical continuity implied, that the psychical, logical, historical, linguistical, social, economic, aesthetic, juridical, ethical, and faith-functions of personality must also be subjected to the naturalistic science-ideal. Thereby, the latter dealt a death blow to the sovereignty of the ideal of personality! "Die ich rief, die Geister, Werde ich nun nicht los!"

In the consistent carrying out of its postulate of continuity, the ideal of science must abolish the ideal of personality and unmask the Idea of its unconditional freedom as an illusion.

The supposed solution of this antinomy in transcendental thought.

As we saw in an earlier context, the transcendental-idealistic trend in Humanistic philosophy thinks, that since KANT and FICHTE this fundamental antinomy has been solved in a definitive way.

The discovery of the transcendental cogito had opened the way to self-reflection of thought, and had brought to light the absolute dependence of all natural scientific syntheses upon the transcendental-logical function of the ego. And the latter can never be made into a Gegenstand. Therefore, was it not true, that this discovery had established insurmountable boundaries for the naturalistic science-ideal, and fully guaranteed the absolute freedom of the rational functions over against the natural law of causality?

However, we have seen, that the conception of the "Unbedingtheit" of the "transcendental cogito" involves Humanistic philosophy in new antinomies. "Reason" in its supposed autonomy should here appoint the boundaries of the ideal of science. In fact, it was nothing but the reaction of a threatened ideal of personality which established the illusive conviction, that by means of "pure thought" the absolutism of the nature-motive in its transcendental ground-Idea could be bridled.

Let us grant, that the Humanist thinkers, who consistently followed the classical science-ideal, were guilty of a primitive
The development of the basic antinomy in the

naturalism, insofar as they supposed it to be possible to comprehend actual thought in a natural scientific manner. But the Kantian transcendental philosophy in no way denounced the expansion of the natural scientific method over the total concrete act of thinking in its empirical temporal character. It subsumed this latter without the least scruple under a naturalistically conceived, psychological common denominator of the ideal of science. Modern transcendental philosophy only wished to limit the science-ideal by means of a hypostatization of a "transcendental-logical subject", which should be elevated above the inter-modal coherence of meaning between the different aspects of the concrete act of thought. As soon as the untenability of this presupposition is seen, it must become evident, that transcendental idealism is helpless in the face of the absolutistic pretension of the naturalistic science-ideal.

In keeping with the latter, this idealism can in fact only accept a cosmic determinateness of the empirical act of thought in the specific sense of a natural scientific relation of causality. Only the flight into an idealistic absolutization can procure to the Humanistic ideal of personality an apparent security against the consequences of the science-ideal with its postulate of continuity.

Consequently, we must establish the fact, that the transcendental ground-Idea of Humanistic thought in its basic structure discloses the irreconcilable conflict inherent in its religious ground-motive.

By the latter Humanistic philosophy seems to be placed in the face of an inexorable "either-or".

A new struggle for primacy, this time for the ideal of science, and then for the ideal of personality, was unchained. And in this struggle no objective judge was present.

The tendency of continuity in the freedom-motive of the ideal of personality.

The ideal of personality, too, sought support in rational functions (which were isolated by theoretical thought in an inter-modal synthesis of meaning). And its freedom-motive possesses the same tendency of continuity as the science-ideal which did not recognize heteronomous limits.

The attempt, soon to be made by Kant, to delineate the boundaries of each must lead to new antinomies, which we shall examine more closely in their proper places. After he had ascribed the primacy to the freedom-motive, the dialectical
development of Humanistic thought offers a really fascinating spectacle.

I think, the more detailed exposition in the following chapters, which begins with the conflict between Descartes and Hobbes, and must be concluded with the last phase of Fichte’s idealism, will gain perspective by letting precede a brief diorama of the whole dialectical development of the Humanistic ground-motive in post-Kantian thought up to the most recent phase.

§ 4 - A DIORAMA OF THE DIALECTICAL DEVELOPMENT OF HUMANISTIC PHILOSOPHY AFTER KANT. THE PROCESS OF RELIGIOUS UPROOTING AND THE ACTUALITY OF OUR TRANSCENDENTAL CRITIQUE.

German freedom-idealism in the Restoration period no longer recognized the line of demarcation Kant had drawn between nature and freedom, between the ideal of science and that of personality. The attempt was now made to synthesize both antithetical motives in a dialectical mode of thought, and it was thought, that the hidden traces of freedom could be found in nature itself.

The freedom-motive and the ideal of personality, rooted therein, in this phase receive a new irrationalist and universalistic form. The philosophy of the Enlightenment, and even Kant, had conceived them in a rationalist and individualistic sense.

The origination of a new historical science-ideal out of an irrationalist and universalistic turn in the freedom-motive.

In our further exposition of the dialectical development of Humanistic philosophical thought we shall see, how there arose out of this new conception of the freedom-motive a new scientific mode of thought, namely, the historical. And we shall see, how the latter, in opposition to the natural scientific and rationalistic method of the Enlightenment, was elevated to the rank of a new ideal of science and a new universal thought-model. This led to an historicistic vision of reality which also permeated the view of nature. In the long run this historicism proved to be much a more dangerous opponent to the Humanistic freedom-motive than the science-ideal based upon classic physics.

As soon as it began to follow its own inner tendencies it under-

\footnote{The term “universalistic” is meant here in contrast to “individualistic”.}
minded the religious foundations both of the classical Humanistic science-ideal and of the ideal of personality. This led to the final phase in the development of the dialectical ground-motive of nature and freedom in philosophic thought: that of a spiritual uprooting.

In the first (Dutch) edition of this work my transcendental critique of Humanistic thought did not include any sketch of this further development of the religious dialectic in the transcendental ground-Idea of Humanistic philosophy since the historicizing of the science-ideal. I now feel the need of briefly sketching this final phase. For since the appearance of the Dutch edition it has become evident, that the phenomena of spiritual uprooting in Humanistic thought were not merely of a passing nature, but reflect a crisis in the very spiritual foundations of western culture.

For, since the time of the Enlightenment, Humanism has been the leading power in this culture.

As soon as historicism permeated the view of nature in the dialectical method of freedom-idealism, “natural history” was conceived of as the basis of human cultural history.

In Schelling’s speculative nature-philosophy the process of development moves in a series of lower and higher potentialities from the pole of mechanical necessity (inert matter) to the pole of creative freedom (the living organism).

But, according to him, there is also to be found in the history of culture a dialectical union of necessity and freedom.

Necessity is implied here in the individual nature of a nation, in its individual spirit (“Volksgeist”) and tradition, which rule man to a great extent unconsciously. Freedom discloses itself in the awakening of historical consciousness. And in the work of art the polar tension between necessity and freedom should find its ultimate reconciliation.

The polar tension between the historicistic ideal of science and the idealistic dialectic of Hegel’s freedom-idealism.

Now the historicistic ideal of science could not reveal its radical relativistic consequences so long as it was inspired and held in check by post-Kantian freedom-idealism. In this phase it remained bound to the irrationalistic and universalistic mode of thought in the Restoration-period. Hegel’s dialectical logicizing of the historical process as a dialectical unfolding of the Absolute
Idea in the objective spirit ("objectiven Geist") signified at the very least a return to the rationalistic and individualistic view of history of the Enlightenment.

Indeed it must contribute considerably to bringing the inner tension to light between the true historical science-ideal and the dialectical-metaphysical logic, inspired in the last analysis by the religious dialectic of necessity and freedom. For, it was impossible to conceive in a satisfactory manner historical development in its unpredictable course in the apriori dialectical thought-forms of the Hegelian system.

This idealistic dialectic must become unbearable to those who had welcomed the historical mode of thought as a new turn in the science-ideal. It bound empirical investigation to an apriori schematicism in which the "creative freedom" of man in the historical process was reduced to the rôle of a puppet of the World-Reason.

Even the fact that HEGEL had a deep historical insight and could fill up his dialectical-idealistic schematicism with a rich historical material, could not save this schematicism itself.

The rise of positivistic sociology and the transformation of the historical method of thought into a natural scientific one.

Even in the first half of the 19th century freedom-idealism was confronted with a dangerous competitor in the positivistic sociology of de ST SIMON and AUGUST COMTE. These thinkers sought to unite the historical manner of thought of the Restoration with the natural scientific view of the Enlightenment. They tried to transform into a rationalistic Idea of progress, the irrationalistic idea of development, as it was conceived of in the Romantic and Historical school.

It is in this very period that the new historical mode of thought in the rising sociology began to relativize the Ideas which de ST SIMON and COMTE — doubtless still under the influence of freedom-idealism — considered to be leading in the historical dynamic of society.

In his famous "law of the three stages" (in passing formulated even by TURGOT) COMTE tried to conceive the historical development of Western society in terms of a necessary causal process. Historicist relativism, however, was not yet carried out here up to its ultimate consequences. Therefore, this first attempt at a historical relativizing of the leading Ideas of Western culture
The development of the basic antinomy in the
was still an inconsistent one. It is true, that the Ideas of the
first two stages, viz. the theological and the metaphysical, were
completely abandoned to historical relativity. The Ideas of the
third stadium, however, as the embodiment of the classic
science-ideal and its domination-motive in a positivistic form,
are elevated to the rank of final goal of the entire historical
process, and to the standard by which the latter is to be
judged. This was nothing but the old faith in the freeing
power of science, as we encountered it in the Enlightenment.
This positivistic historicism is still firmly rooted in the religious
basic motive of Humanism. Later on it proclaimed itself to be a
new religion, "un nouveau christianisme".

The transformation of historicism into naturalistic
evolutionism.

At about the middle of the 19th century historicism took a
new turn in evolutionism. The dogma of evolution spread from
biology to all the branches of science. Thus there began a new
triumphal march of the classic deterministic science-ideal in
its historical transformation. Since Rousseau and Kant religious
primacy had been ascribed to the motive of freedom. But now
the religious dialectic again led Humanistic thought to the
acceptance of the primacy of the nature-motive. Freedom-idea-
listism began to collapse. Marxist sociology transformed the idea-
listic dialectic of Hegel into a historical-materialism. The latter
explained the ideological super-structure of society in terms of
a reflection of the economic mode of production. Marxism and
Darwinism united, but they, too, did not carry historicism to its
extreme relativistic conclusions. Both still believed in a final
goal of development which is itself outside of the historical
relativity. The religious ground-motive of Humanism dominates
the trust of both in objective science and in its freeing activity
for humanity.

The first expression of the spiritual disintegrating
process in Historicism. Nietzsche's religion of
power.

However, in the latter half of the 19th century the process
of spiritual uprooting began to reveal itself in historicism in an
almost pathological form. Nietzsche's gospel of the super-man
is the first manifestation of this process.

In his first period Nietzsche was under the influence of Ger-
man Romanticism and idealism from which he fell under the domination of Darwinian evolutionism. In the third and final phase of his thought, however, he developed a religion of power which completely broke away from the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom in its original religious sense.

The view of NIETZSCHE is based upon the Darwinian basic tenets and upon a radical historicist vision of reality. Proceeding on this foundation he views man only as an “animal”, which is not yet “fixed”, and whose sole superiority to other species of animals consequently consists in the fact that man is not bound to static instincts and to a statically circumscribed “Umwelt”.

In the historical development of culture man has his destiny in his own hands, and thereby displays an absolutely dynamic nature. NIETZSCHE wishes to build his anthropology exclusively upon the positive data of “nature and history”. He fulminates against the fact that man overestimates his own importance, views the whole cosmos as related to himself, and imagines himself to be a free rational personality, radically elevated above the animals.

Man is a “phantastic animal” that from time to time has the need of reflecting upon the goal of his existence and thus posits ideologies concerning God and morality. However, science has progressed so far, that man has killed his gods, and now only retains his own historical future. But history — in spite of all Christian and Humanistic ideologies — is nothing but a struggle for power.

Thus the “Wille zur Macht” is the only existential escape for man from the nihilism to which historicism leads.

The kingdom of the “super-man”, of the “blond beast”, in which this will to power will assume super-human forms, can only be established through an “Umwertung aller Werte” (transvaluation of all values) on the ruins of Christian and Humanistic ideologies.

The ideal of science and the ideal of personality of Humanism are both rejected. NIETZSCHE considers science only as a biological aid in the struggle for existence. It only has a pragmatic value. Consistent historicism can no longer have faith in scientific truth. Nor can it believe any longer in the Idea of humanity

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1 In our analysis of the modal structure of the historical aspect in Vol. II, we shall see that domination or power is indeed the nuclear moment of this aspect.
The development of the basic antinomy in the which was rooted in the religious motive of freedom. Thus Nietzsche introduced into Humanistic philosophy the great process of religious decay. And this would soon enough lead to a radical spiritual crisis in the culture of the West, accelerated by the two world-wars.

The rôle of neo-Kantianism and neo-Hegelianism in the crisis of historicism.

This inner decay even revealed itself in the philosophic movements which in the first decades of the 20th century sought to revive Kantian or Hegelian philosophy.

The neo-Kantians (the Marburg school and that of Rickert, Windelband and Lask) and the neo-Hegelians both tried to check the absolutism of naturalistic positivism, and to arrest the nihilistic consequences of historicism.

Under the influence of Rickert and his follower, Max Weber, historicism began to turn away from naturalistic evolutionism. In its apriori construction of the development of human society the latter could not keep its ground against an accurate cultural-historical investigation of the ethnological facts. The hypnosis of the "dogma of evolution", wherein the XIXth century was dying away, again began to make room for the epistemological reflection upon the methodological difference between natural science and cultural science. For a time it seemed as though Humanistic thought would return to the great figures of German idealism. But the religious root of this idealism was too strongly undermined in Neo-Kantianism and Neo-Hegelianism by the all conquering historical relativism.

Consequently, they could not check the spiritual crisis. The rôle of Neo-Kantianism in Germany was in fact at an end with the rise of national socialism. And German neo-Hegelianism interpreted Hegel's dialectical freedom-idealism preponderately in a relativistic sense, so that it was soon a docile instrument of the Hitler-regime.


On the other hand, a return to the old deterministic science-ideal was no longer possible. The development of micro-physics in the 20th century revealed, that the deterministic conception of the laws of nature could not be maintained. Quantum-mechanics
dethroned the classical concept of causality. Neo-positivism, proceeding from MACH, acquired its centre in the Vienna school. At the very least, it expected from modern natural science, a more adequate approach to reality.

It viewed the formulas and concepts of physics as mere conventional symbols, which only had value for the economy of thought, but could never lay claim to truth.

HUSSERL’s eidetic logic and phenomenology.

The “eidetic” logic which EDMUND HUSSERL established, sought to rejuvenate the Idea of mathesis universalis. But faith had been lost in the creative power of autonomous mathematical thought. So HUSSERL’s introduction of an “eidetic method” in his pure logic is to be understood only from the general decay of former certainties; it was an attempt at founding logical thought itself on a direct intuition of the essences (“Wesensschau”) which would not need a criterion of truth. The phenomenology which he developed later on was, to be sure, formally connected with the cogito of DESCARTES in its broad sense of reflecting self-consciousness. However, it was developed into a transcendental idealism in which both DESCARTES’ mathematical ideal of science and KANT’s faith in the practical reality of the Idea of freedom fell under the phenomenological epochè (ἐποχή)\(^1\).

With this development the so-called transcendental Ego-logy was placed in a religious vacuum.

Radical historicism had denatured the central ground-motive of Humanism to a historical phenomenon. HUSSERL reduced it to a “phenomenon” that is constituted by the transcendental ego itself. The transcendental-phenomenological consciousness becomes an “uninterested observer”; the phenomenologist believes, that in the theoretical epochè (ἐποχή) he can give an adequate essential description of the entire act-life of man in its intentional relation to the world. In this way phenomenology, as a universal philosophical science of the “essences” (Wesenswissenschaft), should have to found all empirical sciences\(^2\). But behind the absolutized transcendental the-

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The development of the basic antinomy in the theoretical consciousness yawns the abyss of nothingness, and this in spite of the fact that a degenerate religious motive of autonomous freedom still operates in this very absolutizing. For, in fact, there is no religious neutrality in the seemingly purely theoretical attitude of this "Ego-logy".

The second main trend in phenomenology which directly arose out of historicism and was established by Wilhelm Dilthey in his last period, was of an irrationalistic origin. It was assimilated by Heidegger in his philosophy of existence, after Søren Kierkegaard had laid the foundations of existential thought in strong opposition to the Hegelian idealism.

Besides, since Nietzsche, a strongly variegated philosophy of life was born out of historicism. It agreed with existentialism in its deep depreciation of the science-ideal and of the Humanistic freedom-idealism.

A general devaluation of Reason here made its entrance. The "cogito" was replaced by the "vivo", the Absolute Idea by the mythos and the "stream of life". In the latter the Humanistic freedom-motive sought its refuge after the decay of its religious ideal of personality. This ideal seemed to receive the death-blow from the side of depth-psychology. In the analytical way of the mechanistic science-ideal Freud had laid bare the dark depths of the unconscious.

Human consciousness seemed to be dethroned and with it the autonomous standards of Humanistic ethics and religion.

The attitude of decline in Spengler's philosophy of history and in Humanistic existentialism.

Since the first world-war the spiritual crisis of Western culture is expressed in Humanistic philosophy in an attitude of decline. Spengler's Der Untergang des Abendlandes, Heidegger's Sein und Zeit and Sartre's l'Être et le Néant, are in this respect three extremely representative works. Modern man has gone through two world wars. Historicism only permits him to retain the insight into the meaninglessness of his existential freedom in the face of nature in which he is "thrown". Western culture is doomed to decline (Spengler) and the freedom of human existence is a "freedom towards death" (Heidegger), a nothingness (Sartre).

Since Roman Catholicism and the Reformation had been pushed away from their dominating position, Humanism had played the leading rôle in Western culture for two centuries.
But now because of this intrinsic process of decay it has lost its monopolistic position of power. Anti-Humanistic spiritual movements (national socialism, fascism and bolshevism) have arisen out of the pathological degeneration of its religious freedom-motive caused by the radical consequences of historicism. Humanism was thus placed on the defensive.

A chaotic struggle for leadership in the future development of the West has now broken out. The older cultural forces, Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, have also re-awakened out of their philosophical and cultural lethargy, and with a new force now seek in philosophy to take part in the gigantic struggle for the future of our culture.

The actuality of our transcendental critique of theoretical thought.

It is precisely in the light of this whole development of Humanistic philosophy that a radical transcendental critique of theoretical thought is highly necessary and actual. The foundations upon which our culture had sought to build have been shaken everywhere by the storms of a tremendous transitional period. Therefore, the autonomy of theoretical thought can no longer properly be posited as a philosophic axiom. It is understandable, that this has been done in the period in which the Humanistic ground-motive was practically unchallenged in philosophy. However, in the present spiritual crisis anyone who thinks he can take refuge on this dogmatic standpoint, in order to block the way to a radical critical self-reflection in philosophy, thereby displays the fact that he has understood nothing of the deepest causes of this crisis.

The following more detailed transcendental critique of Humanistic philosophy only wishes to show the development of the latter in the light of the dialectical tensions in its own transcendental ground-Idea. This is, in my opinion, the only way to do justice to the different movements within this philosophy.
the same metaphysical basic denominator, viz. the "moving body".

This system may be called materialism up to a certain point, but then — however contradictory this may sound — an "idealistic materialism". For Hobbes did not really comprehend the "moving body" in a narrow physical sense. Rather it was conceived of by him as a neutral metaphysical-mathematical basic denominator, created by sovereign thought. "Body" is everything that is capable of mathematical analysis. Hobbes even considered the state to be a body, although an artificial one. In a genuinely nominalistic manner, by means of a social contract, the state is construed in mathematical thought out of its simplest elements, viz. the individuals and their psychical emotions of fear. It is a "Leviathan", a perfect instrument of domination, the synthesis of all natural power of its "elements", viz. the individuals. The domination-motive of the science-ideal has completely absorbed the freedom-motive. In the same way the autonomous freedom of the human will is sacrificed to the mechanistic conception of the human soul.

Hobbes' pessimism and its connection with his ascription of primacy to the science-ideal. Virtue and necessity in Macchiavelli.

Hobbes' "pessimistic" view of human nature was very closely connected with his ascription of primacy to the science-ideal in its mechanistic form. However, this did not at all affect his enthusiastic faith in the ideal of personality. He even sought to elevate the latter to the throne of unlimited dominion by means of the new science. The Faustian consciousness of power in the Humanistic ideal of personality has perhaps never found a more optimistic expression than in Hobbes' Leviathan, where he deals with the "kingdom of darkness" which is destroyed by the light of reason.

Did not Macchiavelli, the man of the Renaissance, previously display a similar tension between pessimism and optimism when he combined the ideas of virtue and necessity? The former was to advance mankind. But the latter was conceived of as a mechanical law which gave dominating power to the lower passions in human nature.

In Humanistic philosophy even "pessimism" and "optimism" turn out to be based on the polar tensions within the basic structure of its transcendental ground-Idea. They are another expression of the polar tension in the latter.
The development of the basic antinomy in the

The dualism between thought and extension in

Descartes.

Why did Descartes hypostatize the "thinking soul" and the "extended body" as "finite substances", the one incapable of being reduced to the other? And why did he elevate the sole attributes of these finite substances, viz. extension and thought, to the two basic denominators for the pre-logical and the so-called spiritual aspects of reality, respectively? Why did he, in sharp contradistinction to his British contemporary, maintain this dualism (irreconcilable to the science-ideal) between body and soul?

Had not Descartes enthusiastically welcomed Harvey's discovery of the double circulation of the blood as a new victory of the modern Idea of science over the scholastic doctrine of the substantial forms? Had he not abandoned the entire biotical aspect of experience to the domination of the mechanistic viewpoint? Whence then the requirement that science must view the "thinking substance" as if no matter existed, and the "extended substance" (with "filled space" as the basic denominator for the pre-logical aspects of reality) as if no 'spirit" existed? This can only be explained by the polarity of his cosmonomic Idea.

The background of the ideal of personality in this dualism.

The ideal of personality, rooted in the Humanistic motive of freedom, had retired in the theoretical ideal of clear and distinct thought. If — as Hobbes supposed — mathematical thought itself should be subjected to a causal determination from the side of the movements of the material body, there would be left no freedom at all in the supposed root of human personality. Nay, the mathematical science-ideal would in this way dissolve itself. There would not remain a standard of theoretical truth, if thought were subjected to the laws of mechanical movement.

In the Cartesian type of transcendental ground-Idea, too, the idea of a given cosmic order had been totally eliminated. Therefore, Descartes must choose an arbitrary boundary in order to bridle the absolutism of the science-ideal. In fact, the ideal of personality was elevated to the rank of referee. But the ideal of personality had become infected by rationalism and identified itself with mathematical thought. It now sought to save the latter from being reduced to an object of natural science.
The tension between the ideal of science and the ideal of personality gradually became acute in the basic structure of the Humanistic transcendental Idea.

But in its first manifestation its true character remained hidden in the rationalistic metaphysics of the science-ideal.

Actually Humanism had not yet arrived at critical self-reflection in philosophical thought as to the very root of the latter. The mere coordination of the "res extensa" and the "res cogitans" in DESCARTES’ metaphysics clearly bears witness to this state of affairs.

The metaphysical problem concerning the relation between soul and body acquires a new significance in the light of the transcendental Humanist ground-Idea.

The mathematical science-ideal retained the primacy even in DESCARTES’ attempt at a solution of the insoluble metaphysical problem concerning the relation of "soul and body". This problem had an important previous history in Greek and scholastic immanence-philosophy. It now acquired a peculiar character in modern Humanistic thought because of the basic structure of the transcendental ground-Idea of the latter.

DESCARTES accepted a metaphysical dualism between body and rational soul. Nevertheless, in an intrinsically contradictory manner this dualism is partly abandoned by his conception of an influxus physicus which was assumed to enter human consciousness from a small gland (parva glandula) in the brain. In this way he thought consciousness could be stimulated to sensory perceptions and affects which have a disturbing influence upon the logical function of thought.

This partial break with the dualism became for DESCARTES the way to extend the mathematical and natural scientific method to the psychological sphere. It now became possible to construe a purely naturalistic theory of the affects and passions.

However, if the foundations of the mathematical science-ideal and of the ideal of personality (which had sought refuge in clear and distinct thinking) were to be preserved, then an "influxus physicus" could not be accepted in mathematical thought itself and in the pure volition directed by it. This consideration led to an epistemology and ethics which met the demand of the ideal of science and exalted the mathematical method as the norm of metaphysical truth and the standard of the moral good.
For, according to Descartes, the imperfection and constraint of the spirit proceed from the passive influencing of the soul by the body in sensory perceptual impressions and in emotions. The perfect free personality ought to conquer the confusion of sensory perception by the pure concept formed more geometrico. And it ought to rule the emotions by means of the moral will which only acts according to clear and distinct Ideas.

The deeper ground of Descartes' partial indeterminism.

I do not at all wish to deny, that there exist external ties between Descartes and medieval philosophy. But in the final analysis Descartes' partial "indeterminism" has outgrown the problems of the Middle Ages, because it is ruled by another transcendental ground-Idea. This also holds good for the scholastic conflict concerning the primacy of the will or that of the intellect. In the Cartesian indeterministic conception of the process of the will, an absolute freedom ("liberum arbitrium indifferentiae") is ascribed to the will over against the inadequate sensorily obscured Ideas. Is this to be understood in the sense of the Scotist conception of the primacy of the will? In my opinion this would be a fundamental misunderstanding. In Descartes the only motive for this indeterministic conception is to be found in his care not to undermine the foundations of the ideal of science. However, according to him, the "will" is just like fantasy and sensory perception only a "modus" of thought. In the face of the clear and distinct concepts of the latter, the will does not possess freedom of choice.  

Error in theoretical knowledge must be explained as an apostasy of the will from the mathematical attitude of thought. Because of this apostasy the will involves us in sensorily obscured Ideas. In the field of ethics, immorality is also due to

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1 In spite of his partial indeterminism Descartes can write: "Nam si semper quid verum et bonum sit clare viderem, numquam de eo quod esset iudicandum vel eligendum deliberarem; atque ita, quamvis plane liber, numquam tamen indifferentens esse possem" (Meditations IV p. 28). [For if I always clearly saw what is true and good, I would never deliberate how I must judge or choose; and thus, although being entirely free, I could, however, never be indifferent]. If the problems in Descartes had not changed it would be very easy to see a connection here with Thomas' intellectual determinism. Just as Windelband has tried to relate Descartes' partial indeterminism to the views of Duns Scotus).
this apostasy. Here the impure will involves us in the causal processes of affects and passions. According to the rationalist ideal of science, the mathematical “cogito” can never err. The statement, “God cannot make our thought to err”, is only the religious expression of the conviction that “the mathematical method of the thinking ego is infallible.” Error and moral wickedness equally result from the constraint of the soul which arises from the influence of the body. This constraint must be conquered by self-reflection upon the absolute freedom and sovereign self-sufficiency of mathematical thought.

Yet the inner antinomy in the basic structure of the transcendental ground-Idea of Humanistic thought revealed itself both in DESCARTES’ breaking through the metaphysical dualism between thought and extension and in the self-refutation of HOBBES’ monistic naturalist metaphysics. In HOBBES, the normative foundations of truth and moral goodness were undermined by his elaboration of the mechanistic view in epistemology and ethics. Thereby both the science-ideal and the ideal of personality fell a prey to logical self-dissolution.

The antinomy in HOBBES’ naturalistic conception of thought in the light of the deterministic ideal of science. The ideae innatae of DESCARTES.

HOBBES’ sensationistic theory of knowledge is in conflict with his nominalistic mathematical concept of truth. In the last analysis it reduces thought to a movement explicable in terms of natural causality. The sole motive for this theory is to be found in the wish to satisfy the postulate of continuity implied in the mechanistic science-ideal. For that reason biotic stimulus, psychical emotion, logical thought and social process were subsumed under the basic denominator of GALILEO’s mechanics, and the modal boundaries of meaning between the different aspects were levelled for the sake of a methodical monism.

On the other hand, to save the very foundations of the science-ideal, DESCARTES accepted a metaphysical dichotomy between mathematical thought and mechanistically determined spatial nature. He must conceive of the mathematical-metaphysical

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1 This concept of truth stands or falls with the validity of the normative principium contradictionis which can never be explained in terms of natural causality.
Ideas as "ideae innatae". And he had to render account of the origin of these concepts exclusively in terms of natural causality.

However, at bottom DESCARTES' metaphysics is no less modern and nominalistic than that of HOBBES. Both refuse to subject mathematical thought to a cosmic order which the former has not itself posited. Both resolve the ideal of personality into the ideal of science, which thereby obtains a strong ethical impetus. In the case of both, the apostate religious root of personality has identified itself with mathematical thought, which in creative freedom wants to choose its own metaphysical basic denominators for temporal reality.

In DESCARTES, we can only speak of a primacy of the ideal of personality within the science-ideal itself. In this connection it is merely of secondary significance that the basic denominator

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¹ Not as innate concepts present at birth. DESCARTES made this clear in his polemic with REGIUS. The latter conceived of the ideae innatae as being present at birth, but for DESCARTES innate concepts are only an in-born capacity to think them: "Non enim unquam scripsi vel judicavi, mentem indigere ideis innatis, quae sint aliquid diversum ab ejus facultate cogitandi" (Notae, pp. 184 and 185. Ed. 1698). ["For I have never written or judged, that the mind has need of innate ideas which are something different from its faculty of thought"].

² DESCARTES' nominalistic standpoint is sharply formulated in his Principia Philosophiae I, 58 ff. He qualifies universals as mere "modus cogitandi" and general names. In the French translation, Méditations Métaphysiques (in Oeuvres Choises, Nouvelle ed., Paris, Garnier Frères, p. 97) the intended passage reads thus: "mais on doit savoir que toute idée étant un ouvrage de l'esprit, sa nature est telle qu'elle ne demande de soi aucune autre réalité formelle que celle qu'elle reçoit et emprunte de la pensée ou de l'esprit, dont elle est seulement un mode, c'est à dire une manière ou une façon de penser." ["However, because every Idea is a work of the mind, it is to be understood, that its nature is such that it does not demand any other formal reality than that which it receives and borrows from thought or mind; it is only a mode of the latter, that is to say a manner or fashion of thinking"].

In the sequel of his argument DESCARTES calls the Ideas in me a representation, an "imago" of the first and principal causes of these Ideas in God. But this does not signify a return to the realistic "Abbildtheorie". We must never forget, that in his methodical scepticism, DESCARTES primarily understands the cogito in a subjective and individual sense, and therefore has to struggle with solipsistic arguments. The Idea of God must serve in the first place to refute these arguments: "et par conséquent, je ne puis moi-même être seul dans le monde" [and consequently I cannot be alone in the world"]. Thus the bridge is built to an absolute mathematical thought which, elevated above all fallible subjectivity, creates the real RES EXTENSIVA.
which Hobbes accepts for all knowable reality is different from that which Descartes chooses for the pre-logical aspects of reality. Descartes conceives movement only as a modus of filled space. For Hobbes space is merely a subjective "phantasma reli existentis" just as time is merely "a phantasma motus"; Hobbes' basic denominator is not space but mathematically determined movement.

§ 2 - THE MATHEMATICAL-IDEALISTIC TYPE OF HUMANIST TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA

It is not our intention to write a history of modern philosophy. Consequently, we shall not discuss the Cartesian circle of Jansenist at Port Royal, which soon united Cartesian philosophy with Christian-Augustinian and neo-Platonic-Augustinian motives. Nor shall we discuss the similar attempts at synthesis undertaken by the Occasionalists, which encountered strong opposition from orthodox Cartesians.

Our purpose is only to investigate the development of the polar tensions within Humanist philosophy itself in a few of its most representative systems. Consequently, we shall examine these tensions separately and apart from the complications which arise by the intrinsically contradictory union of the Humanist with the scholastic-Christian "realist" standpoint in philosophy.

We must then first fix our attention upon the great refinement of the polar tension between the mathematical science-ideal and the ideal of personality in the philosophy of Leibniz.

The supposed Thomistic-Aristotelian traits in Leibniz' Philosophy.

It is usual to speak of a reconciliation in Leibniz between the new mathematical and mechanical view of nature and the teleological Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of substantial forms. Indeed, in many respects Leibniz himself has provided the occasion for this misunderstanding. In his copious letter to Jacob Thomasius (April 20/30 1669) he spoke of such a reconciliation and up till the last period of his life we find statements in this same strain. The letter that he sent to Remond De Montmort in the year 1715 (Philos. Schriften ed. by Erdmann, p. 701 f.) is note-worthy

1 For the most part my own quotations will be taken from this edition of Leibniz' works. The quotations from Gerhardt's edition are only supplementary and refer to papers which are not in Erdmann. Even though
in this connection. And also by continually emphasizing the Idea of the "perennis philosophia" he seems to be pointing in this direction. Did not Leibniz intend to unite in his system all the philosophical motives of his predecessors? Windelband even speaks of a "Platonic idealism" in Leibniz' doctrine of the "eternal verities". Actually one can find in Leibniz the seemingly realist idealistic thesis that the "eternal verities" exist "in quadam regione idearum", namely in God. And in his letter concerning Platonic philosophy (1797 Erdm. p. 445), he identifies this very conception with the Platonic doctrine of an intelligible world.

Nevertheless, there is absolutely no evidence of an actual realistic conception of Ideas in Leibniz' metaphysics. His transcendental ground-Idea recognizes no other 'Azol' but mathematical thought in its deified form.

As appears from his paper *De Rerum Originatione radicali* (p. 148) written in 1697, the origin of the cosmos is sought by him in a "mathesis quaedam divina sive mechanismus metaphysicus" which is incomprehensible only to the finite mind, but functions in God as creative thought.

Even in his doctor's thesis, *Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui* (defended by Leibniz in 1663 when seventeen years old) he chose the side of nominalism. In this thesis he only gave evidence of a rather superficial knowledge of scholastic philosophy. In his *Dissertatio de stilo philophico Nizolii* (1670) he called the sect of nominalists "omnia inter scholasticas profundissima" and considered it to be in absolute agreement with the modern way of philosophizing. It will subsequently

Gerhardt's edition contains much additional material, it is sometimes inaccurate.

1 Locke's nominalist standpoint is not doubted. Yet he, too, speaks of "eternal relations between the Ideas" (*Essay concerning human understanding* iv, 1 para. 9). He is only referring to ethical and mathematical Ideas which are created by thought itself. This conception of the Ideas as a creation of thought itself is incompatible with a veritable realism of Ideas.

2 Erdmann, p. 68: "secta Nominalium, omnium inter scholasticas profundissima, et hodiernae reformatae philosophandi rationi congruentissima; quae quum olim maxime floreret, nunc, apud scholasticos quidem, extingua est. Unde coniecias deceminae potius quam augmenta acuminis." A little further on, however, Leibniz observes: "Idem dicendum est de nostri temporis philosophicae Reformatoribus, cos si non plusquam Nominales tamen Nominales esse fere omnes".
become evident that Leibniz remained a nominalist in his entire further course of development. In speaking of nominalism here we mean the type, dominated by a modern Humanistic ground-Idea, which starts from the primacy of the classical Humanistic science-ideal and holds to supra-arbitrary fundamentals of the latter. This moderate nominalism — in contrast with the extreme kind of Hobbes — maintains the intrinsic (supposedly supra-temporal) necessity of the logical relations of thought. In his Dissertatio de stilo philosophico Nizolii, quoted above, Leibniz testified that nearly all thinkers of his day who aimed at a “reformation” of philosophy, were nominalists in this sense. If they were not nominalistic in this sense they were “plusquam Nominales”, that is to say they went further than William of Occam, Gregorius of Rimini, Gabriel Biel and a number of thinkers of the Augustinian order who adhered to nominalism in its moderate form. It was this moderate nominalism which maintained itself in Leibniz’ mature thought in the doctrine of “vérités éternelles”, in the sense of eternal logical possibilities which reside in the creative mathematical thought of God. We shall discuss this later.

It is no reconciliation between the modern science-ideal and a scholastic doctrine of substantial forms, which lies at the foundation of Leibniz’ philosophical endeavour. Rather his system manifests the increasing tension between the two factors of his Humanistic ground-motive. This tension puts its stamp upon his metaphysics; and the solution which he attempted to give to the fundamental antinomy in his Humanistic ground-Idea must be considered as the greatest that Humanistic thought was able to attain during the phase of the primacy of the science-ideal. This will become evident from our further analysis.

The fact that in his metaphysics Leibniz again introduced

1 Leibniz’ treatise concerning the philosophical style of Nizolius, to which we have referred, contains a veritable panegyric of the basic tenets of nominalism. In it he opposed the extreme nominalism of Hobbes according to whom truth would only be a property of language and “qui, ut verum fatear, mihi plusquam nominalis videtur.” “Non contentus enim cum Nominalibus universalia ad nomina reducere, ipsam, rerum veritatem ait in nominibus consistere.” [which, to be true, seems to me to be more than nominalist.” “For, not being satisfied by reducing, in accordance with the nominalists, the universalia to names, he contends that the very truth of things consists in the latter”].

2 Erdmann p. 69.
Aristotelian terms such as: entelechy, materia prima et secunda, potentiality and actuality, actus purus, causa efficiens and causa finalis, should not lead us astray and make us oblivious of the modern Humanistic sense which he ascribed to these terms. Let us not forget, that, by virtue of his education in the scholastic philosophy of Melanchton, he had become familiar with this terminology.

The secularization of the motive of nature and grace in Leibniz’ philosophy.

Even the scholastic contrast between the sphere of nature and the sphere of grace and the Idea of the subservience of the former to the latter reappears in Leibniz. But he ascribes to this dialectical motive a completely different meaning. Even from this it is clearly evident, that his philosophy is not grounded in a scholastic accommodation of the Greek basic motive to that of Christian thought (as in Thomas), but that it is rooted solely in the Humanistic immanence-standpoint.

In Leibniz the sphere of grace never means anything but the realm of rational creatures who are in possession of freedom by clear and distinct thought. And the sphere of nature is only the realm of creatures who lack this freedom. In the former the deity (pure reason) displays itself as the most wise monarch; in the latter, as the most perfect architect. In the first, laws are ethical, and in the second, mechanical. In this way also Auguste

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1 *Principes de la nature et de la grâce* (1714) 15 (Erdmann 717): ”C’est pourquoi tous les esprits, soit des hommes, soit des génies entrant en vertu de la raison et des vérités éternelles dans une espèce de société avec Dieu, sont des membres de la Cité de Dieu, c’est à dire, du plus parfait état, formé et gouverné par le plus grand et le meilleur des Monarques, où il n’y a point de crime sans châtiment, point de bonnes actions sans récompense proportionnée; et enfin, autant de vertu et de bonheur qu’il est possible; et cela, non pas par un dérangement de la Nature comme si ce que Dieu prépare aux âmes troublait les loix des corps; mais par l’ordre même des choses naturelles, en vertu de l’harmonie préetablie de tout temps entre les Règnes de la Nature et de la Grâce.” [*Principles of nature and grace*: “Therefore all spirits, either of men or of genii, entering by means of reason and the eternal verities into a sort of society with God, are members of the City of God, that is to say of the most perfect state, formed and governed by the greatest and the best of monarchs; where there is not ony crime without punishment, not any good deed without proportionate recompense; and finally as much virtue and happiness as is possible; and such
STINE's Christian conception of the Civitas Dei becomes denatured in LEIBNIZ' speculative metaphysics. AUGUSTINE's conception is reduced to an Idea of a constitutional kingdom in which the deity reigns by the grace of metaphysical-mathematical thought. The creative will of the deity is bound to the eternal metaphysical verities of the latter. LEIBNIZ' Humanistic secularization of the Christian religion received its most evident expression in his conception of sin as a privatio. At first sight this conception seems to be orientated to that of AUGUSTINE, but actually it is entirely Cartesian. LEIBNIZ holds sin to be a lack of (mathematical) distinctness and clearness in conception, because of which the will does not arrive at a correct judgment.

The refinement of the postulate of continuity in the science-ideal by means of LEIBNIZ' mathematical concept of function. The discovery of differential and integral calculus.

Let me now point out the intensive enrichment which the mathematical Humanistic science-ideal acquires in LEIBNIZ by the application of the mathematical concept of function which he introduced.

This concept, discovered in the differential and integral calculus, afforded an extremely fruitful and fine instrument of thought. It was assimilated into the Cartesian science-ideal. Consequently, by infinitesimally small transitions of thought it became possible to carry through the postulate of continuity of this science-ideal across the boundaries of the modal aspects. And, in addition, the crass materialism of HOBES and the crass dualism of DESCARTES could thereby be avoided.

not by means of a disarrangement of Nature, as if that which God prepares for the souls should disturb the laws of the bodies; but by the very order of natural things, by virtue of the harmony preestablished for all times between the Realms of Nature and of Grace."

1 As it appears from GERHARDI'S publication of LEIBNIZ' scientific writings, the discovery of differential and integral calculus took place during LEIBNIZ' stay in Paris in the years 1673—76. He first published the basic principles of this new calculus in 1684 and 1686 in two treatises entitled Nova methodus pro maximis et minimis and De geometria recondita et analyse indivisibilium atque infinitorum. As is generally known these publications involved him in an unpleasant controversy with NEWTON, who had designed his fluctional calculus in 1665/6. The dispute centered around the priority of both discoveries. It is established, that LEIBNIZ' discovery is entirely independent of NEWTON's.
The development of the basic antinomy in the

The principle of continuity that Leibniz indicates as the final basis of his analysis is everywhere presented by him as a regulative principle and a logical method of thought.

If we view two series of values of variable magnitudes which are joined with each other by a fixed law, then, if we approach the limits of both, the functional relation, existing among the members of the two series, may not be viewed as abolished.

From a sensory viewpoint these limiting cases, in contrast to the remaining elements, may appear as entirely heterogeneous, just as rest and motion, equality and inequality, parallelism and intersection of lines must appear as irreconcilable contradictions in the direct sensory intuition. But this cleft, existing for our sensory perception, must be bridged over by thought. When two isolated elements are contrasted with each other, it may seem, that the one is utterly dissimilar to the other. Yet, if the former can be deduced and developed from the latter in a continuous logical process, their connection gains a higher and more securely grounded character, than any sensory perceptible agreement would have made possible.

Leibniz himself formulated the main principle of this new calculus as follows: "If a continuous transition is given which ends in a final term, then it is always possible to introduce a common rational calculus (rationationen communem instituere) which likewise includes the final term".

This brilliant discovery which was made in the infinitesimal calculus was to become one of the strongest foundations for the progress of modern physics. However, at the same time it became a metaphysical instrument of the Humanistic mathematical science-ideal.

The concept of function and the principle of continuity become metaphysical, when employed in the attempt logically to bridge over the modal boundaries of meaning of the different law-spheres and to reduce in the last analysis the whole cosmic coherence in the modal diversity of meaning to a logical and mathematical one. This was attempted according to the ideal that had animated Humanistic philosophy since Descartes,

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1 Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem (The problem of knowledge) vol II, p. 158.
2 In his treatise: Cum prodiisset atque increbuisset Analysis mea infinitesimalis (Historia et Origio Calc. differ. ed. by Gerhardt, p. 40, quoted in Cassirer, loc. cit.).
The two roots of Leibniz' philosophy. The misunderstanding in Schmalenbach concerning the Calvinistic origin of Leibniz' individualism.

In Leibniz' metaphysics this attempt was undertaken in a truly masterly manner. Schmalenbach, in his extensive study of Leibniz, examined the logicistic-arithmetical basic idea which is the primary root in Leibniz' metaphysics.

However, under the influence of Max Weber, he wrongly thought, that the root of this arithmeticism itself — by means of which the science-ideal now rationalized individuality — is to be found in "Calvinistic religiosity". This was a fundamental misunderstanding both of the latter and of the true religious ground-motive of Leibniz' arithmeticism. Rather this religious motive is to be sought in the individualistic and rationalistic Humanistic ideal of personality at the inception of the "Aufklärung".

The differential-number became a monad in a metaphysical sense; it became the true noumenal unity of reality which lies at the foundation of all compound phenomena. These monads

1 Herman Schmalenbach, Leibniz (Drei Masken-Verlag, München, 1921). In the meanwhile one should bear in mind that "arithmeticism" is here used in the sense of the concept of function of differential calculus. Leibniz comprehended the latter as a universal method of analysis. He applied it with equal facility to number, space and motion, and to the field of biology and psychology.

In his work "Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis" (Meditations on knowledge, truth and ideas), Leibniz still defended the conception that number, as a sum of static units, is the metaphysical basic idea of the cosmos and arithmetic is a sort of "statica of the universum". Later on he abandoned this view and held that a discrete element is only a function of the mathematical principle of progression, and number itself is only the simplest instance of the general relation of thought. Thus Leibniz is actually a logicist in his mathematical conception.

It is, however, incorrect to suppose that he thereby abandoned in his metaphysics the arithmetical standpoint as such. In his book Leibniz' System in seinen wissensch. Grundlagen (1902) and in the second vol. of his Erkenntnisproblem, Cassirer erroneously arrives at this conclusion on the basis of his own epistemological conception of the calculus of infinity. Leibniz' monadology actually arose, as Schmalenbach has shown in detail, in conscious opposition to metaphysical space-universalisnism, just as much as to materialistic atomism. It rests upon the hypostatization of the differential-number.
The development of the basic antinomy in the

fill the noumenal cosmos in gapless density. They were thought of as animate beings which in their representations reflect, each in its proper way, the universe, but which, with respect to each other, sustain an absolutely closed, self-sufficient existence. Just as such they come to be the expression of the Humanistic ideal of personality in its individualistic and rationalist conception.

In this way the noumenal metaphysical cosmos was resolved into an infinite multitude of “windowless” monads, spaceless, animated points of force. The lex continui which originates out of mathematical thought maintains a continuous coherence of meaning between them and between the different modal aspects of their inner world. In Leibniz’ system this result was attained without it being necessary to subsume the entire cosmos under a mechanistic basic denominator.

Bruno’s aesthetically tinted individualism in his conception of the monad as a microcosmos was transformed by Leibniz into a mathematical one. The Idea of microcosmos, the Idea of the “omnia ubique” in the Humanistic ideal of personality as it was conceived during the Renaissance, was rationalised. The mathematical science-ideal reduced the individual with its qualitative individuality to a function of the principle of progression and thereby made the individual accessible to rational calculation. In this way, by the lex continui, the self-sufficient individuality of the monads¹, as an expression of the ideal of personality, was reconciled to the ideal of science.

Leibniz’ concept of force and the motive of activity in the ideal of personality.

The individual self-sufficiency of personality and the motive of infinite activity had from the very beginning been predominant in the Humanistic ideal of personality as it was conceived of during the Renaissance. And now both of these moments could be expressed in the metaphysics of the science-ideal. In the Cartesian system the tendency of activity in the ideal of

¹ La Monadologie (1714): “On pouvoit donner le nom d’Entéléchies à toutes les substances simples ou Monades créées, car elles ont en elles une certaine perfection (ἐνέργεια τὸ ἐντέλες), il y une suffisance (αὐτάρκεια), qui les rend sources de leur actions internes...” (Erdmann, 706). [The name of Entelechies might be given to all simple substances or created Monads, for they have a certain perfection in themselves, a kind of self-sufficiency (autarky) which enables them to be the sources of their own internal activity...].
personality could not, as in BRUNO, penetrate the Idea of the cosmos itself. The “res extensiva” as a natural substance is, in DESCARTES, a part of absolutized static space of which motion is only a modus.

In contrast with this, LEIBNIZ hypostatized the concept of force, introduced by NEWTON in physics, and made it into the essence of the monad-substance, which as a self-sufficient microcosmos does not permit any outside influence. In LEIBNIZ this metaphysical concept of force appears in the outward Aristotelian form of “entelechy” and “causa-finalis”, but is not actually to be interpreted in an Aristotelian sense. Rather it is penetrated by the motive of activity in the Humanistic ideal of personality. In this modern sense it is opposed to Cartesian metaphysics. Continuous static space is no longer considered to be the essence of nature, but instead its essence is sought in the working force.

Space and time are in LEIBNIZ only ideal arrangements of phenomena. The first is an arrangement or relation of co-existence; the second is an arrangement or relation of succession. Space is, as LEIBNIZ wrote in his fourth letter to CLARKE: “Cet ordre qui fait que les corps sont situables, et par lequel ils ont une situation entre eux en existant ensemble”.

Regulated by the laws of physical motion, mechanical matter (LEIBNIZ called it “materia secunda”) is only the mode of appearance of the metaphysical force which belongs to the essence of the monad, “un phénomène, mais bien fondé, résultant des Monades”.

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1 In his Système Nouv. de la Nature (1695) LEIBNIZ observed: “Il fallut donc rappeller et comme réhabiliter les formes substantielles, si decriées aujourd’hui; mais d’une manière qui les rendit intelligibles, et qui sépara l’usage qu’on en doit faire de l’abus qu’on en a fait” (ERDMANN, pag. 124). [“It was thus necessary to recall and as it were to rehabilitate the substantial forms which have been so much reviled nowadays; but in a manner which rendered them intelligible and separated the use which is to be made of them from the abuse which has been made of the same”].

2 ERDMANN, p. 758. [“This order which makes it possible for bodies to be localized and by which in their coexistence they have a situation in relation to one another”].

3 It is again evident that LEIBNIZ uses the scholastic-Aristotelian terms materia prima et secunda in a totally modified sense. Materia prima has become the substantial force of the monads which is the metaphysical cause of inert matter in the world of appearance: the materia secunda. Compare LEIBNIZ’ letter to REMOND DE MONTFORT (ERDMANN, p. 124): “Quant à l’inertie de la matière, comme la matière elle même n’est autre
In this fashion the dynamical motive of the ideal of personality penetrated infinite nature itself. There is no trace of a real revival of the Aristotelian concept of entelechy in LEIBNIZ. The Idea of the autarchy, of the self-sufficiency of the monad is entirely in conflict with Aristotelian metaphysics, especially with the Aristotelian conception of the relation between soul and body. Moreover, LEIBNIZ' concept of force has essentially nothing to do with the Aristotelian doctrine of entelechies which is dominated by the Greek ground-motive of form and matter, and to which the titanic *dunamis* of the Humanistic ideal of personality and science is wholly foreign.

Meanwhile, in LEIBNIZ' metaphysics the ideal of personality reached a position of extremely intensive tension with the mathematical science-ideal. This tension was due to the fact that he tried to express the basic tendencies of the former in a metaphysics derived from the latter. LEIBNIZ did not for a moment wish to derogate from the primacy of the science-ideal. On the contrary, the Faustian motive of dominating nature by mathematical thought ruled him perhaps even more than it had his rationalistic predecessors.

Primacy of the mathematical science-ideal in LEIBNIZ' transcendental ground-Idea.

In LEIBNIZ' transcendental ground-Idea, the construction of the relation between totality and modal diversity in the coherence of meaning is completely left to the mathematical science-ideal. This is evident in the first place from the theoretical common denominator under which he subsumes all modal aspects of experience, namely, the representation (perception) which he conceives as “représentation du composé, ou de ce qui est dehors, dans le simple” [representation of the composite or what is outward, in the simple substance].

chose qu'un phénomène, mais bien fondé, résultant des Monades: il n'en est de même de l'inertie, qui est une propriété de ce phénomène.” [“Just like matter itself is nothing but a phenomenon, but a well-founded one, resulting from the Monads, the same holds good in respect to the inertness of matter, which is a property of this phenomenon”].

1 ERDMANN, p. 714. Also compare *Monadologie*, 14 (ERDMANN, p. 706): “L'état passager qui enveloppe et représente une multitude dans l'unité ou dans la substance simple, n'est autre chose que ce qu'on appelle la perception qu'on doit distinguer de l'apperception ou de la conscience.” [The transitory state which envelopes and represents a multitude in a
In Leibniz’ metaphysics, all monads, also the material ones, have become perceiving points of force, which only in their representations reflect the coherence of the cosmos in its modal diversity of aspects. And once this rationalistic basic denominator had been established for the modal diversity of meaning, the mathematical lex continui of the science-ideal had gained complete control. For in Leibniz’ metaphysical conception of the world-order, all monads were arranged in a mathematically conceived progression. The monads do not differ because of a fundamental specific nature. The realistic Aristotelian conception of species is totally abandoned in Leibniz’ metaphysics. In fact, the qualitative difference between the monads has been quantified: it consists only in the degree of clarity of their perceptions in which the cosmos reflects itself and in the degree of the tendency to pass from one perception to the other: “And consequently a Monad in itself, and in the moment, could not be distinguished from another except by the properties and internal actions which can be nothing but these perceptions (that is to say, the representations of the composite, or of what is outward, in the simple) and its appetitions (that is to say, its tendencies to pass from one perception to the other) which are the principles of change.”

A continuous ascending progression breaks through the disunity or in the simple substance, is nothing but what is called the perception which is to be distinguished from the apperception or the consciousness. Every monad is thus a unity in the multiplicity of its perceptions: “Car la simplicité de la substance n’empêche point la multiplicité des modifications, qui se doivent trouver ensemble dans cette même substance simple.” Princ. de la Nat. et de la Grâce. [For the simplicity of the substance does not prevent the multiplicity of the modifications which must be found together in this same simple substance].

1 This transcendental Idea of world-order outwardly reminds us of Aristotle’s two-fold lex naturalis. It is, however in essence a mathematical construction. It arranges both the material and rational monads in a continuous progression, after the pattern of the calculus of infinity. And, proceeding from the lower to the higher, it places the deity, the central monad, at the apex.

2 Erdmann, p. 714: “Et par conséquent une Monade en elle même, et dans le moment, ne sauroit être discernée d’une autre que par les qualités et actions internes, lesquelles ne peuvent être autre chose que ces perceptions (c'est à dire, les représentations du composé, ou de ce qui est dehors, dans le simple) et de ses appétitions (c'est à dire, ses tendances d'une perception à l'autre), qui sont les principes du changement.”
The development of the basic antinomy in the continuity of the monads by passing from the unconscious perceptions (the so-called "petites perceptions") of the material monads, via the conscious, but confused representations of the sensory soul-monads, to the clear and distinct apperceptions of the limited spiritual monads. And from thence it passes to the infinite creative mathematical thought of the deity, which is pure thought without sensory perceptions.

In this mathematical world-order man has his place between the two poles: matter and deity. In man, intelligence (mathematical thought) and sensation, activity and passivity, spontaneity, and receptivity occur together. Therefore, the human mind is limited in its thought, a limitation which is lacking in the deity, as "actus purus".

LEIBNIZ' Humanistic theism.

Ostensibly, an Aristotelian theism is here adhered to; however, in essence, the deity has become identical with the final hypostasis of the mathematical science-ideal. Theism passes — nearly imperceptibly — into a logical-mathematical pantheism: "Harmonia universalis, id est Deus."

The infinite analysis of the entire cosmos is accomplished in God's thought alone; on this ground the world-order is in essence qualified as a purely mathematical coherence of meaning. This is true even though human thought, on account of its limitedness (that is, its metaphysical imperfection), cannot gain insight into the absolute mathematical necessity of a seemingly contingent event within the world of phenomena.

Logicization of the dynamical tendency in the ideal of personality.

Even though it more or less continued to be an irrationalistic residue in LEIBNIZ' system, the metaphysical concept of force, as an expression of the activity-motive in the ideal of personality, was rationalized as much as possible. The individualistic ideal of personality of the early "Enlightenment" did not permit any violation of the self-sufficiency of the individuum. And for the sake of the mathematical science-ideal, the entire activity of all the monads was subsumed under the basic denominator of

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1 The "unconscious perception" is thus conceived of as an infinitesimal degree of consciousness.
representation (Vorstellung). Consequently, the metaphysical concept of force had to be accommodated to the latter: the autarchical activity of the monad was interpreted in the sense of a tendency (appétition) to pass from the one representation to the other. This tendency, in scholastic formulation conceived of as a "causa finalis", brings in motion, in every monad alike, the system of representations in which the universe is reflected.

This logicization of the concept of force was not a "deus ex machina" in LEIBNIZ' monadology.

As we have seen, the monad is primarily the hypostatized differential in the infinitesimal calculus. Now the differential

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1 This concept of force which arose from the ideal of personality, was a stumbling block for the neo-Kantians of the Marburg school because of its irrationalist predisposition. They deemed it to be in conflict with the postulate of continuity of pure thought. See COHEN, Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, 3e Aufl., p. 263/4.

2 Monadologie 15: "L'action du principe interne, qui fait le changement, ou le passage d'une perception, à une autre, peut être appelé Appétition; il est vrai, que l'appétit ne saurait toujours parvenir entièrement à toute la perception, où il tend, mais il en obtient toujours quelque chose, et parvient à des perceptions nouvelles." ["The activity of the internal principle which effects the change or the passing of a perception into another, may be called Appétition; it is true, that the appetite cannot always entirely reach the perception to which it tends, but it always attains something of the same, and arrives at new perceptions."]

Ib. 79: "Les âmes agissent selon les lois des causes finales par appétitions, fins et moyens." ["The souls act according to the laws of the final causes by appetitions, aims and means"].

3 LEIBNIZ called them metaphysical points, and according to him mathematical points are their "point de vue", which enables them to express the universe. See his Syst. Nouv. 11 (ERDM. p. 126): "Il n'y a que les atomes de substance, c'est à dire, les unités réelles, et absolument destituées de parties, qui soient les sources des actions, et les premiers principes absolus de la composition des choses, et comme les derniers éléments de l'analyse des substances. On les pourrait appeler, points métaphysiques: ils ont quelque chose de vital, et une espèce de perception, et les points mathématiques sont leur point de vue, pour exprimer l'Univers... Ainsi les points physiques ne sont indivisibles qu'en apparence; les points mathématiques sont exacts, mais ce ne sont que des modalités: il n'y a que les points métaphysiques ou de substance... qui soient exacts et réels; et sans eux il n'y auront rien de réel, puisque sans les véritables unités il n'y auront point de multitude." ["There are no other atoms but the substantial ones, that is to say the real units which absolutely lack parts; they are the very sources of the actions, and the first absolute principles of the composition of things, and the last elements of the analysis of the substances.
The development of the basic antinomy in the number, as we shall explain in our analysis of its modal meaning in the following volume, anticipates the modal meaning of motion. Meanwhile, the original meaning of motion is logicized by Leibniz; it is transformed into an Idea of mathematical thought-movement and is then laid as \( \varepsilon \pi \delta \varepsilon \sigma \iota \zeta \) at the foundation of natural science. This also paved the way for the logicizing of the concept of force which in Leibniz’ monadology is the necessary prerequisite for the movement of thought and of the lower perceptions.

Insofar as it must guarantee the closed autarchy of the monadic individuals, “force”, as a tendency, only continued to be the expression of Leibniz’ individualistic personality-ideal, because it never becomes active through functional causes outside the monads.

Leibniz’ intellectual determinism and his doctrine of innate Ideas in the light of the lex continui.

Descartes had utilized a partial indeterminism to explain both the possibility of ethical faults and error in thought. This is no longer necessary in Leibniz’ system. In fact it is even impossible here.

For this partial indeterminism implied the acceptance of an “influxus physicus”. As we have seen the latter was intrinsically contradictory in Descartes’ system; nevertheless, it was necessary to explain the origin of sensorily confused perceptions. The will possesses a liberum arbitrium indifferentiae with respect to these confused perceptions. If one allows himself to be influenced by them, one turns away from the path of clear and distinct thought, and error and “sin”, respectively, arise in the theoretical and practical realm.

In Leibniz’ metaphysics, on the contrary, the Idea of the

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They might be called metaphysical points: they have a kind of vitality and a kind of perception, and the mathematical points are their view-point in order to express the Universe... Consequently, the physical points are indivisible only in appearance; the mathematical points are exact but they are nothing but modalities; only the metaphysical or substantial points... are both exact and real; and without them there would be nothing real, because without the veritable units, there would be no multitude at all.”

1 Here is meant motion in its original exact pre-physical sense, as it was viewed by Galileo and is made the “Gegenstand” of an apriori mathematical science, viz. the phoronomy (Kant).

2 See Gerhardt’s edition V, 437, 10.
absolute windowlessness, the absolute inner self-sufficiency of
the monads, excludes any "influxus physicus". Even the sensory
perceptions in the human soul-monad are produced in absolute
autarchy, entirely from the inside.1

On the other hand, the sharp antithesis between sensibility and
logical thought had disappeared. Consequently, error of thought
and "sin" acquire a less accentuated significance than they had
in Descartes.

The proclamation of a "primacy of the will", even if only
partial, has become superfluous because of the lex continui.
The irrational gap between sensory perception and the clear
concept is bridged over by the logical mathematical principle of
continuity. Both sin and error of thought are in Leibniz only
the consequence of the metaphysical imperfection of the finite
rational monads, through which clear mathematical thought
is again and again obscured by sensory "perceptions". They are
only gradual conditions, since from the sensory perceptions the
clear mathematical concept can develop itself in a continuous
transition.

In this way even Descartes' doctrine of innate ideas has been
relativized by the lex continui. In a noteworthy manner the latter
bridged over the antithesis between sensationalistic and rational-
listic trends in epistemology. In his work, Nouveaux Essais sur
l'Entendement, published posthumously in 1765, Leibniz ex-
plained the "idées innées" as dormant, virtual representations
which are not yet "connues" [of which we are not yet aware].
Potentially present in sensory perceptions, they gradually deve-
lop themselves into clear and distinct concepts.

Since all monads in their perceptions equally represent the

1 Monadologie 51 (ERDMANN, p. 709): "Mais dans les substances simples
c'est qu'une influence idéale d'une Monade sur l'autre, qui ne peut
avoir son effet que par l'intervention de Dieu, en tant que dans les idées
de Dieu une Monade demande avec raison, que Dieu en réglant les autres
dès le commencement des choses, ait regard à elle. Car puisqu'une
Monade créée ne sauroit avoir une influence physique sur l'intérieur de
l'autre, ce n'est que par ce moyen, que l'une peut avoir de la dépendance
de l'autre." [But in the simple substances it is only an ideal influence
of a Monad over the other, an influence which cannot have its effect
but by the intervention of God; namely, in so far as in the Ideas of God
a Monad demands in good reason that, in arranging the others since the
beginning, God has regard to it. For, because a created Monad cannot
have a physical influence over the inner life of the other, it is only in
this way that one can be dependent on the other].
entire cosmos, in every moment the result of the movement of representations must be the same in each of them: each monad only lives in itself. As we saw, it has no windows by which it can experience anything of the other monads; all of them experience the same things: their representations are in exact correspondence with each other by means of a pre-established harmony, and in this way it appears as though they continually influence each other.

Here Leibniz' cosmonomic Idea clearly discloses itself in the Idea of Harmonia Praestabilita. In keeping with the mathematical science-ideal the latter implies the most stringent determinism in the process of development of the representations. Not the least margin is allowed in this process. For, if a single monad could arbitrarily deviate from the universally identical course of representations, the harmony in the whole cosmos would be disturbed. Every momentary condition of a monad is a natural consequence of its preceding condition: "the present is pregnant with the future". Leibniz' standpoint in the problem of freedom of the will — the stumbling block between the science-ideal and the ideal of personality in Humanistic philosophy — is thereby implicitly determined.

This German thinker rejected the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae that Descartes maintained with respect to the sensory representations. He called this conception of the freedom of the will an indifferentia aequilibrii by which, in the last analysis, action would be able to occur without any ground.

In his short essay De Libertate, first published by Erdmann,

\[ \text{2 Monadologie 22 (Erdmann, p. 706), Compare also the well-known place in the Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce: "Car tout est réglé dans les choses une fois pour toutes avec autant d'ordre et de correspondance qu'il est possible; la suprême Sagesse et Bonté ne pouvant agir qu'avec une parfaite harmonie. Le présent est gros de l'avenir: le futur se pourrait lire dans le passé; l'éloigné est exprimé dans le prochain. On pourrait connaître la beauté de l'Univers dans chaque âme, si l'on pouvait déplier tous ses replis, qui ne se développent sensiblement qu'avec le temps." ['For everything is regulated in the things once for all with as much order and correspondence as possible: the highest Wisdom and Goodness being unable to act without a perfect harmony. The present is pregnant with the future: the future would permit itself to be read in the past; the distant is expressed in the proximate. One would be able to know the beauty of the Universe in every soul, if one could lay bare all its secrets which do not develop themselves perceptively but in course of time'].} \]
LEIBNIZ asserted, that all actions of substances are determined: "Nihil fit sine ratione".\footnote{ERDMANN, p. 669: "Omnes tamen actiones sunt determinatae et nunquam indifferentes, quia semper datur ratio inclinans quidem nondum necessitans, ut sic potius, quam alter fiat. Nihil fit sine ratione. Libertas indifferentiae est impossibilis." ["All actions, however, are determined and never indifferent, because there is always given some directing, although not compelling reason, that it happens rather in this way than otherwise. Nothing happens without reason. A libertas indifferentiae is impossible."]}

The Idea of the harmonia praestabilita implies the acceptance of a "praedispositio rerum ex causis aut causarum series".\footnote{Compare Causa Dei asserta per justitiam eius (ERDMANN, p. 660): "Neque etiam praedispositio rerum aut causarum series nocet libertati." [For also the predestination of things or the series of causes does not harm freedom].} The spiritual monad is a sort of automaton spirituale: everything in man is predetermined.\footnote{Theodicée 1, 52 (ERDMANN, p. 517).} But, according to LEIBNIZ, this stringent determinedness of the will is in no way in conflict with the freedom of the rational personality. It may not be understood in the sense of mechanical coercion. The determining causes are only "inclinantes, non necessitantes". Insofar as the principle of action lies in the one who acts, the action is voluntary. Naturally, for the monad is autarchical; it has no windows. The freedom of man is greater in proportion to the degree in which he acts in accord with reason; he becomes a slave when he allows his actions to be determined by blind emotions and passions.

The ideal of personality was still conceived of individualistically. It required that the monads be thought of as autarchical and active individuals. However, in the philosophic basic Idea of "harmonia praestabilita" the individuality of the monads is brought under the absolute domination of the mathematical science-ideal. This subjugation was accomplished by means of the lex continui, the principle of universal order and coherence in the cosmos (principium quoddam generale).

The lex continui, as well as the harmonia praestabilita in which it is encompassed, owe their origin to the deity. The deity, in turn, is, as we observed, only the hypostasis of pure creative mathematical thought, which is no longer troubled by sensory representations. Volition is only a modus of thought. The deity
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is at the outset identified with world-harmony. In Leibniz' the Spinozistic "Deus sive natura" becomes the "Harmonia universalis, id est Deus". The kernel of this Idea of world-harmony is actually the functionalistic mathematical lex continui.

§ 3 - THE MODERATE NOMINALISM IN LEIBNIZ' CONCEPTION OF IDEAS. THE IDEA AS SYMBOL OF RELATIONS AND AS THE CONCEPT OF LAW OF THE RATIONALISTIC IDEAL OF SCIENCE

The veritable realistic metaphysics had always viewed the well-founded generic and specific concepts of thought as copies ("Abbilder") of the eternal eidé or as the abstracted substantial forms of reality, respectively.

Such a realistic view was from the very beginning in conflict with the creation-motive in the mathematical science-ideal of Humanism. As Cassirer rightly has shown, there is, indeed, no trace of a realistic form-theory in Leibniz. In true nominalistic fashion, in him, the ideas become symbols of reality; they only represent the proportions, the relations which exist between the individual elements of reality. Very characteristic of this conception is Leibniz' treatise Quid sit Idea, in which he employs almost word for word Occam's distinction between conventional voces and the universal symbols which are grounded in nature. Leibniz writes: "it further appears that some expressions possess a "fundamentum in natura", while the others, e.g. the words of language or arbitrary signs, at least partially rest upon an arbitrary convention. Those which are grounded in nature require a certain sort of similitude as that which exists between a cer-

2 Erkenntnisproblem 11, 166 ff. See also p. 189 where Cassirer gives expression to the inner sympathy of neo-Kantianism (of the Marburg school) with Leibniz' ideal of science. "Die überlieferte Metaphysik der "substantiellen Formen" erfährt indessen hier nur eine scheinbare Erneuerung... Die oberflächliche Ansicht dass die "Formen" der Dinge es sind, die in den Geist eindringen und in ihm die Erkenntnis der Objekte erzeugen, wird von Leibniz in allen Phasen seines Denkens gleich zurückhaltlos verworfen." ["Meanwhile, the traditional Metaphysics of "substantial Forms" is here only apparently revived... In all phases of his thought Leibniz rejected with equal consistency the superficial view, that it would be the "forms" of things which penetrate into mind and produce in the latter the knowledge of the objects."]
tain region and its geographical map. At least they require a connection of the kind which exists between a circle and its perspective reflection in an ellipse. For every point of the ellipse there is a point of the circle which corresponds to it in accordance with a fixed specific law. The fact that there is an Idea of things in us, consequently only means, that God (who in like manner is the origin of spirit and of things) has given such power of thought to the human mind, that the latter can produce results from its own activity which completely agree with the actual results in things"\(^1\). So the functional law of motion also becomes an Idea which does not proceed from reality, but which is laid by reason at the foundation of the experience of reality: "That in nature everything occurs in a mechanical manner is a principle, that one can guarantee by pure thought only and never by experience"\(^2\).

The apparent fight against nominalism in the third book of LEIBNIZ' "Nouveaux Essais".

Only in the light of this whole course of thought, can we understand the exact meaning of LEIBNIZ' apparent fight against nominalism\(^3\) in the third book of his Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain. I must acknowledge, that the reading of this book caused me to waver in my opinion that LEIBNIZ' standpoint can be qualified as nominalistic. And when I now explain my hesitation in retrospect, I can only find the ground for it in LEIBNIZ' remarkable art of clothing his modern Humanistic conception in the guise of the traditional terminology of realistic scholasticism. In the vivid dialogue between PHILALETHE and THEOPHILE, the former defends the philosophy of LOCKE and the latter that of LEIBNIZ. The chief concern of the dialogue is, in the final analysis, only to maintain the eternal truths (in LEIBNIZ' logicistic mathematical sense of "logical possibilities") in opposition to an extreme nominalism that holds all universal Ideas to be arbitrary creations of language. And as we shall see later on, this last conception was in no sense the view of LOCKE, but rather that of HOBBES.

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\(^1\) Gerh. VII, 263 sqq.
\(^2\) Gerh. V, 437, 10.
\(^3\) In this sense the third book of LEIBNIZ' Nouveaux essais was understood in the last but one ed. of ÜBERWEG's Hist. of Phil. III (revised edition of Frischesischen-Köhler and Moog, p. 332).
The development of the basic antinomy in the

Let me call attention to the fact, that in the beginning of the second book, where the question is raised concerning the character of Ideas in general, the spokesman for Leibniz' conception expressly establishes the fact, that the Idea as an object of thought is only an object that is immanent to thought and, as such, is an expression of the character or the qualities of things. This standpoint is continually maintained in the third book, which treats the entire controversy concerning the reality of universals in a most remarkable manner, under the subject of language or words. In the treatment of the "names of substances" the supporter of Leibniz' own standpoint observes, that formerly there were two axioms adhered to by philosophers, that of the realists and that of the nominalists. "Both", says Théophile, "are good, provided that one understands them correctly.

The simple Ideas and those of substance (according to the affirmations of Leibniz' mouthpiece in the treatment of the "names of the simple Ideas") are not grounded in any real existence but only in the possibility of thought: "il n'y aurait donc rien qui obliges ces Idées d'etre fondées dans quelque existence réelle". Even our most clear and distinct concepts do not have any model in nature of which they could be the copy. Even the universalia do not have such a model in natural reality.

Finally, the essentiae, the general essential characteristics of things, are identified by Leibniz with the logical possibilities or "eternal truths" in creative mathematical thought. We shall subsequently examine this point in detail.

1 Erdmann, 222: "Ph. Après avoir examiné, si les Idées sont innées, considérons leur nature et leurs différences. N'est il pas vrai, que l'Idée est l'objet de la pensée? Ph. Je l'avoue, pourvu que vous ajoutez, que c'est un objet immédiat interne, et que cet objet est une expression de la nature ou des qualités des choses." [Ph. "After having examined whether the Ideas are innate, let us consider their nature and their differences. Is it not true, that the Idea is the object of thought?"

Th. I admit it, provided that you add that it is an immediate internal object, and that this object is an expression of the properties of things."]

2 Erdmann, p. 320.

3 Erdmann, p. 307. ["Consequently, there could be nothing which obliges these Ideas to be founded in some real existence."]

4 Ibid., p. 320.

5 Ibid.: "les Essences sont perpétuelles, parce qu'il ne s'y agit que du
On this ground alone the advocate of Leibniz' philosophy opposed the qualification of these essentialia generalia as arbitrary symbols. "The essentiae" are not imaginary, their reality is that of thought itself.

The distinction between nominal and real definitions must also be considered in this connection. By means of it Leibniz opposed extreme nominalism.

According to this nominalistic conception, definitions only exist in an arbitrary union of symbols which function in thought as "counters".

Leibniz observes, that this view only comprehends nominal definitions. A real definition must grasp the essence of the thing, which essence is identical with the logical possibility of the thing defined. The real definition must cause us to know this possibility a priori by discovering the logical principle of the origin of the thing in question.

In other words, Leibniz' whole fight against nominalism only touched the extreme wing of it, which he had already rejected in 1670. It did not strike at the nominalist basic tenet, that Ideas (conceived of as essential structural principles of reality) do not possess any real existence outside of thought.

Leibniz' metaphysics only recognized real monads. The Ideas belong to the representations of the latter. And eternal truths
are only the virtually innate logical and mathematical relations which are in these representations, and which come to our clear consciousness in mathematical and metaphysical thought.

These "ideal eternal truths" do not lie at the foundation of empirical reality as Platonic Ideas, but only as necessary principles of origin inherent in mathematical thought itself. They are nothing but the foundations of the Humanistic science-ideal in its mathematical-logical conception. It is this that Leibniz seeks to defend against the naturalistic nominalism of Hobbes.

\[1\] Leibniz' nominalistic standpoint in his treatise concerning the philosophical style of Nizolius (1670).

This is not my own arbitrary hypothesis, rather it is explicitly confirmed by Leibniz himself in his treatise *De Stilo Philosophico Nizolii*. We have seen, that in this work he took with great emphasis the side of moderate nominalism, as the latter was defended in the Occamistic school. And at the same time he fought against Nizolius' conception of the universalia.

Marius Nizolius (1489—1576) a nominalistic thinker of an extremely sensationalistic orientation, had conceived of the universalia as mere collectives, in which all individual things which are symbolically implied in them, are simultaneously comprehended.

A concept is only an abbreviated summation of many sensorily perceived individuals which are signified by a common name. This conception of universalia does not do justice to the Humanistic science-ideal with its creation-motive: "Non vero error hic Nizolii levis est", writes Leibniz, "habet enim magnum aliquid in recessu. Nam si universalia nihil aliud sunt quam singularium collectiones, sequetur, scientiam nullam haberi per demonstrationem (quod et infra colligit Nizolius) sed collectionem singularium, seu inductionem. Sed ea ratione prorsus evertantur scientiae et sceptici vicere".

\[2\] Erdmann, p. 70. ["This error of Nizolius is not really unimportant, for it conceals a great consequence. For if the universals are nothing but..."]
The conception of "universalia" which Leibniz here opposes to Nizolius is in its very nature not realistic. It conceives of the universal concept as a *totum distributivum*, as an apriori totality comprehended in the definition, which is independent of the sensory perception of a particular instance. According to Leibniz, the real significance of the universal is to be sought *in the universal validity of the judgment*. This universal validity is not and cannot be founded in any great quantity of sensory perceptions of particular instances, but only and exclusively *"in the universal Idea or definition of terms."*

Even at this stage, this "universal idea" is conceived of in the sense of a "real definition" in which we indicate the apriori possibility of the genetic construction or the method of "logical creation". A real definition is grounded in the logical postulate of the universal conformity of all events to laws. **It is the rationalist Humanistic concept of the law, as it is implied in the mathematical science-ideal that is defended here by Leibniz against extreme nominalism. It is this concept of the law that he defended against Nizolius as well as against Thomas Hobbes.** The latter, according to Leibniz, had even begun to doubt the theorem of Pythagoras "that has been deemed worthy of the sacrifice of a hecatomb".*

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1 Erdmann, p. 71. This must be a misunderstanding in Leibniz. Hobbes considered geometry as an apriori science, because the conditions of its constructions depend on our will. He did not draw the destructive consequences from his extreme nominalism with respect to mathematics.
The development of the basic antinomy in the tive conception by elaborating his discovery of the analysis of the infinite. His intention was to create a logical instrument which should make it possible to construct all of knowledge from a relatively small number of elements. The "Ars Combinatoria" would then consist in determining the number of possible combinations of simple logical elements. It would thus contain the schema required in order to answer all the questions that could arise with respect to reality.

In the primitive form in which Leibniz had developed this idea in his youth, it was still entirely orientated to arithmetic as the theory of discrete quantity. Insofar as it is not a prime, every number allows itself to be comprehended as a product of prime numbers. For each number it is possible, on the basis of this analysis, to establish two numbers, with or without a common divisor. In the same fashion, complex concepts must first be arranged in specific basic classes, before the question regarding their mutual possibility of combination will allow itself to be answered in a systematic way.

A true judgment should consequently pre-suppose that subject and predicate possess a common logical factor, or that the predicate is entirely implied in the concept of the subject.

The discovery of the infinitesimal analysis, however, led Leibniz to a fundamental modification of this criterion of truth. In a discourse concerning the distinction of necessary and contingent truths, he wrote, that it was geometrical knowledge and the infinitesimal analysis that first illuminated his mind and taught him to see, that concepts also can be subjected to an infinitesimal analysis. The truth of a judgment cannot depend upon the fact, that the predicate is entirely implied in the concept of the subject, but is dependent upon the question, whether we can discover a general rule for the movement of thought, from which we can conclude with certainty, that the distinction between subject and predicate in the prolonged analysis must approach zero. Thus the lex continui (the principle of continuity discovered in the infinitesimal calculus) now penetrated the Idea of the mathesis universalis, in which Idea the mathematical science-ideal finds its pregnant expression.

The factual contingent phenomena must in the prolonged

1 Opuscula, p. 18.
2 Generales Inquisitiones de Analyse Notionum et Veritatum, 1686, Opusc., p. 374, quoted by Cassirer II, 181.
analysis approach infinitesimally close to "eternal truths" of mathematical thought. Once again, as Cassirer has brought to light, the central significance of Leibniz' view of universal Ideas, as symbols of real relations, discloses itself in this context. Empirical reality cannot be at once grasped by mathematical thought. It can only be approached by it in continually more perfect symbols, in the process of a continuous methodical transition from the simplest to the more complicated phases of empirical reality: "It is not an accident," observes Cassirer, "which urges us to replace the conceptual relations by relations of "symbols"; for in essence the concepts themselves are nothing but more or less perfect symbols by virtue of which we try to gain insight into the structure of the universe".

This is in accordance with Leibniz' conception, provided one does not interpret the symbolic function of Ideas in the extreme nominalistic sense. In Leibniz the Ideas have their foundation in a mathematical order of thought, which in its hypostatization as the thought of the intellectus archetypus is the sphere of the "vérités éternelles".

§ 4 - THE MODAL ASPECTS OF REALITY AS MODI OF MATHEMATICAL THOUGHT

Leibniz' transcendental ground-Idea is not conceived of in an objective idealist sense as in the realist metaphysics of Plato, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. It bears the (no longer medie- val) nominalistic stamp of subjective idealism that seeks its Archimedean point in the "cogito". Here we do not find a realism of ideas but an hypostatizing of individuals. The monads are not merely hypostases of the differential number and nothing more. As we have seen, they are thought of as animate, perceiving points of force, as subjective mirrors of the universe. Creative mathematical thought is deified in the "central monad". Consequently, when in his monadology, Leibniz ascribes reality

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2 Once again Leibniz combated this extreme nominalistic conception in his early work Dialogus de connexione inter res et verba, et veritatis realitate (1677), Erdmann, p. 76ff.
The development of the basic antinomy in the
to the "essentiae" or "possibilitates" or "eternal truths" in the
divine thought, even this is not to be understood in a realistic
sense. For we must remember again and again, that in LEIBNIZ
divine thought is nothing else but creative thought in the sense
of the mathematical science-ideal. It is creative thought in which
mathematical possibility and reality coincide. Here the radical
difference between the Leibnizian and the Platonic conception
of eternal Ideas should be obvious to everyone. The creation-
motive in the absoluted mathematical thought is entirely
foreign to the realistic Platonic conception of the divine nous
as the demiurge, who gives form to a matter after the pattern
of the eternal Ideas. The creation-motive in LEIBNIZ' con-
ception is the Humanistic secularization of the Christian

1 Monadologie 43 and 44 (ERDMANN, p. 708): "Il est vrai aussi qu'en
Dieu est non seulement la source des existences mais encore celle des
essences, en tant que réelles, ou de ce qu'il y a de réel dans la possibilité.
C'est parce que l'entendement de Dieu est la Région des vérités éternelles,
on des idées dont elles dépendent, et que sans lui il n'y aurait rien de
réel dans les possibilités, et non seulement rien d'existant, mais encore
rien de possible.
Cependant il faut bien que s'il y a une réalité dans les Essences ou
possibilités, ou bien dans les vérités éternelles, cette réalité soit fondée
en quelque chose d'existant et d'actuel, et par conséquent dans l'existence
de l'être nécessaire, dans lequel l'essence renferme l'existence, ou dans
lequel il suffit d'être possible pour être actuel." ['It is also true, that in
God is not alone the source of the existences but, besides, that of the
essences, in so far as they are real, or of that which is real in the possi-
bility. This is due to the fact, that the understanding of God is the realm
of the eternal truths or of the Ideas on which they depend, and that
without this there would not be anything real in the possibilities, and
not only nothing that exists but nothing that is possible either.
However, if there is a reality in the Essences or possibilities, or in
other words in the eternal truths, this reality must necessarily be founded
in something existent and actual, and consequently in the existence of the
necessary Being in which the essence includes the existence, or in
which it suffices to be possible for being actual."

2 It is true, that in his famous dialogue Politeia 509b PLATO seems to
say that the eidé originate from the idéα τον άγαθόν (Idea of the good)
and that in 597b the θεός (deity) as demiurge is said to be the origin
of the εἴδη of a couch (κλίνη).
However, this is not to be understood in the sense of a divine creation
of the κόσμος άγαθός (the phenomenal world). Even in the Politeia the
divine mind (νοει) is only conceived of as the origin of the eternal
forms, never of "matter". Besides, in the later dialogues the conception
of the divine Nous as the origin of the eternal forms (eidē) is abandoned.
See my Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, vol. I (the Greek
prelude), p. 231 ff. and p. 361 (the conception of the Timaeus).
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view with its confession of God’s sovereignty as Creator. In LEIBNIZ’ transcendental ground-Idea the totality of meaning is sought in free mathematical thought. This corresponds to the mathematical science-ideal, whose domain had been extended by the infinitesimal calculus. The different modal aspects of temporal reality are conceived of as modi of a mathematical order, and the lex continui maintains the coherence of meaning between these aspects.

It is extremely interesting to follow the application of this transcendental basic idea in LEIBNIZ’ epistemology, aesthetics, ethics and theology.

Phenomenon and noumenon in LEIBNIZ’ metaphysics: “vérités de raison” and “vérités de fait”. LEIBNIZ’ mathematical idealism.

The universe in the representation of the monads is sensory phenomenon, so far as this representation has not attained to the clarity of the mathematical concept which is orientated to the infinitesimal calculus. In their pre-established mutual harmony as the metaphysical differentials of mathematical thought, the representing monads are the root of reality, the noumenon. And, at the same time,

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1 LEIBNIZ’ pronouncement concerning the phenomenon is characteristic: “Nihil aliud de rebus sensibilibus aut scire possumus, aut desiderare debemus, quam ut tam inter se, quam cum indubitatis rationibus consentiant...Alia in illis veritas aut realitas frustra expetitur, quam quae hoc praestat.” (Phil. Schr. hrg. von GERHARDT, IV S. 356, quoted by CASSIRER Erkenntnisproblem I, 410 note 1). [“Concerning the perceptible things we neither can know, nor ought to desire anything except that they agree both among themselves and with indubitable grounds... it is vain to seek in them another truth or reality than that which this provides.”]

2 Nouveaux Essais Livre, IV (ERDMANN, p. 346): “Il faut considérer... que tout a m a s r é e l suppose des Substances simples ou des Unités réelles et quand on considère encore ce qui est de la nature de ces unités réelles, c’est à dire la perception et ses suites, on est transféré pour ainsi dire dans un autre monde, c’est à dire dans le monde intelligible des Substances, au lieu qu’au paravant on n’a été que parmi les phénomènes des sens.” [“It is to be considered... that every real composite supposes simple substances or real units, and when in addition one considers, what belongs to the nature of these real units, namely the perception and its effects, one is, so to say, transferred into another world, that is to say into the intelligible world of the substances, whereas before one has only been among the sensory phenomena.”]
insofar as they belong to the spiritual monads, they are the autarchical individuals of the ideal of personality.

This contrast between the noumenon and phenomenon (which is relativized by the lex continui) has a very close connection with LEIBNIZ' distinction between the "vérités de raison" and the "vérités de fait". The "vérités de raison" are eternal necessary truths. The "vérités de fait" are contingent truths determined by temporal and factual grounds and consequences. The former are of a purely noumenal nature; they owe their origin exclusively to pure thought. Hence they are analytical truths. They rest entirely and exclusively upon the logical basic law of non-contradiction as the norm of logical possibility. In a rationalistic line, mathematical judgments thereby become analytical. From this it appears, that LEIBNIZ was not conscious of the inter-modal synthesis of meaning in his supposed Archimedean point.

The factual contingent truths are of an empirical character. They do not permit themselves to be deduced from eternal truths by finite human thought. They can only be established by thought in confrontation with sensory experience. The judgments in which they are formulated are subject to the principium rationis sufficientis, to which LEIBNIZ ascribed a natural scientific causal meaning. In the deity, the central monad, this entire contrast between "vérités de raison" and "vérités de fait" completely disappears. For, the deity, as absolute creative thought (intellec-tus archetypus), is able to accomplish the infinite mathematical analysis of reality and this analysis makes evident the metaphysical or eternal necessity of the "vérités de fait".

SPINOZA and LEIBNIZ. WOLFF'S eradication of the distinction between necessary and contingent truths.

SPINOZA\(^1\) had a geometrical conception of the root of the cosmos. From it he concluded, that as modi within the two attri-

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\(^1\) I shall not here pass judgment on the question as to whether or not SPINOZA actually belongs in the cadre of Humanistic philosophy. It is certain, that the documented investigation of S. von DUNIS BORKOWSKY in his work *Spinoza* has cast new doubt upon the Cartesian-Humanistic interpretation of SPINOZA'S system. The mystical-religious trait in his thought is doubtless not Cartesian. The mystical interpretation prevails in the Dutch neo-Spinozism of the XXth century, in opposition to the rationalist interpretation of the XIXth century SPINOZIST VAN VLOTEN.
butes (thought and extension) of the sole substance (the deity),
all things must be understood as an eternal mathematical conse-
quence, derived from the essence of the deity.

Because empirical investigation would not increase our know-
ledge of eternal and unchangeable geometrical truths, SPINOZA
intended to exclude the empirical changes of things from his
mathematic ideal of science.

On the basis of his monadology and epistemology, which
bridged over empiricism and rationalism, LEIBNIZ rejected this
consequence in conscious opposition to SPINOZA.

LEIBNIZ’ popularizer, CHRISTIAN WOLFF, no longer understood
the inventive, or “creative” character of Cartesian and Leib-
nizian mathematical logic. WOLFF again reduced the principle
of sufficient reason to the logical principium contradictionis
and thereby abolished the distinction between “necessary” and “con-
tingent truths”. In doing so, WOLFF meanwhile only drew a
consequence which lay hidden in LEIBNIZ’ Humanistic theology.
According to LEIBNIZ, the “eternal” or “metaphysical truths”
are vaguely present in the “petites perceptions” of material
monads. And they are hidden in the human soul as “unconscious”
representations which, in the apperceptions, become clear and
distinct concepts. These latter are not, as LOCKE supposed, them-
selves derived from sensory experience. They are rather initially
contained in experience as a logical apriori, of which we gra-
dually become conscious.

In the human mind the “contingent truths”, whose discovery
rests upon sensory experience, in this way become a preliminary
step to the eternal mathematical truths. Thus LEIBNIZ’ transcen-
dental basic Idea contains indeed a mathematicistic Idea of the
Origin.

According to LEIBNIZ, the psychical sensory aspect of reality is
only a phenomenal expression of the eternal mathematical rela-
tions of thought. No other reality than this can meaningfully be
ascribed to it.

And the same thing is true of the remaining modal aspects of
cosmic reality. Even the aesthetic aspect is brought under the
basic denominator of mathematical thought: “Music charms us”,
writes LEIBNIZ in his Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce”, al-
though its beauty consists in nothing but the proportions of
numbers and in the calculation (of which we are unaware but
which is, nevertheless, performed by the soul) of the vibrations
of the sounding objects which meet one another at fixed intervals. The pleasures which the eye finds in the proportions, are of the same nature: and those which are caused by the other senses, will come to something like it, although we are not able to explain it so clearly”.  

Even perfection, as the basic principle of the Leibnizian ethics, is logicized in the sense of the mathematical ideal of science. Perfection is the freedom which consists in the fact that the will obeys the reason. The goal of the moral endeavour of the spiritual monad is rational self-determination, in which man acts only according to clear and distinct concepts.

Man elevates himself above the animal by this rational freedom. The latter is obtained by the logical understanding of the adequate representations of the other monads, and by the insight into the harmonia praestabilita as the rational order, which places the individual in a universal coherence with all other individuals. The moral fruit of this enlightenment of consciousness would be the love (pietas) which includes the appreciation of the good of our fellow-men as our own well-being.

§ 5 - THE BASIC ANTINOMY IN THE HUMANISTIC TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA IN ITS MATHEMATICAL-Idealistic TYPE AND THE RELATION OF THIS TYPE TO THE OPTIMISTIC LIFE- AND WORLD-VIEW

The Theodicy with its apparent reconciliation of the ideals of science and personality. The optimism of Leibniz.

This Humanistic metaphysics was crowned by a rationalistic theodicy, a justification of God’s world-government by means of a reconciliation of the evil reality (with its mechanical laws and moral depravity) and the ethical ideal of modern man: the perfection and free self-determination of the individual.

Here Leibniz concentrated the tremendous power of his intellect on the attempt to resolve the continually intensified anti-

1 ERDMANN, p. 717/8: “La Musique nous charme, quoique sa beauté ne consiste que dans les convenances des nombres, et dans le compte, dont nous ne nous apercevons pas, et que l’âme ne laisse pas de faire, des battements ou vibrations des corps sonnans, qui se rencontrent par certains intervalles. Les plaisirs que la vue trouve dans les proportions, sont de la même nature; et ceux que causent les autres sens, reviendront à quelque chose de semblable, quoique nous ne puissions pas l’expliquer si distinctement.”
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onomy between the mathematical science-ideal and the ideal of personality. This is the very motive that lay hidden in his Theodicy. And this attempt is that which lay behind the formal scholastic reconciliation of the "causae efficientes" and "causae finales" in the divine worldplan. It lay behind the speculations concerning the relationship between metaphysical and logical possibility, empirical reality, and mathematical necessity. And the radical optimism expressed by it is typical of the faith of the entire "Enlightenment" in the final unity of these antagonistic factors in the Humanistic transcendental ground-Idea. It typifies the faith that finally scientific thought will make humanity free.

But it was not before the great progress of mathematical thought due to Leibniz' discovery of the infinitesimal analysis, that this optimistic faith could find its "philosophical justification". In Hobbes it was still in an overt contradiction to his "pessimist scientific" view of human nature.

In Leibniz' Theodicy the intrinsic antinomy between the ideal of science and that of personality is arrayed in the scholastic form of the contrast between nature and grace.

The reconciliation between these two spheres, their deeper identity, as Leibniz called it, was sought in the creative mathematical thought of the deity. The latter utilized the metaphysical possibilities in its creation of the world in order to choose the reality which, in the light of the Humanistic ideal of personality, appears as the best and therefore as the ethically necessary. Not long after, Kant reduced the metaphysical Leibnizian categories of possibility, reality and necessity to transcendental categories of modality, which are strictly bound to the sensory experience of natural phenomena. This indicates, that the mathematical science-ideal had lost its primacy in Kant; it also marked the end of the rationalistic optimism of the philosophy of the "Enlightenment".

The deceptive formulation of the polar tension between the ideal of science and that of personality in the terminology of the Christian doctrine of faith.

By reading Leibniz' Essais sur la Bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'Homme et l'Origine du Mal, one at first gains the impression that the German thinker is actually concerned with the difficulties which arise in Christian dogmatics, when it sets forth the doctrine of God's sovereignty as Creator, His eternal predesti-
The development of the basic antinomy in the nation, and man's original sin, and at the same time maintains the personal responsibility and guilt of man.

In the first part of the *Essais*, Leibniz divides these difficulties into two classes: The first originates from the freedom of man which seems to be incompatible with the omnipotent Divine nature; the second is concerned with the government of God: even if man should be free in his actions, an eternal predestination would seem to impute to the Divine Creator too large a share of the responsibility for the existence of both physical and moral evil.

Extremely deceptive in this whole formulation of the problem is the fact that in the light of Leibniz' Idea of God the problem acquires a sense which is absolutely different from that which it possesses in Christian doctrine.

One need only remember that this idea of God is in essence only the final hypostasis of creative mathematical thought: the existing cosmos is only the realized choice out of an infinite possibility of worlds and such a choice demands a rational cause: "The cause of the world must have had regard or relation to all these possible worlds in order to determine one of them. And this regard or relation of an existent substance to simple possibilities cannot be anything else but the understanding which has the Ideas of them; and determining one of them cannot be anything else but the act of the will which chooses. And it is the power of this substance which renders the will efficient".

In other words the divine substance is the creative mathematical thought that itself is only bound to the "vérités éternelles". Will and power belong to the essence of this thought as the creative origin of the cosmos.

This final hypostasis of the mathematical ideal of science now clashed with the postulate of the ideal of personality. It clashed with the autarchical self-sufficiency and absolute freedom of the finite spiritual monads and with the postulate of

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1 Erdmann, p. 506: "Il faut que la cause du Monde ait eu égard ou relation à tous ces Mondes possibles; pour en déterminer un. Et cet égard ou rapport d'une substance existante à de simples possibilités, ne peut être autre chose que l'entendement qui en a les idées; et en déterminer une, ne peut être autre chose que l'acte de la volonté qui choisit. Et c'est la puissance de cette substance, qui en rend la volonté efficace."
the happiness and perfection of man, who by means of pure thought ought to participate in this good.

The apparent solution of this antinomy is construed by mathematical thought itself in the speculations concerning the metaphysical relation of possibility, reality, and necessity, and in the synthesis between "nature" and "grace".

In order to understand the course of Leibniz' argument as it is related to the transcendental basic Idea of his mathematical idealism, it is necessary to return for a moment to his discovery of the differential and integral calculus. This discovery, according to Leibniz' own testimony, is connected with the most basic foundations of his entire philosophy.

The basic antinomy in the Humanistic transcendental ground-Idea acquires in Leibniz the mathematical form of the antinomy of actual infinity.

The basic antinomy in the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea in Leibniz' metaphysics was formulated, as it were, as a mathematical problem. It was formulated as the reduction of the discreteness of the monads (into which the individualistic ideal of personality had withdrawn itself) to the continuity of the mathematically comprehended science-ideal and vice versa.

The mathematical antinomy of actual infinity is hidden in the metaphysical concept of the monad.

The differential number is actually only an approximative one. It derives all its definiteness exclusively from the principle of progression. But as the infinitesimal it can never possess an actual existence. Leibniz himself has constantly pointed out the merely methodological origin of his concept of the infinitesimal.

Viewed mathematically, the infinitesimal in Leibniz is not a smallest part of spatial matter. This was imagined in the atomism of Gassendi, but this conception, formerly adhered to by Leibniz himself, was intrinsically contradictory. The infinitesimal must be viewed as an ideal for the mathematical process of

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1 Cassirer II, 155 ff.
2 "Mais les atomes de matière sont contraire à la raison: outre qu'ils sont encore composés de parties; puisque l'attachement invincible d'une partie à l'autre, (quand on le pourrait concevoir ou supposer avec raison) ne détruirait point leur diversité," Système Nouvelle 11 (Éd., p. 126). ["But the atoms of matter are contrary to reason — not considering that they are still composed of parts — because the invincible attachment of one part to the other (if one could conceive or suppose it reasonably) would not destroy their diversity."]
The development of the basic antinomy in the

thought in which reality is created as a logically continuous coherence — which is its noumenal essence.

In the face of empirical reality, the differential is a mathematical fiction. It does not possess any factual individual existence. In a letter to JOHANN BERNOULLI, LEIBNIZ characteristically expressed it as follows: “the differential is not present in the parts of matter. Its place is in the ideal grounds through which things are regulated as through their laws.”

Nevertheless, LEIBNIZ’ metaphysics elevated the differential to actual reality in the concept of the monad. His metaphysics needed this hypostasis in order to reconcile the science-ideal with the still individualistically conceived ideal of personality.

Now the logicist principle of continuity must in the final analysis come into conflict with the discreteness of the monads. This is the intrinsic antinomy in LEIBNIZ’ mathematical idealism, in which he wished to overcome naturalism, as well as dualism.

This antinomy acquired a Humanistic religious meaning. In his Theodicy the actual infinity of the cosmic monads (as differentials) must be finite in contrast to that of the divine monad (the infinite analysis of the divine creative mathematical thought). And their imperfection and the metaphysical evil of the world lies in this finitude. The cosmos is only possible in a metaphysical-logical sense, if it consists of such finite and therefore imperfect beings.

“Metaphysical evil” as an eternal necessary truth in creative mathematical thought.

The monads must be finite substances which are autarchical

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1 Compare Réflexions sur l'essai de Locke (Erom. p. 138): “...ainsi le véritable infinité se trouve point dans un tout composé de parties. Cependant il ne laisse pas de se trouver ailleurs, savoir dans l'absolu, qui est sans parties, et qui a influence sur les choses composées, parce qu'elles résultent de la limitation de l'absolu.

Donc l'infini positif n'étant autre chose que l'absolu, on peut dire qu'il y a en ce sens une idée positive de l'infini, et qu'elle est antérieure a celle du fini.” [“...consequently the veritable infinite is not to be found in a totality composed of parts. However, it is found elsewhere, namely in the absolute, which is without parts and has influence over the composed things, because they result from the limitation of the absolute.

Consequently, because the positive infinite is nothing but the absolute, one can say that in this sense there is a positive Idea of the infinite, and that this Idea precedes that of the finite.”]
with respect to each other. They must be confined within their own borders. For if this were not the case, everything in the cosmos would flow together into a formless whole. This can only be prevented by the finite discreteness of the monads. The spiritual soul-monads participate in mathematical thought and as such, together with the deity, they constitute a part of the civitas Dei. With respect to them Leibniz observes, that if they were not limited, at least in as much as they encounter a definite limit for the mathematical analysis in sensory perceptions, everyone of them would itself be the unlimited deity. On account of its participation in mathematical reason, however, the finite spiritual monad is only "une petite divinité dans son département" (a little deity in its department).

Metaphysical evil in the cosmos — i.e. the discrete limitation and finiteness of the created monads — is necessary, if a cosmos is to be possible. In this way "the metaphysical origin of evil" is derived from creative mathematical analysis itself: the origin of evil lies in the eternal truths of mathematical thought.

It is extremely interesting to notice the ground on which Leibniz rejects the conception of ancient philosophy which sought the origin of evil in "matter". The ground for this rejection is that the ancients viewed matter as uncreated and independent of God.

This conception is in conflict with the creation-motive in Leibniz' mathematical ideal of science, which here clearly discloses its secularization of the Biblical creation-motive. The cause of evil must also in a metaphysical sense be derived from

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1 Théodicée, Partie I, 64 (ERDM. 520): "l'âme serait une Divinité, si elle n'avoit que des perceptions distinctes."

2 Monadologie 83 (ERDM. 712).

3 Théodicée, Partie I, 20 (ERDM. 510).

4 Théodicée, Partie I, 20 (ERDM. 510): "Les Anciens attribuoient la cause du mal à la matière, qu'ils croyoient incréée et indépendante de Dieu; mais nous qui dérivons tout Être de Dieu, où trouverons-nous la source du mal? La réponse est, qu'elle doit être cherchée dans la Nature idéale de la créature, autant que cette Nature est renfermée dans les vérités éternelles qui sont dans l'entendement de Dieu, indépendant de sa volonté."

["The ancients ascribed the cause of evil to matter which they thought to be uncreated and independent of God; but we, who deduce every being from God, where shall we find the source of evil? The answer is, that it is to be sought in the ideal nature of the creature, in so far as this nature is included in the eternal truths which are in the understanding of God, independent of His will."]

A new critique of theoretical thought
The development of the basic antinomy in the
God, als absolute thought, bound to the “vériés éternelles”. Even
sensory matter is rationalized by the analysis of the infinite
completed in the divine mind.

The human spiritual monad is limited in its thought, it is not
omniscient, and therefore it can err in thinking and fall into
moral faults.

Metaphysical evil as the root of physical and moral
evil (sin!).

Leibniz distinguishes evil in a physical and moral sense from
metaphysical evil. Physical evil consists in suffering and moral
evil is “sin”.

Physical and moral evil are not necessary, as is metaphysical
evil. But, because of the eternal truths, they are possible. And
this is sufficient to explain their origin. They are a possible
consequence of the necessary metaphysical imperfection. And
the latter is itself nothing positive; it is a privatio, a mere lack
of perfection.

The metaphysical cause of evil is not a causa efficiens, but
a causa deficiens, according to Leibniz’ scholastic formula. And
the activity of God is directed solely toward the positive, toward
perfection and the good.

It is true that physical and moral evil are not necessary in
themselves. But they are a negative condicio sine qua non for
the realization of the good. This good manifests itself physically
as pleasure, and ethically as the freedom of personality. And
because of this freedom the latter is a member of the “Kingdom
of Grace”, the “société de la raison”. A cosmos without physical
suffering and sin would have been possible, but then it would
be very inferior to the one existing now. Such a cosmos would
not leave any room for the free rational personality of man,
nor for an organic union of soul- and material monads, i.e. a
union of body and soul under the direction of the latter as cen-
tral monad. And this would be a deficiency, because in this case
the continuity in the species of substances would not be actual-
lized, and a breach of the principle of continuity would imply
a “vacuum formarum”.¹

¹ Théodicée I, 13 and 14 (ErDM. 507).
How LEIBNIZ attempted to resolve metaphysical evil into the continuity of infinite mathematical analysis.

Ergo, the moral freedom of personality is required by the principle of continuity of the mathematical science-ideal. And the same principle of continuity requires relative physical and moral evil, because the relative imperfection, as implied in the gradual diversity of clarity in the representations of the monads, is a pre-requisite for the ever greater perfection in the mathematical order of development of the cosmos.

Physical and moral evil possess empirical but not metaphysical reality: they belong to the obscure, sensory confused representations.

The analysis of the universe is accomplished uno intuito in the creative mathematical thought of the deity. Therefore, in the actual infinity of this analysis, the individual evil of the monads disappears in the relative perfection of the total cosmos, as the latter is conceived of in the spaceless continuity of creative mathematical thought. The kingdom of nature, the "phenomenon", is identical in its root with the kingdom of grace, the intelligible world of the clear and distinct concept. The "causae efficiences" are brought into perfect correspondence with the "causae finales" by the "harmonia praestabilita". They are brought into complete harmony with the appetitions in the continuous transition of the representations of each monad. And these appetitions originate in the metaphysical nature of the monads and have as a goal the realization of good and evil.

In this way LEIBNIZ attempts to solve theologically the basic antinomy in his transcendental ground-Idea between the ideal of science and that of personality.

But in spite of its ingenious design, this attempt was bound to fail. In his *Theodicy* LEIBNIZ entangled himself in constant contradictions. On the one hand, he made individual metaphysical evil to be something logically negative, i.e. a mere lack of pure analysis, and, on the other, he elevated it as the condicio sine qua non for the metaphysical reality of perfection, i.e. the good of the cosmos.

Thus the finite discreteness of the monads, as the metaphysical differentials of the cosmos, becomes both an actual metaphysical reality and a logical negative.

Even in its metaphysical form the concept of actual infinity continues to be intrinsically antinomic. The continuity of the movement of thought must necessarily break through the di-
The development of the basic antinomy in the creteness of the monads and, vice versa, the discreteness of the monads must necessarily contradict the lex continui.

Leibniz and Bayle.

The basic problem in Leibniz’ theodicy is, as we saw, that of the reconciliation between the Humanistic ideal of science and that of personality. This is still more evident, when we remember that the voluminous and popular theological work of Leibniz was pointed directly against Peter Bayle. By means of his sceptical arguments against the Cartesian cogito and the mathematical axioms, the latter had undermined the very foundations of the mathematical science-ideal.

Bayle’s nominalist doctrine of the two sorts of truth set forth an absolute clef between Christian faith and natural reason. This view did not interest Leibniz, because of his concern with the absoluteness of the Christian religion. In fact, he always conceived of the Christian “dogmas of faith” as contingent truths, bound to the sensory representation. Mathematical thought must transform them into the eternal mathematical-metaphysical truths of the religion of reason! It was indeed a quite different aspect of Bayle’s scepticism that disturbed Leibniz.

In his sceptical attitude toward the Cartesian ideal of science Bayle indeed granted primacy to the ideal of personality in natural reason, the so-called “practical reason”. He had tried to show that moral commandments do not derive their intrinsic value from the Christian religion but from “practical human reason”. Thereby “practical reason” had been completely emancipated from the Humanistic science-ideal.

Bayle considered the Christian religion to be independent of, or rather in open conflict with human reason. He had sharply opposed the Idea of a “Vernunftreligion”. His intention had been to retain a place for Christian religion in the “heart”. This could only appear to Leibniz as blasphemy against sovereign reason. He wrote his Theodicy in order to bring the ideal of personality

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1 One can say that, with respect to the intensification of the antithesis between the Christian faith and the Humanistic science-ideal, Bayle filled a similar rôle as had been played in the disruption of the Christian faith and Aristotelian metaphysics by William of Occam, and even more strongly by the Averroist Siger of Brabant. Bayle laid bare this antithesis in its sharpest form; he accepted a positive conflict between the Christian faith and Humanistic thought.

2 This Leibniz continually evidences in his polemics with Bayle.
again under the domination of the mathematical science-ideal. He wished to reduce the Christian religion again to a lower function of the "religion of reason".

But the extremely refined antinomies which lay hidden in Leibniz' haughty metaphysics, and which can be traced back to the basic antinomy in the transcendental ground-Idea of Humanistic thought, were soon to be subjected to the scrutiny of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in order to break the primacy of the ideal of science at its very root.

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Compare, *Theodicy* III, 353 (Erdm. 606) where he attacks Bayle as follows: ;"Il s'accommodoit de ce qui lui convenoit pour contrecarrer l'adversaire qu'il aivoit en tête; son but n'étant que d'embarrasser les Philosophes, et faire voir la foiblessé de notre Raison: et je crois que jamais Arcésilas ni Carnéade n'ont soutenu le pour et le contre avec plus d'éloquence et plus d'esprit." ["He availed himself of what suited him to cross the adversary which he had in view; for his goal was only to confuse the philosophers, and to show the weakness of our reason: and I believe neither Arcesilaus nor Carneades ever have defended the pro and con with more eloquence and more genius."]

And especially the introductory *Discours de la conformité de la foi avec la Raison*, 71—82. See no 81: "Mr Bayle poursuit: "qu'il faut alors se moquer de ces objections, en reconnoissant les bornes étroites de l'esprit humain." Et moi, je crois que bien loin de-là, il y faut reconnoître des marques de la force de l'esprit humain, qui le fait pénétrer dans l'intérieur des choses." ["Mr Bayle continues: "that one ought to mock at these objections, when one acknowledges the narrow boundaries of the human mind." And I believe, on the contrary, that one ought to acknowledge in these objections marks of the power of the human mind which makes it penetrate into the very interior of things."]
CHAPTER III

THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY AND THE IDEAL OF SCIENCE IN THE CRITICAL TRANSITION TO THE PRIMACY OF THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY

§ 1 - THE PSYCHOLOGICAL TURN IN THE SCIENCE-IDEAL AND ITS TRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF ORIGIN

Rationalist mathematical dualism, rationalist mechanical naturalism and rationalist mathematical idealism prove to be the chief types in which the transcendental ground-Idea of Humanist thought was specified during the first phase of its development since the rise of the new science-ideal. The latter had built a new metaphysics and it was in the cadre of this metaphysics that the dialectical tension between the nature — and the freedom-motives displayed itself.

As long as the primacy of the mathematical science-ideal was maintained, it made no sense to oppose rationalism to empiricism. HOBBES was doubtless an empiricist in the epistemological sense. Nevertheless, his empiricism was of an extremely rationalist stamp, since it conceived of the process of knowledge itself in terms of the mechanical laws of movement.

Since LOCKE, however, empiricism brought a psychological turn into the science-ideal. The latter retained its primacy, nevertheless, the turn toward psychologism was highly significant. The science-ideal began to liberate itself, in an epistemological sense from metaphysics. It no longer sought its common denominator(s) for the different aspects of reality in one or two metaphysical concepts of substance. It now sought it within the functional apparatus of human knowledge itself, and at least its
inner tendency was to seek it in the psychical function of feeling and sensation alone.

The "substance", the "Ding an sich", became the epistemological X, the unknown and unknowable background of the "empirical world" which is given only in psychical impressions and perceptions.

According to the subject-object-relation in the psychical aspect of human experience, there is to be distinguished an outer world, given only in objective sensations, and an inner world of the subjective operations of the mind which are to be psychically perceived in the so-called "reflection" or "internal sense" only. According to LOCKE experience is exhausted by these two "sources".

The understanding or the logical function borrows all "Ideas" from them. Just as the "external material things" are the objects of psychical sensation, the operations of the mind (including passions and feelings) are the object of inner perception or reflection. For the rest, LOCKE's division of the whole of human experience into "sensation" and "reflection", or as it was later to be called, the distinction between outward and inner experience ("aüszeren" and "inneren Sinn" in KANT), is the perfect counterpart of DESCARTES' dualistic separation of "extensio" and "cogitatio". Although LOCKE denies the possibility of theoretical metaphysics, his psychological dualism between "sensation" and "reflection" remains grounded in the conviction that behind these two realms of experience, a material substance and a spiritual one must be present. And the latter are the causes of the external sensible and the internal spiritual impressions of experience. In DESCARTES these substances are supposed to possess the sharpest possible independence in respect to each other, although he was not able to maintain this dualism in an integral way. LOCKE agrees, except that he no longer considers the substances to be knowable. And if the material sub-

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1 In his Essay concerning human understanding, vol. I, Bk 2 ch. I § 4 LOCKE observes as to the latter: "This source of Ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other sensation, so I call this reflection, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself."

2 Ibid. in fine.
The development of the basic antinomy in the
stance can be only an unknown X to human knowledge, then,
in the nature of the case, the monistic materialist metaphysics
of Hobbes must also lose its foundation.

Nevertheless, Locke, too, did not maintain his dualistic posi-
tion in an integral sense. Although he attempted to oppose sen-
sation and reflection as two entirely independent sources of ex-
perience, he did not ascribe to both of them an equal originality.
According to him, the inner perception of the operations of the
mind is not possible unless the mind by sensations of the outer
world has first been stimulated to a series of operations which
are the first content of its reflection.

This is the very reason why in the new empiricist school of
Locke the same polar tensions were present as in the meta-
physical rationalism of the Cartesian one.

Both Hobbes and Leibniz had sought to free themselves of the
Cartesian dualism. In like manner empiricist-nominalist trends
arose which sought to remove the psychological dualism. The
new psychologism turned in the mechanistic association-psycho-
logy (already stimulated by Hobbes) of a Hartley, Brown,
Priestly, Darwin et al., to the naturalist and materialist pole.
It turned to the idealist pole in the spiritualism of Berkeley.
The latter, however, does not belong to the closer community of
Humanistic thought, because of his scholastic accommodation
of the new psychologism to authentic Christian motives. Male-
branche had done the same with Cartesianism.

The inner antinomy in Locke’s psychological dualism.

Locke’s psychological dualism involved itself in yet sharper
antinomies than did the metaphysical dualism of Descartes.

Indeed, although he acknowledges innate faculties of the soul,
Locke contests from the empiricist standpoint the “innate Ideas”.
The point at which he differed in principle from Descartes in
this matter consisted in his view that the understanding owes
all its content to the simple or elementary psychical representa-
tions ("Ideas") given in sensation and reflection. Thought can
obtain no knowledge beyond the reach of these representations.
Locke even refuses to conceive of mathematical thought as purely
logical, as Descartes and Leibniz had done.

The simple sensible and “spiritual” impressions of psychical
experience which the mind must receive purely passively, are
sharply distinguished by Locke from the complex representa-
tions (“Ideas”). In the latter, thought is actively and freely opera-
cosmonomic Idea of Humanistic immanence-philosophy

The "simple Ideas" owe their origin to sensation and reflection and they not only include pleasure, pain, joy, and grief, but also the representations of force, causality, unity and reality.

The "complex ideas", in which Locke includes also the "universalia", i.e. the universal generic concepts acquired by abstraction, are freely formed by the understanding out of the combination of "simple" ones. Among these complex Ideas, the number of which is infinite, Locke investigates in particular the concepts of number, space, infinity, the concept of identity (chiefly that of personal identity), that of power (especially in connection with the problem of the freedom of the will) and that of substance.

Thus psychological analysis dissolves the entire content of knowledge into simple psychical impressions. Consequently, even the mathematical science-ideal with its Idea of free creative mathematical thought must be given up, if the analysis is to be carried through consistently. But this consequence was entirely contrary to Locke's intention. He continued with Descartes to view mathematical thought, with its strict deductive coherence, as the mainstay of the ideal of science. The total psychologizing of scientific thought was first carried through by Berkeley and Hume. And so Locke's psychological dualism necessarily involved itself in the following antinomy: on the one hand it must reduce the concepts of mathematical thought, with respect to their proper mathematical meaning, to passive psychical impressions of experience; and at the same time, it continues to ascribe a free creative power to reflection in its active character of scientific thought. This antinomy originated from the attempt to furnish a psychological foundation for the mathematical science-ideal.

From Locke's travel-diary it appears that he originally gave up the mathematical ideal of science in the interest of absolutized psychological analysis. In his Essay, however, this radical psychological standpoint is abandoned and he tried on the one hand to bind mathematical thought to the psychical representations, and on the other hand to maintain the concepts of mathematical thought as the very foundation of the reality of experience. The psychological point of view predominates in the first

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1 See Cassirer op. cit. II, p. 243 ff.
The development of the basic antinomy in the two books; in the fourth book, however, the mathematical science-ideal predominates. Almost imperceptibly Locke's psychological dualism is transformed into a radical dualism between psychical experience and creative thought. This dualism, however, was threatened at the root by Locke's absolutized psychological startingpoint.

And this also explains why in the further development of the psychologizing trend of thought the attack was launched in the first place against the dualistic separation between "sensation" and "reflection".

In his psychological analysis the world of experience is dissolved by Locke into atomistic psychical elements, which as such exhibit no orderly inner coherence, but nevertheless are irresistibly related by the consciousness to a common, though unknown, bearer (substance).

Reflexion may possess the capacity to join these given elements in an arbitrary manner, as the 24 letters of the alphabet\(^1\); but such freedom to unite remains arbitrary. And an orderly coherence between the simple Ideas of experience cannot be based on arbitrariness. Unlike Hume, Locke had not yet attempted to reinterpret this orderly coherence in a psychological manner. His concept of order was still that of the mathematical science-ideal.

Thus psychological analysis necessarily led to the conclusion that no scientific knowledge of empirical reality is possible.

And at the same time it led to the conclusion that the necessary orderly coherence in the joining of concepts, without which science is not possible, cannot find its origin in the psychical impressions of experience.

Locke asserted that exact science would be impossible, if there were no necessary relations between the Ideas. According to him, these relations are elevated above the temporal process of the psychical impressions of experience and possess an eternal constancy. Otherwise one could never pass universally valid propositions. A man would ever remain bound to the psychical perception of the individual impressions of experience\(^2\).

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\(^1\) *Essay concerning human understanding* II, 7 § 10. The Idea of an alphabet of logical thought has here acquired a psychological rather than a mathematical sense.

\(^2\) *Essay* IV, 1 § 9: "If the perception that the same Ideas will eternally have the same habitudes and the same relations be not a sufficient ground
We saw, however, that Locke did not in the least intend to approve of the drawing of this sceptical conclusion from his psychological resolution of all the content of knowledge into isolated psychical "elements". On the contrary, he remains true to the mathematical science-ideal, and affirms his belief in the super-temporal necessary coherence of the concepts of thought. True science, according to him, is possible wherever we deal only with the necessary connection of concepts, rather than with the "empirical reality of things". Such is the case in mathematics and in ethics.

Locke maintains the mathematical science-ideal with its creation-motive, though in a limited sphere.

Here it is the understanding itself that creates its objects, i.e. the necessary relations between the Ideas. The mind forms the archetypes, the original patterns to which the things in the experience of reality must conform. A triangle possesses in an empirical form the same sum of its angles as does the universal triangle in the mathematical concept. Moreover, according to Locke, what is valid for the mathematical complex Idea is just as valid for "moral Ideas". These Ideas too are absolutely independent of empirical reality, independent of the question whether or not human actions are really directed by them. "The truth of Cicero's doctrine of duties does not suffer any injury by the fact that no one in the world exactly follows its precepts or lives according to it in its portrayed example of a virtuous man."

Therefore, according to Locke, exact proofs are as possible in ethics as in mathematics.

The thesis: "where there is no property, there is no injustice either," is no less accurate than any thesis in Euclid. Mathematical science and ethics furnish us with apriori knowledge, infallible, true and certain.

Thus it is clear that in spite of the epistemological-psycholog-
The development of the basic antinomy in the
cal turn of his investigation, Locke retains completely the fund-
damentals of the mathematical science-ideal. In his transcen-
dental ground-Idea the latter still possesses the primacy over the
ideal of personality.

With a tenacious faith, equal to that of Descartes and Leibniz,
Locke clung to the Idea that human personality can only main-
tain its freedom of action by being obedient to sovereign mathe-
matical thought.

However, because of the psychological turn which the Carte-
sian cogito had acquired in Locke's epistemological research,
there arose an insoluble inner antinomy in the foundation of
the mathematical ideal of science.

This antinomy is produced by the fact that the "sovereign
reason", in which the Humanistic ideal of personality had con-
centrated itself, refused to accept the dogmatic theory concern-
ing the "Ideae innatae" in their Cartesian sense.

The tendency toward the origin in Locke's opposition
to the innate Ideas, and the transcendental Idea of
origin in Locke's epistemology.

For Locke's opposition to innate Ideas can only be explained
in terms of the internal tendencies of the psychological ideal of
science. The latter will not permit any restriction upon its sove-
reign freedom. Locke, like Hobbes, could only view the innate
Ideas as an arbitrary restriction placed upon the sovereignty
of thought. Descartes, as we have seen, viewed these Ideas
only as potentially innate. In fact, for him they served to check
the postulate of the continuity of the science-ideal so that, in
due time, the autonomy of creative mathematical thought might
be saved. So little did Descartes account for the possibility of

1 Riehl, Der Phil. Kritizismus, supposes that no antinomy may here be
indicated in Locke's system. This statement contains several errors.
In the first place, in the Prolegomena we have pointed out the untenabi-
lity of an opposition between the genetic and critical view-point. Never-
theless, in Riehl's argument this distinction plays its confusing rôle.
He does not see that the question about the origin of our logical concepts
is a transcendental-critical one, because it cannot be solved without a
transcendental Idea of the origin and the mutual relation of the different
modal aspects of reality. In the second place, Riehl forgets that Locke
in the first two books of his essay had considered unity, force and causa-
ality as simply Ideas, and that he proceeds upon the assumption that all
complex Ideas possess the simple Ideas as their elements. Locke did not
yet know Kant's doctrine of the apriori forms of intuition and under-
standing.
mathematical thought, that he permitted it to become a static "res cogitans". Locke was the first Humanist thinker to grant to psychology the central task of explaining the origin and limits of human knowledge and of critically examining the validity of its foundations. Therefore, he could only view the dogmatic acceptance of innate ideas as an attack upon the very sovereignty of thought.

If the psychological origin, the psychological activity, of mathematical thought with its creative concepts is not shown, then, according to Locke, the ideal of science does not proceed from the sovereign self-consciousness, but from a dogmatical faith in authority. And it is just this latter that the "Aufklärung" intended to combat with all the means at its disposal: "The way to improve our knowledge is not, I am sure, blindly and with an implicit faith, to receive and swallow principles; but is, I think, to get and fix in our minds clear, distinct and complete Ideas, as far they are to be had, and annex them to their proper and constant names." So Locke writes in the fourth book of his Essay concerning human understanding (Ch. 12, sect. 6).

The antinomy in Locke's thought which we must establish between the psychologized Idea of origin and the mathematical ideal of science, was disguised by his limiting scientific knowledge to the sphere of the non-real.

The distinction between the knowledge of facts and the knowledge of the necessary relations between concepts.

For this purpose Locke introduced a fundamental distinction between the knowledge of empirical facts and the scientific knowledge of the necessary relations between concepts.

A distinction which had previously been made by Hobbes and

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1 Locke himself qualified his Essay concerning human understanding, as an enquiry "into the original, certainty and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent." (I. 1 § 2). And in book II, 1 § 24, he writes, after having established sensation and reflection, sensory perception and internal introspection as the only sources of our knowledge: "All those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and footing here: in all that good extent, wherein the mind wanders, in those remote speculations, it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those Ideas which sense or reflection have offered for its contemplation."
The development of the basic antinomy in the

would later be taken over by Hume. We shall see that it no longer could have any critical value for the latter.

In opposition to Descartes, however, Locke maintained the view that mathematical and moral judgments are synthetical and not merely logical. From the standpoint of his psychologism no possibility existed to ground synthetic judgments otherwise than on the single psychical impressions of experience.

This is exactly what Hume later did in a very consistent manner. Now Locke, in the fourth book of his Essay, introduced, in addition to “sensation” and “reflection”, a new faculty of cognition, namely the intuition of the “cogito”. This faculty was proclaimed to be the indubitable foundation of all exact scientific knowledge and was thought of as the basis of mathematical proof (“demonstratio”). But by introducing this faculty he really turned away from the paths of his psychologizing epistemology.

Descartes had also founded the certainty of mathematical knowledge on the intuitive certainty of the thinking self-consciousness. But he considered that mathematical knowledge originated in creative logical thought alone, apart from any assistance from sensory perception.

It was precisely against this purely analytical conception of scientific thought that Locke directed his thesis that, if thought is to lead us to knowledge, it must always remain joined to the material of psychical sensations.

Locke recognized that the continuity and infinity of space and time go beyond the perception of particular empirical sensations. Nevertheless, his analyses, in the second book of his Essay, of the complex Ideas of number, space, time, and infinity are invariably joined to the simple impressions of experience.

Thus the ultimate termination of Locke’s psychological analysis of knowledge in the face of mathematical thought signifies a capitulation of his critique which is replaced here by the dogmatic proclamation of the primacy of the mathematical science-ideal.

The psychological epistemology had only caused a rupture in this latter, because Locke no longer deemed it possible to grant to mathematical thought domination over empirical reality. Physics and biology are, according to him, entirely dependent upon sense perception and cannot be subject to any mathe-
mathe-}

cosmonomic Idea of Humanistic immanence-philosophy 271

atical method of demonstration: “Certainty and demonstration are things we must not in these matters pretend to” 1.

Nevertheless, we can observe in the epistemological turn of Locke’s philosophy the germ of a critical self-reflection regarding the root of the science-ideal. This self-reflection was soon to cause a radical reaction against the rationalism of the “Enlightenment”. It was to lead to the granting of primacy to the ideal of personality. For Locke irrevocably rejected the Cartesian deduction of “Sum res cogitans” from “Cogito ergo sum”. In other words to mathematical thought was denied the competency to identify itself with the “sovereign personality”, as the root of the science-ideal.

Similarly Locke refused to resolve the will into a mode of mathematical thought.

Thus the science-ideal was critically emancipated from the domination of a metaphysics, in which, in the last analysis, mathematical thought had been exalted as the origin and root of the cosmos. This emancipation was to have a radical significance for the further development of Humanistic philosophical thought.

The emancipation of the mathematical ideal of science from the rationalistic metaphysics of nature opened the way to the insight that the root of reality is not to be discovered by scientific thought. And it now became possible to see that the science-ideal must have its fundamentals in the ideal of personality.

The consciousness of the absolute autonomy and freedom of personality was not clearly expressed in Humanistic philosophy, as long as the root of reality was sought in a material substance. Nor was it clearly expressed as long as a material substance was opposed to a “res cogitans”.

§ 2 - THE MONISTIC PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPE OF THE HUMANISTIC TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA UNDER THE PRIMACY OF THE SCIENCE-IDEAL

However, before the transcendental Humanist ground-Idea could acquire this final turn and before Humanistic thought could really follow the transcendental direction which is pecu-

1 Essay iv, 3 § 26, As is known, Locke retracted this statement with respect to physics after he learned from Newton the method of scientific physics. See Riehl, Der phil. Kritizismus (3e Aufl. I, p. 89).
The development of the basic antinomy in the liar to Kant's "Critiques", it had to endure a serious crisis in which it would appear, that a radical psychologism in epistemology must undermine the foundations both of the ideal of science and of the ideal of personality.

The credit for having performed this preparatory critical work must unquestionably be given to Hume. This keen thinker had inwardly outgrown the spirit of the "Enlightenment". Nevertheless he continued to accept the primacy of the science-ideal in its psychological turn. Locke had previously undermined the metaphysical conceptions of nature and human personality. By means of his psychological critique of knowledge, Hume reduced them to absurdity.

The fact that Hume in his psychologism proceeded from the standpoint of the Humanistic science-ideal is evident from the announcement of the aim of his research in the second book of his main work, Treatise upon Human Nature. Here he states, that he desired to achieve the same result in the field of the phenomena of human nature as had been attained in astronomy since Copernicus. He desired to reduce all phenomena to the smallest possible number of simple principles. The principle of the economy of thought took a central position in this ideal of science. This same principle had been praised by Leibniz, in his essay on the philosophical style of Nizolius, as one of the treasure troves of Nominalism.

The psychologized conception of the science-ideal in Hume. Once again the nominalistic trait in the ideal of science.

The science-ideal, however, now received a radical objective-psychological turn. All abstract concepts, which are expressed in general symbols of language must in the last analysis be reduced to individual sensory "impressions" as the simplest elements of consciousness. There may not remain a rest in our supposed "knowledge" which is not resolved into these simple psychological elements. If it does, the psychological ideal of science is still subjected to a dogmatic limitation. And the latter must be overcome by sovereign analysis.


2 This principle has in itself nothing to do with nominalism. Aristotle referred to it in his criticism of the Platonic ideas. And Aristotle, to be sure, was not a nominalist.
In this is evident the strong nominalistic tenor of Hume's psychologism. I would here like to point out once more the misconception in the traditional opinion which presumes that modern nominalism manifests itself only in this so-called empiricist form. That this view is erroneous is apparent, if we remember that the so-called "rationalism" desired as much as "empiricism" to discover by analysis the simplest elements of knowledge. It was just by this method that rationalism thought it had found the guarantee for the creative continuity of mathematical thought.

The difference between Hume and Leibniz consists only in the basic philosophic denominator chosen by "sovereign reason" to bridge over the diversity of the modal aspects of our cosmos. In Leibniz the ultimate origin of empirical reality is creative mathematical thought, in Hume it is to be found in psychological analysis.

As we have seen before, a moderate nominalism is quite compatible with the recognition of a necessary and foundational function of universal concepts (according to the ideal significance of symbols). The only condition is that universal concepts and their mutual relations must be recognized as having their origin in creative thought itself. They may not be thought of as having a foundation "in re", outside of mind. However, is not a moderate nominalist but rather a radical one.

In an individualist manner he resolved the "universal representations" into "impressions", as the simplest elements of consciousness. Nevertheless, this resolution was actually the exact psychological counterpart of the resolution of complex concepts into the simplest conceptual elements by mathematicism.

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1 With respect to this, Berkeley's Alciphron furnishes a convincing proof. In it he overcame the extreme sensationalist nominalism of his earlier writings. He even recognizes the logical conformity to laws in the relations between the Ideas, although, in a nominalistic fashion, the function of universality is only ascribed to the signs. But the signs, which constitute the material and instrument of all scientific knowledge, are now for Berkeley no longer arbitrary names. On the contrary the representative character of symbols has now become the foundation of the possibility of our knowledge. They represent the validity of the relations in our thought.

2 Compare in particular Leibniz' exposition in his Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis (1664) (Erdmann, p. 79) of the relation of the primitive (that is simple and basic) concepts to the complex.
The development of the basic antinomy in the

What Hume viewed as the "simplest elements" of consciousness, and therefore as "data", no more belongs to the real data of our experience than a single mathematical concept does.

In his penetrating critique of the "abstract Ideas" which Locke still maintained, even Berkeley had overlooked the fact that the concept of a "simple psychical element of consciousness" is itself no less abstract than that of a "triangle in general".

Hume began by demolishing the barriers which Locke in his dualistic conception had raised between "sensation" and "reflexion". This dualism in Locke was in the last analysis founded on his belief in the existence of a material and a spiritual substance. For without the latter the entire distinction between external and internal experience in his epistemology would lack a foundation.

But even Berkeley, from his "idealistic" psychologistic standpoint, had completely resolved "nature" into the sensory psychical impressions. His well-known thesis "esse est percipi" became the psychological counterpart of Leibniz' mathematical idealism in respect to the world of phenomena. Therefore, he must also discard the distinction between primary and secondary qualities of matter that had been made by Locke in accordance with Galileo's and Newton's physics.

Hume subsumed all of cosmic reality, in all of its modal aspects of meaning, under the denominator of sensation. In a much more radical sense than in Locke, psychologism began to resolve the cosmos into the sensory contents of psychical consciousness, into perceptions\(^1\). It must be granted, however, that in this respect Hume's Treatise proceeds in a much more radical line than his Enquiry.

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\(^1\) *Treatise* I, Part II, Sect. VI p. 371): "To hate, to love, to think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but to perceive.

Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all Ideas are deriv'd from something antecedently present to the mind, it follows, that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an Idea of anything specifically different from Ideas and impressions. Let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appear'd in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination."
Hume and Pyrrhonic scepticism. Sextus Empiricus.

This radical psychologism had an outward point of contact in ancient philosophy, just as Humanist metaphysics had. The Pyrrhonic scepticism which had been transmitted to modern thought especially in the writings of Sextus Empiricus: Pyrrhonic Hypotyposes and Against the Mathematicians, had methodically turned down the same path. But it had a purely negative tendency and the ultimate intention of denying every criterion of truth. Recent investigations have made it very probable, that Hume was strongly influenced by the method of Sextus Empiricus, even though his defective knowledge of Greek presumably kept him from reading the Hypotyposes in the original. However, in 1718, Sextus Empiricus' work had been published in a Latin translation and in 1725 it was published anonymously in a French translation which is now ascribed to Huart.

During this period Hume studied in Edinburgh, where much of his time was occupied with the study of classic writers. In addition, a noteworthy harmony has been discovered between Hume and the connoisseur of Pyrrhonism, Crousaz, in the theory of perceptions, in the psychological treatment of logic, in the doctrine of imagination and of habit in the association of impressions. Crousaz was professor of philosophy and mathematics at the University of Lausanne, and had devoted an extensive work to Pyrrhonism.

Sceptical doubt in Hume, as in Descartes, has only methodological significance.

Nevertheless, Hume did not have the slightest intention of following Montaigne and Bayle by ending in a destructive Pyrrhonistic scepticism.

On the contrary, in him scepticism had no other significance than it had in Descartes; it was only intended to be methodological, that is to say, methodological in the sense of the psycholo-

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1 The Pyrrhonic thesis taken over by Hume and Berkeley: "Being is appearance" can be found in Sextus Empiricus, Pyrr. Hyp. Ic. XIV, 8th trope.
2 B. M. Laing, David Hume (1933), p. 74 f. I refer to this book also for the following particulars. In his Dialogues concerning natural religion (W.W. II, 376 ff) Hume repeatedly mentions the sect of the Pyrrhonists.
3 Examen du Pyrrhonisme, ancien et moderne, 1733.
The development of the basic antinomy in the


gical ideal of science, which in order to carry through its principle of continuity must also repudiate the dualistic division between "sensation" and "reflection". Reflexion with its impressions and their corresponding "ideas" (representations, which, in Hume, are identical with "concepts") must be reduced to a dependent function, to a mere image of "sensation" with its sensory "impressions". It is precisely this reduction which, according to Hume, makes it possible to conquer scepticism by discovering an unassailable criterion of truth.

The criterion of truth.

Hume seeks this criterion of truth in the demonstration of the "original impression" from which the idea is derived. In him "impressions" include all sensations, passions and emotions as they originally appear in the psychical function. But they are not conceived of by him in their subjective actuality; rather, in the line of the ideal of science, they are comprehended according to their objective content, as the elements of phenomena.

The "impressions" are the sole data in human experience. By "Ideas" or "thoughts", Hume understands only the apprehensions of thought and reasoning which are derived from sensory impressions; they are nothing but copies of impressions, which in their elementary forms only distinguish themselves from the latter by a decreased sensory intensity. Even "Ideas" which at first sight do not appear to have any connection with "impressions", upon closer examination give evidence that they have arisen from them. How, according to Hume, does a false Idea come into being? The answer is that either the original sensory impression is related to an Idea, which is the image of an other impression, or, vice versa, an idea is brought into relation with an impression of which it is not the copy.

With respect to the Ideas which he considered to be false,

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1 See Treatise I, Part I Sect II (p. 317): "...the impressions of reflexion are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and deriv'd from them." (I am italicizing).


3 Treatise I, Part 1, Sect. I (p. 311). Thereby, passions, desires and emotions are conceived of by Hume as impressions of the "reflections". The latter themselves arise from ideas of pleasure and displeasure, and these Ideas, in turn, are copies of sensory impressions of hot, cold, hunger and thirst, etc.
Hume set himself the task of discovering the sensory impressions, from which these Ideas are actually derived.

Now, according to him, there are two methods of uniting impressions and Ideas. In the one case they are united by a purely reproducing memory, and in the other by the free combining and variegating of fantasy or imagination.

The Ideas of memory are much stronger and livelier than those of fantasy, but the former are bound precisely to the same order and position as the impressions from which they were derived, whereas fantasy, in contrast, can freely combine and vary its Ideas, and is entirely independent of the original order of impressions.\(^1\)

However, the Humanist science-ideal does not allow this activity of fantasy to be conceived of as completely arbitrary. Even in its psychological form it possesses a concept of order which excludes any Idea of arbitrariness.\(^2\) And as we shall subsequently demonstrate, this concept of law serves in Hume, as well as in Leibniz or Descartes, as the foundation of empirical reality. In Hume it is the concept of necessary connection or association (relating to impressions as well as to the Ideas).

To understand in Hume's nominalist course of thought this transition to the psychological concept of order, we must remember, that Hume, following in Locke's footsteps, divides Ideas into simple and complex. The latter are connections between simple Ideas. In part at least, they are grounded in sensorily perceived relations between impressions. For Hume also divides the impressions into simple and complex.

The natural and philosophical relations. The laws of association.

Hume thought, that he could reduce all associations in the succession of Ideas to three basic laws, namely, the law of resemblance, the law of spatial and temporal coherence (contiguity), and the law of cause and effect.

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\(^1\) *Treatise I*, Part I, Sect. III. Of the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination.

\(^2\) Cf. *Treatise I*, Part I, Sect. IV (p. 319): "As all simple Ideas may be separated by the imagination, and may be united again in what form it pleases, nothing would be more unaccountable than the operations of that faculty, were it not guided by some universal principles, which render it, in some measure, uniform with itself in all times and places."
These laws of association are thought of as being purely mechanical, and concern only the so-called natural relations between the Ideas by which "two Ideas are connected in the imagination and the one naturally introduces the other," when a natural succession of ideas takes place. In his Treatise (I part 1 sect. vi) Hume writes: "This we may establish for a general rule, that wherever the mind constantly and uniformly makes a transition without any reason, it is influenced by these relations" (i.e. by resemblance, contiguity and cause and effect).

These natural associations, according to Hume, cannot be perceived in a sensory manner. They do not connect impressions, but Ideas. The product of these associations are the complex Ideas of relations, substances and modi, which are the ordinary objects of our thought and judgments. It is true, that these complex Ideas are founded in sensory relations of resemblance and contiguity or coherence between the impressions. But the associations, which the faculty of imagination produces upon the basis of these sensory relations, exceed that which is given; they are an "order of thought." And they can lead thought astray, because they go beyond that which is directly given in the "impression".

Hume distinguished the "natural" from the "philosophical" relations. The latter do not determine the associational transition of one "Idea" to another, but simply compare "Ideas" or impressions which are not connected by association.

It is very confusing, that Hume in summarizing the seven classes of philosophical relations, mentions causality once again. When we put aside this natural relation which, incorrectly, is mentioned in this connection, we can list the following six classes of philosophical relations:

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1 Hume called them (Ibid. sect. iv) a sort of law of attraction "which in the mental world will be bound to have as extraordinary effect as in the natural."

2 Treatise I, Part 1, Sect. V: "The word Relation is commonly used in two senses considerably different from each other. Either for that quality, by which two Ideas are connected together in the imagination, and the one naturally introduces the other, after the manner above explained; or for that particular circumstance, in which, even upon the arbitrary union of two Ideas in the fancy we may think proper to compare them. In common language the former is always the sense, in which we use the word relation; and 'tis only in philosophy that we extend it to mean any particular subject of comparison, without a connecting principle" (p. 322).
1 - Resemblance, a relation, which is the foundation of all the other philosophical relations. No impressions or Ideas can be compared with each other which do not display a certain degree of resemblance. As a mere philosophical relation it does not produce any association of Ideas or any sequence in the Ideas, but is rather related to a simultaneous sensory relation of resemblance.

2 - Identity, the most universal relation. It is concerned with constant and unchangeable objects.

3 - The relations of space and time, which are the origin of an infinite number of comparisons, such as distance, contact, above, below, before, behind, etc....

4 - The relations in quantity or number.

5 - The degrees in common quality; thus two objects can both possess the common quality of weight, yet one can be lighter than the other. Thus in the same colour, e.g. red, two shades can be compared with each other etc.

6 - The relation of contrast, a relation, which only seemingly affords an exception to the rule that there cannot be any philosophical relation, unless a certain degree of resemblance exists between the impressions or Ideas; for in reality, this relation, as well, always pre-supposes a point of resemblance, if a comparison is to be possible. In his *Enquiry* HUME reduces this relation to a combination of the relations of resemblance and causality.

The reader observes, how in this table of relations not only are the basic mathematical principles reduced to psychological ones, but also the laws of logic (i.e. the principles of identity and contradiction).

HUME divided the philosophical relations into two classes: the variable and the invariable. The invariable include the relations of resemblance and contrast, and the degrees in quantity and quality. They are the ground of certain knowledge.

According to HUME, this certainty rests upon the fact that the relations in question are unchangeable and at the same time are directly sensorily perceivable together with their terms; and such without reasoning, which always consists in a succession of Ideas. They are “discoverable at first sight, and fall more properly under the province of intuition than demonstration.”

The same also holds good for the variable philosophical relations of identity and time and place. The latter do not go beyond that which is actually given in the sensory impressions. The
reason why we say, that an object A is at a distance from
object B, is that we perceive them both at that distance. Here
the relation itself is given in the complex sensory impression.

It is entirely different, however, in the case of the natural
relations. The latter rest upon a veritable association in the
sequence of Ideas. According to Hume, it is only on the ground
of the relation of causation that the relations of time, place, and
identity can really exceed that which is directly given by the
senses and can play their part in an associational process of
thought. But we will explain this point later.

§ 3 - THE TRANSITION OF THE CREATION-MOTIVE IN THE
SCIENCE-IDEAL TO PSYCHOLOGICAL THOUGHT. HUME'S
CRITICISM OF MATHEMATICS

Proceeding from the four invariable philosophical relations
as the only possible foundation of certain knowledge, Hume
began first of all with his criticism of mathematics. In the latter
the adherents of the Humanistic science-ideal (including Locke)
had till now sought their fulcrum. In Hume, however, the science-
ideal has changed its basic denominator for the different modal
aspects of reality. This appears nowhere clearer than here.

Hume is even willing to abandon the creative character of
mathematical thought in order to be able in his epistemological
inquiry to subject all the modal aspects to the absolute sovereignty
of psychological thought. However, this interpretation of his
criticism of mathematics has been called in question.

Contradictory interpretations of Hume's criticism of
mathematics.

In particular Riehl and Windelband believe, that Hume, to-
gether with all his predecessors since Descartes, shared an un-
wavering faith in mathematics as the prototype and foundation
of all scientific thought.

Windelband, however, has overlooked the distinction between
natural and philosophical relations, which is extremely funda-
mental in Hume. Consequently, Windelband completely mis-

1 Treatise I, Part III, Sect. II (p. 376): "'Tis only causation, which
produces such a connexion, as to give us assurance from the existence or
action of one object, that 't was follow'd or preceded by any other
existence or action; nor can the other two relations be ever made use of
in reasoning, except so far as they either affect or are affected by it."
represents Hume’s conception of the certainty of mathematical knowledge. Riehl, too, did not touch the real content of this conception.

Beyond any doubt Hume displays in his Treatise a sceptical attitude with respect to the claims of mathematics to exact knowledge. Riehl, however, tries to deprive this attitude of its sharpness by limiting it to “applied geometry”, which refers the standards of “pure geometry” to “empirical reality”. According to him, Hume never meant to dispute the universal validity of “pure geometry” itself. Moreover, he thinks, that even in this limited sense, Hume’s criticism only affected a single point, namely the possibility, presumed by geometry, of dividing space to infinity.

Riehl believes, that the appearance which Hume gives in his Treatise of having denied the exactness of pure geometry is only due to his unfortunate manner of expression. According to him, the inexactitude which Hume thought he had discovered in “pure geometry” is not concerned with the proofs of the latter, but only with their relation to the objects in “empirical reality” and with the concepts upon which these proofs are based.

To support his view, Riehl appeals to the distinction that Hume also made between knowledge of facts (matters of fact) and knowledge of the relations between Ideas. For in Hume mathematics indubitably belongs to the latter. Besides, Riehl can, indeed, appeal to some statements even in the Treatise which seem to support his point of view. And, if his interpretation is adopted, the anomaly between the appreciation of mathematical knowledge in the Treatise and in the Enquiry would be overcome.

For, in Hume’s Enquiry which he published after the Treatise, we encounter the statement: “That three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expresses a relation between these numbers. Proportions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths, demonstrated by Euclid, would forever retain their certainty and evidence.” In other words, Hume here

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1 Geschichte der neueren Phil. I, 340 ff. Windeband thereby entirely overlooks the problem of mathesis in Hume.
2 Riehl, Der phil. Kritizismus (3e Aufl.) I, 180.
3 Enquiry, Part I, Sect. IV.
appears to have returned completely to the logicist conception of pure mathematics which lay at the foundation of the mathematical ideal of science. And, as we have seen, even Locke's psychologizing epistemology had capitulated in favour of the latter. Nevertheless, Riehl's interpretation is rejected by Green and Cassirer. In keeping with our view, they hold that at least in his Treatise, Hume's psychologism had undermined the foundations of mathematical knowledge as such.

The method of solving this controversy.

In order to take sides correctly in this controversy, we must not base our opinion upon incidental statements in Hume concerning mathematical knowledge. For it is firmly established that especially Hume's Treatise contains very contradictory statements on this point.

The problem can only be solved by answering the preliminary question as to whether or not the fundamentals of Hume's epistemology actually leave room for an exact mathematical science. Only on the basis of the answer given to this question are we able to examine critically the mutually contradictory statements concerning the value of mathematics.

In the first place we must notice that the contrast in Hume between "matters of fact" and "relations of Ideas" can no longer have the same fundamental significance as it possessed in Locke. From the very beginning Hume abandoned the Lockian dualism between "sensation" and "reflection", which gradually changed into a fundamental dualism between creative mathematical thought and sensory experience of reality.

In Hume reflection is no longer "original". It is only a mere image of "sensation". True "Ideas" also have become images of "impressions": the true complex "Ideas" are mental images of complex "impressions" (connected by sensory relations). And the true simple "Ideas" are such of simple "impressions".

Now, to be sure, Hume observes that not all our Ideas are derived from impressions. There are many complex Ideas for which no corresponding impressions can be indicated, while vice versa many of our complex impressions are never reflected exactly in "Ideas".

1 See Green's Introduction to the first part of Hume's works; Cassirer II, 345.
2 Treatise I, Part I, Sect. I (p. 312/3).
Nevertheless, when RIEHL appeals to this statement, to demonstrate the fundamental distinction between “matters of fact” and “relations of Ideas”, he distorts it, and ascribes to it a meaning which is quite different from what Hume had intended. For the latter illustrates his thesis with an instance taken from the activity of our fantasy, in which, according to him, the truth and universal validity of “Ideas” are entirely excluded: “I can imagine a city like the “New Jerusalem”, he writes, “whose pavements are of gold and whose walls are of rubies, although I have never seen such a city. I have seen Paris; but can I maintain, that I can form such an Idea of this city which completely represents all its streets and houses in their real and exact proportions?”

In fact all judgments, in which the “Ideas” are no longer pure copies of the original impressions, must in the light of Hume’s criterion of truth, abandon their claim to certainty and exactness.

Hume drew the full consequences of his “psychological” nominalism with respect to mathematics.

Thus even mathematical knowledge can never go beyond the limits of possible sense impressions without losing its claim to universally valid truth.

With respect to mathematics, Hume drew the full consequences of the extreme psychological nominalism to which he adhered, and which he also ascribed to Berkeley. He considered it to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries of his time that—as Berkeley had established—all universal ideas are nothing other than particular ones, which by universal names acquire an extended meaning, and thereby evoke other individual ideas in the imagination which exhibit a resemblance with the first.

Even abstract mathematical “Ideas” are always individual in themselves. They can represent a great number of individual Ideas by means of a general name, but they remain mere “images in the mind” of individual objects.

The word triangle, for instance, is in fact always connected with the Idea of a particular degree of quantity and quality (e.g. equal angles, equilateralness). We can never form a universal concept of a triangle that would really be separate from such individual characteristics. Our impressions are always entirely

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1 As we saw above, Berkeley has later on abandoned this extreme nominalism.
The development of the basic antinomy in the individual: "tis a principle generally receiv'd in philosophy that everything in nature is individual, and that "tis utterly absurd to suppose a triangle really existent, which has no precise proportion of sides and angles. If this therefore be absurd in fact and reality, it must also be absurd in Idea; since nothing of which we can form a clear and distinct Idea is absurd and impossible"\(^1\).

This was the radical sensationalistic nominalism LEIBNIZ combated from the very beginning. He knew that it must necessarily undermine the foundations of the mathematical ideal of science. We shall subsequently see, however, that HUME did not draw the sceptical consequences of this nominalism in respect to his psychological ideal of science.

The entire view in HUME's Treatise concerning the Ideas of space and time and their infinite divisibility must be understood in the light of this radical sensationalism.

In HUME the certainty of mathematical knowledge remains stringently connected with the sensory impressions and their mutual sensory relations. If mathematicians seek to find a rational standard of exactness, which transcends our possible sense impressions, they are in the field of pure fictions. These fictions are as useless as they are incomprehensible and, in any case, they cannot satisfy the criterion of truth.

HUME's psychologistic concept of space. Space as a complex of coloured points (minima sensibilia).

HUME's conception of space and time is entirely in this line. The concept of space can only be the copy of sensory impressions of "coloured points". The basic denominator, which HUME chose to compare the modal aspects of reality does not allow any meaning to be ascribed to the concept of space other than a visual and tactual one.

If this psychical space is a complex sensory impression, it must exist in the sensory relation between simple impressions. In that case the "coloured points" — as the smallest perceptible impressions of extension or minima sensibilia — function as such simple impressions, and the concept of space is a mere copy of them. And these points must ever possess a sensory extension which itself is no longer divisible.

In this view the concept of the original mathematical point,

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\(^1\) *Treatise* I, Part I, Sect. VII (p. 327).
that never can have any extension, is untenable. Even in the "order of thought" it cannot have any truth or universal validity. For, according to Hume, anything which is absurd "in fact and reality" — that is to say, anything which cannot be given in sensory impressions — is also absurd "in Idea".

The concept of mathematical equality is treated in the same way: "The only useful notion of equality or inequality is derived from the whole united appearance and the comparison of particular objects" (read: particular sensory impressions). On the other hand the so-called exact standard of equality between two magnitudes in "pure geometry" is plainly imaginary. "For as the very Idea of equality is that of such a particular appearance corrected by juxta-position or a common measure, the notion of any correction beyond that we have instruments and art to make, is a mere fiction of the mind, and useless as well as incomprehensible".

The same holds for mathematical definitions of straight lines, curves, planes, etc.

Hume admits, that the fictions concealed in such exact definitions are very natural and usual. Mathematicians may with ever more exact measuring instruments try to correct the inexactitude of the sensory perceptions which take place without the aid of such instruments. From this the thought naturally arises that one should finally be able to reach an ideal standard of accuracy beyond the reach of the senses. But this Idea lacks all validity. The measuring instruments remain sensory instruments whose use remains bound to the standard of sensory perceptions. "The first principles" (viz. of mathesis) "are founded on the imagination and senses: The conclusion, therefore, can never go beyond, much less contradict these faculties".

In contradiction to Riehl's interpretation, it is evident from the following statement, that this thesis is not restricted to the question as to whether or not space is infinitely divisible, but is actually concerned with the entire claims of "pure geometry"

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1 Treatise I, Part II, Sect. IV (p. 353/4).
2 This entire course of thought is misunderstood by Riehl when he thinks that Hume recognizes an exact standard for "pure geometry" independent of sense experience.
to ideal exactness: "Now since these Ideas (i.e. of exact standards) are so loose and uncertain, I wou'd fain ask any mathematician, what infallible assurance he has, not only of the more intricate and obscure propositions of his science, but of the most vulgar and obvious principles? How can he prove to me, for instance, that two right lines cannot have one common segment? Or that 'tis impossible to draw more than one right line betwixt any two points?... The original standard of a right line is in reality nothing but a certain general appearance; and 'tis evident right lines may be made to concur with each other, and yet correspond to this standard, tho' corrected by all the means either practicable or imaginable".

All that Hume taught here with respect to the concept of space applies even more strongly to the concept of time. For in similar fashion, he gave only a sensationalist sense to the latter. The Idea of time is formed out of the sequence of changing sensory "impressions" as well as "Ideas". As a relation of sensory succession it can never exist apart from such successive sensory Ideas, as Newton thought of his "absolute mathematical time". Five notes played on a flute, give us the impression and the concept of time. Time is not a sixth impression which presents itself to our hearing or to one of our other sense organs. Nor is it a sixth impression which the mind discovers in itself by means of "reflection". Therefore, a completely static and unchangeable object can never give us the impression of "duration" or time.

All false concepts in mathematics, which pretend to give us an ideal exactness beyond the testimony of the sense organs, arise through the natural associations of resemblance, contiguity, and causality. And, according to Hume, the first of these three is "the most fertile source of error."

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1 *Ibid.*, p. 356/7: The statement in question to which Riehl appeals is certainly not clear, when Hume writes further: "At the same time we may learn the reason why geometry fails of evidence in this simple point" (i.e. the pretended infinite divisibility of space) "while all its other reasonings command our fullest assent and approbation." For it is just this very point which strikes in its entirety the claim of mathematics to exactness!

The position of arithmetic in Hume's sensationalism.

Now it may appear that Hume still granted the standard of ideal mathematical exactness at least to algebra and arithmetic. He writes in part III, sect. 1 of his Treatise: "There remain, therefore, algebra and arithmetic as the only sciences, in which we can carry on a chain of reasoning to any degree of intricacy, and yet preserve a perfect exactness and certainty. We are possesst of a precise standard, by which we can judge of the equality and proportion of numbers; and according as they correspond or not to that standard, we determine their relations, without any possibility of error. When two numbers are so combin'd, as that the one has always an unite answering to every unite of the other, we pronounce them equal; and 'tis for want of such a standard of equality in extension, that geometry can scarce be esteem'd a perfect and infallible science". But has the meaning of number in Hume's system in fact escaped from being rendered psychological? Not in the least. The logicistic conception of arithmetic (held to by Descartes and Leibniz) is here only seemingly maintained.

In Hume's thought, arithmetical unity as an abstract concept can only be the copy of a single impression. Number as unity in the quantitative relations is a fiction. The real unity, which alone has real existence, and which necessarily lies at the foundation of the abstract concept of number, "must be perfectly indivisible and incapable of being resolved into any lesser unity". Number can only be composed of such indivisible unities. Twenty men exist, but only because there exist one, two, three men.

What then is the true unit? In Hume's system it can only be an impression which is perceived separately and cannot be resolved into other impressions. As Laing has correctly observed, this was the conception of unity which is to be found in Sextus Empiricus. Let us now return to the "minima sensibilia", the coloured points of space.

A sum of units can in Hume's system only be grounded on a sensory relation between individual impressions. Hume does

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1 Ibid., p. 374.
4 In Part I, Sect. vii (p. 330) Hume introduces a virtually adequate concept of number: "when we mention any great number, such as a
The development of the basic antinomy in the not see the inner antinomy in which such a reduction of the original modal meaning of number to that of sensory impression must necessarily involve itself. He does not see that sensory multiplicity pre-supposes the original multiplicity in the modal sense of the numerical aspect, and that in a sensory multiplicity as such no arithmetical meaning can hide. In his system the arithmetical laws which rule the necessary quantitative relations among all possible numbers, must be reduced to psychical laws ruling the relations of the sensory impressions. Thus, even arithmetic must abandon all claim to being an exact science. Not only the irrational, the differential and the complex functions of number, but also the simple fractions have no valid ground. Even simple addition, subtraction, and multiplication of whole numbers lack a genuine mathematical foundation in his system. It appears from the exceptional position which he ascribes to arithmetic in contradistinction to geometry, that Hume did not expressly draw this conclusion. It seems he did not dare to draw it. Moreover, his entire exposition with respect to number must be judged extremely summary, vague, and intrinsically contradictory.

Nevertheless, the destructive conclusion here intended, lay hidden inexorably in his psychological starting-point.

Hume's retrogression into the Lockian conception of mathematics remains completely inexplicable on the sensationalistic basis of his system.

The position which Hume in his later work, Enquiry concerning human understanding, assumes with respect to mathematics, is actually a relapse into the Lockian standpoint; it is a capitulation in face of common opinion concerning the exactness of mathematical thought.

Locke, however, could base his view upon his dualism between sensation and reflection. But in Hume's sensationalistic nominalism, no single tenable point of contact is to be found thousand, the mind has generally no adequate Idea of it, but only a power of producing such an Idea by its adequate Idea of the decimals, under which the number is comprehended." But even the concept of the decimals in Hume's system only permit themselves to be maintained as the copy of a sensory multiplicity of simple impressions.

1 Green, op. cit., p. 254, thinks that Hume saw the impossibility of reducing arithmetic to sensory relations.
for the traditional conception with regard to the creative character of mathematical thought.

At the utmost, the claims of mathematics to exactness and to independence of all sensory impressions can be judged valid in a pragmatic sense. For in the final analysis in both his Treatise and Enquiry, Hume did not wish to contest the practical utility of mathematics in natural science.

And, as it will subsequently appear, faith in the exactness of mathematics and in the objective universal validity of the causal judgments of physics can be explained by him from imagination and the psychical laws of association of human nature. By means of the latter he finally intended to arrest the radical Pyrrhonist scepticism. There is, however, in his system no room for the real mathematical science-ideal.

§ 4 - THE DISSOLUTION OF THE IDEALS OF SCIENCE AND OF PERSONALITY BY THE PSYCHOLOGISTIC CRITIQUE

In Hume the creative function has actually been transferred from mathematical to psychological thought. In the latter he thought he had found his Archimedean point which needs "nulla re extra mentem ad existendum".

Hume's criticism of the concept of substance and his interpretation of naïve experience.

In the rationalistic metaphysics both the ideal of science and that of personality had been founded on a concept of substance. It is against this metaphysical concept that Hume, on the basis of his new psychological view of the science-ideal, now directs his penetrating criticism.

As his starting point he took the belief of naïve experience in the existence of things in the external world — things which have a continuing reality independent of our consciousness. We shall later show in detail that his interpretation of naïve experience is a falsification of the latter by the realistic "Abbild-theorie" (image-theory). Generally speaking, contemporary Humanistic epistemology has still not gone beyond this false conception of naïve experience. Hume at least does not intend to impute to the naïve experience of reality a theory concerning the relationship between consciousness and reality. He observes that the faith of naïve man in the existence of a reality which is independent of our consciousness cannot
rest upon a theory. It must rather be explained in terms of a natural impulse of human feeling. Hume thinks naïve man does not distinguish between his "impressions" and the "things in the external world", he identifies the latter with the former.

It was philosophy that originated the distinction between the reality of sensory impressions, which are real only in appearance, and the true reality of "things in themselves", the reality of the "substances". On theoretical grounds it rejected the misunderstood naïve conception of the external world.

Hume deemed this philosophical view to be false and dogmatic. In contradistinction to scepticism and the false mathematical metaphysics, he wished to give an account of naïve experience by explaining it in terms of the psychical laws of association inherent in human nature.

Although this interpretation is basically erroneous, and must undoubtedly falsify naïve experience in a functionalistic way, yet, in the face of the rationalistic metaphysics of the mathematical ideal of science, it affords us the important critical point of view, that naïve experience is no theory of reality.

Hume starts from his psychological basic denominator for all the modal aspects of meaning. In our impressions there is not a single one which gives us a ground to form any concept of a constant "thing in itself", which would be independent of our consciousness. Nothing is given in experience but the mul-

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1 Treatise I, Part IV, Sect. 1 (pag. 474/5): "Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel;"

"...belief is more properly an act of the sensitive part than of the cogitative part of our nature." Treatise I, Part IV, Sect. I (pag. 475). From this it is clearly evident, that Hume reduces the modal function of faith to that of feeling.

2 Cf. especially Treatise I, Part IV, Sect. II (p. 483): "And indeed, whatever convincing arguments philosophers may fancy they can produce to establish the belief of objects independent of the mind, 'tis obvious these arguments are known but to very few, and that 'tis not by them, that children, peasants, and the greatest part of mankind are induc'd to attribute objects to some impressions, and deny them to others. Accordingly we find, that all the conclusions, which the vulgar form on this head, are directly contrary to those, which are confirm'd by philosophy." These remarks are excellent!

3 Treatise I, Part IV, Sect. II (p. 479): "To begin with the senses, 'tis evident these faculties are incapable of giving rise to the notion of the
tiplicity of the sensory impressions which continually arise and fade away.

Like Berkeley, Hume abandoned the distinction, still made by Locke, between the primary qualities (extension, motion, solidity) which belong to the things themselves, and the secondary qualities (colour, sound, odour, taste, heat, etc.) which have only a subjective character. But while Berkeley could seek an explanation for the belief in an external world in his metaphysical conception of God, this escape was not open to Hume. The positivistic psychologism of the latter had no room for a metaphysical theology.

There is nothing to be found in our impressions which gives us any right to assume that the "primary qualities", independent of our consciousness, belong to things of the external world. The belief in the "Ding an sich" can only be explained in terms of the natural laws of the imaginative faculty.

The "natural associations" are here active and they rest upon the temporal succession of Ideas. They necessarily lead fantasy beyond that which is given. They lead metaphysics to its false concept of substance.

The task of true philosophy is to indicate the impressions which furnish naïve experience ("common sense") with a basis for its belief in the independent world of things. Hume supposes that in this way he has explained the origin of the false concept of substance. Metaphysical philosophy actually did nothing else but relate the natural associations to a false concept. So Hume wishes to show that his philosophy is in agreement with naïve experience ("the vulgar view"), while, in contrast, metaphysics has from this very experience drawn a false concept of substance.

He supposes that there are two characteristic relations to

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continu'd existence of their objects, after they no longer appear to the senses. For that is a contradiction in terms..."

"That our senses offer not their impressions, as the images of something distinct, or independent, and external is evident; because they convey to us nothing but a single perception, and never give us the least intimation of anything beyond. A single perception can never produce the Idea of a double existence, but by some interference either of the reason or imagination."

1 Ibid., p. 482: "Now 'tis evident, that, whatever may be our philosophical opinion, colours, sounds, heat and cold, as far as appears to the senses, exist after the same manner with motion and solidity!"
be indicated in our impressions, namely the constancy and the coherence of impressions, which actually give the foundation for the naïve faith in the existence of an independent world of things. Constancy indicates a temporarily continuous uniformity or resemblance in specific impressions in spite of their fluctual character in temporal succession.

The trees, mountains, and houses, which I see before me at the moment, have always appeared to me in the same resemblance of impressions. Once I have turned my head or closed my eyes, no longer retaining them in my field of vision, I see them before me immediately afterward, without the least alteration, when I again hold them in view.\footnote{Treatise, Part IV, Sect. II (p. 484)}

But this first relation of my sensory impressions is not yet enough to establish the belief in a constant empirical reality of things. If it were to be decisive, this faith would be bound to the unchangeability of impressions. There arises a problem, however, from the fact that naïve experience accepts the constant reality of things in spite of all changes in their properties and mutual relations.

Therefore, only in conjunction with the law of their coherence can the constancy of impressions supply a sufficient foundation for the belief in the constant reality of things. It is a law of association, namely that of the contiguity or coherence of impressions in time, through which we fill up by our imagination the impressions, actually given in a gradual discontinuity, so that they become a constant and continuous reality of things. The imagination (not logical thought) leaps, as it were, over the gaps in the temporal sequence of sensory impressions and fuses together the successive similar impressions, so that they become identical and continuously existing things.

The creative function of imagination and the way in which the creation-motive of the Humanistic ideal of science is transmitted to psychological thought.

This fusion of impressions is executed (by a natural necessity) through the influence of relations. It is executed through the relations of resemblance and coherence between impressions. The imaginative faculty follows the separate impressions, and on the basis of the resemblance between them passes from the one to the other. Thereby, it creates a continuous bond between
the impressions, and this bond has been incorrectly interpreted by metaphysics as being a substantial connection within the things themselves.

We speak of an identical thing, whereas actually the only data that we have, are similar impressions, separated in time, but united by associational relations.

So the creative function is shifted in Hume's theory from mathematical to psychological thought. At every point he attempts to give a purely psychological explanation of our naïve experience of reality, by means of the laws of association ruling our sensory impressions. The sensory aspect of this experience is absolutized in a psychologistic way.

He rejected the attempt, undertaken by the metaphysics of the mathematical science-ideal, to construct a noumenal world of things out of "creative" mathematical thought.

Mathematical rationalism had sought to defend the foundations of the science-ideal against the consequences of the postulate of continuity by means of the doctrine of innate Ideas. The latter is rejected by Hume in a much more radical way than by Locke. In his entire analysis of "human nature" Hume was primarily concerned with the vindication of the absolute sovereignty of psychological thought. In favour of the latter he abandoned all the dogmas of the mathematical ideal of science. And I would especially call attention to the fact that he desired to explain the claims to logical exactness of the supposed creative mathematical thought in terms of the same psychological principle which he had employed in the construction of the world of things of naïve experience, namely, the creative function of fantasy: "I have already observ'd in examining the foundation of mathematics", so he writes in this context, "that the imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue, even when its object fails it, and like a galley put in motion by the oars, carries on its course without any new impulse. This I have assign'd for the reason why after considering several loose standards of equality, and correcting them by each other, we proceed to imagine so correct and exact a standard of that relation, as is not liable to the least error or variation."

1 Translator's Note: As we shall see in more detail in Vol. III naïve experience is characterized by total structures of individuality, which are never to be explained in terms of the association of separate sensory impressions. D. H. F.
The development of the basic antinomy in the

The same principle makes us easily entertain this opinion of
the continu'd existence of body. Objects have a certain coherence
even as they appear to our senses; but this coherence is much
greater and more uniform, if we suppose the objects to have a
continu'd existence; and as the mind is once in the train of
observing a uniformity among objects, it naturally continues,
till it renders the uniformity as complete as possible.”

In other words, psychical imagination or fantasy is the
creator of the world of things of naıve experience. It is also the
origin of the claims of mathematical thought to exactness. How-
ever, this is true only in appearance.

For it is sovereign psychological thought by which Hume
wishes to account for this situation of things, and which is placed
as such above the “creative” fantasy. It is the “creative” power
of this thought which is imputed to the faculty of imagination,
since the latter is not able to isolate itself in a theoretical way.

So it is actually psychological thought that is elevated by Hume
to the position of ἀρχή, origin and lawgiver of the cosmos of
experience.

The fact that he failed to account for this transcendental Idea
of origin, the fact that he degraded logical thought itself to a
dependent image of sensory fantasy only proves that Hume had
not yet arrived at a transcendental critical self-reflexion.

The laws of association of his psychological ideal of science
serve indeed the same purpose as the mathematical lex continuï
in Leibniz. In an analogous manner Hume employed them as an
ἐναρθητική, as the foundation of the reality of experience. Only
the basic denominator of the science-ideal was changed. In
Hume, too, constant reality is resolved into a process which
conforms to fixed laws. But in him this process is a psychologi-
cal one.

Hume destroys the metaphysical foundation of the
rationalist ideal of personality.

Unlike Berkeley, Hume did not restrict his radical criticism
of the concept of substance to the concept of the material
substance of nature. He extended it to the metaphysical
concept of a spiritual substance in which the rationalist ideal of
personality sought its sole foundation. In a really superb critical

manner Hume demonstrated that (from the standpoint of immanence-philosophy) the whole conflict between materialism and idealism is only a conflict between "brothers of the same house". The idealists called Spinoza an atheist, because he did not accept a soul-substance. Hume correctly observed that both of these standpoints are rooted in the same metaphysical principle. Consequently, if one calls Spinoza an atheist, then with equal reason one must label the idealistic metaphysics of the immortal soul as atheistic. The idealists arrive at their metaphysical theory of the immateriality, simplicity, and immortality of the soul by the same sort of rational speculations: "It appears, then, that to whatever side we turn, the same difficulties follow us, and that we cannot advance one step towards establishing the simplicity and immateriality of the soul, without preparing the way for a dangerous and irrecoverable atheism".\(^1\)

Hume arrived at this conclusion on the basis of his psychologistic standpoint, according to which the universe of our experience is in the final analysis resolved into impressions, and into Ideas which are derived from them. From this standpoint the opposition between idealism and materialism must, in the nature of the case, be a relative one.

Hume had brought the different modal aspects of temporal reality under a psychological basic denominator. Therefore, in keeping with his honest critique, he must also reject the soul-substance. In Descartes and Leibniz the ego, the personality, was identified with mathematical thought and was hypostatized as a thinking substance. Seeking after the origin of this concept Hume states that the ego is not itself an impression, because it is always conceived of as something to which are related all impressions and ideas\(^2\). The "ego is in truth nothing more than a collective concept of the different series of Ideas which are ordered constantly in accordance with the laws of association. Hume observes: "Nowhere in my experience do I encounter myself apart from an Idea and I can never perceive anything other than Ideas." There is in the soul no single faculty which in time remains unchangeably the same: "The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass,

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2 "Self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference." *Treatise* I, Part IV, Sect. VI (p. 533).
re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations”\(^1\).

But, even this comparison of the mind with the theatre of our “perceptions” is misleading. For the mind itself consists of nothing other than “perceptions”.

Even the illusion, which, in spite of everything, ever causes “the ego” to appear to us as a constant and self-sufficient entity, must be explained in terms of the associational law of the resemblance and coherence of impressions. Because the contents of the Ideas of a particular moment are only imperceptibly different from those of the following moment, our imagination easily passes over from the one phase of our “spiritual existence” to the following.

This continuity in the associational process causes the illusion of an absolutely identical and singular personality or “selfhood”: “From thence it evidently follows, that identity is nothing really belonging to those different perceptions, and uniting them together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them because of the union of their ideas in the imagination, \textit{when we reflect upon them}”\(^2\). (I am italicizing).

The radical self-dissolution of the ideals of science and of personality in Hume’s philosophy.

In a truly radical manner, the psychological science-ideal has here conquered the ideal of personality by destroying its supposed metaphysical foundation. In his psychological method Hume could no longer find a way back to the “free and sovereign” personality.

The ideal of science had in fact no other foundation for the “sovereign personality” than the metaphysical concept of substance. In Hume’s philosophy, however, even the science-ideal in its claim to conceive “nature” in the sense of “the outer world”, dissolves itself in a really radical manner. This is evident from the famous critique of the principle of causality, which received its clearest formulation in the \textit{Enquiry}. We shall see that in this critique Hume not only undermined the foundations of mathematical physics, but at the same time those of his own associationism in which the science-ideal had acquired its psychological turn.

\(^1\) \textit{Treatise} I, Part. IV, Sect. VI (p. 534).
\(^2\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 540.
§ 5 - CONTINUATION: THE CRITICISM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY AS A CRITIQUE OF EXPERIENCE

At the outset the principle of causality had been elevated by the metaphysics of the mathematical science-ideal to the rank of an eternal logical truth. Leibniz broke with this purely logical conception, and conceived of causality as a "factual verity". But he, too, held to its ideal logical foundation (viz. on the principium rationis sufficientis) in our judgment.

Hume's criticism of this principle became a critique of experience in the sense later on ascribed to it by Kant. It aimed at an investigation of the ground of validity of all theoretical synthetic judgments which claim to be universally valid and necessary, and this on the supposition that experience has no other data than sensory impressions.

Like Kant, Hume did not make any fundamental distinction between naïve experience and natural science!

According to Hume, all "experience" goes beyond the sensory impressions which alone are given. We can only speak of experience when epistemological judgments of supposed universal validity and necessity are given with reference to the sensory impressions and when from a sensorily given fact we conclude to another fact that is not given.

This is only possible with the aid of the principle of the connection of cause and effect. Through this principle alone can the relations of identity and of time and place transcend that which is given in sense data. "Here then it appears, that of those three relations, which depend not upon the mere Ideas, the only one, that can be trac'd beyond our senses, and inform us of existences and objects, which we do not see or feel, is causation".

If the principle of causality with its kernel, the necessity in the relation of cause and effect, is really to possess an established validity, then a basis in the sensory impressions must be indicated for the Idea of causality. The foundation in question can only be sought in the relations of impressions.

An analysis of the Idea of causality shows that two relations, viz. that of contiguity and that of the priority in time of one event before an other, are essential elements of the relation of causality. And these relations are in fact sensorily given.

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1 Treatise I, Part III, Sect. II (p. 377).
2 Ibid., p. 397.
The development of the basic antinomy in the

But the Idea of causality very decidedly goes beyond this sensory relations. For the judgment of causality does not state a mere *post hoc*, but pretends to be able to indicate a *propter hoc*, a necessity.

The problem pertaining to the necessary connection of cause and effect is to Hume the problem of the origin of natural laws as such.

To Hume the problem with respect to the foundation of the relation of cause and effect becomes in the final analysis the problem of the origin of natural laws as such.

Mathematical physics had based the certainty of its results upon the law of causality as a functional law of physical relations. Descartes called this law an "innate idea". Leibniz saw in it the foundational principle of all judgments of experience, an ideal rational ground by means of which we can give an account of empirical phenomena, but which remains bound to the "factual verities". To Hume, however, this very principle of causality became problematical, insofar as it was conceived of as the principle of a necessary connection between a prior and subsequent event in the outer world.

Hume rejected as sophisms the attempts made by Hobbes, Clarke and Locke to demonstrate the logical necessity in the inference from cause to effect. There is no object that as a "cause" would logically imply the existence of any other object. The denial of a necessary connection between cause and effect does not lead to a single logical contradiction.

Only by experience can we conclude from the existence of any object to the existence of another. With respect to this experience the situation is as follows: We remember that, after certain sorts of facts in space and time, we have constantly seen other facts follow. For instance we remember that, after the sensory perception of fire, we have regularly experienced the sensation of warmth. Thereby, a new relation is discovered which constitutes an essential element of the connection between cause and effect, namely, the constant connection of two sorts of impressions which follow each other in time.

In this relation there is nothing that in itself implies a necessity which would possess an objective validity: "From the mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, there never

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1 *Treatise* I, Part III, Sect. VI (p. 389).
will arise any new original Idea, such as that of a necessary connexion; and the number of impressions has in this case no more effect than if we confin'd ourselves to one only”\(^1\).

According to **Hume**, the law of causality is only to be maintained as a psychical law of association. Nevertheless, every legitimate foundation for the ideal of science in a mathematical physical sense is lacking.

**Hume** thought that he could only maintain the law of causality in the sense of a psychical law of association, which through habit compels the mind to proceed without any reasoning from that which is given to that which is not given.

In his **Treatise** he still took the trouble to indicate an impression as the psychological origin of the concept of causality. Here his argument is as follows: It is of course true, that from the mere repetition of similar events subsequent to previously perceived similar antecedents, nothing objectively new arises which is in fact sensorily perceived in each instance. But the constant resemblance in the different instances does raise a new subjective impression in the mind, namely, a tendency to pass over from an instantly given impression to the Idea of another impression which in the past repeatedly occurred after the former. This is then the impression which corresponds to the Idea of causality\(^2\).

In his **Enquiry** **Hume** no longer took the trouble to bring his theory of the concept of causality in agreement with his doctrine concerning the relation between “impressions” and “Ideas”. In fact this was impossible, because repetition can by no means give a new impression. Therefore **Hume** immediately introduces habit in connecting Ideas as a natural law.

The way in which **Hume**’s **Critique** finally undermines the foundations of his own psychological science-ideal.

It is only habit which compels us to join the Idea of an event B, which repeatedly followed the same event A, with the Idea

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\(^1\) **Treatise** I, Part III, Sect. VI (p. 389).

\(^2\) **Treatise**, Part. III, Sect. XIV (p. 459: “Tho’ the several resembling instances, which give rise to the Idea of power, have no influence on each other, and can never produce any new quality in the object, which can be the model of that Idea, yet the observation of this resemblance produces a new impression in the mind, which is its real model.”)
The development of the basic antinomy in the
of the latter. Habit, in the constant perception of like consequences after like antecedents, is the only foundation for the judgment of causality. The subjective sequence of Ideas is incorrectly interpreted as an objective necessity in the relations between the contents of the Ideas.

The "propter hoc" — and with that the entire necessary coherence of phenomena — can never be demonstrated or understood rationally. It can only be believed. This faith is only "some sentiment or feeling" that accompanies our Idea. But implicitly, this acknowledgement destroys the foundation of the psychical laws of association, as psychical laws of "human nature". For in these laws, too, there is implied a necessary connection between Ideas in temporal sequence: "nature by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel".

Hume even admits that he cannot account for these psychical laws of nature and he appeals to them in a purely dogmatic fashion as to "a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well-known by its effects". Thus he not only undermined the Humanistic metaphysics of the rationalistic mathematical science-ideal and of the ideal of personality with its three themes: deity, freedom and immortality, but through his psychologistic epistemology he also shook the ground-pillars of the ideals of personality and of science as such.

Hume disregards the synthesis of logical and psychical meaning in his psychological basic denominator.

In keeping with the postulate of continuity of the ideal of science in its psychologized sense, Hume levelled the modal boundaries of meaning between the law-spheres, and thereby involved himself in evident antinomies. He was not conscious of the fact that his reduction of the entire given reality

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1 "All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent." Enquiry, Sect. V, Part. I.

2 Treatise I, Part. IV, Sect. 1 (pag. 474/5).

3 Enquiry, Sect. v, Part. 1. It is true, that again and again in the Enquiry the insight appears, that the law of causality must be postulated as the foundation for all events. (See WENTSCHER, Geschichte des Kausalproblems, 1921, p. 102). But Hume's psychologism compels him to seek the ground of the Idea of causality exclusively in subjective associations.
to a psychological basic denominator rests upon a fundamental rational abstraction; he did not understand that only theoretical thought, by synthesizing analytical and psychical modal meaning, is in a position to isolate the psychical aspect of reality. That he failed to acquire this insight is evident from his attempt to obliterate, in the face of the psychical aspect of sensation, the original sense of the logical aspect and to reduce the concept to a mere copy of the psychical impression of feeling.

Hume had sharply recognized the antinomy (previously analyzed by Bayle and Berkeley) of the metaphysical concept of substance, an antinomy, which originates from the fact that a product of thought is proclaimed to be absolutely independent of thought, and to be a “thing in itself”\(^1\).

But he did not see the inner antinomy which lay in his own absolutizing of the psychical (feeling-)aspect of reality. He was unconscious of the antinomy which arises from the attempt to reduce the meaning of the logical aspect to the psychical “in itself”. In truth his basic denominator for all given reality was a *psycho-logical* one, and not merely *psychical*.

In empirical reality the psychical aspect of meaning only exists in the full coherence of all the modal aspects. Only theoretical thought can abstract it, and within its modal cadre isolate the objective sensory impressions, the subjective emotions and the images of sensory phantasy. How then can the logical concept itself be comprehended as a mere image of a sensory impression? Whoever attempts to do so, is guilty of undermining the logical criterion of truth, and necessarily involves himself in logical contradiction. Where only psychical laws of association rule, there is no room for a veritable normative criterion of truth, there every concept of natural law becomes meaningless.

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\(^1\) This antinomy is excellently characterized by Fichte in his *Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre* (Sämtl. Werke 1, S. 491), when he remarks in opposition to those who have accepted the “Ding an sich”: “Ihr Ding ist durch ihr Denken hervorgebracht; nun aber soll es gleich darauf wieder ein Ding an sich, d.i. nicht durch Denken hervorgebracht seyn. Ich verstehe sie wahrhaftig nicht; ich kann mich weder diesen Gedanken denken, noch einen Verstand denken, mit welchem man diesen Gedanken denkt...” (“Their “thing” has been produced by their thought; nevertheless it should immediately after that again be conceived of as a “thing in itself”, i.e. as not being produced by thought. Truly, I don’t understand them; I can neither think this Idea, nor can I think of an understanding by means of which this Idea is thought...”).
The development of the basic antinomy in the

Thus, in his naturalistic psychologized system, Hume has also undermined his own theory's claim to truth.

§ 6 - THE PRELUDE TO THE SHIFTING OF PRIMACY TO THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY

The extension of the psychologized science-ideal over the modal boundaries of the aesthetic, juridical, moral and faith-aspects.

Even though Hume accepts psychological "feeling", in its modal subject-object-relation (emotion-sensation), as the basic denominator for all modal aspects of reality, yet he recognizes a relative modal diversity of meaning in the cosmos. Within the absolutized psychical law-sphere, the aesthetic, juridical, moral and faith aspects of experience were distinguished by him from the logical one (which he had also psychologized). Nevertheless, the science-ideal, with its psychologically conceived law of causality, arbitrarily exceeds these modal boundaries.

In Leibniz all modal aspects of meaning are made to be modi of mathematical thought. In Hume they become modi of his psychological basic denominator. So the aesthetic aspect, too, becomes a modus of psychical feeling: "Pleasure and pain... are not only necessary attendants of beauty and deformity, but constitute their very essence". The same can be stated in respect to the remaining normative modal aspects of experience. Hume presented a mechanistic theory of human emotions, entirely in accord with the tradition handed down by Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, and directly connected with Locke. On this point the latter had reproduced Hobbes' theory in the form in which it acquired its great influence in the English, French, and Scottish philosophy of the Enlightenment. For Hume — as it had been for Hobbes — this theory was the foundation of his ethical philosophy and of his theoretical view of faith: "in the production and conduct of the passions, there is a certain regular mechanism, which is susceptible of as accurate a disquisition, as the laws of motion, optics, hydrostatics, or any part of physical nature".

The laws of association are the sole explanatory principles which Hume will here employ. They are grounded on the principle of the uniformity of human nature at all times.

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1 Treatise II, Part I, Sect. VIII (p. 96).
2 Diss. on the Passions, Sect. VI.
The psychologically comprehended science-ideal that lies at the foundation of this entire explanatory method, is clearly formulated by Hume in the following statement: “We find in the course of nature that though the effects be many, the principles from which they arise are commonly but few and simple, and that it is the sign of an unskilful naturalist to have recourse to a different quality, in order to explain every different operation. How much more must this be true with regard to the human mind”.

We saw that the emotions form a second class of impressions next to those which belong to the sensory function of perception and to the corporeal feelings of pleasure and pain. Hume designated the first mentioned impressions as “reflective” and deemed them to be derived from the original sensual impressions either directly or indirectly through the intermediary of an Idea of a sensory impression. He therefore called the emotions “secondary” impressions, in contradistinction to the “original” ones of “sensation”.

He divided the “secondary impressions” into two classes, the calm and the vehement ones. He considered the emotions of beauty and ugliness as “calm” impressions. Under the “vehement” he subsumed all such passions as love and hate, sorrow and joy, pride and humility.

The “passions” themselves were further divided into “direct” and “indirect”. Under the former he understood all such which arise directly out of the elementary feelings of pleasure or pain, such as desire, aversion, sorrow, joy, hope, fear and despair; under the latter, all such which, although originating from the same source, nevertheless, do so only by combining other qualities. Pride and humility, ambition, vanity, love, hate, jealousy, compassion, generosity, malice, and so on, are considered to be “indirect” passions.

All these emotions appear in human nature in connection with certain Ideas and objects; moreover, they do so in a regular conformity to natural laws. Hume sharply distinguishes the causes of emotions from their objects. The selfhood can never be the cause, but can only be the object of a passion. For in Hume’s criticism of the concept of substance the selfhood was

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1 Treatise II, Part. I, Sect. I (p. 81).
2 Ibid. (p. 75).
3 Treatise II, Par. I, Sect. II (p. 77).
The development of the basic antinomy in the
resolved into a collective concept of the associational series of
ideas. In the case of pride and humility, one's own selfhood is
the object of the emotions, whereas in the case of hate and
love, the emotion has other selves for its object.

The cooperation between the associations of Ideas
and those of passions.

All the various causes of the "passions" are now reduced to
the simple natural principles of association.

The impressions are as much associated as the Ideas, but with
the fundamental difference that the former in the temporal
sequence combine only in accordance with the natural associat-
tional law of resemblance, whereas the Ideas are, in addition,
connected according to the associational laws of contiguity and
causality.

Because the emotions are always accompanied in a natural
way by certain Ideas, also the associations of the Ideas and
the associations of the passions combine in the same object:
"Thus a man, who, by any injury from another, is very much
discompos'd and ruffled in his temper, is apt to find a hundred
subjects of discontent, impatience, fear, and other uneasy pas-
sions; especially, if he can discover these subjects in or near the
person, who was the cause of his first passion. Those principles,
which forward the transition of Ideas, here concur with those,
which operate on the passions; and both uniting in one action,
bestow on the mind a double impulse. The new passion, there-
fore, must arise with so much greater violence, and the transi-
tion to it must be rendered so much easy and natural."

A mere association of Ideas is consequently not sufficient to
originate passions. In the sphere of the emotional or secondary impres-
sions, the laws of association are only valid on the basis of a
natural and original connection between an Idea and a passion.

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1 Treatise II, Part I, Sect. IV, p. 82: "'Tis evident, then, there is an
attraction or association among impressions, as well as among Ideas; tho'
with this remarkable difference, that Ideas are associated by resem-
blance, contiguity, and causation; and impressions only by resemblance."

2 Ibid., p. 83.

3 Ibid., Sect. IX (p. 101): "From this reasoning, as well as from un-
doubted experience, we may conclude, that an association of Ideas, how-
ever necessary, is not alone sufficient to give rise to any passion.

'Tis evident, then, that when the mind feels the passion either of pride
The way in which Hume's psychologized ideal of science destroys the conception of the freedom of the will in the sense of the mathematical ideal of science.

In this entire psychological mechanism of "human nature" there remains no room for the freedom of the will. Hume's standpoint in this respect is quite different from that of Locke and Leibniz.

Locke could leave some room to the freedom of the will in the indeterministic sense of a "liberum arbitrium indifferentiae" or "liberum arbitrium equilibrii", since he did not dissolve human self-hood and personality into a mechanism of psychical associations, and held to the dualism of reflection and sensation. In Hume's psychologized system, such an idea of freedom must be discarded equally with the conception, according to the mathematical science-ideal, that the freedom of the will consists in the fact that it is determined by clear and distinct thought.

The metaphysical bulwark of the rationalistic Humanist ideal of personality, i.e. the selfhood, concentrated in its mathematical thought, as a substance, as "res cogitans", had been destroyed by Hume's psychological criticism. And with equal force, the content of this ideal of personality (autonomous freedom) had to be sacrificed to the psychologized science-ideal. The "will" is therefore conceived of as a mere inner impression which we feel, when we consciously execute a new corporeal motion or produce a new idea in our mind.

This psychical impression which we call "will" is as necessarily determined as are the movements of psychical phenomena. There is a necessary causal connection between human actions or humility upon the appearance of a related object, there is, beside the relation or transition of thought, an emotion or original impression produc'd by some other principle."

1 In his Essay concerning Human Understanding II, 2. Sect. 51, Locke found a place for the moral freedom and responsibility of personality in the "power a man has to suspend his desires and stop them from determining his will to any action, till he has examined, whether it be really of a nature in itself and consequences to make him happy or no." And he taught: "The care of ourselves that we mistake not Imaginary for real happiness, is the necessary foundation of our liberty." In his Introduction (p. 16) to book II of Hume's Treatise, Green correctly observes, that this concession to the ideal of personality again evokes an intrinsic antinomy with Locke's ideal of science.

The development of the basic antinomy in the and their motives and the circumstances in which they arise. This necessity, however, is only comprehended in the sense of the natural laws of association, in the sense of constant sequences of similar motives and actions. It is not thought of in the sense of any hidden mechanical force or compulsion which proceeds from the impulses.

Hume was of the opinion that his psychological determinism could in no way be called materialistic, nor could be at all in conflict with religion. Rather he deemed his doctrine of the psychological necessity of human actions to be essential both for morality and religion. Every other conception altogether destroys the Idea of law, not only of human laws, but of the divine as well.

It must be granted that on the basis of Hume's psychologized cosmonomic Idea no other solution is possible!

The prelude to the shift of primacy to the ideal of personality.

We have seen that Hume's psychologized epistemology dissolved the very foundations of the ideal of science and that of personality. Nevertheless, the fact that Hume subordinated theoretical mathematical thought to the absolutized psychical function of feeling and sensation can be considered as the prelude to the shift of primacy from the nature-motive to the freedom-motive.

In the beginning of his exposition concerning the motives of the will, Hume states in the clearest possible manner the contradiction which exists between his own ethical standpoint and that of the mathematical science-ideal: "Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and assert, that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates. Every rational creature, 'tis said, is oblig'd to regulate his actions by reason; and if any other motive or principle challenge the direction of his conduct, he ought to oppose it, 'till it be entirely subdu'd, or at least brought to a conformity with that superior principle... In order to show the fallacy of all this philosophy, I shall endeavour to prove first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the

1 Treatise II, Part III, Sect. II (p. 189 ff.).
will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will”¹.

Reason, in the sense of the mathematical ideal of science of DESCARTES and LEIBNIZ, is expelled completely from its sovereign position as the ultimate rule of human actions: “reason is and ought to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them”².

Mathematics is of course useful in all mechanical technique, and arithmetic is utilized in nearly every art and in every occupation: “But ’tis not of themselves they have any influence...

A merchant is desirous of knowing the sum total of his accounts with any person: Why? but that he may learn what sum will have the same effects, in paying his debt, and going to market, as all the particular articles taken together. Abstract or demonstrative reasoning, therefore, never influences any of our actions but only as it directs our judgment concerning causes and effects”³.

Even the causal natural scientific thought in which the mathematical ideal of science found the method to extend its postulate of continuity over the entire reality of experience cannot in itself influence nor activate the will. Reason only discovers the causal relations between the phenomena, but “where the objects themselves do not affect us, their connexions can never give them any influence; and ’tis plain, that as reason is nothing but the discovery of this connection, it cannot be by its means that the objects are able to affect us”⁴. Reason cannot motivate an action, because experience demonstrates, that action only arises from an emotion: “nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion but a contrary impulse.”

Thus the rationalist prejudice is abandoned that the decisions of the will are determined by theoretical Ideas (whether clearly distinguished or confused).

HUME withdraws morality from the science-ideal. Primacy of the moral feeling.

Now it is this which paves the way to HUME’s own moral philosophy. It is not correct to say that HUME denied the normative

² Ibid., p. 195.
³ Ibid., p. 193/4.
⁴ Ibid., p. 194.
The development of the basic antinomy in the sense of ethics. On the contrary, no other Humanist philosopher before Kant\(^1\) had pointed out so sharply the necessity of the distinction between that which "is" and that which "ought to be". And, even in Hume, this distinction implies the contrast between scientific thought and ethical action\(^2\).

From this very distinction Hume drew the consequence that ethics is not capable of being proven logically-mathematically, thereby dealing a new blow to the mathematical ideal of science. His argument in support of this view is extremely interesting, since in his own way Hume laid bare the antinomy existing between the mathematical ideal of science and that of personality.

If logical mathematical thought is to be in a position to establish the norms of good and evil, then, according to Hume, either the character of virtue and vice must lie in certain relations between the objects, or they would have to be "matters of fact" which we would be able to discover by our scientific reasoning.

According to the dominant (Lockian) conception, the necessary

\(^{1}\) To be sure, Leibniz, too, makes a sharp distinction between what "is" and what "ought to be". Cf. his Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice [Meditation concerning the common notion of justice] in jur. vol. IIIa, Fol. 72—87; here he remarks against Hobbes: "Car autre chose est, ce qui se peut, autre chose ce qui se doit." [For what is possible is quite different from what ought to be].

However, in Leibniz this does not mean, that ethical action would be independent of clear and distinct thought. On the contrary, as we have seen, he agrees in principle with Descartes' rationalist view of ethics, although in him this rationalism is mitigated by a mystical motive due to his conception of a "supra-natural" participation of human reason in the creative thought of God, which produces "love" and "piety". See Kurt Hildebrandt, Leibniz und das Reich der Gnade [Leibniz and the kingdom of grace] (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1953), especially p. 299 ff.

I fear, however, Hildebrandt has exaggerated this mystical motive at the cost of a just valuation of Leibniz' mathematical rationalism.

\(^{2}\) Treatise III, Part. I, Sect. I (p. 245): "In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet no proposition, that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained;" cf. Laing on this point, op. cit. pp. 189 ff.
relations between the Ideas must be sharply distinguished from “matters of fact”.

Thus, if it were true that virtue is discoverable through thought, it would have to be an object either of mathematical science which examines the relations between Ideas, or of empirical natural science. There is, according to Hume, no third activity of thought.

According to the dominating rationalist conception, however, only the first possibility can receive consideration. For it pretends that the norms of ethics are capable of being proven apriori, “more geometrico”. And a mere “matter of fact” is not susceptible of such proof. When it is conceded, however, that virtue and vice consist in relations concerning which certainty can be attained or for which mathematical proof can be given, then only the four invariable philosophical relations of resemblance and contrast, and the grades in quantity and quality can be taken into consideration. Now, in this case one is immediately involved in inescapable absurdities. For since there is not a single one among the four relations just mentioned which could not just as well be applied to animals and plants, or even to lifeless objects, the consequence would be inescapable that even such things would have to be capable of being judged as moral subjects: “Resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity and number; all these relations belong as properly to matter, as to our actions, passions and volitions. ’Tis unquestionable, therefore, that morality lies not in any of these relations, nor the sense of it in their discovery” ¹.

Hume was too keen a thinker to be blind to the fact that with the same sort of reasoning one could also indicate the intrinsic antinomy in his own psychologized view of morality.

In his system virtue and vice are derived from feelings of pleasure and pain, which have nothing to do with normative properties. He attempts to rescue himself from this antinomy by pointing out that the feeling of pleasure is only a general term which signifies very different “feelings”. So the aesthetic feeling and the sensory feeling of taste are not mutually reducible the one to the other ². Nevertheless, Hume forgets that his theory of the mechanism of human nature destroys the foundation for all normative imputation. If the normative ethical distinctions

² Ibid., p. 248.
are not to be derived from mathematical reason, the question arises, in what must their basis be sought? Hume answers: in the moral sense, an explanation which clearly betrays the influence of Hutcheson. In Hume’s system moral Ideas, just like other ideas, must be derived from “impressions”. Each feeling has its particular impressions. If a particular moral feeling exists, there must also exist moral impressions which cannot be reduced to other sorts of impressions. What is the character of these moral impressions? “To have the sense of virtue is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no further; nor do we inquire into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases; but in feeling, that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous”.

Good and evil, therefore, are nothing but feelings of pleasure and pain of a particular moral character. This special character lies in the feeling of approval or disapproval that an act provokes in ourselves or others. However, in the final analysis, the motives of acts, even of moral acts, in Hume still remain a-normative. Acts are not performed on the ground of their morally good or bad character; they are hedonistically determined. But the contemplation of the act creates a particular satisfaction or feeling of pleasure, which is approbation or the feeling of virtue, from which the Idea of virtue is the copy. In consequence, it may be that the psychologized ideal of science still absorbs the personal moral freedom; but the ratio, in the sense of mathematical thought, is in any case rejected as the foundation of ethics and as the basis for the ideal of personality. The tendency to withdraw the ideal of personality from the stiffening grasp of the Humanistic science-ideal is clearly perceptible. Yet Kant was to be the first to undertake the actio finium regundorum.

Hume’s attack upon the rationalistic theory of Humanist natural law and upon its construction of the social contract. Vico and Montesquieu. Hume’s break with the mathematical ideal of science of his rationalist predecessors is also evident from his noteworthy criticism of the entire rationalistic-Humanist doctrine of natural

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1 Treatise III, Part I, Sect. II (p. 247).
law, and in particular from his criticism of its conception that the state was to be construed by means of one or more contracts between pre-social individuals. From the very beginning the nominalistic trait of the Humanistic ideal of science in its mathematical form manifested itself very clearly in this construction. According to its adherents, the political community is not to be founded on the substantial form of human nature, as the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of natural law had done. Nominalist natural law can no longer ascribe ontological reality to the state, not even in an accidental sense. Even in Hugo Grotius, who externally follows the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of the appetitus socialis, authority and obedience have no natural foundation. Both must be construed “more geometrico” out of the simplest elements, the free and autonomous individuals.

The construction of the social contract seemed to be the sole method to reconcile the postulate of the mathematical ideal of science and that of the Humanistic ideal of personality. For, whereas the former must lead to a construction of the state as an instrument of sovereign domination, the latter must require a justification of the modern concept of sovereignty, introduced by Jean Bodin, in the face of the autonomous freedom of human personality. And the construction of the social contract seemed to satisfy both postulates. While for the rest Hume took a radical nominalistic standpoint, he nevertheless exercised a sharp criticism of this construction, because he correctly thought that by so doing he was able to strike a blow at the mathematical ideal of science. Thereby, in contradistinction to Cartesianism, Hume, by virtue of his historical-psychological method, came to stand on the side of Vico and Montesquieu. And since the Whigs based their political views upon the mathematical doctrine of natural law, Hume’s political affinity with the Tory party is also noteworthy in this connection. Over against the contract-theory Hume appealed to the psychical condition of primitive people. The latter certainly cannot comprehend obedience to political authority in terms of an abstract contract of individuals. Moreover, it bears witness to Hume’s deeply penetrating insight into the weak side of the contract theories, when repeatedly he pointed out, that the obligation which arises out of an agreement is not of a natural but of a conventional character ¹. The contract,

¹ As I indicated in my series of treatises “In the Struggle for a Christian
The development of the basic antinomy in the
therefore, cannot precede the establishment of an ordered com-
community and the institutions of the state.
The historical side of Hume's criticism as he developed it in
his *The Original Contract* and in his *An Enquiry concerning the
Principles of Morals*, naturally did not strike at the heart of the
contract theory. The latter — at least in its general tendencies —
always wished to construe the justification for the state along the
mathematical logical path. Hume, however, had repudiated the
mathematical ideal of science. In keeping with his psychological
ideal of science, the mathematical conception of the natural
state is replaced by a psychological one corresponding to his
theory of "human nature". In his treatise *The Original Contract*
(in sharp contradistinction to his conception in the *Enquiry*)
Hume assumed, to be sure, an original equality of men, from
which he concluded that there was an original consent of individu-
als by which they subjected themselves to authority. But this
agreement is not to be understood — in the sense of the math-
ematical science-ideal — as a universal continuous basis for the
authority of the rulers. According to Hume's psychologized con-
ception of mathematics, exact concepts which go beyond sensory
impressions (e.g. the concept of an exact measure of equality,
the concept of the infinitesimal, the mathematical point etc.) are
ungrounded. The same conclusion must be drawn with respect
to the search for mathematically exact foundations for the state
and the legal order. In Hume's psychologized theory of state and
law the original agreement can only be understood psychologi-
cally and intermittently in terms of the impressions of necessity
and utility which arise in a given situation for the sake of
subjecting oneself to someone of eminent qualities. Such situ-
ations occur again and again, and, in direct proportion to the
frequency of their re-occurrence, a custom of obedience is born
out of the impression. In the further development of the state,
however, the psychologically comprehended agreement of the

*Politics*, the contract theory was the very seed of dissolution within the
rationalist doctrine of natural law. The conflict between the absolutist
concept of state-sovereignty and the principles of natural law concerning
freedom and equality of all men as such, was a document to the inner
antinomy between the ideal of science and the ideal of personality within
the Humanist theory of natural law. See also my *The Contest about the
Concept of Sovereignty in Modern Jurisprudence and Political Science*

1 *Enquiry concerning the principles of Morals*, Sect. III, Part. II.
subjects is of no use as an explanatory principle. The factual basis of authority is only to be found in continually exercised force.

In answer to the question concerning the right of authority Hume points to the influence of time upon the human soul. From the feeling of utility arises the first psychical impulse to obey. When, however, a government has retained its power long enough to create constancy and stability in political life, there arises in the human soul an impression or custom which forms the foundation for the Idea of the right of the government, and personal interest and advantage are reduced to a subordinate value.

Thus Hume's psychologism conquered the strongest position in which the mathematical ideal of science had hitherto thought it could defend the freedom of the individual in the sense of the ideal of personality. Even the Humanistic doctrine of natural law caves in under his critique.

§ 7 - THE CRISIS IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE IDEAL OF SCIENCE AND THAT OF PERSONALITY IN ROUSSEAU

In Rousseau's philosophical world of thought the tension between the ideal of science and that of personality reached a religious crisis. In 1750, in answer to the question posed by the Academy of Dijon, which offered a prize for the best response, the Genevan autodidact sent in his treatise entitled "Discours sur les sciences et les arts". This writing at one blow established his European renown. It signified a passionate attack upon the entire Humanistic civilization which was dominated by the rationalist science-ideal, and had trampled the rights of human personality to a natural development. From the very beginning the Humanistic ideal of science had implied a fundamental problem with respect to the relationship between scientific thought, stimulated by the Faustian passion for power,

1 Treatise III, Part. II, Sect. X (p. 319): "Time alone gives solidity to their right" (viz. of the usurpers) "and operating gradually on the minds of men, reconciles them to any authority, and makes it seem just and reasonable... When we have been long accustomed to obey any set of men, that general instinct or tendency, which we have to suppose a moral obligation attending loyalty, takes easily this direction... 'T is interest which gives the general instinct; but 't is custom which gives the particular direction."
and the autonomous freedom and value of human personality. In the soul of Rousseau this problem attained such a tension, that he openly proclaimed the antinomy between the two polar motives of Humanist thought. He did not eschew the consequence of disavowing the science-ideal, in order to make possible the recognition of human personality as a moral aim in itself.

"If our sciences are vain in the object proposed to themselves, they are still more dangerous by the effects which they produce." So runs the judgment passed by Rousseau on the science-ideal in his Discours sur les sciences et les arts. And his writing ends with the pathetic exhortation to return into ourselves in all simplicity. Freed from the burden of science, we may learn true virtues from the principles which are inscribed in the heart of everybody. "O virtue! sublime knowledge of simple souls, should we need so much trouble and intellectual apparatus to know thee? Are not thy principles engraved in all hearts and does it not suffice for us in order to learn thy laws to return into ourselves and to hear the voice of conscience in the silence of the passions?"

This was the passionate language of the re-awakened ideal of personality that called Humanistic thought to ultimate self-reflection, to reflection upon the religious motive of the freedom and autarchy of personality, through which the ideal of science was itself called into being.

In his Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes (Discourse on the origin of inequality among men) Rousseau rejected the conception which sought the difference between man and animals primarily in thought. Only the consciousness of freedom and the feeling of moral power proves the spiritual character of the human soul: "Every animal has ideas, because it has senses; it even combines ideas up to a certain point... Consequently it is not so much the understanding which among the animals makes the specific distinction of man, but rather man's

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1 Oeuvres complèts de J. J. Rousseau, 1855 (ed. H. Bechold) II, p. 126: "Si nos sciences sont vaines dans l'objet qu'elles se proposent, elles sont encore plus dangereuses par les effets qu'elles produisent."

2 Ibid., p. 138: "O vertu! science sublime des âmes simples, faut-il donc tant de peines et d'appareil pour te connaître? Tes principes ne sont-ils pas gravés dans tous les coeurs? et ne suffit-il pas pour apprendre tes lois de rentrer en soi-même et d'écouter la voix de la conscience dans le silence des passions?"
quality of a free agent. Nature commands every animal, and the beast obeys. Man experiences the same impression, but he is aware of his freedom to yield or to resist; and it is especially in the consciousness of this freedom that the spirituality of his soul manifests itself; for physics explains in some fashion the mechanism of the senses and the formation of Ideas, but in the power of willing or rather choosing, and in the feeling of that power one finds only purely spiritual acts which in no single part are to be explained in terms of mechanical laws"  

Thus human thought was in a sensualistic sense degraded to a mere higher level of the animal associations of sensory Ideas, in order to permit all value of human personality to be concentrated in the feeling of freedom.

Nevertheless, in his democratic-revolutionary political philosophy, ROUSSEAU did not abandon the mathematical pattern of thought. By means of the latter he sought to maintain the natural rights of human personality in the face of the despotism of HOBBES' Leviathan, although the latter was philosophically construed by the same means of mathematical-juridical thought, namely the social contract.

ROUSSEAU sharply distinguishes the "volonté générale" from the "volonté de tous", because the former can only be directed towards the common good. But in this "general will", in which "each of us brings into the community his person and all his power, in order that we may receive every member as an indivisible part of the whole"  

The state-Leviathan

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1 Oeuvres II, p. 30/1: "Tout animal a des idées, puisqu’il a des sens; il combine même des idées jusqu’à un certain point... Ce n’est donc pas tant l’entendement qui fait parmi les animaux la distinction spécifique de l’homme que sa qualité d’agent libre. La nature commande à tout animal, et la bête obéit. L’homme éprouve la même impression, mais il se reconnaît libre d’acquiescer ou de résister; et c’est surtout dans la conscience de cette liberté que se montre la spiritualité de son âme, car la physique explique en quelque manière le mécanisme des sens et la formation des idées; mais dans la puissance de vouloir ou plutôt de choisir, et dans le sentiment de cette puissance, on ne trouve que des actes purement spirituels, dont on n’explique rien par les lois de la mécanique."

2 Du Contrat Social (Oeuvres II), p. 274: “chacun de nous met en commun sa personne et toute sa puissance, afin que nous recevons encore chaque membre comme partie indivisible du tout.”

The development of the basic antinomy in the
construed both in Hobbes and in Rousseau in accordance with
the mathematical ideal of science which respects no limits, devours free personality in all its spheres of life. The introduction of the Idea of the “volonté générale” was actually meant in a normative sense. And in it personality was to regain its natural autonomous freedom in a higher form construed by mathematical thought. In fact, its introduction implied the absorption of free personality into a despotic construction issued from the condemned ideal of science. It was the picture of Leviathan, with its head cut off that formed the frontispiece of the first edition of The Social Contract!

Meanwhile — and this is the point in which Rousseau had decidedly outgrown the spirit of the Enlightenment — the accent in his philosophy is definitely shifted to the ideal of personality. And the latter can no longer be identified with mathematical thought.

In Hume’s philosophy the ideal of personality had already begun to revolt against the science-ideal by making moral feeling independent of the theoretical Idea. In Rousseau feeling became the true seat of the Humanistic ideal of personality which had been robbed of its vitality by the hypertrophy of the science-ideal.

Rousseau’s religion of sentiment and his estrangement from Hume.

Rousseau’s bitterest attacks were directed against the rationalistic view of religion of the “Enlightenment”. In it he correctly saw an attack upon the religious kernel of the Humanistic ideal of personality.

His proclamation of the natural religion of sentiment\(^1\) was directed just as much against the materialism of the French Encyclopedists as against the deism of Newton’s natural philosophy. Rousseau never grew weary of telling his contemporaries that religion is not seated in the head, but in the “heart”. He never grew tired contending that abstract science may not en-

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\(^1\) See the famous fourth book of his Emile, where Rousseau expounded his dualistic conception of human nature (sensory nature versus the feeling of freedom). I suspect that this conception influenced Kant’s dualism.
croach upon the holy contents of human feeling. He combated the rationalistic associational psychology which had excluded the "soul" from its field of investigation. And his opposition was marked by a passionateness which can only be understood in terms of an ultimate religious reaction of the Humanistic ideal of personality against the tyranny of the ideal of science. Thus not only did he necessarily become estranged from the circle of the Encyclopedists but also from his earlier friend and protector David Hume. For, no matter how Rousseau could feel in agreement with Hume in his emancipation of the function of feeling from theoretical thought, yet in the final analysis, in Hume's absolutizing of the deterministic viewpoint of associational psychology, the ideal of science still dominated that of the sovereign personality.

Disillusionized, the passionate defender of the freedom of sovereign personality turned away from Western culture. The freedom of the sovereign personality ought to be recognized equally in all individuals, but Western culture was dominated in all the spheres of life by sovereign science, which was not in the first place concerned with personal freedom. Rousseau sought consolation in the dream of a natural state of innocence and happiness which had been disturbed by modern culture.

Optimism and Pessimism in their new relation in Rousseau.

The state of nature is no longer painted, as in Hobbes, in the shrill colours of a "bellum omnium contra omnes". On the contrary, in his representation of the original state of mankind, Rousseau revived the Stoic Idea of the "golden age". Perhaps he was influenced by such idealistic pictures of primitive society as were current at his time. But his conviction of the value of the primitive had undoubtedly deeper grounds in his antirationalist conception of human nature. Rousseau's optimistic view of the original goodness of the latter differed radically from the optimistic life- and world-view in which the ideal of science held the supremacy.

Science has not made good its promise to human personality, it has not brought freedom to man, but slavery, inequality, and exploitation. Optimism and pessimism are the light and shadow in Rousseau's picture of the state of nature and of culture; however, their rôle is completely the reverse of what it had been in Hobbes. With respect to the culture of the science-ideal Rousseau
The development of the basic antinomy in the

was a pessimist. He was an optimist only in his belief in the free personality which will break the strait-jacket into which it was clapped by the rationalistic culture. It will build a new culture in which the sovereign freedom of man will shine forth in greater brilliance than in the uncorrupted state of nature. This new culture will find its foundation only in the divine value of personality.

LOCKE and Rousseau. The contrast between innate human rights and inalienable rights of the citizen.

In the natural state all individuals were free and equal but they remained individuals. Their inalienable human rights were formulated by Locke in opposition to the absolutistic doctrine of Hobbes. Nevertheless, Locke was a genuine figure of the "Enlightenment". He held fast to the optimistic faith that the domination of mathematical thought was the best guarantee of the freedom of personality.

Just as he resolved all complex Ideas into simple ones, so to him the free individual remained the central point of the civil state. Just as the entire preceding Humanistic doctrine of natural law, Locke construed the transition from the natural state to the civil state by means of the social contract. The citizens had already possessed their inalienable rights of freedom and private property in the natural state, but they needed the social contract to guarantee them by an organized power. And this was the sole intention of this contract in the system of Locke. The civil state is no more than a company with limited liability, designed for the continuation of the natural state under the protection of an authority. It is the constitutional state of the old liberalism, the state which has as its only goal the maintenance of the innate human rights of the individual.

Rousseau broke with this liberalistic conception. Just like the Stoics he did not consider the natural state of freedom and equality to be in itself the highest ideal. This situation is forever gone. A higher destiny calls humanity to the civil state. Only within the latter can the sovereign freedom of personality completely unfold in its divine value. Natural freedom ought to be elevated to the level of a higher, a normative Idea of freedom. The innate natural rights of men must be transformed into inalienable rights of the citizens. By means of the social contract the individual must surrender all of his natural freedom in order to get it back again in the higher form of the freedom of the
citizen. To that end the social contract can no longer be conceived of in a formal sense, as Hobbes, Pufendorf and even Grotius had done. For with these teachers of natural law, the original contract could in the final analysis even justify the abandonment of all freedom of personality. For them the construction of the social contract was not first and foremost orientated to the ideal of personality but to the mathematical science-ideal with its domination-motive. Rousseau raises his flaming protest against this subjection of the value of personality to mathematical thought: "To give up one's liberty that is to give up one's quality of man, the rights of humanity, even one's duties. These words slavery and right are contradictory, they exclude one another mutually".

Freedom, just as equality, is an inalienable human right that only can be abandoned in its natural form, in order to be regained in the higher form of citizenship. There is only a single specific form of association which secures this freedom. Therefore, this form is the only lawful one.

Thus in Rousseau the transition from the natural state to the civil state became the fundamental problem of guaranteeing the sovereign freedom of personality in the only legitimate form of association.

The ideal of personality acquires primacy in Rousseau's construction of the social contract.

This is the new motive in Rousseau, and therefore he could rightly oppose his doctrine concerning the social contract to the earlier Humanistic theories of natural law: the ideal of personality has acquired primacy over the ideal of science. In his famous work *Du Contrat Social ou Principes du Droit Politique* he formulated the problem in question as follows: "To find a form of association which with all the common power defends and protects the person and goods of every member and by means of which each one uniting himself with all, nevertheless is only obedient to himself and remains as free as before".

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1 *Du Contrat Social* I, chap. IV (Oeuvres II), p. 269: "Renoncer à sa liberté, c'est renoncer à sa qualité d'homme, aux droits de l'humanité, même à ses devoirs." Ces mots esclavage et droit sont contradictoires, ils s'excluent mutuellement.

Rousseau intended to solve this problem through his “social contract” which, in order to be valid, must include precisely the clause that each individual delivers himself with all his natural rights to all, collectively and thus through becoming subject to the whole by his participation in the “general will” gets back all his natural rights in a higher juridical form: “For in the first place, if every one gives himself entirely, the condition is equal for all; and if the condition is equal for all, nobody is interested in rendering it onerous for the others”.

According to Rousseau, the inalienable right of freedom maintains itself in the inalienable sovereignty of the people, which can never be transferred to a magistrate. The sovereign will of the people is the general will, which expresses itself in legislation. As such it is to be distinguished sharply from the “volonté de tous”.

For the “volonté générale” should be directed exclusively toward the general interest; it is therefore incompatible with the existence of private associations between the state and the individual, because they foster particularism. At this point Rousseau appeals expressly to Plato’s “ideal state”.

Public law, formed by the general will, does not recognize any counter-poise in private spheres of association. The “social contract” is the only juridical basis for all the rights of the citizens. Thus the construction of the general will becomes the lever of an unbridled absolutism of the legislator. “Just as nature gives every man an absolute power over all his limbs, so the social contract gives the body politic an absolute power over all its members; and it is this same power which, directed by the general will, bears the name of sovereignty”.

Rousseau did observe indeed, that there was an inner tension between his doctrine of the “volonté générale” and the individual freedom of human personality.

Wolff’s basic law for the state: “Salus publica suprema lex
esto”, was to be reconciled with Locke's doctrine of the inalienable human rights. Wolff had openly acknowledged that there was an insoluble antinomy between these two poles of Humanistic political theory.

In Rousseau's theory, therefore, the question as to the mutual relationship between the natural rights of man and the rights of the citizen became a problem of essential importance. "Besides the public person," so he observes, "we have to consider the private persons which compose it, and whose life and liberty are by nature independent of it. Consequently the question is that we should well distinguish the rights of the citizens and those of the sovereign, and the duties which the former have to discharge in their quality of subjects from the natural right which they ought to enjoy in their quality of men". According to him it is beyond dispute, that in the social contract every individual transfers to the state only as much of his natural power, his possessions, and freedom, as is required for "the common good" of the community.

The "common good", and so also the "general will", do not recognize any particular individuals, but only the whole.

The antinomy between the natural rights of man and the rights of the citizen. Rousseau's attempt to solve it.

Proceeding from this principle Rousseau thought he had discovered the way by which "natural human rights", as private rights, could also be maintained uncurtailed in the civil state.

The first principle of the "general will" that follows from the fact that the latter only can aim at the general interest, is namely the absolute equality of all citizens with respect to the demands of the community.

As soon as the sovereign lawgiver (the people) would favour certain citizens above others, so that special privileges would be accorded (recall the privileges of forum, freedom from taxation etc. of nobility and clergy under the ancient regime), the


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The development of the basic antinomy in the “general will” would be transmuted into a private or particular will and the sovereign would exceed the limits of its competency. 

For the clause of the “social contract”, upon which all sovereignty in the state is based, contains unchangeably the principle of equality of all citizens with respect to the public interest. In other words, the “general will”, because of its unchangeable inner nature, can never have a particular object. This is the significance of Rousseau’s concept of statute law which is quite different from the formal one. And it is also different from the so-called “material concept of statute law” in the sense of a positive juridical rule touching the rights and duties of the citizens, as understood by the positivistic German school of Laband in the XIXth century.

According to Rousseau, a real public statute (loi) can never regulate a particular interest. And it cannot issue from an individual by virtue of a seigniorial right: “Besides, because the public statute unites in itself the universality of the will and that of the object, it is evident that an order issued by any individual whatsoever in virtue of his own right, is not at all a statute; even an order of the sovereign concerning a private object is no more a statute but a decree, nor an act of sovereignty but of magistracy”. In other words, not everything which possesses the form of a statute is a statute in a material sense.

There are formal statutes which are not real ones, and conse-

1 Op. cit. III, Chap. IV (p. 286: “On voit par là que le pouvoir souverain, tout absolu, tout sacré, tout inviolable qu’il est, ne passe ni peut passer les bornes des conventions générales, et que tout homme peut disposer pleinement de ce qui lui a été laissé de ses biens et de sa liberté par des conventions; de sorte que le souverain n’est jamais en droit de charger un sujet plus qu’un autre, parce qu’alors l’affaire devenant parti-culiére, son pouvoir n’est plus compétent.” [“From this it is seen that the sovereign power, however absolute, however sacred, however inviolable it may be, does not and cannot surpass the limits of the general conventions, and that every man can completely dispose of what these latter have left him of his goods and of his liberty; so that the sovereign has never the right to charge a subject more than another, because in this case the matter becomes a particular one and his power is no longer competent”].

2 “On voit encore que la loi réunissant l’universalité de la volonté et celle de l’objet, ce qu’un homme, quelqu’il puisse être, ordonne de son chef n’est point une loi; ce qu’ordonne même le souverain sur un objet particulier n’est pas non plus une loi, mais un décret; ni un acte de souverainité, mais de magistrature.”
sequently which are not the expression of the sovereign general will, but are only decrees, private acts of the magistrate which as such are not binding, unless they give effect to the "loi". Thus it seems that in Rousseau the inalienable human rights as private subjective rights are in no way absorbed in the general will, since within the sphere of private law they cannot be assailed by arbitrary decrees or acts of a magistrate. But as we have seen, human rights in the civil state have changed their ground of validity. Now this ground lies exclusively in the social contract. In other words, the juridical source of private and public rights is, in the civil state, one and the same, and on the condition that the formal principle of equality and generality is respected, the general will is omnipotent. Consequently, in the civil state private human rights can only exist by the grace of the general will.

All limits of competency must yield to the general will of the sovereign. Rousseau himself wrote that the judgment concerning what the public interest demands belongs exclusively to the sovereign people. Moreover, he accepted the well-known construction, adhered to by the nominalistic doctrine of natural law since Marsilius of Padua up until and inclusive of Kant, according to which the general will, in which every citizen encounters his own will, cannot do any injustice to any one: volenti non fit injuria!

The limits of the competency of the legislator which Rousseau constructed are not real ones, since they are neither grounded on the inner nature and structure of the different social relationships, nor on the modal structure of the juridical aspect, but have been deduced from the abstract principle of equality and generality which neglects all structural differences in social reality.

The origin of this antinomy is again to be found in the tension between the ideal of science and that of personality.

In his undoubtedly ingenious construction of the relation between public and private interest, it is once again the mathematical ideal of science that pretends to guarantee the value of personality. And in the final analysis the "sovereign personality" is again sacrificed to this science-ideal. Rousseau's famous expression: "On les forcerà d'être libre" (they must be forced to be free) soon would become the watchword under which the
The development of the basic antinomy etc.

Legions of the French revolution were to bring to the nations revolutionary freedom and equality, although Rousseau himself was impatient of every revolution. But it was the expression of the unsolvable antinomy between the ideal of science and that of personality which in Rousseau's doctrine of the social contract had reached its highest tension.

The reawakened ideal of personality had in Rousseau's religion of sentiment reacted spontaneously against the science-ideal. Yet, finally it submitted again to the mathematical construction of the latter. The fulminant protest, however, that out of the religious depth of Rousseau's contradictory personality sounded against the supremacy of scientific thought, was to summon mightier spirits than he to fight for the supremacy of the ideal of personality.
§ 1 - INTRODUCTION. THE MISCONCEPTION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AS THE PHILOSOPHIC EXPRESSION OF THE SPIRIT OF THE REFORMATION

In the preceding chapters we have only given a sketch of the main lines of development of the basic antinomy in the transcendental ground-Idea of Humanistic thought during the period in which primacy was ascribed to the science-ideal. Our investigation ended in an examination of Rousseau's philosophy in which the first violent reaction on the part of the religious freedom-motive manifested itself. In the light of this previous development the philosophic system of Immanuel Kant must be viewed as inaugurating a new phase in Humanistic thought: namely, the phase of "transcendental freedom-idealism".

This phase is typified by several characteristic features: The ideal of personality finally wrested itself free from the tyranny of the science-ideal. Primacy is now definitely acknowledged as belonging to the former and the ideal of science is limited to the world of sense-phenomena. The root of human personality is sought in the normative ethical function of its free will. In addition this new phase is marked by the growing self-reflection of Humanism upon the religious foundations of its philosophic attitude.

Kroner’s view of the relation of Kant’s transcendental idealism to the Christian religion.

It is typical of the lack of a critical view of historical-philoso-
The development of the basic antinomy in the

philosophical connections that in the XXth century Kant has often been characterized as the first to have expressed the intrinsic spirit of the Christian faith within a so-called philosophical life-and world-view. In this respect Kant's "critical" idealism is sharply contrasted with medieval Christian thought. For example, the Hegelian philosopher Richard Kroner states: "The impact of Greek concepts on Medieval Christian thought in its totality was overwhelming, so that the true essence and the real depth of the Christian faith could not find here its full expression within a philosophical view of the world. It is especially Kant and German Idealism that deserve credit for having performed this enormous task, which is of unique importance in the history of the world. It was here for the first time that the idealism of the I-ness, surpassing that of the ἴδεια and ἑιδη, was opposed to the latter. Here at last the attempt was successful to conceive of God no longer as an objective Idea, as Pure Form, as First Cause and Substance, but rather out of the depth of the ethical-religious life".

Is Kant the philosopher of the Reformation?

Przywara.

Such a statement strongly attests to a complete lack of insight into the antithesis between the really Christian and Humanistic ground-motives of philosophical thought.

It is very much to be regretted that some Roman-Catholic thinkers foster this basic misconception by seeking in German idealism since Kant the philosophical expression of the view developed by the Reformation with respect to the relation of God and His creation. It is further contended that the Roman Catholic conception, as embodied in Thomism, forms the real

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1 Richard Kroner: Von Kant bis Hegel I (1921) s. 45: "Während das gesamte christliche Denken des Mittelalters dem übermächtigen Anprall der Griechischen Begriffe gegenüber es nicht vermochte, das wahre Wesen, die eigene Tiefe des christlichen Glaubens innerhalb der philosophischen Weltanschauung zur vollen Geltung zu bringen, ist durch Kant und den deutschen Idealismus diese welthistorische Aufgabe gelöst worden. Hier zuerst wird dem Idealismus der ἴδεια und ἑιδη der ihn überragende Idealismus des Ich entgegengesetzt. Hier zuerst gelingt es, Gott, statt als objective Idee, als reine Form, als erste Ursache und Substanz, vielmehr aus der Tiefe des sittlich-religiösen Lebens heraus zu begreifen."
philosophical antipode to this idealism. We shall return to this point, but in passing, it is well to note, that this view of the philosophical antithesis between the Reformation and Roman Catholicism simply stems from the immanence-standpoint. Consequently, it can not do justice to the real situation.

Kant is not the philosopher of the evangelical idea of freedom; his philosophy is separated from the Biblical spirit of the Reformation by the irreconcilable cleft between the Christian and Humanistic ground-motives. Naturally this does not exclude the fact that Kant has been historically influenced by Puritanism and Pietism in his ethical and theological conceptions. But the very spirit and transcendental ground-Idea of his critical idealism is ruled by the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom. And the latter cannot be reconciled to the genuine Biblical ground-motive of the Reformation. All attempts at synthesis are born out of a lack of insight into the religious foundation of Kant's philosophy, and into the integral and radical character of the Biblical ground-motive.

It cannot be denied that criticistic idealism has deeply influenced the philosophical thought of Protestantism. But this is not to be explained in terms of the religious spirit of the Reformation. On the contrary, it betrays the invasion of the scholastic spirit of accommodation, originating from the religious ground-motive of nature and grace in its dualist nominalistic conception. And we have shown that this very ground-motive has impeded the inner reformation of philosophical thought.

In Kant's philosophy, it is actually the Humanistic ideal of personality which awakens from its lethargy and causes Humanism to become conscious of the \( \theta_\omega\theta_\omega\alpha_\zeta \) of its philosophic attitude. Rousseau's religion of feeling could only signify a transitional stage in this course of development.

The deepest tendencies of the Humanistic ideal of personality could not reveal themselves in the psychical sphere of feeling which in Kant belongs to the realm of "nature" and "heteronomy". They could only find an adequate expression in a fundamental freedom-idealism which transcends "nature" as the particular domain of the science-ideal.

In Kant's critical ethics the "Idea" is the expression of the subjective autonomy of the rational and moral personality. And

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1 See for example, the work of Erich Przywara, *Thomas oder Hegel*, in Logos Bnd. XV, Heft I, 1926, p. 12.
as the ideal subject this personality is itself the final source of the categorical ethical imperative. Henceforth, the Idea is identified in an increasingly greater degree with the religious totality of meaning and with the very origin of the temporal cosmos ¹.

The Idea of freedom as both the religious totality and origin of meaning: Höningswald.

In a pregnant statement, Richard Höningswald summarized this development in the conception of the “Idea”, as the embodiment of the Humanistic ideal of personality which was becoming self-conscious: “so the course of the argument always urges us again to go back to the classical concept of the Idea: the latter signifies as ἀνεξάρτητον totality and process, end and beginning, content and norm, datum and task. As the point of indifference of every question and every answer the Idea embodies the highest form of necessity. But this means neither that the Idea compels something else, nor that the former is subjected to a constraint strange to itself: the Idea itself is this necessity. For this very reason, however, it signifies also in the deepest and most complex sense of the word freedom. The Idea is, as Bauch in a striking fashion has called it, the Ἀόρατος of each phenomenon; the meaning of the concept, the problem of the being of the phenomenon. As an unbreakable bond it embraces world and experience, community and truth, language and object.

“Orienting itself to the world, the Idea furnishes itself with the organon of its working and only through this working it is. It is the Spirit which never has been and never will be; for the Idea simply “is”: that is to say, it is, as Hegel has said, “present”, consequently, “essentially now”. It is not in time, and neither outside it. For the Idea itself is time; not, to be sure, the mere concept of its order, not only Newton’s “tempus, quod aequabiliter fluid”, but time in the fulness of its development, “standing time”, time as totality, i.e. as eternity(!). In this — (and only in this conception) — the Idea means Being itself; Being, free from

¹ Strictly speaking this identification of Origin and totality of meaning cannot be correct. For, as we saw in the Introduction, the Origin necessarily transcends meaning. In the Prolegomena I pointed out, that the absolutization of the transcendental idea in idealism, actually issues from the religious ground-motive that makes this philosophy possible. In the transcendent religious sphere the idea can never maintain itself as the actual origin.
the notion of a mysterious "entity", Being as Meaning, grounded in itself, which eternally renews and forms itself, thereby, however, imposes and at the same time realizes — the highest conditions of the concept of the "Gegenstand". Meaning was "in the beginning"; and it stands at the end. In Meaning beginning and end are one. For meaning is the totality".

The course of development in the conception of the Idea in this sense commences in KANT's Critique of Practical Reason. It continues in dialectical tension in FICHTE, SCHELLING, and in Romanticism and it reaches its completion in HEGEL's absolute idealism.

It is my intention to sketch this course of development in the light of the inner dialectic within the transcendental ground-Idea of Humanistic thought. Our discussion will center around the extremely complicated evolution of the thought of KANT and FICHTE. And from this evolution we shall seek to explain the intrinsic necessity of subsequent developments.


"Die Idee schafft sich an der Welt das Organ ihres Wirkens, weil sie selbst in ihrem Werk und durch dieses Werk allein ist. Sie ist der Geist, der nie gewesen ist und nie sein wird; denn sie "ist" schlechthin: d.h. sie ist, mit den Worten HEGELS, "präsent" also "wesentlich itzt". Sie steht nicht in der Zeit; aber auch nicht ausserhalb dieser. Denn sie selbst ist ja die Zeit; nicht freilich der blosse Gedanke ihrer Ordnung, nicht nur Newton's "tempus, quod aequabiliter fluit", sondern die Zeit in der Fülle ihrer Gestaltung, die "stehende" Zeit, die Zeit als Ganzheit, d.h. als Ewigkeit(!). In diesem, und nur im diesem Verstande bedeutet die Idee das Sein selbst; das Sein, frei von dem Gedanken an eine dunkele "Entität", als der sich ewig erneuernde und gestaltende, gerade damit aber die höchsten Bedingungen des Gegenstandsgedankens fordernde und zugleich erfüllende, in sich selbst gegründete Sinn. Der Sinn war "im Anfang"; und er steht am Ende. Im Sinn sind Anfang und Ende eins. Denn der Sinn ist das Ganze."
The development of the basic antinomy in the

§ 2 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
IDEAL OF PERSONALITY AND THAT OF SCIENCE IN THE
FIRST PHASE OF KANT'S THOUGHT UP UNTIL HIS INAUGURAL
ORATION OF 1770

All the philosophical motives of Humanistic thought during
the rationalistic and transitional periods were focused in KANT's
mind. In his struggle for release it was the mutual tension of
these motives that gave rise to a new conception of the Hu-
manist transcendental ground-Idea, which aimed at saving both
the ideal of science and that of personality by bringing against
them the *actio finium regundorum*.

The motives of the preceding Humanistic philosophy.
The manner in which KANT wrestles with their mut-
tual tension. The influence of Pietism.

Even in his pre-critical period KANT struggled with various
mutually antagonistic motives. In the main they included: the
proud structure of NEWTON's system of natural science, in whose
philosophic attitude the Enlightenment found the incarnation of
its own spirit; the Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics of the mathe-
matical ideal of science, in which the free human personality
was proclaimed to be a function of creative mathematical
thought and a relatively perfect stage of development in the
system of monads; the epistemological psychologism of HUME,
which was detrimental to both the ideal of personality and that
of science; and, last but not least, ROUSSEAU's passionate plea for
the liberation of the Humanistic ideal of personality from the
tyrannical domination of the science-ideal.

In addition, the religious influence of Puritanism and Pie-
tism, that had impressed itself on his entire education, con-
tinued to rule KANT's rigorous attitude with respect to sensory
human nature, without having any affinity with the Biblical
conception of sin. In his transition to the critical standpoint this
influence was to acquire a conclusive significance.

No Humanistic thinker previous to KANT had struggled so
intensely with the inner polarity in the basic structure of the
Humanistic cosmonomic Idea. No one had understood the reli-
gious significance of the ideals of science and of personality as
he did.

His "fondness of metaphysics" had its deepest root in the
hope that he would be able to find a scientific foundation for
his moral and religious convictions. Yet, even in his pre-critical
period, under the influence of Hume and especially of Rousseau, he acquired the insight that the speculative metaphysics of the mathematical science-ideal was necessarily incompetent to aid him in the fulfilment of his desire. Even in this phase he became confident that the sovereign freedom of human personality is not to be grasped in the categories of mathematical natural scientific thought.

In his natural scientific conception, Kant remained a faithful adherent of the ideal of science; his reverence for the spirit of the “Enlightenment”.

After all, Kant was from the very beginning an enthusiastic follower of this very science-ideal. He had been so captivated by the spirit of the “Enlightenment” that even in his critical period he still spoke of it with an extreme reverence. His short answer to the question “What is Enlightenment?”, given in 1784, begins with his confession of faith in the Humanistic Idea of science: “Enlightenment is the departure of man from his self-incurred blame of minority. Minority is the inability to use one’s understanding without the direction of another... Sapere aude! Pluck up courage to use your own understanding! this is consequently the device of the Enlightenment.” No church can contractually bind sovereign human thought to a dogma: “I say: this is quite impossible. Such a contract drawn up in order to keep mankind for ever from all further enlightenment, is simply null and void”.

Even the inception of Kant’s philosophical development was characterized by a strong faith in the science-ideal in its mecha-
The development of the basic antinomy in the mechanistic conception. In his hypothesis concerning the origin of the planetary system, developed in the natural scientific treatise of his first period *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte des Himmels* (1755), he extended this mechanistic conception to the most extreme consequences. Here he repeated the proud motto of DESCARTES' work "Le Monde", in which the passion to dominate nature found its classic expression: "Give me matter, I will build a world from it" ¹.

Throughout the rest of his life KANT remained faithful to this science-ideal. He never repudiated the spirit of NEWTON whom he admired so strongly.

Even when HUME's epistemological psychologism temporarily gained the ascendency in KANT's thought, the resulting sceptical attitude could only momentarily shake his firmly established faith in the sovereignty of mathematical and natural scientific thought over the entire "empirical" reality "in space and time".

KANT's radical doubt was limited to the sovereignty of mathematical thought insofar as it involved itself with the most profound questions of life and of the world. It arose only with respect to the *metaphysics* of the mathematical science-ideal. KANT abandoned the latter insofar as he sought a definite answer to the questions in which the ideal of personality was directly involved.

The influence of Rousseau and Hume.

At this point he was deeply moved by Rousseau's proclamation of the freedom of human personality from its subjection to science.

WINDELBAND correctly sought in the influence of Rousseau a decisive turning-point in KANT's philosophical thought. Through Rousseau's influence, indeed, the division between the theoretical and the practical element in his philosophy was accomplished in an ever increasingly radical fashion ².

¹ Preface, *Allgem. Naturgesch. des Himmels* (General natural history of the Heaven), W.W. Bnd. II, pp. 267: "Gebet mir Materie, ich will eine Welt daraus bauen." To which KANT added: "das ist, gebet mir Materie, ich will euch zeigen, wie eine Welt daraus entstehen soll" ["that is, give me matter, I will show you how from it a world is to proceed.

² Tr.'s note: By employing our terminology, this division can be more accurately expressed as the division between the ideal of science and that of personality.
The decisive influence of Rousseau upon Kant's conception of the value of personality clearly appears from the famous treatise entitled "Träume eines Geistersehers erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik" (Dreams of a visionary explained by dreams of metaphysics) (1766). Kant himself bore witness to the revolution in his thinking in his statement: "I myself am an investigator by nature. I feel all the force of the thirst after knowledge and the restless urge to make progress therein, but also the satisfaction at every advance. There was a time when I believed that all this could be to the honour of mankind and I disdained the mob that do not know anything. Rousseau has set me right. This blind preference is disappearing; I learn how to honour men, and I would esteem myself much more useless than the common labourers, if I did not believe, that this view can give to all the rest a value on which to found the rights of the human race".

It is the voice of the ethical and religious spirit of Rousseau's Discours sur les sciences et les arts that we hear in this remarkable writing.

In the "Practical conclusion from the whole treatise" Kant writes: "But true wisdom is the companion of simplicity, and because with it the heart" (here taken in the sense of moral feeling) "lays down the law to the understanding, it generally renders the elaborate equipment of learning superfluous, and its goals do not need such means that can never be in the power of all men." "When science has run its course, it naturally arrives at the point of a modest distrust and, angry with itself, it says: How many things there are which I do not understand. But reason ripened to wisdom by experience speaks in the mouth of Socrates in the midst of the wares of an annual fair with a

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1 "Ich bin selbst aus Neigung ein Forscher. Ich fühle den ganzen Durst nach Erkenntnis und die begierige Unruhe, darin weiter zu kommen, oder auch die Zufriedenheit bei jedem Fortschritte. Er war eine Zeit, da ich glaubte, dieses alles könnte die Ehre der Menschheit machen und ich verachtete den Pöbel, der von nichts weisz. Rousseau hat mich zurecht gebracht. Dieser verblendete Vorzug verschwindet; ich lerne die Menschen ehren, und würde mich viel unnützer finden, als die gemeinen Arbeiter, wenn ich nicht glaubte, dass diese Betrachtung allen übrigen einen Wert geben könnte, die Rechte der Menschheit herzustellen."

2 See Traume, first part, chapt. 2, p. 115. (W.W. Vol. I) in which the moral motives "which move the human heart" are empirically reduced to "moral feeling".
The development of the basic antinomy in the cheerful mind: How many things there are that I do not need at all!”

ROUSSEAU’S Discours also ended in this strain. With this statement the domination of the mathematical science-ideal over the ideal of personality in KANT’S thought was definitely broken.

For in his humorous criticism of the “visionary” SWEDENBORG, KANT turned against the entire rationalistic metaphysics. He actually dealt a blow to the metaphysics of the Humanist science-ideal, as conceived of by LEIBNIZ and WOLFF and to which he himself had formerly adhered. Henceforth, to KANT, this metaphysics lost the right to speak on questions of morals and religion.

Just as in ROUSSEAU and in HUME, the ideal of personality in KANT, though only for a time, withdrew into the function of feeling. Henceforth, under the influence of HUME, theoretical metaphysics acquired an ever increasing degree the positive significance of a critical theory concerning the foundations and limits of mathematical knowledge of nature.

Even in the so-called “empirist” phase of KANT’S philosophical development, the influence of HUME was only restricted in scope. KANT was no more capable of embracing definitively HUME’s sceptical attitude with regard to the foundations of the mathematical science-ideal, than he was of following ROUSSEAU’s complete degradation of the latter.

He never took seriously HUME’s attempt to establish the ground of the natural scientific judgment of causality in the laws of association which pertain to the connection of our successive psychical Ideas.

KANT was soon to assign to theoretical metaphysics the task of founding the objective universal validity of mathematical natural scientific thought in opposition to HUME’s sceptical criticism.

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1 Ibid., p. 159 and p. 155: “Allein die wahre Weisheit ist die Begleiterin der Einfalt, und da bei ihr das Herz (read “das sittliche Gefühl”!) dem Verstande die Vorschrift gibt, so macht sie gemeiniglich die grosse Zürüstungen der Gelehrsamkeit entbehrlich, und ihre Zwecke bedürfen nicht solcher Mittel, die nimmermehr in aller Menschen Gewalt sein können.” “Wenn die Wissenschaft ihren Kreis durchlaufen hat, so gelangt sie natürlichweise zu dem Punkte eines bescheidenen Mistrauens und sagt, unwillig über sich selbst: Wie viel Dinge gibt es doch, die ich nicht einsehe! Aber die durch Erfahrung gereifte Vernunft, welche zur Weisheit wird, spricht in dem Munde des SOKRATES mitten unter den Waren eines Jahrmarkts mit heiteren Seele: Wie viel Dinge gibt es doch, die ich alle nicht brauche!”
At the same time, however, in opposition to rationalistic metaphysics, he sought definitely to limit mathematical and causal thinking to the sensory-aspect of experience. I shall now endeavour to present a more detailed examination of these different phases in Kant's development up to his famous inaugural oration.

Kant's first period: Kant as an independent supporter of the metaphysics of Leibniz and Wolff. The primacy of the mathematical science-ideal in the first conception of his transcendental ground-Idea.

From the very beginning Kant was conscious of a certain discrepancy between mathematics and metaphysics in the sense in which the latter was defended by the Leibnizian-Wolffian school. Even in his *Physische Monadologie* (1756), he expounded the difference between the Leibnizian metaphysics and the mathematical conception of the problem of space.

In the discourse with which he began his career as special university lecturer in philosophy, Kant opposed Wolff's attempt to derive the principle of causality from the logical principium contradictionis. This discourse, Kant's first metaphysical treatise, was entitled *De Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio* (1755). It attacked the Wolffian conception with Crusius' distinction between "logical ground" and "ground of being" (Realgrund) and rejected the ontological proof for the existence of God, which concluded from logical grounds to the actual existence of a perfect divine Being.

Both these treatises were written during Kant's first period in which he still held to the possibility of a theoretical metaphysics in the Wolffian sense; a metaphysics which in a purely analytical way, would furnish apriori knowledge of reality from mere concepts and also fancied itself competent to answer questions pertaining to the ideal of personality.

Even in this period Kant had gained the insight that the "metaphysical" root and origin of reality cannot be derived from the logical unthinkableness of the opposite. Even at this time he rejected the conception of Leibniz and Wolff that a metaphysical-logical possibility lies at the foundation of metaphysical reality.

According to Kant, metaphysical being can be ascertained by logical thought only in the judgment of identity, but it cannot be proved to be necessary from the principium contradictionis.
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That is why Kant laid great emphasis upon the logical superiority of the principle of identity to the principle of logical contradiction.

Kant's second period: the methodological line of demarcation between mathematics and metaphysics.

The influence of Newton and English psychologism.

In his second period, which extended from 1760 to 1765, these insights were intensified, so that they led to the drawing of a provisional line of demarcation between the method of mathematics and that of metaphysics.

Kant's views in this period are characterized especially by the following writings: Der einzige mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes (1763), Versuch, den Begriff der negativen Gröszen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen (1763), and Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und Moral (1763, published 1764), the last of which was written in answer to the prize question posed by the Academy of Science of Berlin. Kant noted a distinction between the mathematical and metaphysical method of acquiring knowledge on two points, namely, with respect to the significance of definitions and the form of demonstration. Mathematical definitions are synthetical in contradistinction to metaphysical definitions which are analytical. Mathematics creates its own "Gegenstand" in arbitrary concepts. The being taken into consideration by it does not arise from anything other than the mathematical concept.

Therefore, in mathematics definitions come first, whereas in metaphysics the concepts of things are given. By means of thought the latter cannot create any new reality. Metaphysics can only logically analyze the concepts of concrete facts and things given in experience into their simplest elements, in order to make them clear and distinct. In metaphysics, therefore, unlike mathematics, definitions nearly always must be placed at the end rather than at the beginning. Kant pointed metaphysics to the method of mathematical physics as it was formulated by Newton: "At bottom the true method of metaphysics is identical with that introduced by Newton in physics and which had such useful results there". By so doing he unequivocally sided...

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The rupture between the metaphysics of the science-ideal and moral philosophy in this period of Kant's thought.

Nevertheless, during this time, under the influence of English
with Newton against the mathematical idealism of Leibniz and Wolff. According to Newton, knowledge commences with sense phenomena, from which by means of induction and analysis, scientific thought must ascend to the causes of these phenomena, which are expressed in natural laws.

Newton's famous pronouncement: "Hypotheses non fingo" demanded, that the natural laws formulated with the aid of mathematical thought must in the last analysis be subjected to the test of experience. The causes of phenomena cannot be devised by thinking. Only sense experience can offer us the necessary material for knowledge. Even mathematical thought must therefore remain bound to the confines of sense experience, if it is to furnish us with veritable knowledge of reality. By the acceptance of this method of mathematical natural science for metaphysics, Kant implicitly acknowledged, that the line of demarcation, which he made between the method of mathematics and that of philosophy in his writings during the year 1763, could not be definitive and fundamental.

His opinion was only that for metaphysics the time to follow the synthetical method of geometry had not yet come. As soon as "the analysis will have furnished clear and thoroughly understood concepts, the synthesis of the simplest cognitions will be able to subsume under itself the complex, just as in mathematics".

In other words, the standpoint of Kant during this period is still that of the English and French Enlightenment. As also appears from the other writings of this phase, the science-ideal, at least partially, still possesses the primacy. This ideal, however, is no longer conceived of in the abstract mathematical deductive sense of Descartes, but rather in the sense in which it was formulated by Newton. In his first metaphysical treatise, it was this conception of the science-ideal which caused Kant to reject the freedom of the will, thereby manifesting its supremacy over the ideal of personality.

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1 Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und Moral (Enquiry concerning the clearness of the basic principles of natural theology and ethics), W.W. Bnd. IV, pp. 299 (Conclusion of the "second consideration").
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The rupture between the metaphysics of the science-ideal and moral philosophy in this period of Kant's thought.

Nevertheless, during this time, under the influence of English psychologism a break began to show between the theoretical metaphysics of the science-ideal and moral philosophy. This break reveals itself in the treatise concerning the clarity of the basic principles of natural theology and ethics which I have just cited.

Here Kant made a sharp distinction between the knowing faculty, through which we are able to represent that which is true, and the power to distinguish that which is good. And together with Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume, Kant sought the latter faculty in the moral sentiment: "It is a matter of the understanding to analyze the complex and confused concept of the good and to render it distinct," Kant observes, "by demonstrating how it originates from more simple impressions of the good. If once this latter, however, is simple, the judgment: this is good, is wholly incapable of demonstration, and an immediate effect of the consciousness of the feeling of the pleasure we take in the Idea of the object".

The first principles of "natural theology" are indeed capable of the greatest philosophical evidence, insofar as they are metaphysical principles of knowledge, as for example, the principle that an absolutely existing perfect Supreme Being must lie at the foundation of all possible existing things, or the principle of the omnipresence of this Supreme Being.

In contrast to these, however, (like all basic principles of ethics in general) the first principles of this theology are only capable of moral certainty, insofar as they are concerned with God's freedom in action, His justice and goodness.

From this we see that in moral philosophy Kant had taken the path of psychologism. This fact is also confirmed by his Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen (Considerations on the feeling of the beautiful and the sublime),

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published in 1764, where in the footsteps of Shaftesbury, ethics is psychologically and aesthetically grounded in the “feeling of beauty.” During this period in Kant’s thought, the first division began to arise between the ideal of science and the still psychologically comprehended ideal of personality, although this line of demarcation was not yet radically drawn.

In this phase, in which Kant orientated theoretical metaphysics to mathematical natural science, he also proceeded critically to examine the contradiction between the latter and the logicistic-mathematical method of Christian Wolff, who thought that by mere conceptual analysis he could obtain apriori knowledge of reality and its causal relations.

Influence of Crusius.

The constant confusions between logical and real states of affairs in the ruling logicistic metaphysics were now analyzed with a real critical furor. Kant made Crusius’ fundamental distinction between the logical ground of knowledge and the ground of being into the very foundation for this critical investigation.

Following in the footsteps of his teacher Rudiger, but with much more solid means, Chr. Aug. Crusius (1715—75) had been the foremost German opponent of the geometrical method in metaphysics. Crusius had related the material principles of knowledge to the sensory side of experience. Upon the same grounds he also combated Leibniz’ monadology with a famous argument that since has very frequently been employed: if, as Leibniz taught, the essence of each monad were to consist in the fact that the latter represents to itself all the other monads, an absolute concept of the essence of any single monad is not given. If, however, nothing is absolute it is also contradictory to assume something which is relative.¹

In other words, the necessary relations may not be absolutized.

Crusius’ fundamental distinction between the grounds of knowledge and the grounds of being and his further division of the latter into causal ones and mere grounds of existence (whereby he simultaneously distinguished the physical from

¹ Entwurf der notwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten, wiefern sie den zufälligen entgegengesetzt werden [Project of the necessary truths of Reason, in how far they are opposed to the contingent ones] (3th ed. 1745) § 432.
merely mathematical ones) undoubtedly exerted considerable influence upon the further development of German philosophy.

Such men as Lambert and Mendelssohn developed these distinctions further, while Schopenhauer’s treatise “Uber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde (Concerning the four-fold root of the principle of sufficient ground) is practically a faithful reproduction of Crusius’ schema.

In his just-mentioned treatise, Kant recognized the great importance of this schema and made ample use of it. In his Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen (Attempt to introduce the concept of negative magnitudes in philosophy), he affirmed that in physics the terms negative and positive have an entirely different significance from that ascribed to them in logic and mathematics. In physics the mutual neutralizing of physical determinations (forces) leads to rest, whereas the mutual neutralizing of logical determinations leads to a logical contradiction and with that to a logical nothingness.

Third period; the dominating influence of Hume and Rousseau. Complete emancipation of the ideal of personality from the metaphysics of the science-ideal.

As Alois Riehl has convincingly demonstrated, during the following period of his development Kant was for a short time very close to Hume’s scepticism with respect to the foundations of the mathematical ideal of science. At the same time the influence of Rousseau led him to the radical emancipation of the science-ideal from the grasp of theoretical metaphysics.

This phase in the evolution of his thought is best expressed in the writing which I have mentioned above, Träume eines Geistersehers.

In this period (between 1764 and 1766) Kant introduced the distinction between analytical judgments which in the predicate do not add anything to the concept of the grammatical subject, and synthetical judgments which do so. This distinction which later on was to form the foundation of the entire Critique of Pure Reason, had not yet been introduced in his treatise concerning the “negativen Größen” (1763). To be sure, the syn-

1 Versuch den Begriff etc, first chapt. (W.W. Vol. IV), p. 239.
2 Riehl, Der phil. Kritizismus I (3e Aufl.), S. 306ff.
3 See Cassirer, Erkenntnisproblem II, p. 612ff.
synthetic method of the mathematical formation of concepts had, at this earlier stage, been placed in opposition to the analytical method of metaphysics. But this only meant to signify that mathematics creates its own “Gegenstand” in its concepts. Mathematical judgments, which develop only the content given in the definitions, were still conceived of as merely logical. In the period with which we are now dealing, however, the distinction has assumed a new sense.

Following Hume, Kant could for the present find no other solution than to reduce all synthetical propositions to the sensory aspect of experience, thus qualifying them all as “empirical judgments”\(^2\). Thereby, in fact, scepticism momentarily predominated with respect to the universally valid foundations of mathematical physics.

The physical principle of causality, as a “synthetic judgment”, does not possess universal validity or necessity. The universality which we ascribe to it, rests upon a generalizing of the sensory perception of the sequence of causes and effects.

Nevertheless, this psychologistic standpoint was abandoned almost immediately after Kant realized, that mathematical judgments, as “synthetical”, must possess an apriori universal validity which cannot be grounded in the senses. It was abandoned when he considered that scepticism with respect to the foundations of mathematical natural science would first of all touch the very foundations of mathematics\(^2\).

Henceforth, the question arises as to whether or not apriori principles of form are included in all synthetic judgments, principles which, themselves possessing a synthetic character, lie at the foundation of all mathematical and natural scientific knowledge, and as such are the necessary prerequisites for all experience.

The transitional phase in Kant’s thought until 1770.

Henceforth, the development of Kant’s thought is very complicated. Its course can only be reconstructed in some degree by making use of Kant’s philosophical journal, published by Erdmann, *Reflexionen Kants zur kritischen Philosophie* supplemented by the “stray notes” of Kant of the Duisburg inheritance, first

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The development of the basic antinomy in the edited by Reicke and later on by Th. Haering. But it must be granted, that every reconstruction, in view of the scarcity of available material, must retain a hypothetical moment.

From the source material in question, it appears, that by this time the problem concerning the relation of space and time to real things had been placed in the centre of Kant's interest. In a treatise entitled, Vom ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenenden im Raume (About the first ground of the difference of situations in space), which he wrote in 1768, Kant defended Newton's and Euler's mathematical doctrine of "absolute pure space" against Leibniz' conception, which held that space is nothing but an apriori "ordre des coexistences possibles"; an apriori concept of relation. Kant showed, with respect to incongruent symmetrical figures, that two things in the ordering of their parts can be completely alike without the one being capable of covering the other spatially. Consequently, space cannot be the product of the relations of material parts with respect to each other, but it is rather the prerequisite for the relations of spatial things to each other.

In this writing Kant was concerned exclusively with the significance of Newton's and Euler's doctrine for geometry and mathematical natural science; he never wished to be held accountable for the metaphysical speculation which Newton joined to his theory of absolute space as sensorium Dei.

At the end of his treatise, he only mentioned the difficulties which are inherent in the concept of absolute space, "if one wishes to conceive its reality by means of rational concepts, whereas the inner sense is satisfied with grasping it in intuition. But this difficulty manifests itself everywhere, when we want

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1 I could not consult the Reflexionen myself and cite them from Cassirer, Erkenntnisproblem II.

2 It is not easy to translate the German term "Gegend" in the sense here intended by Kant. In his introductory considerations Kant refers to Leibniz' analysis situs; but he remarks that he is not able to say in how far the subject of his treatise has affinity with the branch of mathematics which Leibniz meant. Kant defines the "Gegend" as the "relation of the system of spatial positions (Lagen) of a thing to the absolute world-space". As the simplest examples of "Gegende" he refers to the distinctions of above and beneath, right and left, ahead and astern of us, in which our body is the point of reference in relation to three planes of the three-dimensional space which intersect each other rectangularly. I think the English term "situation" is the best I can find to translate Kant's "Gegend" in the sense here explained.
to philosophize at all about the first data of our knowledge, but it is never so decisive as that which presents itself when the consequences of an assumed concept contradict the most apparent experience".1

Thus Kant expressly removed the metaphysical side of Newton's doctrine in order to limit himself to the data of experience.

The problem of the mathematical antinomies, Leibniz' and Newton's conception of space and time.

Meanwhile, the very difficulties of this conception of space were to be of enormous importance for Kant's further development. The thorough consideration of the problem concerning the relationship of absolute space and time to the universum of corporeal things led him to the discovery of the mathematical antinomies of actual infinity which were to play such an important rôle in the central part of the Critique of Pure Reason. Quite naturally, we shall deal with them later on.

By reason of these reflections, Kant finally became convinced, that space and time cannot be absolute realities in Newton's and Euler's sense. Therefore, for the time being he accepted Leibniz' doctrine, which had proclaimed them to be apriori forms of pure thought, "notions" or "conceptus intellectus puri"; notions, however, of which we first become clearly aware on the occasion of our sensory perceptions of corporeal things².

For while Kant was in the middle of his reflections upon the exact relation between sensibility and the logical function of thought with respect to knowledge, the major epistemological work of Leibniz, the famous Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain appeared.

In it Leibniz treated the same problem, and, as we have seen

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1 Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegend im Raume (W.W. Bnd. IV) p. 325: "wenn man seine Realität, welche dem inneren Sinne anschauend genug ist, durch Vernunftideen fassen will. Aber diese Beschwerlichkeit zeigt sich allerwärts, wenn man über die ersten data unserer Erkenntnis noch philosophieren will, aber sie ist niemals so entscheidend als diejenige, welche sich hervortut, wenn die Folgen eines angenommenen Begriffs der augenscheinlichsten Erfahrung widersprechen."

2 In contradistinction to the earlier view, more recent investigation has made it very likely, that we are not here dealing with a merely external influence of Leibniz, but rather with an influence explainable only by the internal development of Kant's own thought.
The development of the basic antinomy in the earlier, he sought its solution in the fact that the contents of experience virtually contain the very apriori concepts of mathematical metaphysical thought. Consequently, the latter do not originate from the sensory elements of the Idea, rather they are an originally obscure and unconscious possession of the mind. Even though sense experience acts as an intermediary, the mind becomes conscious of them only in clear conceptual apperception.

Nevertheless, Leibniz had given a metaphysical turn to his epistemology. The apriori concepts of the mind enable us to know the “eternal truths”, the metaphysical order of the cosmos; they reveal to us the laws of the “noumenon”, of the „Dinge an sich”, whereas sense experience, as a lower function of knowledge, supplies us with knowledge only of the sensory world of phenomena, in which world only contingent truths hold good.

Although originally Kant had accepted Leibniz’ doctrine of the creative apriori concepts of mind, he could at this time no longer ascribe any value to their metaphysical application. Even in this phase of his development he had planned a schema of apriori basic concepts, although this project did not yet correspond to any specific methodical point of view. In this schema, space and time originally functioned next to the concepts of actuality, possibility and necessity, sufficient reason, unity and multiplicity, part, totality and nothing, complex and simple, change and motion, substance and accident, force and activity. In the Reflexion 513, written between 1768 and 1769, Kant reckoned all these concepts to ontology, in its true sense related to the rest of philosophy as mathesis pura to mathesis applicata. Nevertheless, he could not remain satisfied with this view. For, as we shall see, he was driven further in his thought by the activity of the ideal of personality.

§ 3 - THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THIS CONFLICT AND THE ORIGINATION OF THE REAL CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The separation of understanding and sensibility in Kant’s inaugural address of 1770.

In his Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik (Prolegomena to every future Metaphysics), Kant declared, that it was only after long reflection that he came to the conclusion

\(^1\) Cassirer II, 623/4.
that a complete separation must be made between space and time as synthetic apriori forms of sensory intuition and the apriori pure concepts of understanding. He executed this division in his inaugural address with which he accepted a chair at the University of Königsberg: De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis. Nevertheless, his terminology is still vacillating insofar as sometimes he called space and time "conceptus singulares", and other times "intuitus singulares puri".

By means of the term "conceptus singularis", Kant intended to place space and time in opposition to the "conceptus universales" or concepts of species which are acquired by abstraction: there exist only one space and only one time, which respectively include all limited spaces and all finite periods of time as their parts. This conception passed over unchanged into the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason.

The deeper ground of this new conception of time and space is to be sought only in a reaction against theoretical metaphysics on the part of Kant's gradually maturing new conception of the ideal of personality.

As long as space and time were subsumed under the creative apriori concepts of logical thought, there lurked the constant danger that the relations discovered between spatial things would be transferred to the "mundus intelligibilis". This would result again in a domination of the mathematical science-ideal within the realm of the free and autonomous human personality.

Ethics and religion, the kingdom of sovereign personality, may no longer be conceived of in the forms of nature-experience. For this very reason the metaphysics of the intelligible world must be strongly prohibited from the domain of natural science.

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1 De mundi sensibilis etc. (W.W. Bnd. IV), Sectio II § 12, S. 343: "Intuitus autem purus (humanus) non est conceptus universalis s. logicus, sub quo, sed singarius, in quo sensibilia quaelibet cogitantur, ideoque continet conceptus spatii et temporis." Cassirer I, 626f, thinks Kant conceived of time and space as "conceptus singulares" before he conceived of them as forms of intuition. In this connection he refers exclusively to "Reflexions" written during 1768 and 1769; but Cassirer has apparently overlooked the fact that Kant even in his inaugural oration, in which he distinguished to the utmost possible degree the "forms of pure sensibility" from the "pure synthetical concepts of reason", still sometimes qualified space and time as "conceptus singulares".
Consequently, the significance of the inaugural oration of 1770 lies primarily in the sharp distinction made between the sphere of the knowledge of sensory phenomena and the intelligible world, accompanied by the recognition of the apriori synthetic forms of sensibility and logical understanding. Kant called this distinction the chief methodological basic principle of metaphysics 1.

Even in his Träume eines Geistersehers, he had made a division between the sphere of the experience of nature and that of ethics and religion, and thus withdrew the ideal of personality from the supremacy of natural scientific thought. Even here Kant taught that outside the sphere of sensory experience no scientific judgment is possible. Theoretical metaphysics which endeavours to acquire knowledge from pure concepts lapses into speculative mysticism. It tries to comprehend the spiritual world in the conceptual forms of sense-experience. The value of personality is, however, not dependent upon scientific thought. But during this period Kant still adhered to the sentimental religion and ethics defended by Rousseau and English psychologism.

The development of Kant's new conception of the ideal of personality. Earlier optimism is replaced by a radical pessimism with respect to the sensory nature of man.

A new conception of the Humanist ideal of personality matured in Kant in proportion to the degree in which he became involved in the antithesis between sensibility and reason. As Windelband has explained, this antithesis acquired an axiological character. The pietistic motives of Kant's youth, traversing the influence of Rousseau, were active in an increasingly rigorous suspicion of sensory human nature. And because of this distrust it was no longer possible to seek the value of personality in the function of feeling, which function Kant considered to be only sensual.

1 De mundi sensibilis etc. Sectio V, § 24 (S. 359): "Omnis metaphysicae circa sensitiva atque intellectualis methodus ad hoc potissimum praeceptum reedit: sollicite cavendum esse, ne principia sensitivae cognitionis domestica terminos suos migrant ac intellectualia afficiant." ["Every method of metaphysics concerning the sensory and the intelligible is to be chiefly reduced to this precept: take great care lest principles belonging to sensory knowledge should surpass their boundaries and affect the intelligible"].
With the elimination of this possibility, Kant definitely said farewell to the optimistic life- and world-view which, after the fashion of Leibniz' Theodicy, he had previously defended in his Versuch einiger Betrachtungen über den Optimismus [An attempt at some considerations on Optimism] (1759). Kant's gradually maturing dualistic transcendental ground-Idea made it impossible for him to harmonize with the sensory nature of man the Idea of normative autonomous freedom contained in his new conception of the ideal of personality. That caused him to adopt the pessimistic view of human nature expressed in his critical philosophy of religion, by his doctrine of the "radical evil" in man.

If sensory human nature with its sensual inclinations forms the real antithesis to the rational morality of man, then, in consequence, knowledge bound to sense-experience cannot furnish us with a knowledge of the real essence of things.

"Nature" as the sole experienceable reality is degraded by Kant to mundus sensibilis. In the same sense as in English psychologism, this mundus sensibilis includes both external and internal experience. Space was conceived of as a synthetical form of the "äuseren Sinn" (outer sense), time as a synthetical form of the "inneren Sinn" (inner sense). Both space and time are already recognized as necessary transcendental conditions for all sensory experience, as universally valid subjective conditions of our sensibility, in which the material of our sensory impressions is ordered apriori.

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1 W.W. Bnd. IV, pp. 73ff. It is the metaphysics of the Leibnizian ideal of science that motivated Kant to write here (p. 81/2): "...ich bin... erfreut, mich als einen Bürger in einer Welt zu sehen, die nicht besser möglich war." Man functions as a member of a cosmos which in its totality is the best possible!

2 De mundi sensibilis etc. Sectio II, § 12 (S. 343): "Phaenomena recensentur et exponentur primo sensus externi in Physica, deinde sensus interni in Psychologia empirica." ["Phenomena are investigated and explained in the first place in physics insofar as they belong to the outer sense, afterwards in empirical psychology, insofar as they belong to the inner sense."]

3 De mundi sensibilis etc. Sectio III, § 14, 5: "Tempus non est objectivum aliqvid et reale... sed subjectiva condicio per naturam mentis humanae necessaria, qualelibet sensibilia certa lege sibi coordinandi, et intuitus purus." ["Time is not something objective and real... but a subjective condition necessitated by the nature of the human mind in order to coordinate any sensible impressions whatever according to a
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But this entire "mundus sensibilis" only reveals the phenomenon to us, the mode in which the "Dinge an sich" appear. The latter are, as such, fundamentally excluded from the sphere of experience. In this way even mathematics and mathematical natural science, the primeval domain of the ideal of science in the Cartesian conception, are in principle limited to the phenomenon. Thus Newton's metaphysics of space, which elevated space as "sensorium Dei", is cut off at its very root.

Mathematics furnishes us with universally valid apriori knowledge of space and time which are the apriori forms of sensibility. Consequently, mathematics only provides us with knowledge of the apriori forms of the world of appearance.

With the aid of mathematics, whose universal validity was thus secured, Kant tried in his inaugural address to uphold the foundations of mathematical natural science against Hume's psychological criticism.

Following Newton, he accepted the conception of corporeal things as *filling of mathematical space* (a basically false conception as we shall see in the second volume). Corporeal things are only possible in space, as an apriori form of intuition. This apriori form of sensibility is at the same time an apriori structural law of the entire experienceable world of things.

In the creation of the mathematical theory of the world of phenomena, logical understanding is still limited by Kant to the *usus logicus*, that is to the formal analysis of the phenomena given in time and space.

In addition an *usus realis* is postulated for logical understanding. The synthetical apriori concepts are related to the "mun-
dus intelligibilis”. This intelligible world is to be sure still conceived of as that of the “Dinge an sich”. But even in the inaugural address of 1770 it appears that, contrary to the opinion of WINDELBAND, this does not indicate a relapse into the speculative Leibnizian metaphysics. It is rather the new conception of the Humanistic ideal of personality which now embodies itself in the Idea of the “thing in itself”, at least insofar as the latter is an object of metaphysics! Our pure autonomous will, being only determined by the form of moral legislation, is itself “an example of an Idea of freedom, of an intelligible substance, namely insofar as it binds effects, which can be given in experience, to super-empirical grounds of determination”.

In section 11, paragraph 9 of his inaugural address, KANT assigned two different tasks to metaphysics, namely, an elenctic and a dogmatic one. In the first respect metaphysics must eliminate all sensory concepts out of the sphere of noumena; in the second respect it must direct all the principles of pure reason — which exceed sense experience — toward one thing only, namely the perfectio noumenon, that is the super-sensory perfection. And the latter, as the perfection of God, becomes a principle of theoretical knowledge; and as a moral perfection, as perfectio moralis, it becomes a principle for human action. Knowledge derived from pure concepts of the mind is only a “cognitio symbolica”.

The expression “symbolical knowledge” is derived from LEIBNIZ' treatise, Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis of 1684, in which this thinker developed further the Cartesian criteria for the clarity and distinctness of knowledge. By “cognitio symbolica” in contradistinction to cognitio intuitiva, LEIBNIZ understood a “cognitio caeca”, in which, when we lack insight into the total character of the sensory object, we call in the help of abbreviated symbols in stead of the objects themselves. Nevertheless, it is by means of these very symbols that, according to him, we can acquire adequate knowledge, as in mathematics.

When KANT now applied this conception of the “cognitio symbolica” to the concepts of pure reason, and as a result denied to theoretical metaphysics every mode of intuitive adequate know-

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1 Gesch. der neueren Phil. II (4th ed.) S. 39.
2 Cf. Cassirer II, 635. In Reflexion 1156 and 1157, “die Regel der Freiheit apriori in einer Welt überhaupt” [“the rule of apriori freedom in a world in general”] is expressly called the “forma mundi intelligibilis.”
The development of the basic antinomy in the
ledge, he chose a position diametrically opposite to that of Leibniz: according to the latter, we do acquire intuitive metaphysical knowledge derived from pure and simple concepts of reason.

Kant combated strongly the Idea of Leibniz and Wolff that sensory knowledge is only a "cognitio confusa", whereas, in contrast, knowledge derived from simple concepts is clear and distinct. In Reflexion 414 Kant observes: "It is perfectly out of the question that the sensory intuitions of space and time are confused Ideas; rather they furnish the most distinct cognitions of all, namely the mathematical ones". As confirmed by the "Reflexions" of this period, the notion of metaphysical knowledge as merely symbolical is to be considered as the prelude to the doctrine of transcendential Ideas of Kant's critical period. "The mundus intelligibilis", he remarks in one of these Reflexions, "as an object of intuition, is a mere undetermined Idea; but as an object of the practical relation of our intellect to intelligences of a world in general and to God as the practical original Being of it, it is a true concept and a determined Idea: civitas Dei (the city of God)".

In the Reflexions written during this time, the mundus intelligibilis was plainly identified with the mundus moralis and the idea of God was qualified as the "practical original Being". The identification in the cited "Reflexion" (1162) of the mundus intelligibilis with the Idea of the "civitas Dei" is undoubtedly formally derived from Leibniz. But Leibniz' God was in the last analysis the deification of mathematical thought, the final hypostasis of the mathematical science-ideal. Whereas, in Kant's Idea of God, even in this phase, is expressed the moralistic ideal of personality, in the sense of supra-theoretical practical freedom and sovereign self-determination.

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1 "Es ist so weit gefehlt, dass die sinnlichen Anschauungen von Raum und Zeit sollten verworrenen Vorstellungen sein, dass sie vielmehr die deutlichsten Erkenntnisse unter alle, nämlich die mathematischen verschaffen."

2 Cassirer, Ibid.: "Der mundus intelligibilis als ein Gegenstand der Anschauung ist eine bloße unbestimmte Idee; aber als ein Gegenstand des praktischen Verhältnisses unseres Intelligenz zu Intelligenzen der Welt überhaupt und Gott als das praktische Urwesen derselben, ist er ein wahrer Begriff und bestimmte Idee: civitas Dei."

3 Cassirer II, 635.
The new conception of the ideal of personality as \( \varepsilon \tau \delta \theta \varepsilon \varsigma \) in the transition to the critical standpoint.

The last phase in Kant's development, the rise of his actual critical philosophy, can be understood only in terms of this new conception of the ideal of personality. The Idea of the autonomous self-determination of personality became the hidden \( \varepsilon \tau \delta \theta \varepsilon \varsigma \) of theoretical knowledge.

It may be true that according to Kant's own testimony he was awakened from his "dogmatic slumbers" by the discovery of the antinomies of theoretical metaphysics. Yet this theoretical discovery cannot be considered to have been the deeper cause, but only the occasion of his transition to critical idealism. The real motive of this transition was religious in nature.

Once the ideal of personality is recognized as the foundation of the ideal of science, the autonomy of the theoretical function of thought can be proclaimed over against the empirical determinations of the merely receptive, passive sensibility. The spontaneity of the logical function of thought acquires a new meaning in contrast to the receptivity of sensibility! The sovereign value of personality can express itself in the spontaneity of the intellect only if the latter, in its apriori synthetic functions, is elevated to the position of law-giver with respect to "nature". Kant's famous letter of February 21, 1772 to Markus Herz is the first clear attestation to this new turn in his thought.

Up till now Kant had approached the problem concerning the relation of theoretical thought to reality only from the metaphysical side. In his inaugural address of 1770, he went no further than drawing a sharp line of demarcation between mundus visibilis and mundus intelligibilis. The usus realis of logical understanding with its synthetical categories was related here to the metaphysical root of reality, to the "Ding an sich".

Henceforth, Kant posed the problem concerning the relation of logical understanding and reality with reference to the world of sense-experience ordered in the apriori forms of intuition, space and time.

Does not the intellect possess an "usus realis" in the apriori foundation of the "mundus visibilis"?

Henceforth, Kant concentrated his attention upon the problem of the apriori synthesis, through which in his opinion the world

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of experience is first constituted as a universally valid ordered cosmos. To Kant, universally valid experience becomes identical with the “Gegenstand” of theoretical knowledge, and “Gegenstand” becomes identical with “objectivity”.

In his letter to Herz, Kant wrote, that the key to the entire mystery of metaphysics is to be found in the question: “what is the basis for the relation between that which is called our representation, and the object” (Gegenstand).

The “Gegenstand” may be given to us by our senses, however, this sensory datum appears only as a chaotic mass of as yet unordered material of experience, a mass of intermingled sensory impressions, within the apriori forms of intuition, space and time in which they are received.

All of our representations of things in the external world are actually syntheses of our consciousness through which we bring under the unity of a concept a given sensory multiplicity received in the forms of space and time. The universal validity and necessity of these syntheses can never be found in the psychical laws of association of our representational activity. It can only originate from the apriori function of pure logical understanding with its synthetical categories, which understanding is not determined by sensibility, but, on the contrary, does itself define the sensory datum in a universally valid manner. It is the logical function of thought in its pure unconditioned apriori structure that synthetically constitutes the “Gegenstand” by realizing its categories in sensory experience.

The reason why we rightly assume that the things in expe-rienceable reality conform themselves to these concepts and their combinations, is that our mind itself constitutes the apriori form of the “Gegenstand”, while only the sensory material is given to us in the apriori forms of intuition.

Beyond any doubt, even in this letter to Markus Herz, Kant has clearly formulated the problem of his “critical” philosophy. For the first time he developed the program of the Transcendental Analytic, in sharp contrast to the traditional formal logic, and he introduced the name “transcendental philosophy” for the critical inquiry concerning the apriori elements of human knowledge.

In the “Transcendental Analytic” Kant wished to discover the system of all synthetical functions of the “pure understanding” which are related apriori to the “Gegenstand der Erfahrung”.

Once this task had been accomplished the key would be found for the solution of a question that he later was to formulate as the central problem of his first critical work, *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781): "How are synthetical judgments apriori possible?" But it took nine years before KANT was prepared to present the elaborate system of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to the scientific world.

The discovery of the system of the transcendental categories cannot in itself explain this long delay. KANT had quickly found the principle of the "metaphysical deduction" of these categories, as it is called in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Namely, the principle that all of these categories are founded in the logical function of judgment, so that they automatically arise from the four classes of these judgments (quantity, quality, relation and modality).

Rather it appears, as RIEHL supposes, that the so-called "transcendental deduction" presented KANT with his greatest difficulty. This deduction entailed the task of explaining why the categories are necessarily related to the "Gegenstand" of experience, and as such have universal validity for all possible experience. As B. ERDMANN has shown, we find the first utterance concerning the principle of this transcendental deduction in a letter which KANT wrote on Nov. 24, 1776.

It is also certain that it was again HUME'S critique of the principle of causality which stimulated KANT to demonstrate the transcendental-logical character of the synthetical categories. In the transcendental deduction, the foundations of the mathematical and natural scientific pattern of knowledge were at stake.

The "Dialectic of Pure Reason" as the heart of KANT'S *Critique of Pure Reason*.

But these foundations had an inner connection with the intrinsic dialectic of KANT's hidden transcendental ground-Idea.

According to his own testimony, the core of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is not to be found in the Transcendental Analytic or in the Transcendental Aesthetic; rather it is to be found in the Dialectic of Pure Reason, in which he develops his doctrine of the transcendental Ideas of pure reason.

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1 RIEHL I, (3e Aufl.) p. 371 ff.
The development of the basic antinomy in the

For here the tyranny of the science-ideal over the ideal of personality must be broken. Therefore, in the transcendental deduction of the categories the foundations of the ideal of science were to be brought in accordance with the aim of Kant's dialectic of pure reason. The claims of theoretical metaphysics inspired by the mathematical science-ideal to acquire knowledge of the supra-temporal root and origin of experienceable reality were to be rejected and the way was to be opened for the apriori rational faith in the reality of the idea of autonomous freedom of human personality.

For that very reason we shall have to place the doctrine of the transcendental ideas in the centre of the Critique of Pure Reason.

Over and above this, in the explanation of Kant's "critical" philosophy it will become evident to us how his three main critical works: The Critique of Pure Reason (1781), the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), and the Critique of Judgment (1790) must be viewed as a whole, inseparably connected to his dialectical transcendental ground-Idea. In other words, we shall see, that if any one, from a Christian point of view, believes he can accept Kant's epistemology, while rejecting his ethical and religious philosophy, he is only giving evidence of a lack of appreciation of the true transcendental foundations of Kant's philosophy.

In the second volume, in our treatment of the problem of epistemology, we shall give special attention to Kant's theory of knowledge; therefore, in the present connection we shall only consider its main Idea, insofar as it is necessary in order to gain an insight into the structure of Kant's transcendental ground-Idea.

§ 4 - THE ANTINOMY BETWEEN THE IDEAL OF SCIENCE AND THAT OF PERSONALITY IN THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

Actually Kant's "Copernican deed", i.e. his critical reversal of the relation between the knowing subject and empirical reality, his fundamental break with dogmatical metaphysics, in short the whole content of his Critique of Pure Reason, acquires its essential significance only in the light of the new relationship between the ideal of science and that of personality, in the basic structure of his transcendental ground-Idea.

If one isolates Kant's epistemology from the latter, Kant's
Copernican deed, which is usually considered to be a radical revolution in modern philosophy, is, in itself, in no wise radical. It is quickly forgotten that since the time of Descartes, Humanist philosophical thought had been characterized by the tendency to seek the foundations of reality in the knowing subject only. Hume had with extreme acuteness tried to show that our experience is limited to sense phenomena. In distinction to the “objective” metaphysics of Greek and medieval philosophy, the Cartesian adage “cogito, ergo sum,” signified the very proclamation of the sovereignty of subjective thought. Insofar as the Humanist ideal of science, with its logicistic principle of continuity, developed without a real synthesis with medieval or ancient metaphysics, its deepest tendency was the elevation of mathematical-logical thought to the throne of cosmic ordainer. If any one doubts this, he may return to the sources of the Humanistic science-ideal and behold once again the cleft which separates modern Humanist thought, with its essentially nominalistic concept of substance, from the old objective metaphysics of substantial forms. He may examine once again the experiment of Hobbes, as presented in the preface to his “De Corpore”, according to which the entire given world of experience is theoretically demolished, in order that it may be reconstructed by the creative activity of mathematical thought.

If indeed Kant had done no more than to proclaim the sovereign transcendental-logical subject as lawgiver of empirical reality, his Copernican deed would have been nothing more than the realization of the basic tendency of the Humanistic science-ideal restricted to sense phenomena and his Criticism would have never become a true “transcendental idealism”.

The deepest tendencies of Kant’s Copernican revolution in epistemology are brought to light by the ascription of primacy to the ideal of personality resulting in a new form of the Humanistic ground-Idea.

Kant’s withdrawal of the “Ding an sich” from the domination of the mathematical ideal of science, and his limitation of all theoretical knowledge to sense-phenomena is only to be understood from the dialectical turn of Humanist thought to its religious freedom-motive, embodied in the ideal of personality.

1 Cf. p. 197 of this volume.
Henceforth, the transcendent root of human existence is no longer sought in limited mathematical and natural scientific categories but rather in the rational moral function of sovereign personality, as it is expressed in the transcendental Idea of human freedom. This is the real cause of Kant’s aversion to Leibniz’ logicistic cosmonomic Idea of harmonia praestabilita, by which free personality was included in a continuous mathematically construed cosmic order, and in which, in the last analysis, the distinction between sensibility and rational freedom was relativized by the ideal of science.

In Kant’s epistemology the postulate of the sovereignty of mathematical thought remains in full force with respect to knowledge of nature, but the ideal of science (essentially pertaining only to the domination of nature) cedes its primacy to the ideal of personality. Kant had become fully aware of the polar tension between both of these ideals.

The (sit venia verbo!) naturalistic idealism of the mathematical concept is replaced by a normative freedom-idealism of the transcendental Idea which — in pointing to the root of human personality — transcends the limits of logical understanding.

The neo-Kantian idealism of the Marburg school, in its first critical enthusiasm, thought it could correct Kant by abolishing his limitation of the sovereignty of theoretical thought to sensory phenomena. Thus it wished to extend the logicized ideal of knowledge to the normative world. Meanwhile, we have observed in an earlier context that, in so doing, this school was simply not conscious of the fact that it violated the typical structure of Kant’s transcendental ground-Idea. It supposed it could elaborate Kant’s critical method more consistently by eliminating the epistemological function of sensibility. It was unaware that in so doing it substituted a new type of Humanist ground-Idea for the Kantian one!

The very transcendental critical meaning of Kant’s epistemology is indissolubly linked up with the binding of the mathematical and the natural scientific categories to the sensory function of experience. For this restriction of the Humanist science-ideal was strictly commanded by Kant’s critical insight into the definitive antithesis between the nature- and the freedom-motives in the religious root of Humanistic thought.

The transcendental Ideas of reason point theoretical thought regulatively to the totality of the determinations of empirical reality without logical understanding ever being able to encom-
pass this totality. At the same time these Ideas point beyond the
logical function of theoretical thought to the supra-sensory root
of reality, which the Humanistic ideal of personality henceforth,
in an increasing degree, would identify with the practical Idea
of autonomous moral freedom.

Here the deepest tendency in Kant's proclamation of the
"primacy of practical reason" manifests itself. This proclama-
tion signified the first step in the process of concentrating
philosophical thought in the Idea of autonomous moral perso-
nality.

As we observed in an earlier context, it was still only the first
step which Kant's critical philosophy took in this direction. For
the sharp line of demarcation between both of the basic factors
in his transcendental ground-Idea, for the present, prevented the
drawing of the full consequences of freedom-idealism.

The dualistic type of the Kantian transcendental
ground-Idea.

The Critique of Pure Reason and its counterpart the Critique
of Practical Reason break the cosmos asunder into two spheres,
that of sensory appearance and that of super-sensory freedom.
In the former, the ideal of science is the lord and master, the
mind is the law-giver of nature, since it constitutes empirical
reality as "Gegenstand". But the ideal of science with its mecha-
nical principle of causality is in no way deemed competent in
the super-sensory sphere of moral freedom. It is not permitted
to apply its categories outside of the domain of sensory expe-
rience. In the realm of moral freedom the "homo noumenon"
(the humanistic ideal of personality in the hypostatized rational-
moral function) maintains its own sovereignty.

Kant severed all cosmic connections of meaning which bind
the normative moral function to the sensory. This hypostatiza-
tion of the moral function of personality, as a self-sufficient
metaphysical reality, avenges itself by a logical formalism in
the treatment of ethical questions.

Here it clearly appears how the meaning of the normative
functions of reality is disturbed by the attempt to loosen them
from their coherence with all other modal aspects in "cosmic
time.

The dualism between the ideal of science and that of persona-
ity in Kant's conception of the Humanist cosmonomic Idea comes
sharply to the fore in the relationship between the "transcenden-
The development of the basic antinomy in the fundamental unity of apperception" and the hypostatized Idea of the absolutely autonomous moral freedom. This relationship was in Kant essentially unclarified and antinomical. On the one hand the freedom-motive expresses itself in the "transcendental thinking ego", conceived of as the necessary pre-requisite for all objective experience of nature and as the apriori form of logical unity of the autonomous knowing subject. Whereas, on the other hand, opposite to it was posited the Idea of autonomous freedom of "pure will".

In Kant's transcendental dualistic ground-Idea the basic antinomy between the ideals of science and of personality assumes a form which was to become the point of departure for all the subsequent attempts made by post-Kantian idealism to conquer this dualism.

Are we confronted here with two distinct roots in human reason? If this question were to be answered affirmatively, the unity of human selfhood (which from the outset had been sought in human reason) would be destroyed. This, however, cannot be Kant's true meaning, for he denied emphatically that the logical form of the "transcendental cogito" has any "metaphysical" meaning.

Must we then conclude that the "transcendental logical ego" itself belongs to the phenomenon? This supposition, too, appears to be untenable, because, in this case, this transcendental subject could never be conceived of as the formal origin of the world of natural phenomena.

So the basic antinomy between the ideal of science and that of personality discloses itself in the transcendental Idea of the autonomous human ego itself. This was to become the point of departure in the development of post-Kantian idealism. In Fichte the Idea of autonomous freedom was in a radical fashion elevated as the all inclusive root and origin of the entire cosmos.

For we have seen in an earlier context, that, just as the classical ideal of science implies a postulate of continuity which requires a methodical levelling of the modal aspects, in similar fashion the ideal of personality possesses its proper tendency to continuity which soon was to contest the self-sufficiency of the science-ideal.

Kant conceived of the "transcendental cogito" neither as a substance nor as a phenomenon, but as a merely logical function,
as pure spontaneity of the uniting act synthesizing the multiplicity of a possible sensory intuition.

He tried to represent this "cogito" as a spontaneous activity, and as a final logical unity in consciousness which is ever elevated above all logical multiplicity in concepts.

When we deal with the problem of knowledge in the second volume of this work, we shall more closely analyze the intrinsic antinomy which lies hidden in this concept of the "unity of pure consciousness". Nevertheless, we can note in passing, that Kant cannot recognize the real unity of self-consciousness, because his hidden transcendental ground-Idea requires an unbridgeable gulf between the so-called theoretical and practical reason.

The expression of this dualism in the antithesis of natural laws and norms.

The transcendental logical subject is lawgiver of "nature"; the transcendent subject of autonomous moral freedom is lawgiver of human action (or rather is the logical form of the moral law itself)!

Natural necessity and freedom, causal law and norm, in their relationship to each other become antinomic species of laws which cannot find any deeper reconciliation in Kant's dualistic cosmonomic Idea.

If natural necessity cannot itself find its root in the Idea of free sovereign personality, it remains a counter force against the declaration of the absoluteness of the moral Idea of freedom, and this fundamental antithesis cannot be resolved by a mere axiological subordination of theoretical to practical reason.

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1 Kr. d. r. V. Allgemeine Anmerkung den Übergang von der rationalen Psychologie zur Kosmologie betreffend [General remark concerning the transition from rational psychology to cosmology], p. 322/3: "Das Denken, für sich genommen, ist bloß die logische Funktion, mithin lauter Spontaneität der Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen einer bloß möglichen Anschatzung... Dadurch stelle ich mich mir selbst weder wie ich bin, noch wie ich mich erscheine, vor, sondern ich denke mich nur wie ein jedes Objekt überhaupt" (sic), "von dessen Art der Anschatzung ich abstrahiere." ["Thought, taken in itself, is merely the logical function, consequently pure spontaneity of the uniting activity synthesizing the multiplicity of a merely possible sensory intuition... Through it I represent myself neither as I am, nor as I appear to myself, rather I think myself only as an object in general, abstracted from the mode in which it is perceived.

2 Kr. d. v. V. Transsz. Logik, 2e Abschn. §§ 15 and 16.
The development of the basic antinomy in the

If philosophical thought is to avoid becoming constantly involved in intrinsic antinomies, the Archimedean point of philosophy cannot be as a house divided against itself.

The form-matter schema in Kant's epistemology as an expression of the inner antinomy of his dualistic transcendental ground-Idea.

In Kant's epistemology, too, an inner antinomy is concealed by the fact that sensibility and logical understanding are dualistically set in opposition to each other. And this antinomy is dangerous to both the ideal of science and that of personality.

In spite of the proclamation of logical understanding as the lawgiver for nature, the sovereignty of theoretical thought is seriously threatened, because sensibility as a purely receptive instance, imposes insurmountable limits upon it. The understanding ("Verstand") is the sovereign lawgiver only in a formal sense. Only the universally valid form of natural reality originates in the "transcendental cogito".

The material of knowledge, remains deeply a-logical, so that at this point the problem of the "Ding an sich" behind the phenomena of nature arises again in a dangerous fashion. In the traditional metaphysical way, Kant permits the purely receptive sensibility to be affected by the "Ding an sich".

This "Ding an sich" is obviously again thought of as a natural substance and cannot be compatible with the Idea of the "homo noumenon" as a free and autonomous supra-temporal being. In consequence, post-Kantian transcendental idealism necessarily must consider this to be an insult to sovereign reason. The a-logical "natural substance" threatened both the ideal of science and that of personality.

Pre-Kantian rationalism had actually conceived of the substance of nature as the creation of absolute mathematical thought, and thereby it had made the latter to be the deepest root and the origin of the cosmos. In so doing, however, it had disregarded the proper claims of the Humanistic ideal of personality.

In his dualistic delimitation of the ideal of science and that of personality, Kant permitted an a-logical "Ding an sich" to remain behind the phenomena of nature, a "Ding an sich" which destroys the sovereignty of thought and gives rise to the pro-

1 Kroner rightly observes op. cit. I, p. 103: "In den so gedachten Dingen
blem of a deeper root behind both logical thought and the metaphysical natural substance, and which on the other hand is not compatible with the postulate of continuity of the Humanistic ideal of personality; the acceptance of a metaphysical "substance of nature" did not permit the Idea of free and autonomous personality to be recognized as the deepest root of empirical (natural) reality.

Kant himself felt the antinomy in his delimitation of the science-ideal by a natural "Ding an sich". He tried, therefore, to avoid this antinomy by his construction of an *intellectus archetypus*, an intuitive divine mind, that creatively produces its "Gegenstand" in direct non-sensory intellectual intuition. This Idea is essentially derived from Leibniz' notion of infinite analysis which is to be completed only in divine thought. Kroner rightly observes from the Humanist point of view: "The consequence of epistemological thought compels us to transcend the separation and to arrive at the unity of the intuitive understanding; with regard to the latter, however, the opposition between the "Gegenstand" and the ego can no longer be maintained. In the Idea both are identical, and such not as "Gegenstand", because the understanding is not produced by that which is viewed, but as understanding, since the latter produces that which is viewed... The Idea of the understanding producing its "Gegenstand" leads beyond logic as epistemology; it is a limiting concept, — a concept which limits epistemology".

The function of the transcendental Ideas of theoretical reason.

In spite of all this, it cannot be denied that in the transcendental dialectic, by introducing the transcendental Ideas of theoretical reason, Kant took an important step in the direction later taken by Fichte. The latter completely eliminated the natural "Ding an sich" and proclaimed practical reason, as the seat of the ethical ideal of personality, to be the deepest root of the entire cosmos.

With the synthetic determination of the "Gegenstand" by the mathematical categories of quantity and quality, and by the physical (categories) of relation, substance, causality and interaction, the logical understanding is set on an endless path; in this way alone the totality of the conditions can never be thought of as the "unconditioned" itself.

The very limitation and the restriction of the categories to the sensory phenomenon makes it impossible for the intellect to conceive of the "Ding an sich" in a positive sense as the absolute. The "absolute" can never be given in experience, since the latter is itself determined by the mathematical and dynamical (natural scientific) categories.

For this very reason the mind can conceive of the "noumena" as "Dinge an sich" only in a negative sense. In his remarkable explanation "Von dem Grunde der Unterscheidung aller Gegenstände überhaupt in Phaenomena und Noumena," Kant wrote: "The concept of a noumenon is also merely a limiting concept, in order to fence in the presumption of sensibility, and it is also only to be used in a negative sense. Nevertheless, it has not been arbitrarily invented, but is connected with the limitation of sensibility, without, however, being able to set anything positive in addition to its extent" 1.

It was from this point of view that Kant began his destructive criticism of the rationalist metaphysics of the Leibnizian-Wolffian school. This criticism was pregnantly expressed by Kant

1 *Kr. der reinen Vernunft* (W.W. Bd. III) p. 243: "Der Begriff eines Noumenon ist also blosz ein Grenzbegriff, um die Anmaszung der Sinnlichkeit einzuschränken, und also nur von negativem Gebrauche. Er ist aber gleichwohl nicht willkürlich erdichtet, sondern hängt mit der Einschränkung der Sinnlichkeit zusammen, ohne doch etwas Positives ausser dem Umfange derselben setzen zu können." In the present connection I am quoting exclusively from the second edition. In Vol. II when we take up the problem of Epistemology I will consider the differences between the first and second edition.
in the statement that concepts without sensory intuitions are empty, as vice versa intuitions without concepts are blind. It began with the famous Appendix: "Concerning the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection by means of mistaking the empirical use of the understanding for the transcendental one" and reached its culminating point in the "Antinomies of Pure Reason".

Yet, Kant simultaneously tried to show that no contradiction is implied in the acceptance of the concept of a "noumenon" as the "Gegenstand" of an infinite intuitive intellect, even though the reality of the "things in themselves" is only secured by "practical reason" in apriori faith.

By recognizing the infinity of its task in the determination of the "Gegenstand", the intellect subordinates itself to "theoretical reason", which with its transcendental Ideas — as mere regulative principles for the use of the understanding — indicates to the latter the direction to follow in order to bring unity to its rules. The transcendental idea presents to the understanding the unattainable goal: the "unconditioned", as totality of categorical determinations; so theoretical reason subjects logical thought to an infinite task. Consequently, in Kant the theoretical transcendental Idea is viewed as nothing but the logical category extended to the "absolute". This extension is made possible in pure reason by freeing the category from the inevitable limitations of possible experience and by so extending the concept beyond the limits of the sensory empirical, although still in contact with it.

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1 Kr. d. r. Vern., p. 276: "Der Verstand mag ein Vermögen der Einheit der Erscheinungen vermitteln mit der Regeln sein, so ist die Vernunft das Vermögen der Einheit der Verstandesregeln unter Prinzipien. Sie geht also niemals zunächst auf Erfahrung oder auf irgend einen Gegenstand, sondern auf den Verstand, um den maniegaltigen Erkenntnissen desselben Einheit a priori durch Begriffe zu geben, welche Vernunft einheit heissen mag und von ganz anderer Art ist, als sie von dem Verstande geleistet werden kann." ['The understanding may be a faculty of bringing unity to the phenomena by means of rules: Reason, on the other hand, is the faculty of creating the unity of the rules of understanding under principles. Consequently, the latter is never directly related to experience or to a "Gegenstand", but rather to the understanding, in order to furnish the manifold cognitions of the latter with unity a priori by means of concepts; a unity which may be called unity in the sense of Reason and is of a quite different nature from that which can be produced by the understanding."

2 Kritik der r. Vern., p. 327.
The development of the basic antinomy in the

The transcendental Idea is a necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding objects can be given in the sensory aspect of experience. "Pure reason" is never related to "Gegenstände", but only to the apriori concepts of "Gegenstände", to the logical categories.

As Kant tried to derive his table of pure concepts or categories of the understanding from the forms of logical propositions according to the viewpoints of quantity, quality, relation and modality, so he also tried to construct a table of transcendental Ideas of pure reason patterned after the form of the judgments of relation: the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive.

Thus he divided these Ideas into three classes:

1 - the first is that of the absolute unity of the thinking subject as the absolute substratum of all subjective psychical phenomena;

2 - the second is that of the absolute unity of the series of synthetical determinations of the objective sensory phenomena;

3 - the third is that of the absolute unity of determinations of all the objects of thought in general or the Idea of a supreme Being, a "Wesen aller Wesen". The first point of view furnishes the Idea of the soul as absolute unity of the thinking subject, the second the Idea of the world or that of the universe as totality of all objective phenomena in the external world. The third furnishes the Idea of Deity as the being which includes all reality within itself (ens realissimum).

None of these transcendental Ideas are related to experience. Since in Kant's system all science is limited to the sensory aspect of experience, it is impossible to acquire scientific knowledge

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1 Kant's list of the logical forms of proposition is as follows:
I - Quantity of propositions: universal, particular, singular propositions.
II - Quality of propositions: affirmative, negative, infinite propositions.
III - Relation-propositions: categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive propositions.
IV - Modality of propositions: problematical, assertoric, apodictic propositions.

To this table corresponds that of the categories:
I - Categories of quantity: unity, plurality, totality.
II - Categories of quality: reality, negation, limitation.
III - Categories of relation: substance and accident, cause and effect, interaction.
IV - Categories of modality: possibility, actuality, necessity.

2 Kritik der r. V., p. 297 ff.
from such Ideas. In their speculative use, in which we conclude from the mere "Idea" to the absolute reality of its content, there arises the "dialectical illusion": theoretical thought transcends the boundaries of experience and supposes that in this way it can attain to knowledge of the "supra-empirical".

The task of the "Critique of Pure Reason" is to dispel this dialectical illusion and to keep theoretical thought within its boundaries, while, at the same time, it must furnish us with an insight into the fact that the speculative "dialectical conclusions" are not arbitrary, but rather spring necessarily from the very nature of pure reason itself

Thereby the three metaphysical sciences are discarded in which idealistic pre-critical rationalism had attempted to carry through the primacy of the ideal of science over the ideal of personality, namely rational (metaphysical) psychology, cosmology (more exactly called: metaphysics of nature) and natural theology.

Kant's shifting of the Archimedean point of Humanist philosophy is clearly evident from his critique of metaphysical psychology, in which self-consciousness had identified itself with mathematical thought.

In his doctrine of the "Paralogisms of Pure Reason" in which the rationalist psychology, as theoretical metaphysics, is reduced to absurdity, Kant struck at the very core of the Cartesian conclusion drawn from the intuitive self-consciousness in the cogito, to the esse. From this appears most clearly the shift in the

\[1 \text{ Kr} \text{itik der r. V., p. 302.} \\
2 \text{Ibid., p. 321: "Der dialektische Schein in der rationalen Psychologie beruht auf die Verwechselung einer Idee der Vernunft (einer Intellegenz) mit den in allen Stücken unbestimmten Begriffe eines denkenden Wesens überhaupt... Folglich verwechsle ich die mögliche Abstraktion von meiner empirisch bestimmten Existenz mit dem vermeinten Bewusstsein einer abgesonderten möglichen Existenz meines denkenden Selbst und glaube das substantiale in mir als das transzendentale Subject zu erkennen, indem ich blosz die Einheit des Bewusstseins, welche allem Bestimmen als der blozen Form der Erkenntnis zum Grunde liegt, im Gedanken habe." ["The dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from mistaking an Idea of Reason (of an intelligence) for the concept of a thinking being in general, which is undetermined in all respects... Consequently, I mistake the possible abstraction from my empirically determined existence for the supposed consciousness of a separate possible existence of my thinking self, and I believe I know the substantial in myself as the} \]
The development of the basic antinomy in the Archimedean point which the Humanistic transcendental ground-Idea underwent in Kant's criticism.

The basic theses of metaphysical psychology: the substantiability, immateriality, simplicity, immortality and personality of the "thinking" ego and the different metaphysical conceptions concerning its relation to the things of the "external world", were pulled to bits by Kant's critique. According to him, they only rest on an unjustifiable relating of the empty logical form of transcendental self-consciousness to a supra-empirical "Gegenstand". And this is done by means of the logical categories. "All modi of self-consciousness in thought as such, are therefore not yet logical concepts of objects (categories), but mere logical functions which neither give to thought any "Gegenstand", nor any knowledge of myself as a "Gegenstand". The object is not the consciousness of the determining but only of the determinable self, that is of my intuition (in so far as its multiplicity can be synthetized according to the general condition of the unity of apperception in thought)."

As soon as the ideal of personality had freed itself from the stifling grasp of the science-ideal, Humanism could no longer seek the metaphysical root, the "substance" of personality, in sovereign mathematical thought.

Thus, even the basic problem of Humanistic theoretical metaphysics, namely, the relation of the material substance to the soul substance (in its three pre-Kantian solutions, viz. the naturalistic acceptance of an influxus physicus, occasionalism, and the Leibnizian doctrine of the pre-established harmony between material and spiritual monads), became null and void to Kant.

For him the entire problem is reduced to the relation between the subjective-psychical phenomena of the "inner sense" and

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transcendental subject, while I have nothing in mind but the unity of consciousness which as mere form of knowledge lies at the foundation of all determining acts of thought].

the objective-psychical phenomena of the "outer sense", in other words, to the question how these phenomena can be joined in the same consciousness\(^1\). In fact, this is the problem which concerns the relation between logical thought and psychical sensibility in the same consciousness, which problem Kant deemed to be insoluble in a psychological sense. For him the transcendental Idea of the soul has no other theoretical function than that of a regulative principle of pure reason for all psychological knowledge whose final goal, though never attainable, lies in the insight into the absolute unity of the functions of sensibility and logical understanding.

Nevertheless, as limiting concept, the Idea of the soul possesses an actually transcendental significance. In his "General remark concerning the transition from rational psychology to cosmology" Kant indicated the practical use of the transcendental Idea, in which it directs theoretical thought toward the homo noumenon, as the autonomous law-giver in the supra-sensory realm of freedom.

A principle of the supra-sensory determination of human existence is really found "through the admirable faculty that first reveals to us the consciousness of the moral law". Metaphysical psychology had vainly sought this principle in theoretical thought\(^2\).

Thus in its practical trend, within the limits set for the Humanist science-ideal by the "Critique of Pure Reason", the Kantian idea of the soul displayed itself as a transcendental foundation, even of this science-ideal itself. But Kant's dualistic transcendental ground-Idea prevented him from drawing the consequences through which the cleft between "theoretical" and "practical" reason could be bridged.

Kant's criticism of "rational cosmology" (natural metaphysics) in the light of the transcendental trend of the cosmological Ideas.

In the analysis of the antinomies of pure reason Kant reduced to absurdity rational cosmology, in the sense of the natural metaphysics of the mathematical science-ideal.

According to him the paralogisms of metaphysical psychology cause a completely one sided dialectical illusion with respect

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\(^1\) See note 1 p. 366.
\(^2\) *Kritik der r. Vern.*, pp. 324/5.
to the Idea of the subject of our thought, since there is not to be acquired the least evidence for the affirmation of the contrary through a speculative ratiocination from the pure transcendental Idea of the soul. It is entirely different, however, in the case of the "cosmological ideas of the universe". If reason desires to draw theoretical conclusions from these Ideas with respect to the "Dinge an sich", it necessarily involves itself in antinomies.

If with respect to a supposed metaphysical object, one can prove with the same logical right the thesis as well as the antithesis of a speculative proposition, and consequently the logical principle of contradiction is violated, then it is evident that the supposed object cannot be a real "object of experience".

Now in the first place, Kant developed the system of all possible cosmological Ideas in accordance with the table of categories. These Ideas are nothing but the pure concepts of understanding elevated to the rank of the absolute, viz. the totality of the determinations performed by the logical function of thought, insofar as the synthesis contained in the categories forms a series of determinations. Thus Kant arrived at four transcendental Ideas, which, when speculatively misused, lead to a corresponding number of theoretical antinomies.

In these four cosmological Ideas the Idea of the universe is related to the categorical points of view of quantity, quality, relation and modality.

The antinomies, which arise in the speculative application of these transcendental Ideas, were accordingly divided by Kant into two mathematical and two dynamical (natural metaphysical) ones.

According to him, it can be proved with equal logical stringency that the world with respect to quantity is both limited and infinite in time and space. And, with respect to quality, the world can be shown to consist of absolutely single parts, while at the same time the opposite can be proved with equal logical force. With respect to relation (causality) it can be demonstrated, that causality through freedom in the sense of a first cause is possible. And, with seemingly the same force of argument it can be demonstrated, that such a metaphysical cause cannot exist and everything occurs in the world according to a fixed mechanical necessity. Finally, with respect to modality, the existence of an

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1 *Kritik der r. Vernunft*, p. 328.
absolutely necessary supreme Being can be both proved and disproved.

The actual transcendental trend which the theoretical Idea acquired in Kant is, nevertheless, also evident at this point. Here, too, the "Critique of Pure Reason" discloses itself only as a preparation for the "Critique of Practical Reason".

The intervention of the ideal of personality in Kant's solution of the so-called dynamical antinomies and the insoluble antinomy in Kant's dualistic transcendental ground-Idea.

Kant's Humanist ideal of personality has as its foundations causality through freedom, that is, the autonomous self-determination of personality as "homo noumenon", and the existence of God as the final hypostasis of the moral Idea of freedom. In the treatment of the so-called dynamic antinomies which are related to the categorical points of view of relation (causality) and modality (the absolute necessity), both of these foundations are called into play.

Here, in a positive sense, Kant chooses the side of the theses, in so far as they are related to the "Dinge an sich", and he grants validity to the antitheses only with respect to the sensory world of appearance.

There is at this point, indeed, no longer any question of a natural "Ding an sich", but rather of the intelligible root and origin of the cosmos, in the sense of Kant's conception of the ideal of personality. Thus Kant's ideal of personality is actually involved in the case that "theoretical reason" conducts with itself in the dialectic.

As soon as Kant gives to his theoretical thought this really critical transcendental turn towards the religious root of his entire critical philosophy, the insoluble antinomy in its dualistic transcendental ground-Idea is again immediately in evidence.

At every point this ground-Idea implies "purity" in the sense of the unconditionedness of "theoretical reason". Consequently, the cleft between the ideal of science and that of personality may not be eradicated in an actual transcendental self-reflection. But it must be eradicated, since actually the Idea of the autonomy of pure theoretical thought, in the deepest sense, is entirely dependent upon the Idea of the autonomous freedom of personality!

In the treatment of both mathematical antinomies Kant had
The development of the basic antinomy in the
resigned in an equal rejection of thesis and antithesis insofar as both in an untenable manner treat a mere transcendental Idea as a thing of experience.

But in the treatment of the interest that reason has in the antinomies, he gives evidence of having clearly seen the stimulus of the Humanistic ideal of personality behind the rationalist-idealistic metaphysics: “That the world has a beginning, that my thinking self has a simple and therefore undestructable nature, that this self at the same time is free in its volitional acts and elevated above the coercion of nature, and that finally the whole order of things in the world originates from a first Being, from which everything derives its unity and appropriate connection: these are so many fundamentals of morals and religion. The antithesis deprives us of all these supports, or at least it appears to deprive us of them” (I am italicizing).

The question arises why in the solution of the dynamic antinomies the appeal may be made to the supra-sensory sphere of human personality in favour of the thesis, whereas in the solution of the mathematical antinomies such an appeal to a “noumenon” behind the phenomena, in support of the thesis, must be excluded. KANT answers this question in the following way: “The series of conditions to be sure are all similar insofar as one considers only their extent with respect to the question whether they correspond to the Idea, or that they are too great

1 This thesis is also orientated to the attempt of Christian scholasticism to prove rationally the creation of the world with the aid of the metaphysically applied principle of causality, although the Thomistic demonstration did not imply a temporal beginning of the universe. Naturally in itself this proof has nothing to do with the Humanistic ideal of personality. KANT directs one and the same blow against all rationalistic metaphysics, and in the case of “Christian” rationalistic metaphysics his task was lightened all the more, since in origin it is in nowise more Christian than Humanistic metaphysics. In fact, in the long run, Christian metaphysics joined hands with the Humanistic!

or too small for it. But the concept of understanding which lies at the foundation of these Ideas, contains either merely a synthesis of the similar (which is pre-supposed with every quantity both in its composition and in its division) or also of the dissimilar, which at least can be allowed in the dynamical synthesis of the causal connection as well as in that of the necessary with the contingent. This is the reason why into the mathematical connection of the series of phenomena there cannot enter any other condition than a sensory one, that is such a one which itself is a part of the series; the dynamical series of sensory conditions, on the contrary, still allows a dissimilar condition, which is not a part of the series, but as merely intelligible lies outside the latter; thereby Reason is satisfied and the unconditioned is placed at the head of the phenomena, without thereby disturbing the series of the latter, which is always conditioned, and without interrupting it contrary to the principles of understanding” 1.

One cannot say, that this argument is very convincing. Consider for example the second mathematical antimony 2: the Leibnizian monadology affirmed, that the monad is spaceless, and insofar as it made this affirmation, it taught that the infinite

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“Daher kommt es, dass in der mathematischen Verknüpfung der Reihen der Erscheinungen keine andere als sinnliche Bedingung hinein kommen kann, d.i. eine solche, die selbst ein Teil der Reihe ist; da hingegen die dynamische Reihe sinnlicher Bedingungen doch noch eine ungleichartige Bedingung zulässt, die nicht ein Teil der Reihe ist, sondern als bloß intelligibel ausser der Reihe liegt, wodurch denn der Verwirrung ein Genüge getan und das Unbedingte den Erscheinungen vorgesetzt wird, ohne die Reihe der letzteren, als jederzeit bedingt, dadurch zu verwirren und den Verstandes Grundsätzen zuwider abzubrechen.”

2 The thesis reads here as follows: “Eine jede zusammengesetzte Substanz in der Welt besteht aus einfachen Teilen und es existiert überall nichts als das Einfache oder das, was aus diesem zusammengesetzt ist.”

[“Every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts and there exists nowhere anything but the simple or what is composed of it.”]
series of spatial analysis has its metaphysical origin in a noumenon which is dissimilar to the parts of space. So it can be said with respect to the thesis of the first mathematical antinomy (the world has a beginning in time and is spatially limited) that cosmic time originates in eternity as timelessness, and with that is likewise accepted a heterogeneous "noumenon" outside the "synthetical series of temporal moments".

Within the cadre of KANT's transcendental ground-Idea the natural "Ding an sich" can no longer be maintained. The depreciation of the theoretical Idea of God.

The truth of the matter is, that in the deepest ground of his transcendental ground-Idea, KANT had to reject the natural "Ding an sich" and could only accept the normative ethical function of personality as the very root of natural reality. This is also true in respect to KANT's theoretical Idea of God, which as "Transzendentales Ideal" (Prototyp transzendentale), only had to pave the way for the practical Idea of the deity as a "postulate of practical reason", an idea, which in this practical function is nothing but the idol of the Humanistic ideal of personality.

The entire theologia naturalis with its speculative rational proofs for the existence of God must be destroyed by the "Critique of Pure Reason", because the ideal of personality can no longer find its veritable Idea of God in absolutized mathematical thought, but only in the hypostatized moral function of free and autonomous personality. To this end even the theoretical Idea of God must be depreciated. As long as it concerns the "merely speculative reason", one had better speak of the "nature of the things of the world" than of a "divine creator of nature" and better of the "wisdom and providence of nature" than of the divine wisdom, since the first mode of expression "abstains from the presumption of an assertion which exceeds our competency and at the same time points our reason back to its proper field".

§ 5 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BASIC ANTINOMY IN THE "CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON"

The kernel of the Humanistic ideal of personality in the

1 Ibid., p. 533: "die Anmaszung einer gröszeren Behauptung, als die ist, wozu wir befugt sind, zurück hält und zugleich die Vernunft auf ihr eigentümliches Feld, die Natur, zurückweiset."
cosmonomic Idea of Humanistic immanence-philosophy

A typical form which it assumes in Kant's transcendental ground-Idea is the freedom and autonomy of the ethical function of personality in its hypostatization as "homo noumenon".

As we have formerly seen in another context, it is essentially the hypostatization of the merely formally conceived moral law itself which is identified with the "homo noumenon", as "pure will."

Autos and nomos in Kant's Idea of autonomy.

Kroner strikingly observes that "a double sense is included in the Idea of moral autonomy". The ego does not only subject itself to the moral law, instead of receiving as a slave the command of his master from outside, but it also acquires its own selfhood only through the very law. It does not become autos but on account of its subjecting itself to the nomos, it only becomes an ego when it obeys itself: "The (moral) law is consequently the true ego in the I-ness, it is the transcendental consciousness, the pure practical Reason, to whose rank the empirical will has to elevate itself, if it is to become an ethical one. Reason becomes only as law-giver the reason which separates itself from arbitrariness and inclination. The law which derives its legitimation from itself, and commands by its own authority, elevates Reason above all finite connections, and makes it infinite, absolute".

In Kant's theoretical philosophy self-consciousness had only a hovering existence in the "transcendental unity of apperception" which is related to the phenomenon. In the "Critique of Practical Reason", however, it discloses its "metaphysical root".

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1 Von Kant bis Hegel, Bnd. I, p. 167: "Das Gesetz ist also das wahre Ich im Ich, es ist das transzendentale Bewusstsein, die reine praktische Vernunft, zu der sich der empirische Wille zu erheben hat, wenn er ein sittlicher werden will. Die Vernunft wird als Gesetzgeberin erst zur Vernunft, die sich von Willkur und Neigung unterscheidet. Das Gesetz, das seinen Rechtsgrund aus sich schöpft, das eigener Vollmacht gebietet, erhebt die Vernunft über alle endlichen Zusammenhänge, macht sie unendlich, absolut."

2 Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (W.W., Bnd. V), Vorrede, p. 108: "Hierbei erhält nun zugleich die befremdliche, obzwar unstreitige, Behauptung der spekulativen Kritik dasz sogar das denkende Subject ihm selbst in der inneren Anschauung bloß Erscheinung sei, in der Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft auch ihre volle Bestätigung, so gut, dass man auf sie kommen musz, wenn die erstere diesen Satz auch gar nicht bewiesen hätte." [With this the critique of Practical Reason at the same time com-
We have seen that in this very dualistic conception of the selfhood once more is disclosed the unsoluble antinomy in Kant's trascendental ground-Idea: In the "Critique of Pure Reason" the "thinking ego", conceived of as a pure transcenden-tal-logical subject, is made the autonomous unity of self-con-sciousness, whereas in the "Critique of Practical Reason" the ethical and faith functions of human personality are hypostatized as metaphysical root of human existence. In this way the human ego is itself broken up into two diametrically opposed roots. This remains true even though Kant rejects the conception that the transcendent selfconsciousness is a "Ding an sich".

The dualistic division between the ideal of science and the ideal of personality delivers the latter into the hands of a logical formalism.

The hypostatization of the moral and faith functions of human personality necessarily results in a logical formalization of ethics and theology, which, as we saw, leads to a disturbance of meaning of the modal law-spheres concerned. Contrary to Kant's own intention, theoretical logic dominates the ideal of personality as formulated in the categorical imperative. The sharp dualistic "either-or" between sensibility and reason, induced him to apply — though not in a theoretical epistemological sense — even to the moral principles, the same form-matter schema which had played a dominating rôle in his epistemology: "If a rational being is to think of his maxims as practical universal laws, it can think the same only as such principles which contain the ground of determination of the will, not in respect to the matter, but merely in respect to the form" ¹.

Kant's categorical imperative: "Behave so that the maxim of your will can at the same time hold as a principle of a universal legislation," is in essence a logicistic judgment, for the very reason that it is thought of as an "absolute" principle, separated from the cosmic-temporal coherence of meaning. By its elimination completely confirms the surprising, although undisputable, assertion of the speculative critique, that even the thinking subject in the inner intuition can conceive itself only as phenomenon; and this confirmation is so striking, that one must even arrive at this thesis if the latter (viz, the speculative critique) had not at all demonstrated it."

¹ Kritik der pr. V., S. 136: "Wenn ein vernünftiges Wesen sich seine Maximen als praktische allgemeine Gesetze denken soll, so kann es sich dieselbe nur als solche Prinzipien denken, die nicht der Materie, sondern blosz der Form nach den Bestimmungsgrund des Willens enthalten."
from the cosmic coherence among the modal law-spheres, it lacks any true inter-modal synthesis. In our treatment of the epistemological problem, we shall have ample opportunity to demonstrate this thesis more elaborately. In KANT the religious meaning of the Humanist ideal of personality concentrates itself essentially in the absolutizing of a function of human personality.

The transcendental concept of freedom considered in itself is merely negative (freedom from natural causality) and is to acquire a positive sense only through the principle of autonomy, in the sense of the absolute sovereignty of Human personality as the highest legislator. But this “autonomy”, too, lacks as such a meaningful content. It is in itself only a formal principle. The religious ground-motive which finds its expression in KANT's transcendental freedom-Idea implies the self-sufficiency of the homo noumenon and it is this very divine predicate which makes any moral autonomy of man meaningless.

In KANT's conception, the ideal of personality actually requires the logistic hypostatization of the “categorical imperative”; however, it destroys itself by the very fact that it can only offer “stones for bread” when challenged to disclose its full religious content. Perhaps never in the history of philosophy has the Humanist ideal of personality received a more impressive formulation than in KANT's famous eulogy of duty, but, on the other hand, this ideal of personality has never before exhausted itself in an emptier formalism. To the impressive question, “Duty! sublime and great name... what is the origin worthy of yourself, and where is the noble root to be found that proudly excludes all kinship with the inclinations, and which is the indispensable origin from which man can derive any value that he can give himself?” — the Königsberg philosopher replies: “It must be nothing less than that which elevates man (as a part of the sensory world) above himself, and connects him with an order of things only to be conceived by the understanding, an order embracing the whole world of the senses — including the empirically determinable existence of man in time — as well as the totality of all purposes... It is nothing but personality, i.e. the freedom and independence of the mechanism of the whole of nature. But at the same time it is to be considered as a faculty of a being to whose own peculiar — i.e. by its own reason imposed — and purely practical laws it is subjected insofar as it belongs to the sensory world. In other words the person, as belonging to the world of the senses, is subjected to his own per-
The development of the basic antinomy in the personality insofar as he belongs to the intelligible world. It is not surprising, therefore, if man, who belongs to both worlds, looks upon his own being in relation to his second and highest destination with veneration and considers its laws with the greatest respect.\(^1\)

The precise definition of the principle of autonomy through the Idea of personality as “end in itself”.

Free personality is viewed as an end in itself, as “absoluter Selbstzweck”. To be sure, it is true enough that man is unholy, but “humanity” in his person ought to be sacred to him.

In the entire cosmos all that man desires and all that over which he has power may be merely used as a means, only man and with him every rational creature is “Zweck an sich selbst.”

This “human value”, however, which must be sacred to everyone as homo noumenon, is itself in the last analysis the empty formula of the categorical imperative. The real motive of “pure practical reason” is also none other than the “pure”, that is the absolutized and therefore formalized and empty moral law.\(^2\) Therein consists in Kant the fundamental difference between mede morality and legality.

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\(^1\) *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, p. 211/2: “Pflicht! du erhabener, großer Name... welcher ist der deiner würdige Ursprung, und wo findet man die Wurzel deiner edlen Abkunft, welche alle Verwandtschaft mit Neigungen stolz ausschlägt, und von welcher Wurzel abzustammen, die unannahmliche Bedingung desjenigen Werts ist, den sich Menschen allein selbst geben können? Es kann nichts minderes sein, als was den Menschen über sich selbst (als einen Teil der Sinnenwelt) erhebt, was ihn an eine Ordnung der Dinge knüpft, die nur der Verstand denken kann, und die zugleich die ganze Sinnenwelt, mit ihr das empirische bestimmbare Dasein des Menschen in der Zeit und das Ganze aller Zwecke... unter sich hat. Es ist nichts anders als die Persönlichkeit, d.i. die Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit von dem Mechanism der ganzen Natur, doch zugleich als ein Vermögen eines Wesens betrachtet, welches eigentümlichen, nämlich von seiner eigenen Vernunft gegebenen, reinen praktischen Gesetzen, die Person also, als zur Sinnenwelt gehörig, ihrer eigenen Persönlichkeit unterworfen ist, so fern sie zugleich zur intelligibiden Welt gehört: da es denn nicht zu verwundern ist, wenn der Mensch als zu beiden Welten gehörig, sein eigenes Wesen in Beziehung auf seine zweite und höchste Bestimmung nicht anders als mit Verehrung und die Gesetze derselben mit der höchsten Achtung betrachten musz.”

\(^2\) *Ibid.*, p. 213: “So ist die ächte Triebfeder der reinen praktischen Vernunft beschaffen; sie ist keine andere als das reine moralische Gesetz selber, so fern es uns die Erhabenheit unserer eigenen übersinnlichen Existenz spüren lässt...” [“Such is the nature of the true motive of the
The thesis that human personality is an end in itself, can have a good meaning only in respect to the things which can become an object of human goals. That is to say it is meaningful only in the temporal subject-object relation in which things have modal object-functions in respect to the different modal functions of the volitive act of man.

As soon, however, as this thesis is extended to the central religious sphere, it becomes void, because it contradicts the existent character of the religious centre of human personality.

The true religious root of our existence is nothing in itself, because it is only an *imago* Dei.

As soon as it is absolutized, it fades away in nothingness and cannot give any positive content to Kant's freedom-Idea. This very absolutization is implied in Kant’s conception of the ethical idea of human personality as an absolute end in itself.

We have learned, in an earlier context, that the antinomy in the Humanist concept of substance consists in the fact that a result of theoretical abstraction is absolutized as a “thing in itself”.

In Kant's practical philosophy, the absolute freedom of the "homo noumenon" exists by the grace of the same logical understanding that he had bound in his epistemology to the chain of sensory phenomena!

Now this understanding with its analytical laws even subjects the very ideal of personality to a logical formalization, whereas one would expect that, in keeping with the primacy of “practical reason”, it should, on the contrary, be subject to the latter.

This is clearly evident from the noteworthy section of the "Analytic of Practical Reason", in which Kant treats the subject of the pure practical judgment ¹.

At this point a problem rises with respect to the categorical imperative, which runs parallel to the problem Kant had raised in the so-called “Schematism-chapter” ², with respect to the pure concepts of the understanding. Just as these pure concepts must be capable of being applied to sensory intuition, in the same manner that which in the ethical rule is said generally (in ab-

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¹ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

² I must postpone a detailed analysis of this important part of the *Critique of Pure Reason* until the second volume in which I will discuss the problems of epistemology.
The development of the basic antinomy in the

stracto) must be applied, by the practical faculty of judgment, to an action in concreto.

This gives rise to the difficulty that in Kant's system a concrete action is always "empirically determined", that is, belongs to the sensory experience of nature. And as Kant expressed it: It seems absurd, that one could encounter an instance in the sensory world, that, although itself subject to the laws of nature, yet is capable of being brought under a law of freedom. Naturally there can be no question of a schematization of the practical Idea of reason in the same manner as the schematization of the categories of the understanding, because the moral good ("the pure will") is something supra-sensory that never permits itself to be related to experience.

In the application of Kant's categorical imperative to concrete actions, the dualism between "nature" (ideal of science) and "freedom" (ideal of personality) becomes an antinomy.

The antinomy which necessarily must arise from the dualistic division of nature and freedom emerges at this point. The function of moral activity is impossible outside its cosmic temporal coherence of meaning with the "natural" functions. But the recognition of that connection of meaning would have immediately destroyed the hypostatization of the moral function in Kant's conception of the ideal of personality.

The way in which Kant sought to escape this contradiction is quite typical. The transcendental idea is only to be related to concepts of the understanding and not to sensory experience. Consequently, the moral law can only be schematized by relating it, in its abstract logical formulation, to the mere form of a natural law which is then qualified as a type of the moral law.

The natural law itself can be related to the "sense-objects" in concreto. It is evident that thereby the possibility of applying the categorical imperative to concrete actions is not demonstrated. Even though in Kant's system the category of causality can be related to sensory actions in concreto, this is only possible by means of its schematization in time.

But the mere form of natural law cannot be applied to sensory experience without its schematization in time as a form of intuition of the "inner sense".

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1 Ibid., p. 191: "Es ist also auch erlaubt, die Natur der Sinnenwelt als
According to Kant, the rule of the judicative faculty under laws of pure practical reason is this: ask yourself whether the action which you intend to perform could be viewed as possible through your will, if it would occur according to a law of nature, of which nature you yourself would be a part. Consequently, if the subjective maxim of action does not permit itself to be thought of according to the form of natural law, as a universal law of human action, it is morally impossible.

In the final analysis, this "Typik der reinen praktischen Urteilskraft" is simply reduced to the judgment of the concrete actions according to the logical principium contradictionis. The mere form of the natural law is, according to Kant's own statement, nothing but the form of the "conformity to law in general"; for laws as such are of the same kind, no matter from where they derive their "determinative grounds".

To apply the categorical imperative, Kant has no other choice than to relate it to the logicistic generic concept of "law", which in fact is identified with the analytical principle of contradiction.

As the result of this logical formalism, the antinomy between the ideal of science and that of personality acquires its greatest sharpness in Kant's transcendental ground-Idea. The "pure will" must be comprehended as "causa noumenon", i.e. as absolute metaphysical cause of human actions in their sensory mode of appearance. Under the "mechanism of nature" — the sovereign domain of the ideal of science — Kant subsumed psychical as well as physical causality, and mockingly he called psycholo-
The development of the basic antinomy in the

Kant's characterization of Leibniz' conception of free personality as "automaton spirituale."

The Leibnizian automaton spirituale, which through its representations is determined to its activity, is, according to him, just as devoid of real transcendental freedom as the automaton materiale that is nothing but a material machine. Kant remarks: "if indeed human actions, as they actually belong to the determinations of man in time, were not only determinations of man as phenomenon, but as 'thing in itself', then freedom could not be saved. Man would be a marionette or an Vauconson automaton, constructed by the highest Master of all art works, and even though selfconsciousness would make him a thinking automaton, he would be of such a nature that the consciousness of his spontaneity, when considered as freedom, would be a mere deception...".

God has created man, however, only as a homo noumenon, not as "phenomenon". So it is a contradiction to say that God, as Creator, is the cause of actions in the sense-world, while he is at the same time the cause of the existence of the acting being as noumenon.

But the "causa noumenon" of sensory actions itself appears to be nothing but the absolutized form of the law "überhaupt". This is the embodied antinomy itself.

The categorial imperative, as moral law, is itself thought of as subjective "causa noumenon". Why? Since the subjective moral volitional function (over against which the categorical imperative sets itself as a "norm", because the volitional function can exceed the law) cannot be comprehended as "free cause". For Kant views this subject-function as "empirically conditioned" and dependent upon sensory nature.

Kroner thinks he can solve this antinomy by stating, that not the "pure" (that is hypostatized) will, but only the "empirically conditioned pure will" is to be understood as "causa noumenon" of actions. However, unintentionally he gives in this way the

1 Kritik der pr. Vern., p. 224.
2 Kritik der pr. Vern., p. 229.
3 Ib., p. 231. At this point one can clearly see how Kant's Idea of God is determined by the ideal of personality.
cosmonomic Idea of Humanistic immanence-philosophy

most pregnant formulation to this Kantian antinomy. For how can a “pure will” be “empirically conditioned” without losing its “purity”, i.e. its absolute character? Speculative idealism with its dialectical method sanctions the antinomy as a transitional stage to a higher synthesis. Kant, however, did not accept antinomies and so this solution can never constitute an answer within his system.

Kroner’s conception of the origin of the antinomy in Kant’s doctrine of “pure will” as “causa noumenon”.

Kroner has, however, penetratingly seen wherein lies the origin of the antinomy in Kant’s doctrine of “pure will” as “causa noumenon”. This origin is hidden in the impossibility of thinking the moral-logical form of reason together with its sensorily determined material.

As we saw before, the “Typik der reinen praktischen Vernunft” does not afford any escape from this difficulty. In Kant’s system the “Dialectic of pure reason” could only demonstrate that the natural scientific category of causality is exclusively related to sensory experience but never to “Dinge an sich”. The “Critique of pure Reason”, however, could not furnish us with the insight into the possibility of a real connection between nature and supra-sensory freedom, since it was itself based upon the hypostatization of the logical and psychical functions of consciousness. Kant thought he could lift these functions out of the cosmic temporal coherence of meaning without this hypostatization. But this is impossible.

The antinomy between nature and freedom in Kant’s concept of the highest good.

In a final attempt Kant tried to re-establish in practical reason the coherence of meaning between nature and freedom, which he had crudely severed. To this end he used the concept of the highest good. Nevertheless, it has generally been acknowledged that it is just this very point in Kant’s system which exhibits its weakest spot and actually resolves itself into intrinsic antinomies.

It is our intention to examine briefly this final attempt to achieve a synthesis. Kant considers the older heteronomous (non-realistic) ethics to be characterized by the fact that it sought after an “object of the will” in order to make this at the same

time both the material and the ground of the moral law. This was done instead of first seeking after a law, which apriori and directly determines the will and the object of the latter only through the will itself.

Thus in this heteronomous ethics the concept of the highest good became the final determinative ground of the moral will. To KANT the concept of the “highest good” becomes the “unconditional totality of the object of pure practical reason”, but it is never to be comprehended as the determinative ground of the “pure will”. The moral law as the final determinative ground is rather pre-supposed in this concept.

In the concept of the highest good, however, virtue (as the determination of the will exclusively by the categorical imperative) and blessedness (as the motive of our sensibility) must, according to KANT, be conceived of as necessarily united. For it cannot be supposed that personality needs blessedness and is worthy of it, but nevertheless cannot possess it; this would be incompatible with the perfect will of the rational Being that at the same time is almighty (i.e. the deity). This uniting of virtue and beatitude cannot be conceived of analytically, since freedom and nature do not logically follow from each other, but rather exclude each other. It can only be thought of synthetically, and then only in such a manner, that either happiness is the necessary result of virtue as “causa noumenon”, or vice versa the desire for happiness is the moving cause of moral action. The latter alternative is excluded by the principle of autonomy. But the first way seems equally impossible, since all

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1 Ibid., p. 183/4.
2 Ibid., p. 283/9.
3 Kr. d. pr. V., S. 243: “Also bleibt die Frage: “wie ist das höchste Gut praktisch möglich? noch immer unerachtet aller bisherigen Koalitionsversuche eine unaufgelöste Aufgabe. Das aber, was sie zu einer schwer zu lösenden Aufgabe macht, ist in der Analytik gegeben, nämlich dass Glückseitigkeit und Sittlichkeit, zwei spezifisch ganz versündene Elemente des höchsten Guts sind, und ihre Verbindung also nicht analytisch erkannt werden können... sondern eine Synthesis der Begriffe sei.” [Thus, notwithstanding all attempts at a solution, the question: “How is the highest good practically possible?” still remains an unsolved problem. That, however, which makes the latter a problem hardly to be solved, is given in the Analytic, namely that blessedness and morality are two specifically completely different elements of the highest good, so that their uniting cannot be understood analytically... but rather is a synthesis of concepts].
practical uniting of causes and effects in the world as a result of the determination of the will is not directed by the moral inclination of the will, but rather by the knowledge of natural laws and the physical power to employ these to its purposes.

Kant formulates the antinomy between the ideal of science and that of personality as it is implied in the concept of the highest good as the “antinomy of practical reason”.

Thus arises the “antinomy of practical reason” which Kant treats in the chapter entitled “About the dialectic of pure Reason in the defining of the concept of the highest good”. He thought, however, the following solution would afford a satisfactory answer to the difficulty. He conceded that the judgment according to which the desire for happiness is the moving cause of moral action, must be unconditionally qualified as false. The second proposition, that happiness is the necessary result of virtue, however, is only false insofar as virtue is considered to be the cause of happiness in the sense world, so that only a phenomenal existence would be ascribed to rational beings. It is, however, not only quite reasonable to think of the existence of man as noumenon in an intelligible world, but there is even given in the moral law a pure intelligible determinative ground of the causality of free personality in the sense-world. Therefore, according to Kant, it is not impossible that by an intelligible Creator of nature, the moral inclination is set in a necessary causal coherence with beatitude as its effect in the sense-world.

Thus Kant finally felt compelled to accept a coherence between “nature” and “freedom” in order to escape the antinomical consequences of his hypostatization (and consequently logicistic formalization) of moral personality. The acceptance of such an intelligible Creator of nature (the Deity) cannot be rationally proved, but it is a postulate of pure practical reason that makes possible the realization of the highest good. This postulate consequently, does not rest upon a theoretical knowledge, but just as the two other postulates of pure practical reason (freedom in a positive sense and immortality), it rests upon a universally valid and necessary reasonable faith in the reality of a supersensory, noumenal world and in the possibility of the realization of the highest good.

It is easily seen that this entire attempt to bring “nature” and “freedom” again in a deeper coherence, can only be accomplished
The development of the basic antinomy in the
by abandoning the Idea of the “homo noumenon” as “Ding an
das sich”. If the free and autonomous moral function of personality
is actually to be the “substance” of human being (existence),
a substance, which according to DESCARTES’ pregnant description
“nulla re indiget ad existendum”, then there is no possible bridge
between “nature” and “freedom”. Every attempt to effect a
synthesis must necessarily dissolve the basic absolutization in
KANT’s Humanistic ideal of personality. KRONER correctly ob-
serves, that the very characteristic of pure practical reason, i.e.
its autonomy, is undermined by the inclusion of happiness as
material determination (“Inhaltsbestimmung”) in the pure moral
law. By so doing the very absolute sovereignty of the moral will
is restricted to sensibility instead of maintaining its absolute
independence in the face of the latter.1

It is the concept of the highest good itself into which all of the
antinomies between the ideal of personality and that of science
are crowded together!

In KANT’s Idea of God the ideal of personality domi-
nates the ideal of science.

KANT’s Idea of deity as postulate of “pure practical reason” is
the final hypostatization of the ideal of personality. In this
hypostatization, the Idea of the noumenal world as “a nature
under the autonomy of pure practical reason”2, reaches its
climax. This reasonable God is the categorical imperative itself,
conceived of as the noumenal determinative ground of sensible
nature. His will does not exceed “practical reason” with its
hypostatized moral law. For the “principle of morality is not
merely restricted to men, but extends to all finite beings which
have reason and will, nay it even includes the infinite Being as
Supreme Intelligence”3.

The autonomous will can only recognize a command as divine
insofar as it originates from “practical reason”.

The philosophy of “religion” which KANT built upon his meta-
physics of “reasonable faith” is the “Religion within the boun-
daries of mere Reason”. In the writing published under the
same title KANT attempts to accommodate Christian faith to his
metaphysics rooted in his Humanist ideal of personality. In so

2 Kr. d. pr. V., t.a.p., p. 158.
3 T.a.p., p. 143.
doing he gave a striking example of the fundamental lack of insight into the essence and starting-point of the Christian doctrine, a lack of insight, which has from the outset characterized Humanistic philosophy. The faith of pure reason is, according to him, the kernel of all religious dogmas. Mankind is not capable of conceiving this kernel in its "purity"; it must be rendered perceptible, so that it can become a living force, a "religious reality".

If this "pure ethical kernel" is selected from the Christian revelation it is wonderfully in accord with the "apriori reasonable faith". The fall into sin is then nothing but the antagonism between sensory and moral nature, between "nature" and "freedom" in man.

The "radical evil" in human nature is its tendency to subject the will to sensory inclinations, instead of directing it by the "categorical imperative". Regeneration is a free deed of our moral nature through which the good conquers the evil.

The "God-man" is the Idea of the "moral ideal man" in whom reasonable faith accepts the absolute realization of the Idea of the good; in this sense the God-man is the pre-requisite for regeneration, for the latter can only take effect insofar as we believe in the possible realization of the moral Idea.

Consequently, insofar as the God-man is the redemptive force through whom regeneration is effectuated in this moral ideal of humanity and in the striving toward its realization, individual sins are atoned!

This is the religion of the Humanistic ideal of personality clad in the stiff garb of moralistic rationalism. And this is the "pure ethical kernel" which Kant thought he could select from the Christian revelation!

§ 6 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BASIC ANTIMONY IN THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT

The attempt to resolve the dualism between the ideal of science and that of personality in the Critique of Judgment. The problem of individuality.

In both the "Critique of Pure Reason" and the "Critique of Practical Reason", Kant failed to resolve the antimony between the ideals of science and of personality. In his third main work the "Critique of Judgment", Kant attempted to bridge the cleft between nature and freedom in another way. Here he surveyed
the entire course which his philosophical thought had previously taken. In his famous introduction he wrote: "Now, to be sure, an immense cleft has been established between the realm of the nature-concept as the sensory, and the realm of the freedom-idea as the super-sensory, so that no transition is possible from the former to the latter (that is to say by means of the theoretical use of reason), as if there were two different worlds, the one of which cannot have any influence on the other. Nevertheless, the super-sensory ought to influence the sensory, that is to say the freedom-Idea ought to realize in the sense-world the goal set by its laws; consequently nature must also be conceivable in such a way, that the laws of its forms at least agree with the possibility of the goals which are to be realized in it in conformity to laws of freedom. — Consequently, there must after all be a ground of unity of the super-sensory which lies at the foundation of nature, with the practical content of the freedom-Idea; and although the concept of this unity neither theoretically nor practically arrives at a knowledge of the same, and consequently does not have a proper realm" (I italicize), “nevertheless it must make possible the transition from the mode of thought according to the principles of the one to that according to the principles of the other”.

The problem raised by the “Critique of Judgment” is, consequently, not new to Kant’s system. For it is once again the possibility of subsuming nature under the freedom of reason which

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1 *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (W.W. Bnd. VI) pp. 19/20: "Ob nun zwar eine unübersehbare Kluft zwischen dem Gebiete des Naturbegriffs, als dem Sinnlichen, und dem Gebiete des Freiheitsbegriffs, als dem übersinnlichen, befestigt ist, so dass von dem ersteren zum anderen (also vermittelt des theoretischen Gebrauchs der Vernunft) kein Übergang möglich ist, gleich als ob es so viel verschiedene Welten wären, deren erste auf die zweite keinen Einfluss haben kann: so soll doch diese auf jene einen Einfluss haben, nämlich der Freiheitsbegriff soll den durch seine Gesetze aufgegebenen Zweck in der Sinnenwelt wirklich machen; und die Natur muss folglich auch so gedacht werden können, dass die Gesetzmässigkeit ihrer Form wenigstens zur Möglichkeit der in ihr zu bewirkenden Zwecke nach Freiheitsgesetzen zusammenstimme. — Also muss es doch einen Grund der Einheit des Übersinnlichen, welches der Natur zum Grunde liegt, mit dem, was der Freiheitsbegriff praktisch enthält, geben, wovon der Begriff, wenn er gleich weder theoretisch noch praktisch zu einem Erkenntnisse desselben gelangt, *mithin kein eigenständliches Gebiet hat*, dennoch den Übergang von der Denkungsart nach den Prinzipien der einen zu der nach Prinzipien der anderen möglich macht."
Kant's rationalistic conception of individuality.

The path taken by Kant led him to consider the problem of individuality, or rather that of the "specificity in nature"; for Kant was always concerned with conformity to a law and, as we know, within the cadre of his rationalistic cosmonomic Idea he again and again identified law and subject. Only Kant's aesthetic philosophy, in its doctrine of the creative genius, attributed an independent place to subjective individuality. In the final analysis, it appeared that both the laws of understanding and those of reason can only determine their "object" apriori in an abstract-universal way. There are, however, many forms of nature, "as it were so many modifications of the universal transcendental nature-concept" which are left undetermined by the laws given apriori by the pure logical function of understanding. For these forms of nature there must also be laws, which, to be sure, are empirical and consequently, according to our rational insight, must be called contingent, but which nevertheless, if they actually can be called laws, must be viewed as necessarily originating from a principle of unity in multiplicity. And this is the case even though this latter principle may be unknown to us.

Now in the "class of the higher cognitive faculties" there is a peculiar connective link between understanding and reason, namely, the "power of judgment" ("Urteilskraft"). This faculty subsumes the particular under the universal laws, and as such, i.e. as "determining transcendental faculty of judgment", it is constitutive for experience; while, as the mere "reflecting power of judgment", it judges of the appropriate accommodation of the particularity in the laws of nature to our cognitive faculty.

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1 In our later treatment of the problem of individuality we shall see, that the species as a type-concept includes only the typical law-conformedness, but does not include subjective individuality. Furthermore, we shall find that in the irreducibility of subjective individuality to the typical law of individuality, the subject-side of our cosmos discloses very clearly its proper unexchangeable rôle with respect to the law-side.

The development of the basic antinomy in the

(that can only give universal laws apriori). And in this latter
function it is not constitutive for experience, but regulative only.

When compared with the determining faculty, the reflecting
faculty of judgment, consequently, operates in just the opposite
way. The latter judges the particular in its accommodation to the
universal laws given to “nature” by the understanding in the
apriori synthesis. The determining judicative faculty, on the
contrary, proceeds from the very apriori universal laws and
subsumes under the latter the particular empirical laws of
nature. The “reflecting judgment”, in contrast to the deter-
mining, does not possess objective principles apriori, but only
subjective ones. It judges the particular multiplicity of nature
as if a higher understanding than our own had given the empiri-
cal laws of nature for the benefit of our cognitive faculty, in
order to make possible a system of experience according to
particular laws of nature.

Kant related the reflecting power of judgment to his famous
schema of the faculties of the soul. According to him, all of the
latter can be reduced to three, which do not allow of any further
deduction from a common basis. These faculties are the cogni-
tive, the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the desiring power.
Insofar as the former, as the faculty for the acquisition of
theoretical knowledge, is related to “nature”, it receives laws
apriori only from the understanding. The desiring power, as a
“higher faculty according to the Idea of freedom”, receives its
laws a priori only from reason. Therefore, in accordance with
his schema, it is quite natural for Kant to relate the reflecting
power of judgment to the feeling that we have when confronted
with the theoretically known nature.

According to Kant’s extremely rationalistic conception, every
feeling is a “synthetical activity” through which we relate the
representation of an object to our subjective intentional activity
in which we set ourselves a purpose. In every feeling we order
an imagined object under an end.

The Idea of teleology in nature.

In its empirical form the reflecting faculty of judgment, accor-
ding to Kant, coincides completely with the “inner life of
feeling”. It is this power that permits us to recognize the higher
unity between understanding and reason, because it orders a
“Gegenstand” of knowledge under a goal. But these empirical
reflections of the power of judgment being entirely arbitrary
and subjective, are never able to possess a universally valid and necessary character. The reflecting judgment possesses, however, a universally valid principle apriori, a transcendental principle joined with a feeling which is likewise necessary and universal. This principle is that of the "formal teleology of nature."

For the concept of the objects so far as they are judged according to this principle, is only "the pure concept of objects of possible empirical knowledge in general" and includes no single empirical content.

According to this transcendental principle, the reflective power of judgment must consider nature as if it were generated after a teleological plan. As Kant himself says, "as if that which, for our human insight, is contingent in the empirical specificity of the laws of nature, is, nevertheless, generated by a higher intellect after a law-conformed unity, which unity, although not knowable to us, is, however, conceivable."

The law of specification as the regulative principle of the transcendental faculty of judgment for the contemplation of nature.

This transcendental concept of a teleology in nature is neither a concept of nature, nor a concept of freedom. For the power of judgment, through its transcendental principle, does not dictate a law to nature, but rather to itself in order to judge nature.

This law can be called the "law of specification", and it is a mere regulative principle for our view of nature. "For it is not a principle of the determining, but only of the reflecting power of judgment; one wants only that the empirical laws of nature — as to its universal laws the latter may be ordered as it pleases — must absolutely be investigated according to this principle and the maxims founded therein; because only in this case can we proceed with the use of our understanding in experience and can acquire knowledge".

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1 Kritik der Urteilskraft, t.a.p., pp. 26/7.
2 Kant here speaks of the "heautonomy" of the reflecting judgment.
3 Kritik der Urteilskraft, p. 32: "Denn es ist nicht ein Prinzip der bestimmenden, sondern bloß der reflektierenden Urteilskraft; man will nur, dass man, die Natur mag ihren allgemeinen Gesetzen nach geringer sein, wie sie wolle, durchaus nach jenem Prinzip und den sich darauf gründenden Maximen ihren empirischen Gesetzen nachspüren müsse, weil wir, nur so weit als jenes statt findet, mit dem Gebrauche unseres Verstandes in der Erfahrung fortkommen und Erkenntnis erwerben können."
The development of the basic antinomy in the

If we momentarily overlook the task which KANT here ascribes in a general sense to the reflecting power of judgment, it is easily ascertained, that the basic problem submitted for solution to the "Critique of Judgment" has its root in the question which the other two Critiques had failed to solve; namely, the problem concerning the relation between the ideal of science and that of personality. The Critique of Pure Reason did not ascribe to the understanding the possibility of possessing knowledge of the "totality of determinations", which knowledge was supposed to have included that of the theoretical necessity of empirical laws. If such a possibility were open to the understanding, then, once again, the ideal of science would have dominated the realm of the "absolute", which KANT had once and for all intended to set apart in the supra-sensory teleological kingdom of personality as "Selbst-zweck" (end in itself).

The logical and psychical functions of consciousness may, consequently, only be brought to a unity in a formal synthesis, and the sensory material must continue to be a limit for logical thought.

The teleological mode of contemplation of practical reason, on the other hand, may not penetrate into the domain of the ideal of science, since KANT will not abandon the sovereignty of mathematical and natural scientific thought over nature. This prevented him from following the course taken by FICHTE who at the expense of the ideal of science accepted the domination of the ideal of personality over nature!

The reason why the "Critique of Judgment" cannot resolve the basic discord in KANT's Archimedean point.

Consequently, there remained for KANT no other way than to seek a connecting link between understanding and reason. However, this connecting link, in its subjective functional character, is actually not the absolute "supra-sensory subject beyond theoretical and practical reason", but only a third immanent function of consciousness next to and between the latter. For that very reason, it cannot effect a veritable unity between the two antagonistic factors of the Humanist transcendental ground-Idea.

According to both "sources of knowledge" which the faculty of judgment compares with one another reflecting on their mutual appropriate accord, i.e. sensory intuition and logical
understanding, this faculty can display an alternative function: it can either judge a given sensory representation — before we have acquired any logical concept of it — and establish, that in its immediate visibleness it has an appropriate accommodation to our understanding; or it can, inversely, judge that the concept of an object is the ground of being of the latter and, consequently, establish that the concept has an appropriate accommodation to the visible reality of the object.

In the first case, the object is only called appropriate upon a subjective ground, since its representation is directly joined with a subjective feeling of pleasure (complacence) that never can become an objective “piece of knowledge”, and this representation is itself a teleological representation of an aesthetic character. In the second case the teleological judgment is related to a specific objective knowledge of the object under a given concept; it has nothing to do with a subjective feeling of pleasure concerning things, but with the understanding in the judgment of things only. In this case we judge that the teleology is laid objectively (actually) in the thing of nature as an organism.

In the first case, the original point lies in the emotional effect of (natural) things upon us, and we become explicitly conscious of the teleological relations only by analytical investigation. In the second case, the centre of gravity of our attitude toward the things lies in the rational conception of the relations in the “object”, which we judge to be appropriate. Moreover, in this case the feeling of pleasure is only secondarily united with this judgment.

It is upon these alternative functions that Kant based the division of the “Critique of Judgment” into the critique of the aesthetic and that of the teleological judgment: “By the former we understand the faculty to judge the formal appropriateness (ordinarily also called the subjective) through the feeling of pleasure or pain: by the latter the faculty to judge the real (objective) appropriateness of nature through the understanding and the reason”.

The former has to demonstrate how the universal validity of a cognitive judgment can rightly be attributed to the aesthetic judgment, even though such a judgment lacks a concept. The critique of the teleological judgment has to show, that all teleo-

1 Kr. der Urt. kr., p. 41.
The development of the basic antinomy in the logical contemplation of nature only possesses a regulative value for biological investigation and it must reject its possible claims to constitutive value for knowledge.

In the final paragraph of the "Introduction", Kant treated "the uniting of the laws given by the understanding and by reason through the faculty of judgment." Here, once again, the dualism between the ideal of science and that of personality is formulated with great acumen: "The realm of the nature-concept subjected to the laws of the one legislator, and that of the freedom-Idea subjected to those of the other, are completely isolated from each other, precluding all reciprocal influence which they (each according to their basic laws) might have on one another; this separation is guaranteed by the great cleft which severs the super-sensory from the phenomena. The freedom-Idea does not determine anything with respect to the theoretical knowledge of nature; just as the nature-concept does not determine anything with respect to the practical laws of freedom; and insofar it is impossible to bridge over the gulf between the two different realms".

Be that as it may, the "Critique of Practical Reason" furnished the Idea of a causality through freedom. This causality through free will is the final goal, which itself (or the appearance of which in the sensory world) ought to exist, to which end the condition in nature was pre-supposed which would permit the possibility of such an effect. Now, according to Kant, the faculty of judgment is supposed to furnish us with the mediating concept between the concept of nature and that of freedom, and this in the concept of a teleology in nature: "because through the latter is understood the possibility of the final end which can only be realized in nature and in accord with its laws".

Kant thought that in his system the concept of an absolute causality through freedom could be conceived of without an

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intrinsic contradiction. It has, however, become apparent to us, that the concept of an unconditional “causa noumenon” is encumbered with all the antinomies of the Humanistic concept of substance.

The “homo noumenon” is supposed to be a “Ding an sich” in an absolute sense, and its moral freedom was to have an unconditional validity. This hypostatization is, nevertheless, actually determined by analytical thought in its cosmic relativity. It is nothing but an absolutizing of the moral aspect of human existence, which is lifted out of the cosmic temporal coherence of the modal law-spheres by means of a false analysis, and is thus logically formalized. And in this logical formalization it destroys itself. Even the Humanistic freedom-motive is in this way almost completely reduced to the logical principle of contradiction. It is only the Idea of human personality as “Selbstzweck” in which the religious meaning of this motive could withdraw in order to escape its complete dissolution into a formal tautology. But we have seen, that this Idea itself, because of its absolutization, dissolves itself in nothingness.

The same antinomy which intrinsically destroys the Idea of the “homo noumenon” recurs in the principle of teleological judgment.

The same antinomy reappears in the principle of teleological judgment.

1 In the famous para. 76 of the “Critique of Judgment”, KANT writes: “Die Vernunft ist ein Vermögen der Prinzipien und geht in ihrer äuszersten Forderung auf das Unbedingte; da hingegen der Verstand ihn immer nur unter einer gewissen Bedingung die gegeben werden muss zu Diensten steht. Ohne Begriffe des Verstandes aber, welchen objective Realität gegeben werden muss, kann die Vernunft gar nichts objectiv (synthetisch) urteilen und enthält als theoretische Vernunft für sich schlechterdings keine konstitutive, sondern bloz regulative Prinzipien.” [“Reason is a faculty of principles, and in its extreme demands it points to the unconditional; the understanding, on the contrary, is always only at the service of the former on a specific condition which must be previously fulfilled. Reason, however, is not able to judge anything objectively (synthetically) without concepts of the understanding to which objective reality must be given, and as theoretical reason it does not contain in itself any constitutive principles, but merely regulative ones.”]

But KANT has not seen that the Idea of the “homo noumenon” as the hypostasis of the moral function of personality is itself the product of a religiously founded analytical mental activity which ignores the cosmic coherence and is thus false! For the transcendental “Idea” points toward the totality of meaning and not towards an analytical abstraction, which in its hypostatization destroys the meaning-coherence.
The development of the basic antinomy in the judgment. The point here in question is the possibility to conceive of the stringent mechanical causality of the classical Humanistic science-ideal together with a teleology in nature, a teleology which can only find termination in a moral "Selbstzweck".

The critique of teleological judgment derived the justification of a teleological view of nature from the fact that in nature itself phenomena are given, namely, the living organisms, which set a limit to causal explanation and present themselves to our contemplation, as if they were constructed after a teleological plan.

A thing, which as a product of nature can nevertheless be conceived only as a natural organism, must be related to itself as cause and effect. It is a product of nature itself, and not like the beautiful, only the representation of a thing which is produced by nature or by art. For it gives "objective reality" to the concept of a goal. Since this is the case, the question must necessarily be raised: How is this possible according to the "transcendental conditions of objective reality" in conformity with the category of causality? Now the connection of cause and effect, so far as it is only thought by means of the understanding, is a synthetical determination of phenomena that forms a series of causes and effects and in which the effect is always subsequent to the cause. Therefore, the causal coherence, in a natural organism, can never be a nexus effectivus, a coherence of mechanical, efficient causes.

The organism cannot result from an external cause, but must be thought of as its own cause and at the same time as the effect of this cause; therefore, this relation of causality can be considered by the reflecting judgment in such a manner only, that it is viewed as a nexus finalis, in which the effect is at the same time thought of as a causa finalis. This includes a twofold condition:

1 - the parts of the organism can only exist through their relation to the whole, and

2 - the parts are only connected to the unity of the whole through the fact that they are the mutual cause and effect of each other's form.

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1 Kr. der Urt. kr., pp. 261/2.
The fictitious character of the teleological view of nature follows directly from Kant's transcendental ground-Idea.

Since such a teleological union of cause and effect is known to us only from our own human action, we can, to be sure, lay this teleological principle at the foundation of our judgment concerning the natural organisms, but we must always bear in mind, that by so doing we do not categorically determine the "objective reality" of the organic, but only reflect on it, in order to acquire a regulative principle for the mechanical determination of nature. We may judge the living organism, only as if a teleological activity lay at its foundation. Kant's dualistic transcendental ground-Idea does not permit any other view.

The principle of the inner teleology in nature leads the reflecting judgment necessarily beyond the living organism to the "Idee der gesamten Natur als eines Systems nach der Regel der Zwecke", in other words, to the Idea of nature as a "universal organism" (an expression first employed by Schelling) to which Idea all mechanism of nature must be subordinated according to principles of reason: "The principle of reason has for it (viz. the teleological judgment) only subjective competency, that is to say as maxim. Everything in the world is good for something whatsoever; nothing in it is aimless; and by the example which nature gives in its organical products, one is entitled, nay called upon, to expect from it and its laws nothing but what is appropriate in its totality" ¹.

The teleological view may never again be introduced as an immanent principle of the causal explanation of nature. It remains a transcendental Idea, a limiting concept for the latter and has as such the heuristic value that it constantly raises the question as to which mechanism is responsible for effectuating the particular end of nature.

On the other hand, insofar as it can discover no single "Selbstzweck", no single final goal in nature, the teleological view of nature automatically results in the supra-sensory Idea of the "homo noumenon" and with that in an ethical teleology. Thus it appears, that in the "reflecting faculty of judgment" a reconcilia-

¹ Kr. der Urt. kr., p. 268/9: "Das Prinzip der Vernunft ist ihr als nur subjectiv, d.i. als Maxime zuständig. Alles in der Welt ist irgend wozu gut; nichts ist in ihr umsonst; und man ist durch das Beispiel, das die Natur an ihren organischen Produkten gibt, berechtigt, ja berufen, von ihr und ihren Gesetzen nichts, als was im Ganzen zweckmäzig ist, zu erwarten."
The development of the basic antinomy in the

tion is to be really found between the ideal of science and that of
personality. This reconciliation, however, is not a real one. In
the “Dialectic of teleological judgment” Kant himself begins
with the formulation of the antinomy between the mechanical
view of nature of the ideal of science and the teleological view
of nature which is essentially derived from the ideal of persona-


The origin of the antinomy of the faculty of teleo-
logical judgment in the light of Kant's cosmonomic

We are not concerned here with the maintenance of the modal
boundaries of meaning among the law-spheres which are an-
chored in the cosmic order of time, but only with the mainte-
nance of the ideal of personality against the ideal of science that
desires to erase all the boundaries of meaning through creative
sovereign thought. For this very reason, the solution given by
Kant to the antinomy which he formulated, rests entirely upon
an analytical hypostatic division of the functions of conscious-
ness of reflective and determinative judgment: “All appearance
of an antinomy between the maxims of the properly physical
(mechanical) and the teleological (technical) mode of explana-
tion consequently rests upon this: that a principle of the reflec-
ting faculty of judgment is taken for that of the determinative
faculty and the autonomy of the former (which only subjectively
holds good for the use of our reason in respect to the particular
laws of experience) for the heteronomy of the latter which must
conform itself to the (universal and particular) laws gives by the
understanding”

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1 *Ib.*, p. 278.
den Maximen der eigentlich physischen (mechanischen) und der teleo-
logischen (technischen) Erklärungsart, beruht also darauf: dasz man
From where, however, does the antinomy of teleological judgment arise? It arises from thinking together two principles which, according to KANT, really have their origin in two entirely different and separated functions of reason.

This antinomy cannot be solved by referring either of these functions to its own apriori principles. We are here concerned with the very basic question which every transcendental ground-idea must answer in principle: Where is to be found the deeper unity and the mutual coherence of meaning of the different functions of our consciousness and of temporal reality?

This problem is not taken up again by KANT before the famous Par. 78 of his “Critique of Judgment” where he treats, “Von der Vereinigung des Prinzips des allgemeinen Mechanismus der Materie mit dem teleologischen in der Technik der Natur.”

After having first established that the mechanical and teleological ways of explaining nature mutually exclude each other, KANT observes: “The principle which is to make possible the compatibility of the two in judging nature according to them, must be placed in that which lies outside both (consequently also outside the possible empirical representation of nature) but which nevertheless contains the ground of them. This is the super-sensory and each of the two modes of explanation is to be related to it”¹.

The reason why the causal and teleological views of nature are capable of coexisting harmoniously in thought is consequently sought by KANT in the supra-sensory substratum of nature, of which, however, we cannot acquire any theoretical knowledge ².

¹ Kr. der Urt. kr., p. 309: “Das Princip, welches die Vereinbarkeit beider in Beurteilung der Natur nach denselben möglich machen soll, musz in dem, was ausserhalb beiden (mithin auch ausser der möglichen empirischen Naturvorstellung) liegt, von dieser aber doch den Grund enthält, d.i. im Übersinnlichen gesetzt und eine jede beider Erklärungsarten darauf bezogen werden.”

² Ibid., p. 312, KANT wrote as proof for the necessity of thinking together natural mechanism and natural teleology: “Denn wo Zwecke als Grunde der Möglichkeit gewisser Dinge gedacht werden, da musz man auch Mittel annehmen, deren Wirkungsgesetz für sich nichts einen Zweck
The development of the basic antinomy in the

The influence of Newton's view of the compatibility of mechanism and divine teleology in nature is here very evident.  

Once again we are confronted with the concept of the "Naturding an sich" which is so extremely problematical in the system of Kant. Moreover, in this connection it is doubly problematical, since Kant himself began to explain, that the apriori teleological principle of the reflecting judgment may itself never be related to the objective reality of things in nature, but is only a subjective principle for judging nature, which we essentially derive from the teleology in our own human actions!  

How then can the basis for the compatibility in thought of the mechanical and teleological explanation of nature suddenly be sought in a supra-sensory substratum of nature, while a little earlier, Kant himself wrote: "in conformity with the particular constitution of our understanding we are obliged to consider some products of nature with respect to their possibility as being produced after a plan and as goals; we may not pretend, however, that there actually exists a particular cause which has its determinative ground in the idea of a goal; consequently it is not permitted to deny, that another (higher) understanding than the human one can find the ground of possibility of such products also in the mechanism of nature, i.e. of a causal connection for which not exclusively an understanding as cause is assumed".  

Voraussetzendes bedarf, mithin mechanisch und doch eine untergeordnete Ursache absichtlicher Wirkungen sein kann." ["Where ends are thought of as grounds of the possibility of certain things, there must also be assumed means, whose law of operation in itself does not need anything which pre-supposes a goal, and consequently can be mechanical and nevertheless a subordinate cause of teleological effects."] If consistently applied, this Idea leads to the dissolution of the hypostatization of the moral function in the "homo noumenon".  

1 The rather primitive conception of divine Providence in nature after the pattern of human technics (compare the machine!) was accepted by the whole of enlightened deism.  

In this connection Kant himself expressly speaks of a "gewisse Zufälligkeit der Beschaffenheit unseres Verstandes" (a certain casualty in the constitution of our understanding), which would necessitate a teleological judgment of nature.

Furthermore, in the preceding § 76 and § 77 he had worked out this Idea more precisely in the famous contrast between the intuitive divine understanding which is creative in a material sense and the human understanding which is only creative in a formal sense.

Our understanding has this peculiarity, that it must be given sensory material which does not lie in the understanding itself, and so is not created by the latter. This material is the ground of all contingency of the particular in nature, in contradistinction to the formal and universal laws given by the understanding. For the same reasons our understanding must distinguish the possibility and reality of things. If our cognitive faculty were not assigned to the cooperation of two distinct functions, i.e. logical understanding and sensory intuition, then the distinction between possibility and reality would disappear. An absolutely intuitive understanding could only know reality. "For an understanding in which this difference should not present itself, it would hold good: all objects which I know, are (exist)" and the distinction between contingency and necessity would also disappear for such a mind (compare Leibniz). Now although human reason can ascend to the transcendental Idea of the absolute necessity (in which possibility and reality are inseparably united), yet this Idea itself is only something possible; as an Idea, it is distinct from reality.

The situation which holds good for our human understanding in respect to the relation between possibility and reality, has also validity with respect to its conception of the relation between mechanism and teleology in nature. The contingency in the particular in nature is the remainder which for our understanding is not definable by the universal laws which it imposes a priori upon the phenomena. In order to subject this remainder to the understanding, we must ascend above mere possibility, above the mere universal, above the mere concept, to the transcendental Idea of reason, which requires an absolute necessity.

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2 "Für einen Verstand bei dem dieser Unterschied nicht einträte, würde es heissen: alle Objekte, die ich erkenne, sind (existieren)".
It is true, that by so doing we subject the particular itself, by means of teleological judgment, to a law, namely a teleological principle, but this is only a subjective principle of reason valid for our judgment, “which as regulative (not constitutive) holds good for our human faculty of judgment with the same necessity as if it were an objective principle”. ¹

In other words, the antinomy which in KANT’s functionalistic mode of thought necessarily emerges between natural causality and natural teleology, remains in fact unsolved. For the principle of teleology in nature remains in the last analysis a fictitious one, belonging to the “as if”- consideration of our human reason. Consequently, we may conclude, that also his third Critique could give no real solution to the basic antinomy between the ideal of science and that of personality.

This basic antinomy is irreconcilable, since the absolutizing of reason must necessarily proceed from a rejection of the cosmic order of time, which alone can determine the mutual relation between the modal law-spheres, and which alone can maintain the cosmic coherence of meaning in the sovereignty of each sphere.

Even the appeal to an absolute intuitive mind is of no avail, because this “absolute mind” is itself the final hypostatization of the Humanistic ideal of science, and as such is not identical with the final hypostatization of the ideal of personality in the moral God of reason.

The basic antinomy between the ideals of science and of personality in KANT is everywhere crystallized in the form-matter schema. A synopsis of the development of this antinomy in the three Critiques.

If we survey KANT’s three Critiques, it appears, that the basic antinomy between the ideal of science and that of personality has everywhere crystallized in the dialectical form-matter scheme. Thereby we have proved the thesis, developed in our Prolegomena, that this scheme, formally derived from the religious ground-motive of Greek thought, in KANT’s philosophy has assumed an intrinsically Humanistic sense.

In the “Critique of Pure Reason” it violated the sovereignty of reason.

¹ Kr. der Urt. kr., p. 300: “welches als regulativ (nicht konstitutiv) für unsere menschliche Urteilskraft eben so notwendig gilt, als ob es ein objectives Prinzip wäre.”
of the Humanistic science-ideal and, where it appealed to a natural substance, it simultaneously evoked an antinomy with the ideal of personality, that can only find its “substance” in moral law.

In the “Critique of Practical Reason”, it dissolved the hypothesis of the ideal of personality, the Idea of the “homo noumenon” as a “Ding an sich”, by again relating this Idea to the sensory.

Finally, in the “Critique of Judgment”, it produced the antinomy which necessarily arises by subjecting the same sensory aspect of reality to two principles which by definition mutually exclude each other, namely, that of mechanical causality and that of teleology in nature. In Kant’s system a teleology can never be a teleology of nature, if, as he supposes, it must be thought of as supra-sensory. For how can the principle of teleology be related to sensory experience while the sensory and the supra-sensory are divided by an unbridgeable cleft?

Moreover, as soon as Kant again relates this principle of teleology to the sensory material of experience, even though only as a subjective principle for the use of the understanding, this material is subjected to two principles which mutually exclude one another. In this way the conflict between the ideal of science and that of personality is unchained in the original domain of the Humanistic science-ideal, namely, the experience of nature.

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1 In the second discourse of a later edition (1804) of his “Wissenschaftslehre” Fichte observed these antinomies very clearly, where he wrote concerning Kant’s three Critiques with their three absoluta: “Überdies, was noch mehr bedeutete, war über der zuletzt aufgestellten moralischen Welt, als der einen Welt an sich, die empirische verloren gegangen, zur Vergeltung, dass sie zu erst die moralische vernichtet hatte...” [“Besides, which signified still more, with the finally projected moral world as the one world in itself, the empirical had been lost, in return for the fact that it first had destroyed the moral one...”].

2 In his “Critique of Judgment” Kant thought he could continue to speak of nature-teleology by simultaneously conceiving the organized product of nature under the law of mechanical causality: “da ferner ohne allen zu der teleologisch gedachten Erzeugungsart hinzukommenden Begriff von einem dabei zugleich anzutreffenden Mechanism der Natur dergleichen Erzeugung gar nicht als Naturprodukt beurteilt werden könnte.” [“because furthermore without combining the teleological conception of the mode of production with a concept of a simultaneous mechanism of nature, such a production could not at all be judged as a nature-product.”] Thereby, however, only the mechanism of nature, and not the teleology of nature is saved!
Just as, on the other hand, the ideal of personality is dissolved by joining the principle of teleology (and with that in the last analysis the "homo noumenon" as the final goal) with the substratum of a mechanism of nature.

Kant's dualistic transcendental ground-Idea lacks an unequivocal Archimedean point and an unequivocal Idea of the totality of meaning.

As we observed in an earlier context, Kant's transcendental ground-Idea lacks unity in its Archimedean point and, consequently, an unequivocal Idea of totality. It is true that in its transcendental usage the Idea points very clearly towards the moral aspect of human existence and seems to absolutize it as a totality of meaning. The dualism between the ideal of science and that of personality, however, which characterizes Kant's transcendental ground-Idea, prevented him from reducing all of the functions of human existence to the moral, as the supposed root of personality. The "Ding an sich" of nature, which Kant did not definitely eliminate, continued to be a counter instance against his moralistic Idea of totality.

This is the source of all of the contradictions in his philosophy.

It must be granted that it was a really transcendental critical motive which prevented him from constructing a unity which, indeed, was excluded by his dualistic religious ground-motive. Nevertheless, the very fact that, in the cadre of his transcendental idealism, he emphatically proclaimed the primacy of the ideal of personality must result with an inner necessity in the development of the post-Kantian freedom-idealism which tried to overcome the critical dualism by means of a theoretical dialectic.

Kant's transcendental Idea of freedom became the starting-point of this dialectical evolution in Humanistic thought.

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1 In this respect I must correct the opinion defended in the first (Dutch) edition of this work, that the maintaining of this dualism was due to a lack of critical consistency in Kant's thought.
Chapter V

The Tension Between the Ideal of Science and That of Personality in the Identity-Philosophy of Post-Kantian Freedom-Idealism

§ 1 - The Transitional Period Between Critical Idealism and Monistic Freedom-Idealism. From Maimon to Fichte

So the inner dialectic of the religious ground-motive of nature and freedom could not come to rest in Kant's dualistic separation of the ideals of science and personality. It drove post-Kantian freedom-idealism beyond the Kantian transcendental criticism.

The critical separation between understanding and sensibility, universal form and individuality, form and matter of experience, understanding and reason, had to be overcome. The freedom-motive, which since Kant was increasingly recognized as the very root of the Humanistic life- and world-view, called into play with a growing urgency its proper inner postulate of continuity. It must with a truly dialectical necessity transform the transcendental Idea concerning the coherence and mutual relations among the modal aspects. Thereby the whole cosmonomic Idea of Humanistic thought changed its form.

The dialectic of theoretical reason with its transcendental Ideas, by which in Kant reason elevates itself above the limits of sense experience, was to be transformed and enlarged into a new dialectical logic, as a true "organon" of freedom-idealism. Henceforth, all limits of reason ought to be abrogated and "nature" and "freedom" should be thought together in a dialectical way. In philosophic thought this program could be realized only by a further pushing back of the classical science-ideal and by its

1 Translator's note: This term and the noun "Criticism" are used here to designate the Kantian philosophy as expounded in the three Critiques of the sage of Koeningsberg.

W. Y.
complete subjection to the ideal of personality. Whereas for Kant the theoretical dialectic with its insoluble antinomies was the proof of a speculative misuse of the transcendental Ideas, by which theoretical reason tries to exceed its critical boundaries, the antinomy was now sanctioned as a necessary transitional phase of dialectical thought which must continually proceed to a higher synthesis in order finally to overbridge the religious antithesis in the starting-point of Humanistic philosophy.

Maimon’s attempt at a solution of the antinomy in Kant’s form-matter scheme by means of Leibniz’ principle of continuity.

A first attempt at bridging over the fundamental dualism in Kant’s critiques of theoretical and practical reason (with their antithetic or rather antinomic relation between “reason” and “sensibility”, universally valid apriori form and sensory “empirical” matter) was undertaken by Salomon Maimon (1753—1800). He intended to transform Kant’s antithesis between sensibility and logical understanding from a fundamental into a gradual one by introducing into Kantian epistemology Leibniz’ doctrine concerning the “petites perceptions”. For that very reason he eliminated in a radical manner the intrinsically antinomic metaphysical concept of the “thing in itself” which Kant had maintained because he considered sensibility as merely receptive.

With Maimon an absolute idealistic trend entered into the transcendental thought which issued from Kant. This trend would even have the “matter” of experience originate solely from the transcendental consciousness. But Maimon’s method for the realization of this program is to be qualified only as an apostasy from the veritable transcendental motive in Kant’s philosophy. This qualification holds in spite of the considerable influence Maimon exercised on the development of transcendental idealism in Fichte.

Kantian epistemology is completely dissociated from its ἐπώθεσις, from the Idea of the autonomous freedom of human personality. The critical self-reflection on the ideal of personality, as the root of the ideal of science, had begun in Kant’s philosophy only to be lost again in Maimon.

It is essentially the mathematical science-ideal that regains the upper hand in his critical thought. Leibniz’ mathematical principle of continuity is introduced into Critical philosophy, to
overcome, if possible, the internal antinomy of the Critical form-matter schema. As if this antinomy had a “purely theoretical” origin and could be resolved by the methods of the mathematical ideal of science!

MAIMON even reduced the “sensory matter of experience” to the creative consciousness, understood as purely theoretical. The matter of knowledge is produced unconsciously in the consciousness: its genesis is unknown to the latter. But if it is not to remain completely foreign to “reason”, it must be understood as the “transcendental differential” of clear transcendental-logical thought.

MAIMON’s falling away from the veritable transcendental motive. How the transcendental Idea loses for him its direction toward KANT’s ideal of personality.

The “Ding an sich” then actually loses all metaphysical meaning. Its signification is merged in that of a theoretical limiting concept. It indicates the limits under which our consciousness can no longer control its content by its own creative thought-forms.

This limiting concept, however, lacks all veritable transcendental meaning, which it had possessed for KANT. Rather it is exclusively oriented to the continuity-postulate of the mathematical science-ideal, as will appear below.

The basic problem which MAIMON encountered even in his first work, Versuch über die Transcendentalphilosophie, was that of the relation between the universal apriori forms of the “transcendental consciousness” and the particular matter. This was the same problem that KANT had tried to solve in his Kritik der Urteilskraft and in the year 1789 MAIMON’s book had been sent by MARCUS HERZ to him for criticism even before KANT’s third main work had appeared. To bridge the gap between the universal and the particular in our knowledge KANT had also used LEIBNIZ’ theological Idea of the “intellectus archetypus” with its mathematical analysis completed in a single intuition (uno intuito) of the whole individual reality (not to be penetrated by our finite understanding). But with him this idea remained a merely regulative principle for the use of the understanding, a normative Idea that obtained its transcendental turn in the teleological view of nature, insofar as the latter referred in the last analysis to the supersensible realm of free-
The development of the basic antinomy in the domain. On the basis of his transcendental ground-Idea, Kant must reject the metaphysical turn of Leibniz' Idea of the "intellectus archetypus", resulting in a mathematical idealism that seeks both the origin and root of our cosmos in creative mathematical thought. This metaphysics of the science-ideal was incompatible with the freedom-idealism of Kant's Critical philosophy.

Maimon's mathematical Criticism and the Marburg school among the Neo-Kantians.

Maimon actually tried to reconcile this mathematical idealism with the Critical transcendental philosophy. According to him, the Idea of the "divine understanding" in its Leibnizian sense remains "an Idea, to which any Critique of Pure Reason must be reduced, if it is to be satisfying".

This was doubtless a regression into the dogmatic attitude of thought which, under the supremacy of the faith in the mathematical science-ideal, could not penetrate to the true object of the latter.

Leibniz had wanted to give to phenomena in their sensory form a foundation in creative mathematical thought (hence his continual speaking of "phénomènes bien fondés") Similarly Maimon seeks a mathematical basis for Kant's matter of consciousness, as such. This matter could no longer be relegated to the mere receptivity of sensibility, once a break had been made with Kant's doctrine of the "affection" of our subjective sensory function by the "Ding an sich".

The understanding cannot simply accept the sensory impressions of the "Gegenstand" as a datum; it necessarily asks after the principles of their origin. "Since the business of the understanding is nothing but thinking, i.e. producing unity in the manifold, it can think no object, except by indicating the rule or manner of its origin. For only thereby can the manifold of the same be brought under the unity of the rule. Consequently it can think no object as already originated, but merely as originating, i.e. flowing. The special rule of origination of an object or the nature of its different-

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1 In modern times the Neo-Kantians of the Marburg School have made a similar attempt.

2 Über die Progressen der Philosophie, Streifereien, p. 42, cited by Cassirer III, p. 96: "eine Idee, worauf eine jede Kritik der reinen Vernunft zurückgebracht werden muss, wenn sie befriedigend sein soll."
tial makes it a special object, and the relations of different objects originate from the relations of their rules of origination or their differentials”\(^1\).

Thus the Kantian Idea, or the noumenon, as limiting concept, gains with MAIMON the significance of a mathematical differential concept as the foundation of KANT's sensory matter of consciousness.

The pure categories of thought can never be immediately applied to sensory perceptions “but merely to their elements which are Ideas of reason concerning the mode of origination of these intuitions, and by means of these to the intuitions themselves”\(^2\).

The Idea as such becomes the logical origin-principle that knows no other \(\alpha \omega \chi \eta\) but creative mathematical thought. This was the methodical way which presently was to be taken by the Marburg school, much more consistently than MAIMON had done. This school began to apply LEIBNIZ' principle of continuity as a transcendental logical “principle of creation” ("Erzeugungsprinzip") to KANT's categories. The latter could no longer be analyzed as a static datum from the table of the forms of logical judgment; rather they must be derived in a dynamic process of creation from their logical origin, from an original synthesis of thought.

But even for this dynamic, genetic view of the “pure forms of consciousness” we find the point of contact in MAIMON's mathematical Criticism. MAIMON carries through his view of the datum as “transcendental differential of consciousness” not only with

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\(^1\) Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie, cited by Cassirer III, p. 98: "Denn da das Geschäft des Verstandes nicht anderes als Denken, d.h. Einheit im mannigfaltigen hervorzubringen ist, so kann er sich kein Objekt denken, als bloß dadurch, dass er die Regel oder Art seiner Entstehung angibt: denn nur dadurch kann das Mannigfaltige desselben unter die Einheit der Regel gebracht werden, folglich kann er kein Objekt als schon entstanden, sondern bloß als entstehend, d.h. fließend denken. Die besondere Regel des Entstehens eines Objekts oder die Art seines Differential macht es zu einem besonderen Objekt, und die Verhältnisse verschiedener Objekte entspringen aus den Verhältnissen ihrer Entstehungsregeln oder ihrer Differentialen."

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 355: "sondern bloß auf ihre Elemente, die Vernunftideen von der Entstehungsart dieser Anschauungen sind und vermittels dieser auf die Anschauungen selbst.”
The development of the basic antinomy in the respect to the sensory matter of knowledge, but also with respect to the apriori forms of the knowing consciousness.

The problem as to the relation between the universal and the particular in knowledge within the domain of KANT's apriori forms of consciousness. MAIMON's cosmonomic Idea.

It was the relation of the particular to the universal in knowledge which he tried to clarify by his new conception of the Idea as "differential of consciousness". The same problem, however, occurs in the apriori forms of consciousness. Here it becomes that of the relation of the transcendental logical origin of the theoretical cosmos to the modal diversity of formal logical, mathematical and natural scientific concepts. In other words, the basic problems which must be answered by the transcendental ground-Idea (cosmonomic Idea) here come into play.

If the origin, the \( \omega \chi \), is to be found only in the Idea of deified creative thought, then the modal particularity of meaning must also be reduced to its origin, according to a logical principle of creation.

This modal particularity may at first sight appear as a transcendental apriori datum in the apriori organization of our consciousness. Nevertheless, the Critical science-ideal requires the indication of the rule of origin according to which this particularity is to be created logically.

Thus the problem of specification that KANT had tried to solve in his Critique of Judgment is now set immediately in the frame of a cosmonomic Idea.

MAIMON starts from the problem concerning the specification of the formal logical concepts of the understanding into the special concepts of mathematics.

Finding a point of contact in KANT's doctrine of space and time, as forms of sensory intuition, he conceives space as a particularity which may not remain merely a datum, as an "apriori form of intuition", a \( \nuo \), but must be referred to its logical origin. The problem broadens, however, immediately to the question concerning the principle of the origin of all so-called real thought, which comes about in universally valid synthetic judgments of knowledge having a special sense. MAIMON tries to answer this question in his principle of deter-
minability ("Satz der Bestimmbarkeit"). What is to be understood by this principle?

With MAIMON it expresses the Idea of logical domination (by a system of further categorical determinations) of the manifold in the special "Gegenstände" of thought, which may not be derived from the merely analytic principles, i.e. from the principles of identity and of logical contradiction alone.

As the "principium contradictionis" is the basic principle of all merely formal analytical judgments, so the "Satz der Bestimmbarkeit" becomes the origin-principle of all particular judgments of knowledge, in which thought, according to COHEN's later pronouncement, becomes "thinking of being" and all being becomes "being of thought". For, according to the cosmonomic Idea here laid at the foundation, reality can hold as reality only insofar as it is derived from its logical origin, in the creative process performed by theoretical thought.

In the explanation of his "principle of determinability" MAIMON starts from three fundamentally different ways in which thought can combine a manifold of "objects of consciousness" into a logical unity.

There are three possibilities with respect to the relation between the elements of the manifold which are combined by thought into unity. In the first place, they can be entirely independent with respect to each other, so that each can be thought for itself separately, e.g. the sensory qualities of colour and taste, or "substances" as table and chair.

In this case, thought remains merely formal and arbitrary and connects the "objects of consciousness" only according to the analytic principle of contradiction. Realiter, however, the objects are not unified with one another according to a fixed principle.

In the second place, it is possible that the elements of the manifold, to be combined in thought, are interdependent in such a way that the one cannot be thought apart from the other. According to MAIMON, the judgment of causality, as a pure judgment of relation, is typical of this mode of logical synthesis, since cause and effect stand in correlation to one another. From this relation of thought, however, no independent "Gegenstand" can arise. Since each of its two elements supposes the other, both lack the characteristic of that independent existence, required for the "realen Gegenstand".
Only in the third mode of logical connection or synthesis does thought become thought of reality, in which the origin-principle of the “Gegenstand” can be demonstrated. In this mode of logical connection, the “subject”, to be sure, can be thought in the judgment without the “predicate”, but not conversely. Only a subject in the judgment that can be thought entirely independently, is a true “Gegenstand” in thought. Thought here ties to the concept of the “Gegenstand” an entire system of further determinations.

For this mode of logical synthesis the mathematical style of thinking is the prototype. For the totality of mathematical concepts and judgments forms a system, which, taking its beginning from an independent transcendental logical origin, is created by the continual addition of further logical determinations. Subject and predicate are constantly combined in the mathematical judgment according to the “principle of determinability” (“Satz der Bestimmbarkeit”).

The break between form and sensory matter of knowledge. MAIMON’s later critical scepticism with respect to KANT’s concept of experience.

Not all “real thought”, however, answers to this basic principle. The “empirical” judgments, which make their appeal to the sensory aspect of experience, are synthetic to be sure, but do not hang together in an apriori and systematic fashion according to the “principle of determinability”. Sensory perception always affords us only a group of characteristics, which regularly exist together, but with respect to which it can never be proved that one characteristic is determined by the other. So, for example, the “complex sense-perception” which we call gold is characterized by its yellow colour, by its specific gravity, its solubility, and so on. But, the reason why these very qualities and not any others make their appearance together, remains hidden from our limited understanding. The conclusion from the constant perception of their configuration to the necessity of their combination rests upon the psychological association of Ideas, which HUME had previously analyzed. It is a product of the creative imagination but is not grounded in creative thought.

MAIMON has thus landed in a critical scepticism with respect to the actual possibility of applying the apriori forms of consciousness to the Kantian matter of sensory experience.
According to him, the category of nature-causality remains a merely formal synthesis of thought, creating no actual "Gegenstand". It is not to be deduced according to the "principle of determinability".

The exact natural sciences do not relate the "pure categories of thought" to sensory perceptions themselves, but rather to ideal limiting concepts, to the "differentials", which they substitute for these perceptions. The sensory phenomena do not permit themselves to be connected by thought, in conformity with the logical origin-principle of determinability.

Thus MAIMON's mathematical Criticism ends in a fundamental scepticism with respect to KANT's apriori principles of experience, which actually intended to relate the constitutive logical thought-forms apriori to the sensory material of knowledge. The only synthetic apriori sciences which he allows to be valid are the logicized mathematics and the transcendental philosophy as science of the synthetic origin of the pure forms of consciousness.

The continuity-postulate of the mathematical science-ideal halts in MAIMON's Critical philosophy before the boundary of sensory phenomena!

How is this to be explained in view of the fact that in his first work, Versuch über die Transzendentalphilosophie, MAIMON had expressly maintained that the categories of thought can be related also to sensory perceptions themselves by means of the Ideas of reason (as limiting concepts in the sense of "differentials of consciousness")?

The explanation is to be found in the circumstance that in MAIMON's first work, LEIBNIZ' mathematical idealism was accepted to an extent that did not really agree with KANT's Criticism. With LEIBNIZ, in the last analysis, the sensory aspect of reality becomes a mode of mathematical thought, while the concept of the differential took a metaphysical speculative turn. It was LEIBNIZ' idea of the divine Origin as mathematical thought creating the whole cosmic coherence, that originally dominated MAIMON's entire Critical standpoint.

LEIBNIZ' conception of the relation between phenomenon and noumenon was, however, altogether different from that of KANT.

Only the metaphysics of the science-ideal could attempt to reduce sensory phenomena to mathematical thought as their ultimate origin and assume that, in the creative analysis of the divine thought, they answer adequately to the pure concepts of the understanding.
The development of the basic antinomy in the

Kant could not relativize and eventually annul the boundaries between sensibility and reason in this metaphysical manner.

The way which Kant took to synthesize both antagonistic factors was eventually determined by his conception of the transcendental Idea of theoretical reason as limiting concept of freedom. That Kant thereby involved himself in insoluble antinomies was due to his dualistic transcendental ground-Idea, which did not permit a veritable bridging of the gap between form and matter.

Maimon who tried to understand Kant's doctrine of the transcendental Ideas in a "purely theoretical" sense now stood before the dilemma of giving to the "Ideas" either the metaphysical speculative turn which they had possessed in Leibniz' mathematical idealistic conception of the "intellectus archetypus", or of letting them shrivel up into mere fictions of the creative phantasy in the sense intended by Hume.

The first way would have carried him back irrevocably into pre-Kantian metaphysics, which he had rejected more consistently than Kant himself in his radical critique of the "Ding an sich".

Within the limits of the Critical standpoint, the mathematical science-ideal appears unable to overcome Kant's dualism between sensibility and reason.

As in Maimon's later works Leibniz's speculative Idea of God lost positive significance and the limits of the mathematical science-ideal were drawn more sharply in the critical sense, the Ideas in Maimon also tend more and more pronouncedly to become mere fictions. To the same degree, the boundaries that Kant had drawn between reason and sensibility gain in sharpness in Maimon's criticism. The differential-concept and the continuity-principle originating from mathematical thought halt before a boundary between sensibility and reason, which Kant, however, had drawn for the sake of his new conception of the ideal of personality. Maimon's transcendental ground-Idea ultimately lacks unity in its Archimedean point, despite his falling back into the supremacy of the mathematical science-ideal.

Only from the personality-ideal itself, could the immediately following development of transcendental idealism attempt to overcome Kant's dualism. The science-ideal conceived according to Criticism did not prove capable of this.

1 Cf. on this in detail Cassirer III, pp. 104 ff.
§ 2 - THE CONTINUITY-POSTULATE IN THE NEW CONCEPTION OF THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY AND THE GENESIS OF THE DIALECTICAL PHILOSOPHY IN FICHTE'S FIRST "THEORETISCHE WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE" (1794)

The "Naturding an sich" with the doctrine (attached to it by Kant) of the matter of experience, altogether passively received by the sensory function of consciousness, had become the butt of the most effective criticism, in the first controversy that developed about the new critical transcendental-philosophy. Above all, the gross form which Kant's disciple Reinhold had given to the doctrine concerning the "Affizierung" (affection) of the subjective sensibility by the mysterious "Ding an sich" had sharply exposed the antinomy inherent in it. Reinhold conceived this "Affizierung", in fact, as a "causal process" and this conception fell prey to the annihilating attack which Gottlieb Ernst Schulze, oriented to Hume's psychologicist criticism, in his anonymously published writing Aenesidemus directed against the "presumptions" of the "Critique of Pure Reason". According to Kant, the category of causality is restricted to the sensory aspect of experience. How then could it be related to the "Ding an sich" beyond all experience?

Maimon had given the sharpest form to the problem of the relation of sensibility and reason, matter and form of knowledge. In his first work he had set the requirement of explaining also the origin of the matter of experience from the "transcendental consciousness" itself. He had further ventured a first attempt at giving a veritable genetic system of the "pure forms of the consciousness" with the aid of the origin-principle.

All this was only a preparation for the dialectical development which the transcendental freedom-idealism was to undergo after Kant.

The ground-motive of Fichte's first "Wissenschaftslehre". The creative moment in the personality-ideal.

Not until Fichte's first Wissenschaftslehre (doctrine of science)¹ of the year 1794, does this dialectical development take

¹ This is the translation of "Wissenschaftslehre" in D. D. Runes' Dictionary of Philosophy (1951). The terms: "Grammar of Science", "Philosophy of science" and "Science of science" usually do not have the meaning intended by Fichte. The German term will often be abbreviated as W.L.
The development of the basic antinomy in the
its start from the transcendental reflection upon the Idea of freedom as an hypothesis even of the science-ideal.

The metaphysical concept of the "Naturding an sich" (before Kant, the basic denominator for the rationalistic science-ideal, in Kant's system itself a threat to both the science- and personality-ideal) was completely abandoned. As the basic concept of "dogmatic realism", it must be abolished in the "Wissenschaftslehre" which, as the self-reflection of reason upon its own activity, refers all functions of consciousness, even the receptive sensory one, to their *absolute, transcendent root*, viz. the self-consciousness as *absolutely free ego*, determined by nothing else.

That ego is not itself a *being*; it is no more a given super-individual, universally valid logical unity of consciousness, as in Kant, but it *creates itself* in a free *activity* determined by nothing, by means of a free "Tathandlung" ("practical act").

This absolute ego, creating itself in free activity, is not found among the "empirical" (read "psychological"!) determinations of our consciousness and *cannot* be found among them, but is at the basis of every consciousness (which it alone makes possible) 1.

This ego is no longer the fundamental static form of all synthetic thought, as was Kant's "transcendental unity of apperception". As *absolutely free thesis*, it is necessarily thought of as the *dynamic totality* of activity, in itself still undifferentiated, out of which our entire cosmos must originate through a series of further acts of consciousness 2. Nature can possess no independent root in contrast with this absolute thetic ego. Necessity itself in the causal coherence of nature can be understood only as a product of the free activity of the absolute I.

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2 Op. cit., p. 99: "Auf unseren Satz, als absoluten Grundsatz alles Wissens hat gedeutet Kant in seiner Deduction der Kategorien; er hat ihn aber nie als Grundsatz bestimmt aufgestellt." ["Kant, in his deduction of the categories, has hinted at our proposition as absolute principle of all knowledge. But he has never established it definitely as a principle."]
cosmonomic Idea of Humanistic immanence-philosophy  

The Archimedean point in Fichte's transcendental ground-Idea.

What is this “absolute ego” which Fichte makes the basis of his entire philosophy, in the first and highest principle of his “Wissenschaftslehre”: “Das Ich setzt sich selbst” (the ego posits itself)?

For a moment we might suppose, that here the deepest religious root of the whole temporal cosmos was discovered, and, as religious apriori, was made the starting-point of philosophy.

This might be supposed all the more readily, since Fichte, in his treatise, Œber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre (1th ed. 1794, 2d ed. 1798), expressly declares that his doctrine of science, with its absolute thetic principle, is not determined by logic, but, rather the reverse, provides the basis of the latter 1.

Thus even theoretical logic, the “organon” of all hypostatizing in the immanence-philosophy, is subjected to the doctrine of science.

The transcendental synthesis of the “ego” must itself be understood to be the origin of the analytic principles — a thesis, which Kant had posited in all its sharpness, if taken in a merely transcendental-logical sense, but to which he became unfaithful in his deduction of the categories from the analytical forms of judgment.

Maimon had accepted a mutual dependence of analysis and synthesis, but in the material sense he likewise recognized the transcendental-logical synthesis as a condition of the analytical. Fichte, however, was the first to reduce the origin of the analytic in the last analysis to the absolute “ego”, which appears to be elevated above all logical determination.

But it soon turns out that in the first “Grundsatz” (principle) of the doctrine of science there is nothing embodied but the proclamation of the absolute sovereignty of “practical reason”, in the sense of the Humanist ideal of moral freedom.

1 W.W. I, p. 68: “die Wissenschaftslehre wird nicht durch die Logik, aber die Logik wird durch die Wissenschaftslehre bedingt und bestimmt. Die Wissenschaftslehre bekommt nicht etwa von der Logik ihre Form, sondern sie hat sie in sich selbst und stellt sie erst für die mögliche Abstraction durch Freiheit auf.” [“The doctrine of science is not conditioned and determined by logic, but rather logic by the doctrine of science. The doctrine of science does not in any way obtain its form from logic, but has it in itself and only plans it through freedom for the sake of the possible abstraction.”]
The development of the basic antinomy in the

The first absolute "Thathandlung" (practical act) of reason originates, as Fichte himself explains, from the thinking of itself on the part of the absolute ego. "This necessitates a reflection on that which in the first place might be taken for it, and an abstraction from all that which does not really belong to the same".

He further grants: "The laws (of general logic) according to which that activity must be thought of absolutely as the basis of human knowledge, or — what is the same — the rules, according to which that reflection is executed, are not yet demonstrated to be valid, but they are tacitly pre-supposed, as known and established. Only below will they be derived from the principle whose formulation is correct only on condition of their correctness. This is a circle; but it is an unavoidable circle".

It will have to be granted to Lask, that the "absolute ego", thus gained by abstraction and reflection, cannot be otherwise qualified than as an "hypostatizing of the universal concept "ego" as the totality of reason".

Fichte's "absolute ego" as origin and totality of all cosmic diversity of meaning is nothing but the hypostatization of the moral function.

The "absolute ego" in Fichte is the absolutely unlimited free activity of the moral function, hypostatized in the ideal of personality. As sovereign function of reason, it has the infinite task to create from itself the cosmos as the product of freedom.

The continuity-postulate inherent in the Humanist science-ideal as it was conceived of in pre-Kantian rationalism had

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1 Op. cit. I, u. 91: "Dies macht eine Reflexion über dasjenige, was man etwa zunächst dafür halten könnte, und eine Abstraction von allem, was nicht wirklich dazu gehört, nothwendig."


3 Lask, Gesammelte Schriften I, p. 88: "Hypostasierung des Allgemeinbegriffs ,,Ich" zur Totalität der Vernunft."
required that mathematical thought should produce a cosmic order after its own pattern.

Similarly the postulate of continuity, implied in the religious freedom-motive and first discovered by Kant in the Humanist ideal of personality, moves philosophic thought to exceed the modal boundaries of the different aspects of the cosmos and to elevate the moral function of human personality to a basic denominator of the modal diversity of meaning. To this end, natural necessity must be interpreted as a product of the hypostatized moral freedom in the "reflexive" thought of the "Wissenschaftslehre".

"Theoretical reason", "practical reason" and "faculty of judgment" may no longer remain mutually isolated "departments of reason". They must be related to the root of self-consciousness, viewed by Fichte as freely creative moral activity.

This was the boundary before which Kant had halted in the interest of maintaining the science-ideal. There loomed up, in his Critical philosophy, the antinomy between moral freedom hypostatized in the Idea of the homo noumenon, and the science-ideal, based on the "Critique of Pure Reason", which found the scepter of its sovereignty in the category of natural causality. In the critical dialectic he tried, though fruitlessly, to "mummify" this antinomy by relegating "theoretical" and "practical reason" each within its limits.

Kant would have the understanding bow under the logical principle of contradiction. The transcendental Idea of freedom may not be related as a category of the understanding to sensory experience and thereby to nature, as little as the category of natural causality may be related to the practical Idea of the "homo noumenon".

With Fichte, dialectical thought begins to overpass these critical limits, in order to make the cosmos originate from the free activity of the "absolute ego", from the supposed radical unity of reason itself: "There may be indicated something from which every category is itself derived: the ego as absolute subject. Of everything else to which it possibly may be applied, it must be shown that reality is transferred from the ego to it: — that it must be, insofar as the ego is" 1.

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1 W.W. I, p. 99: "es lässt sich etwas aufzeigen, wovon jede Kategorie
The development of the basic antinomy in the
Fichte's attempt at a transcendental deduction of the
Kantian forms of thought from the self-consciousness.

In the first place, the logical principle of identity is derived
from the first principle of the doctrine of science. According to
Fichte, it is nothing but the form of the conclusion from "being
posed" to "being" ("vom Gesetztsein auf das Sein"), which has
been abstracted from the fundamental proposition "I am", by
elimination of the content implied in the ego. In the logical
judgment "A is A", no possible A can be anything other than
an A created and activated in the ego. As surely as the ego it-
self is not a static datum, but an infinite activity, so surely is
identity not merely an immobile logical form, but an infinite
task in the process of the synthetic determination of the cosmos
in the course of reason's becoming self-conscious.

The "mode of activity of the human mind in general" ("Hand-
lungsart des menschlichen Geistes überhaupt"), which dis-
closes itself in the logical form of the judgment of identity, is
the category of reality. "All that to which the proposition A = A
is applicable, has reality, inssofar as this proposition is applicable
to it. That which is posited by the mere positing of anything at
all (i.e. posited in the Ego) is reality in it, is its essence"¹.

The category of reality, to Kant one of the categories of the
class of quality, which he simply derived from the various forms
of the logical judgments, is thus reduced by Fichte in the
logical judgment of identity to the absolute ego, as actual origin
of all reality. Its relationship to sensory experience can no
longer be grounded in the "natural thing in itself" which affects
our sensibility. Rather it is based entirely upon the "absolute ego"
as the source of all reality created freely in self-consciousness.
After the logical judgment of identity has received this basis,
the logical judgment of contradiction (non-A is not A) is also
referred to the first principle of the doctrine of science.

The first-mentioned as well as the second logical principle is

¹ "Alles, worauf der Satz A = A anwendbar ist, hat, inswiefern derselbe
darauf anwendbar ist, Realität. Dasjenige, was durch das bloße Setzen
irgend eines Dinges (eines im Ich gesetzten) gesetzt ist, ist in ihm Reali-
tät, ist sein Wesen."
found among the “facts of empirical consciousness” and must in the doctrine of science be subjected to the ultimate justification which logic itself cannot offer. In the logical judgment of the antithesis (non-A is not A), the question: “Is then the contrary of A posited, and under what condition of the form of the mere act is it then posited?” \(^1\) remains entirely unanswered.

The logical antithesis is an absolute act of the ego. “Opposition as such is posited merely by the Ego” \(^2\).

This act of consciousness which is enacted in the anti-thesis is possible only on condition of the unity of consciousness in its thesis and antithesis. If the consciousness of the first act did not hang together with the consciousness of the second, the second “positing” (the antithesis) would be no “counter-positing”, but a thesis and nothing else. Only by virtue of its relationship to the absolute thesis does it become an anti-thesis.

Originally nothing is posited but the ego. Therefore all opposition must be made with reference to the latter. But the antithesis of the ego is the non-ego. Thus a non-ego is set in opposition to the ego, as certainly as the absolute evidence of the logical judgment, “non-A is not A”, is found among the facts of empirical consciousness.

By abstraction from the content of the ego, Fichte derives the logical principle of contradiction from the material judgment, “To the ego a non-ego is opposed.” Finally, if total abstraction is made from the act of judgment and attention is directed solely to the form of the conclusion from the antithesis to non-being, Kant’s second category of quality, that of negation, originates. This category also has its true origin in the free, infinite activity of the ego; it is not merely a static logical form. It is to be understood, just as all other categories of thought, only as a dialectical point of transition through which the ego becomes conscious of itself as infinite free activity.

Now there is included in the second “principle of the doctrine of science” (“Grundsatz der Wissenschaftslehre”) an overt antinomy. For the non-ego (i.e. nature), as appears from the first principle, is to be posited only in the ego as absolute totality,

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\(^1\) W.W. I, p. 102: “Ist denn, und unter welcher Bedingung der Form der blossen Handlung ist denn das Gegenthieil von A gesetzt?”

\(^2\) W.W. I, p. 103: “Das Entgegengesetzthein überhaupt ist schlechthin durch das Ich gesetzt.”
but at the same time, as antithesis, it cancels the ego. "Thus the second principle is opposed to itself and cancels itself". Yet, in the absolute thesis of the first principle there is implied the demand that the ego and the non-ego be thought together in the absolute ego. Thesis and antithesis thus require their synthesis, which is contained in the third principle: "The ego posits in the ego the non-ego by limitation of itself." If abstraction is made from the definite form of this judgment (i.e. that it is founded upon a basis of distinction or relation) and attention is paid only to "the universal feature of the mode of action — the limitation of the one by the other", there originates the category of determination (in Kant, that of limitation): "Namely, a positing of quantity in general, whether it be quantity of reality or that of negation, is called determination".

Dialectical thought, dominated by the ideal of personality, usurps the task of the cosmic order.

What occurs in this synthesis is clear. Dialectical thought usurps the task of the cosmic order, which regulates the relationship of the modal law-spheres in the cosmic continuity of time. As we demonstrated in Part I, the cosmic order of time grounds and at the same time relativizes the sphere-sovereignty of the modal law-spheres, by bridging over their boundaries. Consequently, if logical thought in the line of speculative dialectic is set in place of the cosmic order, that thought must relativize the boundaries of the modal spheres. But since logical thought in its very principium contradictionis requires a strict maintenance of these boundaries, it can take upon itself this impossible task only by a false logical relativizing of its basic laws.

Logical thought, conscious of its boundaries, can never come to the point of making the meaning of the pre-logical aspects of reality — conceived of in theoretical abstraction as "nature" — originate from the moral function of free personality. Dialectic thought, however, supposes it can accomplish this magical deed by conceiving the absolutized moral aspect as an unlimited totality, from which by division (cf. the division of a geometrical straight line, an image to which Fichte appeals again and

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1 W.W. I, p. 106: "Also ist der zweite Grundsatz sich selbst entgegengesetzt, und hebt sich selbst auf."
2 t.a.p. 122/3: "Nemlich ein setzen der Quantität überhaupt, sey es nun Quantität der Realität oder der Negation, heiszt Bestimmung."
again!) the limited, finite functions are to originate: "We have united the opposed ego and non-ego through the concept of divisibility". The limited ego and the limiting non-ego of the antithesis have both originated by quantitative division or self-limitation of the absolute ego, in which, naturally, a spatial division is not to be thought of. Thus in the synthesis, finite "nature" and finite "freedom", sensibility and finite reason, matter and form, are thought together, after moral freedom is hypostatized by a first theoretical synthesis as a basic denominator for both! This basic denominator is again viewed rationalistically as the moral law!

Fichte himself has formulated the moral function of law as basic denominator for temporal reality in his pronouncement: "Our world is the material of our duty, rendered sensible; this is the authentically real in things, the true basic matter of all appearance".

But the absolutized moral freedom of action of the ego cannot serve as a basic denominator for the theoretical synthesis of meaning. By hypostatization it is torn out of the cosmic temporal coherence of the modal aspects, and becomes an abstract meaning-less form and no totality of meaning.

In Fichte's "Wissenschaftslehre" of the year 1794, according to Kroner's excellent observation, "ethics is raised to the position of metaphysics".

Speculative dialectic, which was not to be elaborated consistently until the system of Hegel, demands that the thesis, the "absolute ego", should not be posited as absolute in the sense of really falling outside the dialectical system. It requires that both thesis and antithesis should be viewed only as momenta of the synthesis which determine and mutually limit each other. But although Fichte laid the foundations of modern speculative dialectic, his moralism prevented him from accepting this consequence.

The absolute ego of the thesis is separated by him from the limited ego of the antithesis.

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1 W.W. I, 110: "Wir haben die entgegengesetzten Ich und nicht-Ich vereinigt durch den Begriff der Theilbarkeit."

2 W.W. V, 211: "Unsere Welt ist das versinnlichte Material unserer Pflicht; dies ist das eigentlich Reelle in den Dingen, der wahre Grundstoff aller Erscheinung."
The development of the basic antinomy in the

To Fichte the "absolute ego" remains outside the dialectical system. The Idea of the absolute ego as ethical task.

The dialectical system which the doctrine of science develops, does not concern the absolute ego of the thesis (which does not itself reflect as does the finite ego), but only the finite ego, which originates through the creation of the antithesis in the ego.

The absolute synthesis, the return of the absolute ego into itself, remains a task never to be realized.

Here the Idea of the absolute ego as ethical "task" makes its entrance into Fichte's dialectic: "So far as the predicate of freedom can hold for man, i.e. so far as he is an absolute Subject, and not one that is represented or capable of being represented, he has nothing in common with the natural being, and is therefore not even opposed to it. In accordance with the logical form of the judgment which is positive (namely: Man is free from natural necessity), both concepts should, nevertheless, be united. Not, to be sure, in any concept, but merely in the Idea of an ego, whose consciousness is not determined by anything outside itself, but which rather determines everything outside itself by its mere consciousness. But this very Idea is not thinkable, inasmuch as it contains a contradiction. Nevertheless, it is set up for us as the highest practical goal. Man should more and more approximate infinitely the freedom which in itself is unattainable".

Therefore, in the development of the dialectical system, the final antinomy may not be reconciled logically. In the process of thought, too, it may only be solved ethically. Therefore, Fichte writes that, in the antitheses which are united through the first synthesis, thought has to seek after new antinomies, in

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1 W.W. I, p. 117: "der Mensch, insofern das Prädicat der Freiheit von ihm gelten kann, d.i. insofern er absolut und nicht vorgestelltes noch vorstellbares Subject ist, hat mit dem Naturwesen gar nichts gemein, und es ist ihm also nicht entgegengesetzt. Dennoch sollen laut der logischen Form des Urteils, welche positiv ist (scl. Der Mensch ist frei von Naturnotwendigkeit), beide Begriffe vereinigt werden; sie sind aber in gar keinem Begriffe zu vereinigen, sondern bloß in der Idee eines Ich, dessen Bewusstsein durch gar nichts ausser ihm bestimmt würde, sondern vielmehr selbst alles ausser ihm durch sein blosses Bewusstsein bestimmte: welche Idee aber selbst nicht denkbar ist, indem sie für uns einen Widerspruch enthält. Dennoch aber ist sie uns zum höchsten praktischen Ziele aufgestellt. Der Mensch soll sich der an sich unerreichbaren Freiheit ins Unendliche immer mehr nähern."
order to unite them through a new synthesis, "until we come to opposites, which can no longer be perfectly united and we thereby pass over into the realm of the practical part" 1.

Krönér rightly compares the first absolute principle in Fichte's first sketch of the "Wissenschaftslehre" with Kant's categorical imperative and calls the proposition of the self-creative absolute ego "the basic law of pure practical reason in its speculative use." The production of the synthesis in the dialectic is set in perfect analogy with moral activity. It is viewed as moral activity continuing itself in thought and become speculative 2. Thus Fichte's observation may be explained: "We accordingly begin with a deduction and go with it as far as we can. The impossibility of continuing it will doubtless show us the point where we have to break it off and to appeal to that unconditioned authoritative dictum of reason, which will result from the task" 3.

Fichte attempts to give an account of the possibility of theoretical knowledge by referring the latter to the selfhood. Why this attempt cannot succeed on Fichte's immanence-standpoint.

Even in the "Wissenschaftslehre" of 1794 Fichte ventured a serious attempt to clear up the problem of synthesis in epistemology, a problem which Kant had not really solved. To this end he will relate the theoretical synthesis to the root of the self-consciousness 4.

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1 W.W. I, p. 115: "bis wir auf Entgegengesetzte kommen, die sich nicht weiter vollkommen verbinden lassen, und dadurch in das Gebiet des praktischen Theils übergehen."

2 Krönér I, 398.

3 W.W. I, p. 106: "Wir heben demnach mit einer Deduktion an, und gehen mit ihr, so weit wir können. Die Unmöglichkeit sie fortzusetzen wird uns ohne Zweifel zeigen, wo wir sie abzubrechen, und uns auf jenen unbedingt Macht spruch der Vernunft, der sich aus der Aufgabe ergeben wird, zu berufen haben."

4 op. cit., p. 114: "The celebrated question which Kant set at the apex of the Critique of Pure Reason: How are synthetic judgments possible a-priori? is now answered in the most general and satisfactory fashion. We have in the third principle performed a synthesis between the opposed ego and non-ego, by means of the posited divisibility of both, about the possibility of which nothing further may be asked, nor may a ground for the same be adduced. It is simply possible, one is authorized to it without any further ground. All other syntheses that are to be valid must be implied in it. They must at once be performed in and with it. And thus, as this is demonstrated, the most convincing proof is provided that they
The development of the basic antinomy in the

On the immanence-standpoint of Fichte's Humanistic cosmogenic Idea, however, this problem proves to be insoluble, notwithstanding Fichte's penetrating philosophical vision. The elevation of the moral noumenal man (homo noumenon) as root of the self-consciousness has only the effect of rooting the synthesis in the antinomy, which is always the token of a breaking through the modal boundaries of meaning by hypostatizing thought!

The antithetical relation of theoretical thought here becomes a logical contradiction, in the dialectical sense!

Fichte derives the Kantian categories of quantity\(^1\) and quality by abstraction from the *absolute ego* (as origin of the Kantian *forms* of consciousness as well as of the sensory *matter* of experience).

Transcendental deduction of the Kantian categories of relation from self-consciousness. The science-ideal is here derived from the ideal of personality.

In the further dialectical development of his system, Fichte tries to deduce in this manner the Kantian categories of substance and inherence, causality and interaction. The synthesis between *reasonable freedom* (of the ego) and *sensory nature*, posited in the third principle, is the starting-point for this deduction. Here we shall not follow in the wake of this dialec-

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\] By setting the *ego* and the *non-ego* in the third “Grundsatz” as limited parts of the *absolute ego*, according to Fichte, both are united by *quantity* (vid. § 3 of the “Wissenschaftslehre”). “Just as there (viz. in § 3) the ego was first simply posited as absolute reality according to *quality*, so here *something*, i.e. something determined by *quantity*, is simply posited in the ego, or the ego is simply posited as determined *quantity*” (I, 205). [“So wie dort” (viz. in § 3) “zuvörderst das Ich, der Qualität nach als absolute Realität schlechthin gesetzt wurde; so wird hier *etwas*, d.h. ein durch Quantität bestimmtes, schlechthin in das Ich gesetzt oder das Ich wird schlechthin gesetzt als bestimmte Quantität.”]
tical development, but shall simply fix our attention upon the fact that Fichte actually sought to derive the Humanist *ideal of science* — which found its focus in the category of causality — from the *ideal of personality*. To this end his thought followed the way of dialectical *continuity*, contained as a postulate in Kant's practical *Idea of freedom*. In Fichte's dialectic this domination of the *continuity-postulate* implied in the freedom-motive finds its clear expression in the transcendental deduction of the natural-scientific categories of relation (substance, causality and interaction). Here Fichte observes: "The independent activity (as synthetic unity) determines the change (as synthetic unity) and vice versa, i.e. they determine one another reciprocally, and are themselves united synthetically. The activity, as synthetic unity, is an absolute *transition* (*Übergehen*); the change, an absolute *intrusion* (*Eingreifen*) entirely self-determined. The former determines the latter, would mean: only by virtue of the transition, is the causal intrusion of the changing terms posited; the latter determines the former, would mean: as the terms interpenetrate, the activity must necessarily pass over from the one to the other... All is one and the same. — The whole, however, is absolutely posited; it bases itself upon itself”¹. And a little later: “Thus the activity returns into itself by means of the change; and the change returns into itself by means of the activity. Everything reproduces itself, and there is no *hiatus* possible there; from any single term one is driven to all the rest”².

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¹ I, 169: “Die unabhängige Thätigkeit (als synthetische Einheit) bestimmt den Wechsel (als synthetische Einheit) und umgekehrt, d.i. beide bestimmen sich gegenseitig, und sind selbst synthetisch vereinigt. Die Thätigkeit, als synthetische Einheit, ist ein absolutes *Uebergehen*; der Wechsel ein absolutes durch sich selbst vollständig bestimmtes *Eingreifen*. Die erstere bestimmt den letzteren, würde heissen: blosz dadurch das übergangen wird, wird das Eingreifen der Wechselglieder gesetzt: der letztere bestimmt die erstere, würde heissen: so wie die Glieder eingreifen, muss nothwendig die Thätigkeit von einem zum anderen übergehen... Alles ist Eins und Ebendasselbe. — Das Ganze aber ist schlechthin gesetzt; es gründet sich auf sich selbst.”

² I, 170: “Also die Thätigkeit geht in sich selbst zurück vermittelst des Wechsels; und der Wechsel geht in sich selbst zurück vermittelst der Thätigkeit. Alles reproduciert sich selbst, und es ist da kein *hiatus* möglich; von jedem Gliede aus wird man zu allen übrigen getrieben.”
The development of the basic antinomy in the

The domination of the continuity-postulate of the ideal of personality. The Humanist transcendental ground-Idea in its transcendental monist-moralistic type.

It would be unfair to disregard the deep philosophical tendency that is present in this entire process of thought: the search for the radical unity of philosophical reflection in a selfhood beyond the theoretical diversity of syntheses and the insight into the continuous coherence of meaning of the cosmos. But this insight is directed into wrong channels by Fichte's Humanistic cosmonomic Idea. It is by means of dialectical logical thought that the Humanistic ideal of personality attempts to carry the continuity of the freedom-postulate, which tolerates no hiatus, through all cosmological thought and in this attempt multiplies the basic antinomy between the ideals of science and of personality in each new synthetic phase of the dialectical thought-process. With Fichte, the antinomy cannot be solved by thought, because he makes the categorical (i.e. the hypostatized) moral law the basis of his "Wissenschaftslehre", in its theoretical as well as in its practical part, and because — in the line of the Kantian practical Idea — he proclaims the absolute synthesis of nature and freedom to be an eternal "task" for human personality. The limits which reason sets to itself in each new antithesis, in each new antinomy between ego and non-ego, between moral freedom and natural necessity, do not lie to Fichte in a cosmic order set by God in his creation and not to be transgressed by reason, but they rest upon free self-limitations of reason itself. Therefore, theoretical reason in the dialectical system can also again and again annul the limits and in each new synthesis attempt to carry through the continuity-postulate of the freedom-idealism, until, of itself, it brings to light the fact that the absolute synthesis should be effected ultimately by the hypostatized ethical thought of "practical reason", by a "Machtspruch der Vernunft" alone.

Productive imagination is to Fichte the creative origin of sensory matter.

Which function of reason, however, achieves this absolute synthesis, which is thought of, otherwise than in Kant, as a material productive synthesis, as a synthesis that creates form and content alike (though it be in the infinite task through which the ego becomes self-conscious as a productive capacity)? This
function is to Fichte the “power of productive imagination” ("productive Einbildungskraft"), which he — again different from Kant — proclaims as the free creative origin of sensory matter. It is a theoretical as well as a practical function. Kant could not really subject the sensory “matter of experience” to a transcendental deduction; rather he excluded it as the “contingent” and “empirical” from the transcendental inquiry and, for the explanation of this matter, he again appealed to the affection of our senses by the “natural thing-in-itself”.

Fichte's absolute thesis, however, requires the deduction even of sensory matter as the product of the freely creative ego, and as comprehended in the absolute ego.

To this end, he introduces the productive imagination, which in a transcendental sense had for Kant only the function of achieving a synthesis between the given sensory matter and the “pure forms of thought”. In Kant this synthesis is performed by means of the “schematizing” of the categories in time as a “form of intuition”, by the creation of a “transcendental pattern” for all empirical “Gegenstände”.

The dialectical process was described by Fichte as a transition from the free ego into its opposite (the non-ego) that limits the former and as the synthetic reduction of this non-ego to the absolute ego through the mutual determination and limitation of the two momenta: the limited ego and the limiting non-ego, both posited by and in the absolute ego.

The determining theoretical thought, however, that posits rigid conceptual boundaries, cannot bring about the highest synthesis. It remains confined in the final antinomy between the free infinite ego and the finite ego limited by the non-ego, two egos reciprocally excluding each other.

The opposed terms of the final theoretical antithesis can be synthesized only in the concept of mere determinability (Bestimmbarkeit), not in that of determination (Bestimmung); and here Fichte clearly exhibits the influence of Maimon’s “principle of determinability”: “For if the boundary set between the opposites (one of which is the very element that creates the opposition, while the other, in respect of its existence, lies entirely outside the consciousness and is posited merely in view of the necessary limitation) is posited as a hard and fast unchangeable limit, then both elements are united by determination, but not by determinability; then, however, the required totality in the change of substantiality would not be fulfilled either... Accor-
The development of the basic antinomy in the

The final theoretical synthesis is thus attainable only by relativizing the boundaries which determining thought sets between the finite ego and the finite non-ego in the infinite ego. Dialectical thought can grasp this final synthesis only as “determinability”, as “the Idea of determination which is not attainable in this way.” (I, 216): “The ego is only that which it posits itself to be. That it is infinite, is to say that it posits itself as infinite: it determines itself through the predicate of infinity, thus it (the ego) limits itself, as substratum of infinity; it distinguishes itself from its infinite activity (both of which are one and the same in themselves). And this must be the state of affairs if the ego is to be infinite. This activity going on to infinity, which distinguishes it (i.e. the ego) from itself must be its own activity; it must be ascribed to it: consequently, simultaneously in one and the same undivided act which allows no further distinctions, the ego must also again take up this activity into itself (determine A + B through A). But if it takes this activity up into itself, the former is thus determined and consequently not infinite: however, it should be infinite, and thus it must be posited outside the ego.”

“This change of the ego in and with itself, inasmuch as it posits itself as finite and infinite at the same time, is the faculty of imagination. It is a change which consists, as it were(!), in a conflict with itself, and thereby reproduces itself, in that the ego seeks to unite that which is incapable of being united, and at one moment seeks to take up the infinite into the form of finiteness, and at another, driven back, posits it again outside of the same, and in the same moment again seeks to take it up into the form of finiteness”.

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1 I, 216: “Wird nemlich die zwischen die Entgegengesetzten (deren eines das entgegengesetzende selbst ist, das andere aber seinem Daseyn nach völlig ausser dem Bewusstseyn liegt, und bloß zum Behuf der notwendigen Begrenzung gesetzt wird) gesetzte Grenze als feste, fixierte, unwandelbare Grenze gesetzt, so werden beide vereinigt durch Bestimmung, nicht aber durch Bestimmbarkeit: aber dann wäre auch die in dem Wechsel der Substantialität geforderte Totalität nicht erfüllt... Demnach muss jene Grenze nicht als feste Grenze angenommen werden.”

2 I, 214, 215: “Das Ich ist nur das, als was es sich setzt. Es ist unendlich heisst, es setzt sich unendlich: es bestimmt sich durch das Prädicat der Unendlichkeit; also es begrenzt sich selbst (das Ich) als Substrat der Unendlichkeit; es unterscheidet sich selbst von seiner unendlichen Thätigkeit (welches beides an sich Eins und ebendasselbe ist); und so musste
Fichte conceives of the productive imagination as an unconscious function of reason.

This productive imagination (in its thetic, antithetic and synthetic activity) does not consciously produce the content of representations. It is rather the case that it alone makes consciousness possible. Only reflection raises it to the level of consciousness. It is a free act not determined by any grounds. In the deduction of the power of imagination the theoretical doctrine of science reaches its highest synthesis. Imagination is operative prior to all reflection, as pre-conscious activity, and in its antithetic activity it sets no fixed limits at all. It is only reflection that sets fixed limits, inasmuch as it is first to fix the power of imagination: “The power of imagination is a faculty which hovers between determination and non-determination, between the finite and the infinite... This very hovering indicates the power of imagination by its product; the latter is produced by imagination, as it were during its hovering and by means of its hovering”.

So, in order to solve the basic antinomy in his “Wissenschaftslehre”, Fichte withdraws behind reflective analysis toward a “pre-conscious” — by which is apparently meant pre-theoretical — productive imagination. He supposes that, after having arrived at this point, he has overcome all antinomies. He keenly recognizes that the antinomies arose through thought which

es sich verhalten, wenn das Ich unendlich seyn sollte, — Diese ins Unendliche gehende Thätigkeit, die es von sich unterscheidet, soll seine Thätigkeit sein; sie soll ihm zugeschrieben werden: mithin muss zugleich in einer und ebenderselben ungetheilten und unzuunterscheidenden Handlung das Ich diese Thätigkeit auch wieder in sich aufnehmen (A+B durch A bestimmen). Nimmt es sie aber in sich auf, so ist sie bestimmt, mithin nicht unendlich: doch aber soll sie unendlich seyn, und so muss sie ausser dem Ich gesetzt werden.

“Dieser Wechsel des Ich in und mit sich selbst, da es sich endlich und unendlich zugleich setzt — ein Wechsel der gleichsam (!) in einem Widerspruche mit sich selbst besteht, und dadurch sich selbst reproduciert, indem das Ich unvereinbares vereinigen will, jetzt das unendliche in die Form des endlichen aufzunehmen versucht, jetzt, zurückgetrieben, es wieder ausser derselben setzt, und in dem nemlichen Momente abermals es in die Form der Endlichkeit aufzunehmen versucht — ist das Vermögen der Einbildungskraft.”

1 I, 216f. “Die Einbildungskraft ist ein Vermögen, das zwischen Bestimmung und nicht-Bestimmung, zwischen Endlichen und Unendlichen in der Mitte schwebt... Jenes Schweben eben bezeichnet die Einbildungskraft durch ihr Produkt; sie bringt dasselbe gleichsam während ihres Schweben, und durch ihr Schweben hervor.”
The development of the basic antinomy in the
overpassed its boundaries. The productive imagination, how-
ever, sets no fixed limits, since it has “no fixed standpoint”, but
in its hovering nature keeps the mean between definiteness and
indefiniteness, finitude and infinitude. And then Fichte suppos-
es he can conclude: “All the difficulties which presented them-
selves are removed in a satisfactory manner. The task was that
of uniting the opposites, ego and non-ego. They can be comple-
tely unified through the power of imagination which unites
contradictories”.

The “productive power of imagination” explicitly qualified
by Fichte as “Faktum” (i.e. present before all reflection in the
human mind), is expressly announced by him as a synthesis
and at the same time is expressly called a “Funktion des Ge-
müths” (function of feeling).

Here it clearly appears that in his “Wissenschaftslehre” of
1794 Fichte was still deeply involved in Kant’s functionalistic
way of thinking, although in his conception of the productive
imagination he deviated fundamentally from his master. Kant
had attempted to solve the problem of apriori synthesis by
his doctrine concerning the transcendental productive imagi-
nation in which understanding and sensibility are united. In
the last analysis, however, it was the transcendental logical
function from which the apriori synthesis should issue. Fichte
saw clearly that this could not be a real solution of the problem,

1 op. cit., p. 218: “Alle Schwierigkeiten, die sich uns in den Weg stellten,
sind befriedigend gehoben. Die Aufgabe war die, die entgegengesetzten
Ich und nicht-Ich, zu vereinigen. Durch die Einbildungskraft, welche
widersprechendes vereinigt, können sie vollkommen vereinigt werden.”

2 op. cit., p. 226: “The absolute opposites (the finite subjective and the
infinite objective) prior to the synthesis, are a mere object of thought
and, in the sense in which we have always taken the word, ideal. As they
ought to be unified by the power of thought but cannot, they acquire
reality through the hovering of the feeling (Gemüth) which, in this function,
is called the power of imagination, since by means of it they become
intuitive: i.e. they acquire reality as such; for there is and can be no
other reality than that which is mediated by the intuition.” [“Die absolut
entgegengesetzten (das endliche subjektive und das unendliche objektive)
sind vor der Synthesis etwas bloss gedachtes, und, wie wir das Wort
immer genommen haben, ideales. So wie sie durch das Denkvermögen
vereinigt werden sollen, und nicht können, bekommen sie durch das
Schweben des Gemüths, welches in dieser Funktion Einbildungskraft ge-
nannt wird, Realität, weil sie dadurch anschaubar werden: d. i. sie be-
kommen Realität überhaupt; denn es gibt keine andere Realität, als die
vermittelst der Anschauung und kann keine andere geben.”]
because the synthesis between understanding and sensibility requires a faculty which exceeds the antithetic relation of theoretical thought. But, instead of focusing his reflection towards the supra-theoretical ego, he seeks only a “pre-logical” function of the ego as a connecting link, not yet involved in the rigid antithetical relation of the theoretic attitude of thought. Obviously he supposes that he appeals here to the pre-theoretic attitude of naive experience. This, however, is a fundamental error.

In his concept of the productive imagination, Fichte does not penetrate to pre-theoretical cosmic self-consciousness but remains involved in Kant’s functionalistic view of knowledge.

A synthetic function of consciousness in its isolation can never be independent of theoretical thought, and certainly can never bridge the theoretical antithesis implied in the “gegenstand-relation”.

Only the cosmic self-consciousness (to be examined later in the discussion of the problem of knowledge) can grasp the deeper unity of all aspects of reality, because in the transcendent root of the selfhood it transcends all its modal functions, which are interwoven in the cosmic order of time.

But how can a “function of feeling”, prior to all logical reflection, accomplish an obviously inter-functional synthesis, and in this synthesis guarantee the unity of functions that are theoretically opposed to each other, and which consequently cannot be derived the one from the other?

In the “productive imagination” the basic antinomy of

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1 That self-consciousness remains an abstraction just as much to Fichte as to Kant, should appear from the following passage (I, 244): “Das Ich aber ist jetzt als dasjenige bestimmt, welches, nach Aufhebung alles Objects durch das absolute Abstraktionsvermögen, übrig bleibt... (Dies ist denn auch wirklich die augenscheinliche, und nach ihrer Andeutung gar nicht mehr zu verkennende Quelle des Selbstbewustseyns. Alles, von welchem ich abstrahieren, was ich wegdenken kann... ist nicht mein Ich und ich setze es meinem Ich bloss dadurch entgegen dass ich es betrachte als ein solches, das ich wegdenken kann)...” [“But the ego is now determined as that which is left after the removal of every object through the absolute faculty of abstraction... (This is therefore really the apparent source of the self-consciousness which is no longer to be disregarded after it has been indicated. All from which I am able to abstract, all that I am able to think away... is not my ego, and I set it in contrast to my ego, merely by considering it as something that I can think away.)”]
Fichte's dialectic lies open and clear before us. Being pre-logical, it would make fluid all boundaries fixed by thought between "nature" and "freedom" and thereby "unify the contradictory".

The cosmic order imposed by God's sovereign creative will is set aside by the *Wille* (pride) of "sovereign reason". The boundaries of the law-spheres in the realms of "nature" and "freedom" become a creation of reason itself and can therefore again be cancelled by the same reason.

Since by Fichte the tension between the ideal of science and that of personality is itself conceived of as an infinite ethical task, he rejects without hesitation the attempt at a solution of the antinomy by dialectical thought. Rather he raises this antinomy to the position of condition and basis of the whole "Wissenschaftslehre", as a necessary result of an ungrounded, pre-conscious *act* of the free personality bound to no laws: "We see, how that very circumstance which threatened to annihilate the possibility of a theory of human knowledge here becomes the only condition for the building of such a theory. We did not see, how we could ever unify absolute opposites; here we see, that an explanation of the occurrences in our mind could not at all be possible without absolute opposites; since that very faculty on which all those occurrences rest, i.e. the productive power of imagination, would not at all be possible, unless absolute opposites which cannot be synthesized appeared as fully unsuited to the power of apprehension... It is from this state of absolute opposition that the entire mechanism of the human mind issues; and this entire mechanism may not be explained otherwise than by a state of absolute opposition". In this manner,

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1 See I, 156.

2 op. cit., p. 226: "Wir sehen, dass gerade derjenige Umstand, welcher die Möglichkeit einer Theorie des menschlichen Wissens zu vernichten drohte, hier die einzige Bedingung wird, unter der wir eine solche Theorie aufstellen können. Wir sahen nicht ab, wie wir jemals absolut entgegengesetzte sollten vereinigen können; hier sehen wir, dass eine Erklärung der Begebenheiten in unserem Geiste überhaupt gar nicht möglich seyn würde ohne absolut entgegengesetzte; da desjenige Vermögen, auf welchem alle jene Begebenheiten beruhen, die produktive Einbildungskraft gar nicht möglich seyn würde, wenn nicht absolut entgegengesetzt, nicht zu vereinigende, dem Auffassungsvermögen des Ich völlig unangemessene vorkämen... Eben aus dem absoluten Entgegengesetzteyn erfolgt der ganze Mechanismus des menschlichen Geistes; und dieser ganze Mechanismus lässt sich nicht anders erklären, als durch ein absolutes Entgegen-gesetzteyn."
Fichte supposes that he has cancelled dogmatic idealism as well as dogmatic realism in a higher critical idealism.

The first formal-dialectical part of the “Wissenschaftslehre” (1794) begins with the absolute principles (“Grundsätze”) and ends thus with the deduction of the “productive imagination”.

In the second part, described only schematically in the W.L. of 1794, and further elaborated in his Grundrisz des Eigentümlichen der W.L. in Rücksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen of 1795, Fichte follows the very reverse method. The starting-point is here the “fact” of consciousness. He tries to show how the ego which originally experiences only sensory impressions, can rise to that philosophical abstraction and reflection with which the philosopher begins the theoretical doctrine of science. In the second part it appears still more clearly that Fichte’s absolute ego cannot be the supra-temporal totality of the temporal diversity of meaning.

The schema of Fichte’s train of thought is namely as follows: The ego unifies in itself two conflicting, irreconcilable momenta; it must distinguish itself from itself, it must set itself in opposition to itself as something foreign and contradictory — i.e. as “nature”, as non-ego. Inasmuch as it produces itself, it must produce this non-ego by imagination, it must create sensory images, it must undergo perceptible sensory impressions (the Kantian “Empfindung”). But since the consciousness which discloses itself in the perceptible impression is only a part of the ego itself, the ego must find itself in it. That is to say, it must transcend the sensory function, it must make the sensory perception its own. This activity cannot cease until the selfhood

\[1\] From the following passage — in which he attempts to conceive the synthesis between form and matter as an interaction between ego and non-ego — it may appear that Fichte in fact understands the totality of the ego as a relative one: “Neither of the two” (namely form and matter) “is to determine the other, but both are to determine each other reciprocally, means: — to come to the point in few words — absolute and relative ground of the totality-determination are to be one and the same; the relation is to be absolute and the absolute is to be nothing more than a relation” (I, 199). [“Keins von beide” (viz. Form und Materie) “soll das andere, sondern beide sollen sich gegenseitig bestimmen, heisst: — um ohne lange Umschweifungen zur Sache zu kommen — absoluter und relativer Grund der Totalitäts-bestimmung sollen Eins und Ebendasselbe seyn; die Relation soll absolut, und das absolute soll nichts weiter seyn, als eine Relation.”]
has come to the consciousness that the ego has produced the non-ego *in itself*. Since consciousness proceeds continuously in this way, the original mere sensation is changed into the object of *intuition and experience*, which in turn becomes the transcendentally conceived “Gegenstand” of epistemology, until finally the ego becomes conscious of itself as the transcendental consciousness or as “theoretical reason”, which itself creates this “Gegenstand”.

In other words, the “Wissenschaftslehre” rests entirely upon the Kantian position with respect to reality, i.e. upon the view of empirical reality as phenomenality of nature, constituted in a synthesis of sensory and logical functions, but with definitive elimination of the “natural thing-in-itself”. The “impulse” (“Anstosz”), which the non-ego gives to the ego, and which Fichte continues to consider necessary for the explanation of the mental *representation*, is explicitly referred to the hypostatized moral function of the free personality: “Only the question how and whereby the impulse to be assumed for the explanation of mental representation is given to the ego, is not to be answered here; for it lies beyond the limits of the theoretical part of the “doctrine of science”.

Fichte's doctrine of the productive imagination and Heidegger's interpretation of Kant.

It is remarkable that Fichte, in this second part of the theoretical W.L., makes the categories, along with the sensory objects in their apriori sensory forms of space and time, arise dialectically from the productive imagination. That is remarkable,
since Martin Heidegger, though from an altogether different train of thought, in his interpretation of Kant's critique of knowledge (to be dealt with in vol. II), likewise supposes that he has found in this productive imagination the root of the two sources of knowledge, the understanding and sensibility.

§ 3 - THE TENSION BETWEEN THE IDEALS OF SCIENCE AND PERSONALITY IN FICHTE'S "PRAKTISCHE WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE" (1794)

The guiding thesis of the theoretical "doctrine of science" was the following: "The ego posits itself as determined by the non-ego." This thesis was contained in the result of the three basic theses of the entire "Wissenschaftslehre": "The ego and the non-ego determine each other reciprocally." In this latter thesis is expressed the necessary interaction between the antithetic elements in the activity of the self-consciousness, i.e. the interaction between the (free) subject and the (natural) object.

In this thesis, however, there is also implied the "guiding principle" of the practical "doctrine of science": "The ego posits itself as determining the non-ego." The latter is meaningful only after the demonstration in the theoretical doctrine of science that the ego actually produces the non-ego as real, so that the non-ego actually possesses reality for and in the ego.

Only in the practical part is the ethical-idealistic basis even of the theoretical doctrine of science fully clarified.

Fichte observes forthwith, on the occasion of the "Leitsatz" ("guiding thesis") of the practical doctrine of science: "For this thesis implies a main antithesis, which contains the entire contradiction between these entities as being simply posited and consequently unlimited, and compels us to assume a practical faculty of the ego for the sake of uniting them." Only in the...
CHAPTER II

THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY AND THE NATURAL SCIENCE-IDEAL IN THE FIRST TYPES OF THEIR MUTUAL POLAR TENSION UNDER THE PRIMACY OF THE FORMER


The basic antinomy in the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea found its first expression in the violent philosophical conflict between the "semi-idealism" of DESCARTES and the mechanistic naturalism of THOMAS HOBBES.

DESCARTES and HOBBES, two great thinkers, were at one in their faith in the modern ideal of personality. And they both had an unlimited trust in the new scientific method as the instrument of the philosophical science-ideal. Nevertheless, they combated each other bitterly in the actio finium regundorum between the two basic factors in the transcendental ground-Idea of Humanistic thought.

The conflict between DESCARTES and HOBBES as the first expression of the basic antinomy in the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea.

Saturated with GALILEO'S conception of mathematical mechanics, HOBBES would not recognize any limits to the continuity of the natural science-ideal. He wished to found this postulate of continuum in a monistic metaphysical ontology. To this end it was necessary that even in its psychical, logical, linguistic, juridical and moral functions all reality be brought under one and

The development of the basic antinomy in the “practical” part, is an account eventually given of the reduction of the “theoretical” to the “practical” reason, and implicitly of the ideal of science to that of personality. The essence of the theoretical reason consisted in nothing but the restless dialectical movement, in which it sets limits to itself (in the “antitheses”) in order to overpass them again and again by a new synthesis. It appeared dependent on “sensation” as the first groundless (and therefore theoretically incomprehensible) limit, that the ego sets to itself. The theoretical ego discovered the antinomy between the unlimited and the limited activity as the ground of its entire dialectical movement of thought, without being able to understand this ground. The first impulse for the development of the entire dialectical series, i.e. the sensory impression (Empfindung), alone makes “theoretical” reason possible, and so is not to be derived from it.

Fichte refers the impulse toward sensory experience to the moral function of personality, in which the ideal of personality is concentrated.

The ground of this impulse can be sought only in the fact that the ego is “practical”, so far as its innermost nature is concerned, and that the true root not only of personality but even of “nature” must be sought in the moral function. In the “Leitsatz” of the practical doctrine of science is implied the requirement that the ego operate causally upon the non-ego. Thereby the antinomy between the independence of the ego as an absolute being on the one hand, and its dependence and limitation as intelligence on the other, should be overcome. In this very demand, however, an antinomy is implied. The demand that the free ego operate causally upon the non-ego is based upon the absolute essence of the ego, allowing nothing alongside of or opposed to itself. The objection against this postulated causality is grounded on the fact that a non-ego is simply opposed to the ego, and that it must remain so, if the I-ness is not to become an empty form.

Fichte gives to this insight pregnant expression in his “Grundlage des Naturrechts”: “Das praktische Vermögen ist die innerste Wurzel des Ich, auf diese wird erst alles andere aufgetragen und daran geheftet,” III, 20 ff. [“The practical faculty is the innermost root of the ego; on it alone all the rest is built and affixed.”]
The antinomy which is contained in the practical “Leitsatz” may be reduced to the antinomy between the ego as unlimited and infinite and the ego as limited and finite activity. Consequently, at this point, a higher discrepancy is involved in the very nature of the ego. How is this antinomy solved by Fichte?

The infinite and unlimited ego as moral striving. Elimination also of Kant’s practical concept of substance. The ego as infinite creative activity is identified with Kant’s categorical imperative.

The antinomy is resolved in that the infinite and unlimited character of the ego is viewed not as an infinite substance at rest, but rather as an infinite striving. The free unlimited and infinite ego ought again and again to set limits to itself as “intelligence” by an objective non-ego, in order to provide its infinite striving activity with a resistance to be overcome ever and anon, which alone gives content to this striving.

“Just as the ego is posited, all reality is posited; in the ego everything is to be posited; the ego is to be simply independent; everything, however, is to be dependent upon it. Consequently, there is required accordance of the object with the ego; and it is the absolute ego which for the very sake of its absolute being, does require it.”

In the striving resides the final ground of the opposing and of that which is set in opposition, the final ground of the “impulse”, which the theoretical W.L. was unable to explain. Therefore, the practical reason is at the basis of the theoretical as its condition, for without striving no object is possible.

In a note to the passage just cited, Fichte observes: “Kant’s categorical imperative.” Thus it clearly appears that Fichte really seeks the deepest root of the self-consciousness in the hypostatized moral law, identified with the ideal subject in the rationalist conception of the cosmonomic Idea of Humanistic thought.

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1 I, 260: “So wie das Ich gesetzt ist, ist alle Realität gesetzt; im Ich soll alles gesetzt seyn; das Ich soll schlechthin unabhängig, Alles aber soll von ihm abhängig. Also, es wird die Uebereinstimmung des Objects mit dem Ich gefordert; und das absolute Ich, gerade um seines absolutes Seyns willen, ist es, welches sie fordert.”

2 I, 264.

3 Windelband rightly observes, op. cit. II, 224: “Das Sittengesetz also, d.h. die Forderung eines Handelns, das lediglich sich selbst zum Zwecke
The development of the basic antinomy in the

At the same time it appears from the sequel that the Divinity, as the absolute ego, is nothing but the result of this moralistic hypostatization. The striving activity of the ego, going on to infinity, is as striving characterized again as finite: “Even the very concept of striving, however, implies finiteness, for that which is not counter-acted (striven against), is no striving” 1.

The finite (moral, “practical”) ego, however, can have no other goal for its infinite striving than again to become absolute. The tension between ego and non-ego, between form and matter, consciousness and being, freedom and nature, the ideal of personality and the ideal of science, should be eliminated in the absolute ego (the Divinity), which is just so far an unthinkable Idea (unthinkable, because reason is unable to emerge beyond the antinomy). Actually, however, the absolute ego is nothing but a hypostatized, activistically conceived moral Idea of reason, which as such remains involved in the antinomy between the ideal of science and the ideal of personality; for, on the one hand, it must contain the origin as well as the totality of meaning, but, on the other hand, it is nothing but an absolutized abstraction from the cosmic temporal coherence of meaning 2. From the Humanist standpoint, KRONER correctly observes: “Even the absolute ego needs necessarily the ‘impulse’ if in any sense it is to be an ego” 3. In other words, even

1 V, 270: “Im Begriffe des Strebens selbst aber liegt schon die Endlichkeit, denn dasjenige, dem nicht widerstrebt wird, ist kein Streben.”

2 FICHTE has given to his conception of the Deity as absolutized moral law a pregnant expression in his treatise Über den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung (WW. V, 185), where he writes: “Dies ist der wahre Glaube; diese moralische Ordnung ist das Göttliche das wir annehmen”; [“this is the true faith; this moral order is the Deity which we accept;”] and in his Appellation an das Publikum gegen die Anklage des Atheismus (1799; WW. V, 210), where he writes: “Erzeuge nur in dir die pflichtmäszige Gesinnung und du wirst Gott erkennen.” [“Produce only in yourself the inclination in conformity to moral duty and you will know God.”] The moral order, as Deity, is to FICHTE pervaded with the activity-motive of his philosophy of the ego. It is: “Thätiges Ordnung” (active ordaining), Ordino ordinans. Cf. WW. V, 382, Aus einem Privatschreiben.

3 KRONER, I, 511: “Der ’Anstoss’ ist auch dem absolutem Ich, damit es nur überhaupt ein Ich sein könne, notwendig.”
in the “absolute ego” as a hypostatized function there is latent the basic antinomy between “nature” and “freedom”.

In the practical doctrine of science, the ego is conceived of as absolute striving. With the striving there is connected a counter-striving, and the theoretical ego is now viewed by Fichte as necessarily coherent with the practical. For, by reason of the counteraction (i.e. of “nature” as the non-ego), the ego is determined by something outside itself. Because it is an ego, it must reflect about this being-limited, it must relate itself to the “Gegenstand”, as to its opposite. In the theoretical doctrine of science, in the deduction of the representation, the ego (conceiving itself as limited by the non-ego) is deduced genetically by ascending from the sensory consciousness (limited by the non-ego) to the free transcendental consciousness. Likewise, in the second constructive part of the practical W. L., beginning with par. 6, the origin of the practical ego, which conceives itself as free and determines the non-ego, is deduced from the ego that is determined merely by the “impulse”. There is a strict correspondence between these two ways of deduction.

Besides, it appears in the nature of the case that the theoretical and the practical ego are one and the same (for we saw previously that Fichte tries to reduce the ideal of science to the ideal of personality and to absorb the former in the latter!).

“All reflection is based upon striving, and there is no reflection possible, if there is no striving”¹. Striving is the final common root of the theoretical and the practical ego: all theoretical reflection, all sensation, all intuition stems from the practical striving, from the activity of the moral ego-function, which transcends its boundaries. In this context we will quote a passage which is very characteristic for the whole system, because it gives a clear expression to the eventual absorption of the ideal of science in the ideal of personality. We insert it here entirely on that account: “From this follows, indeed, in the clearest manner the subordination of theory to the practical; it follows that all theoretical laws are based upon practical ones and, as there can be only one single practical law, upon one and the same law; consequently the most complete system in the total (human) being; if the impulse should permit itself to be elevated, then also follows the elevation of the insight, and vice versa;

¹ “Alle Reflexion gründet sich auf das Streben, und es ist keine mög- lich, wenn kein Streben ist.”
then follows the absolute freedom of reflection and abstraction also in a theoretical respect, and the possibility of focusing one’s attention to something according to moral duty and of abstracting it from something else, without which no morality would be possible at all.”

“Fatalism is destroyed at its very root, this fatalism based on the opinion that our acting and willing depend upon the system of our representations; for it is shown here, that the very system of our representations depends upon our impulse and our will; and this is indeed the single way to refute this view thoroughly. — In short, by this system there is brought unity and coherence into the whole man, a unity and coherence which are lacking in so many systems”.

The totality of meaning of the consciousness, the very root of human existence, and consequently of the entire cosmos, resides in the absolutized moral function. It is that which must bring unity and coherence in the whole man.

The “fatalism” so keenly opposed by Fichte is nothing but the science-ideal of the “Aufklärung”, dominating the ideal of personality.

The “fatalism” so sharply opposed by Fichte is nothing but

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1 I, 294/5: “Hieraus erfolgt denn auch auf das einleuchtendstende die Subordination der Theorie unter das Praktische; es folgt, dass alle theorethischen Gesetze auf praktische und da es wohl nur Ein praktisches Gesetz geben dürfte, auf ein und ebendasselbe Gesetz sich gründen; demnach das vollständigste System im ganzen Wesen; es folgt, wenn etwa der Trieb sich selbst erhöhen lassen, auch die Erhöhung der Einsicht, und umgekehrt; es erfolgt die absolute Freiheit der Reflexion und Abstraktion auch in theoretischer Hauksicht, und die Möglichkeit pflichtmässig seine Aufmerksamkeit auf etwas zu richten, und von etwas anderem abzuziehen ohne welche gar keine Moral möglich ist.

“Der Fatalismus wird von Grund aus zerstört, der sich darauf gründet, das unser Handeln und Wollen von dem Systeme unserer Vorstellungen abhängig sey (the italics are mine!), indem hier gezeigt wird, das hinauswiederum das System unserer Vorstellungen von unserem Trieb und unserem Willen abhängt: und dies ist denn auch die einzige Art ihn gründlich zu wiederlegen. — Kurz, es kommt durch dieses System Einheit und Zusammenhang in den ganzen Menschen, die in so vielen System fehlt.”

Vid. also I, 284, note: “Die Wissenschaftslehre soll den ganzen Menschen erschöpfen; sie lässt daher sich nur mit der Totalität seines ganzen Vermögens auffassen...” [“The doctrine of science ought to exhaust the whole man; it is consequently to be conceived only with the totality of all human faculties...”]
the Humanistic science-ideal of the “Enlightenment”, which had no place for the freedom of human personality, because it was made independent of the latter.

In the polar tension between this ideal of science and the ideal of personality, Fichte chooses unconditionally for the absolute primacy of the latter — at the expense of the former, as we are still to see!

In his practical doctrine of science, Fichte consequently does not stay with the Kantian dualism between moral self-determination and sensory “inclination of nature”. Just as the “sensory ego”, qua ego, is driven forward dialectically by itself to become the ego that knows itself as intelligence, so also the ego dominated by its sensual impulses becomes the ego determining itself as “pure ethical will”.

So Fichte intends to show that even in the “triebhafe Ich”, the “pure will” or the “absolute impulse” is operative, and that only thereby does the ego feel itself “driven on and ahead” by natural impulses. The sensory nature must finally take its rise dialectically from moral freedom itself. In the ego there is an original striving to “fill out” infinity. This striving conflicts with all limitation in an object. A self-producing striving is called impulse ("Trieb").

Infinite striving requires on the other hand the resistance, the counter-action from an object, in order to overcome this latter. The ego has in itself the law, according to which it must reflect about itself “as filling out infinity”. But it cannot reflect about itself, if it is not limited. The fulfilling of this law, or — what amounts to the same thing — the satisfaction of the “Reflexionstrieb” (impulse to reflection), is thus determined by the non-ego, and depends on the object (the non-ego). This impulse toward reflection cannot be satisfied apart from an object: hence it may also be described as an “impulse toward the object”. The striving therefore requires a counter-action that holds it in balance.

In the limitation, which the “impulse” experiences through the object, the feeling arises as the expression of a suffering, a passivity, an inability: “The expression of impotence in the ego is called a feeling. In it is united most intimately an activity — I feel, I am the feeling subject; and this activity is that of reflection — and a limitation — I feel, I am passive and not active; there is

\[1\] I, 291.
The development of the basic antinomy in the present a constraint. This limitation necessarily supposes an impulse to go beyond it. That which wills, needs, embraces nothing more, is — naturally with respect to itself — unlimited”.

In its limitation by feeling, the “Reflexionstrieb” is at the same time satisfied and not satisfied:

a - It is satisfied: the ego must reflect on itself: it reflects with absolute spontaneity and is thereby satisfied with respect to the form of this operation of consciousness. So far the feeling can be related to the free ego.

b - It is not satisfied with respect to the content of this operation of consciousness. “The ego was to be posited as filling out infinity, but it is posited as limited. This, too, is now necessarily present in feeling”.

c - The originating of the condition of non-satisfaction, however, is determined by the ego proceeding beyond the limit which is set by feeling.

The dialectical line of thought of the practical doctrine of science: feeling, intuition, longing, approbation, absolute impulse (categorical imperative).

The course of Fichte’s deductions is therefore as follows: the ego, as a limited and finite ego, is moral striving according to its deepest being. To be able to create itself as such, and to become aware of itself as such, it is, however, required, that it should be and feel itself as a sensibly driven feeling and intuiting ego. But conversely, it would never feel itself as sensibly limited, if it were not moral striving according to its deepest being.

In consequence of the appropriation by the striving ego of the feeling of compulsion, which arises from the counter-action of the non-ego, i.e. in consequence of the conscious reflection about it as the ego’s own limit, there arises a new feeling, in

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Diese Beschränkung setzt nun notwendig einen Trieb voraus, weiter hinaus zu gehen. Was nichts weiter will, bedarf, umfasst, das ist — es versteht sich, für sich selbst — nicht eingeschränkt.”

2 “Das Ich sollte gesetzt werden als die Unendlichkeit ausfüllend, aber es wird als begrenzt. — Dies kommt nun gleichfalls nothwendig vor im Gefühl.”

3 I, 291/2.
which the feeling ego feels itself in the impulse which strives out beyond the limit.

So far as the drive which is formally satisfied in the reflection about the feeling ego, strives out beyond the limit set in reflection, as a force that strives outward, it becomes longing, ("Sehnen"), "a drive toward something completely unknown, which merely manifests itself by a want, by an uneasiness, by a void, which seeks to be filled out, and does not indicate from where." Fichte here makes this note: "This longing is important, not only for the practical, but for the whole doctrine of science. Only by the same the ego is in itself driven beyond itself: only by the same does an outerworld disclose itself in the very ego" 1.

This longing, however, is also limited, for otherwise it would be no desire, but fulfilment of desire: causality. Through this limitation by the non-ego there arises a new feeling of compulsion, which again becomes the ground for the creation of an object, the production of something outside the ego through "ideal activity", the "ideal" for which the ego longs in its striving.

The object of the feeling of compulsion produced by the limitation is something real. The object of the longing, however, has no reality (since the ego in itself can have no causality, without cancelling itself as "pure activity"), "but it ought to have it in consequence of the longing; for the latter seeks reality" 2. Both objects stand in an antinomic relation to one another ("nature" and "freedom" !).

The reality felt determines (limits) the ego. The ego, however, is ego only insofar as it determines itself (in the reflection about the feeling). Therefore its longing becomes the impulse to determine itself. Or indeed, since it feels its determination (limitation) in the reality of the object, its longing becomes the impulse to determine this reality for the object and thus to create the determination in itself.

In the "longing" arises the impulse to sensory perception

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1 I, 303: "einen Trieb nach etwas völlig unbekannten, das sich bloss durch ein Bedürfniss, durch ein Misbehagen, durch eine Leere offenbart, die Ausfüllung sucht, und nicht andeutet woher." "Dieses Sehnen ist wichtig, nicht nur für die praktische, sondern für die gesammte Wissenschaftslehre. Lediglich durch dasselbe wird das Ich in sich selbst — außer sich getrieben: lediglich durch dasselbe offenbart sich in ihm selbst eine Aussenwelt."

2 I, 306: "aber es soll sie zufolge des Sehnens haben; denn dasselbe geht aus auf Realität."
The development of the basic antinomy in the (“Empfindungstrieb”) and the “drive toward knowledge” in general, which strives to regain for the ego the natural object created by it, but not created with reflection on this act (and therefore not experienced as the ego’s own); it strives to represent the object in the I-ness. The limit is felt as felt, i.e. as one created in the ego by the ego. The sensory feeling (“Empfinden”) is changed (as the theoretical W. L. has shown) by a new reflection into an intuition. So far as the ego has not yet, in the self-reflection of thought, theoretically appropriated that which is sensibly perceived, it does not yet regard the sensory image as a product of the ego, but the image is intuited as an “objective character”. Since the free spontaneity of the ego in the activity of intuition is the driving force, the image is, to be sure, intuited as a character belonging to the object, but contingent, determined by no necessity 1.

If, however, the object is to become an object for the ego, then the ego must become aware of this self-determination of the object as a product of the ego itself. The feeling ego feels itself limited, the intuiting ego freely exceeds the limit. The feeling and the intuiting ego are, however, one and the same: feeling and intuition must therefore be synthetically united. In themselves they have no coherence. “Intuition sees, but it is empty: feeling is related to reality, but is blind” 2. They can be united only when the feeling ego no longer feels itself as such to be limited, when, so to speak, it keeps pace with the intuition, which views what is felt as something contingent in the object. This is only possible in such a way that the feeling ego as such exceeds its limits, and that it, as feeling ego, goes on ad infinitum, or that it is driven on in its longing, instead of losing itself in sensuous feeling.

So the longing discloses itself, as an “impulse toward change of

1 I, 317: “Würde das Ich seiner Freiheit im Bilden (dadurch, dass es auf die gegenwärtige Reflexion selbst wieder reflektirte) sich bewusst, so würde das Bild gesetzt, als zufällig in Beziehung auf das Ich. Eine solche Reflexion findet nicht statt; es muss demnach zufällig gesetzt werden (in Beziehung auf ein anderes nicht-Ich, das uns bis jetzt noch gänzlich unbekannt ist).” [“If the ego should become aware of its freedom in its production (thereby, that it reflects again on the present reflection itself), the image would be set as contingent in relation to the I. Such a reflection does not occur; it is consequently to be set contingently (in relation to another non-ego, which up till now is still entirely unknown to us).”]

2 I, 319.
Feelings\textsuperscript{1}: only where the feelings change, is the primitive longing satisfied.

*Feeling* as such, however, cannot determine the *change of feelings*. The ego can reflect about what is felt only at a higher stage of consciousness. “Consequently, the changed situation cannot be felt as changed situation. This other should therefore merely be intuited by the ideal activity, as something other and opposed to the present feeling”\textsuperscript{1}. The changed feeling must therefore be intuited as changed, if the ego is to be able to reflect about the impulse to change its feelings.

Only through this reflection does the ego become an ego, because it is an ego only insofar as it not merely longs, but insofar as it becomes aware that it longs to change the feelings. If the ego is to be able to arrive at this consciousness, then it must be able as feeling ego to relate itself to a feeling which is not itself that which is felt. And to this end intuition and feeling must be synthetically united in this feeling. This is the feeling of longing, which is necessarily accompanied by a feeling of satisfaction. The altered feeling must satisfy the longing after a change of the feeling. The synthesis here achieved Fichte calls “approbation” ("Beifall").

The ego reflects about its feeling in the intuition of it. The act of determining the feeling (the intuiting) and the drive toward determination (the longing) are now one and the same\textsuperscript{2}.

The ego cannot produce this synthesis of impulse (longing) and action (intuiting) without distinguishing the two, but it cannot distinguish the two without positing some respect in which they contradict each other: So the feeling of approbation finds its opposite in the displeasure ("Misfallen"), in which the disharmony between impulse and act comes to expression. “Not every longing is necessarily accompanied by displeasure, but when it is satisfied, there arises displeasure as to the former; it becomes insipid, flat.” So are “the inner determinations of the things (which are related to feeling) nothing more than degrees of displeasing or pleasing”\textsuperscript{3}.

The synthesis in the approbation, however, may not be per-

\textsuperscript{1} I, 321: “Also der veränderte Zustand kann als veränderte Zustand nicht gefühlt werden. Das andere müsste daher lediglich durch die ideale Thätigkeit angeschaut werden, als etwas anderes und dem gegenwärtigen Gefühle entgegengesetztes.”

\textsuperscript{2} I, 325.

\textsuperscript{3} ibidem.
The development of the basic antinomy in the
formed merely by the spectator, i.e. only theoretically, but
the ego itself must perform it. The ego must be driven on to
desire approval as such; it must also be aware of the impulse
which strives toward approval, and therewith towards the unity
of its selfhood.

If the ego is to become aware of the synthesis between in-
tuition and feeling in approbation, then the intuition and the
impulse alike must be understood as determined and self-
determining at the same time. Then alone is the ego aware of
itself as an ego that determines itself absolutely and consequently
is also absolutely determined.

If the action that satisfies the impulse is determined and self-
determining at once, then it happens out of absolute freedom,
as the self-creation of the absolute ego. If the impulse which
determines this action is absolute in the same way, then it is
grounded in itself. It is the impulse that has itself for its goal.
The drive towards change ("Trieb nach Wechsel") is in the last
analysis determined by the "drive towards mutual determination
of the ego through itself" ("Trieb nach Wechselbestimmung des
Ich durch sich selbst") or the drive towards absolute unity
and perfection of the ego in itself ("Trieb nach absolute Einheit
und Vollendung des Ich in sich selbst")

The categorical imperative as the absolute impulse
that is grounded in itself.

It is the impulse that has itself for its goal which strives to
create itself (and thereby the harmony in the ego, of which the
latter is aware): i.e. the absolute drive: "der Trieb um des
Triebens willen." To this, Fichte adds: "If it is expressed in
terms of a law, as for the very sake of this determination at a
certain point of reflection it should be expressed, then it must
be established that a law for the very sake of the law is an
absolute law, or the categorical imperative: — You ought un-
conditionally. It is easy to understand, where in such an impulse
the undetermined moment lies: it drives us, namely, out into
the indefinite without an aim (the categorical imperative is
merely formal without any object)"

1 I, 326.
2 I, 327: "Drückt man es als Gesetz aus, wie es gerade um dieser Be-
stimmung willen auf einem gewissen Reflexionspunkt ausgedrückt werden
muss, so ist ein Gesetz um des Gesetzes willen ein absolutes Gesetz, oder
der kategorische Imperativ: — Du sollst schlechthin. Wo bei einem
If now action and impulse are to determine one another reciprocally, the object produced by the action (i.e. the effect of the drive which can be intuited in the theoretically determinable sense-world) must be determined by the impulse and agree with the "ideal of longing". Conversely, the impulse must be intuited in the reflection itself, as desiring this object alone. In this case the longing striving finds its consummation. But since the longing and striving in their very essence cannot be completed, the ego must again be driven out away from the feeling of harmony and into the infinite.

The "Du sollst" remains, entirely in the Kantian line, "ewige, nimmer erfüllbare Aufgabe" (an eternal task, never to be fully accomplished).

In Fichte's identity-philosophy, the Humanist-ideal of personality in its moralistic sense has, to be sure, absorbed the science-ideal entirely along the line of the continuity-postulate of freedom, but, as we saw continually, at the cost of sanctioning the antinomy.

Fichte's dithyramb on the ideal of personality:
"Ueber die Würde des Menschen" (On the dignity of man).

Dithyrambically Fichte sings the praise of this ideal of personality in the address "Ueber die Würde des Menschen" delivered at the close of his philosophical lectures in 1794: "Only from man does orderly arrangement spread around him up to the limit of his observation, — and when he extends the latter to a greater distance, order and harmony are extended too to the same degree. His observation indicates the place of all things in their infinite diversity, so that no single one may suppress the other; it brings unity into the infinite diversity.

"Through this the celestial bodies maintain themselves together, and become only one organized body; through this the suns turn in their determined orbits. Through the ego the gigantic ladder (of entities) rises from the lichen up to the seraph; in it is the system of the entire world of spirits, and man expects with reason, that the law which he imposes on himself and on this world, must be valid for the latter; he expects with reason the future universal recognition of the
The development of the basic antinomy in the same. In the ego lies the sure pledge that from it order and harmony shall be extended ad infinitum where it is lacking until now; that with the expanding human culture at the same time the culture of the universe shall expand. Everything which still lacks form and order, shall be resolved into the most beautiful order, and what is already harmonious shall — according to laws not developed till now — become continually more harmonious. Man shall bring order into the confusion, and a plan into the general destruction; through him shall putrefaction produce form, and death summon to a new glorious life. This is man, when we consider him merely as observing intelligence; what would he not be, when we think him as practically active power!" 1.

The passion for power in Fichte's ideal of personality. The science-ideal converts itself into a titanic ideal of culture.

The Faustian passion for power in the Humanistic science-ideal has dissolved itself into the passion for power in the personality-ideal. The science-ideal has converted itself into a

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1 I, 413: "Allein von Menschen aus verbreitet sich Regelmässigkeit rund um ihm herum bis an die Grenze seiner Beobachtung, — und wie er diese weiter vorrückt, wird Ordnung und Harmonie weiter vorgerückt. Seine Beobachtung weist dem bis ins unendliche verschiedenen, jedem seinen Platz an, dass keines das andere verdränge; sie bringt Einheit in die unendliche Verschiedenheit.

Durch sie erhalten sich die Weltkörper zusammen, und werden nur Ein organisierter Körper; durch sie drehen die Sonnen sich in ihren ange-wiesen Bahnen. Durch das Ich steht die ungeheure Stufenfolge da von der Flechte bis zum Seraph; in ihm ist das System der ganzen Geisterwelt, und der Mensch erwartet mit Recht, dass das Gesetz, das er sich und ihr zieht, für sie gelten müsse; erwartet mit Recht die einstige allgemeine Anerkennung desselben. Im Ich liegt das sicheere Unterpfand, das von ihm aus ins unendliche Ordnung und Harmonie sich verbreiten werde wo jetzt noch keine ist; dass mit der fortrückenden Cultur des Menschen, zugleich die Cultur des Weltalls fortrücken werde. Alles was jetzt noch unförmlich und ordnunglos ist, wird durch den Menschen in die schönste Ordnung sich auflösen, und was jetzt schon harmonisch ist, wird — nach bis jetzt unentwickelten Gesetzen — immer harmonischer werden. Der Mensch wird Ordnung in das Gewühl, und einen Plan in die allgemeine Zerstörung hineinbringen; durch ihn wird die Verwesung bilden, und der Tod zu einem neuen herrlichen Leben rufen. Das ist der Mensch, wenn wir ihn bloss als beobachtende Intelligenz ansehen; was ist er erst, wean wir ihn als praktisch-thätiges Vermögen denken!"
cosmonomic Idea of Humanistic immanence-philosophy

moralistic ideal of culture that comes to full expression in titanic activity!  

There is, however, no longer any place for the science-ideal in its earlier sense which hypostatized “nature” in its mathematical and mechanical functions, in order to extend the continuity of natural-scientific thought across all modal boundaries of the aspects. With respect to Fichte’s system, Windelband justly writes: “Nature has meaning only as material for the performance of our duty. Therefore Fichte’s doctrine does not embrace a natural philosophy in the earlier sense of the word. He could not have given such a philosophy, since — apparently because of the one-sidedness of his education as a youth — he lacked any detailed knowledge of natural science. However, the very principles of his philosophy did not permit him to project it. The doctrine of science could not consider nature as a causal mechanism existing in itself”.

Fichte could view nature neither as a mechanistic “world in itself”, nor as an organic world immanently adapted to its own end. His teleological conception of nature had no other intention than to demonstrate in the dialectical way of his “Wissenschaftslehre” that nature, as it exists, must have been created by the free ego in order to render possible a resistance against the realization of its moral task.

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1 This conversion of the authentic ideal of science into a culture-ideal comes pregnantly to expression in Fichte’s writing “Die Bestimmung des Menschen” which appeared in 1800, (W.W. vol. II, pp. 267 ff).


3 For the rest, Fichte did not abandon this standpoint, even in his fourth metaphysical period. Cf., e.g., his writing “Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns” (1810—’11), based on the Transzendental Logik included in the first volume of the “Nachgelassene Werke” (W.W. vol. II, p. 663): “Die Natur ist Bild unserer realen Kraft, und so absolut zweckmässig; wir können in ihr und an ihr das was wir sollen. Ihr Prinzip ist schlechthin ein sittliches Prinzip, keinesweges ein Naturprinzip (denn dann eben wäre sie absolut)...” [“Nature is the image of our real power and thus absolutely purposive, we can do in it and in respect to it what we ought...”]

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A new critique of theoretical thought 29
The development of the basic antinomy etc.

The antinomy between the science-ideal and personality-ideal has actually converted itself in Fichte's first period into an antinomy between Idea and sense within the personality-ideal itself.

In Kant's dualistic world-picture, the antinomy between the ideal of science and that of personality actually implied the recognition of both factors. For Fichte this antinomy is really converted into a contradiction within the personality-ideal itself between free activity (spontaneity) and bondage to the resistance of the lower nature or between "Idea" and sense. Kant too had posed the latter antinomy in his Critique of practical Reason. The ideal of personality cannot cancel the bondage to sensory nature without dissolving itself into an empty abstraction. With the hypostatization of the moral norm, this antinomy must be retained. Windelband justly remarks in this connection: "For this very reason the world is to Fichte the posited contradiction, and dialectic is the method to know it".

to do. Its principle is simply a moral one, by no means a nature-principle (for in this very case it would be absolute)...

1 See also the characteristic pages in Die Bestimmung des Menschen (The Vocation of Man) II, 313—319.

CHAPTER VI

THE VICTORY OF THE IRRATIONALIST OVER
THE RATIONALIST CONCEPTION OF THE
HUMANISTIC TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA.
THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY IN ITS IRRATIONALIST TURN IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

§ 1 - THE TRANSITION TO IRRATIONALISM IN FICHTE'S THIRD
PERIOD UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE MOVEMENT OF
"STURM UND DRANG" ("STORM AND STRESS")

Fichte's development did not stop with the standpoint of
the first edition of the Wissenschaftslehre. Emil Lask especially
deserves credit for having sharply analysed the various phases
in this development since 1797. We are here not so much
interested in Fichte's second period, characterized by the
"Second Introduction into the Doctrine of Science" (Zweite Ein-
leitung in die Wissenschaftslehre) of 1797. In this phase we
can only observe a return to and a completion of the critical
transcendental philosophy in a teleological system of "the pure
forms of reason". It does not open new viewpoints in respect
to the dialectical development of Humanistic thought. Therefore, we shall now focus our attention on Fichte's third period,
in which, under the strong influence of Jacobi's philosophy of
feeling, a new irrationalistic trend gained ground in the Human-
nistic personality-ideal.

Fichte's relation to "Sturm und Drang".

Fichte's relations with the so-called "Sturm und Drang" have
recently been examined in detail by Leon¹, Bergmann², Gelpcke³
and others. Gelpcke sees from the very beginning in Fichte the

² Ernst Bergmann: Fichte und Goethe (Kantstudien 1915, Vol. 20).
³ Ernst Gelpcke: Fichte und die Gedankenwelt des Sturm und Drang
(Leipzig 1928).
influence of such typical representatives of this movement as Lavater, Hamann and Jacobi operative, even before he was taken up with Kantian critical idealism. The titanic activity-motive, the strong voluntaristic tendency, characteristic of Fichte's philosophy, in all the phases of its development, and which signally differentiates it from the more static Kantian system, shows indeed a veritable congeniality of spirit with the deepest motives of "Sturm und Drang", glorifying the "activity of genius". The activistic ideal of personality permeates all expressions of this transition-period and concentrates itself, as it were, in Goethe's Faust, with its typical utterance: "Im Anfang war die Tat ("In the beginning was the deed").

"Sturm und Drang", as Gelpcke observes, finds its artistic form of expression in the "ego-drama". Activity and selfhood are the two poles in this world of thought. The ideal "ego" is absolutized in a limitless subjectivism and becomes elevated to the rank of genius possessing in itself the perfectly individual moral measure of its action, bound to no general norm. In the foreword to his "Räuber", Schiller has given the following expression to this ingenious subjectivism: "The law did not yet form a single great man, but freedom hatches colossusses and extremities".

In his "Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten" (1759) Hamann expressed the same idea in the following form: "What replaces in Homer the ignorance of the rules of art which an Aristotle invented, and what in a Shakespeare the ignorance or violation of these critical laws? Genius, is the unanimous answer".

Only in the very deed can this selfhood of genius render itself objective. A true enthusiasm and optimism of the deed characterizes the period of "Sturm und Drang", sharply distinguishing its basic tone from the preponderatingly pessimistic one of Rousseau, notwithstanding all its dependence upon Rousseau's philosophy of sentiment.

1 "Das Gesetz hat noch keinen grozsen Mann gebildet, aber die Freiheit brütet Kolosse und Extremitäten aus."
2 "Socratic Memorabilia."
3 "Was ersetzt bei Homer die Unwissenheit der Kunstregeln, die ein Aristoteles nach ihm erdacht, und was, bei einem Shakespeare die Unwissenheit oder Uebertrcitung jener kritische Gesetze? Das Genie ist die einmütige Antwort."
The irrationalist view of the individuality of genius.
The irrationalist turn in the ideal of personality.

This entire movement was still bound to Rousseau by the naturalistic view of the personality-ideal expressed in the watchword, "natural forming of life". But for the rationalism of the time of the Enlightenment the "natural" was identical with what was "conceived in terms of natural laws". In contrast the "Sturm und Drang" movement ran to the other extreme: it absolutizes the subjective individuality in nature: the genius must realize himself in the completely individual expression of his psychical drives.

The true reality is sought in the completely irrational depths of subjective individuality and these depths of subjective reality are to be grasped not by the analysing understanding, but by feeling. This irrational philosophy of feeling, predominating especially in Hamann, the young Herder and Jacobi, and of which Goethe makes his Faust the mouth-piece in the utterance: "Gefühl ist alles", is the true Humanistic counter-pole of the rationalistic line of thought characteristic of the "Enlightenment".

The philosophy of life of the "Sturm und Drang" period finds its culminating point in the demand for subjective ethical freedom. This new Humanistic postulate of freedom is averse to all universal rational norms. Gelpcke characterizes it as follows: "The regained concept of freedom becomes a dogma. It is freedom against every rule, every authority, every compulsion of the wrong society. Consequently, it implies unconditional freedom of feeling from all dependence, just as the Enlightenment had preached the unconditional freedom of reason".

Tension between the irrationalist conception of freedom and the science-ideal in its Leibnizian form in Herder, The antinomy is sought in "life" itself. The Faust- and the Prometheus-motive.

The Humanistic ideal of personality discloses itself here in an irrationalist type, still oriented to the aesthetic view of nature, but exhibiting all the more strongly its polarity with the ratio-

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1 Gelpcke, op. cit., p. 27: "Der neu gewonnene Begriff der Freiheit wird zum Dogma. Es ist die Freiheit gegen die Regel, gegen die Autorität, gegen den Zwang der verkehrten Gesellschaft. Freiheit also des Gefühls schlechthin von aller Abhängigkeit, wie einst die Aufklärung Freiheit der Vernunft von aller Abhängigkeit gepredigt hatte."
nalistic science-ideal from which "Sturm und Drang", despite its passionate protest against deterministic rationalism, never was able to liberate itself definitively. This is especially evident in Herder's philosophy of history, with its naturalistic concept of development derived from Leibniz. Antinomy is not shunned, but rather sought for in the very reality of life.

"Faust" and "Prometheus" become the favourite problems of this period. Faust contends with nature, from which he wished to wrest her deepest secrets, in a boundless striving toward power and infinity. Prometheus is the stormer of heaven, who in Titanic pride brings fire from heaven to earth. Klopstock has given to his Prometheus-motive the following pregnant expression: "Forces of the other world are contained in the Idea of God, but man feels like a second Creator, able to reflect the Idea of the universe" 1.

The irrationalist Idea of humanity and the appreciation of individuality in history.

The new ideal of humanity did not spring from mathematical thought, but from the irrational depths of feeling. It displays itself in a boundless reverence for all that man is, and, as such, possesses irrational creative individuality. It further displays itself in an appreciation of historical individuality in people (Volk), nation and state, usually strange to the time of the Enlightenment.

The conception of "Sturm und Drang" about individuality has indeed no longer anything in common with the atomistic individualism of the time of the Enlightenment. It is an irrationalist view that gains ground here, and that seeks everywhere after the irrational relations by which the individual is a part of the totality of an individual community. It is this very view which is characteristic of the philosophy of history of a Herder, who tries to understand the voice of history by way of empathy, by feeling himself into the spirit of historical individualities. Herder unhesitatingly accepts the polarity, the inner antinomy between this irrationalist view and the determinist conception of development, which he had taken over from Leibniz. Necessity of nature

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1 JANENSKY, Lavater, p. 2: "Kräfte jener Welt hat der Gedanke an Gott, aber wie ein zweiter Schöpfer fühlt sich der Mensch, der die Idee des Universums nachzudenken vermag."
and creative freedom of the irreducible individuality come together in history and render impossible Kant's attempt at a separation of the two realms. In this philosophy of history, the science-ideal of the "Aufklärung" still discloses its influence, insofar as historical development is thought of as subject to natural laws. In accordance with Leibniz' lex continui, development is here conceived of in increasingly complicated and more highly ordered series, as passing in a continuous transition from inorganic matter to organic life and human history, and as disclosing a steady progress in the evolution of culture. But this naturalistic cultural optimism is entirely pervaded and refined by the new humanity-ideal of the "Sturm und Drang". The impulse toward a sympathetic understanding of every individuality in the cultural process protected this view of history from the rationalistic construction of world-history after the manner of Voltaire.

Fichte's third period and the influence of Jacobi. Transcendental philosophy in contrast with life-experience. The primacy of life and feeling.

In what way then did the influence of the irrationalist philosophy of life, briefly sketched above, find expression in Fichte's third period, of which his writings: "Die Bestimmung des Menschen", 1st ed., 1800, and his Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grössere Publikum über das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie, are most strikingly characteristic?

This influence discloses itself in the sharp cleavage, which Fichte here sets between theoretical knowledge and real life, identifying the latter with feeling, desire and action, and placing the full accent of value upon life in opposition to philosophical speculation. In his Rückerinnrunigen, Antworten, Fragen (Remembrances, Answers, Questions), an unpublished writing of the year 1799, Fichte observes: "Now the goal is life, and in no way speculation, the latter is only a means (an instrument) to form life, for it resides in an entirely other world, and what is to influence life, must itself have originated from life. It is only a means to know life".

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1 W.W. V, p. 351.
2 Ibid., p. 342: "Nun is das Leben Zweck, keinesweges das Speculieren; das letztere ist nur Mittel, das Leben zu bilden, denn es liegt in einer ganz anderen Welt, und was auf das Leben Einfluss haben soll, musz selbst aus
A little further on we read: "Life in its true essence is not-philosophizing; philosophizing in its true essence is not-life... There is here a complete antithesis, and a point of juncture is as surely impossible, as the conception of the X that rests at the foundation of the subject-object ego..."  

The opposition between his own philosophic standpoint and that of his opponents who accused him of atheism (Eberhard and others), is here formulated as follows: "The true seat of the conflict between my philosophy and the opposed doctrines, which are more or less aware of this situation, concerns the relation between (mere, objectively directed) knowledge and life (feeling, appetitive power and action). The opposed systems make knowledge the principle of life: they believe that through free, arbitrary thought they can originate some knowledge and concepts and implant them in man by means of reasoning and that thereby would be produced feelings, the appetitive power would be affected and thus finally human action determined. For them knowledge is consequently the higher, life is the lower and absolutely dependent on the former... Our philosophy, on the contrary, makes life, the system of feelings and appetitions the highest and allows to knowledge everywhere only the looking on" (italics are mine).
HEGEL as opposed to the philosophy of life and feeling.

In order to realize the polar distance which separates FICHTE’s philosophic thought in this period from HEGEL’s identity-philosophy, it is only necessary to compare these utterances as to the relation of the dialectical concept and the reality of life (seized immediately in feeling) with HEGEL’S following pronouncement in his *Encyclopaedia*: “It is wrong to suppose that the things which form the contents of our representations were first, and our *subjective* activity which through the earlier mentioned operation of abstracting and synthesizing of the common characteristics of the objects, produces the concepts of the same, would come only afterwards. The concept is rather the true first”.

KANT’S sensory matter of experience is now the “true reality” to FICHTE.

KANT’S irrational “sensory matter of experience”, which in the “Critique of Pure Reason” played only the negative rôle of a limit for the transcendental possibility of knowledge, acquired in FICHTE’S third period the positive meaning of “true reality”. Only the “material of experience” accessible to immediate feeling, not yet “logically synthesized” and deeply irrational, can claim to be reality.

In the impressive conclusion of the second book of the writing *Die Bestimmung des Menschen (The Vocation of Man)*, the “spirit” says to the “ego” that wished to come to knowledge of reality through the “Wissenschaftslehre”: “All theoretical knowledge is only image, and there is always something required in it which corresponds to the image. This demand cannot be satisfied by any theoretical knowledge; and a system of science is necessarily a system of mere images, without any reality, significance and aim... Now you seek after all something real which resides outside the mere image... and another reality than that which was destroyed just now, as I know likewise. However, it would be in vain, if you would try to create it through and from your knowledge and to

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embrace it with your science. If you have no other organ to grasp it, you shall never find it. However, you do possess such an organ. Vivify it only and warm it: and you shall come to complete rest. I leave you alone with yourself”.

In agreement with JACOBI, FICHTE now seeks this other organ in belief, which he, together with this philosopher of feeling, views as the diametrical opposite of cognitive thought. JACOBI had taught that the “unconditional Being” could not be demonstrated theoretically, but could only be felt immediately. And he had not restricted the truth-value of immediate feeling to the bounds of sense perception, but had proclaimed as its second basic form the certainty of supra-sensory belief. In like manner, FICHTE, too, now teaches that the true reality is discovered only by belief, rooted in the immediate feeling of the drive to absolute, independent activity.

JACOBI supposed his view to be based upon naïve experience when he identified the latter with the function of feeling. FICHTE follows suit in teaching that naïve man, even without being aware of it, grasps all reality existing for him, only by faithful feeling: “We all are born in belief; who is blind, follows blindly the secret and irresistible drive; he who sees, follows seeing; and believes because he wants to believe.”

This faith is no longer the a-priori practical reasonable faith of KANT, that elevates abstract noumenal Ideas to a practical reality “in itself”. It is rather JACOBI’S emotional faith, that this thinker set again, in the old nominalist manner, in opposition

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2 W.W. II, p. 249 fl.

3 “Wir werden allen in Glauben geboren, wer da blind ist, folgt blind dem geheimen und unwiderstehlichen Zuge; wer da sieht, folgt sehend; und glaubt, weil er glauben will.” Cf. the entire sensualistic conception of naïve experience explained in the context of the cited passage (p. 255).
to the understanding in his famous expression: “Heathen with the head, Christian with the heart”\(^1\). It must, however, be borne in mind that Jacobi supposed he found true Christianity in the well-known postulates of the Humanistic ideal of personality: belief in the personality of God, in moral freedom and autonomy, and in the immortality of human personality, whereas Fichte, who identified the Deity with the “moral order of the universe”, abandoned the belief in a personal God. It was this that brought upon him the charge of atheism.

The relationship which Fichte here accepts between “faith” and reflective thinking also diverges diametrically from that which he accepts between the two in his *Staatslehre* of 1813.

In the last mentioned work all progress in history is seen as a methodical victory of the understanding over faith “until the former has entirely destroyed the latter and has brought its content into the more noble form of clear insight”\(^2\).

Yet a great mistake would be made, if the agreement between the philosophy of feeling and Fichte’s standpoint in his third period were interpreted as a complete surrender to the former.

Even Lask, who for the most part clearly indicates the points of difference, goes too far in imputing to Fichte a radical depreciation of the “Wissenschaftslehre” in his third period\(^3\). He has overlooked that the same writing in which Fichte ascribes the discovery of true reality to *vital* feeling alone — allowing to philosophy only the “Zusehen” (looking on) — concludes with a veritable eulogy of the “Wissenschaftslehre”: “In short: by the acceptance and universal propagation of the doctrine of science among those to whom it is appropriate, the whole of mankind shall be freed from blind chance and fate shall be destroyed for the same. All mankind becomes its own master under the control of its own concept; it makes henceforth itself with absolute

\(^1\) “Heiden mit dem Verstande, Christen mit dem Gemüt.”
\(^2\) IV, p. 493: “so lange bis der erste den letzten ganz vernichtet und seinen Inhalt aufgenommen hat in die edlere Form der klaren Einsicht.” Essentially the same motive of thought is to be found in the *Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters*, (1804–5) VII, pp. 1—15 and passim.
\(^3\) Lask, op. cit., pp. 105/6: “Genauer konnte des Glaubensphilosophen Jacobi Beurteilung der Wissenschaftslehre nicht bestätigt werden.” (“The judgment of the doctrine of science by the philosopher of faith Jacobi could not be affirmed in a more precise manner.”)
The development of the basic antinomy in the liberty into everything, into which it can only want to make itself”

JACOBI was never able to recognize the value of the “doctrine of science”. To FICHTE, on the contrary, even in his closest approach to the philosophy of feeling, it remained the only way to conceive the full consequences of the freedom-motive, just as, even at this time, he never abandoned the transcendental moralistic standpoint and never fell into the aestheticism of the philosophy of life and feeling.

Recognition of the individual value of the empirical as such. FICHTE's estimation of individuality contrasted with that of KANT. Individualizing of the categorical imperative.

In this period the recognition of the value of “empirical” individuality goes hand in hand with the recognition of “feeling” as an immediate source of knowledge of reality. In his frequently cited writing LASK has given a keen analysis of the fundamental difference between KANT's transcendental-logical concept of “empirical” individuality and the conception developed by FICHTE in his third period concerning the epistemological individual value of the “empirical” as such.

KANT was not able to ascribe any value to empirical individuality as such, and could qualify it only as contingent in contrast with the norms of reason which alone have value. For FICHTE, on the contrary, empirical individuality has now acquired an inner value as being rooted in the individuality of the moral ego itself. Even in FICHTE's System der Sittenlehre (System of Ethics) of 1798 this recognition of the value of individuality discloses itself in his supplement to the formal principle of Ethics. KANT's “universally valid” categorical imperative is in-

1 Sonnenklarer Bericht, p. 409: “Mit einem Worte: durch die Annahme und allgemeine Verbreitung der Wissenschaftslehre unter denen, für welche sie gehört, wird das ganze Menschengeschlecht von dem blinden Zufall erlöst, und das Schicksal wird für dasselbe vernichtet. Die gesammte Menschheit bekommt sich selbst in ihre eigene Hand, unter die Botmäßigkeit ihres eigenen Begriffes; sie macht von nun an mit absoluter Freiheit Alles aus sich selbst, was sie aus sich machen nur wollen kann.” LASK has apparently paid no attention to this whole dithyramb on the “Doctrine of Science”.

2 In all writings of this period “feeling” and “drive” remain oriented to the activistic and moralistic consciousness of duty.
dividualized. It comes now to read as follows: “Act in conformity with your individual destination, and your individual situation”¹.

The individuality of the empirical world, incomprehensible in a theoretical way, acquires practical significance for the personality, insofar as the material of our individual duty discloses itself in it². In each individual act of perceiving and knowing is concealed a “practical” kernel of feeling, in spite of its theoretical function³.

In this connection, too, the estimation of individuality is fastened to the immediate evidence of feeling: “whether I doubt or am sure, it does not originate from argumentation... but from immediate feeling... this feeling never deceives”⁴.

In the Wissenschaftslehre of 1801 the principle of individualization (principium individuationis) is explicitly sought in feeling as the concentration-point of knowledge (Konzentrationspunkt des Wissens)⁵.

No radical irrationalism in Fichte’s third period.

Thanks to the influence of the transcendental critical line of thought, which never completely disappeared from the “Wissenschaftslehre”, there never was, in the case of Fichte himself, a complete victory of an irrationalist philosophy of feeling. The moralistic law of reason is not abrogated, even where, in his third period, the recognition of the value of what is individually experienced in feeling makes itself increasingly operative in his moralistic and activistic ideal of personality. Fichte seeks only to individualize its content within the cadre of its universally valid form.

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¹ IV, p. 166: “Es ist daher für jeden bestimmten Menschen in einer jeden Lage nur etwas bestimmtes pflichtmässig...” [“Therefore for every individual man in every (individual) situation there is only some individual conduct in conformity with duty”].

² This motive continues to be maintained even in Fichte’s fourth metaphysical-pantheistic period. Cf. Die Thatsachen des Bewussstseyns (1810—1811) II, 641: “Nur in der individuellen Form ist das Leben praktisches Prinzip” (Life is a practical principle in the individual form only).

³ IV, 166/7.

⁴ IV, 169.

⁵ II, 112.
§ 2 - AESTHETIC IRRATIONALISM IN THE HUMANISTIC IDEAL OF PERSONALITY. THE IDEAL OF THE "BEAUTIFUL SOUL". ELABORATION OF THE IRRATIONALIST FREEDOM-MOTIVE IN THE MODERN PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE AND ITS POLAR TENSION WITH THE SCIENCE-IDEAL

So much the stronger does the irrationalist turn in the Humanistic ideal of personality assert itself in the feeling-philosophy of "Sturm und Drang" and in early Romanticism. From the outset, this tendency proceeds in an aesthetic direction. Here, Kant’s "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment", with its orientation of the aesthetic judgment to free feeling and with its recognition of the absolute individual value of the genius, offered an immediate point of contact.

Schiller and Kant's "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment".
Aesthetic idealism, The influence of Shaftesbury.

Schiller transformed this theory into an aesthetic idealism, in which the aesthetic aspect of meaning is elevated to the rank of the deepest root of reality. Behind Kant’s influence on this point, there was here at work Shaftesbury’s aesthetic ethics of virtuosity. As Cassirer¹ has shown, Shaftesbury’s aesthetics had a decisive significance for Kant’s own aesthetic views. Even in Shaftesbury (1671–1713), the Humanistic ideal of personality, in an irrationalist transformation of the Greek ideal of καλοκαγαθία, was converted into the principle of aesthetic morality of the genius, turning against every supra-individual norm and law. True morality does not consist in the rule of general maxims, nor in the subjection of subjectivity to a universal norm, but in a harmonious, aesthetic self-realization of the total individuality.

The highest disclosure of the sovereign personality in the moral realm is virtuosity, which allows no single power and instinctive tendency in the individual talent to languish, but brings them all into aesthetic harmony by means of a perfect practice of life, and thereby realizes the happiness of the individual as well as the welfare of the entire society. In the nature of the case, this ethics of virtuosity cannot find the source of moral knowledge in the rational functions directed to general laws, but only in the subjective depths of individual feeling.

Accordingly, morality was brought under a subjective and aesthetic \textit{basic denominator}. The morally good was regarded as the beautiful in the world of practical volition and action: according to SHAFTESBURY, the good, like the beautiful, consists in a harmonious unity of the manifold, in a complete unfolding of that which slumbers in the individual nature as subjective talent. It is, just like the beautiful, the object of an original \textit{approbation}, rooted in the deepest being of man: thus \textit{taste} becomes the \textit{basic faculty} for ethics as well as for aesthetics.

This aesthetic philosophy of feeling has acquired a profound influence, even though HUTCHESON and the \textit{Scottish school} replaced the absolutism of individuality in SHAFTESBURY by the absolutism of law, characteristic of the rationalistic types of the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea. As we saw before, the turn that ROUSSEAU gave to the Humanistic freedom-motive, in the emancipation of personality from the grip of the science-ideal, rests essentially on a mobilizing of the undepraved natural feeling against the sober analysing understanding of the Enlightenment-period.

With the Dutch philosopher, FRANZ HEMSTERHUYS, and the philosophers of life of the "Sturm und Drang" this philosophy of feeling recaptures its original, irrationalist character, disclosing itself in an absolutizing of the aesthetic individuality.

\textbf{The ideal of “the beautiful soul”}.

In SCHILLER's aesthetic Humanism, the irrationalist and aesthetic conception of the ideal of personality embodies itself, though within the formal limits of transcendental idealism, in the Idea of the “beautiful soul”. \textit{The philosophical basic-denominator of reality is shifted to the aesthetic aspect of meaning viewed exclusively from its individual subjective side.}

Beauty is, according to SCHILLER's definition, “freedom in appearance (phenomenon)”. In the aesthetic play-drive ("Spieltrieb"), the fulness of human personality, and therein of the cosmos, becomes evident. Man is really \textit{man} only where he is playing, where the conflict between sensuous nature and rational moral freedom in him is silent. KANT's rigorist morality holds only for the man who has not yet matured to full harmony, in whose innermost being the moral impulse must still wage war with sensuous nature. In the “beautiful soul”, however,

\footnote{See the so-called Kallias-letters to KÖRNER of February 1793.}
there is realized the harmony that no longer knows this combat, for its nature is so ennobled, that it does good out of natural impulse. Only by aesthetic education does a man acquire this refinement. In this way alone is the discord between sensuous and super-sensuous functions in human nature reconciled.

WINDELBAND has keenly fathomed the attempt at a solution of all antinomies between the ideals of science and personality undertaken by this aesthetic Humanism, in which the second German Renaissance attains its point of culmination. As to this point he remarks: “This second Renaissance of the Germans is not only the completion of the former, which had been broken off in the midst, but it contains also the first consciousness of the basic drive which inspired the whole European Renaissance. Not before this aesthetic Humanism had there been the awareness of the deepest meaning of all contrasts in whose reconciliation modern culture finds its task. The two sides of the human being, whose harmonical reconciliation is the very content of culture, have assumed manifold proportions in the historical movement. In antique culture the sensuous prevails, in Christian culture the supra-sensuous man. From the very outset it was the tendency of modern culture to find the full reconciliation of these two developments. The sensuous nature of man rules his scientific knowledge, the supra-sensuous determines his ethical consciousness and the faith fastened to the latter. It is the continuous striving of modern thought to find the synthesis of this “twofold truth”. However, the sensuous supra-sensuous nature of man discloses itself as complete totality only in its aesthetical function. Therefore, the whole Renaissance was in the first place artistically moved...! This was the very greatness of the epoch, that at the same time this synthesis of the sensuous and the supra-sensuous man was living in the modern Greek, in Goethe. And it is the immortal merit of Schiller that he has understood this moment in its deepest signification and that he has formulated it according to all its directions. He is truly the prophet of the self-consciousness of modern culture”

WINDELBAND supposes, that he can identify the antinomy between sensuous nature and the supra-sensuous moral consciousness in the Humanistic freedom-idealism with the tension between Greek and Christian culture. This testifies to a fun-

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1 History of modern Philosophy (Geschichte der neueren Philosophie) II, 267/8.
damental lack of insight into the fact that the Humanistic ideal of personality in its moralistic conception is not essentially Christian, but rather a secularization of the Christian Idea of freedom implying an apostasy from the latter.

The "morality of genius" in early Romanticism.

In Schiller's more mature period, aesthetic irrationalism was still held within the limits of transcendental idealism. In the "morality of genius" of early Romanticism, however, where the morality of the "beautiful soul" becomes religion, this irrationalism discloses itself in its radical sense. By way of Schelling, it would dig itself a wide channel in the most recent philosophy of life, with its fundamental depreciation of the science-ideal and its absolutizing of "creative evolution".

The tension of the ideals of science and personality in Nietzsche's development. Biologizing of the science-ideal (Darwin).

The Humanistic ideal of personality in its irrationalist turn was confronted with a new development of the natural science-ideal which, since the second half of the nineteenth century under the mighty influence of Darwin's evolution-theory, pervaded the new "historical mode of thought". As we shall presently show, this new "historical mode of thinking" originated in the irrationalistic turn of the Humanistic freedom-idealism. This dialectical struggle between the two basic factors of the Humanistic transcendental ground-Idea in their new conception discloses itself in a truly impressive manner in the dialectical development of Nietzsche, whose final phase, as we observed in an earlier context, is the announcement of the beginning of the religious uprooting of modern thought as a result of a dialectical self-destruction of the Humanistic ground-motive in a radical Historicism.

We have only to compare Nietzsche's first romantic-aesthetic period, influenced strongly by Schopenhauer and Richard Wagner, with the second positivistic phase beginning in 1878,

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1 Cf. the statement of Novalis: "Gesetze sind der Moral durchaus entgegen" (laws are absolutely opposite to morality) and: "Gesetze sind das Komplement mangelhafter Naturen und Wesen" (laws are the complement of defective natures and entities), cited in W. Metzger, Gesellschaft, Recht und Staat in der Ethik des Deutschen Idealismus (1917, p. 207 note 3).
The development of the basic antinomy in the
in which the biological ideal of science gains the upper-hand, and
the last period of the culture-philosophy of the “Superman”,
beginning in 1883. In this last period, the science-ideal has been
entirely depreciated. Henceforth, science is viewed as a merely
biological means in the struggle for existence, without any
proper truth-value. BERGSON and other modern philosophers of
life took over this pragmatist and biological conception of the
theoretical picture of the world, created by scientific thought.

It would be false to suppose that the irrationalist philosophy
of life preached chaos. On the contrary, it does not intend to
abandon order. But, as the rationalist types of Humanist philo-
sophy make the concept of the subject a function of the concept
of the law in a special modal sense, and thus dissolve the former
into the latter, so, in a reverse manner, the irrationalist types
reduce the “true” order to a function of individual subjectivity.

The relationship of αὐτός and νόμος in the irrational-
ist ideal of personality. Dialectical character of the
philosophy of life. Modern dialectical phenomenology.

In KANT’s formulation of the Humanistic ideal of person-
ality, the true αὐτός discovers itself only in the νόμος; in the
irrationalist conception of autonomy the νόμος (nomos) is
rather a reflex of the absolutely individual αὐτός.

Rationalism and irrationalism in their modern sense are
merely polar contrasts in the basic structure of the Humanistic
cosmonomic Idea.

The tension, the inner antinomy that originates for the irratio-
nalist types between absolutized subjective individuality and
law, led HAMANN and early romanticism to a dialectical con-
ception of reality which ascribed the character of absolute
reality to logical contradiction.

In the modern dialectical phenomenology, issuing from Duh-
they’s irrationalist historical philosophy of life, “dialectical
thinking” has this same irrationalist character; it is sharply to
be distinguished from HUSSERL’s rationalist phenomenology 1.

In this dialectical trait of irrationalism, we can once again

1 See the detailed analysis of this irrationalist phenomenology in my
work, De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer (The Crisis of the Huma-
nistic Theory of the State), publ. Ten Have, Amsterdam, 1931, pp. 47 ff.
find the proof of the thesis that in the last analysis, even the irrationalist types of Humanist philosophy are rooted in an absolutizing of the theoretical attitude of thought.

An antinomy is always the product of the failure of theoretical thought to recognize its boundaries. In pre-theoretical naive experience theoretical antinomies are out of the question. The sanctioning of a theoretical antinomy bears the stamp of a subjective attitude of thought directed against the cosmic order and the basic logical laws functioning in the latter. This attitude of thought is indubitably a component part of sinful reality, but only insofar as its anti-normative meaning is determined by the cosmic order and by the logical norms within this order, against which it turns itself in revolt. Sanctioning antinomy in the identification of dialectical thought with irrational reality, signifies a meaningless negation of the law-side of reality founded in the cosmic order. This negation is meaningless, because subjectivity without an order that defines it can have no existence and meaning.

The types of the irrationalist cosmonic Idea of Humanistic thought.

As rationalism in the Humanist philosophy is shaded into various mutually antagonistic types of cosmonic Ideas, so is irrationalism. In principle we can think of as many types of irrationalism as there are non-logical aspects of temporal reality.

§ 3 - THE GENESIS OF A NEW CONCEPT OF SCIENCE FROM THE HUMANISTIC IDEAL OF PERSONALITY IN ITS IRRATIONALIST TYPES. FICHITE'S FOURTH PERIOD

The Humanistic ideal of personality, having become aware of its own deepest tendencies, must in the long run transfer its tension with the mechanistic science-ideal to the realm of special scientific thought. The continuity-postulate of the Humanistic freedom-motive could not finally accept the Kantian identification of scientific thought with that of mathematical natural-science. It could not finally abandon in this way its claims to the knowledge of temporal reality.

Humanistic philosophy had in its pre-Kantian rationalist types proclaimed the supremacy of the mathematical science-ideal over the normative aspects of temporal reality.
The development of the basic antinomy in the

Kant brought, as we saw, the antinomy between the ideals of
scientific and personality to a pregnant formulation, and esta-
blished between the two the actio finium regundorum. Fichte
had begun to deprive the mechanical science-ideal of its in-
dependence with respect to the ideal of personality and to
deduce the former from the latter. The moment must come in
which this carrying through of the primacy of the personality-
ideal would make itself felt in special scientific thought and
contend the exclusive dominion of the mathematical-physical
conception of science.

The stimulus to this development could only issue from the
irrationalist currents which had absolutized the subjective side
of the normative aspects of human existence in its complete
individuality under this or that basic denominator, and had
resolved the rationalist Idea of the lex into an irrationalist Idea
of the subject.

Where else but in the individual subjectivity could the free-
dom-motive of the irrationalist Humanistic ideal of personality
have made its dominion over "empirical" reality felt? If subjec-
tive individuality is no longer proclaimed with Kant as a merely
negative logical limit of mathematical causal knowledge, but
rather as empirical reality \( \kappa \alpha \tau \iota \xi \omega \zeta \iota \nu \), the whole view of human
experience must be altered in principle. Natural-scientific
thought, suited only for the discovery of universally valid laws,
could then no longer raise the pretension of providing us with
genuine knowledge of the whole field of empirical reality.

Orientation of a new science-ideal to the science of
history.

From the outset we see the irrationalist types in Humanistic
philosophy concentrating their attention upon the science of
history, which by the coryphaei of the Enlightenment period was
denatured to a crypto-natural science with strong ethicizing
tendencies (the ideal of the necessary progress of mankind
through the illumination of thought!).

It must immediately become evident that the method of
natural science cannot grasp the proper "Gegenstand" of histori-
cal research, as soon as the ban of the mathematical science-
ideal was broken by the antagonistic pretensions of an irration-
alistically conceived ideal of personality. Kant's transcendental
critique of teleological judgment had still only cleared the way
for a philosophy of history, oriented, to a certain extent at
least, to the personality-ideal, still conceived of in essentially rationalist terms. His teleological view of historical development, as explained in his treatise *On Eternal Peace (Vom ewigen Frieden)* did not lay claim to a scientific character. In order to wrest special scientific historical thought from the supremacy of the rationalistic science-ideal, there was needed first and foremost a fundamentally different evaluation of subjective individuality.

It was originally an aesthetic irrationalism that even in Herder's *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1784—1791) — although here still checked by Leibniz' rationalist Idea of development — cleared the way for an irrationalist method of cultivating the science of history: an empathetic and sympathetic treatment of the historical contexts in their incomparable individuality. Presently, Schelling's organological idealism was to provide the philosophical equipment for the view of history held by the *Historical school*, with its doctrine of the originally unconscious growth of culture from the historical "Volksgeist" in the individual nationalities.

The spirit of restoration which acquired the upper hand after the liquidation of the French revolution and the fall of Napoleon, naturally favoured the rise of the historical mode of thought. The apriori constructions of state and society by the Humanistic school of natural law were replaced by the historical insight that state, society, law and culture in general cannot be "created" from mathematical thought after a pattern valid for all times and for every people, but are rather a result of a long historical evolution of a people whose "spirit" has an irreducible individuality.

The rise of the science of sociology in the early part of the nineteenth century was also an important factor in the development of a new historical mode of thought; this sociology, however, intended to perform a synthesis between the latter and the natural scientific pattern of thought, which synthesis presently was to lead to an invasion of Darwinist evolutionism in historical science.

Fichte in his fourth period and the South-West-German school of Neo-Kantianism.

In the present connection, however, we will restrict ourselves to an inquiry after the contribution given by Fichte, in his
fourth metaphysical period, to the methodology of historical thought. From this context, a clear light falls over the epistemology of historical thought, propagated in recent times by the South-West-German school of the Neo-Kantians, especially by its two leading figures, Rickert and Max Weber. Lask's researches in particular have shown that it was essentially the fundamental change in the valuation of individuality which brought Fichte in his fourth period to a speculative metaphysics completely different from the identity-philosophy which we find in the "Wissenschaftslehre" of 1794.

Fichte’s later development is indeed to be seen in full connection with the rather general opposition arising at this time against the abstract Kantian criticism, brought to a head in the opposition between form and matter, and hostile to the true valuation of individuality.

The so-called "critical" method had concentrated all value in the universally valid forms of reason and had depreciated the individual, as the transcendental irrational, as "only empirical", as the merely contingent instance of formal conformity to the law of reason. The irrationalistically orientated metaphysical idealists of this period, who had all passed under Kant’s influence, now supposed they had to reject the entire critical method. To be sure, Kant, in his Critique of Judgment, had raised the problem of specification, but here too, only within the framework of the form-matter schema. Only in Aesthetics was he in a position to appreciate subjective individuality as such.

The irrationalistically conceived freedom-motive demanded a new speculative method for the knowledge of individuality, and eventually it was under the inspiration of problems of the philosophy of culture that this motive began its contest against the old rationalist science-ideal.

Hegel’s supposed "rationalism".

The new metaphysics of the absolute Being, as totality of individuality, is nothing but a metaphysics of the irrationalist ideal of personality. The later formal rationalizing of this irrationalism in Hegel’s so-called “pan-logism” is only a typical specimen of the inner polarity of the transcendental Humanistic ground-Idea; but it never warrants the neglect of the fact that this apparent rationalism is the very antipode of the rationalism after
the pattern of the classical Humanistic science-ideal, oriented to mathematics and natural science.

Schelling became the recognized leader in the controversy against formalistic transcendental idealism. The conception of knowledge in terms of the abstract Kantian form-matter schema — in which, as we saw previously, all antinomies between the ideals of science and personality were crowded together — was to be abrogated. Philosophy was to be understood as "the absolute knowledge of the absolute". Here an association was made with the old speculative motive of an intuitive divine understanding, to which there were also allusions in Kant's Kritik der Urteilskraft. But it was now liberated from the mathematical ideal of science. It was not the Idea of the uno intuito perfected mathematical analysis (Leibniz) that inspired the new "idealism of the spirit".

"Intellectual intuition" in Schelling.

In contrast to the dualistically separated sources of knowledge in the Kantian critique of knowledge, Schelling posits the "intellectual intuition" in which the absolute totality of meaning is comprehended by a single all-embracing glance. Krause elevates the knowledge of the arch-essential (das ur-wesentliche), the intuition of essence, above the relative knowledge from concepts. Troxler, with explicit appeal to Jacob, sets the arch-consciousness or immediate knowledge in opposition to reflecting and discursive thought, and Solger contests the dualism of the universal and particular.

In his Lectures on the Method of Academic Study, delivered in 1802 at the university of Jena, Schelling appealed to a method of genius for scientific insight and in so doing he simply gave expression to the whole spirit of this time, which was deeply inspired by the irrationalist ideal of personality. Everywhere it is the value of absolute individuality that one hoped to grasp

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1 Schelling, Vorlesungen über die Methode des academischen Studiums (Stuttgart und Thübingen, 3e Ausg. 1830), p. 15: "Von der Fähigkeit, alles auch das einzelne Wissen, in den Zusammenhang mit dem ursprünglichen und Einen zu erblicken, hängt es ab, ob man in der einzelnen Wissenschaft mit Geist und mit derjenigen höhern Eingebung arbeite, die man wissenschaftliches Genie nennt!" ["It depends on the ability, to view everything, also special knowledge, in the context with the original and the Unity, whether one is able to work in the special science with spirit and with that higher inspiration which is called scientific genius!"]
The development of the basic antinomy in the
by a speculative metaphysical method of intellectual intuition
immediately grasping the absolute.

In opposition to the irrationalism of feeling on the part of
"Sturm und Drang", all attention is now directed to the individual disclosure of the "Spirit", of the "Idea".

Hegel's new dialectical logic and its historical orientation.

In his younger days, Hegel himself had lived in the sphere of the irrationalist philosophy of feeling. In his mature period, he rationalized the irrationalist thought of Romanticism by his new dialectical logic, which in its kernel is nothing but an antirationalist, universalistic logic of historical development. Lask correctly observes that the very structure of the individual totality, as exhibited for example in the transpersonalistic-universalistic conception of the state as a "moral organism", becomes the pattern for Hegel's conception of the structure of the logical concept. The break with the logic of the naturalistic ideal of science — a logic which had led to an atomistic individualism in the field of philosophy of culture — was indeed inescapable after the victory of the irrationalist ideal of personality. Hegel's positive work was the creation of a new speculative metaphysical logic of individuality, by which he sought simply to replace the natural scientific logic of the Humanistic ideal of science, along the entire line of human knowledge. With Hegel the irrationalist and idealist conception of the ideal of personality creates its own metaphysical logic. Thereby it sets itself sharply in opposition to critical idealism, which in spite of its ascription of the primacy to the ideal of personality, nevertheless, in its method of forming concepts had remained entirely oriented to the logic of the naturalistic science-ideal.

Fichte's "metaphysics of spirit", which speedily gained the upper-hand in his thought after the brief period of his approach toward the philosophy of life, also originated essentially from the irrationalistic and universalistic conception of the freedom-motive with its orientation to problems of the philosophy of culture.

In contrast with the problem of the universally-valid transcendental ego of the first sketches of the "doctrine of science", there emerged even in his System der Sittenlehre (1798) the question of the individual ego. This compelled him to proceed beyond the immanent transcendental analysis of consciousness and
to raise the question as to the metaphysical foundations in being for the spiritual life.

To the essence of self-consciousness of one’s own ego belongs, as Fichte clearly realizes, the consciousness of the other ego, the Thou. Concrete freedom and autonomous determination of the will arise only in the immediate connection of the individual ego with other “spiritual beings”. It is no longer satisfactory to deduce my knowledge of other egos, as a necessary activity of consciousness, from the transcendental self-consciousness. The other egos, the plurality of spiritual beings outside myself, have an altogether other mode of being with respect to myself than the material external world (“nature”).

The problem of the “Realität der Geisterwelt” (reality of the world of spirits).

The problem of the reality of the “Geisterwelt” (world of spirits) emerges and it arises from the moral foundation of the ego itself, from the duty to recognize every free individual as an independent moral “end in himself”. The ego must not only think or intuit the other egos in itself (as if they were natural things), but it stands also in a real spiritual contact, in a living spiritual exchange with them. Consequently, the syntheses performed by the transcendental ego of the critical doctrine of science did not exhaust the development of the syntheses of the system of reason. The latter urgently demand a conclusion in a metaphysical “synthesis of the real world of spirits” (Heimsoeth).

In the “Wissenschaftslehre” of 1801 this highest metaphysical synthesis is viewed as a synthesis of the absolute Being with infinite freedom. The individual ego is one of the many concentration-points of the “Absolute Spirit”, of the Origin of the cosmos. It has the form of existence (“Dasein”) from the absolute Being, but definite, concrete, individual being from the interaction of its freedom with the totality of the spiritual world.

Consequently, Fichte seeks the original, essential reality of all finite individual selves in a transpersonally conceived life of reason. The individual egos are not substances, but individual differentiations and “forms of manifestation” of the one infinite

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1 On this see further H. Heimsoeth: Metaphysik der Neuzeit (1929), p. 120 ff.
The development of the basic antinomy in the life of reason; the "bond of union" in the world of spirits is not a joining afterwards of isolated ego-monads; it is much rather the fundamental communion of all individual egos as appearance of the infinite Origin, from which the free spiritual beings, with all their spiritual interactions, originate by a metaphysical actus individuationis in which time itself acquires individual points of concentration. Thus, even in Fichte's fourth period, the ideal of personality acquires that trans-personalist turn which was to find its consummation in Hegel's identity-philosophy of the absolute self-developing Idea.

Trans-personalist turn in the ideal of personality.
The new conception of the "ordo ordinans" in Fichte's pantheistic metaphysics.

The being of the "Spirit" is a transpersonal being of freedom, which, in the totality of individual spiritual life, realizes its infinite actual freedom, still preceding all thought. The "moral order of the world", as the infinite active ordo ordinans, or the "infinite will", now becomes the trans-personal bond of union for all finite spirits in their individual moral destination. It has become the true antipode, irrationalist in its deepest root, of Kant's abstract "universally valid categorical imperative." The ethical individuality of the ego, in Fichte's irrationalist conception of it, leads through itself to a trans-personal community of free spirits. Only from this totality of the community may

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2 W.W. II, 113: "Was ist nun also — dies ist eine neue Frage — der Charakter des wirklichen Seyns? Durchaus nur ein Verhältniss von Freiheit zu Freiheit zufolge eines Gesetzes. Das Reale, das nun daliegt und vor allem wirklichen Wissen vorher das Wissen trägt, ist ein Concentrationspunkt zuvörderst aller Zeit des Individuums, und es ist begriffen als das was es ist, nur inwiefern diese begriffen ist; — aber sie wird immer begriffen und nie. Es ist ein Concentrationspunkt aller wirklichen Individuen in diesem Zeitmomente, ferner, vermittelst dessen, aller Zeit dieser und aller noch möglichen Individuen; — das Universum der Freiheit in einem Puncte und in allen Puncten." ["What is therefore — this is a new question — the character of the real being? Absolutely only a relation of freedom to freedom in consequence of a law. The real, which now presents itself and which bears knowing prior to all real knowing, is a concentration-point first of all of the whole time of the individual and it is understood as such only insofar as this whole of time is understood; — but the latter is always and never understood. It is a point of concentration of all real individuals in this moment of time, furthermore, by mediation of this moment, of all time of this and all still possible individuals; — the universe of freedom in one point and in all points."]
spiritual individuality be understood. The concept of "material freedom" consequently gains in Fichte a trans-personal character which, from the start, was tuned to the grasping of the objective cultural coherences, in which the individuals are interwoven. Fichte's philosophy of history is only to be understood in the framework of this transpersonalist and, at least in its root, irrationalist metaphysics of the spirit.

Meanwhile, this metaphysics finds its conclusion only in a final hypostasis; the absolute Being, raised above all becoming and change, of the impersonal, because actually infinite Divinity. This absolute Being is eternally transcendent to all reflection, to all knowledge, and it is not an external "Ding an sich", but the inner real ground of the possibility of rational freedom with all its finite manifestations. As such, however, it is at the same time the absolutely irrational, the completely incomprehensible. All life is only manifestation, image or schema of God, the finite "existence" (Dasein), the finite form of manifestation of the absolute Being. But only in the moral freedom of human personality does the appearance of this absolute Being have immediate "Dasein" (existence).

"Nature" in the sense of the naturalistic science-ideal is only the appearance of the reasonable ethical appearance of God. This latter discloses itself in the trans-personal individual life of the free ethical world of spirits. Nature continues to lack independent meaning with reference to the ethical aspects of the cosmos. Not in "nature", but in ethical activity only does God reveal himself in the "appearance".

The earlier rationalist deification of the moral law is now replaced by an entirely irrationalist idea of God. God has become the absolute hypostasis of the creative, subjective ethical stream of life, which is the trans-personal bond and totality of the individual free subjects.

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1 See e.g. W.W. IV, 584: "Die durch Vernunft a priori eingesehene Vor-aussetzung ist nemlich die, dass jedem unter den freien Individuen im göttlichen Weltplane angewiesen sey seine bestimmte Stelle, die nicht sey die Stelle irgend eines anderen zu derselben Zeit in demselben Ganzen Lebende..." ["The pre-supposition, perceived apriori by reason, is namely this, that in the divine worldplan to each of the free individuals must be indicated its individual place which may not be the place of any other individual living at the same time in the same totality..."]
The development of the basic antinomy in the

Fichte's basic denominator for the aspects of meaning becomes historical in character. Fichte's philosophy of history.

Yet — and this is of the highest importance in this new metaphysics of spirit — the moral basic denominator, to which Fichte apparently still reduces all aspects of temporal reality and which finds its final hypostasis in the irrationalist Idea of God, is, nevertheless, under the influence of the irrationalist ideal of personality, itself transformed into an *historical* basic denominator.

Heimsoeth correctly observes: “For the first time in the history of philosophy, the specific reality of historical existence is not only conceived of as an original reality of metaphysical rank, but it is even interpreted as the final mode of being of finite existence as such... The modern pathos of the "book of nature" is replaced by the metaphysical-religious conception of history as the proper mode of appearance of the Absolute or the divine Spirit. The world presents itself to Fichte as an infinite active chain of "challenges", of freedom-evoking and spirit-cultivating interaction of self-acting life-centres, in creative freedom producing new and new faces as it were from nothing”.

The absolute ethical Idea, the absolute Being, assumes a purely historical mode of appearance in its manifestation in the "spiritual life" of the temporal human community. It schematizes itself in the infinite movement of the development of history, in which the Deity, in creative irrational fashion, continually assumes new spiritual forms of manifestation. The theme of history for Fichte, just as for Kant, is that of striving upwards to freedom. But in Fichte's fourth period, the higher ethos of the spiritual life is no longer, as in Kant, conceived rationalistically in the formalistic Idea of autonomy, in which the *autos* only comes to itself in the *nomos*, i.e. the formal categorical impera-

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1 Zum ersten Male in der Geschichte der Philosophie wird die spezifische Realität des geschichtlichen Daseins nicht nur als eigenwüchsige Realität von metaphysischem Rang erfasst, sondern sogar als die entscheidende Seinsweise endlichen Daseins überhaupt gedeutet... Das neuzeitliche Pathos vom "Buche der Natur" schlägt um in die metaphysisch-religiöse Fassung der Geschichte als der eigentlichen Erscheinungssphäre des Absoluten, oder des Göttlichen Geistes. Als eine unendliche Wirkenskette der "Aufforderungen", des freiheitsweckenden und geistgestaltenden Ineinandergreifens selbsttätiger Lebenszentren steht die Welt vor Fichte, in schöpferischer Freiheit neue und neue Gesichte wie aus dem Nichts hervorbringend.”
cosmonomic Idea of Humanistic immanence-philosophy

tive. It is rather conceived in the irrationalist sense of the "creative" historical process, in which the one absolute metaphysical Idea, through the concentration-points of the great leading personalities, realizes itself in the diverse forms of cultural Ideas: in the Ideas of art, state, science and religion. The inner value of the latter corresponds to their precedence. In this period, Fichte is deeply convinced of the irrationality of the absolute Idea in its inexhaustible creative fulness of life.

Only in the spiritual originality of great individuals, of creative geniuses, does the divine image immediately break through into appearance. History, as an immediate manifestation of the ethical Idea, is essentially made by great personalities. So Fichte himself expresses it: "All that is great and good, upon which our present existence is based, from which it starts, and which is the only supposition under which it can display its essence in the manner it does display it, has only been realized by the fact that noble and vigorous men have sacrificed all enjoyment of life for the sake of Ideas; and we ourselves with all that we are, are the result of the sacrifices of all previous generations, and especially of their most worthy fellow-members." The original divine

1 WW. VII, 58 ff. As to the conception of beauty as the lowest form of manifestation of the Idea, cf. Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben (1806), WW. V, 526.

2 Cf. also Fichte's letter to Schelling from May 5 to August 7, 1801 (Aus Schelling's Leben I, 345) where he emphatically speaks of the "root" of the world of spirits as "irrational".

3 Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters (The principal traits of our present period), WW. VII, p. 41: "Alles grosse und gute, worauf unsere gegenwärtige Existenz sich stützt, wovon sie ausgeht, und unter dessen alleiniger Voraussetzung unser Zeitalter sein Wesen treiben kann, wie es dasselbe treibt, ist lediglich dadurch wirklich geworden, dass edele und kräftige Menschen allen Lebensgenuss für Ideen aufgeopfert haben; und wir selber mit allem, was wir sind, sind das Resultat der Aufopferung aller früheren Generationen, und besonders ihrer würdigsten Mitglieder."

"Die ursprüngliche göttliche Idee von einem bestimmten Standpunkt in der Zeit lässt grössten Teils sich nicht eher angeben, als bis der von Gott begeisterte Mensch kommt und sie ausführt... Im allgemeinen ist die ursprüngliche und reine göttliche Idee... für die Welt der Erscheinung schöpferisch, hervorbringend das neue, unerhörte und vorher nie dagegewesene.” "Von jeher war es Gesetz der übersinnlichen Welt, dass sie nur in Wenigen Auserwählten... ursprünglich herausbrach in Gesichte; die grosse Mehrzahl der übrigen sollte erst von diesen Wenigen aus... gebildet werden.” "In der Geisterwelt ist Jedwedes um so edler, je seltener es ist;... in äusserst Wenigen spricht die Gottheit sich unmittelbar aus.”
The development of the basic antinomy in the Idea of a definite standpoint in time is for the greater part not to be indicated before the (elected) man comes, inspired by God, and executes it... The original and pure divine Idea is in general... creative for the world of appearance, originating that which is new, unheard of and never had existed before.” “From time immemorial it was a law of the super-sensory world that it only in few elected men... originally broke forth in visions: the great majority of the rest should only be cultivated by mediation of these few...” “In the world of spirits the nobility of everything becomes greater according to its rareness... in extremely few (personalities) the Deity expresses itself immediately” 1.

Natural individuality must be annihilated in the historical process by the individuality of the spirit.

The value of the individuality of genius, which Fichte sets here so emphatically in the foreground, is not that of the merely sensuous individuality of nature. Just as “nature” as such possesses for Fichte no meaning of its own, so also must the individuality of nature (natural individuality) be annihilated for the sake of the disclosure of the absolute Idea. In a clear manner Fichte says that his “unconditional rejection of all individuality” exclusively relates to the “personal sensory existence of the individual”, but that, on the contrary, his philosophy postulates that “in each particular individual in which it comes to life, the one eternal Idea absolutely exhibits itself in a new figure which never existed before; and this quite independent of the sensory nature, through itself and its own legislation, consequently by no means determined through the sensory individuality, but rather annihilating the latter and purely from itself determining the ideal individuality, or, as it is called more exactly, the originality” 2.

Individuality and Society.

As this “spiritual” (historical) individuality is further thought

1 Compare the German text in footnote 3 of the preceding page.
2 WW. VII, 69: “die Eine ewige Idee im jedem besonderen Individuum, in welchem sie zum Leben durchdringt, sich durchaus in einer neuen, vorher nie dagewesenen Gestalt zeige; und dieses zwar ganz unabhängig von der sinnlichen Natur, durch sich selber und ihre eigene Gesetzgebung, mithin keinesweges bestimmt durch die sinnliche Individualität, sondern diese vernichtend und rein aus sich bestimmend die ideale Individualität, oder, wie es richtiger heisst, die Originalität.”
of only as a point of concentration, in which the absolute Idea makes itself concrete in the historical supra-personal stream of life, there is automatically a break with the atomistic natural-scientific view of history. According to Fichte, individuality can only be understood from the individual communities, in which alone it has temporal existence. Even in his Reden an die deutsche Nation (1808), Fichte has made a serious attempt to conceive the individuality of a nation as an historical totality.

The remarkable feature of this whole metaphysical conception, typical at the same time of its irrationalist root, is the nominalistic view, which denies both the reality of abstract general concepts (universalia) and the possibility of a derivation of subjectivity from a law. Fichte's absolute transcendent Idea is not a universal, but a totality. He rejects unconditionally every hypostatization of general concepts in the sense of Platonic ideas. In my opinion, it is also entirely incorrect to characterize Fichte's metaphysics as monistic Eleaticism, as Lask does. The static Eleatic conception of "absolute being" has nothing in common with Fichte's view of the absolute Idea as a totality of being, which unfolds itself in the historical process. The Eleatic being, as I have shown in the first volume of my trilogy Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, is not to be understood apart from the religious form-motive of Greek thought. It is the indivisible, supra-sensory and divine form of being, as such, which can be intuited only in "theoria", and which cannot have any relation to the "matter-principle", the principle of becoming and declining. This "form of being" is thought of as a purely geometrical one, corresponding to the immaterial shape of the sphere, which in Greek philosophy was viewed as the most perfect.

Fichte's "divine Being", on the contrary, although in itself supra-historical, has an essential relation to the historical process. It is the divine origin of all activity and cultural individuality, and is thus by no means to be characterized as a static "universal".

Abandonment of the Critical form-matter schema.

In Fichte's metaphysical conception of the Idea (as closed totality of its individual disclosures in historical development), the Critical form-matter schema is in principle broken through

1 WW. I, p. 175.
and abandoned. Within the framework of the latter schema, the totality of individual determinations could only be an Idea in the sense of a limiting-concept, by which transcendental thought is driven forward without being able to realize its demand because of its limitations in comprehending the empirical material of experience. The recognition of these limitations is here the point of departure. Fichte’s irrationalistic metaphysics, on the contrary, follows the reverse course from the absolute totality as “absolute Being”. The “Idea” is not thought of here as an eternal task for bridging over the cleavage between the form and matter of our knowledge, but rather as a metaphysical totality of all individuality.

In proceeding from the absolute totality in this metaphysical sense, there is a constant threat of an apriori construction of historical development. Such a construction abandons the temporal material of experience, which, as merely empirical, as only simple phenomenon, is reasoned away in Fichte’s metaphysics of history.

To this metaphysical passion for apriori construction, Fichte fell victim in his first work on the philosophy of history, the Principal Traits of the Present Era (“Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters”, 1804—’05). Here he observes: “if the philosopher has the task to deduce the phenomena, possible in experience, from the unity of his supposed Idea, then it is evident, that for the fulfilment of this task he does not at all need experience; and that he, merely as a philosopher, and strictly paying attention to his limitations, can do his work without allowing for any experience, and simply apriori, as it is called with the technical term, and that — in relation to our subject — he must be able to describe apriori the whole of time and all possible periods of it”.

Thus the Idea of an historical world-plan is construed apriori. Fichte defines it in a teleological sense: “the aim of the earthly

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1 WW. VII, 5: “hat der Philosoph die in der Erfahrung mögliche Phänomen aus der Einheit seines vorausgesetzten Begriffs abzuleiten, so ist klar, dass er zu seinem Geschäfte durchaus keiner Erfahrung bedürfe, und dass er blosz als Philosoph und innerhalb seiner Grenzen streng sich haltend, ohne Rücksicht auf irgend eine Erfahrung und schlechthin a priori, wie sie dies mit dem Kunstausdrucke benennen, sein Geschäft treibe, und, in Beziehung auf unseren Gegenstand, die gesammte Zeit und alle möglichen Epochen derselben a priori müsse beschreiben können.”
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life of mankind is this, that the latter should arrange all its relations within the same with liberty according to reason. 

“This world-plan is the Idea of the unity of the whole of human earthly life”.

Out of this apriori Idea Fichte deduces, once again apriori, his five chief periods of world-history. It is not the individual, but rather the “human race” as a whole that functions as the subject of the latter.

In this entire philosophical conception, there appears to be no point of contact for a methodological concept of history, as a condition for the cultivation of the science of history. The empirical science of history appears rather to be handed over to the “Chronikmaker” (annalist), whereas the systematics of history is reserved entirely for the apriori metaphysics of history as “Vernunftwissenschaft” (science of reason).

Lask, however, has pointed out, that in the Grundzüge another motive in the philosophy of history announces itself alongside of this metaphysical one. The two motives may not entirely be brought into agreement. The latter is to be explained in terms of the continued operation of Critical-transcendental motives even in Fichte’s last period. This second motive may be characterized as follows: our thinker by no means made the task of the philosophy of history to consist entirely in the construction of the world-plan, but he sets also the requirement that it should make a thorough logical analysis of the general conditions of empirical existence, as the material of historical construction.

Fichte’s logic of historical thought.

In this requirement of a “logic of the historical mode of enquiry”, not to be found in Kant, the irrational character of the historical material of experience is placed in the foreground.

It is especially the important ninth lecture of the Grundzüge, in which Fichte set himself the task of a “transcendental logical” delimitation of the concept of the historical field of investigation,

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1 WW. VII, 7: “der Zweck des Erdenlebens der Menschheit ist der, dass sie in demselben alle ihre Verhältnisse mit Freiheit nach der Vernunft einrichte.”

2 “jener Weltplan ist der Einheitsbegriff des gesamten menschlichen Erdenlebens” (italics mine!).
The development of the basic antinomy in the

and describes this task explicitly as a philosophical one. It is not the task of the historian to consider empirical existence and its conditions as such. Both belong to his pre-suppositions: “The question which are these conditions of empirical existence — what is to be pre-supposed for the mere possibility of a history as such, and what in the first place must be (present), before history can merely make a beginning — belongs to the competence of the philosopher, who has to guarantee to the historian his basis and foundation” 1.

With “timeless Being” or “divine life” plunging into earthly existence, or into the “flowing of life” in time, infinity and irrationality are joined for knowledge. Physics is the science that investigates empirically the constant objective and periodically recurrent features of temporal existence, i.e. “nature”. Investigation directed toward the contents of the flowing time-series is called the science of history: “Its ‘Gegenstand’ is the always inconceivable development of knowledge concerning the incomprehensible” 2. While the historian accepts his “facts” (FACTA) simply as such, the task of the philosopher of history, who sees through their logical structure, is “to comprehend them in their incomprehensibility” and to render intelligible the appearance of their “contingency” out of their character which is incomprehensible to the understanding. It is, consequently, the task of philosophy to indicate the boundary between speculation and experience in the study of history. At this point, the influence of Criticism on Fichte’s view of history exhibits itself very clearly, where he opposes every attempt to deduce the historical facts themselves from the infinite understanding of the absolute Being. “Consequently: the timeless being and existence is in no way contingent; and neither the philosopher nor the historian is able to give a theory of its origin: the factual existence in time appears as contingent because apparently it can be otherwise; however, this appearance originates from the

1 WW. VII, 131/2: “Das empirische Daseyn selber und alle Bedingungen davon setzt er daher voraus. Welche nun diese Bedingungen des empirischen Daseyns seyen — was daher für die blosse Möglichkeit einer Geschichte überhaupt vorausgesetzt werde und vor allen Dingen seyn müsse, ehe die Geschichte auch nur ihren Anfang finden könne, — ist Sache des Philosophen, welche dem Historiker erst seinen Grund und Boden sichern muss” (italics mine!).

2 Ibid., p. 131: “Ihr Gegenstand ist die zu aller Zeit unbegriffene Entwicklung des Wissens am Unbegriffenen.”
fact that it is not comprehended: the philosopher can, to be sure, say in general that the One inconceivable, just like the infinite comprehending of the same, is such as it is, for the very reason that it is to continue being understood to infinity; he can, however, not at all deduce it genetically, and define it from this infinite comprehending, because then he would have conceived infinity, which is absolutely impossible. Here consequently is his limit, and, if he desires to know something in this department (realm), he is referred to experience. As little can the historian point out genetically this inconceivable (infinity) as the original beginning of time. His calling is to expose the factual successive determinations of empirical existence. Empirical existence itself and all the conditions of it are consequently presupposed by him”.

In this way FICHTE comes to the conclusion that neither the philosopher nor the historian can say anything about the origin of the world or of mankind: “for there is no origin at all, but only the one timeless and necessary Being.” The philosopher has only to account for the conditions of factual existence “as lying beyond all factual existence and all experience.”

What FICHTE had in mind with this actually epistemological task of philosophy with respect to the science of history, appears clearly from his statement: “It acquires a definite concept of what is truly asked for by history and what belongs to it, besides a logic of historical truth; and so, even in this infinite territory, the groping about at random is replaced by the sure proceeding according to a rule”.

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1 Ibid., p. 131: “Also: das zeitlose Seyn und Daseyn ist auf keine Weise zufällig; und es lässt sich weder durch den Philosophen, noch durch den Historiker eine Theorie seines Ursprungs geben: das factische Daseyn in der Zeit erscheint als anders seynkönnend, und darum zufällig; aber dieser Schein entspringt aus der Unbegriffenheit: und der Philosoph kann zwar wohl im Allgemeinen sagen, dass das Eine Unbegriffene, sowie das unendliche Begreifen an demselben, so ist, wie es ist, eben weil es in die Unendlichkeit fortbegriffen werden soll; er kann es aber keinesweges aus diesem unendlichen Begreifen genetisch ableiten und bestimmen, weil er sodann die Unendlichkeit erfasst haben müsste, was durchaus unmöglich ist. Hier sonach ist seine Grenze, und er wird, falls er in diesem Gebiete etwas zu wissen begehrt, an die Empirie gewiesen. Ebensowenig kann der Historiker jenes Unbegriffene, als den Urbeginn der Zeit, in seiner Genesis angeben. Sein Geschäft ist: die faktu- schen Forbdestimmungen des empirischen Daseyns aufzustellen. Das empirische Daseyn selber und alle Bedingungen davon setzt er daher voraus.”

2 “Sie erhält einen bestimmten Begriff davon, wonach die Geschichte
Fichte also mentions more precisely the relationship in which the components of historical development to be known apriori stand in his opinion to those to be known aposteriori. History is beyond doubt conceived of by Fichte as the development of culture which does not begin before the “Normalvolk” postulated by him, was dispersed over the “seats of rudeness and barbarism.” This “Normalvolk” is supposed to have been in a situation of perfect “Vernunftkultur” and such “through its mere existence, without any science or art.” “Now for the first time something new and remarkable presented itself that stimulated the remembrance of men to retain it: — now for the first time could begin the true history which can do nothing more than notice factually, by means of mere experience, the gradual cultivation of the true human race of history, originated from a mixture of the original culture and the original barbarism”¹.

The metaphysically conceived apriori component of historical development is the formerly discussed world-plan that leads mankind through the five periods of world-history. Without any historical experience the philosopher can know that these periods must follow one another: “Now this development of the human race does not make its entrance in the general manner in which the philosopher paints it in one single survey, but gradually, disturbed by forces strange to it, at definite times, in definite places, under definite circumstances. All these particular surroundings do by no means originate from the Idea of this world-plan; they are the non-understood in it, and, as it is the only Idea for this world-plan, the non-understood in general; and here the pure empiricism of history makes its entrance, its a posteriort: the history proper in its form”².

¹ WW. VII, 138: “erst nun gab es etwas neues und merkwürdiges, das das Andenken der Menschen reizte, es aufzubehalten; — erst jetzt konnte beginnen die eigentliche Geschichte, die nichts weiter thun kann, als durch blosse Empirie factisch auffassen die allmähliche Cultivirung des nunmehr durch Mischung der ursprünglichen Cultur und der ursprünglichen Uncultur entstandenen, eigentlichen Menschen-geschlechtes der Geschichte.”

² ib., p. 139: “Nun tritt diese Entwicklung des Menschen-geschlechtes nicht überhaupt ein, wie der Philosoph in einem einzigen Überblickes es schildert; sondern sie tritt allmählig, gestört durch ihr fremde Kräfte, zu
The irrational, new element, not to be repeated, that can be discovered only empirically, fills the time-series of historical development and arises in the subjection of raw nature through rational and free cultural activity of the human race in the various forms of the absolute Idea. In this is seen the “transcendental-logical” criterion of history in Fichte’s first main work on the philosophy of history.

Fichte’s new historical concept of time.

Remarkable to a high degree and yet scarcely observed up to now is the fact that Fichte has paid special attention also to historical time. He distinguishes the true historical time from empty time.

In the latter, there moves only dream and show, all that which serves only for pastime or for the mere satisfaction of a curiosity that is not grounded in a serious desire for knowledge: “The pastime is truly an empty time which is placed in the midst between the time filled up by serious business.” In the “true and real time”, on the contrary, something happens, “when it becomes a principle, a necessary ground and cause of new phenomena which never before existed. Then for the first time a living life has arisen which originates other life from itself”.

We see here how Fichte in a typical manner anticipates the historical conception of time of the modern philosophy of life. Its distinction of true and apparent time is still to engage our attention in detail in our further discussion of this problem.

Yet, in spite of everything that is offered in the “Grundzüge” for the development of an irrationalist logic of the science of history, the fundamental dualism between the merely empirical

1 WW. VII, 245: “Der Zeitvertreib ist ganz eigentlich eine leere Zeit, welche zwischen die durch ernsthafte Beschäftigungen ausgefüllte Zeit in die Mitte gesetzt wird;” in the “true and real time”, on the contrary, something happens “wenn es Prinzip wird, nothwendiger Grund und Ursache, neuer und vorher nie dagewesener Erscheinungen in der Zeit. Dann erst ist ein lebendiges Leben geworden, das anderes Leben aus sich erzeugt.”
The development of the basic antinomy in the individuality and the individuality of value in history is not yet bridged over here. Consequently, at this stage the historical logic exhibits a fundamental hiatus.

Indeed, the true science of history remains restricted to the “Sammlung der blossen Facten” (collection of mere facts), the professional historian remains one “who in collecting historical facts has no other criterion but the external sequence of the years and centuries “ohne alle Rücksicht auf ihren Inhalt” (without any regard to their content) even though his work is called “useful and honourable.”

Now Lask has demonstrated, that in the writings between 1805—9, this dualism between empirical individuality and value, not yet overcome in the „Grundzüge”, is removed in fact, by reason of the explicit ascription of value-character to that which is recognized as irrational with respect to its logical structure. Not until the last phase of all (namely in the Staatslehre of 1813) is the ascription of value-character to the historical material of experience (logically recognized as irrational) made a problem, which was possible only by means of a deepening of the methodological inquiries begun in 1805.

Indeed we find for the first time in the important considerations on the Deduction of the “Gegenstand” of the History of Mankind in the Staatslehre of 1813, properly speaking an elaboration of the task set in the Grundzüge: the discovery of the logic of historical truth.

In the “Staatslehre” of 1813, Fichte anticipates the “cultural-historical” method of the South-West German school of Neo-Kantianism. The synthesis of nature and freedom in the concept of the “free force”.

Here for the first time a serious attempt is made to find a synthesis between nature and freedom within the transcendentally analysed historical field of inquiry. The manner in which Fichte tries to reach this synthesis is characteristic of the irrationalist motive which is operative behind the critical form.

Fichte begins his views with setting a sharp antithesis between the “realm of nature” (as the domain of the naturalistic science-ideal) and the “realm of freedom” (as the domain of the ideal of personality).

These two realms are now synthetically unified by an inter-

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1 WW. VII, 140.
mediate concept, i.e. that of the *free force*: “Nature is death and rest: freedom only must vivify and stimulate it again; according to a concept; and this is the very character of the free force, that it can only be moved according to a concept”\(^1\). “Consequently — and that is the point here — we acquire in that which is possibly given, besides that which is given in nature, also a world of freedom-products, constructed through absolute freedom on the basis of the former, however, not at all grounded on this nature which was closed with this dead force.” “From this (originates) the sphere of the freedom-products, as being possibly given and under a particular condition: these (*freedom-products*) are contingent for the intuition, however qualified for the very history as a description of what in this way is given” (italics mine)\(^2\).

The following dilemma presents itself directly in *Fichte's* world-picture, which knows no modal law-spheres: The realm of “dead nature” is ruled by the mathematical and mechanical laws imposed by the understanding; the realm of living actual freedom by the autonomous moral law. To which laws is now subjected the third realm, that of history as the synthetical realm of visible, cultural freedom?

*Fichte* emphatically observes: “The ethical (realm) is purely spiritual and without figure, it is a *law* without any image. It acquires its concrete figure only from the ethical matter”\(^3\).

Consequently, history in its individual figures and its “free forces” which produce culture, must be characterized as “lawless”. To *Fichte* there is no other solution possible: “The state

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\(^1\) WW. IV, 461: “Die Natur ist Tod und Ruhe: die Freiheit erst muss sie wieder beleben und anregen; nach einem Begriffe: und das ist eben der Charakter der freien Kraft, dass sie nur nach einem Begriffe bewegt werden kann.”

\(^2\) WW. IV, 462: “Wir erhalten sonach, worauf es ankommt, ausser dem in der Natur Gegebenen, in dem möglicherweise Gegebenen auch noch eine Welt der Freiheitsprodukte, aufgetragen durch absolute Freiheit auf die erste, in dieser aber, die mit jener todten Kraft geschlossen war, durchaus nicht begründet.” “Daraus die Sphäre der Freiheitsprodukte, als eines möglicherweise und unter einer gewissen Bedingung gegebenen: *diese sind für die Anschauung ein Zufälliges, also aber eben zur Geschichte, als einer Darstellung des also Gegebenen, sich qualificirend*” (italics mine!).

of affairs is therefore as follows: by far the greater part of the freedom-products present in a period of time of the intuition, have not come about according to the clear concept of the moral law, consequently not according to this law; no more have they come about by the law of nature, since the latter is closed to the creation of these products which have originated from freedom. Since there is no legislation besides these two, this (originating) occurs quite lawless, at random. This is truly, as is well known, the object of human history as it has developed until now...”

The “hidden conformity to law” of historical development. The irrationalist concept of the law.

Thus the historical aspect is brought into explicit opposition to that which is conformed to a law: “a particular historical matter is to be understood only through history in general; the latter again is only to be understood through its opposite, that which happens in conformity to laws and is, consequently, to be known in a strictly scientific way”

Nevertheless, to this statement, Fichte immediately adds the remark that the freedom which discloses itself in historical development must possess a hidden conformity to a law which is nothing other than the providence of the moral deity. But this conformity to a law is not to be known from rational concepts. It is rather a hidden telos in the displaying of the given freedom in the irrational development of culture which makes the transcendent values visible in the individual temporal formations of culture.

Here, in a Humanistic perversion of the Christian faith in the Divine Providence, the law is very clearly made a simple

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1 WW, IV, 462/3: “So darum steht die Sache: Bei weitem das Meiste der etwa in einem Zeitraume der Anschauung vorliegenden Freiheitsproducte ist zu Stande gekommen nicht nach dem deutlichen Begriffe vom sittlichen Gesetze, also nicht nach diesem Gesetze; ebensowenig aber ist es zu Stande gekommen durch das Naturgesetz, indem dieses geschlossen ist vor dessen Erzeugung, und es zu Stande gekommen ist durch Freiheit. Da es nun ausser diesen beiden keine Gesetzgebung gibt, erfolgt sie ganz gesetzlos, von ohngefähr. Dies nun eigentlich und notorisch der Gegenstand der bisherigen Menschengeschichte...”

2 Ibid., p. 458/9: “ein besonderes Geschichtliches ist verständlich nur durch Geschichte überhaupt; diese wiederum nur verständlich durch ihren Gegensatz, das Gesetzliche, streng wissenschaftlich zu Erkennende.”
reflection of the individual free subjectivity, disclosed in the "irrational process". The irrational historical conformity to law, which Fichte accepts, is the very negation of veritable historical norms. It is the precipitation of the irrationalist ideal of personality, in which the φόρος is nothing but the reflection of the individual αὐτός. Only by conceiving the individual in its turn as a member of an individual community whose historical tradition and "common spirit" is an inner constitutive factor of the individuality of all of its members, can this irrationalism escape the anarchistic view of history. Therefore, it must result in a universalist conception of temporal human society which — in polar opposition to individualism — views society according to the schema of the whole and its parts, not considering the inner nature of the different social relations.

Irrationalizing of the divine world-plan.

The divine world-plan, that Fichte in his "Grundzüge", still tried to deduce rationalistically in a purely apriori fashion, apart from the historical material of experience, is now, on the contrary, sought in the very individuality of the historical matter which cannot be comprehended in rational concepts: "However, is there not in this inconceivable incomprehensible element at

1 Which unfortunately also passed over into Fr. J. Stahl's philosophy of history under the influence of Schelling's romanticism. "God's guidance in history" is now irrationalistically conceived of as an unconscious operation of God's "secret counsel", which nevertheless is accepted as a complementary norm for human action! Thus irrationalism penetrated even into the Christian view of history! The so-called "Christian-historical" trend in political theory in Germany and the Netherlands is undoubtedly influenced by this irrationalist view of history.

2 Compare Fichte's statement: "Only the formal concept, formed in pure science, is finite, since it is the concept of a law. The judgment of the given facts, on the contrary, is infinite: for it proceeds according to the law which rules in this judgment itself and remains eternally hidden; it springs up eternally new and fresh. From every point indeed through taking part from the side of the law develops eternity and so in every following moment of time." ["Nur der formale, in der reinen Wissenschaft aufgestellte Begriff ist endlich, denn er ist der Begriff eines Gesetzes: die Beurteilung des faktisch gegebenen aber ist unendlich; denn sie geht einher nach dem in ihr selbst herrschenden, ewig verborgen bleibenden Gesetze: quitt ewig neu und frisch. Aus jedem Punkte entwickelt sich ja durch Hinzutritt des Gesetzes die Ewigkeit und so in jedem folgenden Zeitmomenten."]
The development of the basic antinomy in the same time a world-plan, therefore undoubtedly a Providence and an Understanding? So what is the law of the world-facts, i.e. of that which gives to freedom its task? This question lies very deep; until now I have helped myself by ignoring and denying! I might there indeed arrive at a deeper, truly absolute Understanding, giving the inner support to the infinite modifiability of freedom. Therefore, that which I posited as absolutely factual, might perhaps yet be posited by an Understanding”.¹

It is clear, that in this final phase of Fichte’s thought, the principium individuationis has shifted to the historical realm, as the synthesis of value and temporal reality, whereas, in his first rationalistic period, he had sought it — in accordance with Kant — only in the sensory matter of nature-experience.

The apriori conformity to a law which the “Staatslehre” assumes for historical development, i.e. the gradual conquest of faith by the understanding, is merely a formal one.

It is only the qualitatively individual, moral nature, which, as given freedom, produces the material of history, since it becomes an individual paradigm for the producing by freedom.

Its first appearance is a creative wonder of Providence, transformed by Fichte into a “transcendental-logical condition” of the possibility of history: “Consequently: the concept of a moral procreation or nature of man has replaced Providence (as a Miracle), which is the ground of the truly historical material of history. According to our Idea we have immediately taken up this morality of nature into the necessary form of appearance”².

As the very “transcendental-logical” condition for the possibility of an historical experience, the presence of a “moral


nature” may not be accepted further than is necessary for the explanation of the development.

The concept of the “highly gifted people” (das geniale Volk).

Fichte takes a further step in the development of his irrationalist methodology of history by transferring the concept of the miraculous from the individual to social groups or communities viewed as “individual totalities”. Just as an individual paradigm is postulated for the historical development of the morality of the individual, the social paradigm of an entire people is postulated for the moral development of the human race: “However, since we must conceive the appearance of freedom as a totality absolutely closed in time, we must assume some society which compels and instructs without itself having needed both, since, by its mere existence, it possessed this very morality to which it leads the society coming after it and originating from it, by means of compulsion and instruction: because it was by nature that to which others have to educate themselves in freedom under its cultivating power” 1.

In this way the hypothesis (introduced for the first time in the “Grundzüge”) as to a primeval people that is in possession of a morality, given in an individual moral nature, is now rendered serviceable to the methodology of history.

By virtue of its very non-recurrent individual and “lawless” realization of value, the historical development receives in Fichte a higher value-accent than that which recurs periodically according to the uniformity of natural laws. The historical is no longer, in a rationalistic fashion, set in opposition to the law of reason and in this opposition conceived of as the value-less (because law-less) material of experience; but it is rather understood as totality of what is new and creative individual in opposition to the merely “stehende Sein” (static being) of nature 2.

Fichte’s conception, in sharp opposition to that of Kant, is

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1 WW, IV, 470: “Da wir aber doch die Erscheinung der Freiheit schlechterdings als in der Zeit schlechterdings geschlossenes Ganze auffassen müssen, so müssen wir irgend eine Gesellschaft annehmen, die da zwingt und belehrt, ohne selbst beides bedürft zu haben, weil sie durch ihr blosses Daseyn das schon war, wozu sie die nach ihr und aus ihr entstehende Gesellschaft mit Zwang und Belehrung erst bringt: von Natur das war, wozu Andere unter ihrer Bildung sich machen mit Freiheit.”

2 Lask, op. cit., p. 293, also for the following.
The development of the basic antinomy in the-
now to the effect that the framing of "final ends" of historical
development, such as: "education for freedom", "education for
clarity", etc. can have only the significance of a general descrip-
tive formulation: "Both, however, are only formal. For the in-
finitive content of this freedom, the moral task, remains in fact
something incomprehensible, the image of God, for this very
reason that the latter is absolutely incomprehensible, and is to
be experienced only in the revelations of history".

The concept of revelation in the sense of a synthesis of irratio-
nality and originality is now expressly taken up in the "trans-
cendental-logical" structure of history.

In this way the religious life in the historical-empirical form
of Jesus is characterized as immediate individual revelation of
the Idea of God in the appearance.

It will, consequently, have to be conceded to LASK, that in
Fichte there has actually been developed a transcendental logic
of history in contrast with the metaphysics of Hegel. The concept
of science here developed finds, as we believe we have demon-
strated in detail, its transcendental root in a cosmonomic Idea
inspired by the irrationalist ideal of personality.

The inner antinomies in this irrationalist logic of
history.

If this conception is thought through consistently it must re-
solve itself into inner antinomies. For, on the one hand, by
reason of its immanent continuity-postulate, it knows cosmic
boundaries of meaning as little as the concept of science that
originated from the naturalistic science-ideal; consequently it
brings all normative subject-functions of temporal reality under
a historical basic denominator. On the other hand, by its dena-
turing of historical conformity to law into a mere reflection of
individual subjectivity, it must deny all knowable historical
determination of facts. For de-termination can only issue from
d law, which cannot be a mere reflection of individual sub-
jectivity, but which regulates and limits the subject-functions
in their infinite individual diversity. In our discussion of the

1 "Beides aber ist nur formal. In der Tat bleibt nämlich der unendliche
Inhalt jener Freiheit, die sittliche Aufgabe, etwas Unbegreifliches, das Bild
Gottes eben darum, weil dieser schlechthin unbegreiflich ist, und nur zu
erleben in den Offenbarungen der Geschichte."
2 WW. V, 483 f. 567—674.
modal structure of the historical aspect in the second volume we shall return to this point.

**Law and individuality.**

Notwithstanding all its concreteness and individualization, a real law can never acquire the function of a mere register of the subjective facts in their complete individuality. The concept of a hidden, eternally incomprehensible conformity to law is contradictory and establishes in scientific thought only endless confusion, since it elevates to the status of law the temporal individual subjectivity itself which cannot really exist unless it is bound to a supra-individual order.

Even the circumstance that Fichte does not view historical development as a uniform progress but rather as a process with hindrances and reactions, exhibits the impossibility of carrying through the irrationalist concept of history. For hindrances and reactions are to be recognized scientifically only under the test of a supra-subjective standard.

The dangerous historistic tendency in Fichte's so-called "spiritual-scientific" thought discloses itself in its pregnant sense at the same point at which it has won permanent gains for the science of history, namely, in the discovery of the national community of a people as an individual historical totality in contrast with the atomistic cosmopolitan view of the "Aufklärung" (Enlightenment).

Attention has been drawn sufficiently to the great gain of this discovery in modern Fichte-literature. In Kant's time, individualism was willing to acknowledge, beyond the atomistic individual conceived in natural-scientific terms, only the abstract universal concept of humanity in an ethical sense.

Surely under the influence of Romanticism, which also is to be observed in Schleiermacher's principle of "Eigentümlichkeit" (singularity), Fichte breaks radically with this individualistic point of view: "The form of a people itself is from nature or God: a certain highly individual manner to advance the aim of reason. Peoples are individualities with particular talents and character for it." "This then is a people in the higher sense of the word taken from the view-point of a spiritual world in general: the whole of men who continue living together in society and originate continuously themselves from themselves naturally and spiritually, a whole that is subject to some particular law of development of the divine from it. It is the common
bond of this particular law that in the eternal world, and for that very reason also in the temporal, joins this multitude to a natural and self-conscious totality”.

The “historical nationality” as “true reality” contrasted with the state as conceptual abstraction.

Fichte now shows clearly his historistic view of society. He opposes the nationality — which he conceived as a purely historical entity — to the state. The former is, according to him, a full and true temporal reality, the state, on the contrary, a mere conceptual abstraction. He thereby paved the way for the most recent historistic-phenomenological theory of human society. The newly discovered historical aspect of reality is forthwith absolutized as the basic denominator for all aspects of human society and the national community of the people is elevated to the rank of “true historical reality” which has an “earthly eternity”: “People and fatherland in this signification, as bearer and pledge of earthly eternity, and as that which down here can be eternal, lies far above the state in the ordinary sense of the word, — above the social order as it is conceived in a mere clear concept, and a propos of this concept is established and kept up”.


2 “Volk und Vaterland in dieser Bedeutung, als Träger und Unterpfand der irdischen Ewigkeit, und als dasjenige, was hierdenn ewig seyn kann, liegt weit hinaus über den Staat, im gewöhnlichen Sinne des Wortes, über die gesellschaftliche Ordnung, wie dieselbe im blasen klaren Begriffe erfasst, und nach Anleitung dieses Begriffes errichtet und erhalten wird.” I will here by no means ignore the influence of the historical-political situation in which Fichte wrote his “Reden an die deutsche Nation” and in which his entire concern was the awakening of the national consciousness against the French usurper of his fatherland. However, his construction of the relationship between nation and state is doubtless more deeply based upon his historic view of temporal social life.”
cosmonomic Idea of Humanistic immanence-philosophy

Insofar as Fichte here directs his polemic against the abstract individualistic conception of human society in the school of natural law he is again right to a certain extent. But his intention goes much further. Nationality is absolutized as the true historical revelation of the eternal spiritual community of humanity. The Humanistic ideal of personality here shows a most dangerous irrationalist and transpersonalist turn.

Fichte’s conception concerning the relation of nation and state is in principle the same as that of the “Historical School”.

In the most recent times it has been elaborated in detail in the irrationalist and so-called “pluralistic” sociology of Georges Gurvitch.¹

¹ Compare his Sociology of law (1947), where the nation is characterized as a super-functional, all-inclusive community, whereas the state is only a functional super-structure.
PART III

CONCLUSION AND TRANSITION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POSITIVE CONTENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE COSMONOMIC IDEA
CHAPTER I
THE ANTITHETICAL AND SYNTHETICAL STANDPOINTS IN CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT


From the previous part of our inquiry we have seen how the basic antinomy in the transcendental ground-Idea of Humanistic thought develops into polar antitheses within and between the various systems. By continually returning to the common basic structure of this transcendental Idea we have disclosed the deeper unity in the foundations of all Humanistic philosophic thought. It is now evident that the development of this thought into apparently diametrically opposed systems, in fact, is only the development of an internal dialectic of the same religious ground-motive, namely, that of nature and freedom. The latter determines the general framework of the Humanistic transcendental ground-Idea.

In the final analysis the motive of freedom is the religious root of this basic Idea and (as we have shown in Part II, ch. 1 par. 3) by its ambiguity it evokes the opposite motive of the domination of nature. Before the rise of transcendental philosophy, this root still remained hidden under the primacy of the science-ideal, born out of the ideal of personality.

The transcendental trend in Humanistic philosophy was the first to penetrate to the foundation of the science-ideal, viz. the ideal of sovereign personality. It was not before Fichte that this foundation was openly recognized, which recognition implied a break with Kant’s dualistic conception of the transcendental Humanistic ground-Idea. However, the immanence-standpoint itself remained the ultimate obstacle in Humanism for a radical transcendental critique of philosophic thought.
In critical self-reflection Humanistic transcendental philosophy does not attain anything higher than the Idea of the sovereign freedom of personality, which it persistently identifies with the religious root of the cosmos. It seeks the transcendent root of reality in particular immanent normative aspects of the cosmos, abstracted and absolutized in its transcendental ground-Idea. It cannot attain the insight that the free personality of man cannot be identified with its moral aesthetic or historical functions.

It is true that in HEGEL the free personality became a dialectical phase in the logical self-unfolding of the all-embracing metaphysical “Idea”. But this metaphysical standpoint implied the abandonment of the critical transcendental attitude of Humanistic thought, which FICHTE had preserved, at least in his first period.

In HEGEL’s absolute Idealism, philosophical thought once again became identified with absolute divine thought. Not recognizing any critical limits with respect to belief and religion, it intends to solve the religious antinomy of its ground-motive by a theoretical dialectic. The same must be said of SCHELLING’S “absolute thought”.

The preservation of the critical-transcendental standpoint in Humanistic thought implies the rejection of this absolutizing of theoretical dialectic. But in this case FICHTE’S critical moralism seems to be the ultimate degree of critical self-reflection possible in Humanistic immanence-philosophy during its florescence. Therefore, in the last analysis, even in its most profound systems, critical Humanistic transcendental philosophy lacks insight into the final transcendent determination of philosophical thought. Even when it thinks it has made the ego its Archimedean point, it has not focused its vision upon the religious root of personality, as the concentration-point of all temporal existence, but upon an hypostatized function of personal existence.

This is the limit of all immanence philosophy. If the thinker would cross over these boundaries, he would see through its religious root in its apostasy from the true Origin and the full selfhood. This radical religious criticism, however, is only possible from the Biblical transcendence-standpoint. Humanism cannot surpass its own religious starting-point.

From the Humanistic immanence standpoint it is easy to consider the internal dialectic of Humanistic philosophical thought as an innerly necessary polar course of development,
originating from the very nature of philosophical theory, as such.

When Christian philosophy accepts this viewpoint and permits Humanism to force its method of thinking and problems upon itself, then it is not surprising that the crucial problem of Christian synthetical philosophy, the conflict between philosophical thought and Christian faith, remains forever insoluble.

Schema of the basic structure and the polar types of the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea, in confrontation with the Christian ground-Idea.

In parts I and II of this volume we have examined in detail the antithesis between the basic structure of the Humanistic transcendental ground-Idea in its various types and that of the Christian one. We will now give a parallel schematical presentation of both ground-Ideas and their different implications. A cursory glance will suffice here to show the impossibility of any real compromise.

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manifesting themselves within particular types of antinomies:

expressing itself in the Idea of creative scientific thought, versus the Titanic notion of practical freedom expressing itself in the idea of absolute sovereign personality.

2 - Pessimism versus optimism.
3 - Rationalistic individualism versus irrationalistic trans-personalism.
4 - Universal validity versus individuality, form versus matter, theory versus life.
5 - Speculative metaphysics of the science- or personality-ideal versus scepticism as the result of an unbridled extension of the ideal of science over its own foundations; concept of function versus concept of substance.

"Reason" as lawgiver.
1 - Under the primacy of the science-ideal: absolutized special scientific thought (mathematical, mechanical, biological, psychological etc.);
2 - Under the primacy of the ideal of personality: transcendental thought in its apriori syntheses, directed towards the Idea of freedom.

a) With the dualistic-transcendental type of ground-Idea (KANT): transcendental thought in its relation to the experience of nature, as the formal origin of the laws of nature, and transcendental thought as "practical reason" in its direction toward the Idea of autonomous freedom, as the origin of the norms of moral freedom.

(b) With the speculative metaphysical conception of the ideal of science or ideal of personality: "reason" (in a theoretical or in a practical sense) is, in a final hypostatization, identified with the deity.

(2) with hypostatizing of the individual subjectivity (irrationalism in all its variegations, from biologicist vitalism to irrationalistic dialectical spiritualism and historicism):

the dialectical, or the hermeneutical thought which absolutizes the subjective side of reality in one of its modal aspects, and rejects the conception of general laws; in a speculative metaphysical trend of this irrationalistic Idea of origin the ἄγγλος is called "spirit" (Geist), with the idealistic, and "Lebenström", with the naturalistic and historicist types. Usually "Lebens-philo-
sophie" lacks insight into the theoretical character of its Idea of origin.
contents of the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea

1 - Under the primacy of the science-ideal: the mathematical or natural scientific system of functional relations within the absolutized aspect of temporal reality, considered as an infinite task for scientific thought; thereby all other aspects are conceived of as modi of the aspect which has been absolutized in theoretical thought (e.g. the mathematical, mechanical, biological or psychical).

In the metaphysical-speculative trend of the science-ideal the Idea of the totality of meaning is grasped in the metaphysical concept of substance, (dualistic, pluralistic and monistic systems have been elaborated in this sense).

2 - Under the primacy of the ideal of personality: the Idea of the "homo noumenon" as a categorical imperative (Fichte in both of his earlier periods etc.).

(a) The dualistic-transcendental ground-Idea of Kant lacks an unequivocal circumscription of the Idea of totality of meaning. The latter should here also be conceived in a dualistic sense. But Kant holds to an agnosticism in respect to the metaphysical background of "nature", the "Ding an sich"! The theoretical Idea of totality is exclusively conceived of in its relation to natural science, but does not refer to the root of reality. The practical Idea of totality is conceived of in the moralistic sense of moral autonomy and freedom.

(b) In the modern idealistic value-philosophy the transcendental trend continues to recognize the primacy of the ideal of personality. The Idea of totality is here grasped in the Idea of the "totality of values" (in which theoretical and a-theoretical values are united into a hierarchical order to be established by human personality in autonomous freedom).

(f) Idea of the totality of meaning

(1) with hypostatizing of modal laws:

(2) with hypostatizing of modal aspects of the individual subjectivity (irrationalism):

Under the primacy of the ideal of personality:

(a) in a metaphysical vitalistic trend: the creative "Lebenstrom" (vital stream) with its infinite succession of individual forms (Bergson).

(b) in a psychological trend: the totality of feeling (feeling-philosophy: compare Goethe: "Gefühl ist alles"!).
(c) in a historicist trend: the historical stream of experience (Dilthey, Spengler etc.).

(d) in an absolute idealist trend: the absolute Idea in its dialectical development through the totality of creative individuality under the common denominator of the absolutized aspect (aesthetic, moral, historical irrationalism, etc.): a formal limitation is possible through the system of transcendental thought forms.

1. Under the primacy of the science-ideal: the continuity of the movement of thought within the absolutized aspect of meaning is made the philosophical basic denominator of reality (therefore, different types of this idea of continuity: mathematicism, mechanism, biology, psychology): recognition of a relative diversity of meaning as to the other aspects of reality in the continuous coherence of thought.

2. Under the primacy of the ideal of personality: the continuity of the Idea of freedom which intends to establish a deeper coherence between the different modal aspects by means of a common denominator chosen in a normative aspect of temporal reality; in value-philosophy: the axiological hierarchy of values, established in autonomous freedom.

Under the primacy of the ideal of personality:

(a) In the metaphysical, psychological-vitalistic trend: the continuous coherence of the creative stream of life in which all individual moments permeate each other in a qualitative duration.

(b) In the relativistic-transcendental trend within historicism: the continuous dialectical historical stream of experience (the transcendental "vivo").

(c) In the absolute idealistic trend: the logical-dialectical continuity in the self-development of the absolute Idea in its dialectical passage through the totality of its individual forms in historical time.

Observation concerning section g: the Humanistic Idea of the coherence of the different modal aspects of the cosmos is at every point incompatible with the acceptance of a divine cosmic order which would abolish the sovereignty of reason or of theoretical consciousness.
h. The modal concept of law and subject

(1) with hypostatizing of the law-side of the cosmos:

1. Under the primacy of the science-ideal: A law is a general concept of function, in which the genetic coherence of reality is created by theoretical thought; individual subjectivity is a dependent "exemplary" instance of this law, it is a particular function of it.

2. Under the primacy of the ideal of personality in the transcendental idealism of Kant: the law in the sense of the universal law of nature is a transcendental thought-form, through which the sensory material of experience is determined; the law in the super-sensuous realm of autonomous freedom is a "categorical imperative" identical with the pure will of human personality; all pre-logical functions of reality are objects of consciousness, not subject; the only subject is the transcendental consciousness and the "homo noumenon" as lawgiver, respectively. [Objectivity is identified with universally valid law-conformity, and then both are identified with "Gegenständlichkeit"].

(a) in the dualistic-transcendental type of cosmonomic Idea (Kant): there is an unbridgeable cleft between two types of laws: laws of nature and norms of freedom;

(b) in the monistic-transcendental type, the law of nature is deduced from the ethical norm (Fichte).

(2) with hypostatizing of modal aspects of the individual subjectivity:

Laws, as mathematical natural scientific concepts, are technical symbols which denaturalize reality in order to dominate nature for the benefit of the biological adaptation of man: (Nietzsche, Bergson, Heidegger, and others).

The subject is the creative actual individuality which is not subject to a universally valid law; it has its individual and irrational law in itself, in nature as well as in culture and ethics.

General observation: The preceding schema includes the most prominent types of the transcendental Humanistic ground-Idea in its pure basic structure. The synthesis of the ground-motive of this basic Idea with the ground-motives of the cosmonomic Idea of Greek or scholastic-Christian thought, gives rise to new complications and tensions. This requires a special investigation.

The ideal of science and the ideal of personality as a secularizing of the
Conclusion and transition to the development of the positive Christian Idea of creation and freedom is foreign to pre-Humanistic systems.

B - Basic structure of the Christian transcendental ground-Idea as theoretical expression of the pure Biblical religious ground-motive.

a - Archimedean point

Christ as the new religious root of the temporal cosmos, from which regenerate mankind receives its spiritual life, in subjection to the central religious meaning of the law: the love of God and one's fellow man with all one's heart.

Although in this Archimedean point philosophical thought is emancipated from the obscuring influence of sin, yet, in time, it continues to be subject to error, through the activity of the apostate root of existence.

Christian freedom is only guaranteed in constant subjection to the Word of God which reveals us to ourselves.

The heart in its pregnant Biblical sense as religious root and centre of the whole of human existence may never be identified with the function of "feeling" or that of "faith", neither is it a complex of functions like the metaphysical concept of soul which is found in Greek and Humanistic metaphysics; it is alien to any dualism between the body (as a complex of natural functions) and the soul (as a complex of psychical and normative functions).

The heart is not a blind, or dumb witness, even though it transcends the boundary of cosmic time with its temporal diversity of modal aspects, and temporal thought within this diversity. For it is the fulness of our selfhood in which all our temporal functions find their religious concentration and consummation of meaning; "Ego, in Christo regeneratus, etiam cogitans ex Christo vivo", versus the Cartesian "cogito ergo sum", and the irrationalistic "vivo in fluxu continuo, etiam cogitans".

b - Religious attitude in philosophical thought:

By belonging to Christ the Christian is in a daily fight, also in philosophical thought, against the "flesh", in its Biblical sense, against our apostate ego, which absolutizes the temporal and withdraws it from God.
c - Religious ground-motive: The Biblical motive of creation, fall into sin, and redemption in Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Spirit. This implies the conflict between the Kingdom of God and the kingdom of darkness in the root and the temporal coherence of our cosmos. It implies, too, the recognition of the checking of the disintegrating activity of sin by common grace, because of the regenerate human race that is accepted and hallowed by God in Christ as the Head (particular grace). This basic motive does not lead to antinomies in philosophical thought, but rather to an absolute antithesis with all philosophy which is dominated by apostate ground-motives. It also leads to a thankful recognition of all the gifts and talents that God has left to fallen humanity.

d - Idea of the Origin: The origin of the Law and of individual subjectivity, according to their religious unity and temporal diversity in the coherence of meaning, is God's holy sovereign creative will. Our cosmos is equally the creation of God with respect to its law- and subject-side; the law is the absolute boundary between God and His creation, that is to say all creatures are by nature subject to the law, God alone is "legibus solutus" (sed non exlex, as in nominalism).

e - Idea of the totality of meaning: The direction of philosophical thought toward Christ as the root and fulness of meaning of the cosmos; Christ fulfilled the law and in Him all subjective individuality is concentrated in its fulness of meaning; nothing in our temporal cosmos is withdrawn from Him, there is no sphere of "indifferent things" (adiaphora).

f - Idea of the coherence in the modal diversity of meaning with respect to the law- and subject-side of temporal reality: The inter-modal coherence of meaning is not a construction of philosophical thought but is rather sustained by the divine temporal world-order which is also the condition of theoretical thought. The modal aspects of meaning have with respect to each other, as law-spheres, sovereignty in their own sphere. Each aspect points in its own structure toward and is an expression of the temporal coherence of meaning which

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1 Compare St. Paul's statement: "Whatsoever ye eat or drink, do to the glory of God."
Conclusion and transition to the development of the positive points beyond itself toward the fulness of meaning in Christ. The cosmic order of time guarantees the integral coherence of meaning between the modal aspects. A pre-logical natural reality "an sich", apart from the normative aspects of reality, does not exist.

§ 2 - THE ATTEMPTS TO SYNTHESIZE CHRISTIAN FAITH WITH IMMANENCE-PHILOSOPHY BEFORE AND AFTER THE REFORMATION

The law in its modal diversity of meaning is the universally valid determination and limitation of the individual subjectivity which is subject to it. The subject is sujet, that is subject to the law in the modal diversity of the law-spheres. There is no law without a subject and vice versa.

The consequences of the synthetic standpoint for Christian doctrine and for the study of philosophy in patristic and scholastic thought.

As we have seen in part I, Christian philosophy, at its very inception, sought the aid of ancient philosophy even in formulating its transcendental basic Idea.

Consequently, patristic and especially medieval scholastic thought developed into a compromise-philosophy. Both held to a synthetic standpoint with respect to the relation between Christian faith and Greek philosophy. There are, however, two types of this synthetic standpoint, and they should be sharply distinguished from each other. The first deemed it necessary to bind philosophical thought to the Word-revelation, whereas the second proclaimed the autonomy of the "naturalis ratio" in the sphere of natural thought. This latter standpoint prevailed under the influence of the scholastic ground-motive of nature and grace. As soon as Christian scholasticism thought it had found its real starting-point in the naturalis ratio, the increasing decay of Christian philosophy could not be checked.

The Christian religion cannot tolerate any theoretical conception of cosmic reality which is emancipated from the pure Biblical religious ground-motive, because such conceptions are actually dominated by wholly or partly apostate motives and seek in the last analysis a deceitful restpoint for thought. The Christian religion does not tolerate any hypostatization which ascribes
independent being to dependent meaning. It does not permit these absolutizations, even if they disguise themselves in the garb of a speculative “theologia naturalis”. The speculative Aristotelian Idea of the “unmoved mover” as “pure form” is not, as Thomistic scholasticism taught, a natural preambule to the revealed knowledge of God. The self-revelation of God in Christ is, in the full sense of the word, a consuming fire for all apostate speculation in which human θεός thinks it can create God after its own image!

The consequences of the synthetic scholastic standpoint have also left a deep impression in Christian theology. With the penetration of neo-Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and other philosophical motives into the patristic thought and scholasticism of the Middle Ages, immanence-philosophy even infected the Christian doctrine of faith and paved the way for the rise of a speculative “theologia naturalis”.

Scholastic philosophy had a particularly devastating influence on Christian theology in respect to the pure Biblical religious conceptions of “soul”, “heart”, “spirit” and “flesh”. The latter were replaced by abstract concepts of dualistic Greek metaphysics, in keeping with the dualistic religious basic motive of form and matter.

The cleft between “faith” and “thought” is only a cleft between the Christian faith and immanence-philosophy.

As soon as Christian philosophy, under the influence of this metaphysics, began to seek the concentration-point of human existence in “reason”, it blocked the way to an intrinsic penetration of philosophy by the Biblical ground-motive. An unbridgeable cleft arose between speculative philosophy and genuine Christian faith. Scholastic theology presents a true “spectaculum miserabile” of controversial theological questions, which are completely alien to the Biblical sphere of thought and originate in Greek metaphysics. What had a really Biblical theology to do with such problems as the conflict concerning the primacy of the will or intellect in the “essentia Dei”; what did it have to do with the attempt to support individual immortality of the soul philosophically upon the basis of the realistic Aristotelian view which sought the “principium individuationis” in matter? Of what concern to it was the controversy concerning the question which “parts” of the soul possess immortality (a question
which even Calvin still took seriously in his *Institutio*? Of what interest to Biblical theology were the curious problems inherent in “psycho-creationism”, i.e. a scholastic transformation of the Platonic doctrine set forth in the dialogue Timæus and of the Aristotelian doctrine about the origin of the active intellect νοῦς ποιητικός in the human soul? (according to Aristotle this intellect does not proceed from nature but from outside; according to Plato the divine Demiurge himself has formed the immortal human nous only). Such problems are pseudo-problems and make no sense in a Biblical theology.

The false conception concerning the relationship between Christian revelation and science. Accommodated immanence-philosophy as ancilla theologiae.

The counterpart of the scholastic effort to accommodate immanence-philosophy to Biblical revelation, was the rise of the false idea that Holy Scripture offered certain solutions to scientific problems, at least to the problems discussed in scholastic theology on the basis of Aristotelian metaphysics, physics and psychology. These supposed Biblical theories were, with the full authority of divine revelation, brought into play against scientific investigations which deviated from tradition.

One only needs to recall the position of the Church in the conflict concerning the astronomical theory of Copernicus, which position, although historically understandable, was not, therefore, less reprehensible!

The attempt at a synthesis between the Christian religion and immanence-philosophy was a source of confusion which led to intrinsic contradictions; it was equally oppressive to the Christian faith and to honest scientific investigation.

Nothing characterized the scholastic standpoint more sharply than the attempt to employ Scripture in the sense of a scientific *deus ex machina*.

Because theoretical thought was not itself reformed in a radical Christian sense, scholastic theology as the “regina scientiarum”, deemed itself called to control the “scientiae profanæ”. Since this theology had accepted an accommodated Aristotelian philosophy, Holy Scripture was itself interpreted in an Aristotelian manner, and could in its turn confirm the Aristotelian theses against the Copernican and, later on, against the Cartesian conceptions.

This was the result of the scholastic notion of philosophy as
"ancilla theologiae". The handmaiden was soon to break her chains and become mistress!

The consequence of the Reformation for scientific thought.

The Reformation supplied the first receptacle capable of producing a conception radically different from the scholastic one with respect to the relationship between the Christian religion and scientific thought. As we have seen, the nominalism of late scholasticism demolished every bridge between the Christian faith and Greek metaphysics.

The rise of the modern Humanistic life- and world-view, which preceded the Reformation, placed sharply before the eyes of the Reformers an inescapable dilemma. They were confronted with the antithesis between the attitude of the Christian religion with respect to temporal life and the secularization of this attitude in the Humanistic ideal of personality.

A return to the medieval synthetic standpoint in order to oppose Humanism with the aid of a scholastical philosophy must necessarily contradict the very nature and spirit of the Reformation. For the latter could show no other credential than its claim to a pure Biblical conception of Christian doctrine. This must imply a return to the integral and radical ground-motive of Holy Scripture, as the only religious motive of its theological and philosophical thought and of its whole life- and world-view. By virtue of this religious ground-motive the Reformation should have led to an inner reformation of philosophical thought.

The fact that this did not directly happen, but that after an original promising start, Protestantism fell back upon the scholastic compromise-standpoint, can only be explained as an after-effect of a very old tradition in Christian thought. This tradition found fertile soil, especially in Lutheranism, and, under the influence of Melanchton, proceeded to infect also the Calvinistic idea of science. In the final analysis it was the dialectical scholastic motive of nature and grace that in this way kept its influence on the philosophical standpoint of orthodox Protestantism.

The after-effect of the nominalistic dualism in Luther's spiritualistic distinction between the Law and the Gospel.

Luther confessed the central significance of God's Sovereignty in the Biblical sense. He possessed the insight that divine
grace in Christ must intrinsically penetrate temporal life in all spheres. Yet, in spite of this, he never fully escaped the nominalistic influence of the Occamist University of Erfurt and of his later studies in an Augustinian monastery ("Ich bin von Ockam's Schule"). This influence is evident from his dualistic conception of the relation between the Law and the Gospel. LUTHER considered a person in the sinful state to be bound to temporal ordinances. A Christian person in the state of grace, on the contrary, is not intrinsically subject to the Divine Law, but lives in evangelical freedom according to love. In “this earthly valley of tears” he only bows to ordinances out of obedience to the will of God with respect to the natural state of sin. And, by so doing he tries to penetrate them with the spirit of Christian love. But intrinsically this spirit contradicts the severity of the Law. This dualism between the Law and the Gospel must, with respect to the relationship between the Christian religion and philosophy, again lead to the nominalistic separation of faith and science, with the usual Occamistic depreciation of the latter. At this point we can observe the after-effect of the scholastic nature-grace-motive in its antithetical Occamistic conception. We find, to be sure, in LUTHER a fulminating judgment against ARISTOTLE and the medieval scholastic philosophy; we find in him a passionate opposition to the Biblical Humanism which in Germany and Holland (ERASMUS) tried to effect a new synthesis between the Christian faith and the spirit of Greco-Roman antiquity. But, nowhere do we discover the conviction that the religious root of the Reformation requires a radical reformation of philosophy itself.

LUTHER never had an inner contact with the Humanistic spirit. In his attitude toward human knowledge he remained a prisoner to the medieval spirit of Occamism. The spiritualistic trend in his character was strongly nurtured by the German mysticism of ECKHART and by the Augustinian-Franciscan spirit. Moreover, his “Welt-offenheit”, which caused him to reject the monastic ideal, continued to be broken by a dualism, unexplainable in terms of the Biblical doctrine concerning the corruption of nature due to the fall. LUTHER never wrested himself loose from a nominalistic dualism in his view of the church. He considered the regulation of the “visible church” to be a matter of relative indifference and sought support from the governing prince for an ecclesiastical reformation. In addition, this dualism displayed itself in his subsequently abandoned distinction between official
and personal morality. His attitude towards scientific thought continued to be burdened in the same manner with the dualistic prejudice concerning the relation of faith and natural reason.

One can recognize this without in any way being deficient in love and appreciation for the great reformer. The recognition of his faults does not obliterate the fact that Luther's Biblical faith became the impulse to a continuous reformation of his thought and the cause of his later abandonment of many previous errors.

The scholastic philosophy of Melanchton. Melanchton and Leibniz.

Melanchton did have close literary contact with German and Dutch Humanism, without having any affinity with the new ideal of personality. When he undertook the gigantic task of establishing a relation between the Reformation and modern science, he fell back upon the scholastic standpoint of accommodation.

Throughout the next centuries the influence of Melanchton was therefore instrumental in preventing the development of a philosophy consistent with the spirit of the Reformation. This influence was enormous. It dominated philosophic instruction at the Protestant universities in Germany and Holland, until the spirit of the "Aufklärung" penetrated the latter and Protestant theology itself fell a victim to its alliance with Melanchton's philosophical scholasticism.

Leibniz, too, the genius of the German "Aufklärung", grew up in this school-philosophy, and his own thinking is indebted to it for various motives. But we have seen how these scholastic motives were transformed by him in a rationalistic Humanistic sense.

The scholastic tradition was not beneficial to the Reformation. Accommodated immanence-philosophy, temporarily clothed in pious garments, was soon to cast aside its sober pastoral garb and display its true character!

Melanchton, the "praeceptor Germaniae", grew up in a circle of German humanists. He admired Agricola, and, at an early age, because of his close connection with his second cousin, Reuchlin, he enjoyed the friendship of Erasmus and Willibald Pirkheimer. In August, 1518, at the age of twenty one, he was

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1 Cf. E. Weber, Die philosophische Scholastik des deutschen Protestantismus im Zeitalter der Orthodoxie, [Philosophical Scholasticism of German Protestantism in the Age of Orthodoxy], Abh. zur Phil. und ihrer Geschichte, hrg. von R. Falckenberg, 1e Heft 1907.
appointed professor of Greek at the University of Wittenberg. His inaugural address, *De corrigendis adolescentiae studiis*, was a vigorous attack upon the ruling scholastic barbarisms and in general upon the mutilation of the Greek and Latin languages and philosophy in the era of the “seraphic and cherubic doctors”. But this iron-clad declaration of war with respect to the scholastic corruption of the Classics was only an expression of a philological humanism. It did not signify a break with the religious starting-point of scholastic thought.

The reformation of academic study which Melanchthon promised remained within the framework of the scholastic encyclopaedia; the subjects of the old trivium (grammar, dialectic and rhetoric) formed its preparatory foundation.

The chief aim of Melanchthon was to reform dialectic after the fashion of Agricola in the nominalistic sense of an art of reasoning. In addition he wished to endow the youth with an excellent philological humanistic training, so that they would be able to read ancient philosophers and poets in the original. It is the spirit of Agricola and Erasmus that inspired the young Melanchthon. The program that he proposed in his inaugural address only aimed at the type of philological and at the same time moral and ecclesiastical reform that would be in accord with the desires of these men. The reform-program of the latter, although it possessed a Christian-Stoical coloration, was actually preponderantly motivated by the spirit of Humanistic nominalism. They aimed at an accommodation of the Humanistic ideal of personality to the program of a supposedly “simple, Biblical Christianity”. Yet their synthesis between Humanism and Christianity only amounted to a “humanizing” of the radical Christian doctrine by laying stress upon the moral viewpoint.

Luther differed very much from Melanchthon in character and disposition. The electrifying contact with the passionate champion of faith raised in Melanchthon the antithetical spirit of the Reformation.

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1 The adjective “humanistic” does not imply here the religious meaning of the term “Humanism” as we used it in our transcendental critique of Humanistic thought. Here it is only related to the study of the “humaniora.” Therefore, it is not written with a capital. Nevertheless, we shall see, that even the conception of this “humanistic” studies was penetrated by a Humanist spirit.
Melancthon did not break radically with immanence-philosophy.

But a penetrating examination makes it clear that even during this period Melancthon did not break radically with immanence-philosophy. In essence, his opposition was only directed against speculative realistic metaphysics, with its doctrine of universalia, its “formalitates”, its theory of the infinite, and so on. Even at this time Melancthon tenaciously retained the nominalistic dialectic. Meanwhile, his apostasy from the ideals of humanism caused a break with his sponsor Reuchlin, and Erasmus turned away from him in disappointment. After this break occurred, Melancthon’s old love for antiquity again awoke within him and a new phase in his development began.

This period commenced in 1536 when he brought about a definitive synthesis between the Lutheran faith and a nominally interpreted Aristotelian philosophy. We observed that even in his short antithetical period Melancthon never abandoned the nominalistic dialectic derived from Agricola. This dialectical method, which he had applied to Lutheran doctrine, intrinsically necessitated his return to ancient immanence-philosophy. This is substantiated by the unsuspected testimony of Heinrich Maier in his important study of Melancthon’s philosophy.

Why a radical Christian philosophy can only develop in the line of Calvin’s religious starting-point.

Calvin also passed through an early Humanistic period during

\[1\] Philipp Melancthon als Philosoph (in An der Grenze der Philosophie, Tübingen 1909, S. 47), where he writes: “Die humanistische Erudition bleibt auch damals Bildungsideal. Und in das Gewand der Eloquenz werden auch die neuen Glaubensgedanken gekleidet. Die lehrhafte Bearbeitung des religiösen Stoffs erfolgt in den Formen und mit den Mitteln der humanistischen Methodik. Aber es ist klar, dass diese Formen aufs engste mit der Weltanschauung verbunden sind, auf der die Realphilosophie ruht... So treibt die Entwicklung mit immanenter Notwendigkeit zur Restitution der Physik, Metaphysik und Ethik” (i.e. of Aristotle, interpreted in a nominalistic sense). [“In this period too the humanistic erudition remains the ideal of education. And also the new Ideas of faith were clothed in the garments of eloquence. The didactic elaboration of the religious material occurs in the forms and with the means of humanistic methodology. But it is evident, that these forms are closely connected with the world- and life-view on which the material philosophy rests... So the development with an inner necessity leads to the restitution of the” (nominalistically interpreted Aristotelian) “physics, metaphysics and ethics.”]
which he wrote his well-known commentary on Seneca's *De Clementia*. But when he reached the turning-point of his life, he broke radically with the nominalistic dualism that more or less continued to flourish within Luther's world of thought and that was dominated by the scholastic ground-motive of nature and grace.

In Calvin's Biblical viewpoint this scholastic motive is eliminated. He maintained that the true nature of man cannot be opposed to grace. Nature is in its root corrupted by the fall, and is only restored or (as Calvin more pregnantly states) "renewed" by God's grace in Jesus Christ. This was also Augustine's conception. The Bible does not permit any view of nature, in distinction to grace, in which human reason in its apostasy from God, becomes the mainstay of a "philosophia et theologia naturalis". It does not sanction any view in which the νοῦς τῆς αἰσθήσεως (that is to say, the intellect which is apostate from Christ in the sense of thinking according to the "flesh") is declared to be sovereign.

God's revelation must take hold of the heart, the root of our entire existence, that we may "stand in the truth". Calvin hits rationalistic scholasticism at the root of its apostasy from a Christian attitude towards knowledge, when he writes: "Nec satis fuerit mentem esse Dei spiritu illuminatam, nisi et eius virtute cor obfirmetur ac fulciatur. In quo tota terra Scholastici aberrant, qui in fidei consideratione nudum ac simplicem ex notitia assensum aripiunt, praeterita cordis fiducia et securitate".

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1 See *Institutio religionis Christianae* (1559), II, 1, 9: "Unde sequitur partem illam, in qua refulget animae praestantia et nobilitas, non modo vulneratam esse, sed ita corruptam, ut non modo sanari, sed novam prope naturam induere opus habeat." ['From this it follows that that part upon which shines the excellence and nobility of the soul, not only is wounded, but as much corrupted that it not only needed to be healed, but nearly to assume a new nature.'] Also see II, 1, 6, where the radical character of sin is sharply set forth.

2 "And it will not have been sufficient that the mind is illuminated by the Spirit of God, unless also by its virtue the heart is made firm and is strengthened. In this matter the scholastics completely deviate, which in a superficial way conceive the motive of faith as a mere and simple assent by virtue of the understanding, whereas the confidence and surety of the heart is completely neglected." This statement only gives expression to the pure Biblical conception which considers knowledge — and in the first place knowledge furnished by faith — to be rooted in the heart from
Calvin radically rejected the speculative natural theology. He called it an “audacious curiosity” of human reason that seeks to intrude upon the “essentiae Dei”, which we can never fathom, but can only worship. Again and again he warned against the “vacua et meteorica speculatio” on God’s essence apart from His revelation in His Word. Calvin expressed the true critical religious attitude concerning knowledge of God, an attitude grounded in the humble insight into the essential boundary between the Creator and the creation, in timidity with respect to the deep mystery of God’s majesty.

The scholastic motive of nature and grace is not found in Calvin’s thought, nor is there any trace of the spiritualistic contrast between the divine Law and the Gospel, found in Luther. God’s divine Majesty does not tolerate the blotting out of which proceed the issues of life. This is characteristically misunderstood by Roman Catholics as “sentimentalism”. In 1931 A. J. M. Cornelissen wrote a meritorious comparative study concerning the Doctrine of the State of “Calvin and Rousseau”. In this thesis which he defended at the Roman Catholic University of Nijmegen, he wrote (page 25): “If faith does neither require a praeambula furnished by reason, but the reverse, rational knowledge is strengthened by faith, then, if one is consistent, the act of super-natural “knowing” is only an act of feeling. Calvin drew this conclusion and thus fell into sentimentalism.”

Under the influence of Thomistic-Aristotelian epistemology the insight into what the Bible means by the “heart”, as the religious centre of life, has been so completely lost sight of that there remains nothing else to do but identify it with the temporal function of feeling and then place it in opposition to theoretical thought.

1 Inst. I, 5, 9: “Unde intelligimus hanc esse rectissimam Dei quaerendi viam et aptissimam ordinem; non ut audaci curiositate penetrare tentemus ad excutiendam eius essentiam, quae adoranda potius est quam scrupulosius disquirenda; sed ut illum in suis operibus contemplmus, quibus se propinquum nobis familiaremque reddit ac quodammodo communicat.”

[“Hence we understand, that this is the most correct way and appropriate order to seek God; not that in an audacious curiosity we try to penetrate into an examination of His essence, which is rather to be adored than scrupulously to be examined; but that we contemplate Him in His works by which He comes near to us, makes Himself familiar to us and in some way communicates Himself.”]

2 Ibid. I, 10, 2: “deinde commemorari eius virtutes quibus nobis describitur non quis sit apud se, sed qualis erga nos; ut ista eius agnitiio vivo magis sensu, quam vacua et meteorica speculacione constet.”

[“Moreover we must remember His virtues by which is described to us not what He is in Himself, but how He is in respect to us; in order that this knowledge about Him may rather consist in a lively consciousness than in a void and meteoric speculation.”]
the boundary between the Creator and the creation. In view of this boundary, Luther’s elevation of Christian liberty beyond the limits of the lex divina cannot be accepted.

The cosmonomic Idea of Calvin versus the Aristotelian-Thomistic one.

We have already referred to one of Calvin’s statements that occurs several times in his writings: “Deus legibus solutus est” 1. This statement necessarily implies that “all of the creation is subject to the Law.”

Christ has freed us from the “law of sin” and from the Jewish ceremonial law. But the cosmic law, in its religious fulness and temporal diversity of meaning, is not a burdensome yoke imposed upon us because of sin, but it is a blessing in Christ. Without its determination and limitation, the subject would sink away into chaos. Therefore, Calvin recognized the intrinsic subjection of the Christian to the decalogue, and did not see any intrinsic antinomy between the central commandment of love as the religious root of God’s ordinances, and the juridical or economic law-spheres, or the inner structural law of the state. Anabaptists lost sight of the religious root of the temporal laws, and consequently placed the Sermon on the Mount, with its doctrine of love, in opposition to civil ordinances. Calvin strongly opposed this error. He proceeded from the radical religious unity of all temporal divine regulations and could therefore radically combat each absolutization of a temporal aspect of the full Law of God, as well as every spiritualistic revolution against the state and its legal order: “Christo non est institutum legem aut laxare aut restringere, sed ad veram ac germanicam

1 Cf. De aeterna praedestinatione (1552) C.R. 36, 361: “Non vero commentum illud recipio, Deum quia lege solutus sit quidquid agat reprehensione vacare. Deum enim exlegem qui facit, maxima eum gloriae suae parte spoliat, quia rectitudinem eius ac iustitiam sepelit. Non quod legi subiectus sit Deus, nisi quatenus ipse sibi lex est,” [“I truly do not accept that device that God’s acts are exempt from reprehension because He is not bound to the Law. For he who renders God “exlex”, deprives Him of the principal part of His glory, because he annuls His equity and justice. Not that God should be subjected to the Law, unless in so far as He is a law to Himself.”]

Cf. Comm. in Mosis libros V (1563) C.R. 52, 49, 131: “atque ideo legibus solutus est, quia ipse, sibi et omnibus lex est,” [“and therefore He is above the laws, because He is the Law to Himself and to everything.”] (Contra the nominalistic ex-lex!).
intelligentiam reducere, quae falsis scribarum et Pharisaorum commentis valde depravata fuerant”

This fundamental Idea of the Divine Law does not go with a falling back upon the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of the “lex naturalis”. For this latter proceeds from the religious form-matter motive of Greek thought, and therefore necessarily conflicts with the Biblical conception. The speculative Idea of the “lex aeterna” provides the foundation for the speculative “lex naturalis” with its teleological order of “substantial forms”. In this construction human reason thinks it can prescribe what is law to God. And in the final analysis the Aristotelian conception of the world-order is deified, because in the Idea of the lex aeterna it is identified with the “rational essence” of God. In opposition to it, the Reformation was forced to preach the doctrine of Christian liberty. In this, both Calvin and Luther were prominent, but Calvin succeeded in enunciating a purer position. In his conception of the Divine Law, he lost nothing of the Biblical Idea of freedom in Christ. Luther did not escape falling into a spiritualistic antinomianism against which must be proclaimed the Biblical conception of the Divine Law, grounded in the central confession of God’s sovereignty as Creator. This was necessary for the sake of maintaining the Biblical ground-motive of the Reformation.

**CALVIN’S IDEA OF THE LAW versus BRUNNER’S IRRATIONALISTIC AND DUALISTIC STANDPOINT.**

This Biblical view of Law is at the present time rejected by Emil Brunner. He seeks to replace it by an irrationalistic ethics of love which must break through the temporal divine ordinances. For, according to him, the latter are not the true will of God. In a typically spiritualistic fashion, Brunner fulminates against the Idea of a Christian science, philosophy, culture, culture,

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1. Inst. II., 8, 26. [“Christ has not received the mandate to loosen or to unbind the Law, but rather to restore the true and pure understanding of its commands which had been badly deformed by the false devices of the Scribes and the Pharisees.”]

2. See *Das Gebot und die Ordnungen* (1932) [“The Commandment and the Ordinances”], p. 108 and following, in connection with Brunner’s treatment of *Das Einmalige und der Existenzcharakter* in Blätter f. deutsche Philosophie (1929). The command of love, as “Gebot des Stunde” or “des Augenblicks” (a typically irrationalistic expression) is here opposed to the law in temporal ordinances.
Conclusion and transition to the development of the positive

politics, etc. As to philosophy this is indicative of a new attempt
to effect a compromise with the immanence standpoint (name-
ly, with Kantianism and modern irrationalistic existentialism).
This compromise does not proceed from the spirit of Calvin.
It is rather born from Luther’s dualism and cannot have a
fruitful future.

Brunner attempts to accommodate the after-effect of the Lu-
theran nominalistic dualism between “nature” and “grace” to
Calvin’s view of the Law. But just as this dualism is incompatible
with the Biblical ground-motive, it is also irreconcilable with
Calvin’s standpoint. The Word of God reveals to us the root of
temporal existence; within this root it lays bare the unbridgeable
cleft between the Kingdom of Christ and the Kingdom of dark-
ness; it drives us with inexorable seriousness to an “either-or”.

If a Christian philosophy, Christian jurisprudence, politics,
art etc. are not possible, then these spheres of temporal life are
withdrawn from Christ. Then once again the un-Biblical dualism
between “nature” and “grace” or between the Law and the
Gospel must be accepted, and once again, in order to bridge the
dualism, the path of scholastic accommodation must be followed.

In this case one may reject the synthesis of Christian faith
with the rationalistic cosmonomic Idea of Aristotle or of the
Stoics, but modern Humanistic irrationalism or Criticism are
not an iota more Christian.

For, by following this way one arrives with Brunner at a de-
preciation of certain aspects of reality. Brunner absolutizes love
at the expense of justice; he irrationalistically misinterprets the
central religious commandment of love. As a consequence of
his dialectical standpoint he treats the Idea of justice in a neo-
Kantian fashion: it is denatured to a “purely formal value”.
Brunner sets forth a thesis which denies the fulness of meaning
of the Cross; he holds that complete justice is in itself a contra-
diction and that love, although it must pass through formal

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1 See Das Gebot und die Ordnungen (“The Commandment and the ordi-
nances”), S. 675, where it is said of the Critical Kantian conception of the
Idea of juridical order, that it “erfahrungsgemäss und aus guten Grunden
nur von solchen Juristen verstanden wird, die mit der reformatorischen
Glaubentradition in Zusammenhang stehen” (for example, Stammler and
Burckhardt) [“that, according to experience and for good reasons, it is
only understood by such jurists who stand in connection with the tradi-
tion of faith of the Reformation”]. Thus the synthesis with Kantian
immanence-philosophy is completed.
justice, nevertheless does abrogate the latter. If we follow Brunner along the path of synthesis, we must also tumble into the same pitfall. In this respect Christian philosophy has no more choice than has immanence-philosophy.

The synthesis with ancient immanence-philosophy led Christian thought into complicated antinomies; the synthesis with Humanistic immanence-philosophy does the same. It not only involves Christian thought in the basic antinomy between “nature” and “freedom”, but above all it leads to a radical collision between the hidden apostate ground-motive of this philosophical thought and the central Biblical motive of the Christian religion. Dialectical theology is only the expression of the religious dialectic born out of this collision.

1 See Das Gebot und die Ordnungen, S. 436: “Gerade vom Christlichen Glauben aus gibt es keine irgendwie faszibare Idee der vollkommenen Gerechtigkeit. Denn Gerechtigkeit ist an sich unvollkommen.” [“From the Christian faith itself there cannot in any conceivable way proceed an Idea of perfect justice. For justice is in itself imperfect.”] I would like to suggest that justice “an sich” does not exist but is a meaningless absolutization. The same is true of love “an sich”. Cf. p. 437: “Die Liebe ist konkret, persönlich, nicht-vorausgewuszt, nicht allgemein, nicht gesetzlich. Die Gerechtigkeit ist gerade allgemein gesetzlich, vorausgewuszt, unpersönlich-sachlich, abstrakt, rational.” [“Love is concrete, personal, not foreknown, not generalizing, not legal. Justice, on the contrary, is general, legal, foreknown, impersonal-real, abstract, rational.”] From the Biblical point of view our answer is simply that the opinion of Brunner is not in keeping with the Biblical conception of the Law but stems from a semi-Humanistic point of view. A Christian must learn to bow before God’s majesty and justice, which is not different from His love. God is the origin and original unity of all modal aspects of human experience which are to be distinguished only in the temporal order, but coincide in their religious root and a fortiori in their Divine Origin.

In his later work Gerechtigkeit (1943), Brunner did not essentially change his earlier position. He now spoke of “the justice of faith” in contradistinction to the justice in the sphere of ordinances, but the former does not have any intrinsic connection with the latter. “Justice of faith” is identical with the Love of the Gospel and it abolishes justice in the sense of retribution. And the latter is also true of Divine Justice. Divine Justice is diametrically opposed to earthly justice in the sphere of ordinances. Although earthly ordinances and justice oppose the command of love, yet the former aid in the life of love. This conception is typically Lutheran. In addition compare Reinhold Niebuhr, The Principles of Ethics, chap. V and VI and the Nature and Destiny of Man II, chap. IX. If earthly justice is diametrically opposed to Divine Justice, and nevertheless the former belongs to the sphere of Divine ordinances, there is accepted a dialectical dualism in the Divine Will which betrays the influence of the dialectical ground-motive of nature and grace.
Conclusion and transition to the development of the positive

When we consider this whole situation and recall that Calvin was the first to formulate a purely Biblical conception of the lex in its origin, radical religious unity and temporal diversity, we arrive at the conclusion that a real reformation of philosophic thought cannot historically proceed from Luther but only from Calvin’s point of departure.

Do not misunderstand this conclusion. The reformation of philosophy in a Christian sense does not signify the inauguration of a new school-philosophy such as Thomism which binds itself to the authority of a philosophical system and thinker. It does not signify the elevation of Calvin to a pater angelicus of reformed philosophical thought. It does not mean, that we will seek a philosophical system in Calvin that is not there. It does mean, however, that we will relate philosophical thought in its entire foundation, starting-point, and transcendental direction, to the new root of our cosmos in Christ. We will reject every philosophical standpoint that leans upon the “naturalis ratio” as a supposed self-sufficient Archimedean point. Our aim is an inner reform of thought which is born from the living power of God’s Word, and not from an abstract and static principle of reason. Therefore, in the development of a Christian philosophy which is actually stimulated by the Biblical ground-motive of the Reformation, there must be a constant striving after the reformation of philosophical thought. This precludes the canonizing of a philosophical system.

Christian philosophical thought cannot be led by a spiritualistic mysticism of faith that fancies itself to be elevated above Divine law. It can only be led by the vivifying spirit of God’s Word. In spite of the fact that the temporal cosmos is shattered by sin, since God has maintained its structural order, and since the fulness of meaning is not to be found in time, it is possible to accept the cosmos, in its many-sided richness of meaning, as God’s creation, concentrated in its new religious root: Jesus Christ.

The Christian transcendental ground-Idea embraces the religious antithesis between the apostasy of nature and its destiny according to creation: it does not seek a dialectical synthesis after the fashion of “natura praeambula gratiae”. But it re-

1 In Vol. II we shall show more completely that this is something entirely different from a “cult of antinomies” as Cornelissen, apparently under the influence of dialectical theology, misinterprets Calvin’s thought.
cognizes in "common grace" a counter force against the destructive work of sin in the cosmos, because the antithesis between sin and creation is really abrogated by the redemption in Jesus Christ.

There is no dualism between "gratia communis" and "gratia particularis".

Common grace may not be dualistically opposed to particular grace. If this is done, the dualistic motive of nature and grace is permitted to enter reformed thought under another name. Calvin himself subordinated "gratia communis" to "gratia particularis" and to "the honour and glory of God".

Common grace is meaningless without Christ as the root and head of the regenerated human race. Meaningless without Him, because it only manifests itself in the temporal cosmos. And the latter is necessarily related to its religious root and does not have any existence apart from it. Gratia communis is grace shown to mankind as a whole, which is regenerate in its new root Jesus Christ, but has not yet been loosened from its old apostate root. This is the meaning of Jesus' parable of the tares among the wheat. The wheat and the tares must grow together until the harvest.

For the present, I cannot explain this point any further, but, must postpone its development until we treat the opening process in the cosmos in the general theory of modal law-spheres in Vol. II.

Abraham Kuyper and his often misunderstood Idea of antithesis.

The philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea, from the beginning of its development to its first systematic expression in this work, can only be understood as the fruit of the Calvinistic awakening in Holland since the last decades of the XIX century, a movement which was led by Abraham Kuyper.

But, this philosophy is not to be understood as the exclusive thought of a small clique of Calvinists. On the contrary, according to its basis, by reason of its transcendental ground-Idea, it includes within its range all of Christian thought, as such.

No Christian can escape the dilemma that it sets forth, if he really takes seriously the universality of the Kingship of Christ.

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1 Compare Inst. I, 17, 7 and 11; I, 5, 14; II, 2, 16; III, 3, 25; III, 20, 15 and 24, 2.
and the central confession of God's sovereignty over the whole cosmos as Creator. He cannot avoid its impact unless he seeks to escape by employing such idle words as "Christian freedom" requiring the "freedom of thought". Idle words, indeed, because "Christian freedom" cannot imply a freedom in thought which is stimulated by an anti-Christian ground-motive!

It is in this universal sense that we must understand Kuyper's Idea of the religious antithesis in life and thought. Many peace-loving Christians have made this very point the victim of numerous misunderstandings. They do not recognize that this antithesis does not draw a line of personal classification but a line of division according to fundamental principles in the world, a line of division which passes transversely through the existence of every Christian personality. This antithesis is not a human invention, but is a great blessing from God. By it He keeps His fallen creation from perishing. To deny this is to deny Christ and His work in the world.

Why I reject the term "Calvinistic philosophy".

It may be clear from the preceding that I definitely reject the term "Calvinistic" as being appropriate to name the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea. I reject the term Calvinistic, even though I fully acknowledge that this philosophy was the fruit of the Calvinistic re-awakening in the Netherlands.

Because of its religious basic motive and its transcendental ground-Idea, however, this philosophy deserves to be called Christian philosophy without any further qualification. For it would be impossible for an intrinsically Christian philosophy to be based on any other ground-motive than the integral and radical one of Holy Scripture which does not depend on man.

Thomistic philosophy has constantly rejected the name "Christian". It is true that certain neo-Thomists such as Gilson and Maritain have begun to depart from this tradition. But this departure is more readily explained as the result of an Augustinian rather than a Thomistic influence.

We can speak of a re-formed Christian philosophy in contrast to a particular neo-scholastic-Christian one, which has aban-

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1 Therefore, I regret the fact that the philosophical association, which was formed in Holland [after the appearance of the Dutch edition of this work], chose the name "The Association for Calvinistic Philosophy." But I will give due allowance for the fact that I, myself, in an earlier stage of my development, called my philosophy "Calvinistic".
The philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea and Blondelism.

One of the neo-scholastic trends of thought which follow this latter way has entirely broken with Thomism. It is born out of French spiritualism founded by MAINE DE BIRAN and developed in an increasingly antirationalist sense by RAVAISON, LACHELIER, BOUTROUX and others. It wants to continue the Augustinian tradition in Christian thought. But by virtue of the dialectical ground-motive of nature and grace it cannot permit itself to return to the authentic Augustinian conception which rejected in a radical sense the autonomy of philosophical thought, but made philosophy the handmaid of Christian theology.

The main representative of this neo-scholastic Christian philosophy, MAURICE BLONDEL, a disciple of the neo-scholastic thinker OLLÉ LAPRUNE, starts with the immanence-standpoint in philosophy in order to show the deficiency of philosophic thought by means of an irrationalistic and activistic metaphysical interpretation of thought and being. This interpretation was strongly inspired by the Leibnizian Idea of the immanence of the universe in the representations of every metaphysical being, and by the irrationalist and universalistic turn which this latter conception had taken in SCHELLING's "concrete and absolute thought", and later on in BERGSON's philosophy of life. It was also inspired by the idea of MALEBRANCHE concerning a "visio omnium rerum in Deo". But by no means can BLONDEL's Christian philosophy be considered as an intrinsically reformed mode of thought. It lacks in principle a transcendental critique of philosophical thought as such. And its inner dialectical character is clearly shown by the fact that this Roman-Catholic thinker intends to break through the immanence-standpoint and to arrive at a Christian view by means of an activistic, irrationalist and universalistic metaphy-
sics which in principle is ruled by the Humanistic ground-motive, in its accommodation to the scholastic motive of nature and grace.  

The opinion of Ferdinand Sassen, professor of philosophy at the University of Leyden, that there is an inner connection between the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea and Blondel’s voluntarism, consequently rests upon a misunderstanding.

The significance of the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea for a philosophic contact between the different schools.

The significance of the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea may not be limited to Christian thought as such. For in its transcendental critique this philosophy has raised new problems, which must be considered by every philosophy irrespective of its starting-point. Moreover, it has approached each philosophical system from the standpoint of its own ground-motive and deepest pre-suppositions. Therefore, as we have shown in the Prolegomena, this philosophy has opened the way for a better mutual understanding of the various philosophic trends. Under the influence of the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought the various schools had isolated themselves in a dogmatic exclusivism and had propagated their supra-theoretical prejudices as theoretical axioms.

The significance of the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea is not at all negative for other philosophic schools. It has a positive contribution to make. In the next two volumes I have to show the importance of its theory of the modal structures of the aspects, and of its theory about the structures of individuality and the enkaptic interlacements between the latter. I have to show that these two theories disclose states of affairs which hitherto had not

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1 This dialectical synthesizing of the Humanist and the scholastic ground-motives in Blondel’s thought is clearly explained by his disciple Henry Duméry in his treatise Blondel et la philosophie contemporaine (Études Blondéliennes, 2, 1952, p. 71 ff.). See my two lectures entitled Le problème de la philosophie chrétienne. Une confrontation de la conception Blondélienne et de l’idée nouvelle concernant une réformation de la pensée philosophique en Hollande, delivered at the University of Aix en Provence-Marseille (May 1953), which will be published in the quarterly review Philosophia Reformata of this year.

been subjected to philosophical examination. These "states of affairs" belong to the structure of empirical reality and we have observed in the Prolegomena that, just as the laws of theoretical thought, they are the same for every philosophical standpoint. The only question is: Which philosophy is in a position to give a satisfactory theoretical explanation of these data? We have established in the Prolegomena, that no single philosophy may claim to have a monopoly. Each philosophy may strive in a noble competitive manner to work at a common task. But this cooperation can only take place on one condition. The schools of immanence-philosophy must be ready to abandon their theoretical dogmatism and they must take seriously the transcendental critique of philosophic thought set forth in our Prolegomena.

What we have said is in the first place applicable to our theoretical view of empirical reality. Because of the inner structure of theoretical thought our view of empirical reality is dependent upon the transcendental ground-Idea which directs our philosophic inquiry. And the content of every ground-Idea is determined by super-theoretical motives. If this is not acknowledged, then any philosophic exchange of Ideas is condemned to failure in advance. Philosophical discussion is possible between schools which do not have the same starting-point, if, and only if, a sharp distinction is made between authentic theoretical judgments (concerning which philosophic discussion is possible) and the necessary pre-theoretical prejudices which lie at the foundation of such theoretical judgments.

Philosophical discussion about the theoretical judgments is to be based on the undeniable states of affairs in the structures of theoretical thought and of empirical reality which precede all theoretical interpretation and are to be established with έποιήσεως of the latter. They are to be confronted with the different philosophic views in order to investigate whether these views, each from their own super-theoretical starting-point, are able to account for them in a satisfactory way.

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1 I am happy to be able to say, that during recent years, the critical significance of this philosophy has been better understood in Holland, both in Thomistic and Humanistic circles. However, I do not want to pretend, that this is always the case.
CHAPTER II

THE SYSTEMATIC PLAN OF OUR FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS AND A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE RELATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE COSMONOMIC IDEA TO THE SPECIAL SCIENCES

§ 1 - THE SO-CALLED DIVISIONS OF SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY IN THE LIGHT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA

With this we have come to the end of our critical examination of the significance of the transcendental ground-Idea for all philosophical thought. We have reached the point where we can begin to develop the positive content of our philosophy. To this end we must first give an account of the plan which will determine the course of our future investigations.

The question arises as to whether or not we can employ the basic divisions of philosophic problems as they are made by immanence-philosophy.

The reply is in the negative. And this denial rests upon the fact that also the classification and formulation of problems in immanence-philosophy is intrinsically connected with its transcendental ground-Idea.

With respect to the systematic development of Humanistic philosophy we can state, that the foundation of all systematic attempts at a classification of problems is rooted in both polar basic factors of the Humanistic ground-Idea: the ideal of science and that of personality, with their inherent postulates of continuity.

The fundamental significance of the transcendental ground-Idea for all attempts made in Humanistic immanence-philosophy to classify the problems of philosophy.

We have seen that both of these basic factors have dominated Humanistic philosophy since the Renaissance. Before the critical
philosophy of Kant, however, they were not clearly isolated as a regulative principle for the systematic classification of philosophical problems. The Critique of Pure Reason fenced the first main field of philosophic inquiry: the epistemological foundation and limitation of the classic ideal of science (which is directed toward the “domination of nature”). The second main field of philosophical investigation is indicated by the Critique of Practical Reason, i.e. the critical foundation of autonomous ethics, according to the Humanistic ideal of personality. In connection with this latter Critique, Kant treats the philosophical problems of jurisprudence (“Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre”) and of theology. The Critique of Teleological Judgment (Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft) investigates the philosophical problems of biology, history and aesthetics and is thought of as a subjective synthesis between the two other critiques.

In Fichte we find a re-occurrence of this basic division. He classified philosophy into a “Wissenschaftslehre” with a “theoretical” and a “practical” section. Upon this foundation was subsequently constructed the pantheistic metaphysics of absolute Being. In Hegel’s dialectical division of philosophy into logic, natural philosophy, and the philosophy of Spirit, it is not difficult to detect the influence of the same Humanistic ground-Idea.

As we have seen, pre-Kantian rationalistic Humanistic philosophy was completely under the influence of Descartes’ program of a mathesis universalis. In the naturalistic branch (Hobbes) this program could only lead to an encyclopaedical systematizing of the sciences in a successive continuous procession, from the simple to the complex spheres of knowledge. This was done upon the basis of a mathematical logic and a so-called “prima philosophia”. The method of thought of mathematical natural science was maintained in every field of philosophical investigation, in accordance with the con-

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1 In my treatise Norm and Fact, published in the Dutch juridical quarterly “Themis” (1932), I have shown in detail that Kant’s philosophy of history, particularly developed in his treatise Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784), must be explained from the view-point of the “Critique of teleological Judgment” (published a few years after).
Conclusion and transition to the development of the positive continuity-postulate of the science-ideal. The same can be ascertained again in Comte's positivism. In spite of their maintenance of the primacy of the science-ideal, we saw that, in the dualistic types of pre-Kantian metaphysics, a fundamental metaphysical cleft was made between natural philosophy, on the one hand, and metaphysical psychology and ethics, on the other.

Christian Wolff divided philosophy into two main fields: theoretical philosophy or metaphysics (including natural theology, psychology and physics), and practical philosophy.

Pre-Kantian empiristic philosophy could also accept a division into theoretical and practical sections. John Locke, for example, considered philosophy (as a scientific system) to possess three main divisions: "physica" or natural philosophy, "practica" whose principal part constitutes ethics, and "semiotica", whose principal element consists of nominalistic logic.

Even in the philosophy of the XXth Century, attempts at a systematic division continue to be made in accordance with the foundational structure of the Humanistic transcendental ground-idea.

Thus we find that Cohen, the father of the neo-Kantian Marburg school, divides philosophy into three principal realms: "Logic of pure Knowledge", "Ethics of pure Will" and "Aesthetics of pure Feeling". Obviously this classification receives its orientation from Kant.

The neo-Kantian philosophy of values (Rickert) divides the sphere of real nature from the sphere of ideal values. We have seen in part I, that it seeks to effect a subjective synthesis between the two spheres in the intermediary sphere of culture. The system of values which philosophy must give, according to this standpoint, is grounded in the fundamental distinction between theoretical and practical values. It is not difficult to recognize in this distinction the dualism between the science-ideal and the ideal of personality. Theoretical philosophy becomes a transcendental critique of natural science, practical philosophy a "Weltanschauungslehre".

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1. Essays on Human Understanding IV, 21, § 1 ff.
WINDELBAND's opinion concerning the necessity of dividing philosophy into a theoretical and a practical section.

In his *Introduction into Philosophy*, WINDELBAND divided the philosophical material into theoretical problems (Wissenschaften) and the axiological ones (Wertfragen). In this context he observes: “The connection of both moments (i.e. of the theoretical and practical) is characteristic of philosophy to such a degree, that the division of its historical manifestations into different appropriate periods can be gained in the best manner from the change of the relations between these two. We see how with the Greeks that which is called philosophy originates from purely theoretical interest and methodically comes under the influence of the practical need, and we follow the triumph of the latter in the long periods during which philosophy essentially aims at being a doctrine of the redemption of man. With the Renaissance once more there comes to rule a preponderatingly theoretical striving and the Enlightenment again makes the results of the latter subservient to its practical cultural-ends: until in KANT, with impressive clarity, the intimate coherence between both sides of philosophy is realized and made understandable”

WINDELBAND summarily tries to justify this “foundational” distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy by conceiving it as founded upon the two sides of human nature, considered here as a “thinking” and “volitional-acting” being. But this explanation is not serious. For the so-called “practical” philosophy is as much theoretical as the “theoretical” one, and thinking can be either a practical or a theoretical act.

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1 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 2e Aufl., 1920, S. 19/20: “Die Verknüpfung beider Momente (i.e. "des theoretischen und praktischen") ist für die Philosophie so charakteristisch, dass aus dem Wechsel der Beziehungen zwischen ihnen die Gliederung ihrer historischen Erscheinungen in sachgemäß unterschiedene Perioden am besten gewonnen werden kann. Wir sehen das, was sich Philosophie nennt, im Griechentum aus rein theoretischem Interesse erwachsen und allmählich unter die Macht des praktischen Bedürfnisses kommen, und wir verfolgen den Triumph des letzteren in den langen Jahrhunderten, während deren die Philosophie wesentlich eine Lehre von der Erlösung des Menschen sein will. Mit der Renaissance kommt vom neuem ein vorwiegend theoretisches Bestreben zur Herrschaft, und dessen Ergebnisse stellt wieder die Aufklärung in den Dienst ihrer praktischen Kulturzwecke: bis dann in KANT, der intime Zusammenhang zwischen beiden Seiten der Philosophie mit eindrucksvoller Deutlichkeit zum Bewusstsein und zum Verständnis gebracht wird.”
Conclusion and transition to the development of the positive

We quoted the preceding statement of Winkelband to demonstrate how completely dominating the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical is thought to be; it is viewed as not being peculiar to the Humanistic, but to the entire western immanence-philosophy.

It is, however, the polar tension between the ideal of science and that of personality, in the basic structure of the Humanistic ground-Idea, that gives this division its particular Humanistic sense.

The distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy in Greek thought.

The distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy was in fact already present in ancient Greek philosophy. It played a fundamental rôle since Aristotle, and in the Middle Ages it was in many respects accepted without further reflection.

The reason for its adoption is readily understood, if we examine the Socratic trend in Greek thought. The path of the latter had been paved by the sophists.

As we have seen in our transcendental critique, Greek thought was dominated by the religious form-matter motive. And this motive determined the central content of the various forms of its transcendental ground-Idea.

In the Ionic natural philosophy the matter-motive of the old religion of life had the primacy up until Anaxagoras. In the transcendental Idea of Origin, the divine ἄμαζων was conceived of as the formless and impersonal stream of life. And in most instances it was identified with what was later called a mobile element (e.g. water, air, or fire). In Anaximander, however, it was simply referred to as the invisible ἄμαζων (the formless or unlimited). Under the influence of this transcendental Idea of Origin, man and his culture were viewed under the same perspective as the rest of things, arising in a specific form out of the womb of the eternal flowing stream of life. Man and all things are condemned to death and decay because “form” is ungodly and perishable.

In opposition to the matter-motive the Eleatic school posited its counter pole, viz. the principle of form. It developed a metaphysical ontology in which the all-inclusive form of being was qualified as the only true, eternal, and unchangeable entity. However, the form-motive is here still orientated to the old
contents of the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea

ouranic \(^1\) religion of nature. As a result, this dialectical trend did not lead Greek thought to critical self-reflection concerning the central position of man in the cosmos. This latter did not occur until the form-motive of the culture-religion acquired the primacy in Greek thought. Under its leadership interest was directed to human culture and in particular to the Greek *polis* as the bearer of the Olympian culture-religion. In PROTAGORAS, the father of Sophistic, this dialectical trend was accompanied by a sceptical criticism of natural philosophy and metaphysical ontology, a criticism which involved the whole of theoretical knowledge. It drew the most extreme conclusions from the matter-motive of the older nature-philosophy \(^2\).

If everything is in a constant state of flux and change, this is also true of theoretical truth. There is no fixed norm for the latter. Individual man in his constantly changing subjectivity is the measure of all things. This devaluation of theoretical knowledge of nature had its back-ground in the shift of interest to human culture and in particular to the Greek *polis* as the sphere of human action. In opposition to theoretical philosophy, which is valueless in itself, was posited a practical philosophy, not concerned with truth, but with what is useful and beneficial to man. In particular its task was to furnish practical knowledge necessary for politics. For by means of its *paideia*, the *polis*, as the bearer of the culture-religion, gives form to human nature, which in itself does not posses any law or form, because it is entirely subjected to the ever flowing stream of becoming and decay.

The sophistic distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy in the light of the Greek motive of form and matter.

Thus, for the first time, a fundamental opposition was introduced between theoretical and practical philosophy, and this

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\(^1\) "Ouranic" (derived from "Ouranos") means what is related to the celestial sphere (the "celestial Gods", i.e. the sun and the stars).

\(^2\) Neither the Ionic philosophy of nature, nor Heraclitus had done this. For in the *physis*, i.e. the process of growth and decay, they had always accepted a fixed norm and proportion. They derived the latter from the motive of form. In other words, they did not eliminate the form-motive, but merely ascribed primacy to the motive of matter.
opposition was entirely dominated by the dualistic Greek ground-motive. The question as to whether primacy was to be ascribed to the motive of form or to that of matter was expressly viewed by Socrates in the light of critical self-knowledge. According to the testimony of Plato in the dialogue Phaedrus — which, if not authentic, nevertheless suits the Socratic spirit perfectly — Socrates wished to know, if his ego was related to Typhon, the wild and incalculable God of destructive storms (a genuine mythological symbol of the matter-motive), or whether he was in possession of a simple (Apollinian) nature, to which form, order, and harmony are proper.

Just as Protagoras, Socrates ascribed primacy to the form-motive of the culture-religion. His interests also were entirely directed to culture, ethics, and politics. He was solely concerned in human action. But before everything else he wished to regain fixed norms in philosophical theoria as to the good, the true, and the beautiful. These had been undermined by the critique of the sophists, a critique exclusively inspired by the matter-principle and loosened from the principle of form. The criterion of utility, which Protagoras had accepted for practical philosophy, was in the last analysis itself caught in the matter-principle of eternal flux and change.

Therefore, Socrates wished to elevate practical philosophy to an epistêmê, a science. The virtues must be comprehended in a concept. Every concept of an aretê, however, remains enclosed in the theoretical diversity of the normative aspects. It must therefore be concentrically directed toward the divine Idea of the good and the beautiful, as the origin of all form in the cosmos. This orientation of the scientific method in ethics to the divine form-principle gave a teleological direction to practical philosophy.

All temporal laws and ordinances and all things in the cosmos must in the last instance aim at expressing the Idea of the good and beautiful, according to which the divine nous formed the cosmos.

A concept is valueless, if it does not inform us of the good of the thing being defined. A concept has value in Socrates' practical philosophy only, if it informs us of the aretê, the use of a thing. This Socratic Idea of aretê implies in the last analysis the teleological relation to the divine Idea of the good and beautiful.

Meanwhile, Socrates sharply emphasized the theoretical character of his "practical" philosophy. He did not counte-
nance the sophistical opposition of theoria and praxis. The distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy is not again significant until Plato and Aristotle. For even though they took full cognizance of Socrates' contribution to thought, they again became interested in the problems of metaphysics and natural philosophy.

Since primacy was now ascribed to the form-motive of the culture-religion, the motive of matter was deprived of all divine attributes and the deity was now conceived of as pure nous ("pure form" in Aristotle).

The Socratic influence on Greek thought directed the latter toward the self-hood. And as soon as this critical self-reflection appeared in Greek philosophy, the characteristic of man, which distinguishes him from other beings bound to the principle of matter, was now sought in the nous (reason). This nous was conceived of as theoretical thought.

Besides ethical and political questions, the theoria was again concerned with ontological problems and with those of nature. Consequently, the need arose to introduce a distinction in human reason itself. Henceforth, the misleading opposition between theoretical and practical reason was introduced. This distinction is really misleading here! For by "practical reason" (phronēsis in Plato, nous praktikos in Aristotle) was not in the least understood pre-theoretical naïve thought, insofar as it is concerned with practice. In principle, both Plato and Aristotle held to the Socratic view that only theoretical insight into the good can protect human action from being dominated by sensory passions and desires, which originate in the "matter" of human nature. From this viewpoint the distinction between theoretical and practical reason cannot be founded in the subjective act of thought, but exclusively in the Gegenstand of its logical function.

The philosophical ethics and political theory of Plato and Aristotle intend to give theoretical insight into objective norms for ethics and politics. It is indifferent to the inner nature of philosophic investigation that it intends to give theoretical information to practical life. For every theoretical investigation can be utilized by the praxis. This even applies to mathematics and physics which do not have any normative aspects as their "Gegenstand".

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1 According to Xenophon, Mem. 3, 9, 4, Socrates himself did not yet distinguish the theoretical sophia from the practical ἀρετή (morality).
The Sophists referred theoretical knowledge to the matter-principle and thus denied any universally valid standard for theoretical truth. Consequently, only on this standpoint could the antithesis between theoretical and practical philosophy have a fundamental significance for the mode of thought as such. PROTAGORAS maintained a pragmatic standpoint with respect to philosophy: Theoria does not have any value in itself. Its value lies solely in the practical aim that it serves, namely, in politics.

Naturally, this extreme nominalistic standpoint cannot recognize norms for praxis which are not conventional. PROTAGORAS' sophistic criterion of utility is purely subjective, but not individualistic, as in his epistemology. The nomos, established by the polis, is the common opinion about good and evil, not that of an individual. It has the task to give cultural form to human physis through its paideia. But, as we have seen, the principle of form is subject here to the matter-principle of the eternal flux and change. PROTAGORAS' evolutionary philosophy of culture is a clear proof of this. The nomos is here only a higher phase of development of the lawless physis.

Only with this background in mind can a proper understanding be gained of the realistic standpoint of PLATO and ARISTOTLE.

The axiological turn of this distinction. The primacy of theoretical philosophy versus the primacy of practical philosophy.

In addition to distinguishing between them, Greek thought immediately arranges theoretical and practical philosophy in an axiological order. In the realist-idealistic systems of PLATO and ARISTOTLE a higher value was ascribed to theoretical philosophy. On the contrary, the naturalist-nominalistic systems which proceeded from the Sophistic standpoint, though they were also influenced by Socrates' Idea of virtue, depreciated pure theoria and ascribed exclusive value to practical philosophy.

In the last analysis, this axiological ordering of theoretical and practical philosophy was connected here with the transcendental ground-Idea of Greek philosophy. For, as we have seen, the distinction acquired an entirely different sense in modern Humanistic philosophy.

According to Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Math. 7, 16), the first explicit division of philosophy into ethica, physica and logica was made by Plato's pupil Xenocrates who directed the academy after Speusippus.
In his *Topica* Ἀριστοτέλης provisionally took over this method of classification. He subsumed all philosophical problems that are related to the universal under λογικά. The specific physical or specific ethical do not receive any attention in this general branch of philosophy. According to this point of view, in addition to including formal logic, λογικά encompasses metaphysics.

If we observe the place here accorded to logic in this wide sense, the influence of the metaphysical (speculative) immanence-standpoint is clearly visible. It is evident insofar as it is related to the metaphysical-universal in its supposed elevation above the cosmic diversity. Metaphysical logic is foundational both for natural and ethical philosophy.

In a later part of his *Topica* and in his *Metaphysics* Ἀριστοτέλης introduced the main division between practical and theoretical philosophy next to which he placed the *Poiètikè*, a third main division of philosophy. According to this new division, metaphysics, as the science of the first grounds of being, became theoretical philosophy κατὰ ἔξοχην. Ἀριστοτέλης ascribed to theoretical metaphysics a higher value than to the other branches of philosophical inquiry; he did so, according to the object of knowledge. Practical and "poetical" philosophy possess less value; the former is directed toward ethical and political human activity and the latter toward human creation in technique and art. How is this higher appreciation of metaphysical theoria to be understood?

Insofar as metaphysics investigates the absolute "formal" ground of being, it is theology (θεολογία). Theoretical reason furnishes us with knowledge of the pure nous as divine "actus purus". And the latter, as Ἀρχή, is considered to be the final "formal" ground of being of the cosmos, whereas "pure matter" is the original principle of becoming and continuous change. Theoretical metaphysics, therefore, takes axiological precedence of all practical and "poetical" knowledge. Practical philosophy has its foundations in theoretical philosophy in this metaphysical sense. With this is closely connected the distinction made in

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1 *Top. A 14, 105b, 199 sq.*

2 In this later division Ἀριστοτέλης did not give any place to the Analytica. The Peripatetici explained this by saying that Logic only functions as an organ of philosophy proper.

3 Metaph. K 7, 1064b, 5b: βελτίων δὲ καὶ χειρών ἑκάστη λέγεται κατὰ τὸ δικείον ἔπιστημον.
Conclusion and transition to the development of the positive ethics between the “dianoetic” and the ethical virtues. The former point to theoretical and the latter to practical life. The “dianoetic” virtues are the highest, because they are directed toward theoretical knowledge itself. A life devoted only to sensory enjoyment is bestial. An ethical-political life is human, but a life devoted to theory is divine. In it the divine in man, the nous poïētikos (which is planted in him νοῦς φαίνει, that is to say, from outside) reveals itself in its purest form. It is evident that this whole appreciation of pure theory depends upon the religious primacy of the Greek form–motive. Pure theoria is the only way to a real contact with the divine “forma pura”. The transcendental Idea of Origin has two poles: pure Form versus pure matter.

This Aristotelian axiological view of theory and practice was accepted by Thomas Aquinas. He also placed the “dianoetic” virtues above the practical and ethical ones.

The primacy of practical knowledge in the naturalistic-nominalistic trends of Greek immanence-philosophy.

In giving pre-eminence to theoretical philosophy, the metaphysical-idealistic systems of Greek philosophy held to the reality of the ideal forms. In contrast, naturalistic-nominalist Greek philosophy, influenced by the sophistic subjectivism and the Socratic Idea of virtue, ascribed primacy to practical philosophy. Perhaps it is better to say that they rejected all pure “theoria”. The Megaric, Cynic, and Cyrenaic schools apparently did not distinguish between theoretical and practical philosophy, nor does one find in them the division of philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic. Nevertheless, they concentrated their entire philosophical interest on ethics, to which logic (dialectic) was made subservient.

Epicurus divided philosophy into a canonic (logical), a physical and an ethical section. The philosophy of nature was treated only for the sake of its ethical utility, namely, insofar as it could liberate the soul from the terrors of superstition and could prepare it for the hedonistic enjoyments of cultural life in wise self-restriction. It accomplishes this task by furnishing an insight into the rigid mechanical coherence of the events of nature, considered as an interaction of atoms in the void. In my Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy (1949, vol. I) I have shown that this Greek atomism has nothing to do with the
modern atomistic view of matter, but originated from the Greek form-matter-motive. The systems of the Stoics also followed the traditions of the Academy in dividing philosophy into logic, physics, and ethics. Primacy was, here too, ascribed to practical philosophy\(^1\), even though the philosophic physics (which, in a nominalistic strain, had replaced Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics) occupied the highest position among the theoretical sciences, because as “physical theology” it should lead to knowledge of God\(^2\). The old Stoic view of nature and deity was also completely dominated by the Greek form-matter motive. God is the ever flowing life-stream in its dialectical identity with the form-principle: he is the primal fire and the Logos of nature. It is the task of ethics to teach us how to live according to this Logos.

In Stoic ethics the primacy of practical philosophy is clearly revealed, where — in sharp contrast to the Aristotelian view — it teaches, that the highest human task is found in moral action rather than in theoretical contemplation. All virtues are practical and moral in nature; there is no place for pure “dianoetic” ones as in Aristotle. Zeno traced them back to Ἀκρόμαχος.

According to Plutarch, Chrysippus opposed the philosophers who viewed theoretical life as an end in itself. He contended, that such a view was basically a refined hedonism. It was only agreed that in moral life the correct πράγματα, in conformity with reason, rests upon the θεωρία and blends with it.

In Greek immanence-philosophy, the necessity of ascribing primacy to the theoretical or to the practical reason is connected with the dialectical form-matter motive.

Our discussion should disclose the fact, that the modern Humanistic ideals of science and personality did not play a rôle in the Greek distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy, but that the latter originated from the religious form-matter motive in its dialectical development within philosophic thought. As we saw, this distinction made its entry in Sophistic under the influence of the dialectical opposition of physis and

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\(^1\) Cf. Windelband, Gesch. der alten Phil., 2e Aufl., S. 184.

\(^2\) This theological preference for theoretical philosophy of nature is maintained by Posidonius in the middle Stoa, and by Seneca in the late Stoa.
nomos, as a dialectical antithesis of pure matter and cultural form (due to the paideia of the polis as the bearer of the cultural religion). It appeared that the further development of the distinction, and the question about the primacy of theoretical or practical philosophy, is closely connected with the dialectical antithesis between the realist-idealistic and the nominalist-naturalistic elaboration of the form-motive, conceived in conformity with the cultural religion. The nous is elevated to the rank of the form-principle of human nature.

This nous, as a pseudo-Archimedean point, is imprisoned in the modal diversity of meaning. Realist-idealistic attempts to surmount the modal diversity in a transcendental Idea of the Origin of all forms, theologically leads to an absolutizing of theoretical thought as divine nous, and the latter is then thought of as "pure form without matter". "Practical reason", because bound to the aim of conducting temporal human behaviour, is always related to the matter-principle of human nature. Therefore, it lacks the perfection of pure theoretical thought. The primacy of theoretical reason cannot be maintained unless this hypostatization of theoretical thought is made.

Naturalistic nominalism does not join in this metaphysical hypostatization of "pure thought" to "pure form" lifted out of the cosmic coherence of meaning. Yet, if it did not wish to abandon the Socratic trend toward the ethical form of the self-hood, nor to accept the Sophistic nihilism as to theoretical truth, it could only escape the extreme dualism between theoretical and practical reason by axiologically subordinating theoretical philosophy to practical ethics. But the basic antinomy between theoretical and practical reason in Stoic and Epicurean philosophy testifies to the fact that the two poles in the transcendental ground-Idea of Greek thought were no more reconciled in naturalistic nominalism than in idealistic realism.

Why we cannot divide philosophy into a theoretical and a practical.

Our conclusion is, that the basic division of philosophy into a theoretical and practical section, as well as the division between nature- and spirit-philosophy, are intrinsically connected with the immanence standpoint and its conception of the human self-hood. This division points to an inner dissension in the Archimedean point, a discord, which necessarily leads to the ascription of primacy to theoretical or practical philosophy.
From the standpoint of re-formed Christian philosophy, in view of its transcendental ground-Idea, this distinction must be discarded in all of its many forms. Our rejection is not made, because we will not have anything to do with immanence philosophy, but because the division in question is incompatible with the Biblical ground-motive of our philosophical thought.

We have seen, that the human selfhood as the religious root, as the heart of our entire existence, transcends the temporal limits of our cosmos. It transcends all the modal aspects. Philosophy, directed toward the totality of meaning, in the whole of its activity, is necessarily of a theoretical character. From a Christian point of view, therefore, it is meaningless and even dangerous to take over a basic classification, employed by immanence philosophy, which is rooted in the intrinsic dissension of its Archimedian point.

Upon a re-formed Christian standpoint “practical reason” cannot bridge over the fundamental diversity of the normative modal aspects of our cosmos. And neither a theoretical, nor a practical reason, in the sense of immanence philosophy, is identical with our veritable transcendent selfhood.

§ 2 - THE SYSTEMATIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE COSMONOMIC IDEA IN ACCORDANCE WITH INDISSOLUBLY COHERING THEMATA

In the light of our transcendental ground-Idea, philosophical investigation ought to be carried out in accord with the following fundamental, but mutually inseparably cohering themata (themes):

1 - The transcendental criticism of philosophical thought implying the investigation of the religious ground-motives which determine the contents of the transcendental ground-Ideas.

2 - The investigation directed toward the analysis of the modal aspects of temporal reality in order to discover their functional structure. This is the general theory of the modal aspects and their proper law-spheres.

3 - The theory of knowledge with respect to naïve experience, the special sciences, and philosophy, or the transcendental self-reflection on the universally valid conditions of naïve experience and of the theoretical analysis and synthesis of modal meaning, in the light of the transcendental ground-Idea.
Conclusion and transition to the development of the positive

4 - The examination directed towards the data of naïve experience in order to investigate the typical structures of individuality of temporal reality, and their mutual intertwinements.

5 - The investigation of the structural unity of human existence within cosmic time, in the light of the transcendental Idea of human self-hood; this is the theme of philosophical anthropology. It can only be developed on the basis of all former themes of investigation.

The problem of time cannot be a particular theme, since it has a universal transcendental character, and as such embraces every particular philosophical question. It is the transcendental background of all our further inquiries.

In this volume, we have concluded the discussion of the first theme, the transcendental criticism of philosophy. We are left with the task of applying this ἐπίσκευς to the four remaining themata. But the fifth, that of philosophical anthropology, will be treated separately in our new trilogy Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, especially in the third volume.

The philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea does not recognize any dualistic division of philosophy. The themata develop the same philosophical basic problem in moments which are united in the transcendental ground-Idea, in its relation to the different structures of cosmic time. These moments are inseparably linked together.

This thematization is not intended to be a division of the philosophical fields of investigation in the sense of a delimitation of self-sufficient spheres of problems. We consider such a division to be in conflict with the essence of philosophical thought, as theoretical thought directed toward the totality of meaning. Our entire work is concerned with the religious self-reflection in philosophical inquiry; we cannot allow any single philosophical problem to be viewed in isolation.

The psychologized as well as the so-called Critical epistemology sought to set up the problem of knowledge as an independent isolated basic problem. We cannot accept this absolutization of the epistemological questions, viewed as purely theoretical ones, because a really critical transcendental epistemology depends upon religious self-knowledge and knowledge of God which transcend the theoretical sphere. Epistemology is theory
directed towards the totality of meaning of human knowledge. It is the theory in which our selfhood, having attained the limits of philosophical thinking, returns into itself and thereby reflects upon the limits and supra-theoretical suppositions of temporal knowledge.

Thus viewed, what is all of philosophy other than epistemology? But it is evident, that with such a conception of the problem of knowledge, we might at the same time ask: What is all philosophy other than philosophy of the structures of temporal reality or of time? For in all of its dimensions, philosophical investigation signifies the structural theory of temporal reality, directed toward the totality and Origin of meaning in religious self-reflection. Nay — without religious self-reflection upon the meaning of our temporal cosmos, a veritably critical theory of knowledge would be unattainable for philosophy, because our temporal knowledge, in theory as well as in naive experience, only has meaning in the whole coherence of meaning of temporal reality.

Our further investigations will be carried on in accord with the four remaining themata which we have just enumerated. These themata are to be understood as a methodical explication in different respects of one and the same basic problem. They develop this problem in its relation to the different structures of cosmic time and temporal reality, according to the moments which are contained in our transcendental ground-Idea: the transcendental Ideas of Origin, super-theoretical totality and temporal diversity of meaning in its modal aspects (opposed to each other in the theoretical "gegenstand-relation", but coherent in cosmic time) and in its temporal structures of individuality.

Only the transcendental ground-Idea gives an account of the method of thematization of philosophy.

The philosophy of the cosmonic Idea does not recognize any other theoretical foundation than the transcendental critique of philosophical thought.

Immanence-philosophy very often recognizes particular philosophical basic sciences as the self-sufficient foundation of the special branches of science and philosophical inquiry. Our transcendental ground-Idea does not permit us to accept any other theoretical foundation for philosophy than the transcendental critique of philosophical thought as such. We do not acknowledge as a true foundation of philosophy a "phenomenology" as developed
Conclusion and transition to the development of the positive

by Husserl or Scheler, nor a "prima philosophia" as in speculative metaphysics. A "logic of philosophy", as is found in Lask, a critique of knowledge as developed by Hume or Kant, as well as the critical ontology of Nicolai Hartmann or a symbolic logic in the sense of the Vienna school, are also unacceptable to us as the basis for all philosophical investigation, because they lack a really critical foundation. Nor do we agree that a philosophy of values, or a philosophy of mind may furnish an adequate basis for all cultural sciences, whereas an epistemology may be the exclusive foundation of the natural sciences. The very notion that philosophy is founded upon self-sufficient basic sciences is rooted in the immanence standpoint. And this is true whether or not philosophy is taken as a coherent whole, or — in the case of a dualistic main division of its field of investigation — in its separate parts. Immanence-philosophy withdraws philosophical thought from a radical transcendental critique.

The transcendental critique of theoretical thought, which we have presented in this volume, is, to be sure, the ultimate theoretical foundation of philosophy. This critique is, however, not to be considered as a self-sufficient philosophical basic science, since it gives a theoretical account of the supra-philosophical \( \varepsilon \pi \delta \varepsilon \theta \varepsilon \omicron \) of all philosophical thought.

Philosophical thought, in accordance with its immanent limitations, remains enclosed within the temporal diversity of meaning, within which no single specific synthesis can be the common denominator of all the others, or of a complex of other syntheses. The philosophy of mathematics, physics, biology, psychology, logic, history, language, sociology, economy, aesthetics, jurisprudence, ethics, and theology, as "philosophia specialis", fall under the third and fourth theme. That is to say, they belong to the particular theory of modal aspects and to the theory of the structures of individuality, insofar as the latter express themselves within the modal aspects of reality which delimit the specific fields of inquiry of the different branches of science.

In the sense just specified, no single "philosophia specialis" can function as a philosophical basic science. The particular philosophical pre-suppositions of a special science exert their apriori influence in the most concrete problems of any particular science. We shall later show this in detail. But the particular philosophy of a special science only exists as philosophy, insofar as it examines this foundation in the light of a total theoreti-
cal vision of temporal reality. And the latter is ruled by the
transcendental ground-Idea and the religious basic motive. A
*philosophia specialis* only exists to set forth the basic problems
of the special sciences in the all-sided coherence of meaning of
temporal reality and to relate these problems to the super-
temporal fulness of meaning and to the *arché*. An isolated *phil-
osophia specialis* is a contradiction in terms.

§ 3 - A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PHILOSOPHY AND THE SPECIAL SCIENCES

At this point, however, the question arises once again as to
whether or not the special sciences can operate independently of
philosophy. Although our transcendental critique of theoretical
thought has led to a negative answer, a closer examination is
not superfluous. For the prejudice concerning the independence
of special science in respect to philosophy seems to be nearly
unconquerable. It is argued that the special sciences wrested
themselves free from philosophy with great difficulty. The
Renaissance and the period following are marked by this
struggle. Mathematical physics had to fight in order to free it-
self from the bonds of the Aristotelian philosophy of nature
whose doctrine of substantial forms and especially whose non-
mathematical conception of natural events was supposed to
impede exact physical investigation. In the XIXth century juris-
prudence had to struggle against the rationalistic philosophy of
natural law (Wolff c.s.). Even to-day, especially for the students
of natural science, the example of “Hegelianism” demonstrates
the dangers of a philosophy which tries to meddle in the
problems of the special sciences.

It may be that our transcendental critique has shown the im-
possibility of the autonomy of philosophical thought in respect
to faith and religion. Its argument, however, that even the special
sciences lack in principle this autonomy, because they necessa-
arily are founded upon philosophical pre-suppositions, will meet
with much more resistance, especially from the side of the exact
sciences. And, at least nowadays, we have no occasion to
ascribe this resistance merely to a conceited attitude with respect
to philosophical reflection as such.

Logic, ethics, and aesthetics are generally considered as being
parts of philosophy ¹. In addition, the concession is made that

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¹ I can not agree with this opinion; Only the special *philosophy* of
there must be room for a philosophy of the special sciences and for a general epistemology. But according to the generally held opinion, philosophy and science must remain separate, in order to insure the "objectivity" of the latter. When special sciences operate within their own sphere and employ their own scientific methods, they are to be considered as being independent of philosophy.

The separation of philosophy and the special sciences from the standpoint of modern Humanism.

Nowadays, Humanism generally concedes that the special sciences are autonomous with respect to philosophy 1.

In the positivistic period of the second half of last century, speculative philosophy was completely discredited. It has been extremely difficult for philosophy to regain general recognition. Therefore, Humanist thought now seeks to guard against its old errors and grants complete autonomy to the special sciences within their own sphere 2.

Even many adherents of the so-called Critical epistemology have changed their attitude in this respect.

logic, ethics and aesthetics does have this character. But, here too, philosophy permeats special scientific thought.

1 In modern metaphysical Humanistic philosophy, however, there can be observed some reaction against the tendency of the special sciences to look upon philosophy as something quite indifferent from the view-point of their own empirical research. HANS DRIESCH, for instance writes: "sie (i.e. die Naturphilosophie) will nicht nur den Naturwissenschaften eine Lenkerin sein, die ihnen sagt, welche Wege sie gehen müssen, und welche Wege sie nicht gehen dürfen, sondern sie will auch für die Philosophie den einen von jenen Sammelpunkten bedeuten, in welche alle möglichen Wege des Denkens über Gegebenes zusammenlaufen, und welche ihrerseits Wege ausstrahlen lassen in jenes Gebiet, das das Ziel aller Philosophie ist, in die Lehre vom Wirklichen, vom Nicht-blosz-für-mich-sein: in die Metaphysik (Zwei Vorträge zur Naturphilosophie, Leipzig 1910, S. 21/2. ["It (i.e. the philosophy of nature) does not only want to be a guide of the natural sciences, telling them which roads to choose and which not; but it also wishes philosophy to be one of these central points into which all possible ways of thought about the data meet. From this centre there are roads leading into the sphere that all philosophy aims at, i.e. the theory of reality, of the being that does not exist merely for me, viz. metaphysics. (Two Lectures on Nature-philosophy)]. Driesch recognizes that he opposes the commonly held view.

2 On this standpoint it is pre-supposed that "empirical reality" does not have normative aspects, so that there is no room for "normative sciences".
In his critical period, Kant proclaimed three-dimensional space, as an intuitional form, to be a transcendental condition of geometry. On this ground, several of his followers (L. Ripke Köhn and others) opposed Einstein's theory of relativity. The Marburg school of neo-Kantians, however, hastened to accommodate the Kantian theory of knowledge to the non-Euclidean geometries (Gauss, Lobatschewsky, Riemann, Bolyai and others). The same can be said about the Kantian apriori conception of causal natural law, which was orientated to the classic physics of Newton, but could not be maintained against the modern quantum-physics.

An independent philosophical critique of the method and theoretical constructions of mathematical natural science is, however, impossible when epistemology is exclusively orientated to the “Factum” or (as the Marburg school prefers to say) to the “Fieri” of this science, which must be accepted as it is.

The universal validity and autarchy of scientific theory must in this case be accepted apriori, since, in rationalistic immanence-philosophy, natural scientific thought occupies the same position in the sphere of “natural reality”, as the divine world-order has in Christian philosophy. Epistemology has simply to follow in the footsteps of the special sciences and is thus safe from being in conflict with scientific progress. Philosophy does not guide or give advice but merely reflects upon the course which the special science has followed. It is consequently assured of the good graces of the latter. And the special sciences need take no cognizance of the way in which philosophy seeks to explain epistemologically the course of scientific investigation. The special sciences think they can remain philosophically and religiously neutral. Which sciences can be more neutral than mathematics and physics? When the other special sciences follow the same method, they will need no more philosophical guidance.

Even when the methodological monism of the classical-Humanistic ideal of science is called into question, the neutrality of the special sciences is generally permitted to go unchallenged. In this connection we need only recall the views of Rickert

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1 In his pre-critical period Kant had admitted the conceivableness of a non-Euclidean space. Cf. his Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte (1747, 9 ff) ["Considerations on the true appraisal of the living forces"] and his Allgem. Naturgeschichte des Himmels (1755, IIIth chap.) ["Natural History of the Heavens"].
Conclusion and transition to the development of the positive

and Litt with respect to the relationship between philosophy and the special sciences.

Nowadays, such conceptions are so deeply rooted in philosophical and scientific circles that very often any divergent opinion is quickly branded as an unscientific return to an antiquated conception of the task of philosophy. Yet we must not be frightened by an overwhelming “communis opinio”. We must not hesitate to criticize the current distinction between philosophical and special scientific thought, when it appears to be incompatible with a really critical standpoint.

We are not blind to the danger of apriori speculative metaphysics, if it concerns itself with the specific problems of science. It is not necessary to parade before our eyes this past spectaculum miserabile, because we reject in principle every speculative metaphysics and demand an integral empirical method in philosophic investigations.

The intrinsic untenability of a separation between science and philosophy.

It is impossible to establish a line of demarcation between philosophy and science in order to emancipate the latter from the former. Science cannot be isolated in such a way as to give it a completely independent sphere of investigation and any attempt to do so cannot withstand a serious critique. It would make sense to speak of the autonomy of the special sciences, if, and only if, a special science could actually investigate a specific aspect of temporal reality without theoretically considering its coherence with the other aspects. No scientific thought, however, is possible in such isolation “with closed shutters”. Scientific thought is constantly confronted with the temporal coherence of meaning among the modal aspects of reality, and cannot escape from following a transcendental Idea of this coherence. As we have shown in the Prolegomena, even the special sciences investigating the first two modal aspects of human experience, i.e. the arithmetical and the spatial, cannot avoid making philosophical pre-suppositions in this sense.
The impossibility of drawing a line of demarcation between philosophical and scientific thought in mathematics, in order to make this special science autonomous with respect to philosophy.

Is it possible that modern mathematics would escape from philosophical pre-suppositions with respect to the relationships and coherence of the arithmetic aspect with the spatial, the analytic, the linguistic and sensory ones? Is it permissable to include, with DEDEKIND, the original spatial continuity- and dimensionality-moments in our concept of number? Is mathematics simply axiomatical symbolic logic whose criterion of truth rests exclusively upon the principium contradictionis and the principium exclusi tertii? Does the "transfinite number" really possess numerical meaning? Is it permitted, in a rationalist way, to reduce the subject-side of the numerical aspect to a function of the principle of progression (which is a numerical law) and can we consequently speak of an actually infinitesimal number? Is it justified to conceive of space as a continuum of points? Is it permitted to designate real numbers as spatial points? Is motion possible in the original (mathematical) sense of the spatial aspect?

This whole series of basic philosophical questions strikes the very heart of mathematical thought. No mathematician can remain neutral to them. With or without philosophical reflection on his pre-suppositions he must make a choice. The possibility of effecting a complete separation between philosophy and mathematics is especially problematical with respect to so-called pure ("non-applied") mathematics, because it is conceived of as an apriori science and its results cannot be tested by natural-scientific experiments. Is it not the very task of the philosophy

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1 The opinion that pure mathematics would be apriori in this sense, that it may proceed from fully arbitrary axioms, is incompatible with the Christian conception of the divine world-order as the ultimate foundation of all scientific investigation. From our view-point the apriori-character of pure mathematics cannot mean that the latter would be emancipated from the modal structures of the mathematical aspects which are founded in the temporal order of experience.

The investigation of these structures can only occur in an empirical way, since they are not created by human thought and are no more apriori "thought-forms", but rather are included in the "modal horizon" of our experience as apriori data. They must be discovered in reflection upon our experience of the mathematical aspects. The Kantian conception of the apriori and the empirical moments in human knowledge identifies the "empirical" with the sensory impressions. We have again and again
Conclusion and transition to the development of the positive

of mathematics to investigate the modal structures of the mathematical aspects on which depend all well-founded judgments in pure mathematics?

Is it possible to separate the task of mathematical science from that of the philosophy of mathematics by saying that the latter only seeks to explain the epistemological possibility of apriori mathematical knowledge, whose methods and contents must be accepted without any critique?

But, by such an attempt at demarcation, mathematics is made a "factum", a "fait accompli", and the possibility of a real philosophical criticism of the latter is precluded.

Such an attitude toward the special sciences may be acceptable in the cadre of a transcendental ground-Idea in which the Humanistic ideal of science has a foundational function, but, in the light of our transcendental critique of theoretical thought, it must be rejected as false and dogmatical.

It is true that philosophy can only explain the foundations of mathematics, but this does not warrant the ascription of autonomy to mathematical thought, which reaches its focal point in the technique of reckoning, construction, and deduction. Philosophy cannot attribute this autonomy to it, because the mathematician must necessarily work with subjective philosophical pre-suppositions, whose consequences are evident in mathematical theory itself, as we have explained in the "Prolegomena".

The positivistic-nominalistic conception of the merely technical character of constructive scientific concepts and methods.

The truce between philosophy and the special sciences formulated in the statement that each is to remain in its own sphere, in the final analysis signifies the sanctioning of the positivistic-nominalistic manner of thinking in the sphere of the special sciences. The theoretical scientist is inclined to maintain that — at least in his constructive work — he operates only with technical concepts and methods which are independent of philosophical and a fortiori of religious pre-suppositions.

Thus a mathematician, for example, will say: In our profession, when we employ the concept of the actual continuity of the series of real numbers, we do so without any philosophical prejudice. We utilize such concepts merely, because we find them

to establish that this sensationalistic conception of the "empirical" is incompatible with our integral conception of human experience.
practical and instrumental in the acquisition of satisfactory results.

Similarly, a jurist will say: we use the concept "corporation" (Rechtsperson) as a construction of thought under which we include a whole complex of legal phenomena. We do so from a purely technical juridical consideration, because it is useful and "denkönomisch", that is to say, in conformity with the principle of logical economy. Behind this technical construction we grant philosophy complete freedom to seek a social reality, a collection of individuals, or a super-individual "person". Or if we formally reduce all positive law to the will of the state and declare the law-giver to be juridically omnipotent, then we do so, detached from each standpoint which is dependent upon a philosophy of law; we are equally detached from every political state-absolutism. We employ the concept of the source of law in a purely formal sense and thereby only express the fact that all positive law derives its formal validity from the state. We grant to the philosophy of law the complete freedom to criticize a specific statute as being erroneous and in conflict with justice. It is quite free to oppose a political state-absolutism by insisting upon the freedom of personality.

The positivistic view of reality versus the jural facts.

In spite of such contentions, however, the truth of the matter is, that behind such would-be technical concepts are hidden very positive philosophical postulates. This is especially the case with the appeal to the principle of "logical economy" in order to defend the use of theoretical fictions which do not correspond to the true situation of things within the modal aspect of reality, that forms the specific field of theoretical research. This appeal is characteristic of a nominalistic-positivism. In the general theory of the modal aspects we shall show in detail, that the principle of logical economy has a logical sense only in indissoluble connection with the *principium rationis sufficientis*, which implies that we really account for the theoretical states of affairs in a sufficient way. It can never justify theoretical fictions, which are only introduced in order to mask the antinomies caused by a false theoretical conception of empirical reality.

The ruling positivistic conception in jurisprudence identifies empirical reality with its physical-psychical aspects, that is to say with an absolutized theoretical abstraction.
In this naturalist image of empirical reality there is no room for modal aspects of an intrinsically normative character. The juridical aspect completely loses its irreducible modal meaning if — in the line of the modern so-called “realistic” jurisprudence — it is reduced to physical-psychical phenomena. The juridical facts are the juridical aspect of real facts and within this aspect the latter cannot be established without jural norms to which they are subjected. As soon as in theoretical jurisprudence which maintains the normative character of the legal rules, this structural state of affairs is lost sight of and the “facts” within the juridical aspect are conceived of as “physical-psychical” ones, there originate theoretical antinomies which are usually masked by the introduction of “theoretical fictions”. And again and again it is the principle of “logical economy of thought” which is called into play to justify these fictions.

We shall return to this state of affairs in the second volume when we engage in a detailed investigation of theoretical antinomies.

In the present context we want only to stress the fact that behind the so-called “non-philosophical” positivist standpoint in jurisprudence there is hidden a philosophical view of reality, which cannot be neutral in respect to faith and religion.

The modal-functional and the typical structures of reality.

Under the mask of philosophical and “weltanschauliche” neutrality, the technical pragmatic conception of scientific thought has done a great deal of mischief, especially in the branches of theoretical research which find their “Gegenstand” in modal aspects of temporal reality whose laws are of a normative character.

To make this clear I will briefly indicate the difference between the typical concept of a structure of individuality and the modal concept of function, which difference is set forth in detail in the second and third volume. In every modal aspect we can distinguish:

1 - a general functional coherence which holds in mutual correspondence the individual functions of things, events, or social relationships within a specific modal law-sphere; this coherence exists independently of the typical differences between these things, events or social relationships which function within the same modal aspect.
2 - the typical structural differences manifesting themselves within a modal aspect and which are only to be understood in terms of the structures of individuality of temporal reality in its integral inter-modal coherence.

Some states of affairs taken from the juridical and physical aspects may suffice for the present to make clear this distinction. As we have observed in the Prolegomena, the structures of individuality embrace all modal aspects without exception and group them together in different typical ways within individual totalities. However, they also express themselves within each of their modal aspects by typicalizing the general modal relations and functions.

In the juridical aspect of reality, all phenomena are joined in a jural-functional coherence. Viewed according to the norm-side of this aspect, this means, that constitutional law and civil law, internal ecclesiastical law, internal trade law, internal law of trade-unions and other organizations, international law, etc. do not function apart from each other, but are joined in a horizontal-functional coherence, a coherence guaranteed by the modal structure of the juridical aspect itself. When we view only this universal functional coherence between the various sorts of law, we abstract it from the internal structural differences which the latter display.

This general functional view-point is highly abstract; it only teaches us to recognize the modal functions within the juridical aspect apart from the typical structures of individuality which are inherent in reality in its integral character. It is absolutely impossible to approach the internal structural differences between the typical sorts of law, solely with a general juridical concept of function. Therefore, it must be clear that the general modal concept of law can never contain the typical characteristics of state-law.

Similarly, the general functional coherence between phenomena within the physical aspect is to be abstractly viewed as indifferent in respect to the internal typical differences displayed by reality within its structures of individuality. To discover the general laws of physical interaction, physics views all physical phenomena under the modal functional denominator of energy.

The physical concept of function is a systematic concept "par

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1 It will be evident that we do not mean here the concept of function
excellence”, because it possesses the capacity of grasping the universal horizontal coherence of all possible physical phenomena within this modality.

As long as this functional view dominates exclusively, scientific thought does not view the actual things of nature with their internal structures of individuality. A tree, an animal, and so on (as well as an “atom”, a “molecule”, and a “cell”) undoubtedly have physical-chemical functions in their internal structure as a thing of nature; but an exclusively functional view of the physical aspect of reality reveals nothing within the energy-relations of the universum that could eventually delineate itself as the typical structure of an individual totality. Such a functional view only discloses external relations of abstract “energy” or “matter”, relations, which exceed any internal structural difference, and which are grasped according to the functional aspect of physical law. This functional view was from the outset evident in the formulation of Newton’s law of gravitation, which law is independent of the typical structures of “things”, and actually dominates the physical universum. A pencil falling to the ground is subjected to this law just as much as the motions of the planets.

But there is no single science, except pure mathematics, which is not confronted with reality in its typical structures of individuality. Chemistry essentially investigates the same modal lawsphere as physics, but it can no longer operate solely with a general concept of function, no more than physics itself, since the discovery of the internal atom-structures. Free fluttering electrons may only display bare functional properties of mass and charge, of motion, attraction, and repulsion, but as soon they function, bound within the structure of an atom or molecule, they display specific properties in which internal structural differences enforce themselves.

The distinction between modal-functional and typical structures of reality which we have just shown to be present in the juridical and physical modalities, can also be discovered within all the remaining modal aspects. We shall later demonstrate this in detail.

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in the specific sense of the infinitesimal calculus. It is used here only in the sense of modal function, abstracted from the typical structures of individuality.
The absolutization of the concept of function and the illegitimate introduction of a specific structural concept of individuality as a functional one.

What have we seen take place under the influence of the positivistic view of the task of science? In keeping with the postulate of continuity of the Humanistic science-ideal, the concept of function was absolutized in order to eradicate the modal diversity of meaning which exists between the modal aspects. At the same time the attempt was made to erase completely the typical structures of individuality which reality displays within the modalities investigated. But, especially in the so-called “pure theory of law” (reine Rechtslehre) and in “pure economics”, there often can be observed a curious confusion of the modal-functional and the typical structural view-points. Often unintentionally, under the guise of a general concept of function, a specific concept of a typical structure of individuality is introduced in order to level all other typical differences of structure within the investigated aspect of reality.

Consequently, the supposed merely general modal concept of function is in truth transposed into a typical structural concept. Under the guise of an abstract purely functional view-point the so-called Austrian school in its “pure economics”, absolutized free market relations at the expense of the other typical structures of society, which manifest themselves within the economic aspect of reality.

In the same way the so-called “pure theory of law”, developed by Hans Kelsen and his neo-Kantian school, tried to construe a merely functional-logical coherence between all typical spheres of positive law, either from the hypothesis of the sovereignty of state-law or from the hypothesis of the sovereignty of international law. In the first case, all the other typical juridical spheres were in a pseudo-logical way reduced to state-law, in the second case, to law of a supposed international super-state (civitas maxima). The confusion between modal-functional and typical-structural view-points was completed by the pseudo-logical identification of law and state, or of law and super-state, respectively.

But if state and law were identical, it makes no sense to speak of state-law. And if — as Kelsen thinks — from a purely juridical view-point all positive juridical norms are of the same formal nature, and typical material differences should be considered as meta-juridical, then it is contradictory to introduce
into this modal-functional conception of law the typical characteristics of state-law or super-state-law.

Just as all other spheres of human society, the state possesses an internal structure of individuality which functions in all modal aspects of temporal reality. This is precisely the reason why the state cannot be grasped in an abstract concept of function, no more than its typical juridical sphere.

The modal concept of function is falsified, if under the guise of a merely functional view of law, the whole problem of the sources of law is orientated toward the state or the international community of states, respectively.

Setting aside this aberration, it is advisable to make the following clear: The absolutization in scientific thought of the functionalist viewpoint is not neutral with respect to philosophy or religion. Rather it must be viewed as the fruit of a nominalist view of science which is grounded in the Humanistic science-ideal, although nowadays this latter has undergone a degeneration in consequence of its purely technical conception, especially in the positivist school of Ernst Mach and the younger logical positivism of the Vienna school. In modern times psychology and the cultural sciences have reacted against the complete domination of this functionalistic science-ideal. In the main this reaction comes from the side of the irrationalistic antipode of this functionalism.

The dependence of empirical sciences upon the typical structures of individuality. The revolution of physics in the 20th century.

I do not deny that experimental and descriptive sciences are strongly bound to empirical reality in its modal-functional and in its typical structures. In other words I do not deny the fact

1 In biological theory there is often found a confusion of the modal-functional concept of organic life with a concept of substance, referring to a living being as an individual totality. Compare Driesch's conception of "organic life" as an entelechy, or Woltereck's conception of organic life as a material living "substance" (matrix), which has an outer material constellation and an inner side of life-experience. Cf. my treatise The concept of substance in recent natural philosophy and the theory of the enkaptic structural whole ("Het substantiebegrip in de moderne natuurfilosofie en de theorie van het enkaptisch structuurgeheel") publ. in the quarterly review Philosophia Reformata (15th year p. 66—140).
that the insufficiency or incorrectness of rationalistic levelling methods can appear in the course of empirical research by the discovery of stringent facts. In the twentieth century physics, for example, underwent a revolution and had to abandon its classic functionalistic concept of causality, matter, physical space and time. The theory of relativity and the quantum-theory have reduced Newton's physical conception of the world to a mere marginal instance.

In keeping with the Humanist ideal of science, the classic mechanical concept of causality aimed at an absolute functionalization of reality in a strictly deterministic sense. This concept of causality could not explain the micro-structure of the physical side of reality, disclosed by continued investigation. Planck's discovery of the quantum-structure of energy and Heisenberg's relations of uncertainty made it no longer possible to reduce the physical processes to a bare continuous causal coherence. On experimental grounds, the quantum theory and the theory of relativity radically broke with Newton's conception of matter as a static substance filling absolute space and subject to completely determined causal processes in "absolute time".

The discovery of radio-activity taught the physicist to recognize an autonomous physical change which takes place entirely within the internal structure of the atom, and which cannot be explained in terms of any external functional cause. But the discovery of phenomena which cannot be comprehended in a classical concept of function does not in any way insure that they will be interpreted correctly and in a manner that is philosophically and religiously neutral. On the contrary, it is quite obvious, that the scientific attitude of the leading investigators of nature is profoundly influenced by their theoretical total view of reality. It is evident, for instance, that Mach's and Ostwald's opposition to the acceptance of real atoms and light waves, and their attempt to resolve the physical concept of causality into a purely mathematical concept of function, was dependent upon their positivist sensualistic standpoint in philosophy. B. Baving pointed out that the modern trend in physics which, following Heisenberg and Jordan, declared itself to be in favour of a fundamental abandonment of the concept of causality in physics, did so on the basis of philosophical considerations which it owed to Mach and Avenarius. 

1 Ergebnisse und Probleme der Naturwissenschaften ("Results and
The conflict concerning philosophical foundations is not alien to the heart of special sciences. In fact it is the physicist who is in danger of uncritically accepting positivist and nominalist pre-suppositions. By blindly contemplating the "technical" side of his field, he is soon inclined to accept, without even being aware of their philosophical implications, a nominalistic view of physical problems and a merely technical-constructive view of physical methods and concepts.

From the standpoint of physics alone, may a physicist accept the thesis that a mathematically formulated theory must be considered as correct, if it explains in the simplest way possible the phenomena known up until the present time by bringing them in a functional coherence? In other words is the principle of logical economy in the positivist and so-called empirio-critical sense, in which it is conceived of by Mach and Avenarius, the only criterion of correctness in physics?

Recall the conflict concerning Einstein's theory of relativity which was not only conducted in philosophical circles but also in natural-scientific ones.

Recall the controversy between Planck, v. Laue, Lenard and other physicists on the one hand, and Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Jordan on the other, in which the question was discussed as to whether or not the physical concept of causality could in principle still be maintained in the further development of the quantum theory.

Was the former situation in classical physics a matter of indifference to the Christian examiner of nature? Was it of no consequence to him, that classical physics adopted an essentially rationalistic view of empirical reality in which the entire individual factual side of the physical aspect was fundamentally reduced to the purely functionally conceived of law-side? In other words ought we to accept physical determinism as

Problems of the Natural Sciences" (9th ed. 1948, p. 233 fl.). In my opinion it is not permitted to identify this fundamental concept with the deterministic one, which has originated from the classic mechanical image of reality. The concept of causality has a so-called analogous character. Every empirical science must conceive it in the special modal sense of its field of inquiry. The mechanistic-deterministic conception has turned out to be incompatible with the very nature of physical phenomena. But this does not prove that every physical concept of causality has become meaningless.
correct with respect to the situation of physics in the 19th century, because it could arrange most of the then known phenomena in a systematic functional coherence?

And is it immaterial to the Christian physicist, whether or not physics may be identified with the conventionalist conception that the Vienna school has of it? If it really was indifferent to physics to choose a position in this question, the term "science" might become meaningless. For science pre-supposes a theoretical view of reality, because it must continually appeal to it.

The defense of the autonomy of the special sciences from the so-called critical realistic standpoint.

From the standpoint of so-called critical realism, B. Bavink, the famous German philosopher of nature, has tried to make clear that natural science is autonomous with respect to philosophy: "The principal point is not at all with what methods and means of thought we should approach things, but rather what resulted and probably will result further from this approach which for centuries we have executed with the greatest success without any epistemology. The whole question is not at all a question of epistemology, but rather of ontology, that is to say, it does not

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1 Bavink (op. cit., p. 271) remarks: "Für die Physik sind vielmehr die Moleküle und die Lichtwellen, die Felder und ihre Tensoren" u.s.w. von genau derselber Wirklichkeitsart wie Steine und Bäume, Pflanzenzellen oder Fixsterne." ["For physics the molecules and light-waves, the electromagnetic fields and their tensors etc. are rather of exactly the same sort of reality as stones and trees, vegetable cells or fixed stars"]. But he overlooks the fact that physics has eliminated the naive view of reality!

2 "Critical" realism (Ed. v. Hartmann, Erich Becker, Riehl, Messer, Küpke, and others) proceeded from Kant's critical conception of human knowledge. But, in contradistinction to Kant, it acknowledges, that the categories of thought sustain a relation to the "Dinge an sich"; It repudiates the Kantian view that the "thing in itself" is unknowable. Thus it falls back upon the metaphysics of the Humanistic ideal of science, which in Bavink is accommodated to scholastic realism (universalia in re et ante rem; see his cited work, p. 264). In opposition to Kant's transcendental idealism it accepts a metaphysical conception of the categories. Bavink thinks that the categories can only be derived aposteriori from a scientific investigation of nature. He rejects Kant's categories of relation as being in conflict with the present state of physics. In contrast, he ascribes to Kant's teleological view of nature a real rather than a fictitious significance in respect to "nature in itself". Because of its starting point, "critical realism" must misconstrue and reject the naive experience of reality. In volume III we shall develop this point at greater length.
matter how I ought to think the world or can or must think it, but how it really is”.

This statement seems to be philosophically neutral, but it really depends upon a sharply defined apriori philosophical view of the cosmos. It is only meaningful on the condition of our accepting a constellation of reality in which the physical universum is opposed to human thought as a “world in itself”, a constellation in which reality is shut off in its pre-sensory natural aspects. There is a connection between this view of the cosmos and BAVINK’s agreement with the epistemological conception of the merely subjective character of “secondary qualities” (the objective sensory properties of colour, smell, taste, etc.).

If it is true, however, that cosmic reality, as a universal and temporal coherence of meaning, does not permit itself to be

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1 Op. cit., 5th ed. 1933, p. 204: “Es handelt sich gar nicht zuerst darum, mit welchen Denkmethoden und Denkmitteln wir an die Dinge heran zu gehen halten, sondern darum, was bei diesem Herangehen, das wir ohne alle Erkenntnistheorie seit Jahrhunderten mit grösstem Erfolge ausgeübt haben, herausgekommen ist und mutmasslich weiter herauskommen wird. Die ganze Frage ist gar keine Frage der Erkenntnistheorie, sondern eine Frage der Ontologie, d.h. es kommt nicht darauf an, wie ich mir die Welt denken soll oder kann oder muss, sondern wie sie wirklich ist.” In the 9th ed. the first sentence has been omitted, but the standpoint itself has not been changed.

2 BAVINK does not consider “nature” and “reason” as two absolutely distinct and uncrossable spheres, but considers “nature” as being “rational” in its deepest foundation (op. cit., p. 273 fl.). This is in keeping with critical realism, especially in its scholastic accommodation to the Augustinian doctrine of the divine Logos. It does not contradict the metaphysical conception of a physical world “in itself”, independent of the mutual coherence of all modal aspects in cosmic time. It does only imply that in this physical world “in itself” is expressed the “divine Reason” which is also the origin of human reason. According to this view “nature in itself” must be “rational” in an absolute objective sense. This objective rationality of physical order is quite independent of and has in itself no relation to the logical subjective function of man. But the latter has a relation to the former.

3 Op. cit., p. 59. In this connection I am speaking of “objective” as related to possible adequate subjective sensory perception or sensation. BAVINK does not see the modal difference between the physical electromagnetic waves with their different frequencies and the objective sensory qualities which are founded upon the former. But his opinion is in keeping with the current physiological and psychological conception which lacks an insight into the modal structures of the different aspects.
enclosed within its pre-sensory sides, then Bavinck's view of reality and his conception of the autonomy of science is false. In other words, if the physical aspect of the cosmos is not separate from the psychical-sensory and logical, and, if subject-object-relations exist in reality, then it is meaningless to speak of a "nature in itself".

The physical modality of reality does not permit itself to be comprehended by scientific thought apart from a subjective insight into the mutual relation and coherence of the modalities within the cosmic temporal order.

Experiments do not disclose a static reality, given independently of logical thought; rather they point to the solution of questions concerning an aspect of reality which, under the direction of theoretical thought, is involved in a process of enrichment and opening of its meaning.

The physical aspect of reality does not represent itself in sensory perception as upon a sensitive plate in a photographic apparatus, nor is it arranged "an sich" according to theoretical categories. But, because of the very intermodal coherence of the aspects, physical phenomena have an objective analogon in the sensory ones; they must be subjectively interpreted in scientific thought and thereby logically opened. In this connection the question as to how the physical aspect ought to be understood in its relation to the other aspects of reality is extremely important.

The experimental method is essentially a method of isolation and abstraction. Experiments do not disclose to us the physical aspect of phenomena as a fixed or static reality in itself, independent of theoretical thought, but rather as an opened aspect of meaning, which, in its cosmic coherence with the logical one, is enriched and unfolded by disclosing its logical anticipations under the direction of scientific thought. For, as we have observed repeatedly, every modal aspect of temporal reality expresses its cosmic coherence with all the others in its modal structure.

Experiments are always pointed to the solution of theoretical questions which the scientist himself has raised and formulated.

Bavinck's opinion that in the course of centuries physics has been able to achieve its greatest results without any aid from epistemology is unworthy of a thinker who is trained in the...
history of science and philosophy. The truth is that modern physics rests upon epistemological pre-suppositions which have had to wage a sharp fight against the formerly ruling Aristotelian conception of nature \(^1\), and which only little by little have been generally accepted since the days of GALILEO and NEWTON. Most physicists carry on their investigations without being conscious of their philosophical implications and accept the fundamentals of their science as axioms. This sort of philosophical naïvety is very dangerous for a Christian scientist.

For in addition to the gains that it reached in physics, GALILEO’s and NEWTON’s epistemology implied a purely quantitative and functionalistical view of reality. The latter was not restricted to physics and became the very content of the rationalistic Humanistic science-ideal.

BAVINK’s arguments in defence of the philosophical neutrality of physics, which at first glance seem to be strong, on second thoughts appeared to be not free of pre-suppositions which exceed science. Although he rejects apriori rationalism and the nominalist conventionalism of the Vienna circle, his own opinion concerning the philosophical neutrality of science depends upon a specific philosophical view of reality which to a high degree rests upon an absolutization of the functionalistic view-point of natural science \(^2\), which has no room for naïve experience.

The appeal to reality in scientific investigation is never philosophically and religiously neutral. Historicism in science.

The appeal to “reality” in scientific investigation is never free from a philosophical and religious prejudice. Allow me this time to choose the example of the science of history. RANKE said of the latter, that it only has to establish how the events have really happened ("wie es wirklich gewesen ist"). But in the word "wirklich" (really) there is a snare. For it is impossible for a particular science to grasp an event in its full reality. History, as all other special sciences, can only examine a particular aspect of the latter. Consequently, it groups and arranges historical material in a theoretical modal analysis of temporal reality,

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\(^1\) One need only think of the application of the mathematical concept of function and the introduction of the exact method of experimentation without which modern physics would be impossible.

\(^2\) Compare especially op. cit. p. 272 ff.
without which it could not focus its attention upon the historical aspect.

In the second volume we shall analyze in detail the modal structure of the latter in order to delimit the true "Gegenstand" of historical investigation. This branch of science pre-supposes a theoretical view of reality which has a philosophical character, since historical investigation can only comprehend the historical aspect in its theoretical coherence with the remaining aspects. Now it is extremely easy for Historicism to gain adherents among historians. Historicism, as we know, is a view of reality which eradicates the boundaries between the modalities and subsumes all other aspects of temporal reality under an historical common denominator. In Part II of this volume we have seen how, since the beginning of the 19th century, Historicism exerted an enormous influence upon the foundation of scientific thought.

The Historical school of jurisprudence proclaimed positive law to be an "historical phenomenon". At the same time it had a great influence on the current view of society and on the theory of the state.

If the state is viewed historically, then it is especially considered in its modal aspect of power. As we shall show in the second volume of this work, power is the central moment in the modal structure of the historical aspect. Under the influence of Historicism this fact has given rise to the idea that the state, in its total reality, is an organization of power. The empirical reality of the state is, in this way, theoretically identified with its historical aspect.

As a matter of fact, the integral typical structure of the state is in this way completely misrepresented. It cannot be enclosed in its historical aspect of power, no more than it can be comprehended as a purely juridical, economical, or psychological phenomenon. Its typical structure embraces all these modal aspects, but cannot be identified with any of them.

The attempt to comprehend the state purely in its historical aspect of power, accompanied by a claim to religious and philosophical neutrality, results in a view which offers a false theoretical abstraction instead of the state as it veritably exists.
The conflict between the functionalistic-mechanistic, the neo-vitalistic and holistic trends in modern biology.

Biology also offers many examples of a functionalistic view of reality in which a specific modal aspect is absolutized. The theory of evolution developed a mechanical genetic concept of species that eradicated the internal structural principles of individuality. It was believed, that this did not exceed the limits of biological thought.

Modern biology has become the scene of a sharp internal controversy due to the different theoretical views of empirical reality. The holistic school has sought to reconcile the conflict between the mechanists and the neo-vitalists. The former operated with a mechanical concept of function, and attempted to reduce the modal aspect of organic life to the physical-chemical which was conceived of in the obsolete mechanistic sense.

The neo-vitalists, following Driesch, have seen that the mechanistic method is insufficient to grasp the material examined by biology. Driesch, however, did not attack the mechanistic conception of matter as a purely physical-chemical constellation which should be enclosed in itself and completely determined by mechanical causality. He only denied that organic life can be reduced to a physical-chemical constellation of matter. He did not see that organic life is nothing but a modal aspect of reality. Consequently, he proclaimed it to be a reality in itself: an immaterial entelechy, a substance which would direct the material process without derogating from the principle of conservation of energy. Thus the attempt was made to correct an absolutized concept of function by means of a concept of substance, understood in a pseudo-Aristotelian sense. But this “immaterial substance” was itself the result of a new absolutization. And the latter was destructive for the theoretical insight into the typical temporal coherence between the biotical and the physical-chemical aspects, within the total structure of individuality of a living organism.

Holism made the attempt to conquer the antinomical dualism of Driesch's conception. It had the intention to bridge this dualism by a conception of structural totality. The typical structures of individual totalities, however, cannot be grasped in theoretical thought without a correct theoretical insight into the mutual relations between its different modal aspects. The holistic school lacked this insight. Consequently it fell back upon the
functionalist attempt to construe a conception of the whole of a living organism by levelling the modal boundaries of meaning of its different aspects. Whereas mechanism tried to reduce the biotical aspect to the physical-chemical one, holism followed the reverse procedure.

The philosophical conflict concerning the foundations of biology intervenes in the centre of scientific problems, and up to now, it is exclusively conducted within the cadre of a Humanist view of science. Can the Christian biologist choose sides in the sense of a mechanistic, a vitalistic or an holistic view of the living organism? Or will he consider it safer to hide behind the positivist mask of neutrality? For it is a naïve positivism that has caused the idea of philosophical neutrality to dominate the special sciences. Our conclusion is, however, that the positivistic conception of special science cannot be reconciled to a Christian cosmonomic Idea.

As soon as a special science was born, it was confronted with philosophical problems concerning the modal structure of the special aspect which has to delimit its field of research.

It makes no sense to say that special science can neglect these problems, because it has to do with the investigation of empirical phenomena alone. Empirical phenomena have as many modal aspects as human experience has. Consequently it cannot be the phenomena themselves which constitute the special scientific fields of research. It is only the theoretical gegenstand-relation between the logical aspect of our thought and the non-logical aspects of experience which gives rise to the fundamental division of these fields and to the philosophical problems implied in it.

No more can philosophy neglect the results of special scientific research of the empirical phenomena, because exactly in these phenomena the inter-modal coherence between the modal structures of the aspects is realized. And the typical structures of individuality can be studied only in their empirical realization, on condition that their modal aspects are correctly distinguished.

Therefore an interpenetration of philosophy and special science is unescapable, although the former cannot restrict itself to the

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1 Any one who wants to acquire a sharp view of this state of affairs, should read the work of Prof. Dr R. Woltereck, Grundzüge einer allgemeinen Biologie (1932) ["Principal Traits of a General Biology"].

2 Translator's note: Naïve in the sense that the thinker is ignorant of his own philosophical pre-suppositions. D. H. F.
philosophical problems implied in the special sciences, since it has also to give an account of the data of naïve experience.

The relationship between special science and Christian philosophy has up until now only been provisionally considered. It has been treated here within the general cadre of our transcendental critique of scientific thought. What I am suggesting concerning the mutual penetration of Christian philosophy and science, can only be presented in a more concrete fashion after the development of our general theory of the modal aspects and of the typical structures of individuality. With respect to jurisprudence and sociology I have done this in detail in my *Encyclopaedia of Jurisprudence* (3 vols.), which will soon be published. With respect to the biological problems I may refer to the second volume of my *Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy*. Furthermore, I may refer to many special investigations by others who adhere to this philosophy. For the present our only concern was to show that, in the light of the Biblical ground-motive of the Christian religion, the modern Humanistic division between science and philosophy cannot be maintained. In fact, even upon the Humanistic standpoint this division cannot hold its own against a serious immanent critique.
A NEW CRITIQUE OF THEORETICAL THOUGHT

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TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE

The present translation of Vol. II of Dooyeweerd’s: ‘A New Critique of Theoretical Thought’ has greatly benefited by the vigilant and careful revision of my manuscript by my friend and collaborator David H. Freeman, for which I offer him my sincerest thanks.

At the same time I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to the author of the book, Prof. Dr H. Dooyeweerd, for many improvements in the field of philosophical terminology. The comparison of the original (Dutch) edition with the present version will reveal the insertion of a number of entirely new paragraphs and even whole sections done by the author.

Last but not least, I would thank the publishers as well as Professor Dooyeweerd for the confidence they have put in me and the encouragement they have given me.


H. DE JONGSTE.
PART I

THE GENERAL THEORY OF THE MODAL SPHERES
CHAPTER I

THE FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE MODAL SPHERES, BOTH IN THEIR SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THEIR OWN ORBIT AND IN THEIR TEMPORAL COHERENCE OF MEANING

§ 1 - THE CRITERION OF A MODAL SPHERE

In the Prolegomena we discovered the cosmic order of time, which, as the limit to our ‘earthly’ temporal cosmos, determines the structure of reality in its diversity of meaning, both as regards its modal and typical laws and its subjectivity, including its subject-object-relations. The specific modal sovereignty of the different aspects of reality (with their various modal law-spheres) appeared to be founded in this cosmic order and at the same time made relative by it. **Founded:** for the specific modal sovereignty proved to be only possible in the temporal splitting up of the religious fulness of meaning, which in its turn is only given in the transcendent root of our cosmos. **Made relative:** for the modal law-sphere as a specific aspect of the meaning of temporal reality, proved to have no independent existence in itself, but rather to be interwoven with the temporal coherence of meaning. Cosmic time overarches the different aspects as order, and streams through their boundaries as duration.

The relation between the specific sovereignty of each separate modal law-sphere and the temporal coherence of meaning of all the modal spheres is not intrinsically contradictory.

There is no antinomy between modal sovereignty and the temporal coherence of all the law-spheres. An intrinsic contradiction would exist, as it does in immanence-philosophy, if, and only if the specific modal sphere-sovereignty of a part of the aspects were sacrificed in favour of one or more of the other aspects of meaning. We shall revert to this subject later on. But there is no
antinomy in the acknowledgement that the modal law-spheres, irreducible among themselves, are nevertheless kept in a continuous coherence of meaning by cosmic time.

The continuity of cosmic time is not exhausted by any single specific aspect of meaning. Therefore this continuity cannot be comprehended in any concept, but only approximately apprehended in a transcendental Idea, and experienced in the pre-theoretical attitude. As time cannot contain the religious fulness of meaning, it splits the latter into the diversity of the modal aspects. But without the temporal, relative coherence of meaning the specific sovereignty of the modal law-spheres would not be possible.

The criterion of a modal sphere and its abstract theoretical character.

By what criterion do we distinguish a modal law-sphere as an aspect of cosmic reality? To raise this question is not the same as asking: What is it that guarantees specific modal sphere-sovereignty? The former question is, to be sure, inseparable from the latter, but the criterion in the narrow sense is of an epistemological nature: it is concerned with the problem how a particular law-sphere can be recognized as an irreducible, separate modal aspect of reality. The second question lies on a more fundamental plane, it lies at the very basis of thought; it must be answered in the cosmonomic Idea as the  ἔνδοθες of philosophic thought itself, consequently also of the inquiry into the epistemological problem in the narrow sense, i.e. the question about the theoretical criterion of the law-sphere. This insight has been gained in our transcendental critique of theoretic thought. The latter has shown that, — no matter, whether the thinker has taken this into account in his critical self-reflexion or not — no question regarding our knowledge of temporal reality can have any meaning without a transcendental basic Idea.

And the facts are just as they were stated in the last part of the first volume. If the epistemological question is sounded to its very bottom, it is no longer possible to assign an isolated area to the problem of epistemology. The latter is indissolubly connected with our theoretical insight into the structure of the cosmos, and with our self-knowledge which transcends theory.

This will be clearly seen if we try for a moment to treat the question about the criterion of the modal law-sphere as an entirely independent problem. Arguing from the epistemo-
logical nature of this criterion, the reasoning will run along the following lines: Philosophy will always be theoretical in character. Philosophic thinking is analysis and synthesis of meaning. Every analysis of meaning, however, must be based on logical distinction, and where theoretical analysis is involved, it must be based on epistemological analysis. According to the transcendental basic Idea, on which our philosophic thought is founded, temporal reality cannot be of a logical nature; it is not even capable of being contained in a concept. If this is true, is not a modal law-sphere which is only theoretically knowable to us, after all a mere product of theoretical analysis and synthesis? And if so, what is gained by continuing to speak about the law-spheres as separate modal aspects of the totality of temporal reality? Had we not better assign a purely epistemological character to them?

However conclusive this reasoning may seem to be, it hides a new pitfall. To conclude from the epistemological nature of this criterion to the purely epistemological character of a modal sphere itself would only be justified, if theoretical thought were self-sufficient and could determine the criterion on its own authority, without being itself bound to the transcendental structure of the cosmos.

Such a pre-supposition implies that the knowable diversity of meaning is after all of a (transcendental) logical nature. And this pre-supposition is indeed not to be justified in a purely epistemological manner. It is dependent on a transcendental basic Idea which must be rejected from our Christian starting-point. Just as in an earlier part of this work logical identity has been recognized as identity in a specific aspect of meaning, it should be maintained now that also logical diversity is only diversity in the specific logical aspect of meaning.

This foundation of the epistemological criterion enables us to see that logical diversity, being subject to the logical principle of contradiction, can only have a specifically logical sense in the cosmic diversity of meaning.

The cosmic diversity of aspects has no existence without logical diversity, but the former certainly exceeds the latter. Once this fact has been established, it must be admitted that philosophic thought can only form an idea of the modal aspect by means of theoretical abstraction. Only the latter separates the aspects of experience and sets them apart in logical discontinuity.

So at the outset it should be acknowledged that the criterion of a
law-sphere must be a criterion of a specific inter-modal synthesis of meaning, which as such is of a theoretical character. If we are ever to gain theoretical knowledge of the modal aspects of meaning, we shall have to abstract the cosmic coherence in time.

The criterion of a modal law-sphere, though of a theoretical nature, is nevertheless not founded in thought, but in the cosmic order of time.

But the criterion is not and cannot be founded in theoretical thought. Theoretical thought itself remains within the boundaries of the temporal horizon of meaning. Hence it lacks the self-sufficiency which, on the immanence standpoint, must necessarily deprive it of all meaning if this view were to be consistently sustained.

If theoretical thought is only possible on the basis of the cosmic order of time, the theoretical criterion of the modal sphere must be founded in this cosmic order. Of course this criterion must have a logical aspect to supply the required standard of analytic distinction, which is possible only in a synthesis with the abstracted aspects of meaning of a non-logical character. The situation is consequently as follows: the modal law-spheres themselves are specific aspects of human experience, founded in the order of cosmic time. They are experienced, though not explicitly, in the naive, pre-theoretical attitude of mind. Their diversity of meaning is based on the law of refraction of cosmic time. But theoretical thought, though itself integrated into cosmic time, in building up its concept of a specific law-sphere must necessarily abstract the latter from the temporal continuity. The question how this entire process of abstraction is possible will be answered later on in a special chapter on the epistemological problem.

In order to find the theoretical criterion of a specific aspect of meaning, abstraction is to be carried still further.

The criterion of a law-sphere as a modal concept of function. The functional structure of a law-sphere can only be understood after abstracting modal individuality.

In our theoretical investigation we shall for the present have to leave alone also the structures of individuality in order to find the general modal meaning which delimits one law-sphere from another.
This general modal meaning in its analytic-synthetic abstraction is the criterion of the law-sphere that we are trying to find. It implies a functional structure of the law-sphere, insofar as every specific individuality of meaning within the latter is integrated by the general modal meaning into a functional coherence with all the other individualities presenting themselves in the same modal sphere.

Consider the following example taken from the spatial aspect. The spatial figures present an infinitely varied individuality of meaning among themselves, but, notwithstanding this fact, they are spatially correlated, integrated into functional coherence by the general modal meaning of the aspect, viz. by spatiality.

Geometry\(^1\) makes use of this insight in assuming a functional conformity to law in the coherence of spatial figures which among themselves present the greatest possible individual divergences, such as a circle and a polygon, the circumference of a circle, and a tangent, parallel and non-parallel straight lines. But this assumption is only possible, because geometry does not really consider individual sensory images of spatial figures; these images as such have no original spatial meaning, as shall be explained later on. A not formalized geometry, in its specific synthesis of meaning, investigates the original spatial sphere itself, in which all spatial individualities are placed in a functional correlation by the general modal meaning of the sphere.

The concept of the latter is an apriori functional one\(^2\), lying at the foundation of every idea by which one tries to grasp types of individuality within the law-sphere.

The functional modalities of meaning.

The general modal meaning of the law-sphere may be called a functional modality of the religious fulness of meaning. The functional structure of meaning, guaranteeing to the law-sphere its specific internal sovereignty, is indeed nothing but a modal splitting up of the totality of meaning, \textit{in time}. This functional

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\(^1\) We intend here only a geometry which has not been formalized. The formalization of modern geometry will occupy us in a later context.

\(^2\) In advance the reader should guard against a constructive view of the apriori in our use of the term. When the epistemological problem is dealt with, it will appear that the apriori structure of reality can only be known from experience. But this is not experience as it is conceived by immanence-philosophy.
modal meaning has a law-side and a subject-side, just as cosmic
time itself appeared to have (cf. Vol. I, p. 28).

We are now sufficiently alive to the fact that law and subject
are mutually irreducible, notwithstanding the opinions of rationalists and irrationalists. Law and subject are only possible in
their indissoluble correlation. The functional subject-side of the
law-sphere is determined and delimited by the functional laws of
the sphere. Both the law-side and the subject-side of the sphere
are determined in their structural meaning by the cosmic order of
time. Through the latter as refractive order the law-side and the
subject-side of the law-sphere are integrated into a functional
modality of the religious fulness of meaning. Here it appears
clearly that the criterion of the law-sphere is absolutely dependent
on the transcendent Idea of the totality of meaning. Anyone
who looks for the criterion of the modal aspects of reality,
should first of all consider, in his theoretical self-reflection, to
what basic denominator he wants to reduce the law-spheres in
order to be able to compare them.

In the light of our transcendent basic Idea this denominator
is founded in the cosmic time-order, reflecting itself in the same
manner in the modal structure of every aspect. But this time-order
itself is to be viewed in its relation to the religious fulness
of meaning. The specific modal aspect is incomprehensible outside
of the transcendent Idea of its temporal coherence with all the other aspects, and outside of its reference to the totality
and the 'Arz Al' of all meaning.

\section{2 - The Criterion of the Modal Aspect of Meaning in
Its Absolute Contrast with the Form-Notion of
Immanence-Philosophy.}

Already in the Prolegomena it appeared that the modal sovereignty of each law-sphere within its own orbit, conceived as
a fundamental cosmological principle in our transcendent
d basic Idea, cannot possibly be recognized on the immanence-
standpoint. Immanence-philosophy can only hold its own by a
subjective elimination of the cosmic order of time and a primary
absolutizing of theoretical thought. It should therefore be clear
that the modal criterion by which we gain theoretical knowledge
about the modal boundaries of the law-spheres, can in no way
be reduced to any criterion by means of which immanence-
philosophy tries to attain a theoretical determination of the
diversity of meaning.
In the first place the form-matter-scheme of immanence-philosophy appears to be unserviceable in the theory of the modal spheres.

The form-matter scheme in ancient and medieval metaphysics.

In its philosophical use this scheme functioned in two ways, viz. a metaphysical and an epistemological one. In ancient and medieval metaphysics Form, as \( \varphi \vartheta \alpha \vartheta \alpha \) or ground of being, had to impart a certain delimitation of meaning to chaotic matter (\( \theta \lambda \eta \)); in Plato the \( \mu \hat{\eta} \delta \nu \), in Aristotle the \( \delta \nu \alpha \mu \varepsilon \iota \delta \nu \), i.e. potentiality, possibility), which is in itself a-morphic, non-ordered.

Plato held to the transcendent \textit{being} of the ideal form-world in the Eleatic sense and included in it the numbers themselves (eidetic numbers) as well as the exact geometrical figures. A very rigorous \( \chi \omega \sigma \rho \sigma \mu \omicron \omicron \) (i.e. isolation) separates the ideal world of of true being from that of the phenomena subject to the material principle of becoming and decay. And yet in the ideal world Plato sought the ground of being (\( \alpha \iota \iota \alpha \) \( \iota \)) of all perishable things. The metaphysical \( \chi \omega \sigma \rho \sigma \mu \omicron \omicron \) between the principle of matter and that of form entangled his thought in sharp antinomies. According to the first conception of his theory of Ideas, developed in the dialogue \textit{Phaedo}, the \( \epsilon \iota \delta \varepsilon \) are of a \textit{static} and \textit{simple} nature. The things that have come into being in the phenomenal world are complex, which makes them liable to the material principle of perpetually coming into being and decaying. But how can the ideal form be the essential basis of perishable, complex things, if in the transcendent form-world there is no connection possible between the \( \epsilon \iota \delta \varepsilon \), and if there is not any \textit{paradeigma} here for the principle of matter (the principle of becoming and decay)?

In the so-called Eleatic dialogues (\textit{Parmenides}, \textit{Sophistes} and \textit{Politis}) Plato tried to unite the principles of form and matter by means of a dialectical logic. He devised \( \epsilon \iota \delta \varepsilon \) of a complex character comprising dialectical relations between simple \( \epsilon \iota \delta \varepsilon \) (e.g. \textit{being} as a dialectical unity of movement and rest). Since then he also tried to find an ideal \textit{paradeigma} for the principle of matter in the transcendent world of the forms of being. This is the so-called \( \delta \delta \alpha \nu \tau \nu \delta \xi \iota \omicron \omicron \) (the foundation for the unlimited, the formless) which was called 'ideal matter' in Augustinian Platonic Scholasticism. Under the influence of Pythagoreanism Plato assumes that the arithmetical series of numbers
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(not the eidetic ‘number in itself’) has to make a dialectical connection possible between the transcendent form-world and the world of perishable things. It has to explain how the one-ness of the eidos can turn into multiplicity in the world of becoming and decay. In the Eleatic dialogues the attempt to establish a dialectical unity between the principles of matter and form led to a crisis in the doctrine of the Ideas. The eidê seem to lose their transcendency above the phenomenal world. But in the Philèbos this crisis has passed, and the newly introduced dialectical eidê prove to be complex entities, genera, comprising only that part of the ideal form-world which relates to things that have become. The simple eidê ‘in themselves’ are explicitly re-established. Only Plato acknowledged that they are beyond human logic and can only be discerned intuitively. In accordance with the view explained in the Politeia they are the ςπόθεος of all dialectical conceptualization. After the manner of the Socratic Idea of the καλομαχαδον (the beautiful and the good) the process of becoming in the sensible world is understood as a γένεις εἰς κόσμον, i.e. a teleological development of matter to a being under the influence of divine formation by the Idea of the good and the beautiful. In contrast with the earlier conception of the pre-existence of the human rational soul Plato now considers the latter to be composed of form and matter and includes it in the world of becoming. This raises the problem of the Timaeus concerning the ‘erratic cause’ (πλαγιματη αίτια), originating from the διανοια of the matter-principle which has to account for the chaotic, the evil in the perishable sensory world.

The Platonic conception of the process of becoming as a γένεις εἰς κόσμον under the influence of the form-principle was the starting-point for Aristotle in his last period. He broke with the Platonic separation between a transcendent ideal form-world and the empirical world of what has become. The transcendent eidê are rejected. The Platonic ‘dialectical’ eidos, composed of form and ideal matter is now conceived of as the immanent essence of the material substances in the empirical world. The essential form (morphê) of these substances is now considered as the teleological- or formal cause of the development of matter. As ‘potential being’ matter can only come into actual existence

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1 For the entire development of the Platonic doctrine of the eidê I may refer to volume I of my new trilogy Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy (1949) and the sources analysed in it.
through this form. The essential form of natural substances thus turns into the immanent teleological principle of their genesis, into an *entelechy* (immanent *telos*). In itself it has a universal character, but the specific matter of the substance makes it individual, as this matter is divisible and countable.

In *Aristotle* this metaphysical notion of form, as the immanent teleological principle (entelechy) of an individual substance, is made relative by the world-order, conceived teleologically as an intelligible order, in which a lower kind of form in its turn becomes matter for a higher kind. Only the actual *noēsis*, the actual reason, cannot become matter, because it is the *archè* (*ἀρχή*) of all delimitation of meaning.

The concept of substance.

This metaphysical principle of form and matter is unfit for our apprehension of the modal aspects of human experience. It is intended as an account of the permanent structural totality of individual things given in nature (physis), which are looked upon as substances. It has to explain how in the changes of their accidental qualities these things maintain their identity.

In my treatise on *The Concept of Substance in the Thomistic Doctrine of Being*¹, I have shown that this metaphysical concept, in its dialectical uniting of the Greek motives of form and matter, cannot at all do justice to the structural individuality of things in naïve experience. It is founded in an absolutized theoretical ‘Gegenstand-relation’. ‘Substances’ are opposed as ‘things in themselves’ to human consciousness. They are represented as being quite independent of the latter, independent of possible sensible perception, independent of the theoretical logical function of thought. They are thus excluded from the subject-object relation which is essential to naïve experience (cf. *Prolegomena*). While it is acknowledged that human consciousness stands in an intentional relation to the substances, this is considered to be immaterial for the reality of the substances in themselves. This view consequently breaks the integral coherence of all the modal aspects of our experience asunder. The ‘substantial forms’ qualifying or determining the meaning of the *eidos*, the essence of things, according to *Aristotle*, are not conceived in the cadre of a modal aspect. The soul, for instance, is regarded as the

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¹ Phil. Reform. 8 Year (1943) p. 65—99; 9 Year (1944) p. 1—41; 10 Year (1945) p. 25—48; 11 Year (1946) p. 22—52.
organizing form of the material body. To the soul are attributed all the qualities of the living substance which are not exclusively proper to its ‘matter’, (such as countability, divisibility and extension).

Doubtless, ARISTOTLE never thinks of the substantial form as a substance, as a ‘Ding an sich’. The soul as substantial form can only realize itself in a specific kind of matter. But this form, too, as ‘entelechy of the body’, is a metaphysical subject of qualities belonging to different modal aspects (e.g., the biotic and psychical aspects in plants and animals; and the logical and post-logical in human beings).

Although the ‘substantial form’, as a theoretical abstraction, is considered to be a ‘universal’ which is individualized by matter, it lacks every modal determination. But this form-concept fails to account for the general functional coherence of all the phenomena presenting themselves within a definite aspect of our experience. It is exclusively and entirely directed to the supposed internal structure of individual things and to the teleological order between their forms.

Exactly for this reason modern physical science, desiring to investigate the functional coherence of all phenomena within the physical aspect, had to turn away from this metaphysical notion of form.

The critical elaboration of this subject is out of place in the present context and can only be discussed in the third volume.

The form-matter-scheme in Kantian philosophy.

A quite different philosophical function is given to the form-matter-scheme in KANT’S Critique of Pure Reason. Here it primarily assumes an epistemological character. The term ‘form’ is no longer brought to bear on ‘substance’ (taken in a metaphysical sense), on ‘the thing in itself’. Rather it turns into a transcendental condition of universally valid sensory experience, a constitutive apriori originating in ‘the transcendental consciousness’.

Space and time are conceived of as apriori forms of sensory intuition. Since this intuition or perception functions within the modal psychical aspect of experience (i.e. that of feeling), space and time, insofar as they belong to the structure of this aspect, cannot have the original modal meaning of the mathematical aspects of spatiality and movement. HUME’s psychological criticism of pure mathematics was irrefutable from the psychological
point of view. Kant nevertheless ascribes pure mathematical sense to space and time as apriori forms of sensory perception. So he eliminates the modal structure of sensory perception by effacing the modal boundaries of meaning between the mathematical and the psychical law-spheres, although he does not reduce pure space and time to sensory impressions. The modal structure of sensory space cannot have an original mathematical character.

In the same manner Kant's transcendental-logical thought-forms or categories are destructive to the insight into the modal structure of the different aspects of human experience. They imply, in fact, an inter-modal theoretical synthesis between the transcendental elements of the logical and of the mathematical and physical aspects of empirical reality. Nevertheless, Kant ascribes to them a purely logical meaning, although he acknowledges that they are concepts of a 'pure synthesis a priori', and constitutive for human experience only in a synthesis with sensory impressions. On the other hand, the Kantian conception of the 'matter' of human experience is intrinsically antinomous and incompatible with the modal structure of the aspects. It is conceived by him as a sensory-psychical material which, as such, lacks determination and order.

But, if the 'matter' of knowledge has sensory meaning, how can it, as such, be chaotic and unarranged? How can there be any question of sensuous 'matter', if this matter itself does not possess any inner modal determination and delimitation of meaning due to its own modal structure? The antinomy of the Greek conception of 'matter' as an absolute apeiron, analysed in Plato's Parmenides, reappears here. The two forms of intuition, viz. space and time, by means of which Kant wants to establish the first apriori order in the chaotic mass of sensory impressions, certainly constitute no criterion of the sensory aspect of experience. They appeared to be conceived of in a mathematical sense which is not pertinent to the sensory impressions.

But Kant is not aware of this. His form-concept is no modal criterion of meaning at all, but it is explicitly meant to level out the boundaries of the modal aspects of experience, for the sake of the maintenance of logical thought as the transcendental law-giver of nature.
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The relapse of neo-Kantian legal philosophers into the Aristotelian method of concept-formation.

The neo-Kantian students of a critical-idealistic theory of law immediately involved themselves in serious difficulties when, quite contrary to Kant's intentions, they tried to apply the epistemological form-matter scheme to the normative aspects of experience. They made this attempt to delineate the different 'provinces of knowledge' from one another, in a transcendental logical way, in accordance with specific forms of thinking.

They saw the necessity of distinguishing the positive legal rules as a separate 'field of knowledge' from morality and the norms of social intercourse. In other words, they were confronted with the fundamental modal diversity in the aspects of human experience and tried to find a criterion. But Kant's critique of knowledge which knew of no other sciences than mathematics and mathematical physics, did not offer them a criterion for any modal aspect of meaning. Therefore they took refuge in Aristotelian logic and made the attempt to delimit the 'provinces of knowledge' from one another according to the genus proximum and the differentia specifica.

The modal aspects have no genus proximum.

But this method of concept-formation is not serviceable here in a really critical manner. The attempt must be made to arrive at a theoretical concept of the general modal meaning of the juridical aspect as such. This aspect must be delimited theoretically from the moral sphere, from that of social intercourse, and finally from all other modal aspects of experience.

But, since the different modal aspects are irreducible to one another, there cannot be found a genus proximum in a modal sense. The modalities of meaning themselves are rather the ultimate genera of modal meaning under which are to be subsumed only typical and individual manifestations of the modalities within the different aspects. Consequently, the denominator of comparison for the different aspects can never be a genus proximum. This is also true on the immanence-standpoint. When here the basic denominator of the different aspects of human experience is sought in an absolutized non-logical aspect, the latter can no longer be considered as a modality; rather it is identified with reality itself as the bearer of all its aspects.

And, just as in metaphysics the 'substance' cannot be the 'genus proximum' of its accidents, reality cannot be conceived
as the genus proximum of its modalities. The metaphysical concept of being can no more be handled in this sense. It has appeared in the Prolegomena of Vol. I that this concept was considered as an analogical one which is never to be used as a genus including species.

Why the Kantian categories cannot be subsumed under a genus proximum.

The transcendental-logical categories of Kant's epistemology could not be subsumed under a genus proximum because they were not conceived of as form-concepts in the sense of Aristotelian logic and metaphysics. They were not serviceable for the generic and specific distinction of different provinces of human knowledge. Rather they were supposed to have a creative function and to constitute the whole field of human science.

This is the meaning of Kant's sharp distinction between transcendental and formal logic.

It makes no sense to say that in Kantian epistemology the category of causality is the genus proximum of all natural-scientific thought-forms and that, in contradistinction to the causal manner of scientific thought, there is to be found in the transcendental consciousness a normative or a teleological generic category which, through the addition of differentia specifica, can constitute other fields of scientific experience.

The whole Aristotelian method of concept-formation according to a genus proximum and differentia specifica pre-supposes the existence of genera and species which are independent of logical thought and are only to be abstracted and classified by the latter. But this supposition contradicts the creative function which in Kantian epistemology is ascribed to the categories in respect to the 'Gegenstand' of the transcendental logical function of thought.

It may be that this 'Gegenstand' is constituted only by a theoretical synthesis of these categories with a given 'matter' of sensory impressions. But the latter is, as such, deprived of any generic and specific determination.

In Kant's Critiques there is no room for generic and specific concepts except in the teleological judgment which lacks any constitutive function in human knowledge. These concepts are viewed in a nominalistic manner, they are not founded in 'substantial forms'.

So we must conclude that the neo-Kantian legal philosophers
who tried to connect Kantian transcendental logic with the Aristotelian method of concept-formation according to genera and species, deviated from the fundamentals of Kantian epistemology. They took refuge in a method of classification which contradicts the very nature of Kant’s transcendental logic.

The genus proximum and the differentia specifica construed by them to delineate the epistemological field of jurisprudence, were presented as transcendental-logical categories. They are, however, nothing but pseudo-generic and -specific concepts, for they lack any synthetical modal determination.

**Stammler’s concept of law.**

This whole method of ‘transcendental logical delimitation of the juridical sphere’ may be exemplified by Stammler’s fundamental concept of law (Rechtsbegriff).

Stammler conceives of the jural modality of experience as a form of thinking, as a logical ordering of the experiential matter by means of specific categories. By this ordering the matter of experience assumes an historical-economical nature! For this purpose, however, the legal aspect must first be reduced to a genus proximum, viz. to the universal category of volition, as the teleological fundamental form of thought (teleological, because the content of consciousness is arranged here in accordance with the relation of a means to an end). This form of thought as such is supposed to be diametrically opposite to the causal mode of thought in physical science. Next the attempt is made to trace the juridical ‘differentia specifica’ as a specific form of thinking, in contrast with the category of social intercourse, on the one hand, and the moral, and the religious categories on the other. Law is then characterized together with the norms of social intercourse as a socially binding kind of volition, (i.e. ‘socially’ in the usual, undefined sense of the word), and as such it is contrasted with religion and morality, which are assumed to concern individual persons only. Then, by means of the characteristic of ‘sovereignty’ (Selbstherrlichkeit), law is delimited from the supposed purely inviting nature of the rules of intercourse (which Stammler styles ‘convention’), and by means of the quality of inviolability it is marked off from arbitrariness. It is easily seen that both these ‘differentia specifica’ and the ‘genus proximum’ volition lack every kind of modal definiteness of meaning and are pseudo-logical concepts.

Thus the juridical aspect of human experience, as being a
'specific province of thought', is actually wrenched from the cosmic inter-modal coherence of meaning. Instead, it is made into a species of a transcendental-logical genus, which in its turn is conceived only in an antithetic-logical relation with the natural-scientific category of causality.

The neo-Kantian student of 'pure theory of law', H. Kelsen, applies essentially the same kind of method to delimit the juridical aspect from other 'provinces of thought', although he deduces the separate juridical categories in a different way from Stammler's. He uses the method of genetical-logical thought characteristic of the Marburg School.

Modern phenomenology, too, insofar as it is founded by Edmund Husserl, does not rise above the essentially scholastic method of delineating the different spheres of its research according to genera and species. It delimits the 'regions' of the theory of science by carrying through this method in a very confusing way. Husserl gives the following definition:

'Region is nothing but the supreme total generic unity belonging to a concretum; hence it is the essential unity which connects the highest genera relating to the lowest differences within this concretum. The eidetic extent of the 'region' comprises the ideal totality of the concrete unified complexes of differences of these genera; the individual extent comprises the ideal totality of the possible individuals of such a concrete essence'.

Seen in this light, Kant's 'synthetic basic concepts' or 'categories' are conceived of as 'regional basic concepts' ('essentially related to the definite region and its synthetic basic propositions'), and as many groups of categories are distinguished as there are 'regions' to be found.

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1 *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenol. Phil.* I, 30, 31: "Region" ist nichts anderes als die gesamte zu einem Konkretum gehörige oberste Gattungseinheit, also die wesenseinheitliche Verknüpfung der obersten Gattungen, die den niederen Differenzen innerhalb des Konkretns zugehören. 'Der eidetische Umfang der Region befasst die ideale Gesamtheit konkret vereinheitlichter Komplexe von Differenzen dieser Gattungen, der individuelle Umfang die ideale Gesamtheit möglicher Individuen solcher konkreten Wesen.'
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Here, too, the scholastic method of delimiting the 'regions' according to the 'genus proximum' and the 'differentia specifica' reigns supreme, obscuring the boundaries of the different modal meaning-aspects. In order to get a very clear idea of this method in Husserl we would suggest reading only the 12th and the 13th sections of the Ideen. We refer especially to the following passage:

'In this sense 'meaning as such', is the highest genus in the purely logical area of meanings(!); each definite form of a sentence or of a sentence-part, is an eidetic singularity; the sentence as such is a mediating genus. In the same way number as such is a supreme genus. Two, three, etc., are its lowest differences or particular eidetic units. In the material sphere(!) we find supreme genera like 'thing as such'(!), sensory quality, spatial form, 'experience as such'; the essential elements belonging to definite things, definite sensory qualities, spatial forms, experiences as such, are eidetic and material singularities of this sphere'.

§ 3 - THE CRITERION OF THE MODAL DIVERSITY OF MEANING AND THE PROBLEM OF THE DENOMINATOR OF COMPARISON CONCEIVED AS 'THE BEING OF WHAT IS' (SEIN DES SEIENDEN)

It is a characteristic, and also an alarming phenomenon in the recent development of immanence-philosophy that the ultimate basis for the criterion of the modal diversity of temporal reality has been undermined. This is due to the influence of the process of spiritual uprooting in recent Humanism briefly outlined in Part I of the first volume.

It reveals a crisis in the religious fundamentals of Humanistic thought which is much more destructive than that which we have observed in the transitional period resulting in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. It implies that the faith in 'reason', as

The origin of the *being* of temporal reality, has been shaken.

Kant's transcendental turning of theoretic thought to the Idea as the 'being of what is', as the root of reality, — a process that was completed in Hegel's absolute Idealism — has become extremely problematic to modern Humanistic thought. Critical self-reflection on the supposed supra-temporal root of temporal experience has disappeared in philosophic thinking under the overpowering pressure of historistic positivism.

The Humanistic self-consciousness has now become aware of the fact that it has been uprooted. Deprived of the apriori of the faith in 'reason', it gets dispersed in the diversity of meaning without being capable of concentration. At the most it seeks to regain its sense of freedom and of sovereignty in a 'historic consciousness' which frees the mind of all 'dogmas', or it tries to regain true freedom in a super-rational existentialistic attitude.

Dilthey's empirical and irrational historism, wanting to substitute the 'vivo' for the 'cogito' as its Archimedean point, thinks it can find the new foundation for philosophic reflection in historical life, which finds no resting-place and glides along with the historic process in its historic rhythm. This view is at the same time symptomatic of the apostasy from the spirit of German Idealism.

There are various modern attempts to find a new foundation for philosophic thought which bear the stamp of the decay of the former self-confidence.

Nicolai Hartmann, in his critical ontology, tried to build up a new metaphysics of knowledge, apart from any kind of idealistic or realistic apriori, by a critical examination of the contents of the gnoseological phenomenon. In this attempt the fundamental denominator of all the diversity of meaning is found in 'being' which, comprising both the knowing subject and its 'Gegenstand', was supposed to differentiate itself in various ontological spheres. But the old idealistic postulate to the effect that the root of temporal reality is to be found in the Idea of reason, has been ruthlessly abandoned. The cognitive relation has been degraded to 'one of the many relations of 'being' and knowledge

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1 *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis* (1921) S. 158:

'Erkenntnis ist ein ontologisch sekundäres Gebilde. Sie ist eine von vielen Seinsrelationen, aber in deren Gefüge eine durchaus sekundäre und abhängige. Denn Erkenntnis ist zwar vom Sein des Gegenstandes und des Subjekts abhängig, dieses aber nicht von ihr.'

['Knowledge is ontologically a secondary figure. It is one of many re-
is entirely at the mercy of a metaphysical 'being' which is inscrutable in its root and meaning.

In this way even the sense of the transcendence of the selfhood above temporal reality, however much it may have led to the absolutizing of the rational functions in idealistic metaphysics, has been lost.

'Being', as the basic denominator of reality with Hartmann, is an undefined, general notion ('being as such', 'Sein überhaupt'), the expression of the decay of the religious self-reflexion in Humanistic philosophy.

'The 'being of what is' in Greek and scholastic realistic metaphysics.

In this respect there is indeed a striking contrast between modern ontology and Aristotle's metaphysics as ποιήμα πειρασφορία, as a theory of the 'being of what is' (τὸ ὁν ἢ ὁν)\(^2\). For here 'being' as a unity with its highest metaphysical principles (ἀξιών) is directly founded in reason as ἀξιῶν τῶν αἰσχῶν which is the origin of the 'eternal truths'. It is not a generic concept here, but rather the noumenal ground of all generic concepts, and even exalted above the diversity of the categories\(^3\). In the primordial doctrine of the 'being of what is' all the first metaphysical basic concepts are treated.

Among the first transcendental determinations of ‘being’ are ‘the being true’ and the ‘being good’. ‘Being’ in an absolute actual sense is identical with the deity (the pure νοῦς, the “ens realissimum” as it is called in scholasticism).

Even in Augustine 'being' and 'truth' are identified: Veritas est id quod est\(^4\).

In realistic Scholasticism 'being' is the highest of the 'transcendentalia'.

\(^1\) cf. op. cit. page 148 ff., where the 'notion of being' as 'the unity above the diversity' is deprived of any definiteness of meaning.

\(^2\) Metaph. IV (I) 1, 1003 a 22: ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμην τις ἢ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὁν ἢ ὁν καὶ τὰ τῶν αἰσχῶν ἑπάρχοντα καὶ του ἀν

\(^3\) Metaph. IV (I) 3, 1005 a 27. Praedicam. C. 1; Metaph. X (I) 2, 1054 a 13.

The General Theory of the Modal Spheres

Thomas Aquinas in his first article of the *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* calls ‘being’ the first and best known basic concept, to which all other notions lead back, because the intellect only determines the ‘modes of being’.

In his *Summa Theologiae* absolute ‘being’ is also identified with metaphysical (non-arithmetical) unity, which is in accordance with the Aristotelian way of thinking. Unity and plurality, the whole and its parts, and the basic notions resulting from them, together with potentiality and actuality are counted among the most universal and fundamental grounds of being.

In many respects the same view is held by Duns Scotus, who (with Avicenna, Albertus Magnus and Thomas) calls ‘being’, as ‘transcendens’, the first object of the intellect, from which the universal determinations of ‘being’ such as verum, bonum, etc., are derived as secondaries.

So in realistic metaphysics we invariably find ‘the being of what is’ conceived of as the rational ground of all diversity of meaning; and the fundamental notion of ‘being’ is connected as closely as possible with the supreme principles of reason, on which the whole system depends.

In the case of Hartmann, on the other hand, ‘being’ taken in an ontological sense is entirely detached from the *Agk* and the Archimedean point, and therefore, philosophically speaking, it is a notion formed for the occasion, created in order to get out of a scrape.

The cognitive subject may be posited as the ‘Reflektionspunkt’ of ‘being-in-itself’ by Hartmann, but the really transcendental direction towards transcendence has been lost.

The ‘being of what is’ has changed from an ‘ens nobis notissimae’

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1 *Quaest. disp. de veritate* qu. 1, art. 1. c.: ‘Ilud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio metaphysicae suae.’


3 *Quaest. sup. Metaph. I, IV, q. 1* (Opera Omnia, Paris): ‘Primum obiectum intellectus est ens ut commune omnibus.’ *ib. I. VI qu. 3*: ‘Cum autem quodcumque ens sit per se intelligibile et nihil possit in quocunque essentiale includi nisi ens, sequitur quod primum obiectum intellectus erit ens. Quascunque autem rationes transcendentes, quae sunt quasi passiones entis ut verum, bonum etc. sunt posteriores primo obiecto.’

4 *ib.*, p. 201 fl.
The General Theory of the Modal Spheres

The 'being of what is' as a philosophical basic denominator in Heidegger's 'Sein und Zeit'.

Martin Heidegger, in his philosophy of existence, has thrown a great deal of energy into the investigation of the 'being of what is' in order to arrive at self-reflection, in the midst of the universal decay of self-confidence. In him, just as in Hartmann, 'being' ultimately remains an unqualified generic notion in its function as the common denominator of comparison for all diversity of meaning. But behind this unqualified notion the true philosopher seeks the 'being of what is' as a hidden deity which has left Western philosophy after the period of the Ionian philosophy of nature. He vehemently turns on the old metaphysical equation of being and non-differentiated (rational) unity, because here 'being' is conceived of as a "ständige Vorhandenheit" (a constant datum), in fact as an Archimedean point (in the hypostatized ratio).

With this Heidegger attacks the foundation of the whole of ancient and modern metaphysics, which on the basis of reason wanted to gain access to the 'being of what is', to the being of the selfhood as well as to that of the reality of nature. But he also turns against the naturalistic surrender of the idea of being to the blind facts of nature.

Human existence (Dasein) has been 'thrown into the world' (in der Welt geworfen, i.e. into the given reality of 'nature'), which as a blind 'Vorhandenes' binds its inner freedom. Given 'being' is meaningless, because it is not the internally identical, not the selfhood.

This 'Geworfenheit', the being thrown or 'thrownness' of the selfhood into the meaningless, is its state of rejection ('Verworfenheit'), its falling away into nothingness.

Only in its awareness of the nothingness of being, in its fear
of death, does the ‘Dasein’ (the ex-sistent selfhood) turn in upon itself and reflect on its freedom, in order ‘das Dasein enthüllend zu entwerfen’ (to project its finite existence, revealing it in its inner essence) in the movement of historical existential time.

Thus, the selfhood is sought in reflecting historical being and is distinguished from the given, static being of ‘nature’, the ‘ontical being’ which has no selfhood. 

*Historical* existential being in its reflected or ontological sense, must be distinguished from the ontical being of *nature*, and it is here for the first time that the problem of being as the common denominator for the diversity of meaning crops up. For HEIDEGGER it stands to reason that this common denominator itself must not remain dispersed in the diversity of meaning. But with him the idea of being as the philosophical basic denominator of temporal reality can no longer have the rational analogous character it possessed in realistic metaphysics. And so with HEIDEGGER, just as with NICOLAI HARTMANN, the idea of being evaporates into a meaningless notion of genus, from which the fundamental diversity of meaning between the ontical being of nature and the free historical ‘Dasein’ (the existential being) can be gained only by means of the addition of *differentia specifica*.

‘In what other way,’ says HEIDEGGER, ‘is the difference to be conceived between historicity and the ontic, and how can it be grasped in categories? We can only subsume the ontic and historicity under a more general unity, enabling us to compare and distinguish them. But then we must become alive to the following facts:

1 - the question about the meaning of historicity is an *ontological* problem, an inquiry into the structure of being of historical existence;

2 - the question about the ontic being is an *ontological* one about the structure of being of what is *not* in conformity with existentiality, about what is ‘at hand’, ‘present’, ‘given’ in the widest sense;

3 - the ontic is only one department of ‘what is’. The idea of ‘being’ comprises both the ontic and historicity. It is this idea that must be capable of generic differentiation’.

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1 *Sein und Zeit* (1927) p. 403: “Wie anders soll Geschichtlichkeit in ihrem Unterschied vom Ontischen philosophisch erfasst und “kategorial” begriffen werden, es sei denn dadurch, dass “Ontisches” sowohl wie
The last few sentences in this quotation are very characteristic. 'Being' as a common denominator of comparison has become an unqualified idea. It bears the same relation to the fundamental diversity of meaning of 'nature' and history as the genus-concept to its 'differentia specifica'. It is no longer an Archimedean point. The selfhood has been uprooted. Only in its dread of 'Nothingness', in its freedom to project its existence in the 'Sorge' (concern) and the existential awareness of death is it distinguished from the meaningless world (i.e. das Vorhandene, or things as given by nature), and does it transcend the latter.

The Humanist personality-ideal with its proud claims to sovereignty and freedom has met its doom in a philosophy of death, in which the selfhood can only come to itself in 'concern' ("Sorge") 1, in projecting its future towards death.

With HEIDEGGER the selfhood is exclusively free in its 'anticipatory running forward (in hermeneutical reflection) to death" ("vorlaufen in den Tod"), it is the authentic self ("eigentlich selbst") only in its fundamental isolation by the silent dreadful resolve to accept the fate of its existence 2; a resolve in which

1 HEIDEGGER's ideas of "Dasein" (= human existence), "Zeit" (= time) and "Sorge" (= concern) as the essence of the selfhood, including the definition of "Dasein" as "Zeit und Geschichtlichkeit" (= time and historicity) show a striking resemblance to SPENGLER's Treatise on "Schicksalsidee und Kausalitätsprinzip" (=The idea of Fate and Causality). This part of Der Untergang des Abendlandes, Bnd. I, S. 164—221, is worth reading in this connection.

As far as I know this agreement between the two thinkers has not yet been pointed out. Notwithstanding the fact that their conceptions of 'historic being' are widely different, they are at one in their irrationalist historical attitude.

2 Sein und Zeit, p. 323: The German text reads: "in der ursprünglichen Vereinzelung der verschwiegenen, sich Angst zumutenden Entschlossenheit."
the selfhood of its own free choice abides in nothingness (in das Nichts hinaushält)\(^1\), accepting its ‘thrown-ness’ (Geworfenheit) in nothingness as its guilt.

The ‘being of what is’ (das Sein des Seiendes) is indeed the supremacy of Non-Being (= nothingness), into which the selfhood as Dasein (= the being there, i.e. human existential life) has been thrown in the movement of historical time, which originates from its own essence, and which it realizes with dread in so far as it really comes to itself.

In the comparative denominator, conceived of as the ‘idea of Being’, the fulness of meaning of reality is absent. The latter can never be related to its temporal diversity of meaning as the genus to its species.

§ 4 - MEANING AS THE BASIC DENOMINATOR IN IMMANENCE-PHILOSOPHY AND THE GROUND FOR THE DISTINCTION IN THIS PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN MEANING AND REALITY AS MERELY HAVING MEANING.

In the light of our transcendental basic Idea the criterion of the modal diversity of the law-spheres can only have for its transcendent created foundation the religious fulness of meaning as embodied in Christ, as the new root of our cosmos.

The sinful subjectivity of temporal reality, as will be presently explained in greater detail, has its sinful mode of being as (apostate) meaning only by virtue of the religious fulness of meaning of divine law, without whose determination and delimitation sinful reality would have no meaning and hence no existence or being.

The religious fulness of meaning (in no way self-sufficient, but wholly dependent) is the meaning-ground of all created existence.

This conception of meaning was defended in the Prolegomena of vol. I, where we repudiated any possible misinterpretation of our philosophy as a kind of symbolical idealism, a kind of meaning-ism.

Now the moment has come for a definitive comparison of this conception of meaning with that of immanence-philosophy.

It is remarkable that in Humanistic philosophy there has never been so much talk of ‘meaning’, of ‘rendering meaningful’, of

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\(^1\) Was ist Metaphysik?, p. 26.
'interpreting meaning', as in recent times. And this is happening at the very moment when the former foundations of the idea of 'being of what is' — as established in the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea by the ideals of science and of personality — are being relativistically dissolved.

In the earlier phases of immanence-philosophy the metaphysical idea of being as the basis of the modal diversity of meaning appeared to be founded in the hypostatizing of reason.

Meaning was abstracted from its true religious fulness and from the real Archê. Being, as the ultimate metaphysical idea of reason, is indeed the being of a reason that has been made self-sufficient and independent, the 'Vernunft', the νοῦς, in which the selfhood thinks it has found its Archimedean point.

In post-Kantian freedom-idealism the Idea becomes the only ground of being in a more and more radical sense; it contains the totality of meaning which it expands [in the modal diversity] through its dialectical self-development within time.

In ancient idealistic metaphysics there is, however, always some μὴ ὅν in temporal reality as a counter-instance opposed to the true being, the rational ground of meaning. It is the ἀπειρον, the ἕλη (formless matter), the principle of becoming and decay. It is a constitutive element of the phenomenal sensory perceivable world. Nevertheless the phenomenon shares in the true 'Being' (οὐσία), and in this way becomes meaningful only through its relation to the latter (cf. the μέθεζ in Plato and his doctrine of temporal, changeable reality as a γένεσις ἐλεύθερα). In Aristotelian metaphysics the phenomenon shares in the true being by means of its immanent essential form, which actualizes matter and has a teleological relation to the Deity as pure actual Form. The latter was identified with absolute theoretical thought having only itself as object (νόημα τοῦ νοητοῦ).

Thus it was conceivable that temporal reality derives its meaning solely from reason without being itself meaning.

In pre-Kantian Humanistic metaphysics the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon continues to play its dominating part, and the true ground of Being is found in divine creative mathematical thought.
'Nature' as meaningless reality in Fichte and the South-Western German school of neo-Kantianism.

When Kant ascribes primacy to the ideal of personality, and attributes to the Idea as noumenon a practical-moral sense, the true ground of being of temporal reality can no longer be found in mathematical thought. In Fichte 'nature' as 'phenomenon' becomes the dialectical counterpole of the free I-ness, a dialectical negation (the non-ego) which—being meaningless in itself—acquires meaning only through its relation to the Idea, (as the material for the fulfilment of duty).

In the neo-Kantian philosophy of the South-Western German school this conception of meaning is carried through in its pregnant sense, but at the same time Kant's practical ethical metaphysics is given up. The practical Idea turns into an absolute, extra-temporal valid value, which as such is elevated to the transcendent ground of all temporal meaning.

The empirical reality of 'nature', as conceived of by natural science, is meaningless in itself; however, it assumes meaning through its relation to value, a relation which has not an ontological sense, but can be effectuated only by the judging subject in a synthetical act of consciousness. Thus the immanent "Akt-Sinn", accomplishing a subjective synthesis of reality and value, finds its ultimate ground in the transcendent meaning: viz. in value.

Meaning in Husserl's phenomenology.

In Husserl's phenomenology, meaning also remains 'ideal'. At least in the Logische Untersuchungen the words 'meaning' (Sinn) and 'signification' (Bedeutung) are used promiscuously. The phenomenologist seeks to restrict himself to the data by exclusively directing his intuitive gaze to the intentional acts of consciousness with their entire contents. From this point of view meaning becomes identical with the intentional relationship of the absolute, pure ego to the 'Gegenstand' intended in the act of consciousness. It becomes identical with the 'reine Aktwesen' both as regards its subjective noetic (= rendering meaningful) and its objective noematic (= possessing meaning) aspect.

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1 Ideen I, p. 185: "Ahnlich wie der Wahrnehmung hat jedes intentionale Erlebnis — eben das macht das Grundstück der Intentionalität aus — sein "intentionales Objekt", d.i. seinen gegenständlichen Sinn. Nur in anderen Worten: Sinn zu haben, bezw. etwas "im Sinne zu haben" ist der Grundcharakter des Bewusstseins, das darum nicht nur überhaupt Er-
In a typical absolutizing of the phenomenological attitude the transcendental noetic consciousness is conceived of as the absolute consciousness. The absolute consciousness with its immanent intentional content is held to form the residue of the methodical 'destruction of the world' (Weltvernichtung) which phenomenology pretends it can effect by a methodical ἐποχή of the entire natural attitude of experience, including its appreciative function. The Greek word ἐποχή (epoché) here means: putting in parentheses, replacing the naïve attitude by the theoretical-phenomenological one without neglecting anything of the real content of the intentional act of consciousness.

"All real units are 'units of meaning'. Units of meaning presuppose the noetic consciousness, which on its part is absolute and does not owe its existence to another noesis".

Meaning is consequently conceived of by Husserl as the intentional content of an 'act of consciousness' (Bewusstseinsakt), which content, characterized through 'intentions of the act', is sharply distinguished from purely sensory impressions (Empfindungen), in the same way as Brentano distinguishes them. These sense impressions can at the most be objects of intentions.

'Every Noema,' says Husserl, 'has a content, viz. its 'meaning', and through this it refers to its Gegenstand. Hence: meaning is the intended as such' in the intentional experience, and as such it can be fixed eidetically, i.e.: by means of the logical identification of its eidos (essence) abstracting all the individual possibilities of variation, as the nucleus of the noema, i.e. as the kernel of the intended 'Gegenstand'. Meaning as the noematic kernel is then sharply distinguished from the apperceptional meaning ("Auffassungssinn", i.e. the intending of a 'Gegenstand' in observation, imagination, remembrance, etc.) and the latter is also considered as an essential element in the full 'noema'. Finally, meaning is spoken

lebnis, sondern Sinnhabendes, "Noetisches ist." [Just as observation, every intentional experience — and this very fact forms the fundamental element of intentionality — has its 'intentional object' i.e. its objective meaning. Or in other words: 'to mean' or 'to intend' is the fundamental character of all consciousness, which for this reason is not merely experience, but something that has meaning, something 'noetic'.]

of as the 'noematic kernel in the mode of its fulness' ("im Modus seiner Fülle"), in which meaning is not only conceived in the intention of the "Gegenstand im Was" (the object in the what), but also in the intention of the "Gegenstand im Wie" (the object in the how) e.g. the different "Klarheitsfüllen" (fulnesses of clarity), i.e. in the intended concreteness of the noematic meaning.

The subjectivistic view of meaning in Paul Hofmann.

A purely subjectivistic notion of meaning is advocated by Paul Hofmann, an adherent of the phenomenological school derived from Dilthey's vitalistic philosophy. It forms a contrast with Husserl's conception of meaning as something objective (objektives Wesen) offering itself to the pure phenomenological intuition. 'Thing means 'object'. Meaning, however, is that in which or through which I experience a thing (knowing it and in every respect always valuing it also), i.e. that which, in contradistinction to its 'own' object, is no longer experienced as object, and cannot be conceived of as object without any residue. Just as 'meaning' is the opposite of 'thing', 'Verstehen' is the opposite of 'Schauen' (i.e. having the intended thing itself).  

Hoffmann, too, reverts to a 'pure I' in the sense of a pure (no longer objectifiable) "Erleben" (experience) which he explicitly conceives of as a limiting concept. However, he does not want to hypostatize meaning. Rather he wishes to consider it as existing exclusively in the subjective sphere, as a 'mode of pure experience' (reines Erleben) that understands itself. Thus 'meaning' becomes the opposite of any kind of 'Gegenständlichkeit'. This phenomenological 'vitalistic philosophy' attempts to identify meaning and transcendental experience without per-

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1 Ideen I, S. 273.
2 Paul Hofmann: Metaphysik oder verstehende Sinn-Wissenschaft (1929), S. 3: "Sache heisst "Gegenstand", Sinn aber ist dasjenige, in dem und durch das ich einen "Gegenstand" oder eine Sache erlebe (wissend und allerdings auch stets zugleich wertend), was also diesem "seinem" Gegenstand gegenüber jedenfalls nicht mehr als Gegenstand erlebt wird, und was überhaupt nicht ohne Rest als Gegenstand gefasst werden kann. Wie nun Sinn das Gegenteil von Sache, so ist Verstehen das Gegenteil von Schauen, d.h. von die-Sache(vermeintlich)-selbst-haben." Cf. his study Das Verstehen von Sinn und Seine Allgemeingültigkeit (Jahrbuch für Charakterologie VI).
3 As Husserl does, (and, according to Hofmann, as Heidegger does, too) by elevating meaning to an ideal "für sich selendes objectives Wesen" (an ideal objective essence in itself).
ceiving that this "reines Erleben" (pure experience) itself, in its opposition to all temporal reality, results in a theoretical hypostasis, and as such is abstracted from true self-reflexion.

What is the meaning of a "reines Erleben" (pure experience) of which nothing can be said but this negation that it is opposed to all matter-of-factness, to all "Gegenständlichkeit" (identified with objectivity) ?

It is typical for HOFMANN to call his philosophy, as the science of meaning, "Logology". It was intended as the science "vom Sinne überhaupt" (of meaning as such) and this concept of "Sinn überhaupt" we shall make acquaintance with as a logicist, and therefore meaningless, generic concept.

A more detailed explanation of our own conception of meaning.

At the present stage, our discussion of the above-mentioned Humanistic views of meaning will suffice, and we shall now expound our own conception in greater detail.

The question: what is meaning? cannot be answered without our reflecting on the Origin and unity of all temporal meaning, because this answer depends on the cosmonomic Idea of philosophical thought. Not a single temporal structure of meaning exists in itself (an sich). That which makes it into meaning lies beyond the limit of time. Meaning is 'ex origine' the convergence of all temporal aspects of existence into one supertemporal focus, and this focus, as we have seen, is the religious root of creation, which has meaning and hence existence only in virtue of the sovereign creative act of God.

The fulness of meaning is implied in the religious image of God, expressing itself in the root of our cosmos and in the splitting up of that root in time.

This religious fulness of meaning, given only in Christ, as the new root of creation, is not an abstract 'eidos', not an 'Idea', but it implies the fulness of created reality, again directed to God.

Especially in accordance with the Christian confession about Creation, the Fall into sin, and Redemption, it will not do to conceive of created reality as merely the bearer of meaning, as possessing meaning, as is done in immanence-philosophy.

Such a conception remains founded in an Idea of the 'being of what is', which is incompatible with the radically Christian confession of the absolute sovereignty of God, the Creator, and of the fulness of created meaning in Christ. It is especially in conflict with the view resulting from the Christian attitude, stating that no single aspect of the meaning of reality may be depreciated in favour of certain absolutized aspects. There is an after-effect of the form-matter-scheme of immanence-philosophy discernible in the distinction between reality and meaning. In particular it is the opinion that 'meaning' would be exclusively ideal, supertemporal and abstract — a view found again in THEODOR LITT'S conception of thinking in the so-called cultural sciences — which is the foundation of this distinction.

HUSSELR thinks he can carry ad absurdum the view that natural reality itself would be meaning, by means of the simple remark: meaning cannot be burnt down like a house. And again this remark is founded in the concept of matter and the (semi-Platonic) concept of form of immanence-philosophy: the sensory impressions of nature are 'merely factual reality'; meaning, however, is the 'eidos', the ideal “Bedeutung” (signification). But, in the Christian attitude the Archimedean point is radically different from that of immanence-philosophy. If it is admitted that all the aspects of reality are aspects of meaning, and that all individual things exist only in a structure of meaning, so that the burning house itself, as regards its temporal mode of being as a 'thing', has an individual temporal structure of meaning, then HUSSELR's remark loses all its value.

If created things are only the bearers of meaning, they themselves must have another mode of being different from that of the dependent creaturely existence referring beyond and above itself, and in no way self-sufficient. Then with immanence-philosophy it must be possible to abstract meaning from reality.

Then we fall back into the form-matter-scheme of immanence-philosophy in whatever different varieties and shades of meaning it may be propounded. Then the religious fulness of meaning of our created cosmos in Christ must be an abstract value or a transcendental Idea and nothing more.

But, if 'meaning' is nothing but the creaturely mode of being under the law, consisting exclusively in a religious relation of dependence on God, then branding the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea as a kind of 'meaning-idealism' appears to be based on a fundamental misunderstanding.
I trust I have precluded once for all this misconception, which has arisen in a quarter so congenial to this philosophy.

The struggle to shake off the fetters of the basic schemes of immanence-philosophy from our thinking is an extremely difficult task, and it is quite explicable that there may arise some misunderstandings.

Should there be some misconception on my part, and should it be possible on biblical grounds to show that (religious) meaning is not the mode of being of created reality, I shall not for a moment hesitate to revise my conception on this point. If I see aright, however, the difference on this head between my view and that of Stoker, mentioned in the Prolegomena, is of a provisional character and is connected with the question raised by him, if Christian philosophy can indeed do without the concept of substance. Now I stick to my opinion that this question can only be considered to some purpose, if beforehand the preliminary question has been answered: What is the creaturely mode of being, what is the being of all created existence? The answer to the latter question is of primary importance; for the sense in which a new concept of substance, if any, is to be taken, depends on this answer.

And that is why I believe that it is not right to criticize the conception of meaning as the creaturely mode of being by means of a concept of substance of which the meaning has not been further defined.

The 'problem of substance' cannot be discussed in more detail before the investigation of the structures of individuality of temporal reality. We have observed that the theory of the modal law-spheres must have precedence for purposes of method.

But both the theory of the law-spheres and that concerning the structures of individuality must be founded in an Idea of the mode of being of creaturely reality as such, an Idea that is implied in the transcendental basic Idea.

Meaning in the fall of man.

There remains, however, another central problem of extreme importance: As regards his human nature, Christ is the root of reborn creation, and as such the fulness of meaning, the creaturely Ground of the meaning of all temporal reality. But our temporal world in its apostate religious root lies under God's curse, under the curse of sin. Thus there is a radical antithesis in the subject-side of the root of the earthly cosmos. It may be that this
antithesis has been reconciled by the Redemption in Jesus Christ, but in temporal reality the unrelenting struggle between the kingdom of God and that of darkness will go until the end of the world. The falling away from God has affected our cosmos in its root and its temporal refraction of meaning. Is not this a final and decisive reason to distinguish meaning from reality? Does not the radical antithesis between the kingdom of God and that of darkness, which our transcendental Idea itself also recognizes as fundamental for philosophic thought, compel us to accept an ultimate dualism between meaning and reality?

Is sinful reality still meaning? Is it not meaningless, or rather the adversary of meaning, since meaning can only exist in the religious dependence on its Origin?

Here we indeed touch the deepest problem of Christian philosophy. The latter cannot hope to solve it without the illumination of Divine Revelation if it wants to be guaranteed from falling back into the attitude of immanence-philosophy.

I for one do not venture to try and know anything concerning the problem that has been raised except what God has vouchsafed to reveal to us in His Word. I do not know what the full effect of unrestrained sin on reality would be like. Thanks to God this unhampered influence does not exist in our earthly cosmos. One thing we know, viz. that sin in its full effect does not mean the cutting through of the relation of dependence between Creator and depraved creation, but that the fulness of being of Divine justice will express itself in reprobate creation in a tremendous way, and that in this process depraved reality cannot but reveal its creaturely mode of being as meaning.

It will be meaning in the absolute subjective apostasy under the curse of God's wrath, but in this very condition it will not be a meaningless reality.

Sin causes spiritual death through the falling away from the Divine source of life, but sin is not merely privatio, not something merely negative, but a positive, guilty apostasy insofar as it reveals its power, derived from creation itself. Sinful reality remains apostate meaning under the law and under the curse of God's wrath. In our temporal cosmos God's Common Grace reveals itself, as Kuyper brought to light so emphatically, in the preservation of the cosmic world-order. Owing to this preserving grace the framework of the temporal refraction of meaning remains intact.
The Christian as a stranger in this world.

Although the fallen earthly cosmos is only a sad shadow of God's original creation, and although the Christian can only consider himself as a stranger and a pilgrim in this world, yet he cannot recognize the true creaturely ground of meaning in the apostate root of this cosmos, but only in the new root, Christ. Any other view would inevitably result in elevating sin to the rank of an independent counter-power opposed to the creative power of God. And this would result in avoidance of the world, an unbiblical flight from the world. We have nothing to avoid in the world but sin. The war that the Christian wages in God's power in this temporal life against the Kingdom of darkness, is a joyful struggle, not only for his own salvation, but for God's creation as a whole, which we do not hate, but love for Christ's sake. We must not hate anything in the world but sin.

The apostate world cannot maintain any meaning as its own property in opposition to Christ. Common Grace.

Nothing in our apostate world can get lost in Christ. There is not any part of space, there is no temporal life, no temporal movement or temporal energy, no temporal power, wisdom, beauty, love, faith or justice, which sinful reality can maintain as a kind of property of its own apart from Christ.

Whoever relinquishes the 'world' taken in the sense of sin, of the 'flesh' in its Scriptural meaning, does not really lose anything of the creaturely meaning, but on the contrary he gets a share in the fulness of meaning of Christ, in Whom God will give us everything. It is all due to God's common grace in Christ that there are still means left in the temporal world to resist the destructive force of the elements that have got loose;

In his Kirchliche Dogmatik Karl Barth has tried to escape this consequence by deriving the positive power of sin from the 'Divine No' placed over against His 'Yes' with respect to His creative act. But this dialectical solution of the problem results in a dualistic (at the same time positive and negative) conception of creation.

The Divine 'No' cannot explain the power of sin, which as such is derived from creation itself, as we have stated in Vol. I.

The idea of a negative creation is destructive to the Biblical conception of the integral Origin of Heaven and earth, because it implies that sin has a power outside creation in its positive sense.

Creation itself implies the Divine 'No' with respect to sin in its negative sense as 'privatio'.
that there are still means to combat disease, to check psychic maladies, to practise logical thinking, to save cultural development from going down into savage barbarism, to develop language, to preserve the possibility of social intercourse, to withstand injustice, and so on. All these things are the fruits of Christ's work, even before His appearance on the earth. From the very beginning God has viewed His fallen creation in the light of the Redeemer.

We can only face the problem of the effect on temporal meaning that the partial working of the falling away from the fulness of meaning has in spite of common grace, when we have gained an insight into the modal structures of the law-spheres within the temporal coherence of meaning. But—and with this we definitively reject any separation of meaning from reality — meaning in apostasy remains real meaning in accordance with its creaturely mode of being. An illogical reasoning can occur only within the logical modality of meaning; illegality in its legal sense is only possible within the modality of meaning of the jural sphere; the non-beautiful can only be found within the modal aspect of meaning of the aesthetic law-sphere, just as organic disease remains something within the modal aspect of meaning of the biotic law-sphere, and so on. Sin, as the root of all evil, has no meaning or existence independent of the religious fulness of the Divine Law. In this sense St Paul's word is to be understood, to the effect that but for the law sin is dead ¹.

All along the line meaning remains the creaturely mode of being under the law which has been fulfilled by Christ. Even apostate meaning is related to Christ, though in a negative sense; it is nothing apart from Him.

As soon as thought tries to speculate on this religious basic truth, accessible to us only through faith in God's Revelation, it gets involved in insoluble antinomies. This is not due to any intrinsic contradiction between thought and faith, but rather to the mutinous attempt on the part of thought to exceed its temporal cosmic limits in its supposed self-sufficiency. But of this in the next section. For thought that submits to Divine Revelation and recognizes its own limits, the antithesis in the root of our cosmos is not one of antinomy; rather it is an opposition on the basis of the radical unity of Divine Law; just as in the temporal law-spheres justice and injustice, love and hatred

¹ Rom. 7:8: χωρίς γὰρ νόμον ἡμαρτία νεκρά.
are not internally antinomous, but only contrasts determined by the norms in the respective modalities of meaning.

The religious value of the modal criterion of meaning.

If created reality is to be conceived of as meaning, one cannot observe too strictly the limits of the temporal modal law-spheres in philosophic thought. These limits have been set by the cosmic order of time in the specific ‘sovereignty of the modal aspects within their own spheres’.

Any attempt to obliterate these limits by a supposedly autonomous thought results in an attack upon the religious fulness of meaning of the temporal creation.

If the attempt is made to reduce the modal meaning of the jural or that of the economic law-sphere to the moral one of the temporal love of one’s neighbour, or if the same effort is made to reduce the modal meaning of number or that of language to the meaning of logic, it must be distinctly understood that the abundance of meaning of creation is diminished by this subjective reduction. And perhaps without realizing what this procedure implies, one puts some temporal aspect of reality in the place of the religious fulness of meaning in Christ. The religious value of the criterion of meaning is that it saves philosophic thought from falling away from this fulness.

§ 5 - THE LOGICAL ASPECT OF THE MODAL CRITERION OF MEANING AND THE METHOD OF ANTINOMY.

The principium exclusae antinomiae in its relation to the logical principle of contradiction.

In § 1 of this chapter the theoretical character of the criterion of a modal law-sphere was given prominence and reference was made to the logical side of this criterion.

The modal aspects are implicitly included in naïve experience. Their “ex-plication”, the theoretical unfolding of the functional modalities of meaning from what has been given in the naïve attitude, is a task of philosophy, which has to make use of theoretical analysis and synthesis. Insight into a real synthesis of the logical function of thought with a non-logical aspect of experience can only be acquired on the condition of respecting the specific modal limits of the different law-spheres, including the logical one. Every attempt to erase these limits by a supposed autonomous theoretical thought results in theoretical antinomies. By laying bare such antinomies in immanence-philosophy, we
apply a method of criticism whose efficiency can be denied only by those who employ a dialectical logic either to overcome the ultimate antithesis in their religious starting-point by a pseudo-theoretical synthesis, or to project this basic antinomy as an unconquerable contradiction into temporal reality itself.

The method of antinomy has continually been applied in our critical treatment of the development of the basic antinomy between ‘nature’ and ‘freedom’ in Humanistic philosophy; but the special use of this method in the theory of the modal law-spheres has not yet been brought to light.

The nature of the theoretical antinomy. The principium exclusae antinomiae.

What is the nature of a theoretical antinomy? Antinomy literally means a ‘contradiction between laws’. PLUTARCH uses the term in a juridical sense to denote an inner conflict in positive law, revealing itself in the fact that two opposing parties can explain the law in their own favour.

It is especially the original relation of antinomy to law (of course in this case taken in its fundamental cosmological sense, and not in a modally jural application) that makes it necessary to give all the more prominence to its essentially subjective character of being opposed to law. It is not the law itself, in its basic meaning of the cosmic order of the modal law-spheres that can be antinomic, nor can the laws of the different modal aspects contradict one another. But all theoretical antinomies are caused by theoretical thought involving itself in self-contradiction in theoretical judgments, because it forms an erroneous conception of the coherence in the modal diversity of the laws, thereby giving rise to a seeming mutual incompatibility of the latter.

Antinomy in its inter-modal character may not be identified with the intra-modal relation of contrariety.

Antinomy in this inter-modal theoretical sense ought to be sharply distinguished from the intra-modal relation of contrariety, including logical contradiction. Contraries like logical — illogical, polite — impolite, beautiful — ugly, lawful — unlawful, moral — immoral, belief — unbelief, and so on, present themselves within the same modal aspect of meaning. They do not contain a real antinomy between different modal law-spheres.
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In its theoretical character the latter implies a logical contradiction; but a logical contradiction as such is not an antinomy in the inter-modal sense here intended, referring as it does to the transcendental Idea concerning the mutual coherence of meaning between the different modal aspects of experience.

Antinomy in the sense of a seeming contradiction between the essential laws of different modal aspects of meaning is refuted by the Idea of cosmic order. Anyone who accepts the cosmic order of time regulating the coherence of meaning between the laws of different modal spheres, cannot acknowledge any theoretical justification for antinomy. The transcendental Idea of cosmic order implies the principium exclusae antinomiae.

The essentially antinomic character of all speculative thought. The antinomy of the sole causality of God in speculative theology.

If theoretical thought is indeed bound by the temporal coherence of meaning of the modal law-spheres, any attempt on the part of this thought to overstep the limit of the cosmic order of time must lead to antinomy. For this reason all speculative thought is necessarily antinomic.

Our thought cannot really exceed the cosmic limit of time. What actually takes place in speculative thought is not an antinomic conceptual comprehension of the supertemporal, but merely a theoretical eradication of the modal limits between the temporal law-spheres by making certain modal aspects absolute.

Take for instance the notorious antinomy of speculative natural theology with its notion of the ‘unconditional ultimate causality of God’ proceeding from the impossibility of a regressus in infinitum in the empirical causal relations. This notion lands us in an insoluble contradiction with man’s personal accountability for his actions, since it makes God the ultimate term of a series of causes and effects which must be conceived as continuous and leaving no single hiatus in the causal chain.

For, if any hiatus would be allowed in the temporal chain of causes and effects, by the introduction of “free causes”, in the sense of subjects of normative imputation, the whole argument would lose its foundation.

This argument starts from ‘material’ sensory perceivable effects and from these effects seeks to find the causes. It is impossible in this empirical way to find a free cause as the subject
of normative imputation. The cause which can explain the effect must itself be the effect of another cause and so on.

It is not necessary that the causal relations found in this way are conceived of in a mechanical sense. But they cannot be of a normative character, because the normative imputation of an effect to a subject as its cause implies that the acting subject itself is a final point of reference in the normative aspects of the causal relation 1.

The Thomistic proofs of the existence of God.

The first and second Thomistic-Aristotelian proofs of the existence of God as unmoved Mover handle the concept of causality in the metaphysical sense of the Greek form-matter scheme.

Causality is conceived here in the transcendental-analogical sense of the fundamental concept of being, with its general transcendental determinations of matter and form, actuality and potentiality. This implies that the causal relation is used without any synthetical determination of its modal meaning.

In the Aristotelian principle: Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, 'movement' is meant in the analogical sense of a transition of matter to form, and of potentiality to actuality.

As long as this principle is handled in its purely metaphysical sense, the argument based on it cannot prove anything, because it contains only a theoretical logical explanation of the consequences implied in the religious presupposition of the form-matter motive in its Aristotelian conception 2.

As soon, however, as it is related to human experience of movements in the temporal world, it is no longer possible to use the concepts of movement and causality in an undetermined analogical sense.

In this case it becomes necessary to define the events arranged in the chain of causes and effects which are supposed to demand an unmoved Mover as the ultimate cause. And now theoretical thought cannot escape from defining the modal and typical sense of its concept of causality.

If it is possible to arrange a series of different natural events

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2 Cf. my treatise The Transcendental Critique of Theoretical Thought and the Thomistic Theologia Naturalis (Phil. Ref. 17 Year 1952, p. 151 ff).
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and human actions in the same chain of causes and effects which would be infinite without assuming God as the ultimate cause, the normative aspects of causality must be eliminated on the grounds explained before.

As to the remaining aspects it must be stated that — if they are irreducible to each other — their inter-modal relation cannot be a causal one.

Consequently, it is necessary to define the modal aspect of causality meant in the empirical-theoretical argument.

But, by making God the absolute or ultimate cause of a theoretically abstracted modal series of causes and effects, this modal aspect is absolutized because of its being related to the absolute Origin outside of its inter-modal coherence with the other aspects and outside of the religious centre of human existence. And so the antinomy between ‘causality’ and normative responsibility of man is inescapable.

It does not matter whether causality is conceived of in a metaphysical-mechanical sense, or in a metaphysical-biological or in a metaphysical-psychological one; in either case it is inevitably in conflict with the modal meaning of the normative aspects of human behaviour, as soon as it is brought to bear on the latter. If, for example, an instance of rational human behaviour were capable of an entirely mechanistic explanation, there would not be any foundation for normative juridical or moral accountability.

Human action, however, is incapable of being enclosed in certain aspects of reality in a purely functionalistic way, since insofar as it is human behaviour, it takes its origin in the religious root of human existence.

To the extent that a human ego is qualified as the super-modal cause of his actions, we speak about causality in the transcendental sense of the radical unity of all its temporal modalities, which refers to the religious concentration-point of human existence beyond all and any modal diversity of meaning. This human ego cannot be arranged in a mechanical or psychological causal series.

And insofar as we continue to speak of God being the ultimate cause, we can do so only in the sense of the transcendental Idea of the Origin of all meaning, if we want to avoid the errors of speculative immanence-philosophy. God can never be the ultimate cause in a mechanical or other modal series of causes and effects. Rather He is the Origin of causality in the temporal
coherence and radical unity of all its modal aspects. A purely modal causality cannot refer to a real process, but only to a theoretical abstraction.

It has already been discussed in the Prolegomena that both Ideas (that of the radical unity and that of the Origin), contained in the transcendental basic Idea, are conclusive evidence of the fact that theoretical thought is not self-sufficient, not even in its own sphere, and that it is necessarily determined by the religious root of existence. Antinomy arises in the first place through ignoring this religious determination and dependence of theoretical thought, because this thought sets out to interpret God's causality or that of human volition in a functionalistic way. That which is one in the full sense of the word in the totality of meaning and in the Origin of all meaning respectively, turns into a contradiction between two modal functions of meaning, if interpreted functionalistically; the reason is that these two functions are made absolute in theoretical thought (e.g., mechanical causality and moral responsibility).

Any one who thinks he can solve such a speculative antinomy by granting man a certain measure of independence and freedom in his relation to God as 'prima causa' has not understood the true origin of this antinomy in speculative philosophy. For the speculative concept of cause (which implies an absolutization of a non-normative modal aspect of meaning as soon as it is used in an argument which is based on a continuous series of causes) does not bear any limitation in its supposed applicability to the Absolute Origin of the cosmos.

If God, as a supposed unmoved Mover, is thought of as the ultimate cause in a purely mechanical series of causes and effects, His causal activity must be conceived in an absolute mechanical sense which has no room for any human responsibility. And the same consequence, viz. the exclusion of human responsibility, is implied in the absolutization of any other non-normative aspect of a causal process.

The source of the contradiction lies in this absolutizing itself. For human thought it is absolutely impossible to form a defined concept of causality in the supertemporal fulness of meaning or in the sense of God's creative act. Impossible, because human thought is bound within the limits of the temporal coherence of meaning.

Only in the transcendental Idea referring to the totality of meaning and to the 'Αόρις can human thought be concentrated
towards that which passes beyond its immanent boundaries.

That's why St Paul's words are full of wisdom when he answers those who speculate on causality with reference to the will of God. "Thou wilt say then unto me, why doth He yet find fault? For who hath resisted His will?" "Nay, but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?" This answer is a direct dismissal of speculative thought and it does not enter into the false method of posing problems used by speculative philosophy.

To philosophical thought, concentrating on Christ and on God Who reveals Himself in Christ, this speculative way of posing the problem of causality is simply impossible. Only abstract speculative theoretical thought can take it seriously.

Thus the theoretical antinomies of speculative thought after all prove to be antinomies related to the transcendental Idea of the inter-modal coherence between the different law-spheres.

In the same way the basic antinomy in the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea between the ideals of science and of personality appeared again and again to lead to a theoretical antinomy between mechanical causality and moral freedom.

\[\text{Kant's conception of the nature and the origin of the theoretical antinomies.}\]

The problem concerning the origin of the specific theoretical antinomies has been raised also from the immanence-standpoint. Kant, the founder of the theory of the antinomies in modern thought, is of opinion that their origin lies in the abuse of the theoretical, cosmological Ideas of reason outside of the scope of all experience. The theoretical Idea of reason is nothing but a regulator for the use of our understanding, without having any constitutive function in human knowledge. It stimulates the understanding to carry thought beyond every condition discovered in an empirical phenomenon, and to refer it to the totality of conditions. This totality is never given in experience, since it is to be conceived of as absolute, self-sufficient, unconditional.

The Idea of reason viewed thus, is nothing but the category of thought freed from the limits set to it by experience; it is the "\text{bis zum Unbedingten erweiterte Kategorie}" \text{[the category that has been extended to the unconditional]}. Only the "categories" in which the synthesis contained in them form a \text{series}, are alleged to be capable of such 'extension
into the absolute'. And in this way Kant concludes that there are no more than four cosmological Ideas of reason (in accordance with the four points of view of Kant's table of categories).

These transcendental Ideas ought to be used theoretically only in such a way that they always urge the intellect, tied down to (sensory) experience, to add new determinations to those already found for some phenomenon. They are to be handled in such a way that they set an endless systematical task to theoretical knowledge.

If, however, the Idea is used as a metaphysical 'thing in itself' to which the categories of the understanding are applied as logical determinations without the aid of any sensory experience — as was done in rationalistic metaphysics — then reason inevitably gets involved in 'a dialectical illusion'. It sets up propositions that can neither be proved, nor be disproved by (sensory) experience. The remarkable thing in this "dialectical illusion" is that the thesis as well as the anti-thesis can be conceived without either of them being self-contradictory. They can both appeal to equally valid grounds of reason, but they contradict each other diametrically, notwithstanding. This is how in Kant the theoretical antinomies arise, whose number, according to him, is restricted to that of the cosmological Ideas. There are four of them, distinguished into two mathematical antinomies, relating to the limitedness or illimitableness of the world in time and space and to the infinite or the finite divisibility of matter; — and two dynamic antinomies, relating to the possibility or the impossibility of causality through freedom in the events of the world, and to the existence or the non-existence of the deity as the ens realissimum.

As appeared in the second part of the first volume, this Kantian conception of the nature and the origin of the theoretical antinomies is entirely dependent on the Kantian dualistic cosmonomic Idea with its isolating separation between the realm of experience (of nature) and that of super-sensory freedom.

In this dualism the fundamental antinomy between the ideal of science and that of personality is concealed. And this antinomy in Kant crystallized itself into the isolating separation between the theoretical realm of the understanding, restricted to the phenomenon, and the practical realm of reason, bearing on the super-sensory sphere of the absolute normative Ideas (noumena).

It is to be understood that Kant must find the origin of anti-
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The origin of the special theoretical antinomies in the light of our transcendental basic Idea.

Anyone who has understood the importance of the transcendental basic Idea will no longer hold that Christian philosophy can agree with this Kantian view of the nature and origin of antinomy. But this need in no way be an impediment for us to recognize the elements of truth implied in Kant's extremely penetrating doctrine of the dialectic of pure reason.

Kant's controversy with speculative metaphysics in general, and with speculative divinity in particular, retains its fundamental value, insofar as he had an insight into the fact that theoretical antinomies must be founded in a certain speculative overstepping of the limits of theoretical thought. Especially his criticism of the speculative use of what he styles the category of causality is in this respect a proof of his genius.

In a positive sense this doctrine of the antinomies, however, is useless to us, because of the conception of experience and the Idea of the transcendent root of temporal reality that forms its basis.

And precisely Kant's identification of the reality of temporal experience with its sensory and logical aspects is a source of inner antinomies, just as is his absolutizing of the moral aspect of meaning to the transcendent noumenon. It will appear that philosophical thought cannot avoid antinomies by simply separating the concepts of natural science from the normative ones.

It is not even possible to ward off antinomy by observing the modal limits between the various law-spheres without recognizing the mutual cosmic coherence of meaning between them.

We have discovered the true origin of the antinomies in a subjective turning away on the part of theoretical thought from the cosmic order of time. This order is the foundation of the
inner sovereignty of the modal aspects within their own spheres, in their inter-modal coherence of meaning.

The special theoretical antinomy must consequently be due to a subjective violation of the modal sovereignty of the different law-spheres by theoretical thought.

Insofar as theoretical thought tries to avoid the antinomies that have arisen in this process, by separating and isolating a phenomenal and a noumenal world, embracing two different groups of mental functions (‘nature’ and ‘normative freedom’ in Kant), the antinomies are not really removed. The absolutized complexes of functions, dualistically separated from one another, cannot but cancel and exclude one another by this isolating separation.

In how far the antinomies are caused by a disregard of the meaning of the modal theoretical Ideas, can appear only in a later part of our work, in which the relation of the concept of a meaning-modus to the modal Idea will be explained in the light of our transcendental basic Idea. It will then appear that there must be as many classes of theoretical Ideas as there are modal law-spheres in temporal reality.

In any case it ought to be clear that the number of possible theoretical antinomies is much larger than Kant assumed in his “Dialektik der reinen Vernunft”, and that the first three of the four that Kant formulated and examined, can be entirely explained by the causes indicated by us. The fourth (oriented to the ontological proof of God’s existence) cannot be recognized as a special kind of antinomy, because it touches on the Idea of the Origin in the foundation of all philosophy. On the basis of Kant’s cosmonomic Idea it can be reduced to the specific antinomy between the causality of nature, on the one hand, and morality, on the other.

Antinomies are bound to ensue from the attempt to wipe out the limits of meaning between the mathematical aspects of number and space; hence by either assuming the actual continuity of the approximative functions of number (the infinitesimal and the infinitely large number resulting from the continuous series of real numbers), or by resolving space into a collection of points conceived of as real numbers. Antinomies are bound to ensue from the attempt to reduce the modal mathematical aspect of motion to that of the original spatiality, or to resolve the energy-aspect of matter into a spatial collection of points (the antinomies of Zeno; the race between
ACHILLES and the tortoise, the flying arrow; KANT's second antinomy of the composition of matter). Antinomies must arise if we think the modal aspect of energy to be determined by the mathematical aspect of space (a more exact statement of KANT's first antinomy between the Ideas of finite and infinite 'world-space'). There arise necessarily antinomies, when it is attempted to enclose human activity entirely in its physical aspect (the antinomy between mechanical causality and normative responsibility in the various normative aspects of meaning; a more exact statement of KANT's third antinomy). Antinomies must of necessity ensue from the attempt to reduce the original (mathematical) aspect of spatiality to the sensory (objective psychical) space of sight or touch (this antinomy has been examined in the first volume in our chapter on HUME's psychologizing of mathematics).

By ignoring the modal limits marking off the aspect of sensory feeling from that of logical analysis, one ends in antinomies (we refer again to HUME's psychologizing of logical thought). The same result will follow from a logicizing of the juridical aspect (cf. the antinomies of Kelsen's so-called "reine Rechtslehre", analysed in my Inaugural Address "De Betekenis der Wetsidee voor Rechtswetenschap en Rechtsphilosophie", 1926).

Theoretical thought is confronted with antinomies when it breaks through the boundaries between the juridical aspect of retributive justice and that of moral love, and so on.

In developing the special theory of the law-spheres, we shall systematically examine the antinomies arising from the theoretical violation of the modal boundaries of meaning. But in the general theory of the law-spheres we shall also have continually to apply the method of antinomy.

The cosmic order is maintained when theoretical thought, failing to recognize the modal sphere-sovereignty of the various aspects of reality, gets involved in inner contradictions, revealed as logical contradictions in the logical aspect of the theory. Every theoretical antinomy is at bottom founded in a subjective turning of theoretical thought against the cosmic order underlying also the laws of logical thinking.

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The cosmological *principium exclusae antinomiae* is not identical with the logical principle of contradiction, but the former is the foundation of the latter.

The *principium exclusae antinomiae* is therefore by no means identical with the logical *principium contradictionis*, but rather its foundation.

Without the cosmic order of the law-spheres there is no possibility of logical thought, so that the logical principium contradictionis would be meaningless but for the cosmological principium exclusae antinomiae safeguarding the sphere-sovereignty of the modal aspects of reality within their inter-modal coherence of meaning. This especially distinguishes our theory of antinomy from that of the Kantian doctrine. According to Kant thesis and antithesis are separately conceivable without any inner contradiction. The antinomies, consequently, can in his view be reduced to merely logical contradictions, to a simple conflict between subjective thought and the logical principium contradictionis, which does not allow two contradictory logical judgments to be true at the same time and in the same respect.

From this logicizing of theoretic antinomy it appears most clearly that Kant tried to emancipate theoretical thought from the cosmic temporal order. This is why he has lost sight of the real states of affairs. The thesis about matter being limited by mathematical space (or vice versa the thesis of mathematical space being limited by matter); the thesis as to the infinite divisibility of matter; and that about the exclusively mechanical determination of human actions, are intrinsically antinomic in a cosmological sense. The immanence-standpoint itself is the origin of all cosmological antinomies ("cosmological" is here taken in the sense of our all-sided basic Idea of the cosmos, and not in the Kantian sense of the word).

Not before our analysis of the modal structures of the law-spheres can it be explained how immanence-philosophy is seemingly able to find a point of contact in these very structures for its theoretical violation of the boundaries between the modal aspects, from which the specific antinomies originate.

Antinomy plays havoc with the immanence-standpoint, affecting it in its very root, viz. in its dialectical religious basic motive. In the last instance it is due to the turning away of meaning from its true Origin, and to the emancipation of theoretical thought from the cosmic order of time in which the coherence of meaning is founded.
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The method of antinomy tries to bring to light the consequences of this apostasy for theoretic thought. It is therefore pre-eminently a method of immanent criticism, because it tries to penetrate into other systems of philosophy along the lines of their own cosmonomic Idea. That is to say this method starts from their own pre-suppositions, and so lays bare the origin of the antinomy that has been brought to light.

The method of antinomy should consequently not be used exclusively from the viewpoint of the Christian cosmonomic Idea. As a method of criticism of immanence-philosophy it should enter into the transcendental basic Idea that forms the foundation of the system whose inner antinomies are to be discovered.

The analytical criterion of a modal law-sphere.

The method of antinomy is, however, not only useful in the discussion with immanence-philosophy. As a critical method it is still more important in the positive development of our own philosophic thought.

On the basis of our transcendental Idea of the cosmic time-order this method postulates analytical purity in concept-formation, and thereby requires an analytical criterion for distinguishing the modalities of meaning.

This analytical criterion has no more than a dependent function in the theory of the law-spheres. It wards off impure analyses of meaning, and especially has the task to guard against any method which results in levelling the specific modal aspects by means of concepts that are supposed to possess generic universality of meaning (the method of finding a genus proximum and the differentia specifica).

The analytic impurity of such pseudo-generic and pseudo-specific concepts is to be demonstrated by showing their multiplicity of meanings. The concrete importance of this logical criterion cannot appear until we are acquainted with the method of analyzing the modal structures of the aspects. In the present context we are only concerned with the value of the method of antinomy with respect to the discovery of the material (synthetic-al) criterion of a modal law-sphere. Here this method acquires an heuristic function. If we are in doubt whether the fundamental concepts of jurisprudence, economics, historical science, and so on, are related to specific modal aspects of human experience and empirical reality, we may try to reduce them to the fun-
damental concepts of other sciences whose modal fields of research have already been defined. When this attempt leads to specific insoluble antinomies, a negative proof has been given of a theoretical violation of the modal boundaries between irreducible law-spheres.

By applying this method to legal theory I was able to establish that the fundamental juridical concepts of causality, volition, power, interpretation etc. must have an irreducible modal juridical sense, since they do not permit themselves to be reduced to analogical concepts of other sciences without involving juridical thought in antinomies. But, because they are also used in other sciences — a state of affairs which refers to the inter-modal coherence of meaning between the different aspects — it is necessary to seek for the original juridical meaning-moment which alone can guarantee them their modal juridical sense. Here we are confronted with the modal structures of the aspects, which will be examined later on.

§ 6 - THE COSMIC TEMPORAL ORDER IN THE SUCCESSION OF THE LAW-SPHERES, SUBSTRATUM-SPHERES AND SUPERSTRATUM-SPHERES.

The modal structures of the law-spheres, as to their law-side and their subject-side, exhibit an order of increasing complication in accordance with the order of succession of the spheres in the temporal coherence of meaning.

Since DESCARTES the Humanistic science-ideal has assumed that there is a logically continuous order of the sciences investigating the different aspects of empirical reality. This order is supposedly determined by the increasing complication of one and the same method of thinking. In the terms of the neo-Kantian Marburg School this order is created by a logical process from which new categories of thought continually derive.

Immanence-philosophy has never posed the problem of a cosmic order of succession of modal law-spheres, with their specific sphere-sovereignty, intersecting the whole of temporal reality, its pre-logical aspects as well as its normative functions. And immanence-philosophy never could raise this problem, because it proclaimed philosophic thought to be self-sufficient, thereby necessarily eliminating the temporal order and inter-modal coherence of the law-spheres. This explains the unmethodical character especially of its treatment of the coherence between the normative aspects of reality.
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If our cosmonomic Idea really supplies a reliable ὑπόθεσις for philosophic thought, the Idea of the meaning-coherence in the cosmic order must also be an Idea of the temporal order of succession of the modal law-spheres. It may then be asked what is the exact position of each of the latter in this temporal arrangement of aspects. Naturally, 'position', in this case does not refer to any spatial relation, but it means the relation to the cosmic order of time.

We have seen that the meaning-modalities of the law-spheres cannot be identified with 'categories of thought' in the sense of Kantian or neo-Kantian epistemology. Since we have rejected any such identification, the problem of the analysis of the modal structures of meaning of the different aspects and their subsequent synthesis has become the problem of their analysis from the fulness of their temporal coherence of meaning.

Our transcendental basic Idea does not allow of any arbitrary theoretical delimitation of these modal aspects. This implies the necessity of finding a new method of concept-formation, since the current methods neglect the modal meaning-structures.

When, for instance, did immanence-philosophy ever attempt to find the modal meaning of the juridical sphere by analyzing it from the cosmic coherence between all the modal aspects of experience, including the pre-logical modalities? When has this ever been done in earnest in the case of the modal meaning of the logical sphere, or the aesthetic, the historical, the moral sphere, or that of faith?

Because of the very nature of its philosophical basic denominator for the comparison of the different modal aspects immanence-philosophy was incapacitated to pose the problem correctly. We refer to the disturbing influence on the formation of concepts exercised by the form-matter scheme, or by the disruption of the integral empirical reality into a noumenon and a phenomenon, and by the reduction of this reality to a merely "physico-psychical" world.

Our hypothesis maintains the unbreakable inter-modal coherence of meaning between all experiential aspects. It implies the following methodical rules: The modal meaning-aspects of reality, enclosed in law-spheres, are not scattered about arbitrarily in a sort of chaotic disorder. On the contrary, they are arranged in the order of cosmic time, in a cosmic succession of prior and posterior. And this order of succession must be detec-
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ted by a careful examination of the functional-modal structures of the law-spheres themselves.

The philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea does not proclaim this hypothesis as a gratuitous assertion, — a charge made by the Dutch philosopher J. P. van Mullem in his neo-Kantian period, before he penetrated to the quintessence of this philosophy. On the contrary, it is essential for this philosophy to account for the 'place' of each modal law-sphere by an exact analysis of its structure. It must, however, be borne in mind that we are not concerned with a certain 'arrangement of the classes of knowledge' in the sense intended by the above-mentioned writer, and as it occurs in the writings of the neo-Kantian Görland. Our real aim is much rather to show how one sphere is founded on the other according to their modal structure of meaning in the cosmic temporal order.

The earlier modal spheres are the foundation of all the later modal aspects in an irreversible coherence of meaning. In the future this cosmic temporal relationship will be designated in such a way that the spheres forming the foundation of a certain modal aspect are called the substratum-spheres of the latter, and

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1 Analogon des Levens. Annalen der critische phil. 2 (1932) 1 p. 131/2. Dr. van Mullem acknowledged his fundamental misunderstanding of the theory of the law-spheres in an ample correspondence and he has presented a remarkable elaboration of this theory, projected by himself.

2 Görland, Prologik, p. 347, where this writer argues that 'with increasing clarity and conciseness a certain order of succession has been created among the special sciences, which as a rule cannot be arbitrarily changed.' ['mit wachsender Deutlichkeit und Bündigkeit sich eine Reihenfolge unter spezifischen Wissenschaften sich herausgebildet hat, die allgemein sich nicht beliebig ändern lässt'].

3 This is also the cardinal point of difference between the theory of the modal law-spheres and the theory of the 'spheres of being' developed by Nicolai Hartmann after the publication of my first Dutch trilogy. The 'ontological categories' of Hartmann have nothing to do with the essential 'modal structures of meaning'. The latter pre-suppose the integral temporal coherence of meaning between all the modal aspects of empirical reality. Hartmann's 'spheres of being' are not conceived of as modal aspects of meaning. His dichotomy between material being and ideal being (geistiges Sein) is ruled by the dualistic cosmonomic Idea of Humanist thought. And so is his 'Ethics', conceived of as 'materielle Wertphilosophie'. This may suffice to refute the really surprising thesis of D. Jellema, Ph. D. of the University of West Virginia, according to which the theory of the modal spheres is an accommodation of Hartmann's 'Schichtentheorie' to the Christian standpoint. (Cf. his article Dooyeweerd and Hartmann in Calvin Forum, May 1954).
those which appear to have a later place in the cosmic order of time are indicated as its superstratum-spheres.

The two terminal spheres.

There must, however, be two terminal spheres in the cosmic order. The first has no modal substratum and the second has no superstratum. When distinguishing substratum-spheres from superstratum-spheres, we follow the cosmic order of time only in one definite direction (i.e. starting from the first terminal sphere of our cosmos). This reveals to us that the relationship between the foundation and its superstructure is essential in the inter-modal coherence of the modal structures of meaning. For the present it will be assumed that this relationship is irreversible. Later on the correctness of this hypothesis will be shown in detail. It should not be forgotten, however, that our Idea of cosmic time must point in the transcendental direction towards the selfhood that transcends time. Otherwise we run the risk of apostasy from the fulness of meaning.

The Scriptural conception of order in creation.

The Scriptures reveal God's act of creation. In their statement of this basic truth, which transcends all theoretical thought, they do not primarily appeal to certain temporal cognitive functions of man, but to ourselves in the religious root of our existence. They do not use theoretical scientific concepts, but by means of their central basic motive they appeal to the heart of man in the language of naïve experience.

And then they impress two things in our minds: man does not make his appearance in time until the whole foundation for the normative functions of temporal reality has been laid in the creation; and at the same time: in man the whole 'earthly' temporal cosmos finds its religious root, its creaturely fulness of meaning. Adam's fall into sin is the fall into sin of the whole 'earthly' world, which is not independent of the religious basic relation between God and the human race (in any of its temporal functions).

For that very reason the metaphysical conception of a natural reality in itself, independent of man, is un-biblical. The religious basic motives which gave rise to it, are incompatible with the Biblical one.

When, from the Thomistic metaphysical standpoint, 'natural reality in itself' is related to God as its ultimate cause and
end, it is forgotten that God has created the earthly cosmos in central relation to mankind and that, according to Holy Scripture, He does not look upon this cosmos apart from the heart of man.

And when this metaphysics ascribes ‘objective’ qualities of a sensory, logical, aesthetic and ethical character to natural things in themselves, it is forgotten that these ‘objective’ functions have meaning only in the subject-object relations of human experience; and the subjective functions of this experience cannot be ascribed to God, but are focussed in the human ego as their religious centre. In other words, the transcendental Idea of the Origin implies a transcendental Idea of the human ego as the religious centre of the empirical world.

The relation existing between the law-spheres, indicated here as the relation between foundation and superstructure, is not explicitly mentioned by Divine Revelation, because this Revelation does not set forth a philosophical theory about the temporal structures, but aims at the religious pre-suppositions of the latter. Since these pre-suppositions determine the contents of the cosmonomic Idea, the Idea of Creation in its Biblical sense keeps guiding our philosophic thought, when in theoretical knowledge we try to penetrate to the modal structures of meaning.

According to the temporal relationship between foundation and superstructure in the cosmic world-order, man is not there before the things of inorganic nature. But, viewed from the supertemporal creaturely root of the earthly world, this inorganic nature, just as the vegetable kingdom and the animal kingdom, has no existence apart from man, and man has been created as the lord of the creation.

The foundational and the transcendental direction in the cosmic order of time.

But then it must also be possible to follow the cosmic order of time in the reverse direction, and to approximate the coherence of meaning of the modal law-spheres by starting from the second terminal sphere, which we shall come to know as the sphere of faith. This reverse temporal direction cannot change the relationship between substratum and superstratum, but it is directed towards the religious root of our cosmos, in which the selfhood

1 This is what in Genesis I is called the “earth” in its contradistinction to the “Heavens”, viz. the temporal world concentrated in man.
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participates in its transcendence beyond cosmic time. Under the guidance of the Idea of the totality of meaning philosophic thought is turned in a truly transcendental direction when it is recognized that the modal structure of the temporal modal spheres necessarily points to the religious fulness of meaning. This transcendental direction will appear when philosophical reflection starts from the second terminal aspect of our cosmos, and follows the modal spheres in the reverse order. It is the religious fulness of meaning that forms the foundation of all its modal refractions in cosmic time. If this Idea of the totality of meaning is to be actually maintained in philosophic thought, there must be a strict correlation between the two different directions of time, which for the present will be called the foundational and the transcendental directions. It is only the Biblical religious basic motive that gives the view of time the ultimate direction to the true fulness of meaning intended by our cosmonomic Idea. But we have not yet arrived at theoretical knowledge of the temporal order in the modal structures of meaning. We have done no more than giving our thought its πρόθεσιν by means of the cosmonomic Idea in subjection to Divine Revelation.

Only in the theoretical analysis of the modal structures of meaning can it appear what scientific consequences are implied in the preliminary conception of our transcendental Idea of time as the Idea of the cosmic order of succession of the modal law-spheres.
CHAPTER II

THE MODAL STRUCTURES OF MEANING.

§ 1 - INTRODUCTION.

As an introduction to subsequent expositions I will raise a question which, to my knowledge, has never yet been brought to bear on the subject of the present chapter. And yet it is fundamental to our entire view of the structure of the modal aspects of human experience and to the whole method of scientific concept-formation.

This basic question is concerned with the analogical use of fundamental concepts in the different branches of science. The fundamental fields of research of the various special sciences are defined according to the different modal aspects of human experience in its integral sense, though within these modal boundaries there is room for further specializing.

At first sight it may seem that the analogical concepts are not bound to these special modal fields of research, but give expression to the inner unity of all scientific thought. But a closer analysis of their specific scientific meaning shows that the latter differs with the different modalities of the scientific viewpoint. Nevertheless, analogy doubtless refers to an inter-modal coherence of meaning between the aspects.

How is this state of affairs to be explained? Here we are confronted with a fundamental problem which has not found due philosophic interest in consequence of the immanence-standpoint as such, and the dialectical basic motives which rule the latter.

It is true that Greek and Scholastic logic and metaphysics paid special attention to the analogical concepts, and distinguished them from the generic and specific ones. In addition, real analogy was sharply distinguished from the mere metaphor of common speech. To the analogical fundamental concept of ‘being’ (ana-

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1 General sociology, anthropology etc. are not specific sciences in the sense meant here. The difficult problem concerning the delimitation of their fields of research will be discussed in Vol. III.
logia entis) all the others were related. This concept, however, was conceived of in a speculative metaphysical sense. It contained no reference to the cosmic order of time in which all modal difference of meaning is founded. The concept of 'being' was determined by the Greek dialectical basic motive of form and matter.

The origin of the analogical concept of Being.

PARMENIDES conceived of the eternal form of Being in a rigid metaphysical opposition to the matter-principle of the eternally flowing stream of becoming and decay. His concept of Being was in itself nothing but an hypostatization of the copula 'is' in the analytical relation of identity: ἐστὶν ἐστὶν.

This is evident from PARMENIDES' identification of true Being with logical thought: τὸ γὰρ αὕτῳ νοεῖν ἐστὶν εἰς καὶ ἐστὶν, this is to say: all Being is being of thought and thought is thought of Being. But this hypostatization of the analytical relation of identity was ruled by the religious form-motive. It is true that this motive was not conceived here in the pure sense of the cultural religion of the Olympian Gods. Probably under Orphic influence it had been joined with the old ouranic motive of the worship of the celestial sphere. So the eternal Being was conceived of in the ideal spherical form of the firmament. PARMENIDES says that the powerful Anangkè and Dikè hold it in the ties of this form, preventing it from plunging itself into the deceitful stream of becoming and decay.

Since ANAXAGORAS and Socrates, however, the Greek form-motive freed itself from this ouranic deformation and regained its original meaning. Form was now conceived of as an ideal παράδειγμα, an ideal pattern for the form-giving activity of the divine Nous, the Demiurge of the world of becoming and decay.

In his dialogues Parmenides and Sophistes, Plato introduced a dialectical Idea of Being which should synthesize the Eleatic conception of the ever resting ideal form of being and the Heraclitean principle of the ever flowing stream of life. This dialectical Idea was nothing but the analytical correlation of identity and diversity; the analytical relation: S is P implies: S is not Q, R, S, T and so on, if the latter exclude P.

PARMENIDES had absolutized the Idea of Being in conceiving it only in the analytical relation of identity. The principle of becoming and decay was called a not-being, which cannot be
thought of. Plato’s dialectical Idea of Being was intended to synthesize positive and negative Being, the ὁν and the ὑον, and consequently the principles of form and matter. So the principle of becoming could participate in the dialectical Idea of Being. We have seen that in the dialogue Philebus all genesis is conceived of in the teleological sense of genesis eis ousian, a becoming to a form of being which gives expression to the divine Idea of the good and the beautiful. In this way the Eleatic determinations of Being by unity and verity were completed by those of goodness and beauty, and the dialectical Idea of Being was to embrace the general distinction of form and matter, peras and apeiron. This was the origin of the analogical concept of being which in Aristotelian and especially in scholastic metaphysics acquired a central and fundamental position. But it could not overcome the ultimate antithesis in the religious form-matter motive of Greek thought for lack of a higher point of departure for a real synthesis.

Consequently it lacked any relation to the radical unity of meaning (in the central, religious sphere). This unity, however, is the ultimate point of reference of all modal diversity and intermodal coherence between the different aspects of temporal experience.

Therefore the analogical fundamental concept of ‘being’ could not offer any guidance to philosophical thought confronted with undeniable states of affairs within the modal structures of meaning.

Analogical concepts in principle lacking any relation to the cosmic time-order and to the radical unity of meaning, cannot be the foundation of our inquiry into these structures. From the outset they inevitably lead theoretical thought to levelling the modal structures of the aspects within which the analogical moments are discovered.

The relation of analogy, expressed in these modal structures, points to the inter-modal coherence of meaning determined by the cosmic order of time. It also points to the radical unity of the human ego as the religious centre of experience, and to the Divine Origin. It has no meaning without an order determining its sense and pointing beyond the modal diversity towards its radical identity transcending theoretical thought. An undetermined analogy of being is meaningless and unable to found any modal determination of a scientific concept.

In the metaphysical doctrine of analogia entis the ‘transcen-
dental determinations and distinctions' of the fundamental concept of 'being' are themselves of an analogical character. This shows that the vicious circle is closed here. The cause is that in this speculative metaphysics, in its pretended autonomy, attempts are made to exceed the limits of meaning. The speculative concept, applied in this procedure, is intended to embrace both the Being of God and the meaning of creation.

It is true that the fundamental difference of meaning implied in the analogical concept of being is related to the essential difference between the things participating in it. But the vicious circle in this metaphysics lies in the fact that this difference is supposed to depend on the analogical concept of 'being' itself. This concept is to embrace both the essential differences between the 'substances' and those between their 'accidents'. This means that an undetermined analogy is laid at the foundation of all categorical determinations of being. The latter are consequently involved in the same lack of determinateness, both the fundamental category of substance and each of its accidents. In other words, the ontological analogy is conceived apart from the modal diversity of meaning. This diversity determines the transcendental horizon of theoretical thought itself, and thereby the limits to which the analogical concept is bound, if it is to have any meaning. The ontological analogy cannot be its own foundation; it must be founded in a cosmic order determining its sense in the inter-modal coherence of the different aspects.

For this reason the relation of analogy must be investigated within the cadre of the modal structures of meaning, which are determined by this order. It should be considered on the factual basis of undeniable states of affairs presenting themselves in the fundamental analogical concepts of scientific thought.

1 In his Critique of Pure Reason (Transcendental Logic § 12) KANT has attempted to reduce these transcendental determinations (those of unity, verity and goodness) to the categories of unity, plurality and totality of his transcendental logic. According to him, they are nothing but these categories, conceived apart from their a priori relation to sensory experience and consequently taken in a merely formal-logical sense. This reduction is very artificial, especially the attempt to reduce 'verity', as a transcendental determination of Being, to KANT's category of plurality, and 'goodness' to the category of totality. In addition, KANT was not aware of the fact that his categories of quantity are nothing but analogical concepts, as will be explained in our further enquiry.
The latter give theoretical expression to the inter-modal coherence between the different aspects of human experience and empirical reality.

We shall begin with the description of these states of affairs accessible to everybody who is acquainted with theoretical terminology and with the difficulties implied in the theoretical distinction of the different modal aspects of meaning. A special difficulty in this description is the lack of a uniform terminology in the different languages and the linguistic ambiguity of words that may also have a metaphorical sense. This is the reason why, apart from the fundamental problem with which we are concerned here, the idea of a scientific alphabet of thought in the form of a symbolic logic has won so many adherents.

Why symbolic logic is not serviceable in our examination of the analogical concepts.

At first sight symbolic logic seems to be indispensable. It replaces words by a formal symbolic denotation, free from the ambiguities and irregularities of structure inherent in the different languages. It is intended to enable us to give exact formulation to scientific concepts and propositions of any kind, and to provide us with exact criteria as to their meaningfulness or lack of meaning.

But the very fact that this method of denotation can only be related to the logical form of propositions, classes and predicates with abstraction of their non-logical meaning-aspects, renders symbolic logic unserviceable in our present inquiry. We now have to investigate analogical expressions inherent in the denotation of the fundamental scientific concepts related to the inter-modal coherence of the modal aspects. This is to say, the modal meaning-structures and their interrelations are at issue. The inquiry into the latter is fundamental, also for formal logic.

Logistic is in constant danger of disregarding the modal limits of logical meaning, particularly in its inter-modal relation to the mathematical and linguistic aspects. Especially in the different trends of ‘scientific empiricism’ the opinion is defended that there is a logical unity of scientific language. The concepts of

1 An important representative of this opinion was O. Neurath († 1945), who stimulated the publication of the Encyclopedia of Unified Science the first part of which appeared in two volumes under the title ‘Foundations of the Unity of Science’. The periodical ‘Erkenntnis’ (publ. since
the different branches of science are not considered to be of fundamentally different kinds, but to belong to one coherent system. But this opinion depends on an uncritical pre-supposition, inadequately called ‘physicalism’. According to it, every descriptive term in the language of science (taken in its widest sense) is connected with terms designating sensorily observable properties of things. This implies that in any description of undeniable states of affairs in the modal structures of the different aspects of human experience, these data are immediately reduced either to metaphors in linguistic expressions, or to formal-analytic relations, or to relations between sensory impressions.

The unity of scientific language intended here is acquired at the cost of a fundamental disturbance of the modal aspects to which the basic concepts of the different sciences are related.

The fundamental problem of the analogical concepts in scientific thought is eliminated in an uncritical manner, if the analysis and verification of these concepts is based on formal logic and the sensory aspect of human experience alone.

An adequate designation of the fundamental analogical concepts should give expression both to the inter-modal coherence and to the modal qualification of the analogical moments manifesting this coherence. Every modern language has found its own ways to designate these fundamental analogical concepts of the different branches of science.

1930), now continued as ‘Journal of Unified Science’, is the central review of this movement, which also has many adherents in the Warsaw school, the Cambridge school for Analytic Philosophy, and the Berlin Society for Scientific Philosophy.

1 Cf. the statement of LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, the author of the famous Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: “The right method, properly speaking, would be the following: to say nothing except what can be said. Consequently propositions of natural science — that is to say something that has nothing to do with philosophy — and if somebody else wants to say something metaphysical we must always show that he has not given meaning to certain signs in his propositions.” [“Die richtige Methode der Philosophie wäre eigentlich die: Nichts zu sagen, als was sich sagen lässt, also Sätze der Naturwissenschaft — also etwas, was mit Philosophie nichts zu tun hat —, und dann immer, wenn ein anderer etwas metaphysisches sagen wollte, ihm nachzuweisen, dass er gewissen Zeichen in seinen Sätzen keine Bedeutung gegeben hat.” (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London 1922, prop. 6, 53).] I have called the term ‘physicalism’ inadequate for this movement, because its sensualistic interpretation of physics does not agree with the meaning of the scientific propositions of natural science.
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The linguistic ambiguity of words in common parlance seems to be overcome by ascribing to the terms a special scientific meaning. But this does not guarantee real agreement on their signification. For the states of affairs concerning the modal meaning-structures to which the analogical concepts refer, are not explicitly examined in a philosophical manner.

As soon as philosophy attempts to account for these states of affairs, it will arrive at different interpretations depending on the different transcendental basic Ideas which lie at the foundation of philosophical thought. As a matter of fact these philosophical interpretations always rule the scientific use of the analogical concepts, either consciously or unconsciously. But for the sake of an adequate description of the states of affairs to which they really refer, it is necessary to consider them for a moment apart from these interpretations. Otherwise under the influence of philosophical prejudices one runs the risk of prematurely eliminating the problems involved.

The ambiguity of pre-theoretic terminology and the psychological study of the 'significa'.

It will be clear why the ambiguity in the pre-scientific use of terms does not concern us in this context. Our inquiry exclusively refers to the modal structures of meaning. Pre-theoretical experience does not explicitly distinguish the modal aspects as such; it conceives them only implicitly within the typical total structures of individuality. Therefore pre-theoretical terms are not the subject of our present inquiry.

Neither are we concerned here with a study of the 'significa' in a psychological sense, directed to an analysis of the volitional, emotional, indicative and formal elements in the subjective act of designation and to an enquiry into the so-called 'spreading of signification'. These examinations may be very important, but they cannot give a solution to the problem of the analogical basic concepts in the different branches of science.

For the purpose of our present investigations I shall put down a number of different scientific expressions denoting fundamental analogical concepts. Provisionally I do not make any attempt at systematic arrangement. As a rule these expressions are unhesitatingly used without any account being given of the modal structures of meaning they refer to.
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Some examples of scientific expressions denoting fundamental analogical concepts. The original and the analogical use of numerical terms.

The scientific terms 'number' and 'quantity' have an original mathematical signification. They can be used in arithmetic without a special qualifying adjective denoting their general modal sense. The arithmetical adjectives 'rational', 'irrational', 'negative', 'positive', 'real' 'complex', etc. do not refer to different modal aspects.

They are related to the same arithmetical sphere.

But when we speak of 'unity', 'multiplicity' and 'totality' in logic, it is necessary to qualify these terms by the adjective 'logical'. A logical unity and multiplicity is not an arithmetical one, but has an inner coherence with the latter. A concept, viewed in its analytical aspect, is a logical unity in a multiplicity of logical characteristics. This multiplicity can be indicated by a number. By means of the analytical relation of implication this multiplicity is synthesized to the logical unity of a concept. This relation is not an arithmetical one, although it cannot have any logical meaning without its coherence with originally numerical relations.

The same holds good as to the logical 'totality' of a propositional form (e.g.: All $S$ imply $P$).

Jurisprudence also handles the terms 'unity' and 'multiplicity' in a special modal sense. In a contract between two persons there are two volitional declarations. They are juridically joined to one juridical fact. There may be a concurrence of two, three, or more legal facts in one real deed. This legal multiplicity does not have an intrinsically quantitative sense, although extrinsically it can be indicated by a number. The legal relations between different facts are no numerical relations proper, since they are ruled by juridical norms. The question whether two or more facts are juridically to be viewed as one or more depends on legal standards alone. A legal subject is a unity in an immeasurable multiplicity of relations. It is always necessary in this case to qualify the terms one, two, three, etc. by the modal adjective 'juridical', if the jurist wants to avoid the confusion between his own numerical concept and that of arithmetic.

1 The relation of implication is taken here in a wider sense than is usual in logistic, viz. in the sense of analytical inclusion.
The reason is that there is an insoluble coherence between the numerical and the juridical aspect, which does not affect their different modal meanings.

In ethics one speaks of a moral bi-unity of husband and wife in the marriage-bond. Social psychology speaks of a feeling of social unity in a multitude of men moved by the same ideal. Theology speaks of the Divine Tri-unity (the Trinity). In all these cases the numerical terms are obviously used in an analogical sense qualified by the modal adjective.

The original and the analogical use of the term space.

The same states of affairs are to be observed in the use of the word ‘space’. It is a little confusing that this word has the form of a substantive. This evokes the idea that space is a thing, or, in the metaphysical turn of thought, that it is a substance.

There can evidently not exist a real thing corresponding to the term ‘space’. There is only a modus, a modality of existence manifesting itself in modal relations of extension. The substantive had better be replaced by the adjective ‘spatial’. But even in scientific usage the term ‘space’ has maintained its noun-form. We shall follow this custom without losing sight of the fact that this noun can only denote a modus, and not a thing. The scientific term ‘space’ as such has a non-analogical modal meaning in pure geometry only. For the present we shall pass over in silence the fact that the formalization of modern geometry has resulted in eliminating ‘space’ in its pure, original modal sense. As a matter of fact, this is only a methodical instrument of formal analysis, whose philosophical pre-suppositions will be examined later on. This formalization does not affect the application of the formal axioms and theorems to spatial functions in their original sense. This is done as soon as mathematics is concerned with the specific spatial subject-matter of geometry. It is, however, a little confusing that formalized geometry has retained the term ‘space’ (‘formal space’, as Carnap says). For here its meaning is only dependent on the formal axioms accepted a priori. It does not at all explicitly refer to the spatial aspect of experience in its original modal sense, although it will appear from our later analysis of the modal structures that formal logic, too, implies a spatial analogy. This purely formal use of the term is unserviceable in an inquiry into the original modal meaning of space. It may be true that the latter is not identical with ‘Euclidean space’, but it does
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not allow of any formalizing which would even eliminate its modal structure.

Therefore it is necessary to abandon any formalization of pure geometry in the descriptive stage of our examination concerning the original and the analogical use of scientific terms denoting fundamental scientific concepts.

In pure, but not formalized geometry the term ‘space’ can be used without an adjective qualifying its modal sense. The adjectives two-, three-, four- or n-dimensional, Euclidean and non-Euclidean do not concern different modal aspects of meaning, no more than the adjectives topological, projective or metrical. They all refer to one and the same modal aspect delimiting the field of pure geometry in its non-formalized sense.

The empiricist trend in mathematics is bound to deny this and to assert that sensory space is the original datum. This epistemological pre-supposition, however, is not relevant to this descriptive stage of our enquiry. For the present the only question is: which branch of science can use the term ‘space’ without an adjective denoting its fundamental modal sense? The answer is that only pure geometry, apart from its formalization, can do so. It is true that we hear of ‘pure’ or ‘mathematical’ space. These adjectives, however, do not add anything to the modal meaning of spatiality in its non-analogical sense. For ‘pure’ geometry (in its non-formalized meaning) finds its special modal field of research in the original spatial aspect alone.

Physics, however, cannot use the fundamental concept of ‘space’ without adding the qualifying adjective ‘physical’; psychology has to add the qualifying adjective ‘sensory’ (visual, tactile, auditory); jurisprudence speaks of a legal space of validity with reference to legal norms; economics uses the term ‘space’ with a modal economic qualification, etc. In all these cases the word no longer has the same modal signification. Science is here involved in an analogical use of terms which requires a general delimitation of their intended modal sense, if they are to be serviceable.

The fundamental meaning-moment which all the analogical concepts of space refer to, is doubtless that of extension. But the extensive relations are qualified here in different modal ways.

There can be no question of a metaphorical use of the word ‘space’ in these modal qualifications. If there were a metaphor, the term in its scientific use could simply be replaced by another
the word or by a combination of terms without any spatial signification. But this is impossible. Although there is doubtless a modal difference of meaning between purely mathematical and objective sensory space, no psychologist can do without the term in its modal-psychical qualification. Rather he will maintain that sensory psychical space is 'real', whereas purely mathematical space is nothing but a logical construction. As observed, this would amount to a philosophical interpretation of the states of affairs we are confronted with. It would be premature in this descriptive phase of our inquiry, and it would disregard the complexity of the theoretical problems implied in the use of analogical concepts. It is not permitted to ignore the great modal diversity of meaning inherent in the word 'space' in its analogical scientific use.

As will be shown in more detail in our later investigations, the physical world-space is neither purely mathematical, nor sensory psychical. The same can be said with reference to historical, economical, aesthetic, juridical space, etc. All these modalities of extension cannot be of a sensory psychical character. Physical world-space in principle exceeds the horizon of sensory perception, although it has an inner relation to sensory extension. The remaining modalities mentioned here are no doubt founded in sensory space, but precisely in their special modal meaning they are not perceptible to the eye of sense.

The term territory (German: Gebiet), for instance, has an analogical spatial sense related to human command and legal competence. We can perceive a piece of ground with our eyes, but we cannot perceive in this way a territory of command and competence. The latter can only be signified (for instance through milestones or a national flag). A ship navigating under the Dutch flag is Dutch territory, wherever it may be. We know this only by the flag designating the nationality of the vessel, and from our knowledge of the rules of international law. Here the modal relations of extensiveness disclose a super-sensuous meaning and are subjected to special modal laws.

There must exist a close inter-modal meaning-coherence between the different modal significations of the word 'space'. This coherence finds its terminological expression either in the

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1 This will be explained in greater detail later on in our analysis of the modal structures of meaning.
use of the word with or without special modal qualifications, or in specific nouns denoting space in a particular modal sense.

The original and the analogical use of the term economy.

Another example of the analogical modal use of a scientific term is supplied by the word 'economy'. Its foundational (non-analogical) scientific meaning is the sparing or frugal mode of administering scarce goods, implying an alternative choice of their destination with regard to the satisfaction of different human needs. The adjectives 'sparing' and 'frugal' do not have the limited sense of the economical term 'saving' (said of money for instance). They are only the correlatives of 'scarce' and refer to our awareness that an excessive or wasteful satisfaction of a particular need at the expense of other more urgent needs is uneconomical 1.

Economy demands the balancing of needs according to a plan, and the distribution of the scarce means at our disposal according to such a plan. In this fundamental sense the term is used in the science of economics, in which the word economy requires no further modal qualification.

Logic, however, uses this term in a logical sense, in its 'principle of logical economy' (das "denköonomische Prinzip") and is obliged to denote this analogical meaning by the qualifying modal adjective 2. In linguistic science we speak of 'economy of speech', or 'linguistic economy'. It is very remarkable that neither logical nor linguistic economy are found in pre-theoretical thought and in primitive languages respectively. They occur in a scientific and developed stage of thought and language only. These states of affairs are highly important to our analysis of the modal structures of meaning, although they have not found the philosophical interest they deserve.

The same remark applies to the use of the term 'economy' in its modal qualification by an adjective denoting the aspect of

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1 'Uneconomical' is of course not the same as 'non-economical'. The latter adjective would mean 'not belonging to the economical sphere', whereas an 'uneconomical' manner of behaviour can occur only within the economical aspect.
2 ERNST MACH has omitted this qualifying adjective in the scientific-logical use of the term 'principle of economy'. But it cannot be denied that in economics this principle has a quite different meaning and that only here it can disclose its original sense.
social intercourse: conventional or ceremonial economy is not found in primitive society, but in developed social life only.

In the present context one should also pay attention to the use of the term in a technical sense. Economists make a sharp distinction between economy, in its original scientific meaning, and technique. They deny that the principle of economy which is applied to the solution of a technical problem has a scientific economic sense.

There is indeed a modal difference of meaning between economy in its original scientific sense and in its technical meaning. The latter is not ruled by the economical viewpoint proper but by that of technical control of the material to the highest degree of efficiency. Nevertheless, there is an undeniable coherence of meaning between economy proper and the technical sense of the term. The fundamental meaning-moment which every economical analogy refers to is that of frugality, the avoidance of superfluous or excessive ways of reaching our aim. And again we are confronted with the fact that on the part of technique this inter-modal coherence with the economical aspect is only developed at a higher stage of culture. Primitive technique lacks economy in this analogical sense.

On the other hand the term 'economy' is used in a modal aesthetical sense (cf. the Greek adage μηδὲν ἄγαν) irrespective of the difference between the primitive or the higher developed character of works of art. This is also the case with the term 'legal economy': designating prevention of excessive reactions against tort or crime, and the subjection of these reactions to the principle of juridical proportion. (This is a new analogical term, since proportion has an originally mathematical meaning.) Even the primitive principle of talion implies this juridical economy, and it is thereby sharply distinguished from any form of orderless revenge.

I must again stress the undeniable coherence of meaning between the analogical and the non-analogical use of the term 'economy' excluding any idea of arbitrariness. The essential thing in all this is the scientific use of a term which in its proper sense denotes an original modal meaning, but in its analogical sense is qualified by a specific modal adjective. This adjective

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1 This term is often used in the sense of legal technique; but this sense is not intended here.
denotes another modal aspect which, by means of an analogical moment of its structure, reveals its intermodal coherence with the original modus.

The original and the analogical use of the terms control, command, mastery or power.

This introduction will be concluded with a short examination of the analogical scientific use of the term command or control (German: Macht, Beherrschung).

There are many synonyms of these terms. In the first Dutch edition of this work I always used the Dutch words 'macht' or 'beheersing'. In Vol. I of the second (English) edition I choose the English term 'power'. But the latter is also used in the sense of 'faculty', and this latter term has no original modal signification, because it does not refer to a special modal aspect of human experience. In the analysis of the modal meaning-structures I shall therefore avail myself of the word power only in connection with the terms 'command', 'control', 'mastery'.

It is very important to choose the right terms in this inquiry, because many readers appear to experience great difficulty in distinguishing accurately between the modal aspects of meaning and the typical structures of individuality embracing and individualizing them. They have a natural inclination to identify the modal aspects with concrete phenomena which function in them. The fundamental difference between the modal 'how' and the concrete 'what' is easily lost sight of. A Dutch psychologist asked me, for instance, if it would not be necessary to introduce an aspect of human behaviour in my theory of the modal law-spheres. He did not see that human behaviour cannot be a modal aspect, because it is a concrete activity which in the nature of the case functions in all aspects of experience alike.

Such misunderstandings would be increased by using terms in my explanation which can denote either a modal aspect of meaning, or a concrete something, a 'this' or a 'that'. But it is very difficult indeed to evade this ambiguity in every English term employed here. Therefore I must always ask my readers to look behind the words for the states of affairs which I want to denote by them. Just as in the case of the word 'space', the term 'control' (=command, or power), in its noun-form cannot mean a 'thing', but only a modus, viz. a modality of social relationships implying a manner of exercising social in-
fluence or of controlling things, respectively. In the social sciences the word has different modal significations that should be sharply distinguished from 'natural force' and psychical suggestion. But the meaning of 'mastery' is foundational; it denotes cultural authority over persons or things, corresponding to a controlling manner of social form-giving according to a free project. In this original sense the term is used in the science of history, where it need not be qualified by an adjective denoting its specific modal meaning. As will be shown later on, the historical aspect of human experience, as such, is related to the development of human mastery, power, command or control in this non-analogue modal sense. The adjectives 'political', 'ecclesiastical' and the like do not denote other general modalities of meaning. They refer in history only to typical manifestations of command within the same modal aspect. Political power refers to the state, ecclesiastical power to the church. Both, state and church, are typical social structures of individuality, which as such function in all modal aspects of society alike, and can only individualize the modal meaning of the latter.

But when one speaks of logical command or control, the term refers to another modal aspect, viz. the analytical. Now the word acquires an analogue sense qualified by a special modal adjective. And here we again meet with a remarkable state of affairs, viz. the fact that logical control is not found in pre-theoretical thought, and that the analogue term has an indissoluble inter-modal coherence with the development of human command in its non-analogue historical sense.

By systematical theoretical concepts and propositions we really acquire a logical control of the field of inquiry. Pre-theoretical concepts and propositions lack this systematic character. Theoretical logic has its history, because it is involved in a process of logical moulding of the human mind, and in this actual process discloses cultural power in human society. The naïve pre-theoretical formation of concepts and the naïve use of logical principles show a uniform, unskilled character in the course of times and do not interest the student of history. But logical command is not itself mastery in its non-analogue historical sense. It is, as such, a modal logical meaning-figure, not an historical one. We shall return to this point in later examinations.

Jurisprudence handles a fundamental analogue modal concept denoted by the terms 'competency', 'legal power'. The Dutch term 'rechtsmacht' is more pregnant in its denotation of
the specific modal qualification of the analogy, just as the French term 'pouvoir juridique' and the German 'rechtliche Macht'. The modal diversity of meaning between the non-analogical historical term 'command' or 'power', and the analogical term in its modal-juridical qualification, is not to be denied so long as the historicist or naturalist prejudices are eliminated.

It is a striking case of an evident disregard of the analogical character of the term 'power' in its modal-juridical qualification, when the famous German jurist GEORG JELLINEK identifies it with 'rechtlich beschränkte Macht'. For in this context he conceives the term "Macht" in its non-analogical historical sense. But the modal qualification 'juridical' cannot restrict the modal meaning of power or command in its original historical use. The antinomy in this interpretation of the analogical juridical term manifests itself in JELLINEK's well-known construction of legal power as a self-restriction of political power in its historical sense. This is a construction which also implies a confusion between the general modal juridical viewpoint and the sociological one directed to typical structures of individuality.

The fundamental analogical concept denoted by the German term "rechtliche Macht" has a normative legal sense, but it has an undeniable intermodal coherence of meaning with the term "Macht" in its non-analogical, historical-social meaning.

The true state of affairs referred to by this analogical relation is the following: in its modal juridical meaning 'power' is unilaterally founded in what is denoted by the general term 'power' (i.e. command) in the science of history. In the historical aspect this word has its original, non-analogical modal meaning. This is empirically proved by the fact that no juridical competency can maintain itself when the social¹ organs invested with it lose their social command or mastery in its original historical sense. Every realization of legal power pre-supposes an historical organization of command, and not vice versa.

One should also pay attention to the fact that this coherence of meaning between juridical power and historical command is realized even in primitive society. Consequently this realization is not restricted to the higher developed social order.

The same can be observed with regard to the other analogical

¹ The adjective 'social' is not used here in the specific modal sense of the aspect of intercourse, but in the general sense embracing all modal aspects of human society alike.
modal concepts of power denoted by the terms ‘aesthetical control’, ‘moral control’, ‘faith-power’ etc. Their analogical modal significations are not to be confused with typical forms of historical power, if we want to prevent a general mixing up of the different modal aspects of meaning. An accurate analysis of all these significations is necessary. But in the present context every analysis is only provisional, because we have not yet developed our own theory about the modal structures of meaning.

In this introduction the only point is to establish undeniable states of affairs in the analogical use of scientific concepts. In the last analysis they are founded in the modal structures of meaning themselves and, as such, they are independent of subjective philosophical interpretations. The linguistic denotations of the fundamental analogical concepts demanded attention only insofar as they refer to these states of affairs which urge themselves upon the human mind. The latter reflect themselves in the structure of analogical scientific terms which is beyond any arbitrariness. In other words we do not want to develop a merely linguistic theory of significations.

Behind linguistic signification philosophy has to concentrate on the problem of the fundamental analogical modal concepts of the different branches of science.

The complexity of the analogical concepts.

This problem is in fact much more complicated than could appear in our introductory examinations. We have provisionally made a distinction between the analogical and the non-analogical or original scientific significations of the modal terms number, space, economy, command. Naturally this was only an arbitrary selection. The multiplicity of these modal terms is not at all exhausted by these few examples. But, what is still more important, a further analysis will show that the original modal concepts denoted by the non-analogical terms themselves contain analogical conceptual moments. This implies that analogical relationship is applied much more extensively in fundamental scientific concepts than could at first sight be supposed. This extremely complicated state of affairs should not be disregarded under the explicit or implicit influence of philosophical prejudices which demand the reduction of all fundamental concepts of the different branches of science to one and the same fundamental pattern.
Such prejudices imply a theoretical eradication of the modal structures of the different meaning-aspects, and are bound to lead astray the whole further scientific method of forming concepts and posing problems. Every philosophy must be confronted with the states of affairs to which the analogical modal concepts are related.

From a scientific viewpoint it is not permissible to develop an *a priori* philosophical theory concerning the coherence of the fundamental concepts of the different branches of science. The full complexity of the relevant states of affairs must first be examined in an accurate, unbiased manner. This is the really *empirical* way of philosophizing, viz. the attempt to give a philosophical account of the facts without mutilating their real meaning.

An empiricism which neglects the modal meaning-diversity of the different aspects of human experience is not entitled to claim the epithet 'scientific', because it eliminates the fundamental problem of the analogical concepts in scientific thought. It is merely a bad kind of *a priorism* and has nothing to do with symbolic logic, which as such is a splendid instrument of human thought. The question in what way we shall philosophically account for the states of affairs to which this conceptual analogy refers, will to a high degree depend on the transcendental basic Idea directing our theoretical reflection. For the problem of analogy here intended directly concerns the transcendental Idea regarding the inter-modal coherence and the mutual relation between the different modal aspects of human experience set asunder and opposed to one another in the theoretical 'Gegenstandrelation'.

The provisional elimination of the philosophical prejudices in the description of the 'states of affairs' and the influence of the religious starting-points in this stage of the inquiry. No *ἐνθετά* in the phenomenological sense.

The preceding introductory examinations have stressed the necessity of a provisional elimination of philosophical prejudices so long as we are engaged in a pure description of the 'states of affairs' to be accounted for by philosophy. But in this context the same objection can be expected encountered in the transcendental critique of theoretical thought, developed in Vol. I. Does this methodical suspension of philosophical prejudices
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imply an elimination of the religious starting-points? If so, it would be necessary to accept a religious neutrality which contradicts at least the universal necessity of a religious basic motive with respect to theoretical inquiry. If not, the 'states of affairs' which should provide a common basis for philosophical discussion cannot satisfy this requirement.

My answer to this question is that the states of affairs described in the preceding introductory examinations urge themselves upon the human mind as soon as they have been detected, because they are really the same for everybody. But their discovery and the manner of description are not independent of a religious starting-point. For it is evident that the dialectical basic motives of immanence-philosophy must divert our attention from them, so that we have no concern in an exact description. Therefore I can agree without hesitation that the preceding inquiry into the states of affairs implied in the fundamental analogical concepts was not unprejudiced in a religious sense. But I must at the same time deny that this circumstance detracts from the fact that the 'states of affairs' here intended are a common basis for philosophical discussion.

I have granted repeatedly that other undeniable states of affairs have been detected in immanence-philosophy, that is to say under the influence of non-Christian basic motives. With reference to this point I do not claim a privileged position for a Christian philosophy which is ruled by the Biblical basic motive.

The εποξή of the philosophical prejudices required in this preliminary stage of our examination is in a certain sense exactly the reverse of the transcendental-phenomenological εποξή in Husserl. For the latter pretends to imply a methodological elimination of the natural attitude of experience inclusive of that of the empirical sciences, and in the first place of the religious commitment. The phenomena are considered here as the result of a phenomenological constitution by the transcendental consciousness. In this constitution everything intendable as immanent or transcendent is supposed to be produced as an essentially intentional object (Gegenstand). It is evident that this transcendental-phenomenological 'reduction' of the world to an intentional objective correlate of the absolute transcendental ego implies a fundamental philosophical prejudice. In our conception of the methodological εποξή this prejudice should be eliminated in the preliminary stage of the inquiry into the states
of affairs implied in the use of the fundamental analogical concepts.

It is impossible to eliminate the religious starting-point of theoretical thought. But it is not impossible to perform a provi- sional εποχή of all specific philosophical interpretations of the states of affairs which are to be established in a precise way before we try to account for them in a philosophical theory.

§ 2 - THE COSMIC ORDER OF TIME IN THE STRUCTURAL COHERENCE.

The cosmonomic Idea directs and leads philosophical thought, and gives it the εποχή without which it would be helplessly dispersed in the modal diversity of meaning. Our cosmonomic Idea postulates the cosmic time-order in the modal law-spheres.

But at what point is philosophic thought to make an entry into this cosmic temporal order, so that we are enabled to acquire theoretical knowledge of the place of the different modal law-spheres in it? Cosmic time appeared to be the pre-supposition of theoretical thought; the latter cannot transcend it; it has to abstract from the cosmic continuity in the temporal coherence of meaning in order to find its “Gegenstand” in the modal structure of the law-sphere that it sets out to investigate.

Consequently, only in the modal structures of the meaning-aspects themselves can theoretical thought enter into the cosmic order of time, though the latter itself can never be grasped in a concept. In the analysis of these modal structures the order of succession of the law-spheres, — be it in a discontinuous process of fixation by logical thought, — must be brought to light.

According to our cosmonomic Idea, each of the law-spheres is a temporal, modal refraction of the religious fulness of meaning. And as such every aspect expresses the whole of the temporal coherence of meaning in its own modal structure. If this is so, the temporal order of succession of the law-spheres must be expressed in this structure. Full justice ought to be done to the specific sphere-sovereignty of the modal law-spheres within their temporal coherence. Our cosmonomic Idea itself here provides philosophic thought with the hypothesis that must demonstrate its correctness in the analysis of the modal meaning-structures.

Nuclear meaning, modal retrocipations and anti- cipations.

The modal sphere-sovereignty can only be maintained within
the temporal inter-modal coherence of the different aspects, if the modal meaning of the law-spheres arranged between the initial and the final aspect has the following structure: it must have a nucleus guaranteeing the sphere-sovereignty of the entire aspect; and this kernel must be surrounded by a number of analogical modal moments which partly refer back to the meaning-kernels of all the earlier spheres, and partly refer forward to those of all the spheres that are later in the cosmic arrangement.

Let us represent this structure by a mathematical figure, viz. a circle divided into two equal halves. In the centre is the meaning-kernel; the radii drawn from the centre in the left hand half represent those modal moments of meaning that establish the coherence with the cosmically earlier spheres; and the radii in the right hand half stand for the modal meaning-moments maintaining the coherence with the law-spheres of a later position.

In future the anaphoric modal meaning-moments will be called the modal retrocipations; the modal moments referring forward will be styled the anticipations of the modal structure.

Modal retrocipations and anticipations remain qualified by the nucleus of the modal meaning.

Both the retrocipatory and the anticipatory moments remain qualified by the nucleus of the modal meaning. They do not adopt the nuclear meaning of the substratum-sphere or the superstratum-sphere respectively, to which they refer.

Since the modal structure of each aspect shows an indissoluble correlation between the law-side and the subject-side, this structure must manifest itself in its meaning-nucleus, its retrocipations and its anticipations, both on the law-side and on the subject-side.

The architectonic differentiation in the modal structure of the law-spheres.

If our Idea of the order of succession of the law-spheres is correct, an architectonic differentiation must be observable in their modal structure. The number of retrocipations must decrease, whereas the number of anticipations must increase in accordance with the number of law-spheres forming the substratum of a particular aspect, i.e. in proportion as its position in the cosmic order of time is earlier. And this again leads to the
idea that there are two terminal spheres, the first of which has no retrocipatory moments and the second has no anticipations in its modal structure.

The purport of his hypothesis cannot yet be fully realized and will become clear only after further investigations. The fact that the first terminal sphere lacks retrocipatory moments can never be any reason to absolutize its structural meaning, although this aspect is the foundation of all the other law-spheres. Its lack of retrocipations does not render it independent and unconditioned, because the structure of this modality of meaning is not self-determined.

All the modal spheres are founded in the cosmic time-order and are determined and limited by it. The law-spheres do not determine each other; they are only related to one another by this order in the sense of a relation between foundation and superstructure. From this it follows, that only in the foundational direction of the time-order can we state that a law-sphere is more or less complicated than its predecessor. The degree of complication depends here on the position of the sphere in the retrocipatory structure of its meaning. But when the transcendental direction of time is also taken into account, there is no difference in structural complication. For, in proportion to the decrease of the number of retrocipations in the meaning-structure there is an increase of anticipatory moments, and vice versa.

Observation: Perhaps, in this connection the objection may be made that in our analysis of the modal structures of meaning there is a continual use made of quantitative concepts, and even of spatial analogies. Dialectical philosophy will find this a proof of the fact that the theory of the law-spheres has relapsed into the objectifying attitude of special science. On the dialectical standpoint our method should be "geisteswissenschaftlich", otherwise our philosophy has not yet attained to transcendental self-reflection.

How thoroughly unfounded this objection is, can only be shown in the course of our investigations. In the present context it should only be observed that in the theory of the law-spheres we are engaged in a theoretical analysis of the modal structures of meaning. It must be established that it appears to be impossible to do this without our relevant synthetic concepts of meaning containing analogies of number and space. This proves that the logical sphere has its foundation in the aspects of number and space. For the rest our transcendental basic-Idea is a sufficient guarantee that philosophic thought cannot lose its direction to the selfhood, not even in these theoretical analyses.
The value of the analysis of modal meaning in tracing the original and irreducible nuclei of its modal structure.

The value of an analysis of the different modalities of meaning is this: it reveals the structure of a modality in cosmic time, and compels us to trace the original nuclear meaning-moment.

In its analytical abstraction this nucleus gives the fundamental analogical concepts a definitive modal qualification. It is true, the usual scientific terms for these concepts, examined in our introduction to this chapter, contain a general indication of the modal aspect in which the analogy presents itself. But we have noticed that these terms are handled without a closer analysis of the modal meaning-structures they refer to. The general adjectives giving these analogical terms their modal qualification, e.g. physical, psychical, logical, juridical, aesthetical, etc. cannot prevent scientific thought from a false interpretation, so long as any insight into the modal structures of the aspects to which they refer is lacking. We have seen, for instance, how the analogical term ‘juridical power’ has been misunderstood even by famous scholars versed in legal thinking.

In the prevailing method of forming concepts the moments are unified in a relation of thought that has not been unequivocally qualified as to its modal meaning. Any one who has experienced the confusing equivocality of this procedure will at once admit the value of our analysis. Later on these unqualified general concepts will be discussed in greater detail. Logicism as a whole is essentially founded in the translation of the retrocipatory or the anticipatory moments in the structure of the analytical aspect into the original modal meaning-kernels they analogically refer to. For instance, the logistic concepts of number, of continuity, of dimension, of motion, of ‘pure signification’, of the fundamental jural relations and so on, are entirely based on these essential shiftings of the modal meaning.

The special theory of the modal law-spheres must start with a scrupulously accurate analysis of the modal nuclei of meaning and should point out the non-original character of the modal analogies. This is still unbroken ground.

Merely by way of example I may refer to the dilemma in which modern mathematical thought is caught as regards its view of space.

Immanuel Kant’s transcendentally psychologistic conception of pure space as an a priori ‘intuitional form’ of sensibility to which
geometry is bound, as well as his conception of the exclusive a priori-synthetical character of the Euclidean axioms and theorems had proved to be untenable after the discovery of the non-Euclidean geometries in the 19th century. For mathematics there seemed henceforth to be no alternative but the following: Either pure geometry was to be reduced to the study of a so-called formal space (Carnap)\(^1\) in the logistical sense of a continuous series of propositional functions having two or more dimensions (Russell)\(^2\) without reference to any meta-logical aspect; or its propositions were to be construed from the basal intuition of the bare two-one ness after the manner of the intuitionists (Brouwer), as the form of the conceived multiplicity of the intervals of time. The intuitionists confine themselves to a complete arithmeticizing of geometry. But they hold to the quantitative nature of all mathematical entities, whose existence must be proved by the possibility of ‘construction’ from the basic quantitative intuition of time.

Logistic, on the other hand, reduces both pure arithmetic and pure geometry to logic. It speaks contemptuously of the ‘exploded’ view which supposed it had to bind arithmetic to the investigation of ‘quantitative relations’ (Russell). On this point formalism must agree with logistic.

This dilemma has been removed in the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea. It no longer considers space in its pure original sense as an unqualified a priori ‘form’ of the sensory contents of objective perception. Nor can it attach any meaning to a pretended ‘logical origin’ of the concepts of number, space, dimensionality, and continuity. It must also reject the intuitionist conception that the whole field of pure mathematical research is constructed from a basic intuition of the bare two-oneness in the intervals of time.

It raises the question about the original nuclear modal mean-

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\(^1\) Cf. R. Carnap, Der Raum (Berlin, 1922) p. 14.
\(^3\) Max Black, The nature of Mathematics (London 1933) p. 158, also eliminates the term ‘formal space’ in his statement:

“The last reason for restricting geometry to the study of space has disappeared, and the following view of the nature of geometry is generally accepted: a geometry does not deal with space but consists of a series of formulae (a logistician would say: propositional functions) which are deduced from a number of initial formulae (axioms)... and any interpretation of the symbols mentioned in the axioms which converts the latter into true propositions, is an interpretation of the geometry.”
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ing of space and number in the cosmic coherence of the law-
spheres. Through this also the confusing unqualified notion of
so-called 'empirical space' becomes useless in science.

§ 3 - PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST THREE MODAL
STRUCTURES OF MEANING.

A - A brief analysis of the original meaning of number.

Although the systematic analysis of the modal structures of
meaning can only be treated in the special theory of the law-
spheres, we will now put our conception to the test by the
analysis of some of them.

The original nuclear meaning of number, and the
numerical analogy in the logical modality of meaning.

When we try to analyse the modal meaning of the numerical
aspect, it is necessary to start with the natural cardinal numbers,
in which this meaning discloses itself in its primitive and irre-
ducible structure. For all the rational, irrational and complex
numeral functions in the last analysis pre-suppose the natural
numbers. Every attempt to reduce the modal meaning of the
latter to purely logical relations rests, as will appear, on a con-
fusion between numerical analogies in the structure of the ana-
lytical relations and the original kernel of numerical meaning.
The latter can be found in nothing but quantity (how much)
disclosing itself in the series-principle of the numerical time-
order with its + and — directions. This modal time-order itself is
determined by the quantitative meaning of this aspect. KANT
denatured the nuclear moment of the numerical aspect to a
transcendental logical category, though he derived the different

1 Even MAX BLACK (The Nature of Mathematics, p. 38) states in his
examination of the formalizing of pure mathematics in logistic: 'Arith-
metic is in a peculiar position, since definite integers occur in all systems
of axioms, but even that subject can be arranged as above to begin with
axioms whose subject-matter consists of integers and relations between
integers.' And a little further on he says: 'This apology for formal ana-
lysis requires two important reservations in the case of pure mathematics.
(1) The natural numbers as we have just seen are in the peculiar position
of occurring as constants in all axiom systems, and therefore marks de-
noting integers must be understood in a sense in which lines, points, etc.
need not be understood. (2) No complete axiom system can be set up for
'real numbers'. That is to say in the two cases where the fundamental
philosophical analysis of mathematics arises it will be found that no
'formal' analysis is adequate.' (p. 39/40).
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numbers from the so-called schematizing of this category in time (as a transcendental form of sensory perception).

The view, however, that arithmetic is no more than a special branch of logic, has indeed been prevalent since the Humanistic science-ideal developed the idea of the “mathesis universalis”. Many students of logistic suppose they possess in this splendid instrument of human thought all the requirements to deduce the number concept in a purely analytical way from the general logic of relations.

Now the logical modality of meaning has for its irreducible nucleus the analytical manner of distinction (or distinctiveness, respectively, when the analytical relations are viewed as modal subject-object-relations referring to the analytical characteristics of things). In the structure of this modality there is indeed an analogy of number to be found. This analogy, however, receives its determinateness of meaning only in the nucleus of logical meaning itself. This numerical analogy is the analytical unity and multiplicity, inherent in every analytical relation and in every concept according to its logical aspect. Every concept, viewed logically, is a σύνθεσις νοημάτων, the logical unification of various logical moments into an identical unity. The unifying-process develops according to the analytical norms of thought, viz. those of identity and contradiction.

Every analytical relation, even that of identity, implies a numerical analogy, because analysis itself is a manner of distinction, and distinction implies at least two terms: the one and the other.

As a numerical analogy the logical unity and multiplicity remain qualified by the analytical nucleus of logical meaning. But they undeniably refer back to the original nuclear meaning of number proper in the coherence of meaning of cosmic time.

The relation between number and logical multiplicity.

Logical unity and multiplicity, just as logical allness, are necessarily founded in the meaning of number, and not vice versa ¹.

¹ This is involuntarily admitted by A. Riehl (though he takes the view, in accordance with Kant, that an abstract number is an a priori scheme of the logical category of quantity), when he says (Der Phil. Kritizismus, 2e Aufl., 1925, II, S. 15): “Durch alle Verschiedenheiten der Vorstellungen hindurch, über alle Unterbrechungen des empirischen Selbstbewusstseins hinweg erhält sich das eine: Ich denke, als numerisch mit sich identisch.” [Through all varieties of representations, over all the interruptions of the
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The logical characteristics, summarized in the unity of the concept, cannot be a logical multiplicity if they do not have their number. The fact that this cosmic order of time between number and logical multiplicity was lost sight of, can be explained in some writers because they deduced number from the subjective human act of counting. Counting is naturally impossible without analytical distinction. But is number in its original sense only the product of counting? This supposition cannot be correct, since every act of counting pre-supposes an at least implicit pre-theoretic sense of the meaning of number and its inner conformity to law.

Moreover, logical multiplicity is qualified in a modally analytical way. This multiplicity, in any case, is a dependent moment in the modal structure of the analytical aspect, deriving its qualification from the analytical nucleus of meaning.

A modal meaning-moment, lacking the qualifying character of a nucleus, can never be original, but always refers to another meaning-nucleus lying outside the modal aspect concerned. Logical multiplicity is a retrocipation to a substratum, and not an anticipation. This appears from the fact that the analytical meaning-nucleus always pre-supposes a numerical multiplicity, even in pre-theoretical thought. This is why numerical quantity must find its analogy in a modally logical sense in analytical multiplicity. In the pre-theoretic, naïve understanding the first multiplicity to which analytical distinction appeals, is of an objective sensory-psychic nature. Pre-theoretical distinction rests upon a primitive analysis of a perceived sensory multiplicity. But also this sensory multiplicity cannot be the original manifold. It must refer to an original multiplicity in the sense of discrete quantity. Animals cannot arrive at a logical concept of number. But they certainly have a sensory perception of multiplicity, which latter can in no case be of an analytical character.

And finally, the method of antinomy can be applied to the attempt to ascribe the original meaning of number to merely logical multiplicity.

empirical self-consciousness one thing remains intact: 'I think', as being numerically identical with itself. From this it follows, that even KANT's concept of the transcendental-logical unity of apperception, assumed to be the foundation of the 'category of quantity', appears not to be detached from the meaning of number. On the other hand, number is called "eine Schöpfung unseres Geistes" [a creature of the mind], (ibid., p. 96).
The proposition $2 + 2 = 4$ is true in the (theoretically grasped) original numerical meaning. But we should not try to deduce this addition only from analytical thought after the manner of logistic with the aid of the concept of class. For then it appears that we get entangled in patent antinomies due to the theoretical attempt at erasing the modal boundaries between analytical and numerical multiplicity. Besides, there arises a vicious circle with respect to the cosmic temporal order of the two modal aspects concerned. The reason is that the extension of a class-concept presupposes number in its original sense.

The antinomy, implied in the attempt here intended, can be demonstrated as follows. The sign $+$ is indeed the linguistic symbol signifying the positive direction of the temporal order in the originally quantitative sense of number. In the successive progress of counting the new addition of numbers in the $+$ direction supposes a greater positional value in the series. The two first integers after 0 are really earlier in a quantitative sense than the two next added to them, because their positional value is smaller. The third added unit has the positional value 3, the fourth the positional value 4. If, however, it were allowed to interpret the $+$ sign in an original analytic sense and not in an original quantitative meaning, the judgment $2 + 2 = 4$ would per se be in conflict with the principium contradictionis. For, whichever way we turn, from a merely logical synthesis of two numbers there can never arise a new number. Kant saw this very clearly.

If logistic tries to avoid this antinomy by executing the operation of a 'logical addition' on classes and not on the numbers themselves, it moves in the vicious circle mentioned above. Let us consider the latter more in detail.

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1 Cf., e.g., B. Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*, Vol. I (1903) p.119: "The chief point to be observed is, that logical addition of classes is the fundamental notion, while the arithmetical addition of numbers is wholly subsequent." The deduction of number from the class-concept was first attempted by Frege.

2 That is to say the reduction of the integers to the analytical class-concept is not merely a tautology, which has a quite legitimate function in formal analysis. But it rests upon a fallacious διατίμησις πρώτης with regard to the cosmonomic place of the numerical and the analytical aspects.

The General Theory of the Modal Spheres

Number and the class-concept. Russell.

Russell, — with Whitehead one of the best philosophically trained mathematicians of this movement — admits that the logical addition of 1 and 1, according to the principles of symbolic logic, would always yield one as its result. That's why he gives the following definition: “1 + 1 is the number of a class -w- which is the logical sum of two classes -u- and -v- which have no common term and have each only one term” ¹.

But it may be clear already in the present context that the antinomy Russell tries to avoid by introducing the class-concept, reappears in the vicious circle of his definition.

Russell tries to deduce the concept of number from the extension of the concept of class. But for the simple distinction of the classes he needs number in its original meaning of quantity ².

In other words, Russell's definition of the sum 1 + 1 remains burdened with the inner antinomy whose existence he himself admitted in the attempt to deduce the number 2 from a 'logical addition' of 1 and 1.

B - A brief analysis of the original modal meaning of space in its coherence with the meaning of number.

The structure of the original modal meaning of number does not show any retrocipation. Original quantity does not have modal substrata. According to their modal structure of meaning all the other law-spheres are founded in the numerical aspect. This means that the latter is the first modal terminal sphere of our cosmos.

Meinong's 'Gegenstandstheorie' and G. H. T. Malan's critique of the first modal law-sphere.

This will be denied by Aristotelian scholasticism, which holds to the view that the 'ontological category' πόσον (how much?) pre-supposes numerable 'matter' in its spatial extension.

But this metaphysical view is not founded on a real analysis of the modal structures of the different aspects of human experience. The analysis of the modal structure of the spatial aspect will demonstrate that the latter pre-supposes the numerical one.

¹ Principles, p. 119.
² This is also argued by Cassirer, Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff (1923) p. 66, who rightly rejects Russell's defence against this objection.
From a quite different standpoint my view of the numerical aspect as the first terminal aspect of human experience has been attacked by G. H. T. Malan, emeritus professor of philosophy at the University of the Oranje Free State (S. Africa), in his treatise *The First Sphere of Dooyeweerd* (Die Eerste (Getals-)Kring van Dooyeweerd), published in the Tijdskrif vir Wetenskap en Kuns of the S. African Academy of Sciences and Arts (Oct. 1949), p. 101 ff. This author starts from the so-called "Gegenstandstheorie" of A. Meinong and is of the opinion that the numerical aspect pre-supposes pre-numerical sets of discrete objects which are sensory perceptible, e.g., a pair of shoes, twins, and so on.

He also interprets Russell's class-concept "gegenstandstheoretisch" in this sense, although he agrees that Russell himself has conceived of the concept of class (an 'incomplete symbol') as a purely logical notion.

The chief objection raised by him against my conception of the meaning-kernel of the numerical aspect is that I have failed to indicate the original objects which have the quantitative mode of being: "The objects which have number lie in altogether different spheres. They are points, stones, apples, movements and so on. But none of them belong to the first (i.e. the numerical) sphere. Doooyeweerd is not aware of this lack of specific substantial objects in the sphere. Nevertheless, he speaks about the latter as if there are such objects and calls them 'numbers'. What kind of objects can these numbers be, and from where does he get them? The answer is: he constructs them in a metaphysical way. He postulates first a mode of being or modal meaning, i.e. quantitative discreteness in abstracto. Then he hypostatizes this mode of being or meaning and gets his entity 'number'. 'Number' as an object is the hypostatized quantitative mode of being. From the mode of being itself 'number' is born."

This whole manner of criticism testifies to the fact that Malan has misunderstood the theory of the modal law-spheres in its fundamentals. Objects which have number have nothing to do with the modal structure of the numerical aspect. And numbers cannot be 'objects in the sense of Meinong's "Gegenstands-theorie", no more than apples, stones and other concrete things can belong to special modal aspects of meaning.

'Number' as such is a theoretical abstraction, a modal function, not a thing. The things in which numerical relations are
inherent, are not numbers, they have them. A set of things, viewed only according to the numerical aspect, is not itself a thing so that it can be an object of 'sensory perception'.

MALAN acknowledges that numbers are not individual things, but considers them as 'universal objects' or objects of the third stage (voorwerpen van die derde orde). Their species are not types of things, but only sets of things: They are to be distinguished from the genera whose species are determined by differentia specifica. A pair of shoes and a pair of twins are identical sets. Two sets are identical if each thing of the first set corresponds to a thing of the second. In other words, this identity is the one-one correspondence between the sets. This statement implies that, as far as their numbers as such are concerned, the things functioning in the sets are indifferent. It also means that in arithmetic the sets can only count for something as quantitative relations. Therefore the whole conception of 'pre-numeral sets' as 'species of universal numbers' is meaningless. RUSSELL conceived the one-one correspondence of the members of identical classes as a purely logical relation. But it is impossible to derive a quantitative equivalence from a purely analytical correspondence of members.

MALAN admits this. But his own view according to which numbers are genera of sensorily perceptible, pre-numeral sets of things is equally untenable. He overlooks the fact that a sensory multiplicity as such, abstracted from its intermodal relation to numeral multiplicity, is no longer quantitative in meaning. Consequently, numbers cannot be the genera of sensorily perceptible sets.

The modal meaning-nucleus of space. Dimensionality and spatial magnitude as arithmetical analogies in the modal meaning of space.

The spatial aspect in its original modality of meaning cannot exist without its substratum, viz. the numerical law-sphere. This will for the present be proved by means of a brief analysis of the modal structure of space in its original mathematical sense as regards its nucleus and its retrocipations.

Its original meaning-kernel can only be conceived as continuous extension in the simultaneity of all its parts within the spatial order of time. From the very beginning it must be clear that modern formal mathematics, in its theory of multidimensional sets, has eliminated the spatial aspect as such.
Spatial relations and figures are reduced here to special 'arguments' that play no essential rôle in the formalized theory. This has nothing to do with the discovery of the non-Euclidean geometries, but is only the result of the reduction of pure geometry to pure arithmetic, or to pure logic respectively.

From the philosophical point of view this elimination of the spatial aspect results in a premature elimination of the fundamental problem of the inner nature and meaning of pure space. This problem has been the subject of profound discussion since Newton, Hume, Leibniz and Kant. But it has not found its definitive solution for lack of an exact analysis of the modal structures of meaning. The premature elimination of this fundamental problem has prevented the philosophy of mathematics from examining the primordial question concerning the original modal meaning of the spatial aspect of human experience.

In connection with this it is necessary to inquire into the relation between pure space and the analogical meanings of the spatial concepts used in all other sciences. It is the very task of the theory of the modal law-spheres to resume the study of this problem, which cannot be indifferent to mathematical theory.

We must especially warn against the identification of the original spatial meaning-nucleus with the objective sensory space of perception. The original meaning-kernel of the spatial aspect cannot be qualified by sensory qualities. Nevertheless, this modal nucleus cannot reveal its meaning apart from analogical moments which are qualified by it. In the creaturely realm of meaning even original kernels of modal aspects are bound to analogical moments in which they must express themselves. It will appear later on that even the meaning-kernel of the numerical aspect does not escape this universal coherence.

It is only as dimensional extension that we can grasp the original modal meaning of space. This original modal meaning is therefore dimensional continuous extension, so long as no account is taken of its anticipatory structure. Dimensionality, however, is an element of the spatial modality of meaning (viewed from its law-side) which cannot exist without its

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1 Dimensionality, as such, does not imply a determinate magnitude of lines which, as the coordinates of a point, are constructed in different dimensions. It is only an order of spatial extension, not a determinate spatial figure. Therefore, it belongs to the law-side of the aspect, not to its subject-side.
coherence with the *numerical* aspect. As space may have two, three or more dimensions, it always refers to the arithmetical aspect as its substratum. Viewed from the modal subject-side of the spatial aspect, the spatial figure necessarily has its numerical analogy in its *spatial magnitude*. This retrocipiation in the spatial meaning, so closely connected with the *spatial point*, will be analysed in our discussion of the modal subject-object-relation, because from this point of view it is highly interesting.

Provisionally it may be established that magnitude in the meaning of the space-aspect is only a *retrocipatory analogy of number*.

The so-called transfinite numbers and the antinomies of actual infinity.

Every attempt to transfer the moment of continuity in its original spatial sense into the modal aspect of number inevitably leads to antinomy. Such an attempt really implies the acceptance of the actual or completed infinity of a series, as was done by Cantor, the founder of the theory of the so-called ‘transfinite numbers’.

This antinomy must come to light, if we accept transfinity in the orders of the infinite, and also if this actual infinity is assumed in the orders of the infinitesimal. The latter constitute a domain to which Veronese has extended Cantor's theory of the transfinite numbers in order to obtain a firm foundation for the whole of infinitesimal analysis. And the antinomy is implied in the fundamental concept of completed infinity itself, quite apart from the antinomic character of the different theorems that were supposed to be possible for the ‘transfinite classes of numbers’.

The functions in the numerical aspect that anticipate the spatial, kinematic and analytical modi.

In the infinite series, formed by the ‘irrational’ and differential functions of number, the modal meaning of the number-aspect undeniably reveals its anticipatory structure in that it approximates the original meaning of space and movement respectively. But it remains within the meaning-aspect of discrete quantity. The total of the discrete numerical values, functioning in these

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approximative series, can never be actually given in the anticipatory direction of time of the numerical aspect. In its anticipatory functions number can only approximate the continuity of space and the variability of motion, but it can never reach them. These meaning-functions of number are not to be considered as actual numbers. They are only complicated relations between natural integers according to the laws of number, just like the fractions and the so-called complex numbers.

In this sense I agree with the statement made by the intuitionist mathematician Weyl: "Mathematics is entirely dependent on the character of the natural numbers, even with respect to the logical forms in which it is developed".\(^1\)

However, this does not entitle us to qualify the anticipatory, approximative functions of number as arbitrary products of the human mind, as is done by the intuitionist mathematician Kronecker.\(^2\) They are rigorously founded in the modal meaning-structure of number and the inter-modal coherence of meaning.

Only the interpretation of these meaning-functions as actual numbers is the work of man, but then work that mis-interprets the modal structure of meaning in the numerical law-sphere.

MALAN's defence of the concept 'continuous number'.

MALAN, in his treatise mentioned above, is of the opinion that discreteness and continuity are qualities which a number shows only in its relation to other numbers. The number 1 for instance can represent either a cardinal number, or a rational, or a real one. Whether a number is discrete or continuous, depends on the question, whether it is placed under the laws of discrete numbers or under those of continuous numerical values.

According to him this is only a question of the operator which is chosen. The choice of a particular selecting operator, as, e.g., + 1, is arbitrary. But the result of the operation performed with

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\(^1\) "Die Mathematik ist ganz und gar, sogar den logischen Formen nach, in denen sie sich bewegt, abhängig vom Wesen der natürlichen Zahl." Cf. Weyl: Über die neue Grundlagenkrise in der Mathematik, in Mathem. Zeitschrift, 10 (1921) p. 70.

\(^2\) "Die ganzen Zahlen hat der liebe Gott gemacht, alles andere ist Menschenwerk." [Whole numbers have been made by God, all the others are the work of man], quoted by A. Fraenkel, Einleitung in die Mengenlehre (2e Aufl. 1923) p. 172.
the aid of this operator is necessary, in conformity to the law of
the function. The operator can only lay bare this law-conformity.
Just as the discrete character of a number is laid bare by a
particular operator of juxtaposition, so, according to the author,
the continuous character is laid bare by an operator of repeated
interposition or insertion.

I fear that MALAN has not grasped the point at issue. In the first
place I must observe that not the operator itself, but only the
choice of a particular operator, can be arbitrary. The operators
+ 1, + etc. are themselves implied in the quantitative aspect
of time-order, and so is the operator of 'repeated interposition'.

When we choose the latter in order to find the series of 'real'
numerical functions, it must be possible to indicate the law of
the numerical series which is to result from the operation. If,
however, this functional law implies that the process of inter-
position is necessarily infinite, then it implies at the same time
that the quantitative series cannot be actually continuous. It will
always be possible to insert new values between the members
hitherto found. In other words, the fact that the process of in-
sertion is continuous by virtue of the operator of 'repeated inter-
position', does not guarantee the actual continuity of the series
of numerical values resulting from the operation.

And the fact that the principle or law of the numerical series
resulting from the irrational 'numbers' may be definite, does
not imply that the latter have an actual existence as numbers
on the same footing as natural integers.

MALAN cannot discover any anticipatory relation between the
continuity of the process of interposing numerical values in the
infinite series and the modal kernel of the spatial aspect: "It is
inexplicable", he says, "how DOOYEWEERD can see something
spatial in this continuous series." But I can explain why he can-
not see it. This is due to the fact that he operates with an anal-
logical space-concept without any critical analysis of the original
nucleus of meaning of the spatial aspect as such. This is evident
from the following argument which he directs against my analysis
of this meaning-kernel: "As regards space, there is of course
continuity in space. But only an absolutizing metaphysician can
declare that all kinds of space are continuous. As we have de-
monstrated in section I, there are, especially in the world of the
sense of touch, discrete perception-spaces." I never have said
that 'all sorts of space' are continuous. In the analysis of the
modal meaning-kernel of the spatial aspect we are not concerned
with sensory space which can have only an analogical meaning, just like physical space, biological space, logical space, historical space and so on. But apparently Malan conceives of the different modal ‘kinds of space’ as species of a genus. And this also shows that he has not understood the theory of the modal law-spheres. The latter is intended to lay bare the inter-modal relation between original kernels of modal meaning and merely analogical moments.

Number and continuity. Dedekind’s theory of the so-called irrational numbers.

The introduction of the element of continuity in the concept of number, — if not intended as an anticipatory, approximative moment of meaning, — is primarily to be considered as an effort to do away with the modal boundaries of the meaning-aspects of number, space, motion and logical analysis. Then the law of the continuity of the movement of thought, formulated by Leibniz, is had recourse to for the purpose of rationalizing continuity in its original spatial meaning.

Such was the case in Dedekind’s well-known attempt to rationalize the so-called ‘irrational numbers’, which prompted Weierstrass, Cantor, Pasch and Veronese to make much more radical attempts in the same direction. The mathematician Dedekind would not look upon the continuity of the series as an anticipation of the meaning of space by the modal meaning of number. This would imply the recognition that the number-aspect is not self-sufficient in the anticipatory direction of time. By means of a sharp definition Dedekind wanted to introduce the idea of continuity into the concept of number itself as an original moment in the numerical meaning-aspect.

Now the ‘irrational’ function of number, which can never be counted off in finite values in accordance with the so-called Archimedean principle, was defined as a ‘section’ in the system of rational numbers.

How did Dedekind find this definition? At least in the first project of his theory he related all the values of the numbers of the system to points in a spatial line. Next he logicized these points in space into pure points of thought, which logical thinking subsequently again eliminates in the continuity of its movement. This procedure was based on the postulate that there is only one single definite numerical value corresponding to each ‘section’ of the rational system. The insertion of the ‘section’ fills a vacuum in
The system, so that, if one imagines in thought that in this way all vacancies have been filled up, the whole system of numbers is without any gap, i.e. it is continuous. The modal boundary of meaning between spatial continuity and logical continuity seems to have been broken through in this method.

The complete theoretical elimination of the modal meaning of number, through the giving-up of finite numbers as the basis for the infinitesimal functions. The modal shiftings of meaning in the logicistic view.

Dedekind at least took rational numbers and the Archimedean principle for his starting-point.

Weierstrass, Cantor, Pasch and Veronese, on the other hand, broke completely with the view that discrete quantity is the modal meaning of number. From the start they held the convergent infinite series, (in Cantor: the fundamental series), to be an arithmetical concept. This they considered in its origin to be completely determined by arithmetical thought only and not bound to a deduction from the rational numbers by means of a 'theory of sections'.

Pasch introduced the very characteristic term 'Zahlstrecke' for the 'irrational number'. In this way he expressed that from the beginning the idea of original continuity has been included in the concept of number.

The Marburg school of neo-Kantianism has laid bare the inner relation between this whole rationalistic development of arithmetic and the creation-motive in the Humanistic science-ideal.

Natorp, one of the leading thinkers of this school, writes: "In the last analysis it is nothing but the basic relation between the continuity of thought and the discretion of the separating act of thought which seeks and finds its definite, scientifically developable expression in the relation between number as a continuum and as a discrete quantity" 1.

What strikes us especially in this statement is the exhaustive way in which this philosophical school logicizes the meaning-aspects of number and space. An elaborate system of shiftings has been applied to the meanings of these different spheres.

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1 Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften, p. 188: "Es ist zuletzt nichts als das logische Grundverhältnis der Denkkontinuität zur Diskretion der sondernden Setzung im Denken, was in dem Verhältnis der Zahl als Kontinuum zu den Zahldiskretionen seinen bestimmten wissenschaftlich entwickelbaren Ausdruck sucht und findet."
The original meanings of space and number are supposed to be deducible from the logical movement of thought in a process of logical creation. In other words, the original meaning-nuclei of number and space are first replaced by their analogies in the logical sphere: the arithmetical analogy of logical multiplicity, and the spatial analogy of logical continuity.

And, once this shift in the meanings of the aspects has been accomplished, it becomes possible to carry through the principle of the continuity of thought across all the modal boundaries of meaning. It stands to reason that in his way the meaning-nucleus of number can no longer be found in discrete quantity.

Then the point is how to find the logical origin of number in creative thought. This origin does not lie in the discrete finite one, but rather in the 'qualitative all-ness' (= totality) of the infinite.

The rationalistic concept of law in arithmetic.

This tendency in the Humanistic science-ideal to logicize the meaning-aspects of number and space made the rationalistic concept of law also subservient to its purpose. As a consequence the subject-side of the modal meaning of number was in theory completely merged into the law-side. Otherwise, it would never have occurred to anyone that the so-called irrational and the differential functions of the numeral aspect can be looked upon as real, actual numbers, and put on a level with the so-called 'natural number'.

Still less would the view have arisen that the discrete, finite numbers proper ought to be deduced from the infinite, if the subject-side of the law-sphere of number had not been theoretically merged into the law-side.

As observed above, an infinite series of numbers is no doubt perfectly determined by the law of arithmetical progression. This principle makes it possible a priori to determine the discrete arithmetical value in arithmetical time of any possible finite numerical relation in the series. For the rationalist conception of law this is a sufficient reason to attribute actual, completed infinitude to the series as a totality.

But the identification of the law (in the definite principle of

1 Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften, p. 188.
progression) with the actual subject-side of an endless series, is untenable. This is evident from the fact that in the infinitesimal functions of number the numerical modus in its anticipations approximates other meaning-aspects. But it is never able to exceed its modal boundaries in the anticipatory direction of time. After all, the numerical laws cannot be subjected to the basic arithmetical operations. But in arithmetic we must necessarily start from the natural numbers, if we are to work with irrational, imaginary, differential functions of number. The latter only deepen and open the meaning of the natural numeral values. The cosmic order takes revenge on the rationalistic trend of thought in mathematics which in theory eradicates the modal boundaries of meaning between number, space, movement (in its original mathematical sense) and logical analysis. As a result this thought gets entangled in the notorious antinomies of actual infinitude.

All these points ought to be more elaborately discussed in the special theory of the law-spheres. At this stage of our inquiry, we only wish to give a preliminary illustration of our method of analyzing the modal structures of meaning. The only intention is to shed light on the true nature and the coherence of the different elements of meaning in contrast with the prevailing rationalistic currents in mathematics.

C - A brief analysis of the original (mathematical) meaning of motion in its coherence with the original meanings of number and space.

In the modal structure of the law-sphere of movement (in its original mathematical sense intended in pure kinematics) there are very clear numerical and spatial retrocipations. Neither in the numerical, nor in the spatial aspect can we find movement in its original modal meaning of continuous flowing, which needs no further qualification.

The differential as an anticipation of movement in the original meaning of number.

When a mathematician tries to develop, theoretically, the numerical relations between two variable magnitudes in conformity to the arithmetical laws, he makes use of the concept of function. Then one of two variables is conceived of as a function of the other (the independent variable). In this case discrete quantity is thought of as variable. But neither in the
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logical processus (the movement of thought), guiding the differential and integral calculus, nor in the differential relation between the series of values traversed by the two magnitudes, is there any question of movement in its original modal meaning.

The differences traversed in the course of their changes by the variables $-x$- and $-y$- in the functionally coherent series of values, remain discrete arithmetical values. But under the guidance of the theoretical movement of thought the numerical aspect approximates the original continuity of pure movement in the anticipatory function of the differential quotient.

The differential function of number expresses nothing but the limiting value of the quotient $\frac{\Delta x}{\Delta y}$, when both differences approximate zero infinitesimally.

A mathematician who is of a rationalistic frame of mind, is apt to deny any necessary connection between the differential function of the numerical meaning-aspect and the original modal meaning of movement. Perhaps he will object that the differential and integral calculus has a pure mathematical value in itself and that its relation to physics is nothing but a particular instance of its applicability. This would doubtless be correct. But it has nothing to do with the point in question.

Our statement that the numerical aspect of meaning in its infinite differential function approximates the original modal meaning-kernel of movement, naturally does not imply that movement could be taken here in the sense of an actual physical process. The word movement in this case is taken to refer to the nucleus of the modal meaning of the aspect which delimits the mathematical field of pure kinematics (phoronomy).

The logicist cannot accept the irreducible character of this modal aspect of meaning. He will try to reduce it to its 'logical origin'. The logical movement of thought will be a sufficient basis to him for the infinitesimal calculus.

The logical movement of thought as a retrocipation of the original aspect of movement.

The logical movement of thought is, however, an analogical figure of meaning. It evidently refers back to its substratum in

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1 This guiding function of theoretical logic will be explained in the discussion of the opening-process of the modal meaning-structures.
the original aspect of movement. Though remaining what it is, viz. logical processus, it has a retrocipatory character and appeals to the nuclear sense of its foundation.

The concepts ‘variable’ and ‘differential’ would be without any basis, if the cosmic coherence of meaning between the number-aspect and the aspect of movement in their original sense were denied.

As to movement in its original sense, it should be observed that as late as in Kant (who, at least at this point, followed in the steps of Newton) the prevailing view was that movement was something occurring in mathematical space.

This idea was due to a misinterpretation of the original meaning of movement, because it was based on the objective sensory image of space. In our psychical-sensory perception the sensory impression of movement is really found in the objective sensory image of space. The reason why this is necessarily so in accordance with the cosmic temporal order, is a subject for later research. But there can be no question of an original movement in the original meaning of space.

The erroneous view of classical physics concerning the relation between sensory phenomena and absolute space.

It is very important to stress this modal state of affairs, since Newton, led astray by the fact that physical experiments are related to objective sensory phenomena, wrongly supposed that the latter can be conceived as occurring in the ‘absolute’ space of mathematics. It was only a quite natural result of this lack of distinction between the different modal aspects of experience that ‘matter’ was viewed as a ‘filling up’ of this mathematical receptacle.

1 The Marburg School among the neo-Kantians, too, has stuck to this opinion. Natorp in his work on the logical foundations of the exact sciences, writes with regard to the modern concept of energy: “It is exclusively the logical demand of univocal determinateness of being in relation to time and space which leads to the necessary pre-supposition of a substance of occurrence that maintains itself unchanged. This substance is something ‘real’, which according to its pure concept must necessarily be conceived of as always identical with itself in its fundamental existence, but as having a movable space-content in space.” \["So ergibt sich allein durch die logische Forderung der eindeutigen Bestimmtheit des Seins in Bezug auf Zeit und Raum die notwendige Voraussetzung einer unveränderlich sich erhaltende Substanz\]
According to Newton, this receptacle was conceived as a metaphysical entity: the sensorium Dei. In this metaphysical interpretation of 'absolute space' the antinomic character of the conception of sensible 'matter' as a 'filling up' of the former was sharply accentuated.

It was therefore quite understandable that Kant in his critical period transformed Newton's "absolute space" into a transcendental form of intuition.

But, since this transcendental form was identified with space in its original modal sense, Kant's conception remained burdened with the antinomy that sensory space is to be viewed as subjected to the purely mathematical rules of Euclidean geometry 1.

This view, according to which 'pure Euclidean space' is an a priori receptacle of sensory perceptions ("Anschauungsraum"), had already been refuted by Hume with striking arguments. But even Carnap maintained it in his remarkable treatise Der Raum, although only with respect to the topological space of intuition (not as to the metrical and projective ones, which, according to him, lack a priori necessity).

And it is this first misconception which lies at the basis of the classical physical view that sensible movement of matter is considered as occurring in the cadre of pure mathematical space.

d e s G e s c h e h e n s, oder eines "Realen", welches nach diesem seinen reinen Begriff notwendig zu denken ist als in seinem Grundbestand immer sich selbst identischer, dagegen im Raum beweglicher Rauminhalt."

(Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften, 2e Aufl., 1921, p. 349).

This statement again shows how much the Kantian form-matter scheme is prejudicial to a clear idea of meaning. Kant was already led astray by it, when he wanted to define the relation between space and moving matter.

1 The dark schematism-chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason could only mask this antimony, because it does not deal with sensory space but with an exact Euclidean one, related to a priori intuition, which, as such, cannot be of a sensible nature.

The question how sensible space can be subjected to the a priori rules of Euclidean geometry is neither raised nor solved.

The chief point is that in Kant's exclusively mathematical-physical conception of human experience there was no room for a 'sensory space' in its objective psychological meaning. For this very reason his transcendental aesthetics and his schematism-chapter could not refute Hume's psychological critique of 'exact geometry'.

Sensory perceptions as such can only be related to objective sensory space, not to an a priori mathematical one.
Movement in its original modal sense and in its analogical meanings.

This misconception is of a very complicated character. This appears as soon as we pay attention to the original modal sense of movement in its inter-modal relation to its analogical meanings in physics and in the psychological theory of perception.

In Aristotelian philosophy the analogical character of the fundamental concept of movement was clearly seen. The common moment, implied in the different meanings of this concept, was found in ‘change’ (quantitative change, change of place, change of qualities, substantial change). But it was not overlooked that this meaning-moment was itself of an analogical nature.

The very fact that Greek thought was ruled by the dialectical form-matter motive explains its resigning to a fundamental analogy. No further inquiry was made into the original modal meaning-structure of movement to which all its analogical meanings must refer. It was in the last analysis the lack of a radical unity in the religious point of departure that prevented philosophical thought from penetrating to the original meaning-kernels of the modal aspects of human experience.

As soon as religious primacy was ascribed to the form-motive, all attention was directed to the ‘substance’ which must be the ἔστιν of every movement, the accidental as well as the substantial. But the metaphysical concept of substance could not transcend the modal diversity of meaning implied in the analogical concept of movement.

The ancient Ionian philosophy of nature ascribed primacy to the religious matter-motive. Consequently it reduced all natural movement to the eternally flowing Stream of life as the divine Origin. But for this very reason this original divine movement was not conceived in an original modal sense in which its modal nucleus is contained. Rather it was understood in the analogical sense of vital movement, which was absolutized to the divine Origin of all things appearing in an individual form and therefore subject to decay.

It was only in kinematics as a branch of pure mathematics that the original modal meaning of movement could be grasped. Here movement presents itself in its modal nucleus of continuous flowing in the succession of its temporal moments. It is evident that Newton’s well-known circumscription of ‘absolute’
or ‘mathematical’ time was nothing but a concept of uniform movement in this original modal sense.

It makes no sense to define the latter in the Aristotelian manner as a change of place. For movement in its original modal sense cannot be \textit{qualified} by spatial positions. A change of place conceived of as an intrinsic characteristic of movement would imply that movement occurs in a statical spatial continuum, and that from moment to moment it has another defined place in it.

But this supposition leads theoretical thought into inescapable antinomies since it cancels the concept of movement. We shall return to these antinomies in a later context.

The spatial analogy in the modal structure of the kinematic aspect.

It is true that the modal meaning-kernel of movement needs an analogy of space in the modal structure of the kinematic aspect itself. But this analogy is qualified by the meaning-kernel of this aspect, not inversely. It is a \textit{flowing} space in the temporal succession of moments, not a statical one in the simultaneity of all its positions.

This flowing space is \textit{founded} in the latter but cannot be identified with it. It refers indeed to the meaning-kernel of the spatial aspect, but only in the inter-modal relation of the two modal law-spheres concerned, which is guaranteed by the cosmic time-order. This spatial analogy (flowing extension) also implies an analogy of spatial dimensionality in its original sense, i.e. the \textit{directions} of movement in flowing space, whose multiplicity in its turn is founded in the numerical aspect.

It must be observed emphatically that this provisional analysis of the modal structure of movement in its original (non-analogical) meaning has nothing to do with a speculative construction inspired by a preconceived system of modal law-spheres. On the contrary, in the first (Dutch) edition of this work I tried to reduce the original sense of movement to the meaning-kernel of the modal aspect which is the specific field of physics. But it appeared later on that this attempt could not satisfy the demands of an exact analysis and must lead philosophical thought into inner antinomies.
Physical movement as an analogy qualified by energy.

In the first place it must be noted that in physics the concept of movement usually has a restricted application, namely in mechanics only. For this reason it might produce a confusing effect if movement is elevated to the rank of the modal nucleus of meaning of the physical aspect.

It is true that this objection cannot be decisive, because scientific terminology often lacks philosophical precision and the word 'movement' does not have an exclusively mechanical sense.

There is, however, a much more cogent argument preventing us from conceiving movement as the original meaning-kernel of the physical aspect. This is the undeniable fact that in its physical use the term movement requires a specific modal qualification. Physics, in all its subdivisions, is always concerned with functions of energy (potential or actual) and energy implies causes and effects. That is to say that physical movement cannot reveal the original nuclear meaning of movement, but must have an analogical sense, qualified by the very meaning-moment of energy. In its original modal sense movement cannot have the meaning of an effect of energy. That is the very reason why kinematics or phoronomy can define a uniform movement without any reference to a causing force and why the physical concept of acceleration does not belong to kinematics but to physics alone. Therefore GALILEO could define the principle of inertia in a purely mathematical-kinematical way, which signified a fundamental break with the Aristotelian conception.

Since movement in this original sense cannot be reduced to the numerical, the spatial or the physical aspects, it must be an original modal aspect of human experience, which is at the foundation both of physical movement and of movement in the objective psychical sense of sensory perception. That is to say that human experience of movement can never be exhausted in its objective sensory aspect. It always implicitly (in naïve experience) or explicitly (in theoretical experience) refers to the original aspect of movement which, as such, is of a pre-sensory character. We would not be able to perceive movement with the eye of sense, if this sensory perception was not founded in the original intuition of movement as an irreducible aspect of human experience. The sensualistic view is refuted by a serious analysis of the modal structure of sensory movement-perception which lays bare the analogical and referring character of the latter.
Therefore **Galileo** followed the right scientific method when he founded his mechanical theory in a mathematical kinematics. And **Newton's** conception of 'mathematical time' has not lost its scientific value if it is conceived in the original sense of pure kinematics. It is only the metaphysical absolutization of kinematic time-order and its confusion with the physical one which must be abandoned. But this does not imply that the latter may be conceived without any (at least implicit) reference to kinematic time.

Movement in its original modal sense cannot be conceived without its inter-modal reference to the original meaning of space. We would not have an intuition of a flowing extension without its intermodal coherence with a statical space. But it is not true that this intuition needs a sensory perceptible system of reference. Only the objective sensory *image* of movement demands the latter. But this sensory image appeals to our pure intuition of movement in its original modal meaning. It is founded in this pure intuition by the inter-modal order of cosmic time and cannot be experienced in purely sensory isolation. The sensory image of movement occurs within a sensory space of perception which itself is only an objective sensory analogy of space in its original meaning. Therefore it also appeals to the original spatial aspect of our experience. We shall return to this complicated state of affairs in a later context.

The whole conception of moving matter as a filling up of space is exclusively oriented to the sensory aspect of experience. It has a psychological, not a physical or kinematic content.

Of course it is true that in physical experiments sensory perception is indispensable. But in the theoretical interpretation of the sensory phenomena the latter must be related to the modal aspect of energy which is not of a sensible nature. Fields of gravitation, electro-magnetical fields, quanta, photons, electrons, neutrons, protons, and so on, are not sensory phenomena, although the *real events* in which they manifest themselves have an *objective sensory aspect*. They function within the original aspect of energy. But they have an inter-modal relation to the sensory aspect of human experience and in physics the objective sensory phenomena can only be theoretically interpreted as sensory *symbols* referring to the original physical states of affairs which present themselves to the physical aspect of experience.
The general theory of relativity and the un-original character of physical space.

The general theory of relativity has made the discovery that the properties of physical space (i.e. essentially energy-space) are really determined by matter (in its physical function of energy), because of the indissoluble coherence of physical space and physical time. This is the reason why no privileged rigid system of co-ordinates for physical movement can be accepted. If the properties of physical space depend on energy, the analogical character of this space is indisputable. The general theory of relativity, in the nature of the case, is unable to conceive of physical space without its intermodal coherence with original space, in so far as the latter anticipates the meaning of energy. Such an anticipation necessarily makes an appeal to the original meaning of energy. Hence it can be admitted, that the geometrical foundations of the general theory of relativity (in the transcendental direction of time) are dependent on the modal meaning of energy.

Einstein formulates this as follows: ‘According to the general theory of relativity the geometrical properties of space are not independent, but they are determined by matter’. But this statement can only be correct, if ‘matter’ is not intended as a filling-up of original space but rather in its physical function as qualifying its own extension. The question whether this analogical space is a continuum cannot be answered in an a priori way. It is well known that by accepting the classical view of the continuous character of physical space the theory of relativity does not completely agree with the modern quantum-theory of energy. In the theory of the modal law-spheres there would be no single difficulty in abandoning this residue of the classical conception. For the analogical character of physical space and

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1 The general theory of relativity utilizes the so-called Gaussian co-ordinates, i.e. the four-dimensional (including physical time as the fourth coordinate) system of co-ordinates with curves varying from point to point. They can only be understood as physical anticipations in geometry, in so far as this geometrical pattern is related to physical states of affairs.

2 Über die spezielle und die allgemeine Relativitätstheorie (12. Aufl.), p. 76: “Gemäss der allgemeinen Relativitätstheorie sind die geometrischen Eigenschaften des Raumes nicht selbständig, sondern durch die Materie bedingt.”

3 Particularly the famous French physicist De Broglie has discussed the philosophical problems implied in this incongruence.
its qualification by the meaning-kernel of the energy-aspect is here clearly seen.

If the energy-aspect in its factual side appears to have discontinuity, it is quite understandable that physical space is determined by this discontinuous structure.

Only a theoretical view of reality which lacks a clear distinction between the modal aspects of human experience and holds to the Kantian view of Euclidean space as an a priori form of sensory intuition, must reject the conception of a discontinuous space as paradoxical.

If the modal boundaries of meaning between original space and its kinematical, physical and sensory analogies are obliterated, there arises indeed an inner antinomy. That is to say, an antinomy arises if it is assumed that the structure of space is dependent on a matter which itself is 'enclosed in pure space', consequently, which itself must be determined by the pure mathematical properties of the latter.

The discretion of spatial positions and the un-original or analogical character of this discretion.

In the original meaning of space the positions of the figures must necessarily retain their discretion in the modal continuity of their extension. This discretion, as an arithmetical analogy, is founded in the original meaning of discrete quantity. It is indeed no original kind of discretion. The discrete magnitude, e.g., of the three sides of a triangle, depends on points that have no actual subjective existence in space themselves, as they have no extension in any dimension.

This discretion is to be understood in the static sense of the original spatial positions, which cannot flow into one another in the original meaning of motion. The totality of the spatial positions, passed through by a point, a line, a plane, merely in imagination, in the mathematical movement of thought, is not subjectively actual in the original spatial aspect of time. No more is the totality of the finite numbers in an approximative series subjectively actual in the modal meaning of arithmetic time.

The original time of the spatial aspect is one of the modal meaning-functions of cosmic time, whereas cosmic time itself has an inter-modal continuity. In space the meaning of time is spatial simultaneity, not that of kinematic succession. But in the idea of the totality of the discrete positions of a spatial figure
conceived of as being subject to 'continuous transformation', original spatial time approximates the meaning of kinematic time, in so far as it anticipates the meaning of kinematic succession.

The antinomies of Zeno are due to the attempt to reduce the modal meaning of motion to that of space.

No attempt should be made to reduce succession in the original meaning of motion to the discrete simultaneity of an infinite series of magnitudes in the original meaning of space. For then theoretical thought will inevitably be entangled in the notorious antinomies, already formulated by Zeno the Eleatic (Achilles and the tortoise; the flying arrow). His dialectical arguments against the possibility of movement could only show that movement can never be construed from an approximative infinite series of discrete spatial magnitudes.

From these antinomies it is at the same time clear, that the opposite procedure is equally impossible: discrete spatial magnitudes cannot flow into one another in the continuous succession of movement.

Cassirer makes the remark that geometry has developed a rigorously systematic treatment of its province and has devised truly universal methods only after changing over from the geometry of measure to the geometry of spatial positions. This development, following Leibniz' programme of an analysis situs, resulted in the theoretical opening of the modal functions of the spatial aspect that anticipate the original meaning of the aspect of motion. But this is bound to the condition that theoretical thought does not attempt to violate the sphere-sovereignty of the modal aspects.


In Descartes' analytic geometry the spatial series of positions anticipating the original meaning of the aspect of motion are not really analyzed in the modal meaning of space, but replaced by the anticipatory functions of number. The different spatial

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1 Also Plato in his dialogue Parmenides has stressed the fact that spatial simultaneity is a real modus of time.

2 Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, p. 99/100.
forms of the plane curves are conceived as proceeding from the 'movement' of a definite point, fixed as their fundamental element. Its position in space has been determined univocally by means of a system of co-ordinates. The points obtained in this way are approximated from the values of the numbers assigned to them.

Leibniz' programme of an 'analysis situs' was primarily intended to discover the anticipatory principle of progression in the aspect of space itself. This programme was essentially carried out in Poncelet's founding of projective geometry. In the theory of the law-spheres Poncelet's projective geometry is only to be understood as a theoretical attempt to discover the constant correlative functions of spatial figures of the same group that approximate the original meaning of motion in an infinitesimal series of positional variations.

A definite spatial figure is considered to be correlated to another if it can be derived from the other by 'a continuous transformation' of one or more of its positional elements in space.

In this process certain spatial basic relations are pre-supposed as the invariants of the whole system of spatial relations.

The most important form of correlation, connecting different spatial figures with one another, is discovered in the projective method. Here geometry has the task of discovering those 'metrical' and 'descriptive' moments of a figure that remain unaltered in its projection. Accordingly projective geometry now introduces the imaginary spatial figure, and speaks of the imaginary points of intersection in the transformed system.

One thing is at once clear: it must be the subjective spatial limiting functions that we are confronted with in this procedure. This is the same thing that has been found in the imaginary functions of number, which also appeared to be subjective limiting functions.

It was owing to the discovery of these anticipatory spatial limiting functions that the principle of progression was found to establish the functional coherence between spatial systems which are otherwise entirely heterogeneous. It was seen that the invariant, positional relations in conformity to the spatial laws also obtain among the infinite series of discrete positions whose mutual positional difference is 'infinitesimally small'.

Consider, e.g., two circles in a plane. If they intersect, a
The General Theory of the Modal Spheres

common chord has been given connecting the two points of intersection. The points of this straight line are such that the tangents that can be construed from these points to the circles are equal.

This spatial relation also obtains in case the extreme limit is reached in the series of the positional changes of the two circles, i.e. when they do not intersect any longer. In this case, too, there is always a straight line — the so-called radical axis of the two circles — possessing the spatial property mentioned above and connecting the two ‘imaginary’ points of intersection.

In the same way it can be proved, e.g., that when three circles are given in a plane, and we construe the ‘radical axes’ for any two of them until they have all been used, the three lines obtained in this way intersect at one point. According to the principle of the invariant relations in the infinite series of positions, the same thing holds good for the special case that the three circles intersect indeed, etc. ¹

On the ground of the same principle of progression the projective view of Euclidean space is entitled to speak of the infinitely distant point in which two parallel lines intersect; or of the infinitely distant straight lines in which two parallel planes intersect.

In the ‘imaginary’ positional functions the original meaning of space indeed approximates that of movement. Projective geometry only violates the specific modal sovereignty of the law-spheres of space and movement, in the further development given to it, e.g., by CAYLEY and KLEIN. In their theory conclusions are drawn from the principle of the invariant relations to the effect that an actual continuity is assumed in the series of the transformations of the spatial positions. In other words, they speak of an actual ‘all-ness’ (totality) of the changing positions in this series. This conception implies inescapable antinomies. For in the spatial order of time this totality can no more be actually given than in the numerical order the totality of the numbers in an approximative series. The differential and the integral of the series can no longer have original spatial meaning if the latter is considered to be actually continuous. Only in the original modal meaning-aspect of movement can there be any question of an actual continuity of the changes of position. But

in the meaning of original movement there are no really discrete spatial positions.

When theoretical thought tries to conceive the transition of the spatial positions in the series as ‘actually closed’, or ‘continuous’ (the pseudo-concept of a ‘totality of transformations which is dense in every direction’), it again gets involved in the antinomy of ‘actual infinitude’. A real continuity in the transformations would cancel the original meaning of space; but a real reduction of original movement to an infinite series of discrete spatial positions cancels the original meaning of movement.

The logicistical shiftings of meaning in projective geometry.

The logicistical eradication of the modal boundaries between space and movement must be understood as an unwarranted shifting of meaning. The original sense of movement is then identified with the analogical movement of thought which is actually operative in the analysis of the spatial positions.

According to F. Klein all the geometrical transformations resulting from the arbitrary movements of the elements in an ordinary three-dimensional space, form a group.

The ‘movement’ intended here, which overarches the entire series of positions of the ‘group’, is in fact the theoretical movement of thought. This thought conceives the original meaning of space in its anticipatory coherence with the original sense of movement.

This complicated state of things is given a perfectly erroneous interpretation, if it is suggested that the original modal meaning of the static relations of space can be dissolved into a group of “Operationen” (= operations) in the sense of movements of thought.

In mathematics there is a logicistical tendency which poses the dilemma:

One must either acknowledge the purely logical origin of mathematical concepts,—or fall back into the view of space as it is given in sensory experience.

But in this dilemma the cosmological problem of meaning implied in the mathematical concepts, has been obscured fundamentally and essentially.

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1 Einleitung in die höhere Geometrie. II. S. 1 ff.
§ 4 - SOME EXAMPLES OF THE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF LATER MODALITIES OF MEANING, INTENDED TO GIVE AN INSIGHT INTO THE ORDER OF SUCCESSION OF THE LAW-SPHERES.

In the structural analysis of the first three modalities of meaning, although only intended to be of a provisional character, we followed a systematic method. And it needs no further comment that justice can only be done to the method of analysis indicated by applying it systematically.

But if we go on in the same way in our analysis of the later modalities of meaning, the boundaries between the general theory of the modal law-spheres and the special theory will be cancelled, and we shall land in the problems of the 'philosophia specialis'. This would not only far exceed the scope of a general theory, but it would set the reader on a road that he has not yet been prepared for. He would repeatedly come upon general problems that ought first to be looked into in a general theory. He has so far been confronted for example, with the modal subject-object relation and the opening-process in the modal meaning, which will prove to be some of the main themes in the general theory. They demand a separate discussion.

In the present stage our enquiry is exclusively concerned with the task of bringing home to the reader the value of the distinction between the three different kinds of structural moments in the modality of meaning. In this way he may get an insight into the strict cosmic law-conformity of the order of the law-spheres. The reader should constantly keep this in mind in order to understand why in the study of the later modalities of meaning we restrict ourselves to some examples of our structural analysis. Even in this restriction the anticipation of later themes cannot be completely avoided.

Meaning-nucleus and retrocipations in the original modal sense of organic life.

We start with the biotic law-sphere, which proves to be founded in the spheres of number, space, movement, and energy, according to the cosmic order of time. For the modal structure of the biotic aspect cannot exist without these substratum-spheres. The irreducible meaning-nucleus of the biotic law-sphere is life.

Biology can attempt to find specific characteristics of life-phenomena, such as autonomous procreation, preservation of the whole in the continuous change of its parts etc. But these characteristics are related to living beings in their sensible
behaviour. They cannot define life as the irreducible meaning-kernel of the biotic aspect of human experience and empirical reality. This is due to the fact that they are analogical concepts, which presuppose their modal qualification by the irreducible meaning-kernel of the biotic aspect. Life is a fundamental modality, not a concrete phenomenon. It belongs to the fundamental modal horizon of human experience, which lies at the basis of the concrete phenomena considered to be manifestations of life.

Therefore the contest between mechanists and vitalists in biology cannot be decided by experiments. For as soon as we establish the fact that a living being has originated, we appeal to an irreducible modal aspect of experience, and not to phenomena whose scientific interpretation as manifestations of life pre-supposes this fundamental aspect of experience.

Life as such is not perceptible to the eye of sense. It can only manifest itself in sensible phenomena. But this very manifestation cannot be experienced in a merely sensory way. It appeals to the original life-aspect. And the latter cannot transcend human experience since it is one of its fundamental modalities, not a metaphysical substance.

Therefore the mechanistic interpretation of life is the result of a philosophical prejudice, not the outcome of special scientific research. It tries to reduce life in its modal meaning-kernel to another modality of meaning. But at the same time it must appeal to the nucleus of the biotic meaning-aspect as soon as it wishes to establish the presence of life-phenomena.

1 This state of affairs is being more and more acknowledged by students of biology. Wilhelm Tholl in his Allgemeine Biologie (1948 p. 1/2) summarizes the prevailing view as follows. After having remarked that the attempt to reduce biology to physics and chemistry has furnished many contributions to our knowledge of the phenomena of life, he continues: “With respect, however, to the general pretention that in this way we can arrive at a theory of life merely based on the foundations of physics and chemistry, the mechanic conception mentioned has not only failed to stand the test of experience, but it has positively refuted itself. “For the more progress was made with the application of physical and chemical methods on problems of biology, the more clearly it was shown that in this way the essence of life cannot at all be conceived... Much rather we are confronted with an original phenomenon and in perceiving it we enter into a sphere of experience which transcends physics and chemistry.”

In the theory of the modal structures of experience we have only to
This nucleus expresses itself in an organic relation and this organic relation, as a moment of the biotic modality, is a necessary modal retrocipation in its meaning-structure. The reason is that the 'organic' implies the analogy of number, viz. the (biotic) unity in the multiplicity of vital functions.

I must emphatically warn against an identification of organic life as a modality of meaning with a living organism. The latter is a structure of individuality, a typical whole functioning in principle within all the modal aspects alike, though it is typically qualified by the modus of organic living. Its identification with the biotic aspect has caused a lot of disturbance in the discussion between the mechanistic and the vitalistic trends in biology concerning the problem of life. It was to a great extent due to the influence of the metaphysical concept of substance which diverted the attention from the modal horizon of experience. The organic moment in the modal structure of the biotic aspect is not itself an organism, but a modal relation of unity and multiplicity of life functions, a numerical analogy qualified by the meaning-nucleus of this modal aspect. It cannot be lacking in the modal structure of the latter.

Neither can a spatial analogy be wanting in the modal meaning-structure of the biotic law-sphere. Not a single instance of organic life can exist without its biotic space, as the (objective) field of biotical action and reaction, the bio-milieu. This retrocipation refers in the first place to a bio-physical space as an anticipatory function of the field of energy-effects. But it is ultimately founded in the original meaning of extension. There can be no doubt now that this biotic spatial sphere cannot express the original spatial meaning. For we have demonstrated the internal antinomy in the view of 'matter' as the 'filling-up of pure space', and in that of 'movement' as 'space-content'. Consequently, it must be evident that a fortiori biotic effects cannot function within space in its original (pure) sense.

Among the modal retrocipations of the original biotic aspect there must also be an analogy of movement. Organic life can only express itself in 'biotic movement'.

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replace the term 'original phenomenon' in the last sentence by 'original modal aspect'.

1 Cf. my treatise *Het substantiebegrip in de moderne Natuurphilosophie en de theorie van het enkaptisch structuurgeheel* in the quarterly Philosophia Reformata 15 Year, 1950, p. 66—139.

2 Cf. pag. 98—105.
Static rigidity is incompatible with the original meaning of life. But this biotic movement is not movement in the original sense. It is intensive and qualitative development in the organic unity of life, in the temporal order of the biotic law-sphere itself. It is only founded in the original meaning of movement.

Original movement, in its turn, approximates the modal meaning of life in its biotic anticipations. These biotic anticipations cannot be deprived of their original meaning of movement, although they are directed towards organic life (in the transcendental direction of time).

Meanwhile the modal aspect of movement cannot anticipate the modal meaning of life without the intermediary of the aspect of energy. As explained above, energy itself appeals to the original meaning of movement in an analogical moment of its modal structure, viz. that of cause and effect (operation). Energy-movement in the physical-chemical process can manifest itself either with or without an anticipatory direction towards organic life.

Within the inner structure of individuality of a ‘living organism’ the processes of energy-exchange doubtless disclose biotic anticipations realizing themselves under the direction of organic life-impulses.

The organic moment of life itself implies an analogy of energy. It does not only mean a vital unity in a diversity of biotic functions; in addition it is really an organizing biotic energy directing the physical-chemical processes in their anticipatory potencies.

But this state of affairs is completely misinterpreted when life is conceived of as a ‘substance’ (entelechy in H. Driesch) which directs a purely mechanical constellation of matter, closed in itself in the rigid deterministic sense of classical physics. This neo-vitalistic conception involves itself in inner antinomies and cannot account for the inner coherence of meaning of the biotical and the physical aspects of experience.

Life is not a ‘substance’, but a modal function, just like energy. And the latter is not closed in a rigid mechanical-causal coherence, but because of its modal structure it has anticipatory potencies, which are only opened by the directing impulses of the biotic functions.

To ‘biochemistry’, which investigates these anticipatory functions experimentally, (organic) life lies outside the original

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1 This is not the same as Nicolai Hartmann's ontological theory of the
meaning of the physical-chemical field of research. The concept of life here remains a theoretical limiting concept, and it should remain so.

The modal viewpoint of psychology.

The theoretical field of research of the so-called psychological special science will be delimited univocally only, if the view is given up that the “Gegenstand” (= the modal field of research) of this science is to be found in the ‘soul’ as a collective idea of modal functions. The meaning of this idea is not further defined or delimited. Also the metaphysical conception of the ‘psychè’, which more or less still influences psychology, should be relinquished.

The Biblical meaning of the word ‘soul’, where it is used in its pregnant sense of religious centre of human existence, has nothing to do with a theoretically abstracted complex of modal functions. Neither has it anything to do with the metaphysical Greek conception of the psychè. This must be clear to any one who has discovered that the background of all such views is the immanence standpoint in philosophy. The Bible does not theorize at all about the human soul (let alone theorizing from the philosophical immance standpoint).

If in future we speak of a ‘psychic law-sphere’, we mean a modal aspect of human experience, delimited from all the other aspects by its nuclear moment of feeling. The modal meaning-nucleus of feeling is doubtless original in the cosmic-temporal order, i.e. irreducible to other modal meaning-nuclei.

Feeling as a supposed chief class of psychical phenomena, Felix Krueger’s discovery and its interpretation in genetic psychology.

Modern psychology has been led astray by conceiving of feeling as one of the chief classes of ‘Erlebnisse’ and by co-ordinating it with volition and knowing as the two other classes. This misconception is due to the faculty psychology of the XVIIIth century since Rousseau, especially to Tetens and Kant.

It is true that since the decline of this faculty-psychology there
have been discovered some states of affairs which do not agree with this classification.

Especially the German psychologist Felix Krueger, a disciple of Wilhelm Dilthey, has observed that feeling is implied in every 'Erlebnis' as a quality of the totality of our inner experience and that in this totality there is a continuous transition from feeling to the 'differentiated forms of consciousness'. Attention is also paid to the 'universality' of feeling with respect to these states of affairs. But this discovery has been interpreted in the line of a psychologistic transcendental Idea of origin laid at the basis of genetic psychology. Consequently this interpretation within the cadre of genetic psychology has led to the erroneous conclusion that feeling would be the undifferentiated origin of the other 'classes' of 'Erlebnisse' (the noetic and volitional) which were supposed to rise from it through differentiation. This cannot be true. In the footsteps of Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl the 'Erlebnis' is conceived of as an intentional act of human consciousness, in contradistinction to the abstract 'sensation'. Then it must be evident that feeling, unlike volition and knowing, cannot be an act but only a modal aspect of every act. It is correctly defined by James Drever in his Dictionary of Psychology (1952) as 'a general term for the affective aspect of experience', though the adjective 'affective' should be replaced by the more general term 'emotional'.

It is impossible to regard real acts, like the volitional or noetic 'Erlebnisse', as modal aspects of experience. On the contrary, every real act functions necessarily in the integral modal horizon of human experience, which embraces the totality of all the modal aspects. This fact cannot be lost sight of except under the influence of the metaphysical dogma concerning the dichotomy of temporal human existence as a composite of a 'material body' and a 'spiritual soul'. The more modern version of this dichotomistic conception (Max Scheler) speaks of an antithesis between a vital-psyehical sphere and a 'Geist' which can make the former and the entire 'world' to its theoretical 'Gegenstand'. But also this view contradicts the unbreakable meaning-coherence between the aspects.

It is an undeniable fact that in the first life-phase of a suckling baby feeling precedes the first development of logical distinction; the latter precedes the controlling manner of forming sounds, which in its turn precedes the primitive symbolical designation
of concepts by words etc. But that does not prove that the higher mental functions originate from feeling as their undifferentiated origin. Rather it testifies to the truth of our view of the order of the modal aspects of experience, as a real temporal order, related to subjective duration in the genetic process.

The ‘Erlebnisse’ and the modal delimitation of the psychological viewpoint, Erlebnis and behaviour.

If the ‘Erlebnisse’ as real acts of experience imply the whole horizon of modal aspects, it follows that it is impossible to find in them the specific ‘Gegenstand’ of psychology without a delimitation of the specific modal viewpoint from which they are to be examined.

This specific viewpoint cannot be found in the inner subjective character of the ‘Erlebnis’. For the inner character of the latter does not detract from its encompassing the whole horizon of modal aspects\(^1\) and its subjectivity cannot be examined scientifically without its relation to the different modal laws to which it is subjected. In this respect there is no difference between ‘Erlebnisse’ as inner acts of consciousness and external behaviour. The latter cannot be neglected by psychology insofar as it can be an objectively perceptible expression of the intentional direction of the inner act. On the other hand external behaviour in its objective sensory aspect cannot be a real psychological object of research apart from its relation to the subjective inner experience of which it may be an objectively perceptible expression. Behaviourism is not to be regarded as a trend of psychology proper\(^2\). But the point in question remains: What

\(^1\) The modal horizon of human experience corresponds to the modal aspects of empirical reality. Consequently, the inner act of experience as a concrete ‘Erlebnis’ cannot be restricted to its psychic feeling-aspect. This will appear to be the key to the solution of the epistemological problem which we shall discuss in the third part of this Volume.

\(^2\) The thesis that the inner acts of experience cannot be studied by psychology because science is bound to objective sensory phenomena cannot be maintained. We must bear in mind that the aspects of human experience have a modal structure of a universally valid character and that by means of language it is possible to establish a real social contact between our own inner experience and that of our fellow-men. My inner life of experience is not closed within itself. It can only exist in a social exchange of experiences penetrating my own consciousness and sub-consciousness. In a very close community of two persons the inner act-
is the specific modal determination of the field of psychology, if the latter is to be conceived of as a special science and not as a philosophical anthropology, or as a typical total-science in the sense of positive sociology.

Animal psychology and the unity of the psychological viewpoint.

This question urges itself upon us still more stringently, if we consider the fact that psychology is not restricted to human 'Erlebnisse' but that there is also an animal psychology. Animals lack the inner human acts of experience, because the latter are necessarily related to the ego as the transcendent centre of human existence. They lack actual subject-functions within the logical and post-logical modal law-spheres which in every real act of experience are essential. Within these modal aspects they can have only object-functions in the subject-object relation of human experience.

If animal psychology is to be regarded as a real branch of psychology, it must have the same general modal viewpoint as the psychology of human 'Erlebnisse'. This must be clear if it is considered that the unity of the psychological viewpoint is not to be found in typical totality-structures of human experience, but only in a specific modal aspect, which is made the 'Gegenstand' of theoretical thought in its logical function.

This does not detract from the fact that psychology has to examine concrete phenomena which present themselves only within typical structures of individual totality, as for instance life of the one can often be completely open to that of the other so that they penetrate one another mutually and 'flow together'.

That is why the psychological method of 'empathy' into the inner act-life of the other man has a solid foundation in the inner structure of this life.

As to animal feeling, we must observe that it cannot be completely strange to us. In my anthropology, which will be explained in the third volume of my new trilogy *Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy*, I have argued that the act-structure of inner human experience is founded in a lower structure qualified by feeling-drives in which the psychical aspect has not yet opened its anticipatory spheres. In the so-called 'enkaptic structural whole' of the human body this animal structure is bound by the higher act-structure of human experience. Nevertheless, it is continually present as a sub-conscious under-layer of the latter and it can freely manifest itself in certain limiting situations (Grenzsituationen) in which the controlling function of the higher act-life has become inactive. Depth-psychology has been able to lay this bare.

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1 See the preceding note.
human acts of thought and remembering, volitional acts, acts of
fantasy, and so on. But these totality-structures are not to be
viewed as psychological ones if one wants to escape the absoluti-
zation of the psychical viewpoint. They can only express them-
selves in a typical way within the specific modal aspect which
delimits the field of psychology.

This aspect has logical, historical, linguistic, social, economical,
aesthetical, juridical, and moral anticipations. It also anticipates
the ultimate limiting aspect of human experience, that of faith (in
the feeling of confidence and certainty in the faith in God’s
revelation or in the feeling of unbelief, respectively). In other
words, psychology has indeed a modal field of research which
has real universality in its proper sphere.

The volitional, the intellectual, the fantasy-directions of human
act-life, in their individual as well as in their social manifesta-
tions, can all be studied in their psychological aspect.

But psychology cannot exceed the modal boundaries of its
field without entangling itself in an illegitimate ‘psychologism’.

The pseudo-psychological conception of the human
ego and the I-thou relation.

A fortiori the human ego and its relation to other egos cannot
be of a psychical character.

There does not exist a ‘psycho-physical ego’, or a ‘transcen-
dental-logical ego’, or an ‘historical-existential ego’, or an
ego as ‘psychical’ centre of human ‘Erlebnisse’. All these so-
called egos are nothing but idols of an apostate human self-
consciousness. The human ego to which all human experience
is related is one and the same: it transcends all modal functions
and all temporal individuality-structures of human existence
referred to it. It is the single central point of reference for all
of them, but not any science whatever can make it into its
‘Gegenstand’.

When psychology speaks about self-feeling, self-impulse, self-
love or ego-ism, self-preservation, self-control, self-observation
or -introspection and so on, it can mean only psychological phe-
nomena which manifest themselves in a concentric direction to
the ego. But the ego itself escapes every attempt to grasp it in
a psychological view. The human ego expresses itself in the
entire temporal human existence, but it recedes as an intangible
phantom as soon as we try to localize it in our temporal expe-
rience.
The impossibility of a definition of feeling as the meaning-kernel of the psychical aspect. The psychological distinction between 'feelings' and sensations (Empfindungen).

So we must always stress the necessity of a modal delimitation of the psychological field of research.

To my mind the specific aspect embracing the modal viewpoint both of human and animal psychology can be found only within the law-sphere whose modal structure has feeling as its meaning-kernel. I cannot see another possibility unless I can be shown a better way for a truly modal delimitation of the specific psychological viewpoint.

There cannot exist a material criterion oriented to the concrete contents of human experience; for every concrete temporal 'Erlebnis' can be viewed theoretically according to its psychical aspect.

If feeling is the original meaning-kernel of the latter, it must be impossible to define it by means of specific qualities designated by analogical terms. There is a German adage: "Was man nicht definiren kann, das sieht man als ein Fühlen an." [What cannot be defined is called a feeling]. But the same can be said with respect to the meaning-nucleus of every other modal aspect of human experience.

Many psychologists have tried to distinguish feelings from sensations and representations by specific characteristics. In contradistinction to the latter classes of 'Erlebnisse', feelings are supposed to be characterized by their polarity. They lack a spatial character, and their actuality excludes every possibility of reproduction. But these theoretical distinctions, apart from their psychological serviceableness, have nothing to do with feeling as the modal meaning-nucleus of the psychical aspect of experience.

The latter is not a concrete 'Erlebnis' viewed from its psychical aspect; rather it is the nuclear moment of a modal meaning-structure which determines every concrete phenomenon of consciousness functioning in it with respect to its modal-psychical character. In its modal meaning every psychical phenomenon is characterized by this kernel-moment. Sensations (Empfindungen) are 'elementary' subjective feeling-phenomena referring to objective sensory qualities of things or events. They can be moments of the so-called polar feelings of pleasure and pain which project themselves in the sensorily perceived objects.
They can also be experienced in an attitude of indifference. But indifference, too, is a feeling-attitude in its modal psychical sense. Interest and indifference are only complementary manifestations of feeling which can be experienced in a continuous transition.

The retrocipatory structure of the modal feeling-aspect.

The structure of the full psychic modality of meaning, considered from its retrocipatory side, necessarily shows analogies of number, space, movement, energy, and organic life. If we want to analyse these retrocipatory meaning-moments theoretically as sharply as possible, it is necessary to start from the psychic aspect in its unopened, restrictive state, as it is realized in animals.

The so-called ‘higher feelings’ will not be considered for the present. The modal psychic meaning in its merely retrocipatory structure is sensory.

Sensibility is an evident analogy of the biotic meaning of organic life in the modal meaning of feeling. ‘Sensory’ means founded (by the cosmic order) in the biotic modality of meaning¹. ‘of the senses’, and sensory feeling is closely bound up with, and it is a structural meaning-moment in the life of feeling, which is not life in its original modal sense, since it is qualified by the meaning-nucleus of the psychic aspect. Though it is necessarily founded in the biotic aspect, it is not subject to biotical laws, but it has its own psychical law-sphere (cf. the laws of association, the law of the polarity of feelings of pleasure and pain etc.).

Sensory feeling reacts on biotic stimuli but this psychic reaction is never biologically, let alone mechanically, explicable. For the sensory psychic reaction is qualified neither by the original nucleus of the biotic nor by that of the physical meaning-aspect. Sensibility, as a biotic retrocipation in the original modal meaning of feeling, in its turn refers back to an analogy of movement in this modal meaning. Sensory feeling necessarily expresses itself in sensory movements of feeling which are called ‘emotions’. But the concept of ‘emotion’ should not be identified with particular types of psychic movement like the ‘af-

¹ Scheler has tried to conceive the ‘pure essence’ of feeling entirely isolated from the organic meaning of life. This procedure results in the sublimation of the modal meaning of feeling, because the latter only functions in the intermodal coherence of the aspects.
fects', or the 'passions'. Emotion is necessarily founded in the original meaning of movement but only by the intermediary of biotical and physical analogies. Emotional life is immediately founded in organic and physical-chemical processes which in their turn refer back to the original modal meaning of movement. We shall revert to such complications in the meaning-structure.

Behind this modal analogy of movement, however, a spatial analogy and one of number announce themselves in the structure of the psychic modality of meaning.

The subjective sensory feeling of space, the objective sensory picture of space, and the sensory multiplicity (of impressions) will be examined in a later context.

Some examples will now be given of the structural analysis of the normative law-spheres. This will show that here, too, the cosmic order of time guarantees the law-spheres concerned a fixed place, which cannot be ignored by theoretical thought with impunity.

The retrocipatory structure of the logical aspect 1.

It has been repeatedly observed that the nuclear moment in the modal structure of the logical aspect is the analytic mode of distinction. As a meaning-kernel this central structural moment must express itself in a series of retrocipations which guarantee its inner coherence with the preceding modal aspects.

In the first place there is an analogical moment to be found in the logical aspect which, as such, refers back to the psychical sphere. This is the moment of logical apperception which discloses a retrocipatory meaning-coherence with the perceptive mode of experience inherent in feeling. LEIBNIZ was the first thinker who observed this inner coherence between logical apperception and sensory perception. But he interpreted it in the line of his lex continui, a cosmonomic Idea oriented to his discovery of the differential- and integral calculus.

As a matter of fact conceptual apperception in its first primitive or 'restrictive' state is rigidly bound to sensory representation. The analytical relation of identity and diversity is immediately applied to sensory images of things and in these images the logical characteristics are analysed in a primitive way. For

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1 How an actual analysis of the modal structure of the analytical aspect is possible will be explained in more detail in the second part of this Volume.
instance: an animal which has two legs and wings is a bird. A circle is a round thing. Here analytical apperception and sensory feeling-perception seem indeed to pass into one another without sharp limits. Actually the modal boundaries between analytical apperception and sensory perception are implicitly present even in the most primitive concept. They cannot be lost sight of in the analysis of the modal structures without our being involved in theoretical antinomies.

Analytical apperception can only function in the logical life of thought, and here we are confronted with a necessary biotical retrocipation within the modal structure of the logical aspect. The logical life of thought doubtless has a biotic foundation and would be meaningless without this retrocipatory coherence with life in its original modal sense. But it is not reducible to the latter; it is subject to logical and not to biotical laws. It manifests itself in every logical process of thinking, in every act of conceptual analysis, in every logical conclusion.

This biotic analogy in the modal structure of the logical aspect in its turn implies retrocipatory analogies of the physical meaning of energy, of movement, space and number in their original meaning-nuclei.

The analytical principium rationis sufficientis, which rules the logical process of concluding as its norm, is a real analytical principle of causality and shows an inner retrocipatory meaning-coherence with the relation of cause and effect in its original physical sense. This inner coherence urges itself upon human thought to such a degree that in modern philosophy the physical and the logical principles of causality have often been identified.

The empiricist thinker J. Stuart Mill employed the physical concept of causality conceived in the deterministic sense of classical mechanics, in his System of Logic. His theory of causality, called the theory of the condicio sine qua non, was introduced in continental European jurisprudence and was often viewed as an explanation of the logical principle of causality. In the second part of Vol. I, I have outlined the rise and the development of the rationalist identification of physical and logical causality, and the reduction of the latter to the logical principle of contradiction.

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1 Cf. my treatise De modale structuur van het juridisch causaliteitsverbond in the Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, Dl. 13 no. 5 (1950).
Kant made causality into a transcendental logical category implying the 'pure logical' concept of force as its 'predicable'! The real state of affairs is that the analytical relation of grounds and conclusion has a patent analogical character and cannot disclose the original meaning of the causal relation. Its validity is restricted to the logical process of concluding, which is a real analytical movement of thought, a procedere from premises to conclusion. The retrocipatory coherence of the logical meaning-aspect with the modal aspect of movement here discloses itself in an evident manner.

The movement of logical thought doubtless has an analogical character referring back to movement in its original modal sense of extensive flowing.

But at the same time it implies a spatial analogy. The analytical process of thinking pre-supposes an analytical (formal) space. Analytical space is a logical order of co-existence, a logical extension in which every analytical element can be localized.

Without this logical space no single analysis would be possible. It can have different 'analytical dimensions' which are only logical analogies of the original spatial ones. In logical space we synthesize a one- or more dimensional analytical multiplicity to a logical unity. The numerical analogy in this analytical synthesis has been explained in an earlier context. But it is not superfluous to stress the difference between this analytical synthesis and the inter-modal synthesis of meaning executed in theoretical thought. The former is only the analytical aspect of the latter. The consequences of this distinction will be explained in more detail in the third part of this volume.

The anticipatory structure of the logical aspect. Historical, linguistic and social anticipations.

In pre-theoretical thought the logical aspect is only actualized in its retrocipatory structure examined above. Here it manifests itself in a merely restrictive function. In theoretical thought, however, it opens its anticipatory spheres. The first anticipation which discloses itself in this opening-process is an historical one, viz. that of logical control or mastery. In our introductory examination of the analogical basic concepts we have remarked that the terms mastery, control or command have different meanings. But the fundamental signification appeared to be cultural authority over persons or things corresponding to a controlling manner of form-giving according to a
free project. In this original sense it appeared to be used in the science of history, where it needs no further modal qualification.

In the light of our later examinations concerning the modal meaning-structures this is a strong indication that the term control designates the original meaning-kernel of the historical aspect. When in the continuation of our inquiry we shall be engaged in a closer analysis of the modal structure of this aspect, it will appear that this presumption is justified. Provisionally it will be assumed that it is correct.

In theoretical thought we are obliged to give logical form to our concepts and judgments, and because here our analytical activity displays a systematic character we indeed acquire logical control or mastery over our field of inquiry. Pre-theoretical analysis in its unsystematic character remains strictly bound to the sensory images of feeling-perception and shows a rigid uniformity in the course of time. Theoretical logic, on the other hand, has an historical development because it develops power in the process of a free shaping of the human mind.

But the opening of the historical anticipation in the modal structure of the analytical function is not possible without the opening of its linguistic anticipatory sphere. If theoretical thought is to elevate itself to systematic control over its material, it must free itself from the shackles of sensory images and direct itself to general symbols. Theoretical logic discloses a logical symbolism which replaces the sensory images by general signs only representing the abstract terms of analytical relations; it anticipates the lingual symbolism in its analytical process of thought.

Symbolic logic has developed this analytical symbolism to a high degree of perfection. But we must stress the necessity of a clear distinction between logical symbolism in its anticipatory analytical meaning and symbolic denotation in its linguistic sense. The former is not identical with linguistic symbolism but only an anticipatory function of analysis. In the theoretical act of thought logical symbolism cannot be actualized without the means of abstract symbols. But the latter are not themselves logical concepts and analytical relations; they can only denote them in a linguistic sense. Logical symbolism makes the analytical activity explicit, whereas pre-theoretical analysis remains implicit in sensorily founded representations.
The economic anticipation in the modal meaning of logical analysis.

In the opening-process of the logical law-sphere we also detect a modal anticipation of the original modal meaning of the economic law-sphere in the so-called economy of thought. A better term would be ‘analytical economy’. This meaning-figure has been mentioned in our introductory consideration of the analogical basic concepts. Just like the other moments of the modal structure, analytical economy reveals itself both on the law-side of the sphere (the principle of economy of thought) and on the subject-side (the logical-economic activity of thinking subjected to this principle). It is doubtless a modal anticipation, not a retrocipation. In other words, the economic law-sphere is founded in the logical sphere and not the other way round. This appears convincingly from the fact that the meaning-moment of logical economy can only function in deepened, theoretical thought. In pre-theoretical logical thought — rigidly bound in its analysis to its sensory substratum of feeling as it is — analytical economy cannot develop because the pre-theoretical concept is not systematic.

The principle of economy of thought has played an important part in western logic. It was known, though not explicitly formulated, in Greek thought.

ARISTOTLE appealed to it in his critique of the Platonic Ideas. Especially in medieval and modern nominalism this principle has been given its logical formulation.

OCCAM formulated it in his well-known adage: ‘Principia prae-ter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda.’

It must be clear that both logical control and logical symbolism require economy of thought, and that the latter appeals to the two former. But it must be denied that logical economy would be nothing but an application of the general economic principle.

1 Probably the older ‘objectivistic’ formulation of this principle in economic theory has favoured its elevation to a general teleological standard of rational human activity. In this formulation it gave only expression to the striving after the highest result at the smallest costs.

This was the formulation of the technical-economic principle of efficiency rather than of the economic principle proper. It lacked the very moment of the alternative destination of scarce goods for the different needs after a scale of urgency, which is essential in a sparing administering of economic goods proper.

The theory of limiting profit has intended to give a better formulation to the principle concerned. But in accordance with its subjectivistic con-
to human thought and that it would embrace the single task and
ideal of scientific activity.

MACH and AVENARIUS have absolutized this principle and therefore
lost sight of its real place in the modal structure of the logical
aspect and overlooked its analogical character. They have
neglected its analytical qualification. The same must be said
with reference to W. JAMES' eulogy of the economy of thought
according to which the tendency to frugality, viz. to frugality
with respect to the means of thought, would be the philosophical
impulse 'par excellence'.

This absolutizing of the principle should be seen in close connec-
tion with the pragmatistic conception of scientific truth.

KANT was certainly no pragmatist, and he saw clearly that
economy of thought pre-supposes transcendental conditions of
knowledge. Nevertheless in his Critique of Pure Reason he speaks
about the 'economizing of principles' as 'a law which is not
only an economical principle of human reason, but rather an
inner law of nature'. Here, too, the specific logical character of
the principle is completely overlooked.

An accurate analysis of the modal structure of the logical
aspect is necessary if we want to acquire a clear insight into its
true meaning and the boundaries of its applicability.

The principle of economy in its logical qualification pre-
ception of economic value, it gave a circumscription which was psycho-
logical rather than economical.

See on this subject: PREISER, Das Rationalprinzip in der Wirtschaft und
Wirtschaftspolitik (Jahrbücher f. Nat. Ökonomie, Bnd. 168, 1943; MARCHAL,
Gegenstand und Wesen der Wirtschaftswissenschaft (Zeitschr. f. d. ge-
samte Staatswissenschaft Bnd, 106, 1950); MICHAEL KROLL, Das Rätsel
"Volkswirtschaft" (Schmollers Jahrbuch f. Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und
Volkswirtschaft, 73. Jrg. 3e Heft 1953, p. 1 fl.); and especially the great
work of the Dutch economist P. HENNIPMAN, Economisch Motief en Eco-
nomisch Principe (1943), who denies that the principle in its proper
economical sense has any real signification in economic theory (p.
355 fl.). But this author has arrived at this negative conclusion, because
he supposed it could not account for the factual behaviour of man in
economic affairs. He observes that also irrational economic behaviour is
a real economic activity. This is doubtless right but does not derogate
from the fact that it can be an un-economical behaviour. The latter, too,
has a modal economic meaning. The principle of economy proper cannot
have a causal psychological, but only a normative economical sense.

1 This is also the objection raised by M. SCHLICK against the conception
of MACH and AVENARIUS. He, too, has stressed the logical character of the
principle.
supposes the general logical principles implied in the retrocipatory structure of the analytical law-sphere: those of identity, contradiction and the sufficient ground. Analytic economy can only deepen their modal meaning but becomes meaningless apart from them.

Especially in jurisprudence the principle of economy is often abused to justify the introduction of theoretical fictions which must mask the antinomies caused by the misinterpretation of the juridical basic concepts.

E.g., the figure of the legal person is called a fiction or an artificial construction, because only natural persons are supposed to have a will. But the fact is lost sight of that the concept of the legal subject as such is a concept of a modal function and may never be identified with a real person. In other words, if the juristic person (corporation) is called a fiction, the legal subjectivity of a natural person should be called so as well.

The misconception of this state of affairs began with the introduction of a psychological concept of will. The latter is unserviceable in theoretical jurisprudence because the juridical aspect of volition is different from the psychological one. Even to a natural person we cannot ascribe a will in the psychological sense, when we are theoretically confronted with his function as a juristic subject. One should be aware that the legal concept of will is an analogical basic concept of jurisprudence which can only have a modal-juridical meaning, though it may not be conceived apart from its inter-modal coherence with the psychological concept of volition.

When it is alleged that the ‘psychological will’ is the only real one, we must reply that no single special science, aware of its boundaries, can pretend that its special theoretical viewpoint is capable of embracing ‘reality’ in an integral sense.

What is called ‘psycho-physical reality’ is an absolutized theoretical abstraction which has eliminated the entire series of normative aspects of human experience and consequently has no room for the normative juridical sphere.

Since the modal juristic meaning of volition cannot be eliminated from the juridical aspect it was called a fiction of ‘legal technique’ which finds its justification only in the principle of economy of thought.

The famous German jurist Rudolph von Jhering held this technique to be the highest development of legal science, though in his last period he has abandoned this view.
This conception is based upon a twofold misinterpretation of the principle concerned. In the first place the fact is overlooked that it can have only a theoretical-logical character; merely technical fictions can never be ‘economical’ in a logical, but only in a technical sense. Legal technique concerns the formation of law, not legal theory. In the second place the fact is lost sight of that the logical principle of economy because of its analytic character does not permit itself to be employed apart from the principle of the sufficient ground. In its theoretical application it cannot derogate from the primordial scientific requirement to account for the states of affairs met with in the specific modal field of research. It can only imply that this requirement ought to be satisfied in a logical economical way, with the elimination of really superfluous grounds. Theoretical fictions, however, which are introduced in order to mask antinomies caused by a fundamental misinterpretation of the legal basic concepts, can never be justified by means of this anticipatory logical principle.

At present von Jhering’s view of the juristic technique is no longer generally accepted.

In the footsteps of the French jurist François Geny many modern students of jurisprudence make a sharp distinction between juridical science and juridical technique and deny that in the former fictions may be justified.

But now they have entangled themselves in another misunderstanding of the task of science. According to them, legal science would have to reduce the juristic basic concepts, wrongly conceived by them as ‘technical fictions’, to the ‘only real physico-psychical states of affairs’. The principle of economy of thought was only accepted with respect to legal technique in which, as we saw, it cannot play any rôle.

This may suffice to establish our statement that only an accurate analysis of the modal structure of the logical aspect and

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1 When v. Jhering in his famous Geist des römischen Rechtes (Volume II) argues that the juristic conception of the ‘res’ or of personality is nothing but an artificial expanding of the natural naive concept of a thing or a person respectively, he falls a victim to a fundamental misunderstanding of the relation between naive experience and theoretical thought. He overlooks the fact that the modal legal concepts of object and subject cannot be artificial expansions of the natural idea of a thing, since they refer only to modal functions, not to concrete things. A human person is never identical with his juristic subject-function. He can only have the latter. And the same holds with respect to the relation of a concrete thing to its juristic function as an object.
that of its theoretical 'Gegenstand' can guarantee a correct insight into the meaning of the principle concerned.

Linguistic economy as an economic anticipation in the modal meaning-aspect of symbolic signification. The 'Aktionsarten' (the 'characters' and 'aspects') and the structure of primitive verbal languages.

The modal structure of the lingual aspect can also express its meaning-coherence with the economical sphere only in its anticipatory moments.

Linguistic economy wards off the superfluous in symbolic signification, but, as we remarked in our introductory examination, it is not yet found in the closed, retrocipatory structure of language. This appears clearly and convincingly in the language of primitive gestures, which can do nothing but point out every intended object separately. Mimic gestures show a deepening of meaning; they also show some symbolic economy instead of the merely deictic function of primitive gestures.

In addition there is a tendency to an ever increasing degree of 'economization' in the aspect of symbolic signification at the higher stages of historical development. This becomes evident if we compare modern and primitive verbal languages. The structure of the latter is closely bound up with the structure of primitive (not yet 'opened') thought.

Primitive speeches often have an extremely rich vocabulary, but they lack the capacity to express abstract and general relations and states of affairs. The discovery of the so-called 'Aktionsarten' and 'aspects' has brought to light that in the development of the Indo-European verbal languages the flexional endings added to the same verb-stem to denote the abstract meaning of external time, viz. the past, the present, and the future, must have been preceded by the distinction of

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1 The term 'lingual', as a general modal qualification of the aspect of symbolic signifying, is not adequate. It is used only for lack of a better adjective in the English language, denoting the general modal character of the aspect concerned.


3 Translator's note: They are called characters, because they denote intrinsic characteristics (and not subjective appreciations of the stage of development) of an action, a state, or an occurrence. Aspects express a subjective appreciation of the stage of development of an action, state or occurrence. Cf. E. Krusinga, A Handbook of Present-Day English, vol. II, pp. 232 ff.; H. Jacobssohn, Gnomon II, 379 ff.; Prof. Dr N. v. Wijk, Nieuwe Taalgids, October 1928.
the internally-qualitative kinds of time of the concrete actions and occurrences, in which the temporal aspect was expressed by different stems. The stem of the verb 'to arrive' expresses perfective aspect, i.e. an action that comes to an end. The stem of the verb 'to begin' denotes inchoative aspect, that of the verb 'to remain' denotes durative aspect. The Latin verbal forms: fero, tuli, latum, go back to different stems denoting different 'Aktionsarten' (or rather 'aspects').

It is assumed that the use of the forms to denote differences of 'aspect', i.e. of internal time, has been superseded by an abstract scheme of chronological time-indications as a result of a systematic tendency in linguistic development.

It is obvious that this development is bound to bring about a large measure of economy in the way time is linguistically signified. This process must be connected with the increasing ability of thought to shake off the shackles of the sensory image-world to which it was rigidly tied down at the primitive stage in the formation of concepts.

American native speeches show that the qualitative concrete manner of signifying time and place is more original than the abstract, symbolically economical method.

The artificial languages (esperanto, volapück, etc.) are examples of a deliberate tendency to economize. In another respect the language of science, too, shows its economic anticipations, and at the same time it anticipates the juridical aspect because it requires its symbols to be univocal as a condition of justice in scientific intercourse and discussion.

The economic retrocipation in the aesthetic meaning-aspect. The ἵππος Ἰββαρ.

In the modal meaning of the logical law-sphere and in that of language the expression of the cosmic coherence of meaning with the economic aspect appeared to be found only in the anticipatory spheres. But in the modal structure of the aesthetic and

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1 Translator's note: Or it denotes the result of an action, etc.; hence the final stage; the inchoative aspect denotes the initial stage; the imperfective or durative aspect denotes the going on of an action. An example of a genuine 'character' is the verb 'to tremble', which is called 'frequentative' in character. The form: — He was trembling — has both durative aspect and frequentative character. Cf. E. Krueisinga, op. cit. pp. 230 ff.

2 The treatise Die Bildung der Tempora und Modi im Griechischen und Lateinischen (Sprachvergleichende Beiträge I, 1846), by S. G. Curtius was basic for the theory of the "Aktionsarten".
the juridical aspects this cosmic coherence with the economic sphere is expressed in the retrocipatory direction. The nuclear moment of the aesthetic aspect is harmony in its original sense, a modal meaning-moment found in all the other law-spheres only in an unoriginal, retrocipatory or anticipatory function (cf. harmony of feeling, logical-harmony, harmony in social intercourse, linguistic harmony, economic and juridical harmony, etc.). This aesthetic nuclear meaning cannot express itself in the modal structure of the aspect concerned without an economic retrocipation, which may be qualified as aesthetic economy. The aesthetically superfluous, the ‘piling it on’, the ‘overdoing it’, ought to be warded off in harmonic sobriety or economy if the harmony is to remain intact. And this standard is applied not only to a highly cultured work of art but also to a primitive product, because the aesthetic modality of meaning is not possible without economic retrocipation. What is sometimes called aesthetic exuberance or luxuriance is not meaningless in an aesthetic sense provided it is not in conflict with the basic modal principle of aesthetic economy.

This ‘aesthetic exuberance’ is not really ‘superabundant’. It is no overabundance in the sense of ‘disharmony’ but the harmoniously-economic adaptation of the artistic expression to the aesthetic experience of the artist.

In its original meaning harmony always requires aesthetic unity in multiplicity on its law-side, in which the 

μοήν ἀγαρ, (nothing to excess) notwithstanding the change of period in history, is of unassailable modal validity.

Only an irrationalist view of aesthetic, denying that an artistic genius is bound by laws and proclaiming him sovereign creator can repudiate this basic principle in the original meaning of harmony. A truly Christian aesthetics can never absolutize the individual aesthetic subjectivity and make it a sovereign creator of beauty not bound by norms of the Divine world-order. A Christian aesthetics will be the first to acknowledge the inspired artist's genius as an individual gift of God. It will be whole-heartedly hostile to rationalistic aesthetics. But it cannot give in to the "προφητεία" of an aesthetic irrationalism that denies any subjection to norms to be incumbent on the artist and works of art.

Such a denial would spell apostasy from the Christian basic Idea. In the Prolegomena we saw that such a view of aesthetics must cancel itself on account of its intrinsic contradiction. An aesthetic subjectivity without any determination by an aesthetic
The General Theory of the Modal Spheres

norm would be an absolutely chaotic, hence a meaningless, impossible \( \eta \theta \iota \iota \theta \iota \) which could no longer be called ‘aesthetic’ with any semblance of truth. Only a law can determine and delimit. The absolutely indeterminate cannot be determined by the \textit{aesthetic} modality.

The modal meaning-kernel of the juridical aspect.

So it appeared that in the Divine world-order the aesthetic law-sphere is founded in the economic sphere. The original aesthetic modal meaning cannot exist without an economic retrocipation. The juridical modal meaning also necessarily has an economic retrocipation in its internal structure. As will be shown later on, this analogy cannot occur without its modal coherence with an aesthetic one. The general character of this complication cannot be further investigated as yet.

But what is the modal meaning-nucleus of the experiential aspect concerned? It is very difficult to render the original kernel of the juridical modality of meaning by a satisfactory term. In the first (Dutch) edition of this work I chose the word retribution (Dutch: \textit{vergelding}, German: \textit{Vergeltung}). This term was used in the pregnant sense of an irreducible mode of balancing and harmonizing individual and social interests. This mode implies a standard of proportionality regulating the legal interpretation of social facts and their factual social consequences in order to maintain the juridical balance by a just reaction, viz. the so-called legal consequences of the fact related to a juridical ground. As is easily seen, this provisional explanation of the term appeals to a complex of analogical terms. The modal meaning-kernel proper is not explained by this circumscription.

In itself this is not surprising. For in every previous analysis of a modal structure we were confronted with the same state of affairs. It is the very nature of the modal nucleus that it cannot be defined, because every circumscription of its meaning must appeal to this central moment of the aspect-structure concerned. The modal meaning-kernel itself can be grasped only in an immediate intuition and never apart from its structural context of analogies.

But the term by which this meaning-kernel is designated must be able immediately to evoke this intuition of the ultimate irreducible nucleus of the modal aspect of experience concerned.

In jurisprudence, however, the original modal meaning of the word ‘retribution’ has been often wrongly restricted to criminal
law, i.e. to a typical manifestation of its general modal sense. And at the same time this concept has become the subject of a vehement contest between the so-called classical school in the theory of criminal law and the modern criminological trends. According to the latter the idea of retribution is nothing but a residue of the unreasonable instinct of revenge; it impedes a rational treatment of criminality. The classical school, on the other hand, handled a rigid conception of penal retribution which only left room for an abstract delict and eliminated the person of the delinquent and his social environment.

It must be evident that if retribution is to be considered as the nuclear meaning of the juridical aspect, it must be detached from this typical controversy in a special branch of jurisprudence. Retribution is not only exercised in malam but also in bonam partem. Its modal legal measure of proportionality can be applied to every possible legal consequence (Dutch: rechtsgevolg) connected with any juristic fact.

The only material question is: Does this term indeed evoke the intuition of the irreducible meaning-kernel of the juristic aspect in its general structure?

**Leo Polak's inquiry into the meaning of the term retribution.**

The famous Dutch philosopher and jurist Leo Polak, a disciple of Heymans, has devoted a special inquiry to the signification of this term in Indo-Germanic and Semitic languages in his work: *De Zin der Vergelding*, Vol. I (Amsterdam 1921), Sect. 1, Ch. II. He did not intend to conceive of retribution as the qualifying meaning-moment of the juridical aspect; his aim was only to treat it in the context of the theory of criminal law. Nevertheless, he begins with the statement that the term is also used to denote a reaction in bonam partem, viz. remuneration or recompense. According to him, the term in its general sense denotes merely a reaction in social life. Only in its strict sense of *just* retribution, or retribution *proper*, it necessarily implies the standard of proportionality or equivalency. In criminal law this signifies that punishment must be *deserved* pain, that the criminal gets his due in it. But also with respect to a contractual remuneration or recompense, retribution, in its pregnant sense, implies this requirement that it must be deserved, that it is a determination in a super-arbitrary way of the (juridical) value of the deed upon which it is intended to react.
Another essential implication of the pregnant meaning of the term, according to Polak, is to be found in its being a reaction corresponding to egoistic motives. When we say that virtue or vice deserve praise and blame respectively, this is not meant in the strict sense of retribution proper: retributive consequences of the deed are deserved only once. It would be unreasonable to demand the due recompense or punishment for one and the same fact twice. Ethical praise or blame, on the contrary, are deserved continually. This refers to a different function of retributive and ethical reaction. The former means an acquittance, a mutual discharge of debt.

This would be the very reason why most terms denoting a retributive reaction are taken from economic life.

Retribution and economical life.

If this latter observation were right, the term retribution should be positively rejected as a denotation of the original meaning-kernel of the juridical aspect.

For in this case it could have only an analogical sense when referring to jural relations. But here Polak has overlooked the fact that the very implication of a deserved reaction excludes an original economical meaning of the term. In an economical sense wage is only the price of labour, not the indebted recompense of the latter. An analogical meaning can be ascribed only to the juristic term 'equivalency' or 'proportionality', not to the term 'retributive' in its pregnant use. The latter is the proper juridical qualification of the former.

It is true that the Dutch words 'vergelding' and 'vergoeding' cohere with 'geld' (money) and 'goed' (good). Nevertheless, at least in scientific language, the term 'vergelding' itself lacks an original economical meaning.

Rather in a pregnant way it designates the irreducible meaning-kernel of what is signified by the words добр, jus, justice, recht, diritto, droit, etc. For this very reason it can be used in jurisprudence without a general modal juridical qualification, although indeed the typical penal meaning of the word is preponderant.

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1 In a later context Polak has explained the essential difference between criminal legal and economic equivalence. Nevertheless, he speaks of 'indebted' wage in purely economic relations though he puts 'indebted' between inverted commas.
It is this inner nuclear meaning of the juridical aspect of experience which from the very beginning has struck the human mind, before philosophical thought had found the methodical way to define things by their genus proximum and differentia specifica. The latter method of analysis was introduced by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle and applied to the definition of justice. Then the intuitive insight into this modal meaning-kernel was theoretically replaced by analogical concepts detached from the inner meaning-coherence within the modal structure of the legal aspect. For it has appeared that this method is unserviceable in the analysis of the modal structures of meaning.

Justice as *suum cuique tribuere* and the older cosmological conception of retribution. Dikè, Anangkè, Rita and Tao.

Nevertheless, the whole Greco-Roman, patristic and medieval scholastic tradition preserved some intuitive insight into the retributive character of justice in its strict juridical sense. The characterization of the latter as *suum cuique tribuere* is based upon an older cosmological conception of justice whose retributive meaning cannot be doubted.

The very earliest reflection on justice in its strict sense has found retribution as its 'essence'. The old Ionian philosophers of nature, Heraclitus, the Pythagorean thinkers as well as old Indian philosophy, have stressed this meaning. It is true that they expanded justice to a general cosmic order of causality and consequently lacked the insight into the modal boundaries of the juridical aspect. But it should not be forgotten that the cosmic order of time itself guarantees the inner coherence of meaning between the juridical aspect and all the other modal law-spheres. It is, consequently, not surprising that the earliest conception of a causal order in nature was inspired by the idea of justice in its original retributive sense, which in the social order urged itself upon the human mind.

The rigid and merciless character of this conception was only due to the fact that it was ruled by a pagan religious motive which led to a deification of the forces of nature not yet opened by human culture. Their retributive operation was viewed as an inescapable necessity. Heraclitus (B. Fragm. 94) says that Dikè which prevents Helios (the sun) from exceeding its measures is assisted by the ἔγνωρες, i.e. the daughters of the inescapable Anangkè. According to Parmenides Being is bound to its
spherical form by the Dikè and the latter is identified with the 'powerful Anangkè'.

The same identification of retributive justice in the order of nature and inescapable necessity is found in the old-Indian conception of Rita explained in the Veda and in the old-Chinese idea of Tao.

Retribution and love in the Christian religion.

As soon, however, as the modal structure of the juridical aspect opens its anticipatory spheres, its retributive meaning-kernel loses these rigid and merciless traits without abandoning its irreducible character.

In its concentric relation to the revelation of Divine Justice in the cross of Christ, it appears to be nothing but a temporal creaturely refraction of meaning of the Divine fulness of Love which is the fulfilment of Justice.

The fact that every human execution of retribution is deformed by sin does not imply that the juridical aspect in the retributive kernel of its modal meaning-structure is of a sinful character. On the contrary, it will appear from our further examinations that in the temporal cosmic order retribution is the irreplaceable foundation of love in its modal moral sense. Only from the modal meaning-structure of the juridical aspect with its indelible retributive nuclear moment can an imperfect and sinful human legal order derive its juridical character and its claim to respect.

A positive legal order is only possible within this structural cadre of meaning. Every attempt to define the juridical nature of positive law by means of external purely phenomenal characteristics moves in a vicious circle.

The retributive character of every juridical relation.
Retribution and ultra vires. The retributive meaning of rights.

The retributive mode of ordering social relations is not restricted to the narrow boundaries of penal law and private contracts.

As has been said, every really juridical relation whatever discloses this modal meaning-kernel, which urges itself upon us as soon as we analyse its modal structure.

The delimitation of legal spheres of competency also has a

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1 Cf. C. Chardon's treatise Themis in Phil. Ref. 7th Year (1942), p. 6 ff.
necessarily retributive character in its juridical consequences.

Retributive justice, as Heraclitus and Parmenides have rightly observed, reacts against every 'ultra vires'. It binds every legal power and subjective right to its limits. This is to say that also the attributive-imperative function in which the Russian jurist Petraczicky sought the ultimate distinctive trait of law, in the last analysis is qualified by the retributive meaning-kernel. Apart from the latter it has no specific juridical sense.

Within the modal aspect of social intercourse we meet with privileges attributed by convention to the higher classes; they lack every juridical sense. When, however, the attributive character of law is sought in its attribution of rights, competences, and claims balanced by duties, then the term 'attributive' ought to be taken in a retributive sense.

Does retribution essentially imply a reaction corresponding to egoistic motives? Retribution and altruism.

Polak's opinion is that the pregnant meaning of retribution essentially implies a reaction corresponding to egoistic feeling-motives. But this view requires correction. Retribution in its pregnant original modal sense cannot react upon egoistic motives in their psychological sense, since it is not a feeling-drive. Rather it is the specific juristic modality of balancing and harmonizing social relations; it characterizes the juristic manner of interpreting social facts and their factual effects; it qualifies the juridical manner of reaction against every fact which affects this balance, viz. by requiring harmonizing consequences and redress in the case of wrong or ultra vires. In this sense it also determines the specific juristic manner of reacting against excessive factual manifestations of altruism, which threaten the juridical balance of social interests; for instance gifts prejudicing the juridical interests of creditors or legitimate children.

Our conclusion is that we can find no better term to designate the original meaning-kernel of the juridical law-sphere than retribution. Consequently we shall continue to use it.

No single analogical meaning-moment or complex of analogical meaning-moments by which legal philosophy and the general theory of law have tried to replace it, can satisfy the requirement of a real modal definition.

Such concepts as 'equality', 'proportion', 'compulsory order of communal life', etc., are unqualified analogical concepts,
from which the original meaning-nucleus of the juristic aspect has been eliminated. The moment of equality ( \( \tau \delta \lambda o\nu \) ) to which ARISTOTLE already tried to reduce the meaning of justice in its strict sense is only a mathematical analogy in the meaning of retribution. This is clear in ARISTOTLE's further differentiation of the principle of equality into arithmetical and geometrical proportions.

The modal meaning-kernel of retribution is indeed an abstraction in itself. It can reveal its modal meaning only in the coherence with quite a series of retrocipatory moments reflecting the cosmic coherence between the juridical aspect and its substratum spheres. But it qualifies the latter and not vice versa.

Aesthetic, economic, and social analogies in the modal structure of the juridical aspect.

The first modal retrocipsations expressing the original meaning-nucleus are the aesthetic and the economic analogies. They will be studied a little more closely in this context. In its modal nature retributive meaning must express itself on its law-side in a well-balanced harmony of a multiplicity of interests, warding off any excessive actualizing of special concerns detrimental to others. The multiplicity of interests mentioned should be subjected to a balanced harmonizing process in the modal meaning of retribution. The aesthetic and the economic analogies are unbreakably connected with a modal social retrocipation \(^1\), expressed in a strict correlation between communal interests and those of inter-individual relationships in juridical intercourse.

In a 'community' the juridical subjects are united into a solidary, institutional or associational whole according to relations of authority and subjection \(^2\). In the inter-individual relations, on the other hand, the juridical subjects are co-ordinated, and not grouped into a solidary unity according to relations of authority and subjection.

The modal meaning of retribution on the law-side is expressed in the juridical aspect first of all in a balanced harmonizing of

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\(^1\) 'Social' here means: referring to the modal aspect of human intercourse. Juridical intercourse (Dutch: rechtsverkeer) is only an analogy of intercourse (Dutch: omgang) in its original meaning.

\(^2\) Only the natural community implied in the larger circle of natural kinship (which should be sharply distinguished from artificial organisations like sibs or clans) lacks natural relations of authority and subjection.
communal and inter-individual interests, warding off any excessive, extravagant enforcement of special communal or inter-individual claims.

The analogical meaning-moments, laid bare here, express their cosmic coherence with the modal structures of the aesthetic, the economic and the social law-spheres as retrocclusions, not as anticipations. This implies that the juridical law-sphere is necessarily founded in the aesthetic and the economical aspects and in the modal aspect of social intercourse. This fact is convincingly proved by the character of the most primitive juridical systems of law. As a rule, these systems do not show a trace of anticipatory functions in the meaning of retribution. And yet in primitive law retribution expresses itself in anaphoric meaning-moments referring to the aesthetic, the economic, and the social spheres. Also in its as yet non-anticipatory form the modal meaning of retribution appeals to harmony, the economic principle, and social intercourse (all these taken in their original modal nuclear meanings) as its necessary substrata. This is the reason why even primitive retribution, in its special expression of harmonizing reaction against injustice, is something quite different from the expression of a psychic feeling of revenge which is blind to the meaning of justice.

In the primitive tribal-laws excess in this reaction is excluded by a doubtless rude standard of proportion, viz. the principle of talion or fixed tariffs of composition.

The legal consequences of a juridical fact are weighed against the juridical grounds in the harmonizing of communal and inter-individual interests while warding off excess. This happens even though there is no knowledge of the theoretical concepts of juridical fact, juridical ground and juridical effects; and although the entire procedure in which retributive harmony is realized bears an extremely primitive character.

This undeniable state of affairs, briefly mentioned in the introduction to this chapter as a philosophical problem, has now found its explanation by means of the theory of the modal structures of meaning. It is bound up with the position of the juridical aspect in the cosmic order of time.

The current modern view, according to which retribution is nothing but an expression of the primitive instinct of revenge,

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1 This difference is not affected by the undifferentiated character of primitive society.
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proves to be untenable as soon as the real meaning of this modal nucleus of law in the intermodal coherence of the aspects is laid bare.

The lingual analogy in the modal meaning-structure of retribution,

A continued analysis of the modal structure of the juridical aspect shows that the latter must also have a lingual substratum. The economic, aesthetic, and social reticulations in the retributive modality necessarily appeal to a lingual analogy.

The analogy meant here gives clear expression to the fact that juridical relations are only possible when signified.

The smashing of a window-pane, the getting into a public means of conveyance, can only function in the legal aspect of temporal reality because they have a juridical signification as a delict, and as an indirect expression of the intention to make an agreement of conveyance respectively. And these legal significations are necessarily founded in the original meaning of symbolic signification (= language). The latter is by no means restricted to verbal language. It may be expressed in all kinds of forms of symbolic designation: in the expression of the face, in a waving of the hand, in written symbols, signals, flags etc.

This is a point that will be made clear after the more detailed discussion of the modal subject-object relation.

The juridical signification as a signified meaning is not qualified by the original meaning-nucleus of language, but by that of retribution. It is a necessary lingual analogy in the modal structure of the juridical aspect. The question, e.g., whether the absence of a so-called ‘customary stipulation’ in a written agreement may be interpreted as a silent acceptance of this stipulation by both parties, is a juridical question, not one of language. The signified juridical meaning of every juridical fact and of every positive juridical norm must be determined by means of a juridical interpretation. Juridical and linguistic interpretation may never be identified, though they cannot occur apart from each other. Through lack of insight into the intermodal meaning-relations between the linguistic and the jural aspect this mistake is often made in legal theories of interpretation.

Jurists have always considered the truly juridical interpretation as belonging to the juridical domain, and rightly so. They have never dreamt of relinquishing it to linguistics, just as theologians have never relinquished their truly theological interpre-
tation to the linguists. The original juridical interpretation is primarily a part of the process of law-making in a concrete case, and not of theoretical jurisprudence. The latter can only analyse the principles and method of legal exegesis and interpret the legal norms and facts theoretically after these scientific standards. Juristic life, however, does not allow of an ultimate divergence in the juridical interpretation of norms and facts. It demands a decision which puts an end to uncertainty. A truly binding interpretation can be given by competent legal organs exclusively. If a judge interprets a juristic fact or a legal provision he thereby enacts positive law binding in concreto on the parties concerned, provided that his sentence has been brought to execution.

But the theoretical jurist as such is not competent to give a binding juridical interpretation. His interpretative activity remains of a theoretical juridical nature. It may have a very great de facto influence on the legal praxis on account of the scientific authority of the writer. In view of the increasing complexity of legal relations the scientific theoretical analysis of the juristic meaning of norms and facts is becoming more and more indispensable as a basis for a binding juridical interpretation. But in itself it has no binding legal character. This state of things has been misinterpreted by the Historical School, which wrongly elevated theoretical jurisprudence itself to the rank of a source of law. It must be granted that this misconception was due to Puchta more than to v. Savigny. Nevertheless, von Savigny made classical the erroneous conception that looked upon juridical interpretation proper as something essentially theoretical. He held that it ought to be executed according to grammatical, logical, historical and systematic viewpoints. The specific juridical viewpoint was lost sight of. His theory of interpretation is one of the causes of the error prevailing in jurisprudence up to our days that juridical interpretation can only be applied to verbal expressions of the will in legal texts, contracts and testaments.

But the structural analysis of the modal juristic meaning shows that nothing can be understood in its juridical aspect — not even an objective juridical fact like the burning down of a house — if it is not interpreted according to its juridical signification. In the latter there is no original lingual sense but only a necessary lingual analogy.

Linguistic interpretation is indeed the basis for juridical interpretation, but the former cannot express the original modal meaning of the latter.
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The lingual analogy in the modal aesthetic meaning.

If it is true that a lingual analogy is essential to the modal meaning-structure of the juristic aspect, then it is implicitly admitted that in the original modal meaning of harmony there is necessarily also a lingual analogy. For it has appeared that the modal meaning of the former is directly founded in the aesthetic modality.

It is generally conceded that aesthetic meaning cannot exist without its symbolic lingual substratum as far as works of art are concerned. But the modal meaning of the aesthetic law-sphere is not only expressed in works of art, but also in the beauty of nature (not subjectively, but objectively). The objective beauty of nature is also founded in a symbolic meaning-substratum. An animal may have a sensory feeling of pleasure when it is impressed by the sight of a sunlit landscape. The aesthetic harmony of the scene, however, can only be apprehended on the basis of an awareness of its symbolic substratum, its symbolizing signification.

The aesthetic harmony of a natural object, or of a complex of natural objects is necessarily a signified meaning.

The beauty of nature is signified to those who are susceptible to aesthetic harmony, in the colours, the effect of light, the sounds, the spatial relations of nature etc. If these sensorily perceptible colours, sounds, etc., do not signify anything to the spectator or the listener he cannot experience the aesthetic harmony of a landscape, because this harmony cannot be apprehended in its original modal meaning by sensory perception alone, although it is indissolubly bound up with the sensory side of the landscape.

The juridical and the aesthetic anticipations in the modal lingual meaning.

The aesthetic law-sphere as well as the juridical aspect have appeared to be founded in the modal lingual sphere, because their modal structure necessarily contains a symbolic retrocipation. In the modal structure of the lingual aspect, on the contrary, the cosmic coherence of meaning with the aesthetic and the juridical modalities can only find expression in the anticipatory direction of time. In the exact juridical use of language, in which every symbolic expression is to be carefully weighed with respect to its ‘juridical sense’ in order to guarantee a univocal signification, we encounter a modal anticipation on the modal juridical
meaning-aspect. This is a deepening of language only reached at a higher stage of culture, just as lingual economy and lingual harmony are absent in the merely retrocipatory structure of the lingual aspect.

It is true that in primitive society every juridical act is bound to a strict formalism of symbols. But this proves only that juridical meaning is necessarily founded in the modal aspect of symbolic signification. In primitive symbolism itself, which often shows magic traits, the manner of denoting does not disclose a juridical anticipation.

On the contrary, it binds the lingual function to sensory representations of a strictly prescribed pattern, just because primitive language lacks the juridical anticipation in an abstract symbolism. The latter pre-supposes an opening of the symbolic and juridical anticipations in the logical aspect which makes possible the formation of abstract juridical concepts freed from the primitive sensory representation. That primitive language also lacks aesthetic anticipation, is primarily due to the fact that here the linguistic aspect has not yet opened its economic anticipatory function.

For without a free economic disposal and control of the symbols, language cannot disclose a syntactical harmony in anticipating the meaning-kernel of the aesthetic aspect.

The primitive manner of denoting is strictly bound to sensory representation. Therefore it cannot anticipate the super-sensory meaning of harmony in its original aesthetic sense.

This does not mean that primitive man necessarily lacks the aesthetical aspect of experience. Primitive art testifies to the contrary. We can only say that the primitive manner of symbolic denotation has no aesthetic anticipation. That is the reason why primitive art cannot elevate itself to a free, explicit expression of aesthetic harmony, but remains bound to vital and sensory needs, so that its aesthetical aspect can manifest itself only implicitly. We shall return to this state of affairs in the third Volume.

§ 5 - JURIDICAL AND SOCIAL RETROCIPATIONS IN THE MODAL ASPECT OF LOVE

Finally we shall investigate some retrocipations in the modal structure of the ethical law-sphere to exemplify our

1 The adjective 'social' is again used here in the special modal sense of
method of analysis and to find the place of the moral aspect in the cosmic order of time.

It is demonstrable that the juridical law-sphere can disclose its inner coherence with the moral aspect only in the anticipatory sphere of its modal structure. For it has appeared that the juridical moment of guilt, the juridical figures of ‘good faith’, of ‘good morals’, of ‘equity’, etc. are obviously anticipatory meaning-figures which are not yet found in a primitive system of law (except for some incidental beginnings of the opening-process of the legal meaning). In such a primitive legal order only the retrocipatory meaning-coherence is expressed. Then it follows that the reverse is also true, viz. that in the modal meaning-structure of the ethical law-sphere we can trace an analogy of the jural aspect.

Rudolph von Jhering called the logical distinction between law and morality the ‘Cape Horn’ of legal philosophy. It would be more correct, perhaps, to say that if the modal boundaries between the different law-spheres are neglected, every theoretical distinction of a meaning-aspect from the others is a veritable ‘Cape Horn’ of philosophy. For how is theoretical thought to form a correct notion of these meaning-aspects, if their modal structure in the intermodal coherence of the cosmic time-order is lost sight of?

The prevailing logical distinction between law and morality.

Under the influence of Kant it has become customary to seek the difference between the jural sphere and morality in external legality in contrast to inner morality, i.e. external conformity to the law versus inner respect for the law. Legal order, according to this view, demands only external behaviour; the moral law, however, as the autonomous categorical imperative, applies to the inner disposition of the will.

This difference is usually expressed by the contrast of heteronomy versus autonomy. Law was supposed to be a heteronomous order, in so far as the inner motive is irrelevant to lawful conduct.

Consequently, the fear of punishment, the hope for some ad-

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the aspect of intercourse ruled by the norms of courtesy, good manners, tact, sociableness, fashion and so on; not in the comprehensive sense of social life embracing all modal aspects of experience.

1 Cape Horn was notorious for its dangerous storms.
vantage are acceptable to the legal order as motives. According to Kant such motives do not originate from the 'pure moral will' itself but from outside, from man's sensory nature.

Modern positivistic jurists like Austin and Félix Somlo, who have broken with Rousseau's and Kant's natural law view of statute law as "volonté générale" (the general will), interpret the distinction between heteronomy and autonomy in a different way. They hold that positive law, as a heteronomous order, has not the individual conscience for its source, but is simply imposed on the individual persons by a sovereign power; whereas ideal morality (not to be identified with positive morality) is alleged not to allow of this heteronomy.

Further, as a result of the former distinction, morality is supposed not to brook any compulsion, while compulsion (at least the competence to exercise compulsion) is taken to be a logical characteristic of law.

At present the prevailing conception (but not in the naturalistic sociological view) distinguishes between legal order and morality according to a threefold criterion:

1 - law is an external social order; morality is an internal norm of the individual human conscience;
2 - law is heteronomous, imposed by an external authority; morality is only binding on the individual conscience;
3 - law is a compulsory order sanctioned by organized constraint; morality demands voluntary observance.

A preliminary question. Does there exist a modal ethical law-sphere or moral aspect of experience with an irreducible modal meaning? The distinction between the world of experience and the I-thou relation in Jewish and Christian existentialism.

From our previous analysis of the modal structure of law it has appeared that this distinction is quite unsatisfactory with respect to the inner modal meaning of the juridical aspect.

Does it correspond to the inner modal sense of morality? Here a preliminary question urges itself upon Christian thought. In our earlier investigations it was continually supposed that there exists a specific ethical or moral modal law-sphere. But can this supposition be maintained from the Christian viewpoint?

In the first place a serious objection may be expected on the part of modern Christian existentialism which from the Jewish
thinker Martin Buber has taken over the sharp distinction between ‘experience of the world’ and the ‘I-thou-relation’. The former would have to do only with ‘impersonal objects’ as things, laws and so on. The latter, on the contrary, is intrinsically personal and existential, the realm of personal freedom and existential responsibility, the sphere of a real meeting between I and thou which does not allow of general rules and laws, nor of boundaries of modal spheres. Since the ethical relations are supposed to show to a high degree this personal and existential character, the idea of an ‘ethical law-sphere’ must be fundamentally rejected by these Christian thinkers.

When, however, we subject this existentialistic view of ethics to a transcendental critique, it appears to be ruled by a dialectical religious motive in which the Humanistic motive of nature and freedom, in its irrationalist conception, is an essential component.

The dialectical distinction between the ‘world of experience’ as an impersonal I-it relation and the existential I-thou relation is nothing but a modern irrationalist version of the dialectical basic-motive of Humanism. It is intrinsically un-Biblical.

It deforms the integral structure of human experience and eliminates its relation to the central religious sphere.

The world of experience seems to be impersonal and non-existent only if we identify it with an absolutized theoretical abstraction (‘nature’ in the sense of the classical Humanist science-ideal). But this absolutized abstraction has nothing to do with the modal horizon of human experience in its integral meaning from which we have started. On the other hand, the real meeting of I and thou is in the deepest sense a central, religious relation, which indeed does not allow of modal boundaries of law-spheres. But if this central relation is sought within the temporal order of human existence, one gives oneself up to an idolatrous illusion.

Nevertheless, it is exactly the relation between Christian religion and ethics which is to be considered as the ‘Cape Horn’ of every Christian view of ‘the moral sphere’. Can there be room for a modal moral aspect of human existence and experience which is to be distinguished from the central religious relation

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1 Martin Buber, *Ich und Du* (1923). The influence of Buber is important, especially among the adherents of dialectical theology who have written ethical works (Emil Brunner, Fr. Gogarten and others).
of I-we and I-Thou subjected to the central commandment of Love?

Can there be an ethical norm of love which is not identical with this commandment? If so, what is the meaning-kernel of the supposed moral aspect in which this norm functions?

In our provisional delimitation of the ethical law-sphere we have assumed that this nuclear-meaning is to be designated by the word love. But if, according to the Biblical view, love is the very totality of meaning, the religious radical unity of all temporal modal diversity of law-spheres, how can there be room for love as a modal aspect of temporal human experience and empirical reality?

The scholastic distinction between moral theology and natural ethics. Natural ethics and the Greek form-matter motive.

Starting from the scholastic basic-motive of nature and grace, Thomism distinguished between natural and super-natural ethics. In natural ethics it accepted the Aristotelian conception of virtues as the essential content of the ἕθος (éthos), the moral disposition of man. Love, together with faith and hope, was here conceived of as a super-natural virtue, the subject of moral theology. The norm of natural ethics is given in natural reason, that of moral theology in super-natural Revelation. But the Aristotelian conception of virtue is ruled by the religious form-matter motive of Greek thought, which cannot be really synthesized with the central motive of Biblical Revelation. The dialectical theme of form and matter proved to be destructive to a real insight into the modal structures of the different aspects of experience.

In ARISTOTLE the ethical sphere is determined by the idea of the highest good. But in his metaphysics the good, as such, is an analogical concept inherent in the metaphysical idea of being. He rejected the Platonic conception of the transcendent Idea of the good in which the different virtues find their concentric unity. In Aristotelian ethics the idea of the natural good can be determined only by the different essential forms of natural beings. By virtue of its innate entelechy every natural being, as such composed of form and matter, strives after its specific natural good, i.e. the actualizing of its substantial form. Since human nature finds its specific form in the rational soul,

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behaviour in conformity to natural reason (ψυχής ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον) is identical with good or virtuous activity (ψυχής ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀφετηρία)\textsuperscript{1}.

Ethical virtue consists in the permanent control of the lower sensory functions (particularly the passions) by the will in conformity to the rules of practical reason. It is conceived of as the due mean between two extremes, and its natural consequence is eudaemonia, i.e. happiness. It is a permanent disposition (εὐεὐθυς) of the will as the actualizing of an ethical potentiality (dynamis); this disposition can be acquired through continuous training.

The analogical character of the Aristotelian concepts of virtue and of the good.

This entire conception of the good and of ethical virtue is dependent upon the Greek form-matter motive. It is impossible to discover in it a really modal criterion for an ethical law-sphere. Both the concept of virtue and that of the good are analogical notions. The so-called dianoetical or logical virtues (λογικαὶ ἄρεται) are not dispositions (εὐεὐθυς) of the will, but of the faculty of thought, either in its theoretical or in its practical function (directed to human actions). Virtue must therefore derive its specific ethical meaning from its specific relation to the human will. But the latter is not a modal aspect of experience and human existence. Rather it is a concrete direction of the inner human act-life which functions in the coherence of all the modal aspects. Consequently, the special scientific concept of volition can only be analogical in character. The modal difference between the psychological and the juridical concepts of the will has already been discussed\textsuperscript{2}. What would be its ethical modality? If the latter is sought in a constant disposition of volition to follow the norms of practical reason by controlling the lower sensory functions, the definition moves in a vicious circle. Practical reason as such has no modal-moral delimitation of meaning. The control of our sensory passions and affects is as such a cultural, not an ethical function of

\textsuperscript{1} Eth. Nic. B 5, 1106a 22 fl.: ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἁρετὴ ἔγιν ἐν εὐεὐθυς ἀρετὴν ἐγέρας ἀγαθὸς ἰδέατος γίνεται καὶ ἐδώ τὴ ἐν οἷον ἔφεσαν ἀκομάθει.

\textsuperscript{2} Eth. Nic. B 6, 1106b 36 fl.: εἰς προμαχοτήτι ἐν μεσότητι ἀνθή τῷ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀφυπομικὸν λόγον καὶ ὧς ἂν ὁ φυσικὸς ἀφαίην.

\textsuperscript{3} Cf. pp. 125 ff. of the present volume.
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volitional life. It may be made serviceable to very immoral ends, for instance self-worship, imperialism, the destruction of economical competitors etc.

For lack of a really modal criterion it is no wonder that the modal boundaries between the juridical and the ethical spheres are levelled in Aristotelian ethics. Justice is conceived of as an ethical virtue. In its general sense it is the perfect virtue encompassing all the others insofar as they are concerned with our social relations to our fellow-men. In its strict sense it refers to equality and inequality ($τῷ ἵκνῳ καὶ ἀκοινωνίᾳ$) as the specific rational measure of legal order.

In the Aristotelian conception the juridical aspect of the good is thus only a species of the general ethical good and lacks an irreducible modal meaning-nucleus. The legal norm cannot belong here to a law-sphere different from the ethical modus. Only the permanent subjective inclination or disposition of the will to follow the rational norm of justice — not this standard itself — is exclusively ethical and cannot be transferred to the juridical sphere.

So there remains only a single criterion for the distinction between the ethical and the juridical viewpoint: the subjective ἔθος as a constant disposition of the will to subject itself to the autonomous norms of practical reason. But we have seen that this ἔθος, as such, lacks a specific modal meaning; it is an analogical concept. Its determination by the rational measure of the due mean between two bad extremes does not detract from this analogical character. This measure was taken from the Pythagorean idea of the peras limiting the apeiron, a mathematical expression of the Greek form—matter motive which has also strongly influenced the ethical conception of Plato's dialogue Philebus.

So it appears that Aristotelian ethics lacks the modal unity of meaning in its enumeration of the different 'virtues'. This whole conception of ethical virtue as a result of the autonomous human training of the will is unacceptable from the Christian standpoint. It cannot be a natural infra-structure for a really Christian ethics because it contradicts the very basic motive of the latter, that of creation, sin, and redemption.

If there exists a modal ethical law-sphere in the temporal order of creation, there can be no question of autonomous morality with a standard of good and bad derived from natural reason and realized by human volition.

Then the standard of the moral good can only be a modal tem-
poral refraction of the central commandment of Love as the religious meaning-totality of the whole temporal coherence of modal law-spheres. There cannot exist a moral disposition of the will independent of the central religious disposition of the heart. For there does not exist a 'will' as an independent and autonomous entity, no more than an independent, autonomous 'reason'. All our volitional acts are acts of the I-ness which expresses itself in them.

Ethics and the human character.

What is called the 'character' of man is the individual result of a pedagogical shaping of the flexible hereditary factors of disposition of the inner act-life in its confrontation with the influences of social environment. It belongs to the bodily existence of man, as will be explained more in detail in my anthropology. The human body is not at all identical with an abstract 'physico-psychical soma'; it is the structural whole of temporal human existence in the intermodal coherence of all its modal aspects.

It may be that 'character' is to be sought especially in the volitional direction of the inner act-life; nevertheless it cannot be identified with the moral aspect-function of the volitional disposition or -inclination in its individual shape and stamp. Therefore the relating of virtue to character, as is done in modern times by the Dutch philosopher G. Heymans, cannot give a modal delimitation to the field of ethics. Psychology, too, has much to do with the human character. But the moral aspect is different from that of feeling, although Heymans seeks the origin of the ethical norm in a specific moral feeling. Nevertheless Heymans speaks of 'character' in its relation to the standards

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1 This word is meant here in its pregnant Biblical sense.
2 *Einführung in die Ethik*, Leipzig (1922).
3 Heymans (op. cit. p. 43) defines character as 'the totality of the inclinations of the individual in their mutual relations of strength' (die Gesamtheit der Neigungen dieses Individuums in ihren gegenseitigen Stärkeverhältnissen); or as 'the whole of the laws, in conformity to which in this individual stronger or weaker motives evoke stronger or weaker wishes and thereby contribute more or less to the determination of the particular volitional decisions' (die Gesamtheit der Gesetze, nach welchen bei diesem Individuum verschiedene Motive stärkere oder schwächere Wünsche hervorrufen und dadurch mehr oder weniger zur Bestimmung der einzelnen Willensentschlüsse beitragen").
of good and evil as the veritable object of ethical judgment and defines ethics as the 'science of good and evil'. But it has appeared that in their scientific use the latter terms are analogical ones. They lack, as such, modal delimitation of sense. If we mean moral good and evil we must be able to indicate the modal meaning-kernel of morality in order to escape the vicious circle inherent in every undefined analogy.

Heymans' merely formal ethical criterium of 'objectivity' or 'universality' has no moral meaning at all.

Only with reference to the central religious sphere may the terms good and evil be used in their fulness of meaning without any modal qualification. As to their ethical sense we must agree with Nietzsche and Nicolai Hartmann: 'We do not yet know what good and evil may be' ¹.

Why a moral law-sphere must exist.

Now it cannot be denied that in the cosmic order of time a modal law-sphere must exist which succeeds the juridical and precedes the ultimate limiting aspect, viz. that of faith. This is demonstrated by our previous analysis of the anticipatory moments in the modal structure of the legal law-sphere, which, as soon as they are realized in a positive legal order, appear to open and deepen the retributive meaning of this modal sphere. Modal meaning-figures, such as juridical guilt, good faith, good morals, equity, and so on, undeniably refer to a later modal aspect of experience which cannot be designated by another term than the moral or ethical sphere. The anticipatory meaning-moments concerned refer neither immediately to the faith-aspect, nor immediately to the central religious sphere.

In pre-juridical aspects, such as the psychical, we have also discovered anticipatory relations with an ethical law-sphere.

This does not prove the existence of a natural morality apart from the religious centre of human existence. It proves only that in the temporal modal horizon of experience there exists a modal ethical aspect which is not to be identified with the super-modal sphere of religion, nor with the aspect of faith.

Therefore the conception developed especially by Karl Barth, that there is no room for ethics as a specific science different from theological dogmatics, cannot be maintained. But this does not detract from the extremely difficult problem we are confron-

¹ Nicolai Hartmann, Ethik (1926, Berlin und Leipzig) p. 40.
Criticism of Kant's criterion of morality. Love and the imago Dei.

Before considering this problem in greater detail we must return to Kant's criterion of morality, explained above. It must be established that his 'Gesinnungsethik' was really meant to replace the central commandment of Love in its religious fulness of meaning. This commandment requires us to love God and our neighbour with our whole heart. It is the very nature of love in this central religious sense that it implies complete self-surrender. We cannot really love in this fulness of meaning of the word so long as we experience its requirement as a law which urges itself upon us externally, contrary to the inner inclination of our heart. This love must penetrate our inner selves, it must inflame the centre of our existence and permeate it so that it has become one with us, and reflects in our heart the Divine Love as the answer of the human I to the call of its Origin, the Divine Thou.

This is the real meaning of the imago Dei. It explains why the human ego can be nothing in itself as an autonomous being. It explains why the fall into sin has radically obscured this imago Dei, so that it is only revealed in its original sense in the infinite love of Jesus Christ in His complete self-surrender to His heavenly Father and to lost mankind. Only from Him can this love flow into the human heart. Apart from Him we do not know it, nor can there be any volitional disposition worthy of the name of 'good' in its proper religious sense.

Kant's 'Gesinnungsethik' has secularized this religious state of things. It sought the true self, the real autos of man, in a 'pure will' which identifies itself with the ethical law originating from practical reason, so that autos and nomos become one and the same. But love is rejected in this ethics as the real moral motive of human behaviour. It is replaced by the respect for the ethical law in its pure form of categorical imperative, which in the last analysis means nothing but respect for the 'Idea of Mankind' in

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1 Cape Horn was notorious for its dangerous storms.
The sense of the Humanist personality-ideal. Love, on the contrary, is viewed as a sensory inclination, which is an impure motive because it detracts from the autonomy of morality. Here the dialectical tension between nature and freedom, the Humanist science-ideal and personality-ideal manifests itself in a pregnant sense.

The Kantian conception of the freedom-motive seeks the true essence, the 'noumenon' of man, behind the temporal sensory reality of nature in the autonomous moral will as the law-giver for human conduct. That is why morality must be conceived of as entirely apart from the reality of nature and traced back to a pure, autonomous moral will. Legal order, however, has to reckon with 'empirical humanity' and should be content with the function of an order of external freedom in the coexistence of human individuals. It can be nothing but an order of peace.

But KANT is unable to indicate what modal meaning is to be attached to 'autonomous morality'. The modal meaning of a law-sphere can only disclose itself in the intermodal coherence of meaning of all the aspects and this very coherence has been torn up in the Kantian conception.

The sharp separation between moral disposition and natural sensuous inclination and the characterization of the impulse to follow the latter as the 'radical evil' in man, clearly shows the influence of the Christian conception of sin. But the latter has been secularized and denatured to an irreconcilable antithesis between two aspects of human existence and experience which are arranged by the temporal order of creation in an indissoluble structural coherence of meaning. The moral function of volition is closely connected with the volitional function in the aspect of feeling. There are moral feeling-drives which prevent man from an undisciplined surrender to sexual and other biotically founded impulses. Without the presence of such anticipatory drives in human feeling-life, the rational moral motives would be powerless.

Even the Kantian conception of the moral motive, that of duty or respect for the moral law, if it is to have any moral meaning, pre-supposes a moral feeling-drive. The complete lack of the latter and the presence of a rational idea of duty only is a well-known pathological phenomenon. KANT's rigid separation be-

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1 Cf. Vol. I, Part II.
tween morality and natural feeling-drives is in serious danger of legitimating such pathological desintegrations of the inner act-life. It is inhuman and a-moral in its logicistic formalizing of the meaning of ethical duty and ethical law.

On the other hand the thesis ‘law only regulates external behaviour and is indifferent to motives’ is a clear proof that Kant does not only want to distinguish between law and morality, but really separates them. As a result the entire anticipatory structure of the modal meaning of the juridical aspect is misinterpreted. Kant only tries to maintain the connection between law and morality in an external teleological way. He holds that juridical order is merely an order of legality, an order of external peace, which is meant to enable the individual to do his moral duties. But it has already appeared that the principle of guilt in criminal law and other anticipatory juridical concepts necessarily anticipate the moral meaning-aspect! They cannot be understood in their juridical sense without their internal coherence with morality.

The moral meaning-aspect is not itself the super-temporal root of human existence, in spite of Kant’s doctrine. It is as temporal and as relative as all the other meaning-sides of temporal reality. But the moral sphere, just like all the others, has a modal meaning that is sovereign within its own boundaries. Kant’s logicistic-moralistic viewpoint inevitably compelled him to eliminate this modal meaning. His ethics is in fact a religion of human personality in a specific Humanistic conception.

The original meaning-nucleus of the moral law-sphere.
Love in its original modal sense and its analogies in the other aspects.

Every attempt at defining the ethical sphere without indicating its modal meaning-kernel must result in an inescapable conflict with the central religious sphere of human existence.

One may try to solve this conflict either by reducing religion to morality or by reducing the latter to the former. Both attempts, however, are tantamount to a destruction of morality in its temporal meaning and are a serious threat to the central place of the radical commandment of Love in the fulness of its religious sense.

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1 This criterion was taken over from Thomasius, who made it serviceable to the defence of toleration in his doctrine of natural law.
On the other hand, every serious attempt at an analysis of the modal meaning-structure of the moral relation leads us back to love as its irreducible kernel. There can be no single really moral 'virtue' which in the last analysis is not a manifestation of this modal nucleus of the ethical law-sphere.

But love in this temporal nuclear meaning cannot be the same as love in its religious fulness. The former is only a temporal modal meaning-refraction of the latter, determined by the whole inter-modal coherence of the different law-spheres in the order of cosmic time. Love, as the moral modality of human experience, cannot exist apart from its immediate foundation in the retributive meaning of the juridical aspect. The preceding modal aspects refer to it in the moral anticipations of their modal structures. In the biotic aspect, for instance, it is anticipated by the human sexual drive in its natural direction to moral unity in love; in the feeling-aspect we meet with the moral feeling of love disclosing itself in different typical ways (cf. the feeling-impulse to help a fellow man who is in distress; the feeling-impulse of filial or parental love etc.). Even in the anticipatory structure of the logical aspect there is an inner coherence with the moral meaning-kernel of love in the theoretical eros which has to direct the whole of our scientific activity and is a guarantee of 'logical morality' and integrity. In the cultural (historical) aspect we discover a moral anticipation in cultural love of our form-giving task in human civilization. In the lingual aspect a moral anticipation is implied in the love of a language, a tendency to signify our feelings, volition, thoughts etc. in the linguistically most adequate way inspired by the affection for language in its pure form.

Love and the conventions of social intercourse.

In the modal aspect of intercourse the social conventions have an inner anticipatory connection with love in its moral nuclear meaning.

This is clearly shown by Jesus Christ who contrasts the love of the prostitute who had anointed his feet with very costly

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1 This is clearly seen by Calvin in his Comment. in ep. ad Col. 3:14, where he observes that 'the whole chorus of virtues is summarized in love. For it is the rule of the whole of life and of all actions; everything that is not reduced to it, is wrong, how great the splendour may be it has in another respect.'
spikenard, with the uncourtly attitude of the pharizee who had invited him but had omitted to observe the eastern forms of courtesy towards the Rabbi of Nazareth. Jesus shows here that courtesy and social convention in general are not indifferent things. They should be directed and animated by love. Nevertheless the conventions of social intercourse as such are not to be reduced to morality in its original modal meaning-nucleus. Therefore it is confusing to call them 'positive morality', as is done by the so-called empiricist trends in ethics.

The economic aspect, too, has an anticipatory coherence with the moral meaning-nucleus. The frugal manner of administering scarce things in their alternative destination for the satisfaction of human needs, acquires a positive relation to morality if it is directed by love towards our neighbour. Here it implies a voluntary-restriction of our own needs for the sake of the needs of our fellow-men. In this sense frugality is rightly called a virtue, but only if it is considered from the moral viewpoint of love.

Eros and Agapè.

The aesthetic aspect opens its inner connection with the moral law-sphere in its anticipatory meaning-moment of aesthetic love. This is the eros, as Plato has described it in his splendid dialogue Symposium, an aesthetical love-drive to the beautiful which functions as a mediator between sensory life and the super-sensory Idea of beauty.

Modern Christian ethics has paid much attention to the radical difference between this Greek aesthetical eros and the Christian agapè. Indeed neither Plato, nor any Greek thinker, knew the religious fulness of meaning implied in the central commandment of Love. Nor did Plato know love as the original modal meaning-kernel of morality. His eros is nothing but an analogy of love in the modal structure of the aesthetic aspect. But the Platonic conception of eros should not be criticized from the dialectical viewpoint of modern existentialism. That is to say, we should not think that the aesthetic eros is opposite to the Christian agapè as the contemplative experience with its I—it-relation to the existential sphere of the I—thou relation. On the contrary, it is necessary to stress the inner meaning-coherence between the aesthetical eros and love as the modal meaning-kernel of the moral aspect in order to relate both to the central religious sense of the Agapè.
It is clearly testified both in the Old and the New Testament that 'aesthetic love' has its legitimate place in the entire temporal coherence of the aspects of God’s creation and has a concentric relation to the central commandment of Love. In the temporal order of experience the love of God implies the aesthetical enjoyment of the beauty of His creation which is worthy of this human eros. But the latter appeals to love in its modal nuclear meaning and should reflect the central love to God and the neighbour within the modal boundaries of the aesthetical sphere. The very orientation of the Platonic eros to the Greek form-matter motive reveals its apostate direction.

The ‘Cape Horn’ of Christian ethics.

We have called the question concerning the modal meaning-kernel of the ethical aspect the ‘Cape Horn’ (i.e. the most dangerous point) of Christian ethics. In taking cognizance of different attempts to establish the real relation between the ethical sphere and the central commandment of Love we are confirmed in this opinion. We shall mention only two of them.

In his Manual of Ethics the late Dutch theologian W. J. AALDERS, who was professor of ethics at the University of Groningen, clearly saw the necessity of a distinction between the ethical and the religious relation. He, too, seeks the qualifying meaning-moment of the former in love. But he sees no other way to distinguish ethical love from the central religious love than by introducing this distinction into the central commandment itself. The love of God, as the summary of the first table of the Decalogue, is considered as the religious relation proper which has directly to do with God. This love has a unilateral character insofar as the creature is dependent on the Creator but not vice versa. The love of the neighbour as the summary of the second table of the Decalogue, is considered as the ethical relation which has directly to do with the creation, especially with our fellow-man, and only indirectly with God. This relation is a real correlation because it is bilateral. So the author concludes that the ethical sphere of love is that of creation. In this way he thinks he can escape the danger of moralizing religion, on the one hand, and

1 Handboek der Ethiek (Amsterdam 1941). See also his De Grond der Zedelijkheid (Groningen-Den Haag) 1933.
2 Handboek, p. 129.
3 ib., p. 123 fl.
that of an absorption of morality by religion, on the other. The moral sphere remains dependent on the central religious one without being dissolved into the latter.

Though this intention deserves the greatest respect, it must be denied that AALDERS has succeeded in correctly delimiting the ethical aspect in its relation to the Christian religion. In our opinion it is a fundamental mistake to seek the criterion within the central commandment of Love itself. The latter is an unbreakable unity and does not permit itself to be considered as a composite of a religious and a moral part.

In its religious fulness of meaning the love of our neighbour is nothing but the love of God in His image, expressed in ourselves as well as in our fellow-men. This is why Christ said that the second commandment is equal to the first. One can also say that it is implied in it.

If the central commandment of Love is indeed the radical unity of all the temporal modal law-spheres, it must be impossible to delimit within it a specific-ethical aspect. If we see aright AALDERS has arrived at his conception under the influence of the existentialistic view of MARTIN BUBER, who considered ethics as the sphere of the I-thou relation in its dialectical opposition to the contemplative I-it-relation of human experience.

Here it appears once again that this dialectical existentialism cannot be accepted without detracting from the integral and radical meaning of the Christian religion. AALDERS doubtless would positively deny every intention to do so. Nevertheless, in spite of his unsuspected intention, he could not escape from a partial moralization of the central religious sphere in consequence of his acceptance of the dialectical opposition between the existential I-thou relation and the contemplative sphere of human experience. Starting from this opposition, he was unable to conceive of the ethical sphere as a modal aspect of the temporal horizon of experience and reality. In order to avoid its reduction to the religious sphere he could find no way out but a limitation of the latter to the effect that the central commandment of Love was divided into a religious and an ethical part. In addition, a distinction was made between the sphere of religion and the sphere of creation, and this is incompatible with the Biblical conception. The central religious sphere be-

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longs to creation as well as the temporal sphere of human existence which embraces the ethical relation.

Together with the existentialistic opposition between the ethical sphere and the contemplative sphere of experience AALDERS accepted the dialectical Humanistic motive of nature and freedom. Morality is separated from the lower vegetative and animal functions of human life, ruled by natural laws, and is localized in the higher sphere of freedom or spirit, ruled by norms. This means that the second part of the central religious commandment of Love, which AALDERS reserved for ethics, is related to an abstracted complex of normative functions of temporal human existence, instead of being related to the religious centre of the whole of temporal human functions. So it loses its absolute character and is denatured to a specific norm regulating only the higher temporal volitional life of man.

A second example of a serious confusion of love, as the modal meaning -nucleus of the ethical aspect, with love in the fullness of its central religious sense is to be found in Emil Brunner's famous work Das Gebot und die Ordnungen (Tübingen, 1932).

Already in his definition of Christian ethics: Christian ethics is the science of human conduct determined by divine action, he reveals his aim to merge Christian morals into the Christian religion, which is diametrically opposed to the moralization of religion in rationalistic Humanism. This leads to a fundamentally erroneous definition of the relation between love and justice.

According to Brunner the love mentioned in the central divine commandment is absolute. It concerns the whole person, and is concrete and not legal. Justice, on the contrary, is universal, legal, "vorausgewusst, unpersönlich-sachlich, abstrakt, ratio-

1 Op. cit., p. 84.
2 A 'norm' is always a rational standard, founded in the logical manner of distinction. Therefore it is confusing to call the central commandment of Love a norm. In my opinion this term is to be applied only to temporal standards of what ought to be. The religious commandment is identical with what we have called in the Prolegomena: the religious concentration-law of human existence. It cannot be opposed to 'laws of nature', as is done with norms.
nal” (known in advance, impersonal, objective, abstract, rational).

That's why, according to this writer, it is a contradictio in terminis to speak of 'perfect justice': for what is perfect cannot be justice.

Even when we speak of Divine justice we mean nothing concrete and material but “jene formale Qualitäten der Entsprechung, der Zuverlässigkeit und Konstanz göttlichen Handelns” [these formal qualities of the consistency, the reliability and the constancy of divine actions]. For in the idea of justice is implied especially: the idea of the reliability, of the objective and active operation of a rule that has been imposed on us, and which we know as such.

Here the fundamental error in Brunner's view is laid bare. In this view it is forgotten that the fulness of meaning of love, as revealed in Christ's cross, is at the same time the fulness of justice. If we assign a higher place to Divine love than to Divine justice, this procedure necessarily detracts from God's holiness. In his later work Die Gerechtigkeit Brunner appears to have avoided this error.

In fact Brunner contradicted himself by saying that justice is the pre-supposition of love, and that love which has not passed through justice, is arbitrary, unreal, sentimental. If love requires justice for its pre-supposition, it cannot be absolute, "unbedingt" (unconditioned), in contrast with justice.

Brunner's error is that he opposes love, as the exclusive content of the fulness of God's commandment, to the 'temporal ordinances', which owing to the fall show God's will only in a broken state. He wants to build Christian ethics on the basis of the actions proceeding from this love within the formal framework of all the temporal ordinances. This is an after-effect of the dualistic scheme of nature and grace in Luther's world of thought. It leads to the identification of morality with the Christian religion, and at the same time it leads to a misinterpretation of the temporal moral meaning of love, i.e. of the moral aspect of temporal human experience and existence.

That's why everywhere in this ethics antinomies arise. For Brunner's conception of love as the opposite of justice is not

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2 Ib.: "Die Idee der Zuverlässigkeit der objectiven und wirksamen Geltung einer "gesetzten" und als gesetzt bekannten Regel.”
really Biblical, but much rather an absolutizing of the temporal modal meaning of love. Only the latter can be significantly opposed to the meaning of justice as another aspect of temporal reality, and to the modal meaning of the other law-spheres. Anyone who tries to do so with the fulness of meaning of love, violates its religious fulness. He has no eye for the new religious root of creation in Christ as the concentration-point and the fulness of all the temporal meaning-aspects.

It is an essentially un-Biblical thought to deny Divine Justice its perfection by calling it a ‘merely formal idea’, and to seek that perfection only in love.

The social retrocipation in the modal meaning of love.

As a result of the primordial confusion of the ethical and the central religious sphere, Brunner opposes love of one’s neighbour in an ethical sense, as absolute love, to the love between husband and wife and that between mother and child. From the ethical viewpoint as such this opposition is meaningless. Love in its modal-ethical nuclear meaning — just as love in the religious fulness of its sense — implies the relation to the neighbour. But within the ethical aspect this love of one’s neighbour occurs in a very rich variety of social forms, in the correlation of communal and inter-individual relations. This correlation is a social retrocipation in the modal structure of morality. It is precisely this retrocipation of the aspect of social intercourse which — in coherence with the typical totality structures of temporal society — occasions a rich diversity and variety in the relations of moral love, which are in principle misinterpreted by individualistic ethics. The universal love of one’s neighbour in the moral inter-individual relations is something different from the communal love between parents and children, husband and wife; something different also from the love of one’s country; the love of one’s mate in a labour-community, etc.

Without this social retrocipation love in its modal ethical sense cannot exist. Only in the religious fulness of meaning is the love of one’s neighbour no longer differentiated according to the temporal communal and inter-personal relations of this life. In Jesus Christ there is no difference between Jew and Greek, master and servant, fellow-countryman and foreigner, kin and outsiders.

1 Op cit., p. 315/6.
In his subjective moral function, however, man is subject to the temporal moral law as a law of love in accordance with the temporal communal relations (Honour thy father and thy mother) and the interindividual relationships.

Brunner, however, in his erroneous abstract conception of the 'law', thinks that the commandment of Love cancels the concept 'law', as the law is supposed at once to divert our attention from the 'Legislator' Himself and to turn it to *that which* has been commanded. Abstraction, universality is inherent in the 'law', according to him, and he thinks that obedience to God's law is mere *legality*.

As a matter of fact he only strikes a blow here at the rationalistic 'metaphysical' idea of law as it is found in scholastic ethics of the XIXth century and in Kantian moral philosophy. He appears not to have overcome it because of his relative recognition of the Divine ordinances conceived of in the sense of rigid, impersonal rules. This is due to the fact that Brunner, just as Aalders, has accepted the dialectical opposition of the existential I-thou relation and the impersonal I-it relation of experience. Within this framework the 'law' can only belong to the latter and is interpreted in an impersonal, abstract, and rigid sense. In addition, both this depreciation and relative recognition of the law could appeal to Luther's dialectical conception of the Divine ordinances in the state of sin. But the right relation between the central commandment of Love and the temporal ethical sphere cannot be discovered from this dialectical standpoint.

Within the temporal order of modal aspects the fulness of the meaning of justice can express itself in a non-analogical manner in the relative modality of retribution alone; in the same way the fulness of the meaning of love is expressed unequivocally within this temporal order in its moral modality only.

In their religious fulness love and justice coalesce, just as in this totality of meaning all the modal meaning-aspects of the cosmos find their fulfilment because of their religious concentration on the Divine Origin. In the refractional order of cosmic time they are mutually irreducible modal aspects of meaning, which cannot be reduced to one logical denominator without internal antimony.

All other known criteria of morality, sought outside of the theoretically analysed meaning-modus of love, prove to fail when the test of the modal analysis of meaning is applied to them.
In its analogical meanings love functions in all the substratum-spheres of the moral aspect by way of 
*anticipation*. In its original modal sense it can only function in the moral law-sphere. As an original meaning-nucleus, however, it can find its expression within the modal structure of this sphere solely in the coherence of all the retrocipations in which the inter-modal coherence of meaning with the substratum-spheres expresses itself. This retrocipatory structure guarantees the temporal relative character of the moral aspect and should be a warning against every confusion of love as its modal nucleus with the fulness of meaning of the religious *Agapè*. It should also warn us against every identification of love in its original modal sense with an anticipatory feeling-drive.

Moral love has a *rational* foundation though it also has a feeling-substratum. It is not pre-logical as feeling is. It implies personal responsibility and is regulated by a normative standard. Thus it is understandable that the apostle speaks of the *duty* of the husband to love his own wife. By the intermediary of the Christian faith this moral duty is directed concentrically to the love of Christ (to His Bride) in its religious fulness of meaning. Nevertheless it retains its logical foundation. In order to elucidate this rational foundation of love in its modal moral sense it is necessary to pay attention to the juridical analogy in its modal structure.

The retributive analogy in the modal meaning of love.

In the modal ethical relation love manifests itself on the normative law-side only in a well-balanced proportion between self-love and love of one's neighbour. This is not the same as the equality of self-love and love of the neighbour in the radical religious commandment. When the latter says that we shall love our neighbour as ourselves, this means that the central love of God implies the love of His image equally in ourselves and in our fellow-men. The I-Thou-relation to God implies the religious I-we relation to our neighbour. In the temporal moral relation, however, it is necessary to seek a just balance in love between our *moral* duties with respect to our own ethical personality and to that of our fellow-men. In the moral relation to our neighbour love undoubtedly demands self-denial, but not at the cost of our ethical personality, which is a temporal expression of our I-ness, as the religious centre of our existence. In practising love of our neighbour we also have to
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take into account the typical differentiation of the ethical relation of neighbourliness brought about by the social structures of individuality.

There ought to be a moral balance between conjugal love and parental love, between love of one's country and love of foreigners, and in general between love in communal and inter-individual relations.

In the primitive or closed conception of the love-relation, which is not yet opened by the Christian faith, the circle of 'neighbours' may still be restricted to the membership of the natural family, the 'sib', the 'tribe' or the folk; but here, too, the ethical meaning of love can only express itself in an equal measure of self-love and love of one's neighbour in the different social relations. Uncontrolled outbursts of love lacking this balance do not even correspond to the primitive norm of morality. The equality of proportions primarily refers back to the retributive meaning-kernel of the juridical aspect, although it also implies an economical retrocipation 1.

Nobody can truly love his neighbour without observing the exigences of retribution. That is why all the moral commandments of the Decalogue (the second table of the Law) 2 make an appeal to the legal order. The commandment: 'Thou shalt not kill', has no ethical meaning of love without this juridical foundation. Anyone who rejects the demands of retribution does harm to his neighbour in the sense condemned by the moral law of love, as it is expressed in the commandment mentioned; for he delivers him up to injustice and violence 3.

1 The aesthetic retrocipation manifests itself in the harmonizing of the different duties of love; the economical retrocipation is revealed in the just distribution of the sacrifices demanded by love with respect to the different moral duties.

2 The first table in its temporal (modal) meaning refers to the modal aspect of faith, especially to the worship of God.

3 Calvin continually emphasized this relation between justice and love in the divine world-order. This has been proven by my late friend Prof. Dr. J. Bohatec of the University of Vienna, who presents an elaborate list of sources in his important work Calvin und das Recht (Verlag: Buchdruckerei und Verlagsanstalt G.m.b.H., Feudungen in Westphalen, 1934). This book is partially based on fresh material from the sources. Bohatec writes here: 'by opposing love and justice, freedom and compulsion, the Anabaptists, as is well-known, have forced a problem on the Reformation. Calvin does not try to get round it. Against the one-sided solution of the Anabaptists who reject the State and law, he argues that it is in the interest of love to maintain justice and the ordi-
The internal antinomy arising from the theoretical eradication of the modal boundaries of justice and love.

Whoever tries to read retributive meaning into this commandment itself, after the manner of Aristotelian Scholasticism, gets involved in antinomy. Retribution may demand a man's life, and in principle, it demands satisfaction for injustice committed. The Thomistically orientated Roman Catholic philosopher of ethics, Victor Cathrein, tries to avoid this antinomy by reading the commandment as follows: 'Thou shalt not kill unlawfully'. But then the meaning of the commandment is distorted. In the moral relation of love the norm is fully determined in its modal meaning and allows of no exceptions. The judge passing a death sentence, the soldier shooting at the enemy, they all continue to be subject to the commandment of love: 'Thou shalt not kill'. No hatred, no enmity against the neighbour may inspire him, although as a consequence of the fall of mankind into sin there may arise nearly intolerable tensions in human conscience between the moral duty of love and the legal duty of retribution. But the addition of the word 'unlawfully' deprives the moral commandment of all meaning or makes it contradictory. It becomes meaningless if with this addition it is

quences connected with it. A man who is inspired by true love will not think of harming his brother; on the contrary, he will strive after preserving everybody's rights and after protecting him from injustice.

["durch die Gegenüberstellung von Liebe und Recht, Freiheit und Zwang, hatten bekanntlich die Täufer der Reformation ein Problem aufgedrängt. CALVIN weicht dem Problem nicht aus. Gegen die Anabaptistische einseitige, Staat and Recht verneinende Lösung betont er, dass es im Interesse der Liebe liegt, wenn das Recht und die damit zusammenhängende Ordnung aufrecht erhalten bleibe. Wen die echte Liebe beseelt, dem wird es nicht in den Sinn kommen, seinen Bruder zu verletzen; er wird vielmehr trachten, dass jedermann sein Recht unverletzt bleibe und dass alle gegen das Unrecht geschützt werden."] Cf. with this Op. 49, 252 ff.; 26, 313 ff.; 27, 556, 564; 27, 560; 26, 502 ff.; 27, 588.

In the passage quoted first CALVIN very significantly writes: "ergo violat caritatem si quis angaxivn inducit, quam statim consequitur rerum omnium perturbatio..."

In the second passage he observes: "St Paul nous rameine à la charité, quand il expose ce commandement d'obeyr aus Magistrats." Not, of course, in such a way, that justice could be reduced to love in the temporal meaning of both, but in such a way that love rests on the foundation of justice.

1 Recht, Naturerecht und positives Recht (2e Aufl. 1909), p. 223.

2 Cf. CALVIN, op. 27, 560; — 26, 502 ff.; — 27, 588.
understood as a legal principle. All that follows after the word ‘unlawfully’ is redundant, for I ought not to do anything unlawfully. On the standpoint of retribution the most important thing is to know what is to be understood by ‘unlawfully’; and ‘natural law’ cannot appeal to positive legal rules to find out what ‘unlawfully’ means in the context of a principle that has not yet been positivized. The commandment would be rendered contradictory if, in spite of the addition of the word ‘unlawfully’, it is interpreted in the modal meaning of love. For then it would run as follows: ‘Thou shalt not bear hatred to anybody unlawfully, since hatred is the origin of homicide.’ As if it were possible to hate one’s neighbour lawfully!

* * *

All the meaning-structures, very briefly analysed in the preceding paragraphs revealed the temporal order in the coherence of the law-spheres. This temporal order cannot be ignored with impunity by theoretical thought in the formation of its concepts.

§ 6 - COMPLICATIONS IN THE MODAL MEANING-STRUCTURE OF THE LAW-SPHERE IN BOTH THE RETROCIPIATORY AND THE ANTICIPATORY DIRECTION.

A - Retrocipations.

The structure of the modal meaning becomes extremely complicated because of the fact that a modal retrocipation does not only refer back to the meaning-nucleus of the substratum-sphere in which the analogy finds its ultimate modal point of reference. Indeed it appeals to the modal structure of this substratum-sphere in the complete coherence of its nucleus and its modal retrocipations, at least, in so far as such retrocipations exist in this modus. For this meaning-nucleus does not exist in itself but must express itself in the internal coherence with the retrocipatory and the anticipatory moments respectively, in order to preserve its character of meaning. In this intra-modal coherence the meaning-nucleus points beyond itself to the temporal inter-modal coherence of all the law-spheres.

Thus it appears that the structure of the retrocipatory meaning-moments shows an increasing degree of complication. In every
modal retrocipation the coherence between the law-spheres finds a further way of expression.

It is true that a modal retrocipation in the last instance is founded in the meaning-nucleus of the law-sphere to which it refers back in particular. But this does not take anything away from the fact that such a retrocipation cannot be conceived as detached from possible retrocipations of earlier law-spheres. The reason is that the meaning-nucleus in which it is ultimately founded, cannot exist apart from its own retrocipatory moments.

The totality of the structure of the meaning-modus.

This insight is of fundamental importance for the formation of a theoretical concept of the meaning-modi. The analysis of the meaning-nucleus, retrocipations and anticipations is the analysis of the modal structure of a totality in which the moments, as meaning-moments, can never be conceived of apart from each other. Every meaning-moment points beyond itself to all the others within the structural totality of the modal meaning, and has meaning only in the structure of the whole. The order of the retrocipatory and anticipatory meaning-moments is determined by the cosmic order of time. A modal retrocipation will be more complicated according as the law-sphere in whose meaning-nucleus it is ultimately founded is further away from the law-sphere in whose modal meaning-structure it functions as a retrocipation. The reason is that such a complicated retrocipation has undergone a successive burdening with meaning, making it much more complicated than a retrocipation which is directly founded in the retrocipated law-sphere.

Simple and complex, directly and indirectly founded retrocipations.

The modal retrocipations can therefore be distinguished into the simple and the complex, and (according to the manner of their foundation) into the directly founded and the indirectly founded retrocipations.

Consider the following examples.

The analogical meaning-moments of dimensionality and of magnitude in the original meaning of space are the only truly simple retrocipations. They are not complex because the original meaning-nucleus of the numerical aspect to which they ultimately refer, is not further connected with retrocipations. At
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the same time these retrocipations are directly founded, being connected with the nucleus of their foundation immediately, and not through the intermediary of intervening law-spheres.

The directly founded, but complex structure of the spatial analogy in the aspect of movement.

Kinematic space is an example of a complex retrocipation founded directly in its ultimate substratum. It is directly founded in the original meaning-nucleus of space because it is a spatial analogy in the modal meaning of pure movement. But its structure is not simple since implicitly it refers back to the retrocipatory moment of dimensionality in the original meaning of space. This implicit reference is expressed in the retrocipatory moment of the direction of movement, implied in kinematic space as a modal retrocipation. The direction of movement, in its turn, is founded in a dimension as an arithmetical analogy in the original meaning of space.

The complex, indirectly founded arithmetical and spatial retrocipations in the modal meaning of the legal aspect.

As examples of very complicated, indirectly founded retrocipations may be mentioned the spatial and arithmetical analogies in the juridical or legal aspect.

On the law-side of this aspect the spatial analogy is expressed in the retrocipatory moment of the extensive area of validity of the legal norms. On the subject-side of this modality the spatial analogy is expressed in the retrocipatory moment of the legal place of the juridical fact. It is true, these juridical spatial analogies are ultimately founded in the original meaning-nucleus of space (on its law- and subject-sides). But they are by no means directly founded in the latter. They are heavily charged with additional analogical meaning, because their coherence with the original spatial aspect is mediated through a series of successively intervening law-spheres in the intermodal order of time.

1 That the question concerning the place of a juridical fact is really a legal one, appears from the legal consequences of this localization. In many cases this place is not objectively given but is to be determined in accordance with legal rules. For instance: What is the local definition of a contract when the parties have declared their will by telegraph? The legal place of a fact always lies within the validity-area of a legal order and the latter is not sensorily perceptible.
The large number of the intervening spheres acting as intermediaries between them and their ultimate foundation make the structure of these retrocipations all the more complicated. In order to understand the modal structure of the legal validity-sphere it is necessary to consider that this meaning-moment, which is essential to the legal norm, appeals in the first place to the harmonious balance of juridical interests and competences. In this way excessive demands of the law-maker in a specific sphere of competence are warded off. The aesthetic retrocipation disclosed in the harmonizing manner of delimiting the legal validity-spheres refers back to a social analogy expressing itself in the indissoluble correlation between 'communal'- and 'inter-individual' law. So the harmonious delimitation of the extensive spheres of legal validity is specified into a retributive harmonization of the validity-spheres of the legal norms that rule communal and inter-personal relations in their mutual juridical interlacements.

This social analogy refers back to a lingual retrocipation in the juridical aspect, because the structure of the validity-sphere can exclusively function on the foundation of its symbolic substratum. The legal meaning of the limits of the sphere concerned can be found only in the way of a juridical interpretation of their denotation. For they must be signified, they are not given by nature as a sensory phenomenon.

The lingual analogy, in its turn, refers back to the historical retrocipation; for the inner balance between the various ranges of validity of communal law and of interindividual law requires legal organs. These organs are provided with original legal power or competence with respect to the making and realization of law in accordance with the stage of historical development.

In this way the analysis of the modal structure of the extensive legal sphere of validity should be continued in the whole series of retrocipatory analogies, implied in its modal retributive meaning.

Still more complicated than the spatial analogies summarily analysed are the arithmetical retrocipations in the modal meaning of the legal aspect. On the law-side of this aspect the arithmetical analogy reveals itself as the unity of legal order in the multiplicity of the original material spheres of competence in the

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1 'Social' is understood here again in the modal meaning of human 'intercourse'.
interlacements between communal and inter-individual relations. On the subject-side it reveals itself in the function of a legal subject as a subjective unity in the multiplicity of communal and inter-individual relations qualified by the meaning-nucleus of retribution. Furthermore, the numerical retrocipation is implied in every legal fact because the question how many legal facts are realized in a concrete event, is dependent on legal norms. In the special figure of the legal personality of a corporation or a foundation this arithmetical analogy assumes an extreme importance and pregnance.

When this analysis is continued, the modal retrocipations concerned appear to refer to the entire intermodal meaning-coherence of the juridical law-sphere with all its substratum spheres.

There can be no question of a direct foundation of the juridical arithmetical retrocipation in the original meaning-nucleus of number; nor can there be question of a direct connection between the juridical spatial analogy and the meaning-nucleus of space functioning as its ultimate foundation.

The mathematical science-ideal of Humanistic philosophy, as manifested in the nominalistic-individualistic doctrine of natural law from Grotius to Rousseau, Kant and the young Fichte, explained these complicated juridical analogies of number by imputing a mathematical meaning to them (the 'mos geometricus' in the Humanistic doctrine of natural law!). In this way it tried to eliminate the complication of meaning in the juridical arithmetical analogy and to construe the state, the juridical person and the legal order out of their 'mathematical elements': the free and equal individuals (the construction of a social contract!).

This is the same thing that Cohen, the father of the neo-Kantian Marburg School, does when he applies the 'quantitative categories' of unity, multiplicity and totality to the legal person, and to the legal relation between state and society. Cohen supposes he can follow the mathematical method, just as Hobbes did before him. Like Hobbes, he arrives at an absolutism of the state which only stops at the inner freedom of thought. But he eliminates the question whether an absolute sovereignty of the state can have a really juridical meaning, and whether the multiplicity of the different typical legal spheres can be really united by reducing them to the absolutized legal order of the state as a mathematical juristic totality.

This is not the way to handle the arithmetical analogies in the modal meaning of the legal aspect.
A brief analysis of the complicated spatial analogy in the psychical aspect with its indirect foundation.

The spatial analogies in the psychical sphere are less complex than the arithmetical and spatial analogies in the juridical aspect. They will be analysed as a last example of complicated retrocipations. The sensory space of perception (differentiated as tactile, auditory and optical space), is an objective spatial retrocipation in the meaning of the psychic law-sphere. As an objective meaning-moment it is strictly correlated with the subjective feeling of extension. It could not be actualized without this subjective feeling. Previous structural analyses have repeatedly disclosed the modal subject-object relation in connection with the retrocipatory structure of the meaning-modus. But this relation can be dealt with in more detail only in a later context.

Tactile space, together with optic space — both in their coherence with the organic substratum (but of this later on!) —, is three-dimensional in the modal meaning of sensory feeling. This three-dimensionality must not be taken in the sense of original (pure) space, though a three-dimensional extension in its pure mathematical sense is indeed its ultimate foundation in the cosmic order of time. Sensory space is a sensorily qualified extension and has only sensory dimensions, no pure ones.

The whole psychic analogy of space is not a simple one, and is by no means directly connected with the original spatial meaning. In the first place, it refers back to biotic space, itself a complex spatial analogy in the modal meaning of the biotic law-sphere. And behind this latter analogy the psychic spatial retrocipation appeals to the physical space of energy and the kinematic mode of extension. Only behind kinematic space does it refer back to the original nucleus of space, in which it finds its ultimate foundation.

Why do we perceive the sensory images of motion in the objective sensory picture of space?

This also explains how the images of motion can be perceived with the senses only in the objective psychical picture of space, although in an earlier part of this work it appeared that in the original meaning of space no movement is possible.

The explanation is that the objective sensory space of feeling is a modal retrocipation of the original modus of extension. As such it forms the necessary basis within the modal structure of the
psychical aspect for the sensory image of motion as an analogy that comes later in the modal arrangement. This in its turn is an (objective) modal retrocipation of the original meaning of motion.

Consequently sensory three-dimensional space is indeed the a priori modal condition of all sensory perceptions of the objective images of motion. The modal retrocipations in the meaning-structure of feeling, however, are not really coordinated with one another as the juxta-position of the theoretically grasped meaning-moments in our analysis might suggest. They interpenetrate intensively in the modal coherence of the meaning-aspect. In its complex structure within the modal meaning of psychical feeling objective sensory space is entirely interpenetrated by the physical and kinematic retrocipations. In the same way the subjective feeling of space is entirely interpenetrated by the subjective feeling of energy and motion. The objective sensory images of motion, too, must interpenetrate psychical space itself, and so motion can only be perceived with our senses in objective sensory space.

Similarly, in the reactive space of organic life the biotic spatial analogy is entirely interpenetrated by biotic motion. Biotic motion is only possible in organic-biotic space. Sensibility, again, is a modal retrocipation in the meaning-aspect of feeling immediately referring back to the organic structure of life. This retrocipation is of a complex character as it also refers back to organic development and, in concreto, e.g., shows various degrees of differentiation in higher and lower animals.

Organic development, in its turn, is a complex kinematic analogy in the biotic meaning-aspect which in its organic moment refers back to the arithmetical and spatial meaning-aspects.

**B - Anticipations.**

Just as in the modal retrocipations, there is an increasing structural complication in the modal anticipations; but here this complication manifests itself in the opposite direction of the cosmic order of time. The modal anticipations of a law-sphere will become more and more complicated according as this law-sphere occupies an earlier place in the temporal order in comparison with another sphere. Whereas retrocipations proved to be either simple or complex, modal anticipations can only be complex.
The only differentiation to be made here is that between directly and indirectly anticipating meaning-moments.

The reason why a modal anticipation can never have a simple structure is that even the least complicated modal anticipatory sphere, viz. the spatial anticipation in the modality of number, directly points forward to a meaning-modus (that of original space) which has a retrocipatory sphere of its own.

The complex modal structure of the so-called irrational function of number as a direct anticipation, and that of the so-called complex function of number as an indirect anticipation.

In the so-called irrational function of number ($\sqrt{2}$, $\sqrt{5}$, $\sqrt{2} + \sqrt{2}$ etc.) within the series of the `real numbers’¹ there proves to be implied a complex anticipation of the spatial meaning-moment of extensive magnitude in the modal meaning of number ². For, though this anticipation is a direct one in the sense defined above, it implies the anticipation of the meaning of spatial continuity and dimensionality.

The so-called uni-dimensionality of the infinite basic series of real numbers can therefore not be an original moment, but only an implicitly and directly anticipatory one in the meaning-structure of number. It remains qualified by the meaning-nucleus of discrete quantity. But it cannot be grasped in this modality outside of the coherence with the original continuity of extension and the moments of dimensionality and magnitude implied in the latter. The inadequacy of the infinite series of fractional rational number-values in which the irrational function of number is expressed can never be removed in the meaning of number itself. It is rather the necessary expression of the lack of self-sufficiency of the numerical modality in the anticipatory direction, the expression of its appeal to extensive magnitude in the modal meaning of continuous dimensional extension.

This anticipation of spatial dimensionality and magnitude assumes a further complication in the so-called complex function of number. In this the real numbers are deepened through their connection with the imaginary function (in the ordinary, simple

¹ ‘Real numbers’ are all rational numbers in connection with the irrational number-values interpolated between them, whose series is (as appeared, unjustly) considered to be actually continuous.

² Cf. Hankel, *Theorie der complexen Zahlensysteme* (1867) p. 59, who, wrongly however, calls the spatial concept of magnitude entirely independent of any number concept.
form: A + Bi, in which $i = \sqrt{-1}$ or $(-1)^{\frac{1}{2}}$. This is a new complication in the numerical meaning-structure because the symbol $-i$ signifies the approximation of the modal directions of pure movement in the modal function of number. Apart from this inter-modal coherence of meaning the imaginary function of number would remain perfectly meaningless. In this case we are confronted with an indirect anticipation which can only point to directions and intensity in the modal meaning of motion through the intermediary of spatial dimensionality and magnitude, and therefore anticipates movement implicitly.

In the meaning of number proper the imaginary function finds its only starting-point, as NATORP correctly pointed out, in the multiplicative relations of the + and — directions. But these relations remain originally defined by the nucleus of discrete quantity 1. In their anticipatory function they continue to imply the intermodal reference to spatial dimensionality and change of direction in the original aspect of movement. In other words, they should never be conceived in the original meaning of the continuous transformation of direction.

Reckoning with the imaginary function of number made its entrance already in the 17th century. The decisive factor, however, leading to the acknowledgment of the full value of this function of number was GRASZMANN's "Ausdehnungslehre" in close connection with HAMILTON's so-called quaternion-calculus. At first it drew little attention in mathematical circles. GRASZMANN introduced the complex numbers of an arbitrary order for the approximation of the dimensions of continuous extension. In keeping with LEIBNIZ' idea of a universal method of reckoning, GRASZMANN considers geometry merely as a species or an 'example' of a kind of mathematics which is a pure calculus. And at the same time this method wants to rise above ordinary arithmetic by including the latter in its own domain only as a special case.

But GRASZMANN did not yet go so far as to introduce the moment of dimension into the number-concept itself. With him direction and dimension are at bottom still only 'proporties' of what is countable. In his "Ausdehnungslehre" he merely wanted to create a suitable method of scientific treatment of these properties.

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1 NATORP is in principle bound to deny this, in keeping with the logicistic postulate of continuity.
Logicistical arithmetic, however, found sufficient inducement in this method to attempt a further step. Graszmann had very successfully assumed a close connection between the complex functions of number and the spatial dimensions. Logicistic arithmetic now tried to derive dimensionality as an original meaning-moment from the meaning of number proper, or rather from logical thought. It gained an easy victory over its antagonists, in so far as they regarded number as fundamentally 'uni-dimensional', and only opposed the introduction of the moment of multi-dimensional continuity in the number-concept.

In his attempt to derive the moment of multi-dimensionality from the original concept of number, conceived of in a logicist way, Natorp starts from the 'uni-dimensional' or 'linear' basic series of numbers. He considers it to be a straight line, created in rigid logical continuity from the logical basic relation of isolation and unification. In this straight line the plus- and minus-directions are strictly correlated and determine the place of each member of the series as a counter-member to a basic member, or as a basic member to a counter member. The introduction of linear dimensionality into the number-concept was preceded by the introduction of original continuity into this concept. The latter has been already discussed and found antinomic.

Natorp tries to find the logical transition to the 'multidimensional' or complex number in the multiplicative development of the so-called relative functions of number, i.e. the series in which counting (0, 1, 2, ... etc.) occurs twice, only differing through the symbols + or —, and connected in the common starting-value, 0. The logicistic concept of 'Dimension überhaupt' (dimension in general), and the modal shift of meaning in this pseudo-concept.

The logicistic shifts of meaning in Natorp's attempt to derive the so-called imaginary function of number from the fundamental logical relation of isolation and unification may be called palpable. The logicistic principle of the origin does not allow theoretical thought to respect the modal boundaries of meaning between number, space and logical analysis. That is why the logical continuity and direction of the movement of thought, as spatial and

1 Die logischen Grundlagen, p. 248.
kinematic analogies, have to do duty as a basis for the inclusion into the number-concept of the moments of continuity and dimension as original logical moments of meaning, without any reference to the original modal sense of space.

The multiplicative relations of the plus- and minus-directions in the modal temporal order of number, which have the meaning of discrete quantity, are interpreted as dimensions. After assuming actual continuity in the basic series NATORP seems really to have derived the concept of dimension from the 'logical' meaning of number itself. But this concept of dimension has become a pseudo-logical general notion without any modal definition of its meaning. This is, moreover, proved by NATORP's thesis that in order to be able to think the dimensions of space, it is necessary first to know how to think the 'Dimensionen überhaupt' (dimensions in general). The concept: 'Dimension überhaupt' has been obtained in a logicistic way from the logical analogy of dimension. But the fact has been overlooked that this analogy cannot exist without its meaning-substratum in the original modal meaning of space.

It is, however, very instructive for our insight into the complex structure of the spatial anticipations within the original meaning-aspect of number that this logicism does not see its way to include the moment of dimension into the number-concept without first introducing extensive continuity into the series of the real numbers.

Complex systems of number and the theory of groups.

The formalistic conception of the symbol $i$.

In the complex modal functions of number there is no question of a mere anticipation of spatial dimensions. Rather they anticipate, via these dimensions, modal directions of pure movement, and they do so under the guidance of the movement of theoretical thought.

This holds good both for the system of the so-called ordinary complex functions of number ($A + Bi$ etc.), and for the systematic extensions into the systems of the so-called quaternions, biquaternions and triquaternions. The modern inclusion of the whole of the theory of the complex functions of number into the so-called theory of groups$^2$ which investigates the invariant

$^1$ Die logischen Grundlagen, p. 263.

$^2$ Cf. Dr J. WOLFF, Complexe Getallenstelsels (1917, Groningen), p. 15 ff.
relations in the transformations within the group, only emphasizes this state of affairs which is revealed to us by the structural analysis of the meaning-aspect of number.

Every system of complex numbers is supposed to refer to two interchangeable groups of linear homogeneous transformation, and vice versa. As to this supposition, the intermodal coherence of meaning of the complex function of number with the modal structure of the spatial dimensions and the pure directions of movement cannot be philosophically irrelevant.

In the quaternion-systems consisting of one real and three imaginary units \((i, j, k)\), the absence of the so-called commutative quality of multiplication (entitling us in ordinary algebra to change the product \(ab\) into that of \(ba\)) cannot be understood unless its connection with the directions of pure movement is taken into account; the quaternion anticipates the latter in the meaning-aspect of number.

The formalistic trend in mathematics erroneously hold the imaginary unit \(i\) to be a self-sufficient abstract construction of thought with an unexplained meaning, while it is assumed to be immaterial that this unit \(i\) can be adequately represented in a sensory spatial picture of motion. In our treatment of the modal subject-object relation it will appear that a sensory representation pre-supposes a sensory original, and that a non-sensory original can never be depicted in a sensory way.

The point at issue is much more concerned with an (intrinsically cosmological) intermodal coherence of meaning into which the complex function of number has been fitted according to its modal structure. Even nominalistic formalism has to reckon with this, at least implicitly, in its supposedly arbitrary definitions if it is at all to be able to fix the complex functions of number in the theoretical vision.

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1. \(i, j\) and \(k\) are then interpreted as rotations of 90° round three axes, placed vertically on each other, so that their squares are \(-1\).

2. From a formalistic standpoint Hankel remarks (in his *Theorie der complexen Zahlensysteme* (1867) p. 66) on the symbol \(i\): 'It is merely a sign for an imaginary mental object which is called the imaginary unit, whose nature, however, in pure theory remains entirely undetermined and must remain so, as in this we have only to do with its formal relations and complications' ['es ist weiter nichts als ein Zeichen für ein eingebildetes mentales Objekt, welches man die imaginäre Einheit nennt, dessen eigentliches Wesen aber in der reinen Theorie ganz unbestimmt bleibt und unbestimmt bleiben muss, da wir uns in dieser nur mit seinen
A brief analysis of the complex anticipatory structure of the economy of thought.

This part of our inquiry will be concluded with a brief analysis of the complex structure of two indirect modal anticipations in the later law-spheres, viz. the economy of thought, and the feeling of justice. It has been shown that the 'economy of thought' is really an economic anticipation in the aspect of logical analysis. In the present context it will be explained how the cosmic order of time of the law-spheres finds expression in the complex structure of this anticipation. In other words, it will appear that the economic anticipation of thought cannot directly start from the anticipated modal meaning of the economic law-sphere, but only through the intermediary of all the modal aspects lying between the logical and the economic law-spheres. Consequently, in this anticipation there are quite a series of other anticipations implied.

An earlier analysis has shown that the economic anticipation of the logical meaning-aspect can only express itself in deepened, theoretical scientific thought. In scientific thought the modal meaning of analysis acquires a systematic tendency, in which logical distinction is deepened into logical control. In this logical control expressing itself in the systematic character of theoretical thought, the analytical modality in the first place anticipates the aspect of history. This anticipation has been examined in an earlier context. For the present it must be established that the economy of thought is meaningless without the foundation of logical control. All the biologistic misconceptions of the principle of analytical economy in the school of MACH and AVENARIUS are due to a lack of insight into the anticipatory coherence of meaning in which this principle can only reveal its true meaning. It is in the anticipatory meaning-coherence between the logical and the historical law-spheres alone that also the history of scientific thought can be assigned its true place.

This cosmic meaning-coherence between the logical and the historical law-spheres is misinterpreted by Historism, in its radical form defended by Oswald Spengler. It surreptitiously substitutes the historical modality of meaning for the theoretical logical one. This point will be discussed later on.

formalen Verknüpfungen zu beschäftigen haben.

But the imaginary function has not a hidden 'metaphysical nature' as Hankel thinks. Its functional side itself is at issue, on which its entire complex of apriori law-conformable relations depend!
Logical control, as an historical anticipation in the modal meaning of logic, cannot unfold itself into real economy of thought without anticipating the modal meaning of language. Logical control must provide itself with an intermediary basis for deepening its meaning into economy of thought. It does so in the modal anticipation of logical symbolism, which has been explained before. In its turn the economy of thought becomes the modal foundation for logical harmony in which the theoretical system anticipates the nucleus of the aesthetic law-sphere.

In its *judicial* function theoretical thought inquires after the logical justification of every theoretical judgment, and in this way it anticipates the meaning-nucleus of the legal aspect. KANT has stressed this anticipatory function of analysis *with reference to the 'Gegenstand'* by saying that theoretical reason has to interrogate nature as a judge and not as a pupil. In fact, there is an undeniable coherence of meaning between the judicial function of theoretical analysis and that of jurisdiction in its original retributive sense. In theoretical thought it is necessary to balance the logical grounds and the counter-grounds of an argument just as a judge has to balance the claims of two litigants. Only the modal meaning of the judicial function of theoretical analysis differs from that of jurisdiction in its legal sense. But the aesthetic and juridical anticipations of the modal meaning of analysis are already further away in the anticipatory direction of time than the economic anticipation. The present enquiry is merely intended to show that the economy of thought is necessarily founded in logical control and logical symbolism.

A brief analysis of the structure of the feeling of justice as a complex modal anticipation.

Our last example of the complex structure of modal anticipations is the modal meaning-figure of the feeling of justice (Rechtsgefühl). The feeling of justice is a modal anticipation in the meaning-structure of the psychical law-sphere. The psychical aspect here anticipates the meaning-kernel of the legal

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1 The social anticipation of the analytical modus will be left alone in this context. A discussion of this analogy would have to anticipate our insight into the relation between the individual and the communal character of science, which cannot be explained before our discussion of the epistemological problem. Here we restrict ourselves to those anticipations that can be shown to exist in the present stage of our enquiry.
sphere. This modal anticipation in the structure of feeling, however, cannot point forward directly to the latter, but only through the intermediary of the modal structures of all the intervening law-spheres.

Before the feeling-modus can deepen into legal feeling — which is something entirely different from the animal feeling of revenge, rigidly bound up with biotic stimuli, — the psychical aspect must have deepened to logical feeling. Then feeling anticipates analytical distinction, although not necessarily theoretical analysis, which fact will appear to be important in the sequel.

Animals can have no feeling of justice, if only for the reason that they lack the normative analytical function. The deepening of feeling into logical feeling, however, is not a sufficient foundation for the modal anticipation in the feeling of justice. Psychiatric science confirms the fact that logical feeling may have developed even to a striking degree of sharpness while the feeling for social intercourse, the feeling of justice and moral feeling are lacking (cf. the figure of ‘moral insanity’). In modern man this may be a pathological phenomenon, it is nevertheless an indication that the feeling of justice has a very complicated structure. Its complication would be quite inexplicable, if it is assumed that this anticipatory function starts directly from the structure of logical feeling.

In the first place it must be observed that the feeling of justice can only manifest itself in a psychical form which differentiates it clearly from the feeling of social intercourse, from aesthetic feeling, moral feeling and the feeling of faith. This occurs at an historical level of civilization that offers a sufficient foundation for the articulated distinction of social norms of intercourse, aesthetic norms, legal norms, moral norms, and norms of faith. Even among the highly cultured Greeks, beauty, justice and morals were an undifferentiated whole in the popular mind. The καλοκαγαθίας ‘embodied’ the Greek ideal of personal perfection. In primitive tribes a differentiated feeling of justice will be sought in vain; they have only an inarticulate tribal feeling of what is permissible and what is not. The psychical reaction upon every assault on the tribal order cannot be compared with the modern differentiated feeling of justice.

In a later context we shall revert to this very interesting state of affairs. For the present it should only be stated that the feeling-aspect must first be deepened in its anticipating the historical meaning of culture, if there is to be any question of a differen-
tiated feeling of justice. It is impossible to disentangle the 
(essentially modern) feeling of justice from the cultural 
feeling of modern man. The feeling of justice, as a modal anti-
ception in the psychical aspect, is founded in the opening of 
the historical anticipation in the modal structure of feeling.

The low degree of differentiation in the axiological 
spheres of feeling at a primitive stage of culture.

Modern genetic psychology, which for the rest has by no 
means univocally delimited its scientific field of research, has 
thrown a strong light on the low degree of differentiation in the 
axiological spheres of feeling at a primitive cultural level. It has 
also shown that at a higher cultural stage there is an increase in 
this differentiation. There is a very striking parallelism between 
the life of feeling in primitive man and that in the child.

With regard to a child's emotional life, the Hamburg Pro-
Fessor Heinz Werner¹ observes: 'The splitting up of the un-
differentiated complexes of feeling into specifically different 
feelings, as Kroh shows, is not yet finished at a child's entry 
into the Elementary School. The distinction between the evaluat-
ing feelings has not yet been accomplished: aesthetical, ethical, 
and with these also utilitarian moments of feeling are often 
woven into one complex unit. 'Not seldom do we observe in 
young children,' says Kroh, 'a more or less complete identi-
fication of ethical and aesthetical values: 'hateful' and 'un-
just', 'beautiful' and 'good' become identical notions. This view 
leads many children to look upon injustice as a kind of 'stain'².

Of course, the anticipatory differentiation in the meaning-
aspect of feeling at a higher cultural level must be sharply 
distinguished from the retrocipatory differentiation which is 
connected with the organic development in the biotic meaning-
sphere. The primary error committed by every naturalistic 
theory of evolution is that it loses sight of this difference.

Genetic psychology has established that the axiological dif-
ferentiation in human feeling is dependent on the stage of our 
cultural development. This is a state of affairs which can no

¹ Heinz Werner, Einführung in die Entwicklungspsychologie (2e Aufl., 
1933) p. 71. [Introduction to Genetic Psychology]. For the rest I do not at 
all agree with the strongly constructive way in which this psychology 
sets to work with its schema of differentiation, and by which, in my 
opinion, it falsifies in particular primitive thought.

longer be denied after its detection. But it can only be correctly interpreted if we constantly bear in mind the cosmic order of time with regard to the psychical and the historical law-spheres as manifested in their modal meaning-structures. The theory of the modal-spheres lays a solid foundation for the investigations of special science by the analysis of these structures.

The feeling of justice pre-supposes a successive series of intermediate psychical anticipations, not only logical and historical feeling, briefly examined above, but also symbolic feeling, social feeling, economic feeling and aesthetical feeling. We shall not go into all this. For the present it may suffice to refer to the correlation with the retrocipatory structure of the legal meaning in which the previous analysis has shown the symbolic, social, economic and aesthetical analogies.

Some new complications in the anticipatory structure of the modal meaning-aspect. The normative anticipations do not refer to the merely retrocipatory structure of the anticipated aspect.

The meaning-analysis of the feeling of justice has revealed a new complication in the anticipatory modal structure of the law-sphere which in the present context immediately demands the closest attention.

When dealing with the analysis of the historical anticipation in the feeling of justice it must have struck the reader that this anticipation does not simply refer to the modal nucleus of the historical aspect in the context of its retrocipatory structure. It has rather appeared that the differentiated feeling of justice pre-supposes a higher stage of cultural development. This is to say, the historical anticipation appears to start from the anticipated modal meaning-structure of history which has already opened out its own anticipatory spheres.

The same thing holds good with regard to all the other anticipations in the modal aspect of feeling. And so we are confronted with a kind of complexity in the anticipatory structure of this law-sphere which seems to point in the direction of the boundless, the apeiron. The reason is that the historical-cultural aspect in its anticipatory spheres does not yield a resting-point either, but in its turn refers forward to the following anticipatory meaning-structures. And in the last law-sphere, the second terminal sphere of our temporal cosmos, viz. the sphere of faith, the insight into the entire anticipatory movement of
meaning seems to be brought to a deadlock. No rest is to be
found here for the dynamics of meaning. For, if the temporal
aspect of faith were indeed the absolute zero-point of the anti-
icipatory movement of meaning, the whole of the dynamics of
meaning would come to a standstill within its own structure,
and so cease to be meaning at all.

The unrest discovered in meaning as such, and in the modal
structure of the normative anticipations in particular, does not
suffer rigidity in time. The opening-process in the temporal
diversity and coherence of meaning in its entirety now demands
attention. Unless philosophic thought maintains its transcen-
dental direction to religious self-reflexion, it cannot succeed in
elucidating the profound problem that announces itself here.
CHAPTER III

THE OPENING-PROCESS¹ IN THE ANTICIPATORY MEANING-STRUCTURE OF THE LAW-SPHERES.


The modal structure of a law-sphere is primarily expressed in the continuous coherence (systasis) of its nuclear moment and retrocipations, at least insofar as it has substrata in the cosmic temporal order.

The modal retrocipations are inseparable from the modal nuclei of all the law-spheres — with the sole exception of the numerical — so that, in general, modal meaning cannot express itself outside of the retrocipatory coherence of meaning.

The primary structure of a founded meaning-modus.

For this reason the coherence of a modal nucleus and its modal retrocipations is to be called the primary structure of a modal aspect which is founded in one or more others. That is why, for instance, in the primary modal meaning of an illegal act there must of necessity be an analogy of energy-effect in the factual juridical causality if we are to speak of a legal fact. No act of human behaviour can be illegal if it does not causally encroach upon the retributive harmony of the communal and inter-individual interests, thereby yielding a juridical ground for legal consequences on the law-side of the juridical aspect. Juridical causality is also pre-supposed in cases where human behaviour formally deviates from a legal norm which does not mention a particular effect of the unlawful deed or

¹ The Dutch text has 'ontsluitingsproces'. The term 'opening-process' though occasionally replaced by the words 'unfolding-process, process of disclosure, or process of expansion,' seems to be preferable.
omission. Otherwise, why should this action have been forbidden by a legal order?  

It is quite possible, however, that the anticipatory functions of the modal meaning of retribution have not yet been opened out in temporal reality. This state of affairs has already been noticed in the preceding inquiry into the modal structure of the juridical aspect. But now it demands special attention in the general context of an analysis of the opening-process in the normative law-spheres.

The expression of the modal meaning of retribution in a primitive legal order.

In a primitive society — apart from some scarce indications of a distinction between accident and intention — criminal law is based on the principle of "Erfolgshaftung" (responsibility for the factual consequences of the deed).

As a legal ground for a juridical consequence to take effect (on the law-side), the causal legal fact is generally sufficient here. The juridical causal relation, as a retrocipation of the physical effect, shows the complex structure examined in the case of other retrocipations in the preceding section 2.

Retribution — as expressed in the criminal law of a primitive tribal community — still clings rigidly to its modal substrata without having deepened itself into the anticipatory principle of accountability for guilt.

Cf. my treatise: Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in het licht der Wetsidee (Anti-Revolutionaire Staatkunde, driemaandelijks orgaan, 1928).

The juridical causality of a legal fact, as the juridical basis for the juridical effect on the law-side, is e.g. evidently impossible but for the substratum of logical causality which itself has an analogical character. This analogy finds expression on the law-side of logical causality in the principle of the sufficient ground. On the basis of the analytical principle juridical causality implies normative imputation either to objective legal facts (as fire, storm, hail in the case of insurance against damage), or to subjective legal facts (delicts, delay in the performance of contractual duties etc.). The legal extent of the causal nexus imputed to a legal fact is always dependent on juridical principles of responsibility (the principle of risk or the principle of guilt, respectively). The legal causal nexus in the last analysis presupposes a physical nexus as its ultimate substratum. But it is never to be identified with the latter on penalty of involving legal theory in insoluble antinomies. The most striking example of such antinomies is to be found in the contradictions resulting from the attempt to reduce the famous causation by omission to a natural scientific concept of causality.
In the same way the legal subjectivity of man and the validity-area of the norms are still rigidly bound up with the unopened aspect of social intercourse restricted to the members of the tribe. The foreigner as such is still hostis, exlex. He is excluded from peaceful intercourse, from juridical and moral relations, as well as from relations of faith. (The primitive communal order is an undifferentiated whole whose modal functions have not yet been explicitly distinguished).

A gratuitous donation, as an act of liberality, is unknown in the primitive legal order. The principle of do ut des rigorously governs the whole of the primitive law of contract, even the mutual exchange of gifts.

The primitive law of contract (as yet little developed) is characterized by a strict formalism, frequently exhibiting magic traits, in which there is no room for the anticipatory principles of good faith, of 'justa causa', of 'equity' etc., as little as there is a possibility to challenge a declaration of will on the ground of error, compulsion and deceit.

On the inert substratum of primitive thought all juridical acts are still tied down to the sensory symbol. A juridical act that has not been represented by means of a sensory symbol cannot be understood by the primitive mind. That is why the subjective rights to things are not understood if they are not expressed in a sensory way in the 'wer' or 'Gewehre', the actual possession of a thing visible to all. Hence it testifies to a lack of real insight into legal history if the attempt is made to find in a primitive legal order the abstract right of property (protected by a civil lawsuit) quite apart from the 'wer'.

Also the normative substratum-spheres of a primitive juridical order are still in a rigid condition, not yet deepened by the opening-process.

Nevertheless, primitive legal life, as a component of the undifferentiated communal order, is to a high degree directed by primitive popular faith. This state of affairs gives rise to a new problem which can be discussed only in a later phase of our inquiry.

The primitive closed structure of the feeling-aspect in animal life.

In the psychical law-sphere the modal meaning-structure of feeling still manifests itself in the primary, rigid form in animals. There may be different degrees of differentiation and of higher
development in psychical animal life, in accordance with the stage of organic development that an animal has reached. There may even be found proofs of 'intellect' in the psychical reaction upon new factual situations, resting upon a deliberate presentiment of causal and teleological relations (not upon rational analysis). But an animal's subjective psychical feeling remains in a closed state with regard to the meaning of the normative law-spheres. It is not susceptible of anticipation in the axiological sense of the word; it is not capable of a deepening of meaning under the direction of normative functions of consciousness.

The closed structure of the aspect of energy-effect.

The aspect of energy-effect shows its modal meaning in a rigid closed structure in physical-chemical processes that are not guided and directed by higher modal functions. But in the inner individuality-structure of a living organism the physical-chemical processes are deepened by anticipating the directing impulses of organic life. In an animal organism they also reveal psychical anticipations¹, in the human living organism even anticipations of the normative aspects.

The law-sphere in its restrictive function and in its expansive function. Guiding modal-functions.

In all cases in which the opening-process has not yet started, the anticipatory spheres of the modal structure are still closed and the modal aspect still shows itself in a rigid, restrictive function.

When the anticipatory spheres are opened out, the modal meaning is deepened and expresses itself in an expansive or deepened function. This opening is possible only under the guidance of the anticipated law-spheres. But, because it is only an opening-process that manifests itself here, the possibilities of anticipation must be implied and latent in the modal meaning-structure of all the aspects preceding the second terminal sphere.

In future the modal anticipations will be called guided or directed meaning-functions, and the modal meaning-functions

¹ Cf. e.g. PAVLOV's experiments with dogs concerning the secretion of spittle under the direction of psychical associations, or the physical-chemical reactions in a psychical state of rage or fear.
of the anticipated spheres guiding or directing functions. The guiding meaning-function points the way to the guided function towards the opening of its meaning.

The numerical meaning-aspect for instance is not self-sufficient with regard to the opening of its meaning, it has no self-guarantee in the matter of its modal anticipations. Only through the guiding function of later aspects do the anticipatory-spheres of the numerical meaning open out into the 'approximating numerical functions'. The irrational and differential functions of number are 'limiting' functions of the numerical aspect. They point forward to the original meaning of space and motion, which are not given in the arithmetical aspect proper.

The psychical meaning-aspect is opened through the guiding function of the analytic aspect into deepened logical feeling. The modal meaning of feeling has no self-guarantee with regard to its deepening into logical feeling. Logical feeling is a modal limiting function of the psychical aspect in which the latter approximates the analytic meaning which is not given in the modal structure of the psychical law-sphere proper.

Only through the guiding function of the moral aspect does the moral anticipatory sphere in the juridical modality open itself. The retributive meaning in itself has no guarantee for its anticipatory functions in juridical guilt, good faith, good morals, etc. All these juridical figures are limiting functions of the retributive aspect, in which the latter approximates the modal meaning of morality which is not to be found in the meaning of retribution itself.

Deepening of the modal retrocipations through the opening-out of the anticipatory spheres of the modal aspect.

The modal anticipations deepen the entire primary meaning of the law-sphere in the coherence of its nucleus and retrocipations.

Thus subjective juridical guilt deepens the primary meaning of an illegal act. It deepens the unlawfulness, the juridical causality, the juridical imputation, etc., as it approximates the moral attitude of the agent in the subjective meaning of retribution. For this reason it is unscientific to treat causality, illegality and guilt as three absolutely separate elements of a punishable fact, as is done in the current doctrine of criminal law.

The isolating treatment of these three basic concepts of criminal law disturbs the intermodal coherence of meaning and is
due to an un-juridical view of causality and guilt, owing to which unlawfulness, too, cannot be conceived in its material modal retributive sense.

The internal antinomies into which this treatment entangles the doctrine of criminal law have been analysed elaborately in my treatise: Beropsmisdaad en Strafvergelding in het licht der Wetsidee (1926)\(^1\).

Another example of the deepening influence of the anticipations upon the primary structure of a modal meaning-aspect is found in the modal sphere of feeling. Logical feeling, cultural feeling, linguistic feeling etc. deepen the modal retrocipations in the latter. Sensory perception, e.g., as a biotic retrocipation in human feeling has its own meaning deepened, when the opening-process in the psychical law-sphere has started and raises human sensibility on account of its anticipatory function above the sensory life of the animals.

Concept and Idea of the modal meaning-aspect and their relation in the foundational as well as in the transcendental direction of time.

On the distinction between the primary and the deepened modal meaning rests the distinction between concept and Idea of a specific aspect.

Especially since Kant this distinction has been universally adopted in philosophy but it could not be fathomed in its full import in immanence-philosophy.

Of each law-sphere it is possible to form a theoretical concept of its modal meaning as well as a theoretical Idea.

The modal structure in its ‘restrictive function’ is grasped by a synthetical concept, but its ‘expansive function’ is only to be approximated in a synthetical Idea of its meaning, which, as a transcendental ἐπιθέως, seizes upon the anticipated modal structures in advance.

In this way the number-concept and the number-Idea, the concept of space and the Idea of space, the concept of feeling and the Idea of feeling, the concept of law and the Idea of justice, etc., both theoretically comprehend the modal meanings of the same respective law-spheres. But the theoretical Idea points in another direction of time, viz. the transcendental or

\(^1\) Professional Crime and Penal Retribution in the Light of the Cosmonic Idea (published in the quarterly review Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde, 1929).
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anticipatory direction, and it cannot be closed up in time. Hence every conception of the theoretical Idea as a concept destroys the theoretical meaning of the Idea and draws philosophical thought away from its true transcendental direction.

The theoretical antinomy in mistaking the Idea for a concept.

And now the inquiry quite naturally reverts to the question raised in the first explanation of the method of antinomy, viz. in how far the abuse of the theoretical Idea as a rational concept gives rise to the special theoretical antinomies.

The matter stands in fact as follows: if the Idea of a modal meaning-aspect is used as if it were a concept, the necessary consequence is a theoretical eradication of the modal boundaries of the law-spheres. This appeared to be the very origin of the special theoretical antinomies. In the Idea of a modal aspect theoretic thought can only approximate the intermodal coherence between the law-spheres, their radical unity and Origin; it can never really comprehend these transcendental presuppositions in a concept. The theoretical Idea is a transcendental limiting concept.

Anyone who tries to overstep the temporal limits of the modally qualified Idea, and thinks he can comprehend the coherence and the totality of meaning theoretically in the Idea of a specific aspect, lapses into absolutizing the modal speciality of meaning. This procedure is incompatible with the due observance of the modal sovereignty of an aspect in its own sphere.

All the 'isms' in immanence-philosophy are guilty of the abuse of the modal theoretical Idea as a concept. Also transcendental idealism has not avoided this misconception of the Idea, in so far as it identifies a modal Idea with the meaning-totality of the cosmos 1.

With equal right it can be said that the concept founds the modal Idea, and that the modal Idea is the foundation of the concept.

In the transcendental direction pointing to the totality of meaning every concept is dependent on the Idea; in the found-

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1 The distinction between theoretical and practical Ideas in Kant cannot be adduced against this. Also Kant's Idea of the 'homo noumenon' is a theoretical Idea in our sense, since it rests on a synthetical abstraction of meaning. That Kant restricts science to the sensory experience of nature is irrelevant to this point.
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Ational direction of time the Idea of the meaning-modus is dependent on the concept of that modus.

Only the cosmonomic Idea, as the transcendental basic Idea, is the presupposition both of the concept and the Idea of every meaning-modality.

When a normative meaning-modus in temporal reality still expresses itself in a restrictive, closed structure, this primitive expression shows a certain formalistic character. An example of this can be found again in primitive law, enclosed as it is within the totality of the primitive social order. How rigid the view of justice is which has not yet grasped the Idea of the modal meaning of retribution appears even in the name given to primitive customary law with the old Germanic tribes. In Old-Germanic the latter was called ēwa (in Old-English texts: æw) ¹. It is possible to explain the meaning of this Old-Germanic word in more than one way — but one thing is certain, it implied a rigorous kind of unchangeability.

Such a legal order in its primitive meaning-structure is nonetheless a juridical one. As regards its validity it is founded in the rigid, non-anticipatory principles of retribution which have been realized in it. It is no arbitrariness. And yet, only on the basis of the Idea of justice can the meaning proper of such a primitive legal order be grasped, because it is only in an Idea that philosophical thinking can be directed towards the religious fulness of meaning, and all meaning is rooted in religion and has a Divine origin.

If the opening of the anticipatory spheres of the modal meaning of the juridical aspect is to be accomplished, the opening of the meaning of its substratum spheres must also have started.

The retrocipatory and the anticipatory directions of time in the opening-process of the normative anticipatory spheres.

In the cosmic temporal order the correlation between the retrocipatory and anticipatory directions of time is indissoluble. Therefore the opening-process in a modal aspect cannot be set going in the transcendental direction of time without its found-

¹ Indo European: *aiwón*, Greek *aión*, meaning: age, eternity, are cognate with Latin: *ævum*; and with primitive Germanic *ēwa*, meaning law; from this came Old English - *æ*, or *æw*, meaning: divine or human law, custom, religious rite, marriage, faith, religion; the literal meaning is given as: 'something established from time immemorial'.
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ation in the disclosure of its substratum-spheres; at least, if this modal aspect itself does not serve as the ultimate basis for the opening-process in the later law-spheres.

The preceding chapter terminated with the formulation of the philosophical problem evoked by the opening-process in the normative and in the non-normative law-spheres, the latter as far as their normative anticipatory spheres are concerned.

It appeared then that every 'guiding normative function' must first open its own anticipatory spheres if it is to direct the earlier spheres in cosmic time in the process of the opening of their meaning. The whole opening-process seemed to get stuck in the last limiting sphere of our cosmos, i.e. that of faith, which has no modal anticipatory spheres. And the historical law-sphere was the first to make us aware of the problem.

The entire opening-process in the normative aspects proved to be dependent on a 'higher level of historical development'. Of a higher level of historical development there can, however, be no question unless the modal meaning of history has been deepened in the opening of its anticipatory spheres.

Does the opening-process of the normative anticipations start in a particular law-sphere?

Where does the opening-process of the anticipatory spheres of the modal aspects start in the normative dynamics of our cosmos? When this question is raised, the cosmic order of time is again to be considered in its two directions.

The transcendental (or anticipatory) direction of time cannot be arrested; it points unalterably above time. If it appears to be the modal function of faith that ultimately leads every opening of the normative anticipations, this can only show that the whole opening-process is not self-sufficient in the transcendental direction. This fact confronts philosophy with a fundamental problem, because the modal function of faith is the modal limiting function in the opening-process, and as such it has no modal anticipatory spheres.

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1 As to the pre-logical modal spheres one can speak of normative anticipatory spheres only in the sense of their anticipatory coherence with original normative meaning-modalities. The pre-logical aspects, as such, are not ruled by norms proper. Legal or moral feeling for instance remain subjected to the laws of emotional life which lack normative character. But the latter have opened their modal psychical meaning under the direction of the anticipated normative aspects.
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If, however, the question regarding the starting-point of the opening-process is related to the retrocipatory direction of time, it must be possible to point out a normative law-sphere on whose modal opening of meaning the whole opening-process depends in all the other normative law-spheres.

In the analysis of the modal retrocipations our attention was always directed to a law-sphere in whose modal nucleus the retrocipation is ultimately founded. In other words, the retrocipatory direction of time offers to theoretical thinking, at least provisionally, some resting-points in the original meaning-nuclei. It is true that these resting-points are again done away with by the transcendental direction of time without which they would become rigid and meaningless. Nevertheless, the first consideration provides a sufficient ground for the supposition that in the foundational direction there must exist a normative law-sphere in which the opening-process of the normative anticipatory spheres gets started. The only reserve to be made is that the point of comparative rest in this way offered to philosophic reflection on the possibility of the modal meaning-opening, is only a *provisional* resting-point. In the transcendental direction of thought it must necessarily be resolved into the essential unrest of meaning.

Provisionally it will be assumed that the law-sphere required is that of the historical aspect. According to this supposition the opening-process of the normative spheres must start here in the retrocipatory direction of time.

The historical law-sphere as the foundation of the entire opening-process of the normative anticipatory spheres of the modal aspects.

In the sequel of these investigations it will become more and more transparent that the historical aspect must really have this special place assigned to it in the retrocipatory temporal direction as regards the entire opening-process of the normative anticipatory spheres. The historical sphere must in fact be called the *nodal point of the entire normative meaning-dynamics within cosmic time*, in so far as all normative deepenings of meaning in the law-spheres have the raising of the cultural level in the historical process for their foundational ἐξόθεους.

If the historical law-sphere is indeed to have this foundational function in the opening-process of the normative anticipations
within the modal structures, the opening of its own anticipatory spheres cannot have an earlier foundation in time. Every attempt to find its foundation in an earlier law-sphere must in this case land us in a vicious circle.

It is true that with reference to the logical sphere the modal opening of the historical aspect is the first \( \varepsilon \pi \delta \varepsilon \alpha \zeta \) in the transcendental or anticipatory direction of time. This has been shown in the brief analysis of the principle of economy of thought. But the opening-process of the historical law-sphere as such cannot be founded in that of the logical aspect, since the meaning-disclosure of the logical sphere itself proved to be possible only at a higher cultural level of development.

It is possible that in the historical and in the post-historical law-spheres the opening-process has already started without naïve logical thinking having been deepened into scientific theoretical thought. So, for instance, the Carolingian renaissance of science and arts had the establishment of the Carolingian empire as a real state-power for its historical foundation. It will be shown in Vol. III that a real State cannot appear at a closed historical stage of culture. But it is not possible that science starts without the guidance of a deepened manifestation of human power in the opening-process of history. As long as a rigid historical tradition has the exclusive mastery over the human mind and wards off any progressive conception of culture, science lacks the primary conditions of its rise and development.

Here we are indeed confronted with a peculiar feature in the functional structure of the normative opening-process. In all the substratum-spheres of the historical aspect the opening of the normative anticipatory spheres appears to be one-sidedly dependent on the beginning of the meaning-disclosure in cultural development. With regard to the opening of the preceding law-spheres this beginning, consequently, lies in the transcendental direction of time. In all the post-historical law-spheres, on the other hand, the process of disclosure has a \( \varepsilon \pi \delta \varepsilon \alpha \zeta \) both in the foundational and the transcendental temporal direction.

In a strict sense the beginning of the disclosure in the historical law-sphere is not the foundation of the normative meaning-disclosure in the preceding law-spheres. But all the same, here too, there is a one-sided irreversible relation of dependence entitling us to call the historical law-sphere, in the foundational direction, the nodal point of the entire process of disclosure in the normative anticipatory spheres of the other aspects.
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The expression of the foundational direction of time within the transcendental direction of time itself.

After all, even the foundational relation in the normative process of disclosure is a relation that functions within the transcendental direction of time, because the deepening of the modal meaning is, as such, of an anticipatory character, no matter in which law-sphere it takes place. So it appears that the twofold direction of time finds expression in the transcendental temporal direction itself. A correct insight into the special position of the historical aspect in the opening-process, however, is entirely dependent on the view that historical development, as such, is really enclosed in a specific modal law-sphere. But this is a view that must rouse the opposition of modern Historism in all its forms (the naturalistic as well as the spiritualistic). Even in Christian thought this conception may be called, to say the least, a very unusual one. Therefore in the first place this point must be made clear if our whole line of thought is not to lack its basis. And for this reason it is necessary to give a more detailed analysis of the 'modal meaning of history'.

§ 2 - THE MODAL MEANING-NUCLEUS OF HISTORY

The pre-theoretical and the theoretical conceptions of history.

In the pre-scientific language of every day it is, of course, quite legitimate to talk of history as the complex of successive events that have really happened in the past. Non-scientific linguistic usage is integrated into the mental attitude of naïve experience, which lacks a theoretical analysis of the aspects.

When, e.g., a Christian statesman in opposition to speculative political constructions repeatedly appeals to the adage: 'It is written, and it has happened!'\(^1\), it must be clear that history is not conceived here in an abstract theoretical sense, but rather in the fulness of the concrete temporal coherence of meaning, revealed within typical structures of totality and individuality. But in this non-theoretical attitude of experience the modal meaning of history in that concrete coherence of past events is

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\(^1\) This adage was directed by the famous Dutch Christian statesman and historian Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer against the natural law constructions of the state, familiar to the French revolution. Cf. The Authorized (King James) Version Matthew 4:4.
undoubtedly meant implicitly. Only this modal meaning has not been theoretically conceived here in an explicit way; it has not been made a theoretical 'Gegenstand' of analysis; it has not yet become a problem of thought.

If, however, in the theoretical attitude of thought the question is asked: 'What is history?' the answer: 'All that happened in the past' does not really get us a step further.

That you had dinner, smoked a cigar, and took a cup of coffee yesterday, all this at the present moment no doubt belongs to the past.

It cannot be denied that these concrete actions have an inherent historical aspect, since in the Middle Ages people did not smoke cigars and drink coffee. The introduction and general adoption of these luxuries undeniably belong to the realm of historical development. For this very reason, however, it is extremely important to know what exactly constitutes the historical aspect of these activities, in other words what is the modal meaning of history.

The 'past' taken in an unqualified sense comprises a great deal that cannot be considered as historical in a modal sense. The fact, e.g., that I breathed yesterday is no less a thing of the past, but the merely 'natural' aspects of this event do not fall within the scope of 'history'.

Besides, the restriction of history to what has happened in the past cannot be essential even to the pre-theoretical attitude of experience. Everybody experienced the great moment of the invasion of France as a historical event, as the decisive turning-point in the second world-war.

History unites the present, the past and the future. It is exactly in its historical aspect that time assumes this threefold articulation. The present is the historical orienting-point between what has passed away and what is coming. The past and the future meet in the historical present. The latter is the point of reflection in our experience of historical time. But what is the historical mode of experience?

Many historians are satisfied by the statement that the historical viewpoint refers to becoming, genesis or evolution. The famous Dutch historian Robert Früin, e.g., defined the science of history as 'the science of becoming'.

But becoming, or genesis is an analogical concept which in analytical scientific thought demands its modal delimitation of meaning, since the term genesis here has very different modal
significations. It is also used in chemistry, in geology, in biology, in psychology, in linguistic science, in jurisprudence, and so on.

The equally analogical concept of evolution lacking all modal specification of meaning, also does not offer a real criterion, if we want to characterize the historical mode of experience. In the organic processes of the life of plants and animals there is also question of ‘evolution’, and it is here that the term doubtless has its original sense. ‘Evolution’ is a concept applied to phenomena in all the modal aspects of reality founded in the biotic law-sphere. It is therefore especially important to know what modal meaning is grasped in historical evolution.

Different views of the meaning of history.

What then is the modal meaning of history? Many answers are given in modern philosophy to the question what is the end or telos of history, and what is the specific method of historical science. But the modal meaning of the historical viewpoint has never really been investigated.

Many writers, following the footsteps of Comte’s positivism, look upon history as the progressive evolution of mankind which in the course of its successive phases is subject to ‘sociological’ laws erroneously interpreted as ‘laws of nature’.

Others, oriented to the neo-Kantian view of the South-Western German School, consider the historical aspect to be a transcendental-synthetic relation of human judgment. By means of this the transcendental subject of judgment is supposed to relate empirical reality, which in itself is “wertblind”, i.e. devoid of value, (and which is identified with the sensorily perceptual phenomena of ‘nature’), to universally acknowledged values in human society (the state, art, religion, economy, law, etc.).

Historical science, as cultural science, is supposed to pay special attention to the individuality of the phenomena that are thus considered as “Sinngebilde” (meaning-formations). In contrast to this method of thinking natural science is said to proceed in a generalizing way and to be ‘blind to values’.

The adherents of Hegelian idealism view history as the temporal mode of development of ‘spiritual reality’ in which the

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1 The juridical concept of genesis is related to the formal sources of law and the origin of legal relations (obligations, rights, and so on).
'objective Mind' immanently unfolds its infinite wealth of meaning. Each individual phenomenon in history is a particular figure or shape adopted by that Mind in its dialectical course through the history of the world; it is an individual moment in the spiritual totality, only intelligible in the coherence of the whole.

And then there are others (Spengler, etc.) who are of the opinion that history is a stream of life which in the course of centuries produces parallel, self-contained types of culture growing up, maturing, and dying, just like natural organisms.

And lastly, the philosophy of existence holds that history is the typical mode of being of human existence as such. Here 'history' is taken in the purely subjective and individual sense of the free project of one's personal existential being, not in the 'objective' social sense intended by the science of history.

Behind all these conceptions there is no difficulty in recognizing the fundamental structure of the cosmonomic Idea of Humanistic immanence-philosophy analyzed in great detail in Volume I. They cannot reveal the modal meaning of history because they do not recognize modal law-spheres. And they cannot accept modal law-spheres because they start from the dialectical religious basic motive of nature and freedom which disturbs the insight into the modal structures of meaning.

In the preceding chapter the modal meaning-nucleus of the historical law-sphere has been provisionally circumscribed as the controlling manner of moulding the social process. Strictly speaking, this nuclear moment should only be designated by the term control or mastery, since the additional moment of the circumscription has an analogical character. But control or mastery in its original (non-analogical) sense was assumed to be an irreducible modal manner of formation according to a free project. And this is exactly the original meaning of the term culture which is generally used to designate the 'Gegenstand' of historical science in contradistinction to the fields of research of natural science.

We have first to show that the term 'culture' according to its original sense really refers to an original and irreducible modal nucleus by means of which a genuine law-sphere is delimited which is to be indicated as the historical.
The modal nuclear meaning of the term culture and the ambiguity of the term history.

Doubtless, the indication of the specific field of research of the science of history by the term 'culture' is not complete. The historian studies the cultural process of development of human society. But it must be clear that in this more ample circumscription the process of development can only be an analogical moment which, as such, is not suitable to qualify the historical viewpoint proper. Rather it must derive all its modal qualification from the preceding adjective.

Apart from their reference to the cultural modality of social development the terms 'history' and 'historical' lack every relation to the scientific field of research of the historian and are ambiguous.

Occasionally the term 'natural history' occurs, but it does not denote the specific field of research of the science of history proper. In the common use of the term the substantive 'history' is taken in the neutral Greek sense of 'enquiry' and is related to the study of animal life, especially as set forth for popular use. There is still another use of the term history when it refers to the natural genesis of geological formations and of species of plants and animals. But here, too, the term lacks any relation to the specific modal aspect of experience delimiting the historical viewpoint proper.

Geology and palaeontology can, doubtless, render important services to the historian who is confronted with ancient phases of cultural development. It is, however, only the cultural modality of development itself which can determine the historical field of enquiry. Consequently, there can be no question of an historical aspect of experience apart from the cultural one. If the meaning-nucleus of the cultural modality is only to be found in control or mastery we must establish that this nuclear moment, as such, implies a vocation and task which can only be accomplished in a successive cultural development of mankind in its temporal social existence.

The terms 'historical' and 'history', viewed merely etymologically, have indeed no specific modal sense. It is only the cultural modality with its nuclear moment of mastery or control that can give them the pregnant meaning of an irreducible aspect of human experience. Apart from it there can be no question of an historical law-sphere at all.
The universality of the historical viewpoint.

There is no ground for the fear that, through a modal limitation of the historical viewpoint and the concept of culture in the sense indicated, the scientific field of research of the historian will lose anything of its legitimate material extent. With regard to this point I may refer to what has been said about the modal limitation of the psychological viewpoint. There remains room for a history of human intercourse and language, for an economic and a legal history, a history of morality and of faith, of science and of the fine arts, a history of human society in its typical structures of individuality. When historical research is specialized according to modal aspects which, as such, lack historical character and come later in the cosmic temporal order, the historical viewpoint must anticipate them as leading modal functions. In this case the historian is obliged to take over from other sciences the specific scientific concepts necessary for the theoretical delimitation of these aspects of the phenomena whose historical development is to be examined. But this does not detract from the fact that his own specific viewpoint remains qualified by the modal nuclear moment of mastery.

The study of legal history for instance is not the same as an examination of the legal institutions in their successive juridical appearance and disappearance. The juridical modality of genesis and change is not the historical one. A really legal-historical inquiry has to provide us with the insight into the entire cultural background of the legal institutions in the coherence of an historical period. It has to show the development of the historical power-formations of the different social circles concerned in the process of law-making, as well as the cultural influence of the legal institutions themselves (for instance that of Roman or canon law upon the Germanic peoples).

It is always the cultural viewpoint, the controlling manner of giving form to the social process, which characterizes historical inquiry proper.

Cultural and natural formation.

Mastery or control, in its original modal sense, elevates itself above what is given and actualized after a fixed pattern apart from human planning. It pre-supposes a given material whose

\[\text{See p. 194 note.}\]
possibilities are disclosed in a way exceeding the patterns given and realized by nature, and actualized after a free project of form-giving with endless possibilities of variation.

It always seeks new roads in such a way that what precedes fructifies that which follows, and thus a certain continuity is preserved in cultural development. This is why the cultural mode of shaping is fundamentally different from all manner of formation in nature. It is neither a physical-chemical, nor a biotic, nor an instinctive psychical modus expressing itself in animal constructions. A spider spins its web with faultless certitude. But it does so after a fixed and uniform pattern, prescribed by the instinct of the species. The web is not the result of a free project due to reflection and productive fantasy; the animal lacks the free control of the material of its construction. Even the admirable works built by beavers or termites in social cooperation do not have a cultural character. They are the result of a social instinct, a social feeling-drive proceeding after a fixed model.

Mastery over persons and over things (‘Personkultur’ and ‘Sachkultur’) and the analogy of this distinction in the legal sphere.

Culture discloses itself in two directions which in the modal structure of the aspect concerned correspond to the historical subject-object relation. On the one hand culture appears in mastery over persons by giving cultural form to their social existence; on the other hand it appears in a controlling manner of shaping things of nature. The Germans speak of ‘Personkultur’ and ‘Sachkultur’. It will appear later on that mastery over persons is an essential requirement in the leading figures who are called ‘formers of history’ and who give positive content to the cultural principles proper. In the present context we provisionally observe that in the modal structure of the juridical aspect there is to be found an essential analogy of this state of affairs. Legal power over persons (competency) is an essential requirement of law-making. Legal power over things is essential to the jura in ré as well as to the legal possession of things. But it has appeared that legal or juridical power is never to be reduced to mastery or power in its original cultural sense, though it is founded in the latter.
Culture and civilization.

In addition to the distinction between ‘Personkultur’ and ‘Sachkultur’ sometimes a further distinction is made between ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’ (Zivilisation, civilisatio), meant as the difference between inner and outward culture. This further distinction is neither unambiguous nor generally accepted, because the word civilization itself can be understood in this twofold sense. In any case it cannot be derived from the modal structure of the cultural or historical aspect. In general it seems to concern the psychology of culture rather than cultural development itself. In a special sense it is related to the modal aspect of human intercourse in which the moment of cultural form can only have an analogical meaning. Forms of fashion, good manners, courtesy, etc. can be appropriated internally or outwardly only. As such they are not forms of mastery proper, although they are always founded in the latter. The controlling manner of social shaping of the human mind and human behaviour on which they are based, has not itself the modal meaning of fashion, courtesy etc. As legal power has an intrinsical juridical and not a cultural sense, so the leading rôle of the higher circles in human intercourse is only an analogy of mastery in its original signification. This leading function must be founded in historical power proper if it is to maintain itself.

A democratic or a proletarian revolution can annihilate the historical power-formation on which the leading position of the higher ranks in the relations of intercourse was based. The bolshevist revolution gives a striking recent example of this state of affairs.

Culture and human society.

The cultural mode of form-giving is always a social human modality. That is to say, it is nothing but a modal aspect of empirical human society. The terms ‘social’ and ‘society’ are not used here in the specific modal sense of the aspect of human intercourse;

1 The term civilization betrays its origin from the Greek conception of the polis, which as bearer of the cultural religion of the Olympian Gods was supposed to be an essential condition for the complete development of the “essential form” of human nature. In this sense civilization was opposed to barbarism. Barbaros was anyone lacking the cultivating influence of the polis.
rather they are taken in the signification of an essential trait of
temporal human existence as such. The latter is rooted in
the central religious community of mankind, and therefore
temporal human existence, in all its modal aspects, is pervaded
by social relations of every kind.

Our transcendental critique of theoretical thought has brought
to light that the temporal horizon of human experience with its
modal diversity of aspects finds its individual point of concen-
tration in the I-ness, but that the latter participates in the central
spiritual community of mankind. So it must be clear that this
temporal horizon of human experience itself is the transcen-
dental condition both of individual and social temporal expe-
rience, and that it must be essentially related to mankind in its
temporal social existence.

If, however, the cultural manner of form-giving is only a
modal aspect of social experience and temporal human society,
it is not permissible to identify it with the latter. Historism, whose
historical mode of thinking is often pervaded by a universalistic
and irrationalist sociological view, has done so. The Historical
legal school, founded by v. Savigny, was led astray by the noun-
form of the word ‘culture’. They spoke of the culture of a people
as of a social historical whole with different aspects and origin-
ating from the individual ‘Volksgeist’. So the pitfall concealed
in the historicist view of social reality was masked by the iden-
tification of the ‘culture’ and the social life of a national com-

Positivistic sociology, founded by de St Simon and Auguste
Comte, replaced the irrationalist conception of the individual
national community as origin of human culture by the rationalist
and naturalist conception of human society, taken over from
the physiocratic and the classical schools of economics.

‘Culture’ viewed as an objective social whole resulting from
human society could, consequently, no longer be conceived of
as a specific modal aspect of social human experience and
social reality. Its original modal meaning was lost sight of on
account of an unqualified analogical use of the term, whose
specific modal qualifications (as economic, legal, ethical, aesth-
etical, etc.) were interpreted as modalities or special ‘realms’
or ‘sides’ of ‘culture as such’.

It is highly important to get a clear insight into the inner
coherence between the historicistic view of social reality and the
theoretical transformation of the original cultural modality of
social experience into an unqualified analogical collective concept.

As soon as this transformation takes place the historical viewpoint loses any modal delimitation, and every obstacle impeding its absolutization seems to be cleared away. Nevertheless, there does remain an ultimate obstacle: cultural life cannot be identified with social life because the latter also encompasses the pre-logical aspects of human experience and temporal reality, whereas 'culture' has always been opposed to 'nature'. It makes no sense to say that human social life, in contradistinction to that of animals, lacks 'natural' aspects; and that it is restricted to the 'spiritual realm' of existence. The real state of affairs is that there cannot exist any temporal human society without pre-logical social aspects, realized in a genuine human sense. Even the human body originates from social sexual relations in which the biotic aspect is essential. 'Culture', on the other hand, cannot have pre-logical aspects, and consequently it cannot be a social reality on the same footing as human society. It is, as such, nothing but a modality which can only be realized in an unbreakable coherence with the non-cultural modalities of empirical reality. As soon as it realized in a concrete phenomenon we are confronted with a typical total structure which is more than its cultural aspect.

The neo-Kantian school of Windelband, Rickert and Lask must have seen this to a certain degree, since they denied the reality of culture, and made it into a transcendental mode of judging 'nature' by relating the latter in an individualizing manner to the realm of values. But in this conception, too, the original modal meaning of the term 'culture' has been entirely eliminated. The very nucleus of this meaning: the controlling manner of shaping, is lacking in this neo-Kantian circumscription which is clearly influenced by Fichte's considerations on the methodology of historical science and Kant's Critique of teleological Judgment.

Every attempt at a conceptual delimitation of the cultural sphere and the corresponding historical viewpoint which eliminates this nuclear moment, has only resulted in the introduction of unqualified analogies and collective pseudo-concepts.
K. Kuypers' view concerning tradition as the modal nucleus of the historical aspect.

In different methodological and epistemological investigations much attention has been given to the meaning of fundamental historical concepts like those of historical development, historical causality, historical time and its periodizing, etc. But all these analogical concepts remained unqualified so long as the modal nucleus of the historical aspect was not laid bare, and the original modal sense of the term 'culture' was not distinguished from its analogical meanings.

K. Kuypers¹ in his important thesis *Theorie der Geschiedenis* (1931) has tried to show on the basis of the theory of the modal law-spheres that the modal nucleus of the historical aspect is not to be found in culture but rather in the moment of tradition ². To my mind, he has not succeeded in making this view plausible. By holding to the current unqualified concept of culture he has lost sight of its equivocal character.

It will appear below how important the moment of tradition really is in the modal structure of the historical process. Nevertheless, it cannot function as the nuclear moment in this meaning-structure. A closer analysis immediately shows its retroci-patory character.

Tradition is what has been handed down from generation to generation, from ancestors to posterity. It can manifest itself in customs which are followed without any consciousness of their origin. What distinguishes it from the rigid instinct of the species in which the continuity of inheritance handed down from ancestors to posterity is also implied, but in a sense quite different from really *historical* tradition?

This characteristic moment can only be found in the cultural mode of shaping the social relations between men. *Historical* tradition is qualified by *formative power* in its original modal sense. It is not only its cultural *content* but in the first place its cultural *modality* as form-giving power which distinguishes it from blind animal instinct. By this, and by this alone it exceeds the natural patterns of instinctive tradition imposing themselves upon animal behaviour by the irresistible force of a non-con-trolled feeling-drive of the species.

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The General Theory of the Modal Spheres

The indirect test of the correctness of our conception concerning the modal nucleus of the historical viewpoint.

That 'culture', in the sense of 'formative control', must really be an original meaning-nucleus was already made clear indirectly. In the logical law-sphere the moment of formative control (or command) appeared to be an evident analogy anticipating the historical meaning-aspect, and in the later law-spheres there was repeatedly found a retrocipatory analogical moment of power and formation in our previous analyses. In these non-historical law-spheres this meaning-moment could not be original, as it was qualified by the specific modal nuclei of these spheres. This made it necessary to try and find the law-sphere whose modal structure is qualified by the controlling manner of formgiving as its irreducible meaning-nucleus. And then only the historical aspect conceived as that of cultural development, could be considered.

This indirect method to establish the existence of a modal law-sphere has universal validity. It has been applied continuously in our analysis of the modal structures.

The cultural modality and its typical empirical contents.

Meanwhile it should not be forgotten that in the present context we are only concerned with an analysis of the modal structure of the historical aspect of experience. This implies that great stress is laid upon the original modal meaning of the term culture, and that this modality is considered apart from the rich diversity of its empirical contents. The typical structures of individuality expressing themselves in every modal aspect alike bring about an enormous amount of variation in the cultural phenomena especially in a differentiated society. They cannot be examined before the termination of our inquiry into the modal structures of the different law-spheres.

For the moment we can only refer to what has been said about the material extent of the historical field of research. There are cultural realms of science and fine arts, of technics and industry, of Church and State etc. And it will appear in Vol. III that this implies a great diversity of typical qualifications of cultural phenomena (scientific culture, aesthetic culture, political culture, ecclesiastical culture etc.).

So the term 'culture' can be used in this concrete and material
sense. But this does not derogate from the modal character of
the aspect in which this collectivity of concrete culture can only
present itself as such.

Current opinion, however, has always tried to resolve the
nuclear-moment of 'the cultural modality' into really unquali-
fied general concepts. In so far as 'culture' was conceived as
the 'material meaning-content' of history, the attempt was made
to comprehend it in a modally unqualified concept of relation.
'Culture' was defined as natural reality to which values cling
(Rickert) as 'the synthesis of nature and freedom'; as the
'realization of values in time'; as an 'immanent meaning-structure';
as the 'formation of nature and society related to Ideas' (Münch)
2, etc.

In the nature of the case this deprived the moment of 'culture'
of all of its modal character.

The origin of the Humanistic concept of culture.

The entire eradication of the original modal character of the
historical viewpoint can only be explained by the fact that the
prevailing tendencies in the recent philosophy of history have
not really derived their concept of culture from an analysis of
the modal horizon of human experience but from the Humanistic
ideal of personality.

The attempt was made to comprise the whole of the rational
temporal activity of human personality with all its objective

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1 It must be denied that in our modern, highly differentiated, western
society this collectivity of concrete culture can be a 'social whole'. If this
were the case, it would be possible to indicate a typical social structure
of individuality giving all the differentiated realms of modern culture
the same typical total character, or at least to indicate a typical
community (e.g. the church) which through its uniting power could
impregnate all of the different cultural realms with its spirit and leading
ideas. In a primitive society, or in the ecclesiastically unified medieval
society, we may find examples of such a cultural unity. In modern western
culture, however, such a uniting power is not to be found, and the
universalist conceptions of it are nothing but a priori constructions
lacking any foundation in empirical social reality.

2 The latter circumscription contains at least the moment of forma-
tion. But the modal nuclear moment of mastery or control is lacking. As
an adherent of Rickert's neo-Kantian standpoint, Münch is obliged to
seek the meaning of culture in a transcendental relation between reality
and values or Ideas.
results, in the notion of 'culture', in contrast to the realm of 'natural reality', as a mere 'Gegenstand' of theoretical enquiry. The concept of culture became a truly collective concept of all the normative aspects of temporal experience, whose unity was supposedly grasped in the idea of the free personality as 'practical reason'.

Since thus the temporal material meaning of history lost its character as an irreducible modus of experience, it became necessary to try and find a formal 'epistemological' criterion for the historical field of research. By its means the attempt was made to delimit the specifically historical viewpoint from cultural-theoretical viewpoints that are specifically different, such as the 'sociological', the 'economical', the 'juridical', the 'aesthetic', the 'linguistic' and the ethical points of view.

But then an insoluble difficulty cropped up. The recent epistemological investigations into the criterion of the historical field of research have their essential background in modern Historism, which has reduced all the normative aspects of reality to the historical basic denominator. The attempt may be made to put up some resistance to the relativistic consequences of this Historism by holding fast to formal, supposedly super-temporal values of justice, beauty, truth, holiness, etc. But that positive law, positive morality, positive doctrines of faith, positive aesthetic norms, etc., are essentially historical phenomena, is such a deep-rooted opinion that it rouses scarcely any opposition. In this state of affairs a specific historical viewpoint seems hardly to be found.

TROELTSCH's and DILTHEY's struggle with the problems of Historism.

The influence of this relativistic Historism has at last also undermined the rational faith in absolute super-temporal 'Ideas' or 'values' in the prevailing modern 'Lebensphilosophie'.

TROELTSCH has carried on a truly titanic struggle with the problems of this Historism, in order to rescue the faith in the Humanistic ideal of personality from the rising tide of the historicist philosophy of life. He has, however, been affected by this trend of thought to such a degree that he merges all material 'values' and 'norms' into the creative historical development of culture. Appealing to the Leibnizian idea of the monad, he only retains an unprovable faith in the coherence of this development with the 'Absolute' in the concurrence of the factual
and the ideal. In this way he tries to justify the entire personality's throwing itself into the historical struggle for values. According to him, all the standards of the so-called 'objective ethics', of communal life (in the family, the state, and industry), of art, of law etc., must be acquired from historical development by means of conscious formative power. Formal ethics, as it was absolutized by Kant in the Idea of the categorical imperative, can only furnish these material cultural-historical standards of human activity, directed to the future, with the form of normative necessity.

An essentially similar historical relativizing of the absolute is found in Dilthey, who thought he had regained the idea of the sovereign freedom of human personality, freed from the last remnants of dogmatic restriction, in the 'historical consciousness'. Consider the following utterance of this famous thinker:

"The historical consciousness of the finiteness of every historical phenomenon, every human or social condition, and of the relativity of every kind of belief, is the last step to the liberation of man.

"By its means man attains to the sovereign power to appropriate the contents of every experience, to throw himself entirely into it, unprejudiced, as if there were not any system of philosophy or belief which could bind men. Life becomes free from conceptual knowledge; the mind becomes sovereign with regard to all the cobwebs of dogmatic thought. Every beauty, every kind of holiness, every sacrifice, revived, and explained, opens vistas disclosing a reality. And similarly we apprehend evil, terror, deformity as having their place in the world, containing a reality that must have its justification in the coherence of the world. Here we are confronted with something that cannot be spirited away. And, in contrast to relativity, the continuity of the creative force asserts itself as the most essential historical fact."

1 Cf. his standardwork: Der Historismus und seine Probleme, p. 200—221.
2 Hauptprobleme der Ethik (Ges. Schriften II, p. 618 ff.).
3 Ges. Werke VII, 290/1:
"Das historische Bewusstsein der Endlichkeit jeder geschichtlichen Erscheinung, jedes menschlichen oder gesellschaftlichen Zustandes, von der Relativität jeder Art von Glauben ist der letzte Schritt zur Befreiung des Menschen. Mit ihm erreicht der Mensch die Souveränität, jedes Erlebnis seinen Gehalt abzugewinnen, sich ihm ganz hinzugeben, unbefan-
Nevertheless, on his 70th anniversary the famous thinker clearly saw the impasse in which this Historism involves theoretical thought.

"The historical world-view," he observed, "has broken the last chain not yet broken by philosophy and natural science. Everything is flowing, nothing remains. But where are the means to conquer the anarchy of opinions which threatens us?"

**Rickert's distinction between individualizing and systematic cultural sciences.**

In the light of the historicistic conception there could at most be room for a formal differentiation between the historical and the 'specific cultural-scientific' view-points. In this cadre of thought, e.g., Rickert's later distinction between systematic and individualizing cultural sciences finds its place in which historical science proper was qualified as individualizing.

The subject-matter of all cultural sciences, however, according to Rickert's later more exact conception, is an historical material "which according to its essence is cultural life filled with meaning". The theoretical 'relation to values' (Wertbeziehung) has been adapted to this historical material. It is only a formal method. Just as Rickert expresses it himself: "In the way indicated they" (i.e. the general cultural values) "constitute the concrete meaning-formations clinging to the historical processes.

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2 "welches seinem Wesen nach sinnerfülltes Kulturleben ist."

hence to the actual State, actual art, actual religion, actual scientific organizations, and they give to these real objects the intelligible meanings which render them into historical objects or to bearers of historically important forms of meaning. In so far the historian must ever be an historian of culture” (I italicize) ¹.

We saw that, contrary to post-Kantian monistic idealism, Rickert does not include the meaning of history in reality itself, but considers the (psycho-physical) ‘reality’ only as the bearer of that meaning.

It is, however, not important in this connection that he will not hear of an immanent realization of the ideal values. The chief thing is that, in accordance with the prevailing conception, he reduces all the normative aspects of temporal experience to the historical denominator of culture.

But from what source then can a criterion arise for the distinction of the ‘specifically historical viewpoint’ from specifically sociological, linguistic, juridical, economic and other aspects?

According to their material modal meaning, all these aspects have become modi of the historical meaning of culture in this conception.

A ‘theory of values’ cannot furnish a delimitation of the scientific historical viewpoint in a philosophy of culture that does not recognize a ‘specific value’ to which to relate history itself.

The confusion caused by the application of the form-matter schema to the relation between the post-historical modi and the historical aspect of empirical reality.

Neo-Kantianism resorted to the form-matter-schema, when defining the relation of the historical aspect to the other postlogical modi of empirical reality. Rudolph Stammler conceived, e.g., positive law as an historical-economic material in the legal

¹ Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, p. 80:

“Sie” (nl. die allgemeinen Kulturwerte) “konstituieren in der angegebenen Weise die konkreten Sinngebilde, die an den geschichtlichen Vorgängen, also am wirklichen Staat, an der wirklichen Kunst, an der wirklichen Religion, an der wirklichen wissenschaftlichen Organisationen haften, und sie geben diesen realen Objekten die verständlichen Bedeutungen, die sie zu historischen Objekten oder zu Trägern von geschichtlich wesentlichen Sinngebilden machen. Insofern muss der Historiker immer Kulturhistoriker sein.”
form of thought'. By means of this 'critical' conception STAMMLER thought he had conquered Historical Materialism!

But economic science and the science of history were equally in need of a 'specific view-point' for the delimitation of their methods of research. On this point Rieckert's conception of the rigorous adaptability of the transcendental-logical historical form of knowledge to the 'material' was useless, since the 'material' of all the cultural sciences had been assumed to be identical.

This could not but lead to an internally antinomic exclusivism of the 'transcendental-logical forms of knowledge' in the epistemology of 'cultural' or 'mental sciences'. The material (the content of experience), assumed to be grasped in these 'forms of knowledge', was in fact outlawed. The 'pure theory of law' transferred this content to sociology, psychology, and the science of history. 'Formal sociology' referred it back to the other 'cultural sciences', and 'pure economics', 'pure grammar', 'pure aesthetics' or 'ethics' could not give shelter to the 'historical material of experience' either. If Kelsen's or STAMMLER's 'pure theory of law' were correct, 'pure economics' and 'formal sociology' would be precluded. If 'pure or formal sociology' with its formalistic conception of the sociological categories were right, there would be no room left for a 'pure theory of law' or 'pure economics'.

And the science of history would in truth have to pay the piper if the form-matter schema were applied in this way. For then the consequence was inescapable that history can only furnish a material of experience, and lacks any constitutive logical form of its own. If according to the critical view-point, the material of experience is only determined by the logical forms of thought, and there are no specific historical categories, it follows that there is no room for an historical science proper, as distinct from the natural and the special social sciences.

Thus RUDOLPH STAMMLER denied economic and historical sciences a particular 'transcendental logical view-point'. He was the first to apply the epistemological form-matter schema to the province of law. He thought the historical-economical

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1 Cf. his Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung and the destructive criticism of it by MAX WEBER in his: STAMMLER's "Überwindung" der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung (Ges. Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, Tübingen, Mohr, 1922, p. 291 ff.).

2 i.e. the "Geisteswissenschaften" in the sense meant by DILTHEY.
phenomena could only be logically determined as 'material' by means of the 'forms of juridical thought' or those of 'social convention' (intercourse) respectively, just as only the Idea of justice was supposed to give history its unity of meaning.  

In sociology the form-matter schema was introduced by Georg Simmel, though not in a merely epistemological function. Hans Kelsen, in his *Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre*, compared the 'pure theory of law' to geometry in so far as it only attended to the form of the social phenomena. Similarly Simmel, in his *Sociology*, made use of the figure of the geometrical form to delimit the view of formal sociology from that of the 'material social sciences'.

As geometry states what constitutes the spatiality of spatial things, sociology fixes the social *forms* in the actual social structures.

Simmel assumes, to be sure, that the 'social forms', unlike the 'theoretical thought-forms of nature' do not originate from mere theoretical thought. They are supposed to be *a priori* conditions, included in the historical-psychical life of the social individuals themselves (since they are consciously and synthetically active), as 'elements of society'. By means of the social forms the individuals combine into the 'synthesis' of *society*. But the supposedly fundamental social category of *psychical interaction* to which is attributed the task of delimiting the science of 'formal' sociology from 'material' social sciences, remains a purely *formal* criterion. The investigation of the feeling-drives which cause the different forms of social interaction is assigned to social psychology, that of the different aims and interests to which these social forms are serviceable is reserved to jurisprudence, economics, ethics, theology and so on.

All these causes and interests are supposed to be the 'material' of the social relations. The insuperable difficulty, however, in Simmel's conception is that this 'material' is considered to be psycho-historical. The sociological basic category of 'interaction' was supposed to have been abstracted from the content of the psychical processes. The latter are as such, i.e. in their subjective character, to be subsumed under the purely 'psychological categories' of scientific explanation. The same psychical material is, consequently, subjected to two kinds of formal categories.

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1 Cf. his: *Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie* (1922), 177.

excluding one another per definitionem. The 'contents' of the 'social' phenomena are supposed to consist of 'interests, aims, motives', which only function as actual social phenomena in the form of the 'interaction between the individuals'.

These actual social phenomena, constituted in the indissoluble coherence of form and content, are identified with 'historical reality'. They can be viewed from three different standpoints: either 'with regard to the individuals who are the real bearers of the conditions;' or 'with regard to the forms of interaction between the individuals, realized, to be sure, in their individual existence, but considered only from the view-point of their being together with one another and for each other'; or finally 'with regard to the conceptually expressible contents of conditions and events. In the last case the subjects and their formal social relations are not inquired after but only the purely objective signification of the contents intended: viz. industry and technics, fine art and science, legal rules and the products of the life of feeling'.

In this way SIMMEL tried to delimit formal sociology as a method of research from psychology, the science of history and the 'material social sciences'.

But he also held to the neo-Kantian form-matter schema for the epistemological constitution of the scientific historical field of experience. In his well-known book: Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, the first edition of which appeared in 1892, he turned sharply against the 'naïve-realistic' conception that the historian finds his 'Gegenstand' in a cut and dried form in the reality of experience.

He tried to analyze the historical forms of thought which are supposed to constitute this 'Gegenstand': the individualizing view of reality in its special sense of 'objective mind' (objektiven Geist), (in contradistinction to the generalizing way of

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1 Op. cit., p. 16:

"auf die individuellen Existenzen hin, die die realen Träger der Zustände sind; auf die formalen Wechselwirkungsformen, die sich freilich auch nur an individuellen Existenzen vollziehen, aber jetzt nicht vom Standpunkte dieser, sondern dem ihres Zusammen, ihres Miteinander und Füreinander betrachtet werden; auf die begrifflich formulierbaren Inhalte von Zuständen und Geschehnissen hin, bei denen jetzt nicht nach ihren Trägern oder deren Verhältnissen gefragt wird, sondern nach ihrer rein sachlichen Bedeutung, nach der Wirtschaft und Technik, nach der Kunst und der Wissenschaft, nach den Rechtsnormen und den Produkten des Gefühlslebens."
thought directed to what is conformable to law in natural sciences), the 'category of development', etc. ¹.

From such a use of the form-matter schema the greatest possible confusion must result. The social *forms* of the historical-social phenomena are abstracted from the contents of the psychical processes, whereas the subjective motives of the latter come under the cognitive forms of natural science. The 'historical' viewpoint itself is constituted by a 'category of thought', the category of the individualizing *understanding* of reality in its individual meaning and continuity of development.

But how can truly *social* phenomena then be qualified as *historical*? In his treatise: "*Der Fragmentcharakter des Lebens*" SIMMEL distinguishes theoretical cognitive forms and quite a series of *non-theoretical forms* (of art, law, religion, etc.). They are supposed to constitute a parallelism of different worlds of forms, and to individualize themselves in 'psycho-historical reality'. Here he observes: 'A real overlapping and interlacing of one world into another is impossible, as each of them already expresses the totality of the world-contents in its special language' ².

This implies the recognition of the impossibility of defining the relation between formal sociology, the science of history, and 'material social sciences' according to the form-matter schema. If also the legal, the aesthetic, the moral fields, etc., are constituted by absolutely independent *forms*, 'formal sociology' can no longer be opposed as *formal* to the *material* 'social sciences'. Thus SIMMEL later on abandoned the conception of a purely formal sociology.

The form-matter schema, applied as a methodical criterion to the delimitation of sociology, historical science, and the special 'cultural sciences' of law, language, morality, etc. disintegrates itself. And Kelsen correctly concluded from this schema the impossibility of a 'formal sociology' with categories of its own and distinct from a 'pure theory of law'. He abandoned sociology as a merely 'empirical science' entirely to the causal view of natural science.

Riekert could only distinguish the historical from the 'particular view-point of the special sciences of culture' by means of a formal discrimination between the 'individualizing' and the 'systematical' (typisierende) methods of 'relating to values'.

Especially in the light of his view that the individualizing method of historical research is rigorously adapted to the material of culture, this distinction could not fail to reveal itself as internally contradictory. The 'material' of the systematic sciences of culture was supposed not to be different from that of the science of history! How then can it allow of a generalizing method of relating to values by means of type-concepts?

The neo-Hegelian philosophy of culture yields no criterion for the historical law-sphere either.

The neo-Hegelian philosophy no longer conceives of culture in a schema of form and matter as neo-Kantianism had done. Rather it considers it as the creation of the 'objective Mind' accomplished before all theoretical reflection. This 'objective Mind' is the transpersonal acting reason ('Vernunft') unfolding itself in time in the communities of nation and state, and attaining self-consciousness in dialectal philosophy.

This view is also unable to offer us a material criterion of history as a law-sphere. It might consider 'Ideas' as practical constitutive principles of the 'objective Mind', and as such have them really enter into historical development. But its dialectical basic Idea of the meaning-coherence in the meaning-diversity does not allow of the acknowledgement of the cosmic boundaries between the modal law-spheres.

The distinction between the juridical and the specifically historical view-point in Julius Binder.

In the same strain the neo-Hegelian legal philosopher Julius Binder writes in his voluminous Philosophie des Rechts about the relation of the systematic juridical science to the science of legal history:

"The 'Gegenstand' both of the systematic and the historical sciences of law is at bottom the actually operative legal order of the present, which as a meaning-figure has an historical essence which must be looked upon as the unifying point for the two disciplines of empirical law".

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1 Only the immanence of the Ideas in historical reality is not accepted by Binder. Cf. my: De Beteekenis der Wetsidee voor Rechtswetenschap en Rechtsphilosophie (1926), p. 51 ff.
2 Philosophie des Rechts (1925), p. 1012.
In the same way positive language, rules of social inter-course, art, 'religion', etc., are essentially of an *historical* character to Binder. They are modi of 'history', which comprises all the normative meaning-aspects of reality; and 'history' itself, in a material sense, is 'cultural development'.

This cultural development is not constituted by a 'specific' Idea in time (as the Idea of justice), but is rather conceived of as the dialectical-temporal development of the absolute reason in the totality of its Ideas. Consequently, Binder, too, lands in an insuperable impasse when delimiting the specifically juridical from the specially historical view-point. Legal science is supposed to be an historical, interpretative discipline, which works according to an individualizing method of 'relating to value' in the sense intended by Rickert. But Binder cannot deny that the *science of legal history* cannot be identical with the so-called *dogmatic legal doctrine*. 'It is certain,' he writes, 'that there is a close connection between the two sciences of law, which does not only consist in their both being related to law but has a much deeper foundation. For the essence of all law is history and can only be understood historically. The meaning of law and its forms reveals itself to the historical view, and therefore also the 'jurist' needs history in order to apprehend his *Gegenstände*. But it is equally certain that legal history means something different from jurisprudence. The jurist trying to form concepts of the contents of his legal order needs the historical conception, but does not pursue historical studies proper. It may be that his interest, just like that of the historian, is concentrated on the understanding of a certain juridical system in its uniqueness and its individual character, so that the concepts formed by him are concrete or individual. It may be that in this characteristic nature of his concepts the historical kernel of law is manifested. But we think of something else and something more, when we speak of legal history'.

Unintentionally, Binder sharply formulates here the antinomy in which the theoretical obliteration of the modal boundaries of meaning between the historical and the juridical aspects of reality gets entangled. The temporal meaning of law is supposed to be entirely *historical*. Accordingly, legal science is to be viewed as a specific *historical* science, but all the same it is something different from the *science of legal history*. And indeed, no one who seriously examines the meaning of his legal concepts will be able to assert that fundamental juridical concepts such as that of juridical volition, of juridical validity, juridical causality, of competence and subjective right, lawfulness and unlawfulness have an intrinsic historical sense.

The historian must borrow the original modal meaning of these concepts from jurisprudence. And in this sense he must take them for granted if he really wants to understand the historical background of a positively operative legal order. In Binder's line of thought it is the specific *Idea of justice* as the "Idea of a coercive

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human community”, which alone makes empirical law possible as a part of historical reality. He supposes he can infer from this Idea some 'transcendental juridical categories' (sovereignty and subjection, the personality of a community and individual personality, compulsion as a means of community), which are considered as ‘ideal norms for all kinds of legal formations’, and not as forms of thinking 1.

These categories, just like Binder’s Idea of justice itself, are, however, analogical notions without any inner definiteness of sense. Binder has not even approximately obtained them from a real analysis of the modal meaning of law. But he realizes as a jurist the necessity of distinguishing them sharply from other 'categories of culture'.

Remarkable enough, he even distinguishes them from those of history as well as from those of morality, religion, etc.2. But he forsakes this momentary pure juridical intuition in the exposition of the relation between jurisprudence and the science of legal history, and denatures law again to an essentially historical phenomenon. And so he no longer finds a criterion to distinguish the historical from the juridical viewpoint, although he has admitted the necessity of this distinction.

Legal history, according to Binder, is: 'the genesis of law as the necessary form of life of a nation in time, its rise from the depths of the national mind in its own nature, conditioned by the external relations of nature, economy and morals, and the influence of other nations; its conscious formation in the course of legislation, its adoption of foreign juridical material and the elaboration of this material by the living organism of the nation'3.

If, however, positive law is essentially of a historical meaning, and jurisprudence is essentially an historically interpretative discipline, it is no longer possible to discover a boundary-line between the latter

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2 Binder: Philosophie des Rechts, p. 411:
‘...in which, however, we must bear in mind... that these legal categories, like other categories of culture, of history, of morals, of religion, etc., are of an essentially different character from that of nature.’ ['“...wobei wir uns aber bewusst bleiben... dass diese Kategorien des Rechts ebenso wie andere Kategorien der Kultur, der Geschichte, der Moral, der Religion, etc., von wesentlich anderer Art sind als die der Natur.”]

and the science of legal history. As a matter of fact Binder does not mention this boundary any more.

But the necessity of the distinction forces itself on Binder as a jurist. Thus he himself has furnished the evidence that the levelling of the modal boundaries between the historical and the juridical law-spheres cannot be consistently carried through.

The modal nuclear moment of cultural development is irreducible.

All this is sufficient evidence of the impasse into which the obliteration of the modal boundaries between the law-spheres in the Humanistic concept of culture has brought the theory of science as to the delimitation of the historical viewpoint.

There is really no possibility of finding the qualifying nucleus of the modal meaning of history in anything else but in 'the cultural' in the sense defined by us above. Every attempt to eliminate this nucleus in a general concept like "wertbezogene Wirklichkeit" (reality related to values), results in the theoretical abrogation of the historical aspect. Then the meaning-boundaries between the normative law-spheres are theoretically merged into one another in an internally antinomic way.

'The cultural' cannot be turned into a modally unqualified relation between 'natural reality' and values, nor into a dialectically conceived totality of all the normative aspects of temporal reality, without eliminating its original modal meaning-character. It is simply untrue that the modal sense of positive law, positive morality, positive art, positive language, science, or contents of belief, etc., can be reduced to the meaning of cultural development.

The cultural, as such, is never right or wrong in the modal sense of social intercourse, of retribution, of love, of belief. It cannot as such be qualified as logically correct or false, as aesthetically beautiful or ugly, as economical or uneconomical. And it is not at all a kind of supra-modal concentration-point of the aspects of experience.

'Culture' does not find its original temporal modal standards outside the historical law-sphere. The positive norms of the law-spheres founded in the historical modality are not 'cultural norms' proper. But they appeal to the aspect of cultural development in their positive modal meaning. Inversely, cultural development refers forward in the anticipatory direction of time to the deepened meaning of the later law-spheres.

Of course, the historical modality detached from the inter-
modal coherence of the modal aspects would shrink into a form without any material meaning. But this statement also holds for all the other modalities. Consequently, it cannot be objected to the conception of cultural development as an original modal aspect of human experience.

The historicist view tries to break through the modal boundaries of the normative aspects of temporal human society by means of a modally undefined concept of culture. This procedure is in accordance with the continuity-postulates of the Humanist freedom-motive and the Humanist science-ideal.

In its irrationalist turn it must necessarily historicize the modal law-sides of the different normative aspects. The irrationalist historicistic conception of culture has no room for them in their irreducible modal character. All positive norms of the law-spheres concerned are conceived of as subjective historical phenomena following the course of historical development. This leads to a result whose internal antinomy is emphasized rather than removed by means of a metaphysical theory of values.

The subject-side of a law-sphere taken apart from its irreducible modal law-side, cannot maintain its modal meaning. If we should try to relate the modal norms of logical thinking, language, intercourse, law, morals, etc., to the historical subject-side of reality, we should only evoke an inescapable internal theoretical conflict between the modal aspects concerned.

§ 3 - THE INTERNALLY ANTINOMIC CHARACTER OF THE HUMANISTIC CONCEPT OF CULTURE AS THE BASIC DENOMINATOR OF ALL THE NORMATIVE ASPECTS OF REALITY.

To demonstrate this in greater detail we shall use the method of antinomy and show that every attempt at reducing the modal meaning of the other normative law-spheres to the historical meaning-modus of cultural development is bound to dissolve itself into internal contradictions. We shall start with the attempt to conceive scientific thought as a historical phenomenon of culture.

The specific sciences in their temporal development have their immanent meaning in the theoretical analysis and synthesis of the different aspects of concrete phenomena. These aspects are all bound to their own modal structure and to irreducible

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1 Cf. Rickert.
modal laws. Science pre-supposes a scientific standard of truth which, as such, cannot have an historical meaning, though as a concrete social process science doubtless has its historical development.

In this immanent theoretical sense of the deepened analysis and synthesis of its modal 'Gegenstand' scientific thought can never be conceived of in the modal meaning of cultural development without cancelling its scientific character. As soon as we try to bring scientific activity with regard to the intrinsic character of its theoretical meaning, under the historical denominator — as is done in irrationalistic and relativistic Historism — we lapse into a self-refuting scepticism.

Spengler's historicizing of the intrinsic meaning of science.

In a radical way this historicizing of scientific thought has been carried through by Spengler in the first volume of his Untergang des Abendlandes. The internal antinomies inherent in the reduction of theoretical analysis and synthesis to an 'expression of culture' can be best demonstrated by this radical attempt.

To the historist Spengler 'nature' as the subject matter of physical science is only the dead, rigid content of thought entirely dependent on our mental cognitive activity. And the latter is, as such, a living, historical activity, entirely dependent on, and determined by the morphological characteristics of a particular culture: 'And indeed, in the eyes of the historically-minded there is only a history of physics. All its systems do not appear to him either right or wrong, but historically, psychologically conditioned by the character of the period and more or less perfectly representative of it' 1.

Mathematics, too, can only be valid as a phenomenon of historical culture: 'There are more arithmetical worlds than one, because there are more kinds of culture than one. In the course of history we find systems of numbers that differ from civilization to civilization. Thus there are Indian,

1 Der Untergang des Abendlandes I, p. 167:
'Und in der Tat, für den Blick des historisch eingestellten Menschen gibt es nur eine Geschichte der Physik. All ihre Systeme erscheinen ihm jetzt nicht richtig oder unrichtig, sondern historisch, psychologisch, durch den Charakter der Epoche bedingt und ihr mehr oder weniger vollkommen repräsentierend.'
Arabic, classical, western types of number. Each of them is fundamentally single of its kind and has a character of its own. Each expresses a different emotional attitude with regard to the world and symbolizes a particular kind of validity that is, also scientifically, exactly restricted to this type of culture. Each of them represents the structural principle of an order of things that history has led up to, and reflects the deepest essence of one, and only one soul as the centre of this culture and of no other.¹

Kant's conception of a priori forms of cognition, supposed to be invariably valid, is due to a delusion. To the historist there are only historical styles of cognition.²

Spengler saw very clearly that this entire historicistic view must result in radical scepticism. But even this scepticism is interpreted as a typical symptom of the decline of western culture. After the systematical and the ethical periods of philosophy (in our terminology those of the science-ideal and the ideal of personality) this declining culture offers only the possibility of a last historical phase of philosophizing: that of historical relativism openly avowing its scepticism.

With regard to the latter Spengler writes in the introduction to his work: 'Scepticism is the expression of a pure civilization; it disintegrates the world-picture of the culture that has preceded. Here all the older problems are resolved into the genetic. It implies the conviction that what is, also has become; that the natural and cognizable is rooted in the historic; that the world as actual has an Ego at its foundation as the potential actualized in it; it implies the insight that the 'when' and the 'how long' contain as deep a secret as the 'what'. This conviction and this insight lead to the fact that whatever else it may be, everything must at any rate also be the expression of something living. In what has become, the becoming reflects itself.' Therefore 'also the

¹ Der Unterg. d. Abend., p. 86/7:

claim of the higher thinking to detect universal and eternal truths must be abandoned. There are only truths with respect to a particular type of mankind. My own philosophy is, accordingly, only the expression and reflection of the western mind as distinct for instance from the classical and Indian. Its view of the world, its practical implications and its range of validity are determined by the present civilized stage of this mind.

But SPENGLER, as a 'Lebensphilosoph', has evidently not considered the ultimate consequences of this sceptical Historism. If science as such were actually only a cultural historical phenomenon, it would be impossible to form a theoretical concept of history. Then every attempt at a scientific establishment of historical facts, and their interpretation in the historical coherence, would be meaningless.

The whole line of thought in SPENGLER's *Untergang des Abendlandes* in which he tries to interpret the meaning of history theoretically, pre-supposes the possibility of abstracting the historical aspect of experience theoretically. He has absolutized this aspect. But history cannot be isolated and absolutized in a theoretical way by a consciousness which is supposed to be entirely enclosed in it. All theoretical absolutizing of a meaning-modus pre-supposes theoretical analysis and synthesis of meaning in the fundamental *Gegenstand-relation*.

But at the same time this absolutization destroys the meaning

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1 Op. cit., p. 64/65:

"Des Skeptizismus ist Ausdruck einer reinen Zivilisation: er zersetzt das Weltbild der vorausgegangenen Kultur. Hier erfolgt die Auflösung aller älteren Probleme ins Genetische. Die Ueberzeugung, dass alles was ist, auch geworden ist, dass allem Naturhaften und Erkennbaren ein Historisches zugrunde liegt, der Welt als dem Wirklichen ein Ich als das Mögliche, das sich in ihr verwirklicht hat, die Einsicht, dass nicht nur im Was, sondern auch im Wann und Wie lange ein tiefes Geheimnis ruht, führt auf die Tatsache dass alles, was immer es sonst sei, auch Ausdruck eines Lebendigen sein muss. Im Gewordenen spiegelt sich das Werden." (And therefore) "fällt auch der Anspruch des höheren Denkens, allgemeine und ewige Wahrheiten aufzufinden. Wahrheiten gibt es nur im heutzutage auf ein bestimmtes Menschen- und. Diese Philosophie selbst würde demnach Ausdruck und Spiegelung der abendländischen Seele, im Unterschiede etwa von der antiken und indischen, und zwar nur in deren zivilisierten Stadium sein, womit ihr Gehalt als Weltanschauung, ihre praktische Tragweite und ihr Geltungsbereich bestimmt sind."

of history by eliminating its constant modal structure. How could we speak of historical development if its historical character itself were a variable phenomenon, dependent on a particular type of civilization in a particular phase of its development? How could Spengler speak of a diversity of cultures with their specific morphological traits, if the philosophy of culture and the science of history were nothing but historical expressions of a typical cultural mind in a particular phase of its development?

How could he attempt to understand the inner mind of the Arabic, Indian, and Greco-Roman cultures, if his philosophy of world-history were unable to keep theoretical distance from the historical development of modern western civilization? How could he establish the existence of non-western cultures, if his whole scientific conception of the cultural process were only a historical expression of the ultimate phase of western civilization?

Historical experience can maintain its historical character and meaning only in the inter-modal coherence of the historical and the non-historical aspects, which are bound to their own modal structures.

No true history of science would be possible if the intrinsic meaning of scientific thought were reducible to the historical meaning of civilization. The consequence of Spengler's Historism is therefore its own refutation.

The simple mention of different 'cultural styles of scientific thought', of different 'Zahl- und Raumwelten' pre-supposes the identical original intentional meaning of scientific thought and the constant modal meaning of number and space.

As soon as these original meaning-structures are theoretically denatured into changing expressions of self-contained historical cultures, it is no longer legitimate to speak of historical types of conceiving 'number' and 'space', and of historical types of science in general.

The modal meaning of language is irreducible to that of cultural development. The historical retrocipation in the modal meaning of language.

Is it possible to reduce the internal modal meaning of language to a specific phenomenon of civilization taken in the historical sense of cultural development? Is not language an historical phe-

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1 Worlds of number and space.
The General Theory of the Modal Spheres

nomenon *sui generis*, whose genesis falls entirely within historical time?

Let the attempt be made to reduce its modal meaning to that of the cultural aspect and it will appear that there is no escape from internal antinomy.

The nuclear moment of the lingual aspect is symbolic signification related to the lingual understanding of signs. This modal meaning fits all the concrete symbolic meaning-functions of a language into an internal functional coherence within which specific linguistic laws are valid.

This meaning-modus is really founded historically, containing as it does a modal retrocipation of the meaning of cultural development, viz. the inner formation of language.

But this internal moulding of language is not an immanent-historical affair. It follows immanent principles (irreducible in their modal meaning), as, e.g., the phonological principles and those of syntax. These principles can only be conceived as internal laws of formation in the modal structure of symbolic signifying. But they have an unbreakable inter-modal coherence with historical development.

A theoretical eradication of the modal limits of meaning between the two law-spheres, however, if carried through consistently, would cancel both the concept of language and that of lingual history. If the modal meaning of language were in itself only a specific phenomenon *in* the modal meaning of cultural development,² a univocal symbolic signifying of cultural develop-

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¹ On the concept of the "*innere Sprachform*" (the internal form of speech) as the "Bildungsgesetz des tragenden Bedeutungsgefüges der Sprache" (the formative law of the structure of linguistic signification) cf. GUNTHER IPSEN: *Sprachphilosophie der Gegenwart* (Philos. Forschungsberichte Heft 6, Berlin 1930), p. 19/20. (The term itself was introduced by VON HUMBOLDT).

² The philosophical theory of language founded in the positivism of H. PAUL's *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte* has in fact identified linguistic science with the scientific research of the history of language.

The invariable 'principia' on which PAUL thought he had to base the historical development of language, have not at all been conceived of in the modal meaning of language (which, of course, is unknown to this historical positivism). Rather they are viewed as the psycho-physical substratum-conditions of historical development, as 'permanent forces and relations that remain unalterably the same, neither increasing nor decreasing' ("konstante Kräfte und Verhältnisse, die unverrückbar die gleichen bleiben, sich weder vermehren noch vermindern"). Their *interaction*, their typical interlocking is alleged to be the proper field of
ment would become impossible and we would not be able to speak of a history of language. That which has a history cannot be an historical phenomenon.

The historical aspect of experience cannot distinguish itself analytically from other modal aspects, nor can it signify its meaning by means of a symbol.

In cultural development there cannot dwell an original linguistic sense. Language can only signify the modal meaning of history, and the latter must be kept distinctly apart from the modal function of signifying and its intentional meaning of designating. There would be no theoretical concept of language possible, if the modal meaning of language were only an historical phenomenon enclosed in the stream of cultural development. For this modal meaning of language creates the possibility of all the actually formed separate languages.

The symbolizing of an historical event by means of a memorial remains modally outside the meaning of cultural development. Nevertheless, the concrete act of building the monument was occasioned by an historically qualified fact, and the monument itself, as an individual thing, has its objective modal function in history (e.g., it will be destroyed by the invasion of a hostile army or at the outbreak of a revolution).

If the modal meaning of language proper cannot be historici- zed without internal antinomy, then the formation of a particular language, viewed in its lingual aspect, can no more be qualified as an historical phenomenon. Within the modal aspect of symbolical signifying and understanding we can no more experience historical meaning-functions than we can experience them in the juridical or in the economic aspect as such.

The interpretation of the historical analogy in the modal aspect of language as an original historical phenomenon remains internally antinomic.

In the fulness of reality, of course, the modal meaning of

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research for the science of the 'Principles of Linguistic History' ('Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte'). Explicitly and emphatically this fundamental science is subordinated to a universal philosophy of history. 'On the basis of the experimental sciences, which seek to reduce the facts to general laws, this philosophy of history has to establish the general fundamental conditions forming the necessary basis for any kind of historical development'.

In this positivistic line of thought language has indeed been turned into a specific branch of culture.
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language in its concrete individual manifestations is included in a continuous temporal meaning-coherence with the historical aspect and those preceding the latter. As soon, however, as theoretical thought is concentrated on the law-sphere of language, it is of primary importance to guard against possible shiftings of the modal meaning. Such shifts do not really account for what has been *given* in experience, but rather falsify the data theoretically.

*Remark:* Modern phonology and the new trends in semantics.

In this respect, at least, I think it a great advance in modern phonology, as compared with the naturalistic conception of the sound-laws in the development of language, that efforts are made to understand the expressive *articulated sounds* as *speech-sounds* (*phonemes*) from the meaning-structure of language itself (J. Stenzel, Ipsen, Trubetzkoy, Stevers, and others).

In this way the linguistic concept of the phoneme could be clearly distinguished from the physical and psychological sound-concepts. This was indeed an important advance, notwithstanding the fact that in many respects the erroneous view was maintained that actual language is an *historical* phenomenon.

The effort, on the other hand, undertaken by Husserl to maintain the a priori structure of language in a 'pure grammar' as a 'theory of pure significations', against any kind of psychologizing or historicizing of the symbolic meaning of the verbal phrases, could not really yield any insight into the modal meaning of language. This must be established without detracting anything from the correct intention of this theory. For to Husserl the 'pure theory of significations' (*reine Bedeutungslehre*) becomes a part of 'pure logic' (*reine Logik*). In this conception the lingual anticipation in the analytical meaning-modus, (logical symbolism), is interpreted as the original meaning of symbolical signification. And this logicizing of

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1. The concept of articulation as a characteristic of speech-sounds was introduced by the Genevan linguist de Saussure (*Cours de linguistique générale* 1916), whose theory, for the rest, was more psychological than linguistic.

2. Cf. Ipsen, op. cit., p. 14, against Husserl's idea of 'pure grammar': "...no more can the philosophy of language adopt the idea of "pure grammar" without cancelling itself. For this would mean *sacrificing the reality of language in history.*" (Italics are mine). ["...ebenso wenig kann die Sprachphilosophie die Idee einer reinen Grammatik...... zu der ihren machen, ohne sich selbst aufzugeben. Denn das hiesze, die Wirklichkeit der Sprache in der Geschichte zu opfern."]

3. Cf. *Logische Untersuchungen* II, I, especially the IVth Untersuchung,
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the modal meaning of lingual signification could not fail to provoke the reaction of the Diltheyan historical school. HUSSERL's abstract conception of 'pure signification' broke the actual subject-object relation connecting the symbolic sign and its signification indissolubly with the subjective symbolical function of signifying and that of inter-individual understanding. To the Diltheyan school this was tantamount to disregarding the historical life of language. The historically-psychologically conceived 'vivo', as an act of inter-individual understanding related to the 'signs' and their ideal meanings as fundamental forms of the 'objective Mind', was supposed to connect HUSSERL's 'pure significations' with the historical stream of experience (FREYER, LITT). This again turned the philosophy of language into a dialectical-phenomenological philosophy of culture.

HUSSERL's structural conception of the lingual sign.

But in this way no justice could be done to the modal structure of the subject-object relation in the intrinsic meaning of symbolical signifying. HUSSERL had himself developed a remarkable structural theory of the lingual sign which was generally acknowledged as an important progress in comparison with the psychological theory of DE SAUSSURE. He distinguished three structural moments: 1°. the expression (Ausdruck) as a complex psycho-physical process manifesting itself in the vocal movements of speaking and the sound-waves produced or in the writing of alphabetical symbols; 2°. the meaning-intentions (Bedeutungsintentionen), i.e. acts which give the physical phenomenon an inherent sense and make it into a word or sentence; 3°. the intentional relation of the psycho-physical phenomenon in its inherent meaning to a signified object or an objective state of affairs. This signifying the object or the objective state of things intended is done via the signification (Bedeutung) of the word or the sentence.

It must be clear that the psycho-physical aspects of the concrete acts of speaking or writing cannot function within the modal linguistic subject-object relation proper. It can only be the linguistic function of meaning-intention and signifying by which the spoken sounds (or written characters) in their articulation and particular lingual value acquire an objective linguistic sense as signs.

§ 14, concerning the 'idea of a purely logical Grammar' (Idee der reinlogischen Grammatik). By this I do not deny the stimulating value of HUSSERL's investigations. But from the point of view of the modal analysis of language the theory of the pure significations as a branch of pure logic is misdirected. The signified meaning abstracted from its relation to the subjective function of signifying and symbolical understanding is not lingual at all. A 'pure signification' in HUSSERL's sense is, strictly speaking, a contradicatio in terminis. A signified intentional meaning is not the same as 'meaning as such'.
The real failure in Husserl's 'reine Bedeutungslehre'.

By introducing his theory of the 'pure significations' it was doubtless Husserl's intention to make a clear distinction between the linguistic meaning proper and its psycho-physical foundation.

The failure of this theory cannot be this distinction as such but only the logicizing of the 'Bedeutung' by its abstraction from the subjective meaning-intention and the subjective function of signifying. Husserl considered the latter as a psychical act which can only intend the linguistic meaning but which as such belongs to the field of psychological research. Here the lack of a modal delimitation of the psychological viewpoint and the lack of distinction between the different modal aspects of the act seriously affected the linguistic theory. It was overlooked that the modal function of intending and signifying meaning cannot be identified with the concrete act in which it is realized. Consequently, the dialectical phenomenological school inspired by Dilthey found no other way to restore the subject-object relation in language than by relating the signs and their meanings to the concrete act of consciousness understood in an historical-psychological sense.

But it is not in this manner that linguistic theory has to regain its relation to the dynamical historical aspect of human experience. This relation is guaranteed by the historical retrocipation in the modal structure of the aspect of symbolic signification itself. It is by virtue of the inner structural moment of lingual formation that the change in the intentional meanings of symbols adapts itself to the cultural development. But this does not detract from the modal irreducibility of the lingual law-sphere.

The same must be established with regard to the intermodal relation between the latter and the psychical and logical aspects of experience.

Husserl has clearly seen that in language the reference of the symbol to the things or states of affairs signified is made only via the meaning-intention and subjective signifying. But the latter are to be conceived as modal linguistic functions of the real act, and consequently they are no longer to be identified with the psychologized act itself. Then we can completely account for what is called the conceptual, the emotional and the associational components of the meaning-contents of words¹ without any violation of the modal boundaries of the lingual aspect. There does not exist a 'logical meaning-kernel' (logischer Bedeutungskern) of the lingual signification itself, but only an intentional reference of the latter to the pre-theoretic or scientific concept signified by the symbol. What is called the feeling-tone (Gefühlston) of a word is not the same as the emotional effect evoked by its use in a concrete context and situation, but only its intentional reference — within the modal subject-object relation of language — to feeling-values. The intentional reference itself to what is signified, remains bound to the 'inner modal structure of the lingual aspect.

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The same can be observed with regard to the association of representations evoked by the intentional reference of the symbol. This reference cannot be interpreted in an original psychological way, without abandoning the modal structure of the semasiological subject-object relation. The intentional reference of a symbol retains its linguistic character in its modal nuclear meaning of symbolical signification.

The irreducibility of the modal meaning of intercourse to that of cultural development.

If it is granted that the modal meaning of language cannot be reduced to that of cultural development, the further question may arise: Is not at least the meaning of intercourse expressing itself in the social forms of courtesy, modesty, politeness, tact, fashion, etc., to be conceived in the modal meaning of history? Are not the norms observed in our intercourse with our fellowmen entirely dependent on the historical development of our Western civilization? And are they not, as such, quite different from those of a primitive African tribe, or those of a highly civilized Eastern culture, such as that of the Chinese?

I do not deny this in the least. The modal meaning of intercourse has an historical foundation, which appears from the presence in this meaning-modus of the historical retrocipation of positivizing formation. This historical analogy will be investigated in detail in the next §. It has a necessary inner coherence with formative power in its original historical sense. The modal meaning of intercourse can indeed only express itself in the historically founded forms of courtesy, politeness, etc. Even in its still ‘closed’ function it cannot maintain its character as meaning outside the meaning-coherence with cultural development. But the attempt to reduce the original meaning of intercourse to that of cultural development must lead to antinomies.

The modal function of intercourse is founded in that of symbolical signification as its substratum. Consequently, the antinomy resulting from the reduction of the aspect of symbolical signification to that of cultural development, will manifest itself even more forcibly when we try to reduce the meaning of intercourse to that of history. A brief analysis of this state of affairs may suffice in this context.

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1 This is done by C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards in their book *The Meaning of Meaning* (2th ed., p. 11 ff.).
The modal meaning of intercourse is founded in that of language.

Every form of intercourse and every subjective instance of social behaviour giving expression to it, e.g. making a bow, giving a handshake, lifting one's hat, letting a superior precede, necessarily refer back in the modal meaning of intercourse to symbolical signification, and would become meaningless but for this lingual substratum.

History, at least in its closed structure, continues its course though it is not symbolically signified, in spite of its necessary connection with the symbolical aspect in the transcendental direction of time. But social intercourse, even in its restrictive modal function, cannot manifest itself without symbolical signification. It is inevitably a signified meaning, as such, however, lying outside of the meaning of language proper. Anyone who historicizes the meaning of intercourse, primarily historicizes the meaning of language.

The historian has to take the modal meaning of social intercourse for granted if he is to theoretically grasp the history of the social forms of intercourse, i.e. the cultural development in which these forms are founded in their positive changes. Forms of courtesy, politeness, etc., cannot have the original meaning of historical power.

If the historian really assumes he can conceive the modal meaning of social intercourse as a species of cultural development proper, he lapses into the same vicious circle as the psychologist who supposes he can derive the meaning of retribution from the feeling of justice. And inescapably he involves himself in the antinomy that we are now going to analyse.

If a history of the social forms of intercourse is to be possible, these forms must lie outside the modus of cultural development as regards their intrinsical modal meaning.

There is, indeed, a history of the forms of intercourse, just as there is a history of language and of science. Intercourse, language, and science, with regard to their modal, or synthetic theoretical meaning respectively, are something different from their history. This history is the development of their cultural moulding of the human mind in its social relations by means of the concrete acts in which they are realized. There is also a history of the different States, of their wars, their town-planning, etc. State, war, and town-planning, as typical total structures of individuality, are more than their historical aspect. A history of
an historical phenomenon, however, is a contradictio in terminis. The historical function of a thing, of a human social group, or of a concrete event presents itself only in the modal meaning of cultural development, but cannot have a history of its own.

The historical aspect of experience can maintain its cultural meaning only in its intermodal coherence with the other modal aspects. So, if the original meaning of intercourse were historical, it could not have a history of its own, unless the historical meaning were something more than, or different from the historical, which is contrary to the principium identitatis and the principium contradictionis.

By this we have also laid bare the contradiction arising from the theoretical attempt to reduce the modal meaning of intercourse to a historical phenomenon sui generis.

If the attempt at reducing the modal meaning of the other normative law-spheres to that of history is continued, still more complicated antinomies are bound to arise. For our purpose it was sufficient in the present context to apply the attempted reduction to three of these spheres. By means of the method of antinomy we have made clear the internal sovereignty of their modal meaning-structures within their own spheres.

The further analysis of the modal basic meaning of history may convince the reader that the historical modus can reveal its temporal meaning only by maintaining the modal sovereignty within its own sphere.

§ 4 - ANALYSIS OF THE MODAL MEANING OF CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT WITH REGARD TO ITS RETROCIPATORY STRUCTURE.

The logical analogies in the modal meaning of culture and the normative character of the historical law-sphere.

Provisionally, we found the cultural or controlling manner (of form-giving) to be the original nuclear moment in the modal structure of the historical law-sphere. Only in the coherence with its retrocipatory and its anticipatory moments can this nucleus maintain its determinative meaning-character. The first retrocipations revealed by a continued analysis of the modal structure concerned refer back to the logical aspect. In the pre-logical aspects of temporal reality there is no original cultural meaning to be found. The use of the term ‘natural history’ in the Romantic sense of a genetic view of ‘nature’ in its ascending potentialities of creative freedom, is primarily due to the confusion of biotic
with historical development. It shows a lack of insight into the truth that the concept of development without any modal determination of meaning is multivocal and consequently confused. It is doubtless true that in principle natural events and things can have a modal function in the historical law-sphere. But they can function here only in the historical subject-object relation, i.e. in a cultural relation to the subjective power-formation of man. They cannot have a subjective but only an objective function in history.

Cultural development is not a 'natural' process; in its internal meaning-structure it is not subject to the laws of nature. Only creatures with a rational power of distinction, with an analytical 'sense of meaning', as K. Küppers put it quite correctly, can be subjects in history.

The historical modality is based on the logical aspect and this inter-modal coherence finds expression within the modal structure of the historical law-sphere in retrocipatory moments; in the first place in the historical relation of identity and diversity. This relation is indeed a retrocipatory analogy of the corresponding analytical basic relations and a necessary condition of every historical distinction. Historical experience is not possible without the implicit or explicit awareness of the historical identity of cultural events in the diversity of their moments.

Even to pre-theoretical experience the battle of Waterloo is not given in the manner of a natural sensorily perceptible event. What gives this battle its historical identity by which it can be distinguished from events not belonging to it? The famous economist Hayek has raised the question whether the battle of Waterloo also included the actions of the farmers who hurriedly tried to get in their harvest on the battle-fields. This question is very instructive because it shows that historical events have no objective limitation in the sensory space of perception. Therefore animals cannot distinguish them, whereas they do dis-

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1 At first also Rickert used the term natural history from a merely methodological conception of history. In the modern philosophy of history, inspired by Dilthey, it is emphatically stated that history belongs to the 'Geisteswissenschaften' in contradistinction to the natural sciences. Later on also Rickert has admitted that the historical viewpoint cannot include an individualizing view of nature. Cf. Fritz Kaufmann, Geschichtsphilosophie der Gegenwart (1931), p. 9.

tinguish natural things and events within their natural 'Umwelt'. Historical facts are only accessible to human experience. Their historical identity and their diversity from other events rest on the basis of analytical distinction, without being themselves of an analytical character. For they are modally determined by the nuclear moment of the cultural aspect only: that of formative control. The battle of Waterloo is historically delimited from other events as a decisive contest between the military powers of Napoleon and his allied adversaries viewed as subjects of political power-formation. What belongs to this historical event, and what does not, depends on historical imputation, not on objective sensory data.

Doubtless, its individual identity cannot be deduced from the modal structure of the historical aspect alone, because it has a typical structure of individuality which exceeds the boundaries of this aspect. But this does not detract from the modal-historical character of its identity as an historical fact, since in the historical aspect of experience the different structures of individuality can exclusively express themselves within the modal structure of this aspect.

The modal nuclear meaning of the historical law-sphere also implies the imputation of cultural deeds to the subjects of formative power. The cultural mode of form-giving is a controlling manner of moulding after a free project. This modal meaning of cultural activity excludes its equation with natural events in a functional series of causes and effects. The pseudonatural scientific conception of the historical process is irreconcilable with the modal structure of cultural development.

Even historical mastery over persons does not detract from the fact that the latter are cultural subjects whose behaviour is to be historically imputed to them, and not objects of cultural moulding which are not accountable for the course of cultural development.

In close connection with the logical analogy of identity and diversity implying the historical relation of imputation, it is necessary to pay attention to another logical analogy in the modal structure of the historical aspect, viz. that of historical contradiction.

It is impossible to experience any continuity in cultural development without distinguishing between what is in agreement with it, and what is contrary to it. This distinction is doubtless based on the logical principle of contradiction, but it has a
modal historical meaning. It reveals the intrinsically normative character of the historical law-sphere.

In a consistently positivistic attitude of thought the attempt may be made to abandon the concept of development in history, but this will not do. Though this development can only be an analogical moment in the modal structure of the historical aspect, viz. a biotic retrocipation referring to the aspect of organic life, it is nevertheless essential. If it is eliminated, there is no possibility of rising beyond the chronological enumeration of facts which can never be conceived in their historical coherence. Such a procedure is tantamount to an elimination of the historical modus of experience as such. As soon as the concept of development was introduced in historical thought, it was implicitly or explicitly conceived in a normative sense. Even the positivist sociological view of history has done so, though it masked its normative criterion of development by giving it the form of a natural law.

The Historical school and the normative conception of historical development. Fr. J. STAHL's view of the secondarily normative character of God's guidance in history.

HERDER had introduced the Leibnizian Idea of development in historical thought, and had connected it with his conception of the individual "Volksgeist". It was the Historical school which gave this Idea a central position in the science of history. VON SAVIGNY and his adherents conceived historical development to be continuous, and distinguished between the vital and the intrinsically dead elements in cultural tradition. In contrast to all artificial and revolutionary constructions of the state and of human society all stress was laid on 'natural growth'. Doubtless, this conception displays a normative tendency. The influence of FICHTE'S and SCHELLING'S idea of a hidden law of Providence lying at the foundation of history and giving it its inner coherence is here clearly perceptible. This hidden law-conformity of the historical process was from the outset sharply opposed to the rationalist and determinist conception of the laws of nature. In the line of SCHELLING'S transcendental idealism VON SAVIGNY had conceived it as a dialectical synthesis between natural necessity and freedom. Consequently, this hidden historical law could not fail to assume an irrationalist normative sense and it was the Lutheran legal philosopher and statesman Fr.
JULIUS STAHL who openly accepted this consequence. In his opinion all that has come about in a long process of historical development under the influence of secretly operating forces, without the interference of rational human planning, ought to be respected as a manifestation of God's guidance in history, in so far as it does not contradict a positive commandment of Divine Law.

This conception of God's guidance in history was quite in accordance with the conservative mind of the Restoration. Apart from its romantic-quietistic formulation, it had a great influence in the so-called Christian-historical political theory. The latter accepted the new historical manner of thinking as a powerful ally in the contest with the principles of the French Revolution.

Meanwhile serious objections could be raised against this ascription of normative sense to God's guidance in history. They were amply explained in a remarkable thesis \(^1\) defended in 1911 at the University of Leyden by A. C. LEENDERTZ.

From the theological viewpoint this author argued that God's guidance in history embraces all that happens, both good and evil. For this very reason this guidance cannot imply any norm for human behaviour. Only God's revealed Will, not his hidden intentions guiding the course of history, can direct our practical life in a normative (ethical) sense.

From the philosophical viewpoint LEENDERTZ attacks the normative conception of God's guidance in history with the Kantian argument that facts and norms belong to different worlds. If the factual course of history is elevated to the rank of a norm this is tantamount to a continuous acceptance of the 'fait accompli'. If a governing dynasty is supposed to be justified by the fact that it has maintained its power in a long course of time, then also a revolution overthrowing this dynasty must be regarded as justified after the lapse of time by a succesful maintenance of its position.

This criticism must fail insofar as it starts from the Kantian separation between what is and what ought to be, a dualism founded in the dialectical Humanist motive of nature and freedom. It overlooked that historical facts are not given in the way of natural events and that in the normative aspects of human experience every fact has a normative qualification.

\(^1\) *De grond van het overheidsgezag in de anti-revolutionnaire staatsleer* (Leiden, 1911).
without being itself a norm. The fact that a certain person in a certain place and on a certain day has committed a theft, cannot be established without a legal norm which indicates the criterion of theft.

When we say that at present Winston Churchill is prime minister in the English cabinet, we establish a fact implying a certain legal competency of the bearer of this office. And legal competency is a normative meaning-figure.

The concept of historical development cannot have a merely factual content apart from a normative criterion for the establishment of the historical coherence between the facts and for the distinction between what is in keeping with this development and what is not. This is what v. Savigny meant when he distinguished between the vital and the intrinsically dead elements in historical tradition, and what Stahl intended when he opposed the organic development of history to the revolutionary encroachments upon God's guidance in it. The only question is whether this normative criterion can be derived from the subject-side of the historical process. The Historical School thought it could do so by elevating the so-called 'Volksgeist' in its subjective individuality to the true standard of cultural development. This implied the view that the individual character of a folk or a nation has a value in itself.

Taking the natural development of a living organism as a pattern, v. Savigny and his adherents supposed that the continuity of historical development was only guaranteed by the directive potency of the individual national mind. Cultural goods imported from abroad and contradicting the national mind of a people were viewed as an encroachment upon true historical development, as a revolutionary violation of its continuity.

Starting from this conception of historical development, the Germanists of the Historical legal School in the eighteen forties launched their vehement attack upon the reception of Roman law in the Germanic countries 1.

It was quite in keeping with the dialectical synthesis of nature and freedom that this irrationalist standard of historical development was considered both as an inner necessity resulting from the individual nature of a people, and as a norm which can be

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1 v. Savigny and Puchta did not agree with this attack because they denied that the reception of Roman law contradicted the Germanic "Volksgeist".
violated by revolutionary encroachments. Therefore it must imply an inner antinomy.

Granting that we can establish and describe the individual subjective mind of a nation in a scientific way, this national mind can never be a cultural norm in itself. It may show both good and bad traits. It is no use elevating this 'Volksgeist' to the rank of a gift of Divine Providence, or in a more secular way, regarding it as the destiny (Schicksal) of a people which has a historical right to the complete development of its individual cultural potentialities. From the Christian viewpoint it should be remarked that such irrationalist conceptions of the norm of historical development show a complete disregard of the effects of sin in the subjective cultural disposition of the nations. This fundamental un-Christian trait cannot be rendered harmless by subjecting this irrationalist conception of the historical norm to the ultimate test of the decalogue.

If there really are genuine historical norms irreducible to ethical laws, they can no more be subjected to the latter than the logical or the aesthetic principles. Although such historical norms cannot be separated from the subject-side of the historical aspect, they cannot be reduced to the latter. This does not mean that in the positive and variable forms in which the supposed historical norms appear there cannot be a subjective element. This question must be examined presently. But if they are in any way to be acknowledged as modal norms, they must contain a super-arbitrary standard of judging the factual course of cultural development. And this standard must have an intrinsically historical meaning, irreducible to the meaning of any other normative aspects.

For the present the contents of such norms have not yet been discovered. But the modal structure of the historical aspect doubtless reveals the normative character of its modal law-sphere in the logical analogy of historical contradiction. Let us examine this structural state of affairs somewhat more in detail, and consider what is meant when we speak of an unhistorical line of conduct.

The adjective 'unhistorical' has the meaning of 'deviating from a norm of historical development'. Is anti-normative behaviour really possible in this historical sense?
Reaction as an anti-historical meaning-figure.

Anti-normative behaviour in a historical sense is certainly possible. It is denounced as historical reaction in an unfavourable signification. It may be that in the political contest this term is often abused to put a stamp of backwardness upon political parties who do not agree with a certain ideology of social progress. Nevertheless, even this misuse of the terms reaction and progress appeals to a norm of historical development. For it is meaningless to speak of progressive and reactionary trends in politics without accepting a normative criterion of an historical character. And the very fact that even national socialism availed itself of these terms, shows the necessity of seeking for a super-arbitrary standard in the modal structure of history itself.

The political criterion can only be a political-historical one, i.e. it must be founded in a historical standard which is typically related to the state in its structure of individuality.

The historical meaning-figure of reaction is in no way to be reduced to an anti-normative line of behaviour in another modal sense. In its modal meaning it is neither illogical, nor un-economical; neither contrary to the norms of social intercourse, nor unlawful or immoral. Anyone who after the French revolution wanted to put the clock back to the political order of the 'feudal régime' was indeed guilty of reaction in the typically historical sense of the word.

Nobody who really thinks historically will hesitate to agree with this judgment. Every historian will say that the partial restoration of the undifferentiated seigniorial rights in the Netherlands in the years 1814 and 1815 was an atavism. But why does he come to this conclusion? The answer will be: because the restoration of these rights contradicted the modern idea of the State which in the course of historical development had conquered the undifferentiated particularism of the feudal system. But this 'course of historical development' is the very problem that is to be solved. This course is by no means to be understood as a natural process. From the modal historical viewpoint it seems to imply a norm for the development of political power-formation, to be formulated as follows: the development concerned ought to proceed from a state of undifferentiated particularism to that of political integration based on the monopoly of authoritative power of the sword in the hands of a central government. In the legal or juridical aspect of the social process this
development has to express itself in a juridical sense, because this aspect is founded in the historical modus.

But from what does this historical norm derive? It is not yet possible to give a sufficient answer to this question at this stage of our inquiry. Only by means of a further analysis of the modal structure of the historical aspect is there any possibility to detect the general criterion for the distinction between really progressive and reactionary trends in the factual course of the cultural process.

Typical political norms of historical development cannot be deduced from this modal structure alone, but must be found by means of an analysis of the structures of individuality of human society giving the modal standard its typical individualization. For the rest the problem does not concern the State only. The meaning of reaction is not restricted to the historical aspect of political life. Reaction is a retrocipatory modal meaning-figure that can assume all kinds of meaning-individuality. Its general sense is an anti-normative attitude with respect to historical development, a falling back on the historical past, while disregarding the norms of historical evolution.

The peculiar character of the modal structure on the law-side of all the post-logical law-spheres. The relation between the temporal normative principle and human formation. Positivizing formation as an historical analogy in all the post-historical law-spheres.

Although it is not yet possible to indicate the contents of these norms, it is possible to establish a peculiarity of their modal structure, directly resulting from the logical retrocipations. This peculiarity will be found again on the law-side of all the post-historical aspects by virtue of the historical retrocipations in their modal structure.

From the logical sphere onwards the modal laws are only given as regulative principles which cannot be realized on the subject-side without rational consideration and distinction.

From the historical law-sphere onwards these normative principles require a variable formation, even in an as yet closed structure of their modal meaning. By means of this variable formation they become positive norms accommodated in a more or less adequate way to the course of cultural development.

In the pre-logical aspects of reality the modal laws are realized in the facts without human intervention, at least inso-
far as in this realization the normative anticipations of their modal structure are not concerned. It is an essential characteristic of genuine modal norms that they do not realize themselves in this way. They only offer a rule of conduct to human judgment, a principle requiring *human formation* for its further specification.

The logical norms of thinking are only valid as analytical principia (principium identitatis, contradictionis, rationis sufficientis, exclusi tertii). The same state of affairs must be established with regard to linguistic norms, norms of social intercourse, economic, aesthetic, legal, ethical norms, and norms of faith: their super-arbitrary Divine content has been given in principle only. This is immediately connected with the founding of all the later normative law-spheres in the logical or analytical sphere. Upon the latter every free rational judgment is in the last instance based. Temporal normative freedom, thus founded in the logical aspect of thought, is for this reason most sharply distinct from the free scope manifested on the subject-side of the pre-logical law-spheres in individuality qua talis. This free scope does not imply an appeal to rational judgment.

The moment of *free formative control* appeared to be original only in the modal structure of history. In the modal structures of the later law-spheres this moment is to be understood as a retrocipation of the original meaning of cultural development.

Consequently, *every positivizing formation of the modal norms of these later law-spheres is founded in the original formation of the cultural principles.*

The formation of the historical principles makes an appeal to the *will of the formers of history.* This is the cause of the peculiar interlacing on the law-side of the historical sphere of super-arbitrary principles and human formative will. This is a state of affairs that holds good in an analogical way for all the later normative law-spheres, and can only be understood from the cosmic meaning-coherence of the modal aspects. It has again and again been theoretically misinterpreted by immanence-philosophy, either in an idealistic or in a positivistic sense. In the idealistic line of thought normative principia were absolutized and elevated to the rank of supertemporal values or ideas, sharply separated from the positive norms. In the positivist
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standpoint, the human formative will was absolutized into the creator of the positive norms. As far as legal philosophy is concerned, I may refer to the struggle between the rationalistic theory of natural law and the positivistic legal theory.

Although we acknowledge the elements of truth contained in each of these views, we must hold fast to our insight into the nature of a normative principle. In the historical and post-historical aspects the laws acquire a concrete sense through human positivizing of Divine normative principles. The human formative will is then to be conceived of as a subjective moment on the law-side of these law-spheres themselves. It may be that natural laws of the pre-logical aspects of experience do not appeal to the human formative will for their realization, insofar as in the latter the normative anticipations of their modal structure are not concerned. But the disclosure of their normative anticipatory spheres is certainly dependent on historically founded human formation. They have, therefore, only a restrictive independence of historical development.

The distinction between 'absolute' and 'empirical' norms is untenable.

The well-known distinction between the so-called 'absolute' and 'empirical' norms, meant as a discrimination between two fundamentally different kinds of norms, loses every semblance of justification in the light of this state of affairs. It is closely connected with the modern Humanistic philosophy of values, rooted in the ideal of the autonomous (or rather "sovereign") personality.

According to Windelband\(^1\), the logical, aesthetic, and ethical norms have an absolute character, in the sense of being fundamentally elevated above time and therefore not subject to temporal change. They are the norms claiming with immediate evidence that they ought to be realized. Following Windelband, the well-known Hungarian legal theorist Félix Somlo has tried to interpret the difference between legal rules and social conventions on the one hand, and logical, moral and aesthetic standards, on the other, as the difference between empirical and absolute norms. We refer to the following utterance of this author: 'Norms' in this sense (i.e. absolute), 'are therefore merely the immediately evident, not deducible, and not further reducible

\(^1\) Präludien (3th ed.) p. 292/3.
rules with which we are confronted as the last data which are indicated as necessary and universally valid in this sense. We may also call them the highest, like the logical, the ethical and the aesthetic norms, which are the usually coodinated kinds of standards of the true, the good and the beautiful. Opposite to these are the merely accidental or empirical norms, not logically necessary, the most different kinds of rules and prescriptions which do not give expression to the absolute values, and which cannot be designated as norms in the narrow sense of the word" ¹.

This entire way of representing things gets entangled in insoluble antinomies. The notion of a merely ‘accidental’, arbitrary norm contains a contradictio in terminis. Arbitrariness can never be elevated to a norm, to an obligatory rule of conduct.

Qualifying the positive legal norms and those of social intercourse as ‘arbitrary’ or ‘accidental’ is equal to denying their normative character. But this would imply a denial of the entire law-side of the modal aspects in which they function, since the latter cannot be reduced to other law-spheres without violating their intrinsic modal meaning.

On the other hand, the notion of absolute logical, ethical and aesthetic norms is thoroughly contradictory. It is an attempt to conceive of the specific meaning-modi of the logical, the ethical and the aesthetic aspects of experience apart from their inter-modal coherence with all the others. But our previous enquiry has shown that this attempt must result in a theoretical destruction of their modal meaning. The aspects concerned can only express themselves in the retrocipatory and the anticipatory meaning-coherence with all the earlier and the later modal spheres and among these is also the historical modus.

The aesthetic norms positivized in modern architecture, modern music, modern painting and belles lettres, have a different concrete content from that of the early Renaissance, the High Middle Ages, or Greek antiquity, notwithstanding the invariability of the primary principles that have received their positive forms in them.

The ancient dramatic norm of aesthetic unity of time, place and action, formulated by Aristotle, is no longer valid in modern dramaturgy.

¹ Juristische Grundlehre, p. 59.
The same state of affairs must be established with regard to the ethical norms. The positive content of modern economic ethics (Wirtschaftsethik) is entirely different from that of medieval times. The prohibition of interest had a positive-moral sense on the substratum of a cultural level in history at which the modern credit system in money-economy had not yet been introduced. Once the progress of historical evolution had reached a sufficiently advanced stage, this medieval norm could not remain unaltered.

And, lastly, it may be that the logical norms do not yet require formative positivizing in their 'restrictive function', because naïve thought in its logical aspect does not show any theoretical-systematic tendency to anticipate historical development. But when the logical meaning-aspect is opened, the logical principles of thinking do require theoretical forming by the human will to think scientifically.

The formation of history and law-formation. The historical struggle for power between tradition and formative will. Tradition as the guardian of historical continuity, and the principle of continuity as a modal normative principle.

Notwithstanding, there remains a fundamental modal difference between the original formative control in the sense of cultural development and forming or positivizing in the modal meaning of the post-historical law-spheres.

In the juridical sphere, for instance, the positivizing activity is necessarily dependent on competency in the material meaning of the modal aspect of retribution. The historic adage 'might is right' results in an inner antinomy due to the theoretical leveling of the modal boundaries between the historical and the legal aspects of experience.

Historism thinks that its view in this respect is eminently 'realistic', but it really gives an erroneous theory of the real structural relations.

Usually this view is especially defended by referring to successful usurpations, revolutions, conquests, etc. Nevertheless, it cannot account for the real states of affairs. Although law-formation is founded in historical power-formation, it cannot be reduced to the latter.

Legal competency as such has no historical meaning; it is impossible to speak of a legal competency to form history,
whereas the jurist can never understand the forming of law apart from a competent law-forming organ.\(^1\)

Law-formation itself is not the formation of history, neither is it simply the dependent reflex of it, but rather the adaptation of the legal norms in their original retributive meaning to their substratum in historical development.

There is, however, a second point by which the original 'formation of history' (giving positive direction to historical development on the law-side) is fundamentally distinguished in its modal meaning from all manner of norm-positivizing in the later law-spheres. In the modal meaning of cultural development the formation of new cultural norms is always the result of a struggle between the guardians of tradition and the representatives of new ideas. So long as this struggle for power has not been decided, the party of tradition can never be accused of reaction. For reaction pre-supposes a regressive running counter to a positive norm that has already been formed in the evolution of civilization; it is a falling back to a past which, culturally speaking, is dead.

As long as the traditionalist party simply acts as the guardian of the positive norms prevailing up to now, it normally represents an extremely beneficial factor in the development of culture, viz. that of continuity. For it must be evident that no real cultural life would be possible if every new generation could begin with the revolutionary year One. Every generation is historically bound to all the former by tradition. The power of tradition is enormous, since in a condensed form it embodies cultural treasures gathered in the course of centuries. Therefore it is the main factor in the cultural formation of the human mind. We all are dominated by it to a much higher degree than we are conscious of. But it would be a serious error to seek in it the norm of historical development itself. This would result in a bad traditionalism and conservatism, which forgets that the fulfilment of the cultural task of mankind demands a continuous striving forward.

The task of tradition is only to guarantee the continuity in cultural development.

\(^1\) In my theory of the sources of law I have shown that this is even the case with respect to customary law. Custom, as such, is no legal source at all, but only a mode of indirect law-formation which supposes original legal competence to do so.
The shapers of history have to fight in order to secure general acceptance for their new cultural principles. These principles are thus purified of their revolutionary subjectivity, and adapted to the modal norm of historical continuity. For it can no longer be doubted that we are confronted here with a real normative principle of an intrinsically historical character. But in this stage of our enquiry its normative content cannot yet be indicated as to the direction of cultural development, since the criterion for distinguishing historical reaction and historical progress has not yet been detected. This criterion can only reveal itself in our further analysis of the modal structure of the aspect concerned, in which its entire intermodal meaning-coherence with the other aspects must be laid bare.

For the present it must be borne in mind that the moment of the struggle for power between tradition and progress is inherent in the shaping of history and that the principle of the continuity of cultural development is a normative principle for all really formative processes within the aspect concerned.

It is the great merit of Dr K. Kuypers' *Theorie der Geschiedenis* to have established in such a pregnant way a connection between the modal meaning-moment of tradition and this principle of historical continuity. By this he has indeed fixed an essential meaning-moment in the modal aspect of cultural development, although this moment itself cannot be considered as the modal nucleus of the meaning of history.

The historical formative will as a psychical retroci-pation on the law-side of the modal meaning of cultural development.

The analysis of the logical analogy in the historical modus, has implicitly revealed quite a series of other modal retrocipations; for this logical analogy became apparent on the law-side in the interweaving of the normative principle and the human formative will. The moment of this formative will compels us to direct our analytical glance behind the logical sphere, and to study first the sphere of its psychical analogies.

The formative will in the great leaders of history, such as Cæsar, Galilei, Luther, Calvin, Rembrandt, Napoleon, Bismarck, etc., in its modal meaning necessarily refers back to the modal

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1 By 'progress' I do not mean to pronounce an appreciation such as is implied in the term *Fortschrittsgedanke*. 
sense of the psychical law-sphere, especially to the psychical
function of volition, i.e. emotional striving and desiring.

The historical formative will is not a craving and striving in
the meaning-modus of emotional feeling, although it cannot
exist without the latter for its foundation.

As such it functions in the normative meaning of history only
on the substratum of this psychical desire and this striving, just
as the will of the law-maker can only be understood as such
in the modal meaning of retribution, but in a retrocipatory
coherence with the psychical aspect of volition. The formative
will here intended is an essential moment in historical mastery
over persons. It concretizes, positivizes, elaborates, the modal
developmental principles of the historical law-sphere in the
typical total structures of the various cultural spheres.

In founding the Frankish Kingdom Clovis positivized a prin-
ciple of historical development which will be explained presently
as a further regulative determination of that of continuity: i.e. the
principle of cultural integration. What his personal psychical
motives were, is irrelevant to his significance as a moulder of
history. It may be that in connection with Clovis' leading func-
tion in the political-cultural development of the German peoples
these personal psychical motives cannot be neglected by the
historian. But the real historical importance of Clovis' conquests
and of his political organization of the new Frankish empire
lies outside of the psychical aspect of experience. His formative
volitional function in the historical process could not follow the
course of his feeling-drives and emotional desires. He broke
through the narrow limits of the sib, the populace and the tribe
that hemmed in the primitive culture and had doomed it to
internal barrenness.

In this way he enabled civilization to expand. The moulder
of history sees how his ideas are realized, and how the develop-
ment of civilization is affected in a quite different way from
what he had subjectively desired and intended. This is what
Wundt called the *heterogenesis* of aims in history. In the same
way the political law-maker finds the legal norms which he has
enacted still imputed to his juridical will as legislator, while
they gradually detach themselves entirely from his original
conception and intention.

The shaper of history is only the leader, or perhaps only one
of the leaders in a historical group-function (a cultural sphere,
a nation, a school, etc.)
In this group-function the power of tradition in an immensely complicated system of factors — of whose full significance no single contemporary is fully aware individually — forces his formative will along the paths of historical continuity.

This is what German historical idealism used to call the 'objective Spirit' in history,—if we strip the states of affairs here intended from any speculative idealistic interpretation doubtless connected with this term.

The historical past with its condensed treasure of cultural factors permeates the present and the future in the normative continuity of cultural development. It is in no one's power to dissociate himself from this supra-individual group-tradition.

The rôle of great personalities in history.

With this we automatically touch upon the old controversy about the question whether after all history is 'made' by the great personalities, or if these personalities themselves are only products of a particular supra-individual historical spirit of the times.

This way of formulating the question is unacceptable. History is not 'made' by men, but shaped, formed only. Moreover, the dilemma of an individualistic or a universalistic-sociological conception of this formation of history ought to be rejected in principle, if insight is to be gained into the meaning-structure of the historical formative will.

At a primitive stage of culture, civilization seems to be immersed in the lethargy of a rigid group-tradition which the members of a primitive social group undergo in many respects as an unalterable supernatural power. But civilization has got into this state in consequence of the sinful human formative will. The guardians of the group-tradition remain responsible individual personalities. They cannot be denatured to a kind of indifferent passage-way of an unconscious group-will.

And when, at a higher cultural level, the individual genius interferes with the process of the forming of history, such an individual moulder of history is neither to be simply considered as the product of the group-mind, nor as an autarchic individual, drawing exclusively from his own genius. He is rather nurtured by the rich supra-individual tradition of the group, without which he could never be an individual shaper of cultural development whose free projects open new roads to the history of mankind.
Power as a normative historical mission in the modal meaning of history. Mastery over persons and social-psychical influence.

What is it that makes a man the former of cultural development in a particular period of history? It is not any casual historical subject that makes, or rather moulds history. For this task power over men in a particular cultural sphere is essential.

In our previous examinations it has repeatedly been stated that this historical modus of social influence is no brute natural force. Nor can it be reduced to social-psychical influence, a modal shift of meaning regularly found in the treatment of the fashionable sociological theme of 'the leader and the masses'.

In the present context it is necessary to explain in somewhat greater detail the radical modal difference of meaning between power over men in the process of cultural formation of human society and the psychical mode of influencing social human behaviour. This is the more necessary because in modern Christian ethics inspired by dialectical theology there is often noticeable a real horror of power-formation, which is considered as something essentially un-Christian. In positivistic sociology power is always regarded as a psycho-physical phenomenon, and so it is quite understandable that, according to the usual opposition of facts and norms, mastery over persons was supposed to be an entirely a-normative social relation. But since the analysis of the logical analogies in the modal structure of the historical aspect has laid bare the normative meaning of its law-sphere, it is no longer possible to accept this current view.

In addition, from the Christian standpoint this conception is hardly to be reconciled with the Divine cultural commandment mentioned in the first chapter of the Book of Genesis, according to which the subjection of the earth and the mastery over it is expressly posited as a normative task of mankind. There is no explicit mention of power-formation in the social relations between men in this passage. But without the latter cultural development of mankind would be impossible. Culture is bound to human society, which, in its turn, demands cultural formation, i.e. a controlling manner of shaping the social relations between men. All human power is derived from God as the absolute Origin of every earthly mastery. JESUS CHRIST has said that all power on earth and in the Heavens was given in His hands. The horror of power-formation for the sake of the fulfilment of the Christian task in the cultural develop-
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ment of mankind is, consequently, un-biblical. The Church itself is historically founded in power over men by means of the organized service of the Word and the Sacraments.

Doubtless, every power given in the hands of man implies a serious risk of abuse. But this state of affairs can only accentuate its normative meaning, it can never justify the opinion that power in itself is an evil.

The positivistic sociological view that power over men can be reduced to social-psychical influence, eventually (in the case of sword-power) supported by ‘physical means’, rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding.

Power over men has indeed a social-psychical substratum in the feeling-drive of submission to the leadership of superior figures. The latter exercise a considerable emotional influence upon their social environment. But real formative power in its original cultural sense does not function in the feeling-aspect of human experience, as little as the formative will in its historical function can be identified with the psychical aspect of volition.

Wherever real power over men manifests itself, it is always consolidated in cultural forms which transcend the psychical life of the individuals in their social interaction.

This is why history can never be reduced to social psychology. The construction of a collective soul as the psychical origin of the cultural forms of human society is nothing but a metaphysical speculation. And it is indeed surprising that this metaphysical construction was laid at the foundation of the positivistic sociology of Emile Durkheim, who at the same time emphatically denied that the social institutions can be examined in a psychological way.

Power over men, as the irreducible cultural modality of social influence, cannot be realized apart from the other modal aspects of social life, consequently, not apart from the social-psychical relations between men. But in this realization it maintains its cultural modal meaning. Its factual side remains bound to the normative cultural principle of power-formation founded in the Divine order of creation, and cannot be experienced apart from it in its original historical sense.

Historical power is not an a-normative meaning-figure, but it is the power of a normative mission in the sense of formative control. The possessor of historical power does not possess it as a kind of personal property that he has at his subjective disposal. He has a normative task and mission in the
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development of human civilization either to guard or to mould culture further, in subjection to the principles laid down by God in His world-order. If he thinks he can trample on these cultural principles, which are elevated above any subjective arbitrariness, he will discover his own powerlessness. Real power to form history can only unfold either in obedient, or in compulsory subjection to the Divine principles of cultural development. This important point is essential to a true insight into the intrinsic meaning of historical power, and it will be explained in the further analysis of the principles of historical development.

The glory of power has been tarnished because its normative modal meaning was lost sight of.

It ought to be completely restored in its irreplaceable value within the Divine world-order by considering its modal sense in the light of the Biblical basic motive. For it is of Divine origin and finds its religious consummation in Christ Jesus as the Incarnate Word, in Whom God’s omnipotence finds its pure expression, not tainted with sin.

It has not been included in the world-order because of sin only. For God created man after His own Image as ruler and lord of the earthly world.

Through sin the power of man was turned away from its religious fulness; instantly the striving after its absolutization came into existence, the disregard for its temporal meaning-coherence, root and Origin. And in this apostate direction of the human craving for power man was reduced to relative powerlessness. The power of the kingdom of darkness revealed itself in the history of the world, — power as the citadel of Satan in its struggle with the power of the kingdom of Christ. This central theme of the Christian view of history will presently demand all our attention.

The romantic quietist conception of God’s guidance in history.

With the acceptance of the human will as an essential formative factor in the historical process, and the acknowledgment of the normative meaning of power as a historical mission, our view of history is inexorably opposed to all manner of romantic quietism. Under the influence of Schelling and the

1 Matth. 28:18; John 3:38
2 Genesis 1:26, 28.
Historical School, this quietism — which found a fertile soil in the dialectical Lutheran view of the Law in its relation to Christian freedom — has also penetrated into the conception of history propounded by Fr. Julius Stahl.

Stahl's view of the normative sense of historical continuity appeared to be infected by an irrationalist organological trait. What had come about by the activity of the national mind in a supposedly unconscious process, was surrounded by a special aureole of sanctity, because it was due to 'organic growth' and not to the actions of men. And Stahl thinks he can recognize in the unwritten customary law something that grew out of the 'mind of the people' as a product of 'God's guidance' (Gottes Fügung). This ought to have a higher value accorded to it than to legislation in which the human formative will is so very much in evidence.

But history is never formed without human interference, though the latter is only instrumental with regard to God's government of the world. The interlacing of normative principle and human formative will is founded in the modal meaning of history itself and in the Divine world-order in which its modal law-sphere has been given its proper place. The historical development sets Christianity an eminent, normative task, a Divine mission, viz. the laying of the historical foundation, through the power of Christ, for the realization of Christian principles in this sinful world. This conclusion can no longer be evaded since it has been shown that the historical law-sphere is really the basis in the retrocipatory direction of time for the entire normative dynamics revealing itself in the opening-process of the other normative law-spheres.

If the Christian principles of justice, morality etc. are to find acceptance in this world, then it is only possible on the historical basis of power-formation in a continuous struggle with the powers of apostasy. True, God Himself guarantees the Honour of His Name, the victory of His Kingdom over the kingdom of darkness. But He uses human instruments in this struggle. Those who in the manner of the quietists make an appeal to 'God's guidance in history', as a kind of an unconsciously operating irrational factor outside of human intervention, corrupt the meaning of this Christian motif. For the latter is a summons to activity, not to resignation.
The biotic analogies in the retrocipatory structure of the historical aspect.

After our examination of the psychical retrocipations in the modal structure of history the biotic analogies once more demand our attention. These were already mentioned in the analysis of the logical analogies and in the discussion of the normative sense of historical development. But in the present context it is necessary to make some additional remarks about their retrocipatory structure.

Historical development is inherent in cultural life and constitutes an indispensable element of historical experience. But any dialectical abuse of these biotic analogies should be carefully avoided.

The danger of such an abuse can be clearly seen from the organological view of history in which cultural unfolding was conceived of as a higher stage of natural development, so that the former was construed after the pattern of the growth of a living organism. It may be that this biologistic conception was dialectically connected with the motive of cultural freedom; but this could not retrieve the fundamental levelling of the modal boundaries between the biotic and the historical aspects, implied in this view.

On the other hand, the distinction between living and intrinsically dead elements of cultural tradition was very useful and even indispensable. It appeared that the Historical legal school conceived it in a normative sense, but failed to indicate a serviceable criterion. Here, too, the dialectical-organological view of historical development lost sight of the fundamental modal difference between natural growth, in the sense of organic life, and the historical process of cultural unfolding.

This does not detract from the value of the distinction as such. But the normative criterion cannot be found in the biotic retrocipations of the historical law-sphere alone, nor in its retrocipatory structure as a whole. As long as the modal structure of history is considered only in its closed or restrictive function every attempt to detect the regulative content of the normative principles of cultural development is doomed to failure.

This is undubitably a very interesting state of affairs, since it deviates from what was found in our analysis of the retrocipatory structure of other normative aspects. In the logical, the legal and the moral law-spheres, for instance, we detected a material content of the normative principles even in their closed structure.
And it is especially the biotical analogy of historical development in which this deviating state of affairs manifests itself. This may be a new indication of the particular position of the historical law-sphere with regard to the opening-process of the normative meaning-aspects.

For the present our analysis of the retrocipatory structure of history must be continued by considering the analogies of the aspect of energy-effect. This will direct our attention to the famous problem of causality in its historical meaning.

The intermodal meaning-coherence between the historical aspect and that of energy-effect. The problem of historical causality and Toynbee's idea of 'challenge'.

The analysis of the logical analogies in the modal meaning of the historical aspect has brought to light that the identity and diversity of historical events is not to be established in the way followed in verifying natural facts. What belongs to an historical occurrence, and what does not, appeared to depend on historical imputation. One should not be led astray by the fact that natural events, too, can have an historical signification. For this appeared to be possible only in an historical subject-object-relation. In this relation the historical meaning of such facts depends on particular subjective cultural situations affected by them.

This state of affairs must be of great importance for the insight into the physical analogies within the modal structure of history which reveal the inner meaning-coherence of the latter with the aspect of energy-effect.

Every historical event — either subjective or objective — implies historical effects in cultural development. Without such effects it would be historically irrelevant. But if historical events themselves cannot be established without normative imputation the same thing must apply to the historical relation of cause and effect.

In their epistemological reflections on the historical concept of causality historians have been troubled by the naturalist philosophical view of the causal nexus inspired by the deterministic Humanist science-ideal.

Starting from the so-called physico-psychical image of temporal reality they considered that a particular effect can only result from the whole of physical and psychical antecedents by which it is necessarily determined. And since the series of causal
conditiones sine qua non in the case of historical processes seemed to be immensely complex, and the knowledge of its totality transcends human possibility, the historian should be content with making a relatively arbitrary selection from this series. This is, for instance, the view of the famous Dutch historian Huizinga and of the German philosopher Georg Simmel.

It needs no further argument that in this way the problem of historical causality is completely misunderstood since it is conceived outside of the modal meaning of history.

An historical causal nexus can only be found between cultural events, just as a juridical causal nexus can only exist between legal facts, and a psychical one only between psychical phenomena. It is true that the historical modality of causal relations has an unbreakable intermodal coherence with the other modal aspects of a real causal process. But it cannot be reduced to the latter.

Let me illustrate this state of affairs by an example. In the discussion of the question: Which historical situations have caused the rise of the feudal system in the Frankish kingdom? historians usually mention two facts: in the first place the invasions of the Arabs, whose cavalry by far surpassed that of the Frankish army, whose horsemen only consisted of the royal antrustiones; and secondly the interior danger caused by the formation of a private cavalry by the mighty Frankish seigneurs. The Carolingians conquered both dangers at once by a compulsory incorporation of the private vassals in the Frankish army.

The causal factors alleged here are doubtless historical. Two power-formations threatened the Frankish kingdom. They were a real ‘challenge’ in the sense meant by Toynbee, and their historical effect was a dangerous situation. The latter became the historical ground for a measure of political genius by which the challenge was answered and the military and political power-integration of the Frankish empire was assured.

Every attempt to reduce this intrinsically historical causal nexus to a physico-psychical complex would be meaningless, though it is evident that the former can reveal its historical meaning only in the inter-modal coherence with other modalities of causal relations.

The ‘challenge’ in Toynbee’s sense is, in fact, at the same time an appeal to the normative task of the real formers of history, a historical test of their qualification as leaders in the process of cultural development of mankind. This is to say that the histori-
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cal causal relation in the case mentioned shows a factual side and a norm-side, which are insolubly related to one another. The factual effect of the Arabian invasions and of the private power-formation of the Frankish seigneurs was the rise of a serious danger to the Frankish empire. This was the 'challenge', which, on the normative law-side of the historical law-sphere, became the ground for the fulfilment of an historical task: the military and political integration of the Frankish kingdom into a real state. There was no guaranty in advance that the Carolingian rulers would be able to conquer the dangers. We cannot say that the maintenance of an imperium, originated from conquests, and viewed by the Merovingian conquerors as their private dominium, was in itself a normative requirement of cultural development. From the historical viewpoint the only question was how the Carolingian rulers would answer the 'challenge', whether or not in the line of a cultural principle which turns out to be a real norm of historical development.

The affirmative answer to this question supposes again that an historical norm is to be assumed implying the task of the political formers of history indicated above. And this can only appear from our further analysis of the modal structure of history.

For the present it must be established that neither the psychical nor the physical aspects of causality implied in the realization of the Arabian invasions, the private power-formations of the Frankish seigneurs and the political-historical projects of the Carolingians, touch at the intrinsically historical causal relation explained above. The historian who examines the political-historical development of the Frankish kingdom during the 8th century, cannot escape from taking account of the psychical and physical aspects of the events. But he must be aware that he is then in the same position as the jurist, who, for instance, confronted with the question whether a murder has been committed in the legal sense of the word, must in advance establish whether a certain dose of arsenic can be medically considered as lethal.

To the judge this is a preliminary question lying at the basis of the real juridical causal problem, and when he is in doubt, he will consult a specialist.

In the same way the historian should consider that the psychical and physical aspects of a causal process functioning in the historical law-sphere do not belong to the real historical causal nexus.
It is the modal structure of the latter which determines its meaning. Therefore the analysis of this modal meaning-structure is necessary.

The so-called individual causality in history and the rejection of the concept of historical causality by the Diltheyan school.

It is not sufficient, after the manner of RICKERT, to work with the category of 'individual causality' which is not further determined in its meaning. Neither will it do to speak of a 'lack of causal equation' as distinct from the natural scientific 'causal equation' (Kausal-Ungleichung; Kausal-Gleichung). With regard to the concrete historical causality the mathematical-physical principle of equivalence doubtless does not hold, because it has no historical sense at all. In the meaning of cultural development 'small causes' may have 'great consequences'. But this 'individual causality' is by no means inherent only in the historical side of reality. It is revealed wherever our attention is directed to the subjectivity of the events in their structures of individuality, as they are expressed within the different modal aspects of experience.

Considered modally, individuality remains an απειροσ, so long as our theoretical view is not directed to the 'guiding functions' opening the infinite number of possibilities, implied in the structures of individuality and their modal aspects.

This disclosure within the concrete structural coherence of the individual totality takes place in a definite anticipatory direction.

In any case the moment of individuality cannot determine the modal structure of an historical causal nexus. As soon as (with RICKERT, TROELTSCH, and other methodologists of historical thought) individuality is considered as an a-priori determining moment of the historical aspect as such, the order of investigation is inverted. It is forgotten that historical individuality as such can only be determined from its historical modus, and not the other way about.

When our theoretical attention is prematurely directed to the incalculable diversity of individuality manifested in concrete things and events we can no longer read its rich modal diversity.

The unjustified identification of causality with the natural-scientific conception of it, explains why the Diltheyan trend in
the philosophy of history wishes to ban the entire category of causality from historical science. In the opinion of the Diltheyans causality belongs to explanatory spatial thinking, and they hold that 'historical thought' should be directed to the interpretative understanding of the historical meaning-coherences, and not to explanatory analysis.

The truth of the matter is that the relation of cause and effect is an inseparable retrocipatory element in the modal structure of history itself, but in this meaning-aspect it cannot be reduced to any non-historical function of causality.

Historical causality, as such, is necessarily qualified by the nuclear meaning-moment of formative control. It is a cultural relation.

The retrocipation of movement in the modal structure of history.

There can be no doubt that our experience of historical development is ultimately founded in the pure intuition of movement. It may be that this development, as such, is a biotic retrocipation; but the previous provisional analysis of the modal structure of the biotic aspect has shown that the moment of development cannot be the modal nucleus of the latter. It is only an indirectly founded analogy of movement in its original sense.

Historical or cultural development is, consequently, a much more complicated retrocipation, since its intermodal foundation is mediated by all the modal aspects following that of movement and preceding the historical sphere. As was remarked in an earlier context, it is not the logical compulsion of a pre-conceived philosophical system which leads to this conclusion. Rather it is the unavoidable result of an exact analysis of the modal meaning-structures.

Insofar as historical or cultural life is founded in organic life, historical development implies the analogy of biotic potentiability, and the analogical moments of vital and intrinsically dead components of tradition. Insofar as it is founded in the physical aspect of energy-effect, it implies the analogy of historical cause and its consequences. But the dynamical moment, as such implied in the experience of cultural development, can have no other ultimate foundation than the pure intuition of movement.

It is no use explaining it from the experience of historical time. For such an explanation appeals to the historical meaning-modus
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of time whose modal structure is the very subject matter of our analysis.

If historical time implies historical movement, which can hardly be denied, we are confronted with the question concerning its ultimate foundation, since in its historical qualification it reveals its analogical character. Analogies cannot exist without this basis, if they are not to be meaningless. They refer to an original modal meaning-nucleus as their ultimate temporal point of reference. And a serious philosophical analysis should not rest before this point of reference has been laid bare.

But then it is inevitable that, together with the analogy of movement, we shall detect spatial and numerical analogies in the modal structure of history. The horror of ‘spatial thought’ in the ‘Geisteswissenschaften’, which we remarked in Dilthey and his adherents in the philosophy of history, should not refrain us from bringing to light also these ultimate retrocipatory moments in the modal structure concerned. Only it should be borne in mind that they are analogies and not mathematical concepts.

Numerical analogies in power.

The numerical retrocipations require no special attention. Every historical fact and every historical relation implies (in a cultural sense) the moments of unity and multiplicity founded in arithmetical relations.

Power implies a quantitative analogy in its different gradations. But it cannot be really quantified in its inner cultural meaning. Its numerical analogies are ruled by cultural standards, not by arithmetical measures. Political power, for instance, cannot be measured by the number of men over which it extends, but only by the degree to which this multitude is formed to a political-historical unity. A numerically great people may be weak as a political power-formation. The same holds good with respect to other types of historical formations of mastery.

For the rest, these quantitative analogies can only be examined via the spatial retrocipations.
The spatial analogies in the modal moment of the cultural area. The normative call to win the control over nature, and the positivizing of this modal historical principle in technical industry. The instrument as a document of civilization and its relation to the cultural area.

The spatial analogies in the modal structure of history already demanded attention in our introductory consideration of the analogical basic concepts of scientific thought. There it appeared that the science of history is bound to a historical notion of space which is called cultural area. A cultural area is qualified by the modal nuclear moment of formative control (or power) in the correlation of power over persons and power over objects. Since this nuclear moment appeared to have an intrinsically normative meaning, this spatial analogy, too, is only to be conceived in a normative sense. It appeared to be a sphere of human power-expansion which, to be sure, is founded in the space of sensory perception, but is not perceptible in its modal cultural meaning to the eye of sense.

A cultural area may be more or less extensive and this gradation shows its intra-modal coherence with the quantitative retrocipations of power briefly discussed above. This extension, too, just like its gradation, has an intrinsically cultural measure; it cannot be conceived in mathematical equations, though in its realization it doubtless has a mathematical foundation so that by nature it has an inner meaning-coherence with spatial magnitude. It is an historical magnitude bound to cultural movement and development, consequently, a dynamical supersensory meaning-figure. As such it is a spatial analogy which can only be conceived in the historical subject-object-relation. Let us consider this relation in somewhat greater detail, though in so doing we cannot escape anticipating our later general examination of this subject.

Already in its restrictive retrocipatory structure the modal meaning of culture implies the normative historical principle of the call to win the control over nature in its objective cultural potentialities. This principle appeared to be founded in the Divine ordinance of the creation (Gen. 1:26—28). Though the fall into sin deprived man of the fulness of this power, the principle itself has retained its modal validity in the development of culture. It is positivized in technical industry in the sense intended in the Greek word τεχνη, i.e. formative control.
Wherever tools are found to control nature, be it in ever so primitive a form, we are on historical ground, in a cultural area. The term ‘agriculture’ clearly indicates the cultural subject-object-relation between human techné and the soil in its objective cultural potentiality. And even the primitive control of nature in the still undeveloped techné is based on a logical meaning-substratum. Without logical thinking it is impossible to gain the control of nature.

At first sight this technical control, as a historical meaning-figure, seems to expand itself only in the objective direction. And if only this objective direction is considered, the normative character of the modal principle of power-expansion over nature positivized in technical industry cannot immediately catch the eye.

Especially at its modern highly developed level, technics is usually viewed as a purely material factor of culture whose predominant power threatens human personality. In its impersonal sphere there seems to be no room for subjects but for objects only. And it can hardly be denied that an excessive expansion of the power of technical industry implies serious dangers for mankind. But this is the subject of later examinations. For the present it should be borne in mind that in technical industry we are confronted with the modal subject-object-relation which renders any merely objectivistic conception really meaningless. Technical industry, as a historical phenomenon, is itself ruled by principles which, as such, refer to subjective formative activity. Their normative content in the formative process of history on the law-side is subjected to development in a progressive direction.

Technical industry is never to be understood in an individualistic sense. It always means a historical expansion of formative power both in subjective and in objective directions. In the former direction it is primarily a communal factor. The formation of the technical principles is only possible through the agency of historical authorities within a cultural group.

If on the basis of natural-scientific thought the technical control of nature is to be raised to a higher level, the authority of the formers of history must intervene in the cultural community in order to conquer reactionary conservatism. The latter is not identical with tradition, the guardian of historical continuity; but is rather the power of inertia that simply opposes any novelty. Progress in technical industry is impossible with-
out the basis of historical power over persons, manifesting itself in the general acceptance of new technical ideas: the deepened technical principles must find sufficient support in a cultural community and cultural area.

An individual discovery or invention that has no historical consequences because it is not generally accepted, and consequently lacks the character of a formative factor in human society, cannot form history.

We have now almost imperceptibly passed on to the chief theme of our enquiry connected with the opening-process in the historical law-sphere. Our previous investigations of the retrocipatory structure of history have served only as a preparation.

§ 5 - THE ANTICIPATORY STRUCTURE OF THE HISTORICAL ASPECT AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEA OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.

The rigidity of the cultural meaning in the still closed primitive cultures. The historical norm of integration and its divine foundation.

In the restrictive as yet unopened function of the historical law-sphere in a primitive society, civilization is still enclosed between the rigid walls of small sibs, tribes, or populaces. The typical structures of these communities have as yet no differentiated determinating or leading function 1. The historical authorities in primitive society are the guardians of a rigid group-tradition, often deified by a pagan faith.

So long as such communities maintain their isolation in history, there is no question of any development of culture in the proper sense of the word, as it is taken in the science of history.

The primitive group must come into contact with other groups that are at a higher cultural level. Its historical tradition, rigidly tied down to an idolatrous belief in nature, must be affected.

1 The concept of the 'determinating or leading function' as the guiding structural function of things and human social groups can only be explained in the third Volume. There we shall analyze the structures of individuality further. In the present context a preliminary explanation of the term must suffice. The determining or leading function is the typically guiding structural function in the entire architecture of a 'thing' and of social groups. Thus, e.g., the temporal community of the church has its typically guiding structural function as a community of believers on the basis of a common positive confession of Christian faith. The determining function of the temporal ecclesiastical institution is, consequently, enclosed in the aspect of faith. It gives this institution its typical qualification.
The isolating walls of partition must be broken through if there is to be any normative dynamics, any deepening of the meaning of a primitive civilization. Very often it is the historical power of the sword that makes the opening-process possible here, but other (peaceful) powers like that of the Christian mission, of trade, etc. are also frequently active.

In the removal of the rigid walls of isolation, historical development moves in the line of cultural integration. The latter has its counter-part in the process of an increasing differentiation. This process of cultural integration and differentiation should be sharply distinguished from the levelling tendencies which in our days threaten to penetrate the so-called under-developed cultures with secularized factors of Western civilization. In its genuine sense it is highly important to our enquiry.

Here Christian philosophy is directly confronted with the problem whether the modal structure of historical development on its law-side implies a normative principle of cultural integration and differentiation which can really be employed as a criterion of historical progress. In our previous examination of the problem of historical causality such a norm was only hypothetically introduced. At the present stage of our enquiry this hypothesis ought to find its justification. For it has appeared that the normative principle of historical development can reveal its material content only in the opening-process of the historical law-sphere.

It deserves special attention that the biologistic school in sociology has indeed accepted the principle of cultural integration and differentiation as a norm of historical development, though they transformed it into a natural law of higher organical life. EMILE DURKHEIM, too, though not belonging to the adherents of this school, assumed a necessary development of culture from an undifferentiated primitive stage to the level of increasing differentiation and integration. Both HERBERT SPENCER, the founder of the biologistic school, and DURKHEIM seemingly based this principle of cultural development on biotic analogies in the historical process of social life.

The previous examination has shown that these analogies, in their merely retrocipatory sense, cannot furnish any material standard of cultural development.

But in fact, the biologistic school, and also DURKHEIM, based their conception on the evolutionistic theory of DARWIN. And, as will appear presently, this theory, in its application to human
culture, implies a normative Idea of historical development masked in a natural-scientific garb. This Idea was, consequently, not derived from biotic analogies only. Its transformation into a natural law was a pure mystification. The simple fact that there exist primitive tribes which from times immemorial have remained in an undifferentiated state of culture, suffices to refute any natural scientific view of the principle of historical development.

If the principle of cultural differentiation and integration is really a modal norm of historical development, it must be founded in the modal structure of the historical opening-process, and in the Divine world-order as a whole. That this is indeed so will appear from our further analysis of the anticipatory structure of the historical meaning-modus.

Provisionally it is necessary to stress the fact that without the realization of the principle concerned, the anticipatory spheres of the historical aspect will remain closed. This is a strong indication that the principle of cultural differentiation and integration must be founded in the modal structure of the cultural opening-process.

In addition, it must be stated that without the process of cultural differentiation and integration there can be no question of a free unfolding of the structures of individuality in human society. As long as culture remains in an undifferentiated condition there is no room for a state, a church, a free industrial or trade-life, free associations, a free unfolding of fine arts, a scientific community etc. Even the matrimonial community and family-life are often denatured by being intersected through artificial undifferentiated power-formations, like those of matriarchal or patriarchal sibs or clans, which impede a free unfolding of the natural matrimonial and family relations.

God has created everything according to its own inner nature; and in the temporal order of genesis and development this inner nature must freely unfold itself. This also holds good with regard to the structures of individuality determining the inner nature of the different typical spheres of human society. Only in connection with the whole order of creation is it permitted to refer to the development of a human being from an undifferentiated impregnated egg-cell to a highly differentiated individuum, and to an ascending series of undifferentiated and more or less differentiated living beings in nature. In so doing, the Christian philosopher does not fall back into the error of de-
riving a norm of cultural development from the closed biotic analogies in the structure of the historical aspect. Rather he appeals to the universal order of creation which has to unfold itself within all aspects of the real process of temporal development, in the biotical, as well as in the psychical, and the postpsychical law-spheres.

For the rest more arguments may be alleged for the thesis that from the Biblical standpoint the principle of cultural differentiation and integration is to be acknowledged as a fundamental norm of historical development. The history of the building of the tower of Babel, viewed in the light of the cultural commandment of Genesis I, shows that seclusion and isolation in cultural development is contrary to the Divine ordinance.

Cultural expansion, the spread of humanity over the surface of the earth in the differentiation of the cultural groups, and the cultural contact between these groups, have been set as a task to mankind.

The unity of mankind in its spiritual root does not allow a continuous cultural isolation of separated peoples. The task of winning the control over the earth is set to mankind, as a whole, in its historical development.

Meanwhile, the Biblical basic motive of the Christian religion does not permit the historical process of differentiation and integration to be considered only in the light of the order of creation.

Though the Divine cultural commandment has retained its complete validity, it should not be forgotten that in the process intended the historical power of sin must also develop in an increasing degree. And the influence of sin cannot fail to manifest itself also in the human formation of the cultural principles. This is why the Christian can never agree with an optimistic view of cultural progress. On the other hand, he should not surrender to the radical pessimism of a modern philosophy of cultural decline, or resign to a abandonment of culture to the power of apostasy. In the light of the Christian basic motive of Redemption, culture belongs to the Kingdom of Jesus Christ. And the task set to mankind in the cultural commandment of creation should be fulfilled in a continuous contest with the historical development of the power of sin, a contest to be waged through the spiritual δόναμος of the Redeemer. This theme will require special attention in a later context.
The problem of the original historical state of civilization and the Idea of progress.

But is the primitive condition of civilization in which the meaning of history manifests itself only in its closed restrictive function the original state of mankind? Is the factual side of historical development a steadily progressive evolutionary course? It is remarkable that already in Greek philosophy this evolutionistic view of history presented itself under a neutral positivistic mask. PROTAGORAS, the great founder of Greek sophism, was one of the first to construe the factual human cultural development in an ascending line.

Before him the idea of a golden age at the commencement of history had been prevalent. Even PLATO in his dialogues *Timaeus*, *Critias* and *Politicos* adopted it. But PROTAGORAS in his “Prometheus-myth” advanced the idea of a natural state of mankind as a life without justice, morality or body politic, though in possession of a limited amount of technical skill in controlling nature. Religion and language are supposed to have existed in this natural state. But justice and morality are said to have developed only in the civil state as the ‘general conviction’ or ‘general will’ of the united citizens. Owing to this view PROTAGORAS sharply opposed the idea of a ‘natural law’ and a pre-political moral standard. That is why he looks upon ‘civilization’ as a higher stage of development of the ‘culture’ existing in the state of nature.

In modern times the Idea of progress in its naturalistic form was propagated especially by the consistent adherents of the Humanistic science-ideal, in its mathematical orientation. The philosophy of the Enlightenment with its preponderately empiristic-positivistic tendency was permeated by this Idea.

At present it hardly needs special argument to say that the

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1 The credit of having pointed out the great importance of PROTAGORAS’ theory of cultural development for later theories in the same strain, is undoubtedly due to ADOLF MENZEL (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Staatslehre, Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akademie der Wissensch. Phil. hist. Klasse, Bnd. 210, Abh. I, 1929, pp. 192 ff). Cf. also W. Graf Uxkull-Gyllenband, in the work: *Griechische Kulturentstehungslehren* (1924), p. 22 ff.

2 Doubtless PROTAGORAS here meant the older nature-religion with its basic motive of the eternally flowing stream of Life, which in his philosophy was depreciated in favour of the form-motive of the cultural religion of the Greek polis.
Idea of historical development, in the sense of a steady progress under the guidance of 'reason', cannot be maintained on a positivistic foundation but contains a hidden axiological standard.

The transcendental Idea of historical development, as such, necessarily points beyond and above the modal temporal meaning of history. As a transcendental Idea it is unavoidably directed to the Origin and the consummation of the meaning of culture.

It may be that the concept of history has to start with the primary, as yet unopened meaning of the historical law-sphere; but this is in no way decisive for the question concerning the original historical conditions.

The question about the original historical condition of mankind necessarily refers back to that concerning the origin of history itself. Therefore it cannot be answered by historical science on the ground of the positive historical material only. In the same way physical science cannot explain to us the problem of the origin of "energy", and biology cannot explain to us the origin of "organic life".

Darwinistic evolutionism, conceived as a genetic world- and life-view encompassing the origin of human culture and society, is a sheer metaphysics of the Humanistic science-ideal. So is Fichte's hypothesis of a highly gifted original people which, as the individual embodiment of a given qualitative morality in a moral nature, is supposed to be the bearer of the original civilization. The origin of mankind cannot be found by science independently. The origin of culture is therefore a meta-historical question, answered for the Christian by the Divine Revelation of creation. And the original historical condition is indissolubly bound up with the origin of mankind.

Pre-history has doubtless furnished extremely important indications concerning the oldest testimonies of human culture. But every attempt at a reconstruction especially of the palaeolithic periods of cultural development contains a good deal of hypothesis. This is partly due to the lack of sufficient scientific material. But chiefly it is caused by the transcendental presuppositions of the pre-historical viewpoint.

But does it follow from this state of affairs that historical science, in accordance with the neutrality postulate, should refrain from giving an opinion on the direction of cultural development? Is it to relinquish the normative Idea of development? We shall see that it cannot do so if it is not to lose hold of
the historical aspect itself. It would be tantamount to sacrificing its position as a science with a limited sphere of its own. Only the historical aspect can guarantee historical science its own field of inquiry. And the modal meaning of culture, as we have now sufficiently demonstrated, just as any other modal meaning-structure, cannot be conceived apart from a transcendental basic Idea.

Historical science works with a transcendental Idea, and not with a rigid concept of historical development. Its relation to ethnology and the science of pre-history.

In analysing this modality we are necessarily confronted with the relation between primitive and deepened culture. The science of history is not interested in primitive closed cultures that have not been taken up in the stream of cultural development. It leaves the study of these civilizations to ethnology, the science of the so-called pre-history, and to sociology. Primitive cultures are important to historical science only insofar as they are referred to by an opened and deepened form of cultural development. The investigation of Old Germanic and pre-Germanic Celtic civilizations for instance is not merely important for ethnology or for ‘pre-history’. Historical science includes these cultures at their primitive stage in its own field of enquiry, because they have been taken up by the stream of development of modern civilization. As far as the source material goes, they are subject-matter for the historian. Nevertheless, they are also rightly investigated by ethnology and pre-history, insofar as cultural development in ‘closed cultural groups’ is submitted to a comparative (or a non-comparative) method of investigation.

On the other hand the theoretical inquiry into, e.g., the pre-historical cave-cultures, the culture of the Neanderthal-man, etc., is not a genuine historical theme, unless documentary evidence should enable us to trace the historical advancement of these primitive closed cultures into the stream of opened and deepened cultural development. At least with regard to the Neanderthal culture it has been established that this is not the case; and with respect to the cave-cultures it will appear presently that the discoveries of pre-history are not susceptible of scientific-historical interpretation in its proper sense.

The opened and deepened cultural development is undeniably found in the anticipatory and no longer in the retrocipatory direction of the historical aspect.
The anticipatory direction of history appeared to be understandable only in an *Idea* of cultural development. In the present context this point is very important. For here it appears that genuine historical science is itself oriented to the normative Idea of cultural development, although the current conception holds that it ought to abstain from any kind of 'value judgments'.

It is necessary to examine this state of affairs in somewhat greater detail.

The necessity of a normative Idea of cultural development for historical thought.

The merely retrocipatory moment of cultural development of which it is possible to form a *concept*, is rigidly bound up with biotic organic development, and as such it also occurs in the as yet closed primitive cultures.

These cultures may have their periods of historical rise, maturity and decline, just as a living organism has its developmental periods. The duration of their existence is dependent on that of the small popular or tribal communities that are their bearers. They vegetate upon the developmental potentialities contained in their isolated existence; and incidental influences from abroad (for instance the borrowing of new forms of tools) are only undergone receptively without giving rise to new cultural ideas. They may vanish from the scene altogether without leaving any trace in the history of mankind.

Quite different is the situation in the historical development of opened cultures. From the ancient cultural centres of world-history: Egypt, Babylon, Persia, Crete, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, Palestine etc. essential developmental tendencies have passed over into medieval and modern Western civilizations. They have fecundated the Germanic and Arabian cultures and this fecundation has given rise to new forms of civilization. This disclosed or opened cultural development has been freed from the rigid dependence upon the vital conditions of popular or tribal communities. It does not vegetate within the narrow boundaries of closed and undifferentiated cultural groups, but, like a fecundating stream, it always forms new channels to continue its course.

The merely retrocipatory element in cultural development, *its closed biotic analogy*, does not interest historical science. The fact that a primitive cultural group as the Marind-anim in New-
Guinea vanishes from the earth, owing to the dying out of the greater part of the tribe and the total decline of its culture, may interest ethnology\(^1\), but it is irrelevant to historical science. Only the anticipatory development of culture is drawn within its horizon.

If, therefore, historical science is denied its right to be guided by an Idea of historical development, this means that it is deprived of its necessary \( \psi \rho \delta \theta \epsilon \omega \iota \varepsilon \). The science of history — though the historian does not realize it — has indeed taken its stand with regard to the relation between primitive and deepened civilization.

Historical inquiry is only concerned with the latter, and with the development of primitive cultures to deepened civilizations insofar as documentary evidence is available.

Therefore historical thought moves in principle in the direction of the historical Idea, which is not possible, however, without the historical concept.

Is this Idea to remain without any direction; is it to be restricted to an immanent ‘Kultursynthese’\(^2\)? This is the opinion of modern Historism; it has prevailed also in the science of history, since the foundations of the Humanistic personality-ideal were undermined by sceptical relativism.

But a genuine Idea of historical development cannot be derived from an immanent synthesis of cultural facts in their typical structures of individuality.

The Christian Germanic cultural development is doubtless not to be understood without taking into account the influence of the powerful factors of Greek-Roman culture. In the Greek cultural development there were important Egyptian and other individual historical factors at work. But the ancient Greco-Roman factors operate in the Christian-Germanic history as in a new dynamic historical totality, and thereby assume an entirely new cultural nuance.

The individual historical structural totalities formed in this course of development must, consequently, stand in a functional relation which cannot be the result of these historical totalities themselves but which, inversely, is their very condition. This functional relation is that of historical development in the


\(^{2}\) The term is Troeltsch’s.
opening-process of its modal meaning. And the factual side of this opening-process is not to be established apart from normative cultural principles, which in their anticipatory character point beyond the immanent boundaries of the historical law-sphere.

This is why an immanent theoretic synthesis of Western culture in the sense meant by Troeltsch presupposes a transcendental Idea of historical development, if it is to be more than an arbitrary selection of separate elements lacking historical coherence. Western culture cannot be conceived of as a closed civilization whose positive cultural measures are only to be found in its immanent tradition.

Historical development is guided in the anticipatory transcendental direction by later modal functions, and the opening-process that takes place here is impossible without a definite direction.

In the older science of history, oriented to 'Universal-' or 'World-History', this was not doubted and historians were fully conscious of the historical Idea they laid at the basis of their researches.

The developmental Idea of progress. Its \( \xi\pi\delta\varepsilon\gamma\varepsilon \) in the Humanistic science-ideal.

It was a new Idea of development by means of which the 'Enlightenment' definitively accomplished the breach with the Christian conception of history that had prevailed from Eusebius and St Augustine up until Bossuet. This new Idea was that of the steady advance of mankind towards autonomous freedom guaranteed by reason becoming conscious of itself (reason taken in the sense of natural scientific thought).

Voltaire was the first to formulate the Humanistic idea of culture in this pregnant way. 'Culture', in the absolutely immanent, 'profane' conception in which the philosopher of the 'Enlightenment' opposed it to the soterological facts of Christian religion, as well as to the military struggle for power among the different states, became the central theme and the slogan of the Humanistic view of history.

The normative standard in which this conception of historical development was founded, was that of the Humanistic science-ideal oriented to Newton's principles of natural science. This ideal had gained its supreme historical power in the very period of the Enlightenment. Every possible progress, every possible
happiness for mankind was expected of the progressive realization of this ideal. In a deeper sense the Humanistic personality-ideal was itself active in the background of this idea of the steady progress of culture.

Voltaire collected the gigantic poly-historical factual material of his time from the results of the investigations of nature, the reports of travellers and missionaries, and the work of special historical science. From the viewpoint of the new Idea of culture he re-shaped this material in order to adapt it to a pre-conceived course of development of world-history, supposed to be in strict conformity to the causality of nature.

‘World-history’ in this sense became an illustration of the expansion of the power of sovereign scientific research. It ended in the apotheosis of the ideals of the Enlightenment, the glorification of its own culture. Compared with this, all the previous phases in the development of history could only be called inferior earlier stages, a spectacle of the stupidity of the world, which had to give way more and more to the light of reason.

The new Idea of culture was sustained by the optimistic belief in the possibility of perfecting man by means of science, and by the rationalistic-individualistic view of the similarity of the ‘rational nature of man’ in all its world-wide ‘specimens’. This similarity was oriented to the Humanistic idea of ‘natural law’ and was supposedly maintained in the entire process of historical development.

The developmental Idea of progress, as the purest precipitation of the French and the English ‘Enlightenment’, was presently led into collectivistic-sociological paths by the positivistic view of history of Count de St Simon and of August Comte.

Subsequently the influence of the Darwinistic theory of evolution undermined one of the foundations of this developmental Idea: the belief in the universal similarity of human nature. Spencer, who introduced Darwin’s biologic evolutionary principle into the conception of history, could impregnate this principle with a genuine Idea of historical development only because he elevated modern economic industrialism and British liberalism to the normative final purpose of historical development. By representing this normative standard as the result of natural causes the illusion of a positivist biological view of history was main-

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The General Theory of the Modal Spheres

tained. But the factual course of cultural development did not fit this preconceived evolutionistic Idea.

It is quite understandable that the biologistic principle of evolution found adherence especially in pre-history and ethnology (Morgan, Tylor, Frazer and others), whereas the historians in their special field of research could hardly be interested in it \(^1\). For in the course of development of primitive cultures, in which the typically anticipatory process of differentiation and individualization has not yet started, the biotic retrocipations must necessarily come to the fore \(^2\). Nevertheless, even in ethnology the evolutionist hypothesis has been refuted by the facts, since the unscientific manner of arranging and interpreting the material of research after a preconceived scheme has been replaced by a serious cultural scientific method of investigation. Thereby its claim to the rôle of an explanatory principle which can account for the factual course of cultural evolution has been lost.

I will revert to this important point below.

\(^{1}\) Wells' *The outline of history* is a history of the world, and may be alleged as an exception. It is indeed founded on Spencer's evolutionistic ideas, to some degree mixed with socialistic conceptions. For the rest it ascribed a great rôle to the initiative of the human mind.

\(^{2}\) This is also remarked by Troeltsch in his important work *Der Historismus und seine Probleme* (1922), p. 432/3.
teleologischen Urteilskraft he oriented the historical Idea of development to the normative moralistic Idea of liberty of the personality-ideal. In this way the Idea of progress was fundamentally changed. There could, of course, no longer be any question of a real advance in the development of history, explicable in terms of natural science.

But Kant’s teleological view-point enabled him to judge the development of history as if the final aim of practical reason were realized in it. It might be that this development must be thought of as an ‘empirical process’ subjected to natural causality, but it was the victory of the rational-moral nature of man over empirical sensibility that should lead it as a regulative principle or practical end. The ‘empirical development of history’ was thus founded in a normative standard to bear ‘the burden of actual history’.

Kant fully shared Rousseau’s criticism of the Idea of culture of the ‘Enlightenment’. ‘Rousseau was not so very wrong,’ he writes, ‘when he had a predilection for the condition of the savages, that is to say as soon as this last stage is omitted to which our race still has to rise’ (i.e. the attainment of some form of a ‘cosmopolitan union of states’). ‘We have been cultivated in a very high degree by Art and Science. We have been civilized so as to be polite in society and to have a sense of propriety, until it has become overburdening. But we are still a long way from having become moralized’.

A real advance in the development of history can only be oriented to the Idea of autonomous morality. But the inner norm of this morality, the dutiful disposition of the will, in the nature of the case, is useless as a norm for the advance of historical development. Only in its special application to the so-called ‘external’ behaviour of mankind, hence only as the Idea of legality, does Kant base the judgment of historical development upon the supersensory Idea of freedom.

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And as such the idea of the League of Nations is introduced by Kant as the ‘final aim of the history of the world’. The general history of the world is then conceived teleologically as the realization of a providential plan of ‘nature’, directed to the ‘perfect civil union of the human race’. This means the creation of an institution by which the natural condition of the ‘bellum omnium contra omnes’ between the states is replaced by a ‘civil legal condition’ in which these states settle their disputes in the peaceful way of a civil law-suit.

But this historical Idea of development remains a fictitious criterion to Kant. He himself calls it a ‘chiliasm of the philosophy of history’ for which “experience” gives us only ‘a little’ to go on.

Besides, Kant’s Idea of development was oriented to a rationalistic, formalistic conception of the Humanistic personality-ideal, which, as such, lay entirely outside the modal meaning of history. Real historical development remains a process of natural causality, which only acquires its meaning through its teleological relation to the Idea of autonomous liberty.

The essential function of individuality in the historical developmental Idea.

Only the irrationalizing of the personality-ideal, oriented to the historical process itself, could provide an Idea of development really able to make the method of historical research fruitful.

In this respect Herder’s Ideeën zur Philosophie der Geschichte was the great turning-point in comparison with the rationalistic view of history of the ‘Enlightenment’. It is true that this philosopher himself continued to hold to the optimistic confidence of the Enlightenment in the ‘perfectibility’ of human nature. He still started from the developmental Idea of Leibniz which owed its origin to the mathematical science-ideal, and as such had no historical but rather a metaphysical meaning. But the irrationalizing of the personality-ideal began in the period of “Storm and Stress” of which he was a representative. And already in Herder it oriented itself to a fine intuitive insight into the unfolding of the individual totalities in historical development.

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1 op. cit., p. 235.
2 This turning-point in Humanistic philosophy has been submitted to a critical investigation in the second part of Volume I.
In the present context this point is indeed of the very greatest importance. Before this we dismissed every interference of the moment of individuality as premature, because we were chiefly concerned with grasping in a concept the modal meaning of history with respect to its retrocipatory structure.

Individuality, we argued, can never be a constituent in the primary meaning-modus of history. It rather has to derive every delimitation of its meaning as a historical individuality precisely from this modal aspect. But in the anticipatory structure of this aspect individuality assumes a special modal meaning. The process of individualization lies in the transcendental direction of historical development.

In primitive, closed cultural groups the individual character, as such, is certainly not wanting. But on account of the rigid attachment of culture to the "natural" sides of reality this individuality retains a certain traditional uniformity, which from generation to generation displays the same essential features in civilization. This remains true notwithstanding the fact that highly gifted leaders may be found in such primitive groups. So long as these leaders do not use their formative power in an integrating and differentiating direction, they cannot break through the traditional character of the primitive cultural community. For this reason the science of history proper takes no interest in these cultural individualities.

It is only in the opening-process of historical development that a dynamic individualizing tendency assumes essential importance. Again and again new cultural figures make their appearance. Especially the individuality of the formers of history comes to the fore. All these phenomena are unmistakable characteristics of the opening-process of the meaning of history.

Historical individuality now assumes a directed, deepened meaning.

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1 These individual cultural figures can themselves no longer be conceived from the general modal viewpoint, but only with the aid of a structural idea of individuality which, as such, must exceed the boundaries of the historical aspect.
The rise of nationalities in the opening-process of history. Nationality and the idea of "Volksstum" in national-socialism.

This deepened meaning of historical individuality is also manifested in the rise of nationalities in the cultural opening-process. A nation viewed in its historical aspect should be sharply distinguished from the ethnological notions of popular and tribal communities. The former can only develop after the decline of the latter as primitive political power-formations. It will appear from our further inquiry that after the rise of national communities as integrated political power-formations, the ethnical characteristics of the older popular and tribal communities may continue to reveal themselves in popular customs, dress, dances, superstitions etc. They belong to the field of folk-lore.

It was a typical reactionary trait of German national-socialism that it tried to conquer the idea of nationality and to revive the primitive idea of "Volksstum". This was in accordance with its myth of 'blood and soil'. The reactionary character of its totalitarian political system was evident from the pattern after which it was built, viz. the primitive old-Germanic trustis, a military power-formation of the popular and tribal chiefs, dukes or kings, which in its turn was an artificial expansion of the old undifferentiated (and consequently totalitarian) domestic power of the Germanics.

It is the transcendental Idea of historical development, lying at the foundation of the science of history proper, which has to provide the criterion of reaction and progress. And it can provide a real criterion only if it is oriented to the anticipatory modal structure of the historical aspect, as it is founded in the Divine world-order.

The modal norm of individualization for the opening-process in the historical law-sphere. Its connection with the norm of differentiation and integration.

As the modal norm of the opening-process in the historical law-sphere, the norm of differentiation and integration is thus at the same time a norm of individualization. The individual dispositions and talents of peoples, nations, and individual for-merers of history must expand in the process of cultural development in their typical cultural spheres, and this expansion is set mankind as a normative task.
This norm is, however, not to be understood in an irrationa-
listic sense. The subjective individual dispositions and talents
intended are not themselves to be viewed as the normative
standard of the disclosed process of cultural development. They
ought to be unfolded in accordance with the normative prin-
ciples implied in the anticipatory structure of the historical law-
sphere.

The further analysis of this structure will show that these
principles have an unbreakable mutual coherence so that the
norm of cultural individualization is never to be conceived
apart from the other anticipatory principles.

The normative process of individualization in history is only
possible in a differentiation of the typical cultural spheres under
the guidance of typical non-historical normative modal functions
which have themselves opened their meaning.

In the primitive tribes or the primitive populaces the cultural
community is an undifferentiated whole. In general there is as
yet no question of differentiated cultural spheres typically
'guided' by a theoretical (logical), a social, an economic, an
esthetic, a juridical, a moral function, or by the function of faith.

As soon as the differentiating process has started, however,
the task of the individual talent becomes manifest. In the
mutual contact between the differentiated cultural communities
their historical individuality becomes essential. They are in
need of one another because they each have something indivi-
dual, something characteristic to give, and because only in the
cultural coherence of the individual complexes can the deepened
and disclosed historical development continue.

The opened historical individuality can therefore only be
conceived theoretically in the coherence of the entire cultural
community and in the historical interlacing of the different
disclosed cultural spheres. And every individualistic atomistic
conception of the deepened historical development is for this
reason a misinterpretation of the historical 'Gegenstand'.

It is undeniable that historical science proper only takes an
interest in cultures that have been taken up in the historical
process of individualization. The historical method of forming
concepts proceeds indeed along individualizing lines. These

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1 The term 'social' is used here in the modal sense of the aspect of
human intercourse.

2 In this respect we can do full justice now to the important elements
of truth in RICKERT's methodology of historical thought. RICKERT's error
facts, too, prove that historical science does not orient itself to a rigid concept, but rather to an Idea of cultural development.

For as soon as historical individuality is considered to be without any direction and self-sufficient, in other words, as soon as it is conceived apart from the anticipatory meaning-coherence, it turns into an &alpha;ξετίγων. Then it offers no standard for the selection of what is historically significant.

Herder's irrationalistic Idea of humanity and his conception of historical individuality.

After Vico, Herder was one of the first thinkers fully alive to the above-mentioned state of affairs.

He realized the fundamental importance of structural totalities like a nation in the process of the deepened development of culture. He saw the intrinsic impossibility of genuinely individualizing historical thought without orienting this individualizing thinking to an Idea of cultural development. And he conceived this Idea as the Idea of humanity, a typically irrationalistic conception of the Humanistic personality-ideal, strongly oriented to Shaftesbury's aestheticism. In it the value of personality was no longer sought in some abstract kind of intellectuality but rather in an absolutely autonomous, harmonious expansion of every individual natural disposition and ability. In this individual aesthetic expansion the 'general dignity of man' was to acquire its greatest possible content, as Von Humboldt put it ¹.

Only in this orientation to the irrationalistically conceived aesthetic Idea of humanity does the historical individuality of the national cultural communities find its foundation in Herder's trend of thought. His thesis that every nation has the standard of its perfection absolutely in its own self ², would necessarily have resulted in cancelling the Idea of cultural development if it had not been connected with the Idea of humanity. For what nation has ever had an 'isolated' course of development in history, in which the expansion of its individual abilities took place like some vegetable growth from its own seed?

Are not things rather quite different, as Ranke already saw so clearly and sharply, namely, that national individuality itself lies in his assumption that he can resolve the modal meaning of history into an unqualified concept of relation, in other words, that he introduces the moment of individuality too soon.

¹ W. Von Humboldt, Werke, I, p. 283.
² Ideen XV, 3.
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does not begin to unfold until the historical development has been disclosed and includes the nations in a larger dynamic cultural coherence?

In Herder there remains a certain tension between the individuality of the nations as cultural communities and the Idea of humanity that has been related to the universal development. This is due to the strongly naturalistic-organological strain in his view of the individuality of a nation. His historical Idea of development threatens to stiffen into biological analogies. The history of the world is seen in a semi-naturalistic light as the development of all the seeds and of every natural disposition that mankind possesses. And also his Idea of humanity really lacked the constant transcendental direction that alone can give the historical Idea of development its determinateness. This deficiency was inherent in the naturalistic aesthetic conception of his philosophy of feeling.

In a review of Herder's Ideen Kant rightly blamed the writer for this lack of direction in his Idea of the history of the world. The 'universally human' in Herder's Idea of humanity is used as a standard of value for historical development. But it is, after all, nothing but the harmonious unfolding of every individual natural ability without any reference to the international cultural contact giving historical individuality its deepened meaning. Therefore, it cannot really guide the investigation of the differentiated and integrated cultural development, in which the isolated seclusion of the individual cultural communities is broken through.

The numbing of the Idea of development in the organological conception of the Historical School, and the crux of the historical explanation of the reception of Roman Law by an appeal to the national mind.

The same defect was to manifest itself presently in a pregnant way with regard to the organological Idea of development of the Historical School in jurisprudence, which tried to conceive historical development exclusively from the point of view of the individuality of the 'national mind'.

That's why, e.g., to Von Savigny and Puchta the reception of Roman Law in Germanic countries became a true crux of legal history.

Quite rightly v. Jhering and the Germanist Georg Besseler argued that it was a hopeless task to try and explain this recep-
tion historically by appealing to the Germanic 'Volksgeist'.

We have shown that the organological Idea of historical development, as conceived of by v. SAVIGNY and his followers, originated in SCHELLING's romantic idealism, which had passed through KANT's transcendental philosophy. This idealism sought to undermine the mathematical science-ideal in order to introduce the continuity-postulate of the transcendental Idea of liberty, founded in the new conception of the personality ideal. 'Nature' itself was viewed organologically as 'the Spirit that is coming into existence' ('werdender Geist'). Nature and history were declared to be two different developmental series of the Absolute (as 'Indifference'), and hence to be radically identical. In both series the Absolute differentiates itself into a succession of 'grades' or 'potentialities'. In history we must assume that there is a synthesis of nature and freedom. In this synthesis free action, it is true, is founded in a hidden, unconscious necessity, in Providence or Fate ('Schicksal'). But, at the same time in our development from 'stage' to 'stage' ('Stufe zu Stufe'), history realizes our elevation from the numb state of unconscious subjection to 'Fate', to the free consciousness of Providence in the historical process.

SCHELLING's System des transzendentalen Idealismus really aimed at a new aesthetical culture as the final goal of history in accordance with the cultural ideal ('Bildungsideal') of Romanticism. This was a cultural Idea which, in accordance with KANT's and SCHILLER's doctrine, glorified the reconciliation of mind and sensibility, of nature and freedom, in fine art. At the same time this aesthetical Idea, conceived as the ever original and individual embodiment of the profoundest unity, was to replace KANT's moralistic Idea of the homo noumenon (TROELTSCH).

The Idea of development from nature to freedom, and the deeper identity of these two has been taken over by the Historical School, but severed from the romantic cultural ideal. VON SAVIGNY and PUCHTA have carried it through in their historical theory of law.

From the 'Stufe' (i.e. stage) at which law starts growing unconsciously out of the mind of the people, the development leads

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1 Cf. the well-known passage in v. SAVIGNY's introductory article in the Zeitschr. für geschichtl. Rechtwissenschaft, Band 1, 1815, p. 2—4, for his view of historical development as a synthesis of 'nature' and 'freedom'.
to a higher “Stufe”. Here the free and conscious formative activity of the jurists intervenes, as a higher scientific organ of the ‘people’s mind’. At the same time a place is assigned to legislation, — although a modest one — in the process of development.

Hence it cannot be said that this idea of development is *without any direction*. It did not belie its origin from romantic idealism. But there is no doubt that it had been entirely detached from Schelling’s romantic aesthetic ideal of culture. The Idea of development was completely irrationalized and enclosed in the individual ‘Volksgeist’. There was no longer any room left for a real insight into the historical coherence of the individual cultural totalities in the progressive course of the opened development of culture. That is why this organological Idea of development bore an extremely nationalistic conservative stamp (though in Puchta this trait comes to the fore much more strikingly than in v. Savigny). It was soon submerged into a technical positivistic attitude of mind in the epigones of the Historical School. And in consequence historical research lapsed into antiquarian “Klein-Krämerei” (i.e. the retailing of trifles; pedantry).

The intensive conception of world-history in Hegel.
The orientation of his dialectical Idea of development to the Humanistic personality-ideal in a transperson- alistic conception.

In Hegel’s dialectical Idea of development world-history is conceived of as “Fortschritt im Bewusstsein der Freiheit” (progressive advance in the consciousness of freedom). The romantic organological conception of the national mind has in principle been superseded. The ‘Volksgeister’, as the true subjects of the “Weltgeschichte” (world-history), have become manifestations of the ‘objective Mind’. They are considered as channels in the dialectically conceived process of the disclosed cultural development. Exactly because of its individualizing tendency this process is as sharply distinguished as possible from any kind of pre-history, rigidly tied down to nature. In this Hegelian conception there can be no question of an initial stage of purely vegetative development of the mind of the people: ‘It is only in keeping with philosophical thought and also worthy of it if we start with history at the moment when “Vernunftigkeit” enters earthly existence, not when it is still a possibility ‘an sich’, but
when there is a state of things in which 't makes its appearance in consciousness, volition and action'.

Owing to this conception of the Idea of development, — which really constitutes history, so that there is no room left for an as yet closed meaning of the latter — history is identified with world-history. And all those peoples are denied a function in history whose cultural community cannot be considered as a 'preliminary stage' of modern European culture in the dialectical development. Consequently, Africa and India fall entirely outside history. The Hegelian Idea of development is a logical dialectical one, whose content is the self-development of the Humanistic freedom-motive in its irrationalistic trans-personalist conception.

Historical development is thus made a dialectical totality in which the concept itself becomes historical and fluid, realizing itself concretely in the individual national minds. At the same time these minds are recognized only as individual passage-ways in the process of Mind becoming conscious of itself. This is the "List der Vernunft" (the stratagem of Reason) that individuality as a necessary precipitation of the Mind is at the same time no more than a means in this process. In the dialectical logicizing of this idealistic Idea of development the Idea of world-history has changed from an extensive into a intensive conception.

The naturalistic 'Fortschritts'-Idea (the Idea of progressive advance) of the 'Enlightenment' borrowed its material from all parts of the world. The ratio in its natural scientific mode of thought only used this material as an illustration of the progressive enlightenment of mankind by the science-ideal.

Herder's idea of the history of the world embraced the entire globe and made him carry 'a hundred peoples under his mantle to market'. But Hegel's Idea of development is incompatible with such an extensive conception because he related it to the universalistic idealistic conception of the personality-ideal.

The motif of world-history necessarily asserts itself in the view of every 'individual national mind'. In this trend of thought

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1 Die Vernunft in der Geschichte (hrg. von GEORG LASSON, 1917) p. 142/3: "Der philosophischen Betrachtung ist es nur angemessen und würdig die Geschichte da aufzunehmen, wo die Vernünftigkeit in weltliche Existenz zu treten beginnt, nicht wo sie noch erst eine Möglichkeit nur an sich ist, sondern wo ein Zustand vorhanden ist, in dem sie in Bewusstsein, Willen und Tat auftritt."
it is impossible to consider an individual cultural community as enclosed in a self-contained organic development. It is equally impossible to go into individuality as such with an open mind, or rather with a historical abandonment that lacks any direction. The dialectical Idea of development here permeates every moment. Every individual moment contains the whole course of world-history in nuce.

This intensive view of world-history has passed over into Ranke's Idea of development, notwithstanding all his criticism of Hegel's dialectical logicizing of the historical process. Ranke recognizes as the scene of world-history only the coherence in the disclosed cultural development between the cultural communities of Asia Minor and those of the Occident.

For him, as for Hegel, history starts only at the moment 'when the monuments become intelligible and trustworthy, when there are written records'; when, in other words, the modal meaning of culture begins to anticipate symbolical signification.

Fundamental objections may be raised to such a centripetal direction of the entire Idea of development to the modern culture of the West. It is conceived from the idealistic conception of the Humanistic personality-ideal, or, as in Ranke, from a synthesis between the Lutheran belief in Providence and the modern Idea of humanity.

Especially Hegel's dialectical logicizing of the process of the disclosed cultural development may be denounced as a fundamental denaturing of the meaning of historical evolution. And from the point of view of the Christian cosmonomic Idea the direction of Hegel's developmental Idea to the Humanistic personality-ideal in its trans-personalistic conception, and its enclosure within the latter, may be deemed objectionable. But all this should not prevent us from recognizing the important element of truth contained in the intensive conception of the historical Idea of development as such. For only an intensive developmental Idea is able indeed to grasp the supra-individual historical connections between the disclosed cultural communities. Such an Idea is the unavoidable ἐπιστήμη also of every genuine special-scientific conception of history.

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1 Weltgeschichte. Band I, 1, p. V.
The necessity of an intensive Idea of historical development.

The insufficiency, or the fundamental unacceptableness from the Christian viewpoint, respectively, of RANKE's and HEGEL's Ideas of development can, consequently, never be ascribed to their intensive character. Rather their failure is only to be sought in their inner rigidity, due to the absolutizing of the cultural dominators of Western civilization, or in the false direction of the Idea to a Humanistic conception of freedom, respectively.

Genuine historical thought cannot do without an intensive Idea of development. In its opening process the historical aspect of reality itself everywhere shows intensive developmental connections.

It is a dogmatic prejudice on the part of the irrationalist historicist relativism to suppose that by immediate empathy or a direct entry into the historical material the 'historical consciousness' can grasp these cultural coherences quite apart from an Idea of development at least used intuitively.

Thinkers like DILTHEY and TROELTSCH trace the lines of historical development between the Middle Ages, the Reformation, the 'Enlightenment' etc. They try to show that the entire historical process centres in an absolutely autonomous Idea of culture, in which Christianity has been coordinated as an important factor together with others. This whole conception continues to be determined by a Humanistic Idea of development, although its content is strongly affected by Historism.

No doubt, modern Historism has undermined and abandoned earlier conceptions of world-history founded in the science-ideal of the "Enlightenment" and in the Idea of humanity in the idealistic forms of the Humanistic personality-ideal. RANKE's pupil J. BURCKHARDT was already fully aware of the mental revolution of the latter part of the 19th century. He could no longer accept his great teacher's Idea of "Weltgeschichte" (world-history). But a genuinely historical Idea of development could only be given up under the influence of a relativistic kind of Historism that knows no direction. This sacrifice must be considered, as MASUR rightly observes, as an 'expression of the total disorganisation of the realm of values in the western world at the end of the 19th century' 1. It is a phenomenon of the crisis that undermines

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1 Cf. GERHARD MASUR, Ranke's Begriff der Welt-Geschichte, Beiheft 6
the foundations of all genuine historical thought by means of its scepticism. For no special-scientific historical technique in the investigation of the sources and in the study of details can avail the historian if real historical insight into the deepened developmental coherence of his subject matter is lacking.

Directionless Historism destroys the Idea of development, and deprives scientific historical thought of its necessary ɛxòdèous. SPENGLER’s morphology of the civilizations of the world.

SPENGLER’s ‘morphology of the civilizations of the world’, born of the mind of relativistic Historism, shows us the consequences of this standpoint for the insight into historical connections and coherences. There is no longer any room for an Idea of development in this relativism. Historical thought tightly clings to a concept of historical development, within which evolution shows merely biotic retrocipations.

Only parallels in the historical development of the great cultural totalities are accepted here. This drawing of parallels, however, leads to the disturbance of the real historical coherences. It also results in an unhistorical view of time, though SPENGLER thinks he has delimited the historical concept of time once and for all from every kind of natural-scientific time-concept. He eliminates the concept of causality and replaces it by the irrationalistic idea of ‘Fate’ ("Schicksal") ¹.

Our previous analysis of the retrocipatory structure of the historical aspect has shown that without a historical concept of causality no single historical fact can be established.

¹ Cf. Der Untergang des Abendlandes, I, p. 161, where the concept of simultaneity is developed:
‘I call two historical facts simultaneous when they, each in its own culture, make their appearance in exactly the same relative conditions, and therefore have an exactly corresponding significance. It has been shown that ancient and western mathematics have developed in perfect congruency’. ["Ich nenne gleichzeitig zwei geschichtliche Fakta, die, jedes in seiner Kultur, in genau derselben relativen Lage eintreten und also eine genau entsprechende Bedeutung haben. Es war gezeigt worden, wie die Entwicklung der antiken und der abendländischen Mathematik in völliger Kongruenz verläuft."] In this conception civilizations really grow rigid and become self-contained organisms.

In the preceding paragraph we gave an account of the absolute necessity of an historical Idea of development, as the hypothesis of genuine historical thought.

In the Idea of a meaning-modus philosophical reflection oriented to our cosmonomic Idea passes through a process of successive meaning-coherences in the transcendental direction of time. The internal unrest of meaning drives it on from anticipatory sphere to anticipatory sphere, and so from one anticipatory connection to another. At last we arrive at the transcendental terminal sphere of our cosmos and reflect on the insufficiency of the modal Idea.

We then direct our glance to the transcendent meaning-totality and the Origin, in which at last our thought finds rest in its religious root.

In our previous investigation various modal anticipations were already made manifest in the historical aspect.

The symbolical anticipation in the modal aspect of history.

In the first place the symbolical anticipation is revealed, together with the transcendental coherence between the meaning of cultural development and that of language.

We saw how Hegel and Ranke held that history proper does not start before the need arose to preserve the memory of historical events by means of deliberate symbolical signification. This, of course, is something quite different from the myths of primitive peoples preserved in oral traditions.

In his: Die Vernunft in der Geschichte Hegel observes: 'It is to be supposed that historical narrative appeared simultaneously with historical deeds and events; it is a common internal basis from which both arise' ¹.

For disclosed history, the field of inquiry of historical science in the narrower sense, this statement is correct. Every historian who knows the limits of his field will agree with it. But what is of the utmost importance in this connection is the insight that

¹ Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, p. 145: “es ist dafür zu halten, dass Geschichtserzählung mit eigentlich geschichtlichen Taten und Begebenheiten gleichzeitig erscheine; es ist eine innerliche gemeinsame Grundlage, welche sie zusammen hervortreibt.”
this necessary coherence with the modal meaning of language only exists with regard to the really disclosed anticipatory meaning of cultural development. *Primitive* history does not have the need of symbolic signification. Its relatively uniform course does not yet give *Mnemosyne* any subject matter worth recording as memorable.

The genuinely disclosed meaning of history, on the other hand, is necessarily signified meaning. The opened historical function of consciousness refers to the lingual meaning, whereas in the deepened cultural development itself there is an unfolding of cultural symbolism which marks off the significant from the insignificant.

It needs no further argument that historical signification is not identical with lingual meaning inherent in words, sentences etc. Nor can the historical interpretation of facts and source material be the same as a linguistic interpretation of symbols.

But the unbreakable inter-modal meaning-coherence between the two modal aspects concerned, revealed in the anticipatory direction of history, on the one hand, and in the retrocipatory structure of language on the other, is undubitable.

Just as symbolism in historical consciousness, marking off the significant from the insignificant, anticipates symbolical signification in historical narratives, monuments etc., so the lingual signification of words and sentences refers back to its historical substratum and is not to be conceived apart from the latter.

The ‘social’ anticipation in the modus of history.

In the differentiating and integrating process of disclosed history, investigated in an earlier context, is further revealed the anticipation in the historical aspect of the meaning of social intercourse.

The opened and deepened cultural development can only begin its course in historical intercourse between the nations, in the mutual exchange of historical treasures of the mind between the cultural communities. It is exactly the isolation of a primitive cultural community, its mental seclusion from the disclosed cultural communities, that causes its historical rigidity.

It should be borne in mind that the modal meaning of social intercourse anticipated in the opened structure of historical development, is itself to be conceived in a disclosed and anticipatory sense.
For it must be evident that in its closed or restrictive function it is not able to guide the opening-process of history. In this function it is also found in primitive tribal communities. But regular social intercourse is here restricted to the members of the group.

The economic anticipation. The historical principle of cultural economy.

'Social' anticipation points beyond itself to one that appears further on in the transcendental direction of time, viz. the economic anticipation.

In the formative process of history the various cultural spheres have the call to take an active share in it while maintaining their own individuality in historical intercourse. Then only can the differentiation and integration, inherent in every really disclosed historical development, be fruitful in a historical sense. But this implies that the different cultural factors ought to be prevented from expanding their power in an excessive sense.

Here a modal principle of the greatest importance is revealed, viz. that of cultural economy. This economy points beyond itself forward to the aesthetic and the juridical anticipatory spheres of the historical modus, presently to be examined.

In the sequel the importance of the principle mentioned will become more and more clear. In the nature of the case it has a normative character, and may be positivized in a better or in a worse way. In the case of some formers of history there may even be a fatal tendency to set this principle aside. But this tendency results in the total dislocation and ruin of an entire cultural complex, unless in due time the unbridled, excessive striving after power of some particular cultural sphere is broken, and the encroachment of this particular cultural factor on the other cultural areas is checked.

Here we touch on the anticipatory meaning-coherence of the historical aspect with the aesthetical and the juridical law-spheres, a coherence which demands special attention.

The inner connection between the economic and the aesthetical anticipations in history.

It must be clear that the economic anticipation in the modal structure of historical development is necessarily connected with an aesthetical anticipatory sphere. The modal principle of
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cultural economy appeals to the principle of cultural harmony. As soon as the undifferentiated cultural community is broken into a rich diversity of differentiated cultural spheres the necessity of a really harmonious relation between these different power-formations becomes evident. But how can these spheres of formative power be harmonized? If every excessive expansion of the one at the expense of the others must lead to disharmony in the development of culture, what then is the normative criterion of an excessive expansion of a differentiated sphere of power?

The principle of cultural harmony can provide this criterion only in coherence with the whole order of creation. The inner nature of the typical cultural spheres must unfold itself in the historical process of differentiation, and this inner nature is founded in the Divine order of creation.

As long as the expansion of power occurs within the boundaries of the typical structural principles by which this inner nature is determined, there can be no question of disharmony in cultural development. But when, for instance, the cultural sphere of natural science or that of technical industry try to expand their formative power at the expense of that of justice, morality and the Christian faith, they exceed the boundaries of their inner nature and evoke a cultural conflict.

The same effect will result from a totalitarian expansion of the political power of the state, i.e. the attempt to assimilate the typical spheres of formative power of the church, of science, fine arts, industrial life, and so on, to its own political ends. It is a delusion if the totalitarian political leaders think they can thus increase the power of the body politic to a supreme degree. The truth of the matter is that the authority of the state needs the support of the other cultural spheres of formative power, but this support can only have real value so long as their inner nature is left intact.

Their assimilation to the political ends of the state results in their denaturation, in their reduction to cultural corpses which do not increase the power of the body politic, but rather affect it with dissolution.

\[\text{\footnotesize 1 It should be borne in mind that modal aspects can be realized and given a typical cultural sphere of formative power only within social structures of individuality, such as, the state, the church, family-life, industry etc.}\]
In a certain historical period the ecclesiastical institute may also try to expand its formative power excessively.

It is quite understandable that those who do not accept the Roman-Catholic view of human society are inclined to seek the most striking instance of such an excessive power-expansion of the church in the times of the ecclesiastically unified culture. But one should guard against a hasty and unhistorical generalization in the judgment of this cultural period. It should not be forgotten that after the dissolution of the Carolingian state the 'secular' organization of medieval society fell back into an undifferentiated condition. And it was only the church as a differentiated institute of grace, together with the continued influence of Greco-Roman culture, which could prevent this society from falling asunder into primitive closed communities. Through the church and the christianized Roman idea of the holy Roman empire medieval society was integrated into a community embracing the whole of Christianity with a spiritual and a secular head.

There is no reason to idealize this social condition. From a cultural viewpoint it meant that the formative power of science, philosophy, art, education, industry and even of secular government was on-sidedly bound to the ecclesiastical authority: The latter was really able to impede the propagation of new ideas in the secular cultural spheres if these ideas did not agree with ecclesiastical politics; for excommunication had serious consequences in worldly life. This structural trait in medieval society doubtless favoured an excessive expansion of ecclesiastical power. Many instances may be alleged from medieval history which show that the church did not resist this temptation.

But it should not be forgotten that the church has never defended a really totalitarian view of ecclesiastical authority.

At least in principle it did not intend to interfere with the inner spheres of "secular" culture. Since the introduction of the scholastic basic motive of nature and grace this intention found expression in the thesis that natural life has an inner autonomy with respect to the supernatural authority of the church. One should only be aware of the fact that this scholastic conception could not provide a real criterion for a harmonious relation between the different cultural spheres in their typical structures of individuality.

It could not do so because its view of nature was ruled by
the Greek form-matter motive in its accommodation to the doctrine of creation, and not by the genuine Biblical creation-motive.

The juridical anticipations and the true meaning of the 'Weltgericht' in world-history.

The economic and the aesthetical anticipations in the opened modal structure of historical development appeal to the juridical anticipatory sphere.

It is from this intra-modal meaning-coherence that the real signification of the Hegelian adage of world-history as "Weltgericht" is to be understood. This adage cannot be true in the sense meant by Hegel himself (as if in the struggle for power among the states a 'higher kind of justice' were revealed than in the legal order, viz., 'the justice of the Absolute Mind in the history of the world')\(^1\). According to Hegel, that which is doomed to decline manifests itself as unworthy in the dialectical process of world-history: it is relinquished by the Idea. But Hegel does not consider that justice in the anticipatory meaning of history is modally different from justice in the original modal sense of retribution and, consequently, cannot be compared with the normative measures of law. The jurisdiction of world-history has not the task of maintaining a legal order, as has jurisdiction in its original juridical sense.

In the factual course of world-history there is even no positive guarantee that the struggle for power is instrumental to a higher cultural justice in the sense that the culturally superior is destined to win.

Such a view would ignore the working of sin in history. It may occur that what is culturally superior is conquered by what is inferior. In our sinful world the course of history is often marked by blood and tears, and in the struggle for power the principles of justice are often trampled down. But doubtless in the opening process the deepened historical principles become manifest which anticipate the meaning of retribution.

The question if in the historical process of power-formation and power-expansion these principles are willingly positivized is something quite different. But world-history unquestionably reveals itself as an 'historical jurisdiction' in the sense that God

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\(^1\) Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, p. 127. Hegel acknowledges that no state may make an appeal to this 'higher justice'.

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maintains His world-order and the principles founded in it, in spite of any kind of human arbitrariness and ὀμολογία. God does not suffer His world-order to be trifled with. Any excessive or extravagant striving after power that ignores the fundamental modal principles of cultural economy and harmony, dashes itself to pieces against the power of the other differentiated cultural spheres. Or, if these have already lost the power to resist the usurper, it ends in the collapse of an entire culture. The history of the world offers many illustrations of this fundamental truth.

God's guidance in history as a realization of the juridical anticipations.

The Christian Idea of God's guidance in history here indeed assumes a normative meaning, but not as the execution of God's hidden counsel in the process of the history of the world! In this latter sense God's guidance doubtless embraces everything, including the outbursts of sin in the process of cultural development. But this hidden counsel can never become the normative standard for human activity, nor for the judgment of the course of world-history. In this respect Mr Leendertz's previously mentioned criticism of the irrationalistic view of history is really irrefutable.

The idea of God's guidance can have normative-historical meaning only insofar as it refers to the juridical anticipations disclosed in the course of history. They are brought to light in the sense of an historical retribution even when a former of history proceeds subjectively counter to the normative principles invested in the anticipatory structure of the historical law-sphere. For a time it may seem that an excessive and arbitrary expansion of power is prosperous. The Christian, however, clings to the unshakable belief that in the history of the world judgment will be passed on such human ὀμολογία. And this belief has not been built on idle speculation. In the wide perspective of world-history the delusion vanishes that the cultural process obeys no laws at all, and that the Divine call to the historical task enables man to dispose of his power as an absolute sovereign.

The moral anticipatory sphere in the modal structure of history. Cultural love and cultural guilt.

The juridical anticipatory sphere in the opened modal structure of history in its turn refers to a sphere of moral anticipa-
tions. The historical right of the differentiated cultural spheres to accomplish their formative task in accordance with their own typical nature appeals to the true cultural ἐρῶς, i.e. the love of this cultural call as a real formative power in history.

Without this cultural ἐρῶς no single great work has come about in the course of the opened development of civilization. But this moment of ἐρῶς in formative power can only disclose itself in a right way if the principles of cultural economy and harmony are respected. Otherwise cultural love is denatured to idolatry.

We shall see in the sequel that nevertheless an idolatrous cultural love may bring about great things in the development of civilization. But it also implies the historical guilt of mankind, revenged by cultural tensions, conflicts and catastrophes.

One should again guard against reducing these moral anticipations to the original modal meaning of morality. They presuppose the latter, but retain their inner cultural sense.

The anticipation of the function of faith in the opening-process of history.

Following the process of disclosure in the historical law-sphere in the transcendental direction, we at last come upon its cosmic meaning-coherence with the function of faith, the second terminal function of our cosmos.

It is this function which ultimately guides the opening process without itself being guided by a later temporal meaning-function. In the process of the disclosed cultural development the shapers of history in the various specific cultural spheres may be guided by an Idea of science, an Idea of technical mastery of nature, economic welfare, beauty, justice, or the love of one’s neighbour. But in the final analysis the entire opening-process makes an appeal to faith in its modal functional structure. And this holds good notwithstanding the great variety of specific tasks that the formers of history have undertaken in connection with the typical structures of their cultural spheres, their office, and their abilities.

The rise of modern natural science in the XVIth and XVIIth centuries was, historically considered, primarily conditioned by the growing power of the new functionalistic-mathematical ideal of science in cultural development. Owing to this power-formation of the new science-ideal, the scholastic-Aristotelian conception of nature that had prevailed before the Renaissance, was
driven from its leading historical position. But the new Humanistic Idea of science itself can never be understood apart from its background in the Humanistic belief in the sovereignty of mathematical thought. As shown in the second part of Volume I, the Humanistic science-ideal was primarily directed to the domination of 'nature'. The belief in the sovereignty of mathematical thought, however, appeared to be rooted in the Humanistic basic motive of autonomous freedom.

In the next period of the development of western civilization the natural-scientific way of thought gained the upper hand, also outside the typical cultural sphere of science. This was due to the powerful influence of a Humanistic life- and world-view, in which primacy was ascribed to the classical science-ideal in its deterministic form.

On the basis of this historical power, which for the rest did not remain unchallenged, the belief in the science-ideal during the period of the Enlightenment also began to guide the opening-process in the post-historical law-spheres. The Idea of civilization in the time of the Enlightenment has its last functional end in this faith.

The so-called 'Religionsoziologie' of Weber and Troeltsch and the schema of a sub-structure and a super-structure in the Marxist view of history.

It is in πίστις that the inquiry into the functional commencement of the opening-process ends in the transcendental direction of time. It is doubtless possible to investigate the typical social effects of a particular doctrine of faith as has been attempted, e.g., by the so-called Religionsoziologie of Weber and Troeltsch, although their so-called ideal-typical method may evoke serious objections.

But then we look backwards to that which has already been realized in the foundational direction of cosmic time under the guidance of πίστις, viz. in the historical, social, economic, aesthetic, juridical and moral substrata of faith. The real

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1 It will no doubt be superfluous to observe that by the 'cultural sphere of science' we understand that typical sphere of power-formation which finds its guiding and qualifying function in the scientific logical aspect. We have now made sufficiently clear that we do not consider science quatalis to be a cultural phenomenon in the merely historical sense of the term.

2 E. Salin is quite right when he remarks in his Geschichte der Volks-
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problem, however, lies in the transcendental direction of the temporal order of the cosmos, in the possibility of the opening of the aspect of faith itself.

This real problem is especially to be borne in mind, if we want to evaluate the well-known sub-structure and super-structure schema of the Marxian view of history.

The basic error of Marxism is not that it assumes a historical-economic sub-structure of aesthetic life, justice, morals, and faith. But it separates this conception from the cosmic order of meaning-aspects, and in all seriousness assumes it can explain the aesthetic conceptions and those of justice, morals and faith in terms of an ideological reflection of a system of economic production.

Faith, as the transcendental terminal function of the entire process of disclosure in the meaning-structure of the cosmos, is driven on directly by impulses from the religious root of human existence, either for good or for evil. Every modern attempt at explaining faith psychologically, sociologically, or in terms of history and economics, is based on the well-known πρότετος. It ignores the transcendental direction of time in the order of the creation and entangles itself in a vicious circle. For all these rationalistic attempts at explanation stand or fall with the belief in the Humanistic science-ideal and therefore presuppose what they want to explain! The modal meaning of faith, it is true, has a psychical, historical, and economic foundation. In so far it is dependent on the meaning-coherence with the law-spheres concerned; but it can never be reduced to the meaning of its substratum-spheres.

wirtschaftslehre (Berlin, 1932), p. 41, that there is a reversion of meaning hidden in Max Weber’s "Religionssoziologie", with regard to the problem that this thinker had posed in his well-known study Die Protestantishe Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus (Arch. f. Sozialw. und Socialp. 1904/5): 'A first study, as a valuable supplement to Sombart's work, had proved in exemplary lucidity, what Puritanism had meant for the rise of capitalism. But in the later work the basic problem is methodically replaced by that of the influence of economic and social conditions on the religious systems.' ['Hatte eine erste Studie in musterültiger Klarheit, eine wertvolle Ergänzung des Sombartschen Werkes, die Bedeutung des Puritanismus für die Entwicklung des Kapitalismus herausgestellt, so kehrt sich allmählich das Grundproblem ins Gegenteil um, zur Frage nach dem Einfluss der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Verhältnisse auf die Religions-systeme'], For the rest also the results of Weber's first study have evoked serious criticism on the part of other scholars.
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Directing our glance to historical development from the temporal aspect of faith as the transcendental terminal function of the whole process of disclosure, we see this process inevitably related to the religious fulfilment of meaning and the Origin of history.

In the religious root of our cosmos (hence also in the root of the whole of historical development) irreconcilable war is waged between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena. The temporal function of faith in determining the direction of the opening-process in the earlier law-spheres is itself immediately directed by religious basic motives in which this radical contest expresses itself.

This gives the Idea of cultural development its true and only possible fulfilment of meaning in the religious self-reflection of the Christian.

St Augustine grasped the Biblical thought for the entire Christian view of history when he stated that, at bottom, the course of the history of the world is a struggle between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena. In the last analysis, therefore, history becomes meaningless if it is detached from this religious root.

No Christian philosophy of history will ever be able to give to its Idea of cultural development another religious direction than this. Any other view is bound to lapse into the developmental Ideas of Humanistic immanence-philosophy, or into the Greek Idea of the eternal return of things in the circular movement of time.

The modal temporal meaning of history has, to be sure, its meaning-nucleus in culture as (formative) control, which has been set as a responsible task to man. But the historical law-sphere can only maintain this meaning in its absolute dependence on the religious fulness of meaning of history. The possibility of human formative control has its guarantee in the victory over the kingdom of Darkness gained by the kingdom of God in Christ Jesus, in Whom the call to historical power, as well as Christian faith, find their consummation. For Christ, to Whom 'all power is given in heaven and in earth' \(^1\), is also 'the finisher of our faith' \(^2\).

\(^1\) Matth. 28 : 18.
\(^2\) Hebr. 12 : 2.
The struggle between civitas Dei and civitas terrena is carried on through the whole of the temporal creation in all its meaning-aspects. It finds its pregnant and dramatic expression in the temporal course of world-history, since here the whole opening-process in its normative direction is founded. Adam's fall into sin and Christ's incarnation, although both concern the root of the entire cosmos, also signify historical turning-points of all-deciding importance in the history of the world.

The history of salvation is and remains, in a modal-historical sense, the central theme in whose light even the pagan and Humanistic ideas of culture only become fully understandable in their apostate meaning.

But it was a premature and incorrect opinion of the earlier Christian philosophy of history to assume that Holy Scripture itself has revealed a theoretical Idea of historical development, so that it is possible to read in the Word of God a kind of scientific division of world-history into periods.

This misconception had a deeper foundation in an erroneous conception of Christian science.

A truly Christian philosophical Idea of the history of the world presupposes a laborious work of theoretical analysis. The meaning of history must be distinguished in the whole of the meaning-coherence of the temporal law-spheres, in the transcendent light of the Divine Word-Revelation. And the science of history, if it is not to lapse into idle speculation, can never attempt a division into periods independent of the actual course of historical development. In addition, every attempt at such a division is bound to the provisional phase of history in which the historian himself lives. The latter should not risk predicting the periods that belong to the future. He will have to conceive of the scene of world history, not in an extensive sense, but intensively. His task is to investigate the historical coherences in the process of the disclosed development of history in strict conformity to the historical material.

This is the reason why the question as to the handling of the Christian Idea of development in historical science requires further investigation. For this question, as will appear in the sequel, confronts us with some new and extremely difficult problems.
Objections raised on the part of some of our fellow-
Christians against the conception of the modal mean-
ing of history as cultural development, and the mis-
understanding from which they spring.

Viewed in this light, it must be due to some misunderstanding
when on the part of some of our fellow-Christians exception is
taken to our characterization of the temporal modal meaning of
history as cultural development. This misconception is due to the
fact that only the religious consummation of meaning of history
is considered. But the same Christian-religious view demands
the recognition of the temporal world-order in which history
functions as an irreducible aspect of reality. Anyone who does
not recognize this, falls a prey to a Historism which cannot
accept the modal sovereignty of the other law-spheres. The
kingdom of Christ not only comprises history, but the whole of
creation in all its modal-aspects.

In the Christian Idea of cultural development the modal
meaning of history as a temporal law-sphere is related to the
religious fulness of meaning. At the same time it implies the
recognition that only in this relation can the specific meaning
of history be maintained. This Idea also determines our view of
the original historical condition of mankind. As remarked above,
this question implies a problem which science can never elucidate
independently. This problem is inseparably bound up with the
question about the origin of the human race, which directly
touches the religious root of our cosmos. The idea of an original
cultural state, as Fichte rightly observed, is really a (subjective)
transcendental a priori of historical science, for which, we would
add, the historian has to account in his religious self-reflection.
In the primitive undisclosed cultural conditions we recognize
the subjective falling-away on the part of man from his own
self and from his Creator.

Primitive culture as an apostate state of the cultural
aspect.

For primitive culture (in the pregnant sense to be explained
in the next section) is characterized exactly by the undisclosed
state of the modal cultural aspect in the transcendental
direction of time. Here man does not realize that he transcends
the things of nature. His sense of being a personality is diffuse,
dispersed: he even incorporates personality into animals, plants
or lifeless objects.
The primitive control of nature which develops in such cultures is unable to bring home to man that he transcends the things of nature. The whole of the closed cultural aspect, and also logical thought, is here rigidly tied down to its pre-logical substrata. And the fear of the powers of nature which cannot yet be controlled by ordinary means is at the base of the content of primitive faith.

Is there really no meaning-coherence in such primitive cultures between the cultural aspect and the later law-spheres? Certainly there is. The subjective apostasy of man cannot set aside the temporal world-order, in which all the law-spheres have been woven into an indissoluble coherence. The apostate primitive function of faith even plays a dominant part in keeping the cultural aspect closed. It binds all the normative aspects of reality rigidly to their pre-logical substratum-spheres, because it deifies the closed forces of nature. It may be said that primitive culture in its essential traits is guided by this primitive faith in nature, and that this faith draws away all the normative meaning-functions of human consciousness from their super-temporal root and Origin. The guidance of faith here means guidance in the falling away of the personality to the pre-logical natural complex. The night of closed 'nature' covers up the primitive cultural communities. For from a deification of closed natural forces no guidance may be expected which could lead the other normative modal functions to an opening and deepening of their meaning. That is why this direction of civilization by faith does not at all result in a disclosure of the meaning of history.

The new problem.

At this point a problem arises that is very important to the Christian conception of history, viz. how the expansive development of the cultural aspect is possible or, for that matter, how the entire process of disclosure in all the normative aspects of experience may be realized, if the guiding terminal function of temporal human existence is not activated in this process by the Spirit of the Civitas Dei. A satisfactory answer to this question will bring us nearer to the insight into the peculiar function that the Idea of historical development has to fulfil in a Christian philosophy of history, if it is indeed to be a useful for scientific thought.

For this purpose it is necessary to direct our attention to the
modal aspect of faith and the way in which it is interwoven in the Divine world-order with the other law-spheres. For, although the historical sphere is basic in the normative process of disclosure, that of faith is the guiding function in the transcendental direction of time.

Without an insight into the position that the function of faith has in the opening-process the new problem raised in this stage of our inquiry cannot be solved.

§ 7 - THE POSITION OF THE ASPECT OF FAITH IN THE OPENING-PROCESS

The modal law-sphere of faith is often identified with religion, which is very detrimental to religious self-knowledge. Up to now we have always spoken of faith as of a modal meaning-function, viz. as the second terminal function of temporal human experience and temporal reality. As a subject-function faith is at the same time the terminal function of human existence in the transcendental direction of time. As such it is found in all human beings, in believers in Christ as well as in those whose faith reveals itself in an apostate direction. There is an apostate faith, and there is a faith which can only come into action in man through the Spirit of God. But both function within the modal structure of a law-sphere, implanted in human nature at creation. In both a sharp distinction must be made between the subjective function, the principium, the content, the direction and the root of belief. And in both cases it is obvious that the function of faith cannot be identified with the religious root of temporal existence or, in the words of the Ecclesiastes, with the heart from which spring the issues of life. Believing, logical distinction, feeling, etc. are temporal functions delimited from one another in law-spheres of mutually irreducible meaning-modalities. But the religious root of our entire existence is not a function; religion is not enclosed in a temporal law-sphere.

Dr A. Kuyper's conception of πίστις as a function.

Holy Scripture clearly points out the temporal limiting character of true Christian faith, which will find its fulfilment in the religious 'vision face to face', in the βλέπων πρόσωπον πρός πρόσωπον. The epistle to the Hebrews expresses the limiting character of the function of belief in its content and direction
in this way: "Now faith is the ultimate ground (διόστασις) of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen" 1.

The great Dutch theologian Dr A. Kuyper has observed that these words do not refer to faith in the special soteriological sense, but rather to the function of believing as such, in whatever direction it may manifest itself 2. I doubt whether the text is meant in this general sense. But, in my opinion, it cannot be doubted that the function of believing has a general modal structure, founded in the temporal order of creation.

Only in the 'heart' does the function of faith find its religious concentration, and from this spiritual root of our existence the direction of our believing is determined. True Christian faith is directed to the religious fulness of God's Revelation in Christ Jesus, to the invisible, super-temporal wealth bestowed on us in the Redeemer. But, as a function, it is not super-temporal itself, since it is interwoven with the whole temporal coherence of our existence. Faith as a particular modal function is not to be viewed in an exclusively soteriological orientation but in a much wider perspective. This view was no doubt first developed by Dr A. Kuyper in his famous Encyclopedia of Theology. In a masterly way he analyzed πίστις as an irreducible function in the whole process of human knowledge.

It is true, that his first formal and provisional epistemological definition of πίστις as 'that function of our psyche through which we obtain direct and immediate certainty, without any discursive reasoning', did not touch at the special modal meaning of faith. This circumscription was almost identical with the usual conception of intuitive evidence. But in the continuation of his inquiry this formal definition is related to a material one in which the essential reference of the function of faith to divine Revelation is clearly explained. In this material sense πίστις is laid at the foundation of every form of immediate certainty which manifests itself both in the different spheres of theoretic knowledge and in practical life 3.

Since Kuyper calls all these forms of certainty particular

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1 Hebr. 11.
2 Dr A. Kuyper, Encycl. der H. Godgeleerdheid, dl II (2e druk, 1909), p. 74.
3 Therefore Kuyper (op. cit. II, p. 83/4) warns emphatically against a simple identification of the formal act of πίστις with the usual conception of intuitive knowledge.
manifestations of πίστις, it is clear that he meant the anticipations of faith in the other functions of human consciousness.

This has been completely misunderstood by those who supposed that Kuyper's formal conception of πίστις has nothing to do with faith in its 'theological' sense. The truth of the matter is that the latter is fundamental in Kuyper's whole explanation. He showed that the function of faith in this original and material sense, implanted in human nature at creation, has not been lost by the fall into sin. Its essential structure has been maintained by God's common grace. But owing to the radical antithesis between the spiritual διναμικ of apostasy and that of the Holy Ghost, it now develops in an apostate as well as in a soteriological direction.

This was a deep Biblical conception whose great importance is far from being sufficiently recognized in theological circles.

The psychologizing of faith into a function of feeling, or its logicizing into an actus intellectus due to a super-natural gift of grace (Thomas Aquinas), was thus cut off at the root.

At the same time the modern irrationalistic-idealistic and transcendental-psychologistic views of faith as a religious a priori (Troeltsch, Otto) are rejected in Kuyper's conception.

The Barthian conception of faith.

On the other hand this conception also disagrees with the view nowadays defended by Karl Barth, according to which the human subject of Christian belief originates from a new creation, since it is only constituted by the relation of this belief to Jesus Christ. The latter view can be hardly accepted from a Biblical standpoint. It is true that a veritable Christian faith presupposes a radical regeneration of man, and that in this sense the Christian is a new creature. But the term 'new' can here only mean 'renewed'. Regeneration in Jesus Christ is not a creation, it does not add a new 'organ of believing' to the created nature of man. The function of believing, implanted in this human nature at creation, is the same in Christians and non-Christians; it has a

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1 See my treatise Kuyper's Wetenschapsleer in the quarterly review Philosophia Reformata, 4th Year, 1939, p. 228 sqq., where Kuyper's conception of πίστις has been analyzed in greater detail.
modal structure which guarantees its unbreakable meaning-coherence with all the other modal aspects of the temporal order. If not, unbelief or apostate belief could not be the opposite to Christian faith. It would belong to an entirely different order and could have no point of comparison with the belief in Jesus Christ.

Barth considers Christian faith entirely apart from the modal aspect of belief. It does not appear that he has seen this terminal aspect of human existence, and I suppose he is obliged to deny its existence. True, he accepts that the Christian as the subject of belief participates in the double solidarity of creation and sin with the other members of mankind. But he does not distinguish the regeneration of the religious centre of human existence from Christian faith in its functioning within the second terminal aspect of the temporal order. On the contrary, he identifies the regeneration of man in Jesus Christ, with the constitution of the subject of Christian belief as an act of new creation originating in the Redeemer. The subject-function of believing is in Barth 'the Christian subject' itself, in the sense of the new individual root of human existence. So there remains no room for a modal aspect of faith founded in the temporal order of creation.

But if Christian belief has no point of connection with this temporal order, all the analogies of the other meaning-modalities, which reveal themselves in the analysis of the modal aspect of faith, lose their basis. And all that is said in the New Testament about the analogical relations between natural life and the life of faith should be interpreted as mere metaphors. Which is, however, impossible without abandoning the concrete meaning of the texts concerned.

In fact, we are again confronted here with the dialectical basic motive of nature and supernatural grace in an antithetic and dualistic conception.

It is true that in his Kirchliche Dogmatik Barth has relinquished the extreme dualism of his earlier writings. It appears that he now seeks to understand the original nature of creation from the supernatural grace revealed in Jesus Christ. But the dialectical scholastic basic-motive itself has not been abandoned. It appears in a new antithetic and dualistic form in the conception of regeneration as a new creation, and in the denial of any connection between Christian faith and the innate function of believing which belongs to the temporal order of human exi-
stence. This is the more deplorable because there are really masterly and magnificent traits in Barth’s reflections on Christian faith.

The importance of a clear insight into the modal function of faith.

It is quite understandable why the conception of belief as a function implanted in human nature at creation has raised serious objections not only on the part of Barthian theologians. At first sight it might seem that in this way Christian faith is reduced to a common human faculty, whereas the New Testament lays full stress on the radical impotence of carnal man to believe in Jesus Christ. But this is a radical misunderstanding of the true meaning of the conception concerned.

The question is not whether in the state of sin man can come to Christ by means of a natural faculty of faith alone. The only question is whether Christian belief can function outside of the temporal order of creation in which the modal aspect of faith has an essential and undeniable terminal position.

According to the order of creation this terminal aspect was destined to function as the opened window of time through which the light of God’s eternity should shine into the whole temporal coherence of the world. That this window has been closed by sin, and cannot be opened by man through his own activity, does not mean that it cannot be disclosed by the Divine power of the Holy Ghost. It does not mean that sin has the power to render this essential terminal function of temporal human existence unavailable as an instrument of God’s grace in Jesus Christ, so that God would be obliged to create a new organ of believing outside of the ‘natural’ order of creation. Sin cannot destroy anything that is implied in the order of creation. Otherwise it would be a real counter-power over against the Creator, whereas in fact it derives its power only from creation itself.

We shall see that the modal structure of the function of faith itself guarantees that it cannot be conceived apart from the ‘heart’ as the religious root of human existence and the spiritual δύναμις operative in the latter. So it must be evident that Christian belief cannot be understood apart from the δύναμις of Jesus Christ operative in the hearts of those who by regeneration are implanted in Him.

But this does not detract from the necessity of distinguishing
between faith as a modal function in the temporal order of creation, and its religious δύναμις, which transcends its functional character and determines its content and direction.

The misinterpretation of this state of affairs has occasioned a great deal of confusion in many fields, especially in the view of the relations between the State and the institution of the Church, and between ‘believing’ and ‘thinking’, etc. On the other hand, the usual identification of the function of faith with religion was fatal to the sense of the central, super-modal and radical position of the latter. It created a habit of looking upon religion as a particular aspect of human life comparable with the others. It led to the distinction of special ‘religious norms’ coordinated with ethical, juridical and social rules of conduct. Or, inversely, it became fatal to the insight into the temporal function of πίσις in elevating the Christian faith proper above temporal life within the ‘ordinances’.

Compared with all these misunderstandings Kuypér’s really Biblical conception of faith as a temporal function must be considered as breaking new ground.

His view, however, can only be understood in its full significance and scope in the general and special theories of the law-spheres. For here is revealed the position occupied by the function of faith in the whole of the temporal coherence of our cosmos. Here also its significance as transcendental terminal function becomes clear. At the same time it appears to be impossible to identify the function of faith with cognitive intuition, as Volkelt does 1.

It may be that in the last instance intuition refers to faith in its original sense, but it lacks the very terminal character of the latter and the immediate relation to Divine revelation.

But we cannot go into this last question before the more detailed treatment of the epistemological problem.

The transcendental character of the modal meaning-nucleus of πίσις. The Greek conception of πίσις as δόξα and its revival in Husserl’s phenomenology.

If we want to comprehend the aspect of faith in its original modal meaning we must abandon the Greek philosophical concept of πίσις. The latter was conceived of as δόξα, a hypothetical

1 Erfahrung und Denken, p. 184; Die Quellen der menschlich. Gewissheit, p. 72 ff; Gewissheit und Wahrheit, p. 338 ff.
opinion, bound to sensory perception and representation. In this sense it is the opposite of the certainty of \( \varepsilon w c \varepsilon n m \) which theoretically seeks for the ultimate grounds of truth.

Husserl's phenomenology revived this Greek concept of belief. Belief (Glaube) is conceived of as a noetic character of the intentional act of sensory perception or sensory representation (remembrance), respectively; it can assume different modalities and on the noematic side it corresponds to different characters of being.

In this sense belief is called 'doxa'. The original perceptional certainty implied in a normal perception is called 'Urdoxa', and its modifications (as presumption, doubt etc.) are designated as 'doxische Modalitäten'. The 'Urdoxa' corresponds to the being-character of reality on the noematic side. The 'doxische Modalitäten' refer to the different modalities of being, as possible, probable, questionable, doubtful.

This phenomenological analysis of \( \pi \iota o \mu c \) in the sense of 'doxa' is not at all oriented to the modal structures of experience. In so far as it starts from the perceptual certainty as 'Urdoxa', it has touched at an anticipation of faith in the modal meaning of sensory perception, without accounting for its meaning-coherence with belief in its original sense.

The irreducible meaning of the function of faith proper is bound to be entirely misinterpreted if its character as a transcendental terminal function is not recognized, i.e. its immediate relatedness to the transcendental root and to the Origin of temporal existence. As a modal function \( \pi \iota o \mu c \) cannot exist without the revelation of God as the Origin. Only in orienting itself to this revelation of the absolute Arché can the function of faith reveal its irreducible meaning-character.

Therefore the modal meaning-nucleus of faith can only be theoretically approximated as an original transcendental certainty, within the limits of time, related to a revelation of the 'Achý, which has captured the heart of human existence.

This is the only modal meaning-nucleus that points above time without the intermediary of modal anticipations. And that is why, strictly speaking, no concept of the faith-aspect is possible. Its meaning-nucleus cannot be isolated in its essential transcendental character from that which is beyond all comprehension.

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1 Ideen I, p. 214 ff.
This fact should be recognized and it should also be admitted that the function of faith is not merely a subjective terminal function of our individual human existence, but the transcendental terminal function of the entire (earthly) empirical reality. Without faith this reality cannot exist. The view that it is possible to find a hold on reality neutral with respect to belief will then prove to be a fundamental error. Such a hold is no more possible in our immanent subjective functions of consciousness than in any objective function of temporal reality. In virtue of their meaning-structure, both offer an unconquerable resistance to any theoretical attempt at enclosure or at obtaining a grasp on reality in time, independent of faith.

Can the function of faith occur in a closed state as well as in a deepened condition? If so, how is this to be understood?

The transcendental terminal character of the aspect of faith confronts Christian philosophy with the most difficult problems. If πίστις, as the transcendental terminal function of the cosmos, has a law-sphere of its own, it must have a law-side and a subject-side. And the law-side can only be the norm prescribing the subjection of our belief to Divine Revelation, as the ultimate guarantee of certainty. The religious consummation of the meaning of Revelation is Christ Jesus, as the Word that was made flesh (John 1:14). This Word-revelation in its aspect of faith establishes the norm and contains the principium of Christian belief.

The Divine Revelation, finding expression in the whole of creation, shows its meaning-coherence with history in its temporal aspect of faith. This appears from its progressive character (also as the special Revelation of salvation). This Revelation, also in a soteriological sense, has entered into history, and has its historical aspect.

From this it appears that the meaning of faith, even in its soteriological function, is susceptible of dynamics, of meaning-disclosure. Notwithstanding the irreducible modal character of πίστις, it can never be conceived of as detached from historical development. If in the modal structure of πίστις there is a

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1 Cf. Dr H. Bavinck, The Philosophy of Revelation (Stone-lectures 1908), Vth Lecture, pp. 95—120.
possibility of meaning-disclosure, and if this is *actualized* in reality, we must distinguish between faith in a *restrictive* or *closed* function, and faith in a *deepened* and *disclosed* state.

But does not this distinction cancel the transcendental character of faith *qua talis* on which we have laid so much emphasis?

This conclusion would be inevitable, if the 'closure' and 'rigidity' of the modal function of belief is taken in the same sense as that of all the preceding meaning-functions.

Then our assertion would be invalidated that the meaning-nucleus of \( \pi\iota\sigma\nu\varsigma \) is the only one that already in its primary state points beyond the boundary-line of time. But then the function of faith as the second terminal aspect of temporal reality, irreducible in its modal meaning, would also be cancelled. For as soon as the attempt is made to abstract it from *its direction to the Divine*, from *its relatedness to the Revelation* of the '\( \text{\textDelta}\gamma\iota\nu \)' the meaning-nucleus of faith is itself eliminated. Then one may continue to speak of 'faith' in the phenomenological sense of 'doxa'; in the psychological meaning of an irresistible 'feeling' of certainty and confidence; or in the purely epistemological sense of 'intuitive evidence'; but the modal meaning of faith proper has been lost to sight. We shall presently revert to the analogical use of the word faith. Provisionally it must be established that when \( \nu\iota\sigma\nu\varsigma \), as the transcendental terminal function of our temporal cosmos, disappears from our theoretical view, every possibility of explaining the functional structure of the opening-process is precluded. That is why we must bear in mind from the outset that the terms 'restrictive' and 'disclosed function', used with reference to the modus of faith, can only have a *special signification*. This particular and really exceptional sense is connected with the position occupied by faith as the transcendental terminal function in the entire opening-process of temporal meaning.

What is then the particular meaning of the terms here in question?

The Revelation of God in 'nature' and in His Word. Christian theology has from the outset distinguished between the universal Revelation in 'nature' (i.e. creation), and the universal and the particular Word-revelation. The starting-point of our inquiry into the special sense of the 'restrictive' or 'closed' function of faith is doubtless to be sought in the 'Revelation
in nature'. It is necessary to draw attention to the original essential connection between the 'revelatio naturalis' and the universal Word-revelation. God revealed Himself at the creation of the cosmos in the religious root and the temporal meaning-coherence of the world. He created man after His own image. He gave expression to His Divine fulness of Being in the whole of His creation, as a totality of meaning. From the very beginning, however, this revelation of God in the nature of the cosmos was borne and explained by the Word-revelation. At the outset, also after the fall into sin, this Revelation by no means had a private but rather a universal character. It was directed to the whole human race.

The independent line of development of a revelatio particularis, which was no longer universal, did not start before Abraham. Presently the people of Israel was to be the provisional bearer of this special revelation. Israel, which was to bring forth the Redeemer, was separated from the other nations because of the treatening general apostasy from the Word-revelation, until the Word appeared in the flesh.\(^1\)

In the Word-revelation God addresses the human race in its religious root, and man has only to listen faithfully. As this Word-revelation was originally a revelation to a community, and not to individuals, its addressee was not each individual believer apart, but mankind in community with its first head, Adam. The function of faith can likewise again be truly directed to God only in Christ, as the Head and root of the regenerate human race. But now in such a way that only Christ is the Finisher and the Subject of the Covenant of faith (Hebr. 12:2). Only in faithfully listening to the Divine Word is the true meaning of God's revelation in 'created nature' revealed to man.

The uncorrupted 'natural' knowledge about God was not a kind of knowledge originating from a reason that was self-sufficient in this 'natural domain'. It was not the 'theologia naturalis' of speculative philosophy; but it was knowledge which, in its temporal character, was in the last instance exclusively guided by faith in the Word of God. Through this Word alone the eyes of the mind were opened to the understanding of the universal revelation of God in created nature. Only the function of faith

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\(^1\) Gen. 14:18–20; 20:3 ff; 21:22 ff; 23:6; 24:50; 26:19; 40:8 etc. Jos. 24:2, 14, 15; Deut. 26:5 etc. see also Bavinck's exposition in his Philosophy of Revelation (1908), pp. 161 ff.
was able to direct the logical function of thought to the Divine Revelation, and only the Word-revelation could disclose to faith the Revelation in nature.

That's why apostasy from God started with a refusal to listen any longer to Him, with the repugnance of the heart to what God had said. The function of faith was thus drawn away from the Divine Word.

God's Revelation in the whole of created nature, and primarily in the heart of man, became man's doom when he fell away from the Divine Word-revelation. Where the heart closed itself and turned away from God, the function of *πίστις* was closed to the light of God's Word. As a result faith began to manifest its transcendental direction in an apostate way, in the search for an absolute firm ground in the creation itself. The inevitable consequence was the idolatrous absolutizing of meaning.

The thesis that there can be no conflict between God's Revelation in 'nature' and God's Word-revelation becomes a superficial attempt at accommodation, as soon as, contrary to the Scriptures, the natural Revelation of God is set apart and attributed to a self-sufficient 'naturalis ratio'\(^1\). 'Natural reason' then can start spinning one part of the thread of the explanation of the world, and the other end is supposed to have been prepared by the Word-revelation of God's special grace, as a supernatural one. The two parts are finally brought together by a kind of natural harmony\(^2\). But such a harmony is a delusion!

The 'natural revelation of God', detached from the Word-revelation, subjects apostate functional faith to the law of sin. This is the Divine Law which turns into a curse and a Divine judgement on man, because it is drawn away from its religious fulness and fulfilment in Christ by the apostate human consciousness.

The reason is that even apostate faith is not purely arbitrary, but subject to normative principles of natural Revelation.

\(^1\) The Roman-Catholic appeal to St Paul's utterance in 1 Romans 19—23 is unacceptable. The apostle does not speak here of a natural knowledge of God from an autonomous natural reason. On the contrary, he states emphatically that God was knowable from a general revelation:

"ὅτε οἱ γνώσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁ θεὸς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐφανέρωσεν.

The word ἐφανέρωσεν means a general revelation in the works of creation, not a particular one.

\(^2\) Cf. Bavinck's *Philosophy of Revelation*, p. 180, on the "Vermittlungstheologie" of the 19th century.
The revelation of God's common grace, on the other hand, by which the effects of sin were checked and retarded, is not to be separated from the Word-revelation in its general sense. This common grace cannot be understood in the subjective apostate function of faith. Apart from Christ it does not become a blessing, but a judgment on humanity. Consequently, every fundamental dualism in the conception of the relation between gratia communis and gratia specialis, in the sense that the former has an independent meaning with respect to the latter, is essentially a relapse into the scholastic schema of nature and grace. It is even a greater set-back than the Thomistic-Aristotelian conception, which at least conceived of 'nature' as a 'praeambula gratiae'.

The restrictive function of the faith-aspect as the extreme limit of the transcendental apostasy of πίστις.

Apostate faith can only manifest itself in the modal aspect of πίστις; in other words the extreme degree of apostasy in the pistic ¹ function still remains a function of faith.

This modality of meaning must therefore also have a restrictive structural law which — unlike the restrictive structures of the earlier meaning-aspects — must be conceived of as a transcendental restrictive structure in apostasy ².

This means that the modal aspect of πίστις retains its transcendental terminal character, even in this 'restrictive function'. This character is essential in this meaning-modus, though in its closed sense the true direction to the Absolute Origin has been reversed in the absolutizing of what has been created ³. The 'restrictive function' expresses that cosmic limit of the possibility of apostasy in πίστις by which all the normative anticipatory spheres of the earlier law-spheres remain closed in the transcendental direction, in other words: that structural con-

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¹ The adjective 'pistic' is construed from the Greek word pistis (πίστις).
² The term transcendental here means: pointing beyond the limits of time to a Deus absconditus, revealing itself in the world.
³ Cf. the extremely pregnant exposition given by Kuyper, op. cit. II, p. 254 ff. of the so-called 'theologia naturalis' in the sense of an innate knowledge of God, and especially this statement: 'Christianity and paganism are related to one another in the same way as the plus- and minus-directions of the same series.'
dition of faith in which, as the guiding terminal function, it makes impossible the entire opening-process in this direction.

In this condition the function of faith must be considered as having reached the terminal point of its apostasy from the Word-revelation. There are primitive forms of faith-in-nature and of myths that make a pathological impression, and seem no longer to show any trace of the original universal phaneroosis of the Divine Logos. Nevertheless they can only be understood in the sense of the modal aspect of faith, which has its own sphere-sovereignty. They can never be explained in a causal psychological way e.g., in terms of sexual passions or demonic affects of fear, although the temporal meaning of faith has the emotional meaning of feeling as its necessary substratum.

Two kinds of starting-points for the opening-process in the transcendental direction.

Taken in this restrictive sense πίσις can never be the starting-point for the positive development and deepening of meaning of the function of faith implanted in man at creation. It must rather be viewed as the transcendental limit in the devolution, the degeneration and the running to waste of the true nature of faith.1

But it can serve as the starting-point for the transcendental deepening of meaning in the process of the apostasy of πίσις about which we shall have to say more below.

There is, however, also a positive development and deepening of meaning of the pistic function to the fulness of the Christian faith. Its starting-point must be sought in the structure of πίσις as it was implanted in man by God at the creation, i.e. in its primary openness to the Divine Word-revelation.

After the fall into sin this primary disclosure is only possible by means of the working of God's Spirit in the opening of the heart by grace. The apostate function of faith as such does not offer any starting-point for the development of the Christian faith. First the religious root of human existence must be directed to God, if πίσις is to be a useful organ for listening to the Word-revelation.

1 Kuyper, op. cit., pp. 255/6, relates this absolute deterioration of the natural knowledge of God to what St Paul repeats three times in Romans I, viz. that at last God abandoned (παραδόθη) the idolatrous sinner to the apostate inclination of his heart.
In this process no new function of faith is created, but the primary opening of the πιστις to the Divine Logos is a radical reversal of the direction of faith, which cannot possibly be brought about by the apostate nature of man.

Thanks to God's gratia communis, the semen religionis (as Calvin calls it) has been preserved in the human heart. And in many apostate religions important remnants of the original Word-revelation have been retained. It is even possible that through contact with the Jewish race or with Christianity some religions show moments of Biblical origin. They can, therefore, not be called pagan. But these moments of truth in the apostate faith are baffled because of the radically false direction of the basic motive of the pseudo-religion.

The elements of truth left in the apostate 'theologia naturalis' can only be understood in the light of God's Word-revelation. And even the structure of the entire process of devolution, in the apostate knowledge about God, can become transparent only in this light.

This statement has a much more universal implication. The function of faith is the essential transcendental terminal function, both of the whole of the temporal cosmos and of human consciousness. In the light of the Divine Word-revelation the recognition of this state of affairs will enable us to get an insight into the true meaning of the important elements of truth discovered through God's grace also by apostate philosophy in general. This at the same time explains why Christian philosophy does not and cannot simply cancel the whole of immanence-philosophy.

We must strongly emphasize, however, what we have already said in the Prolegomena about the meaning-structure of truth. No single partial truth is a self-sufficient moment that can be set apart. The partial elements of truth are falsified when interpreted from the immanence-standpoint. This is not a question of incidental misunderstandings, or errors of thought, which no sinful human thinking is exempt from. Rather it is evidence of a conscious repugnance in the human mind to the root and fulness of meaning of the Truth.

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1 This term is here intended in the general sense of 'natural knowledge about God', and not in the special, theoretical sense.
The revelational principle of faith in its restrictive function and the theme of magic and cult.

It may have become sufficiently clear now that πίσις in its subjective manifestations cannot exceed its modal structure. Also in transcendental apostasy faith remains subject to the structure of its law-sphere, even in its closed, restrictive state. Its normative revelational principle is elevated above any human invention and arbitrariness, and remains valid, even when belief has reached the last stage of apostasy. In an earlier context we saw that the normative principle of πίσις is only to be found in the faith-aspect of the Divine Revelation. We shall therefore have to seek for the contents of the restrictive revelational principle which determines and limits the actualization of belief in temporal reality as a norm.

In early Humanistic rationalism the attempt was made to find a kind of natural, rational, original faith of which all positive dogmatic doctrines were no more than higher or lower forms of development. The attempt was hopeless. It originated from the Humanistic belief in the uniformity of human nature, in its supposed root of ‘sovereign reason’. It has long since been given up by science. But this does not mean that the constancy of the structural law of πίσις has to be given up in the case of the restrictive function of faith. Even for the scientific research of the pistical phenomena of primitive religions the restrictive revelational principle is a necessary ἐπόδεεως without which it cannot delimit its special field of investigation. This appears already in the question as to whether or not magic belongs to ‘religion’.

James Frazer, the first to raise this problem in the well-known chapter ‘Magic and Religion’ of his book The Magic Art, gives a negative answer.

In a purer form the question ought to have been framed as follows: ‘Is magic indeed a phenomenon belonging to a cult in the modal meaning of faith?’ Frazer really meant this, — witness his definition of ‘religion’.

This question must be answered by the inquirer if he is ever

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2 ‘a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life.’
to be able to start his specific inquiry into primitive belief. It cannot be answered without arbitrariness, if the investigator does not make use of a restrictive normative principle of revelation regulating the aspect of faith on the law-side. If, in theory, the subjection of the primitive subjective πίστις to such a restrictive revelational principle is ignored, the essentially transcendental, terminal character of functional faith is lost sight of.

Then the way is paved for no end of confusion as regards the modal aspects resulting in constructive efforts to explain the meaning of faith which pre-suppose the very thing in need of explanation ¹.

The same is true of FRAZER’S own theory about the origin of cult. According to him a period of magic precedes every kind of ‘religion’ (read: cult). Magic is directed to the impersonal forces of nature and does not strive after the propitiation of a deity, but aims at controlling and dominating the forces of nature. The discovery of the inefficacy of magic is supposed to cause in man a feeling of helplessness and a consciousness of the power of invisible things around him.

From this feeling the primitive forms of ‘the religion of nature’ are supposed to spring: the worship of the personified forces of nature and that of death. The principle of the economy of thought is then used to account for the transition from animism to polytheism, and from the latter to monotheism.

People would come ‘to limit the number of the spiritual beings of whom their imagination at first had been so prodigal’ ².

In this theory, the construction of magic being the necessary preliminary stage of ‘religion’ is not only open to question. It is

¹ The most deterrent instance of such explanations is S. FREUD’S attempt at explaining the function of faith, which he identifies with ‘religion’, in a psycho-analytical way as a universally human compulsive neurosis. This is supposed to originate from the infantile ‘Oedipus-complex’, the ‘relation to the father’. Primitive man is said to attribute the character of a father to the forces of nature and to deify them, just as a child elevates its father to ‘God’. The father, admired and feared at the same time, is the primitive image of every form of deity. The ‘father complex’ on the one hand, helplessness and the need of protection on the other, are assumed to be very closely connected in the ‘origin of any religion’, and all dogmatic doctrines thus bear the stamp of an ‘illusion’. (Die Zukunft einer Illusion, 1927, pp. 26, 36 ff. 50). That this entire theory already presupposes the irreducible transcendental meaning of faith, has apparently not dawned upon the author.

² The Worship of Nature I, pp. 17 ff.
actually refuted by the simple fact that magic and the cult of deities function simultaneously, side by side, and are interrelated. In addition, the principle of the economy of thought is abused in Frazer’s rationalistic construction of the evolution from animism to monotheism. But apart from these serious objections, the transition of a phenomenon which in essence is not qualified as faith, in the true sense of the word, to \( \pi \sigma u \) proper, is a leap which is simply not permissible in an explanatory theory.

This leap was only made possible through the misinterpretation of the irreducible modal meaning of faith and of the necessary revelational principle functioning in it. If one tries to give a ‘natural explanation’ of the essentially transcendental terminal function of human consciousness, one cannot avoid an obliteration of the modal boundaries between the aspects. This is the reason why all the constructive developmental theories of the origin of the different kinds of cult are doomed to fail. In trying to find the restrictive structure of the aspect of \( \pi \sigma u \) we in no way want to follow the path of this evolutionistic construction. This path must already come to a dead end in the indeterminateness of the meaning in which the concept of time is used.

A truly historical division into periods of the development of the different forms of faith presupposes, — as the minimum of scientific seriousness, — the insight that it is indeed the history of faith to which the investigator ought to devote his attention. He should refrain from framing any evolutionistic hypotheses about the origin of the pistic cult from phenomena of a different nature.

Even from the evolutionistic standpoint the hypothesis that the magical phase was the oldest and therefore the ‘original’ one is already obsolete, since Beth and Vierkandt discovered a pre-magical cultural stage. This stage was characterized by the total lack of any magical meaning of human actions, and it is supposed to have left clear traces in the pre-historical period of the Aurignacians.¹

Scientific inquiry cannot shed light on the true origin of the pistic function and its original structure. This is the domain of the cosmonomic Idea which, as its hypothesis, lies at the basis

of all theoretical investigations. In the light of our Christian cosmonomic Idea we could not accept the closed state of history as the original one. Nor can our examination of the restrictive meaning-structure of the revelational principle of faith be understood as an inquiry into the original phase of belief preceding all the other developmental phases. The restrictive pistic revelational principle, in the sense intended by us, can only be understood from the cosmonomic order itself, in the light of the Divine Word-revelation.

The restrictive function of the logical and post-logical aspects proved to be characterized by their rigid attachment to the pre-logical aspects of reality. The restrictive function of faith is the extreme transcendental limit reached in the apostasy of faith, in which under its guidance the normative anticipatory spheres of all the earlier aspects remain rigidly closed.

This limit is consequently to be found in that stage of apostasy in which primitive man deifies the unknown forces of nature regulating life and death, fertility and barrenness etc., i.e., generally speaking, the whole of the biotic-sensory substratum of a closed society.

Man, fallen away from truth to this primitive faith, even lacks any awareness of his transcendental freedom and of his transcendence above the things given in nature. In his function of believing he directs himself to some deification of the natural forces whose normative anticipatory spheres have not yet been opened. He believes that they wield a mysterious kind of power over the natural functions of life in the entire primitive community to which he belongs. To him they are both good and destructive deities, who ought to be propitiated or warded off by religious rites. In other words, the restrictive structure of the subjective πίστις has no other revelational principle than the transcendent certainty about the deity revealing itself in the closed 'forces of nature', and entitled to religious worship.

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1 It need hardly be stated explicitly that these mysterious forces of nature are not conceived of by primitive faith in theoretical abstraction. Rather they are wrapped in a phantastic web of mythology woven by primitive man, who interprets the pistic object-function of the things of nature according to his phantastic sense of the deity. This state of things cannot be made clear before our investigation of the subject-object relation. Compare also what Ed. v. Hartmann observes with regard to the faith in nature in his book Das religiöse Bewusstsein der Menschheit (2e Aufl. 1888), pp. 16 ff.
Here, too, the Divine Revelation in 'created nature' primarily touches the heart of man's existence. Being completely closed to the Word-revelation this heart guides the function of faith in its restrictive apostasy.

This restrictive revelational principle turns into a curse to man in the depravity of his pistic function. Nevertheless, the principle itself is founded in the Divine world-order, and therefore elevated above all human arbitrariness. In the Word-Revelation, which finds its consummation in Christ, it is not set aside. But it is revealed in its true sense through its relation to the fulness of meaning of the Divine law: the service of God with our whole heart in Christian freedom.

The disintegration of the sense of personal identity in the belief in mana and in totemism.

In the restrictive function of its transcendental apostasy πίσις lacks any direction to religious self-reflection. The disintegration of personality-awareness, invariably seen in primitive peoples, finds remarkable expression in the belief that the divine is mana. Codrington was the first to draw attention to this idea in his well-known book: The Melanesians (1891). Other names are also used, such as orenda, wakonda, manitu, dema¹. It has been found that this belief has spread all over the earth.

After this discovery a lively controversy arose about the meaning of the mana-idea ², which immediately resulted in a hypothesis of a pre-animistic phase of religious belief (King, Marett, Hubert, and Mauss). From this discussion it appears that the pistic mana-idea may safely be characterized as possessing a peculiar fluidity. In 'mana' the natural and the supernatural, the personal and the impersonal merge into one another in a singular way ³.

Mana (with its negative counterpart: taboo) is the divine

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¹ Among the Marind-anim of Dutch Southern New-Guinea the 'dema', in a general sense, is conceived as 'mana'. This has been demonstrated by P. Wirtz in his work: Die Marind-anim von Holländisch-Süd-Neu-Guinea, Bnd II, pp. 6 ff.

² Cf. the critical survey of writings on this subject brought up to date till 1920 in Fr. Rud. Lehmann's monograph: Mana.


The mana-idea is considered as a kind of basic category of mythical
mysterious force distributed in things everywhere. It is elevated above the familiar, every-day sphere of life which can be conceived by common sense. It is personified in mythical figures which, in a fragmentary and fluid way, embody themselves in visible beings such as plants, animals, men, and also in inorganic objects of a great size or with unfamiliar shapes, regarded as a kind of 'masks' of the mysterious mana.

This is the heno-theistic feature in the primitive nature-belief, as Max-Müller styled it. For although this fragmentary personification of the divine lacks every kind of concentration of the personality-awareness, it does not cancel the belief in the deeper unity of mana.

In the case of some tribes it is possible to show that primitive belief assumes a distinct splitting-up of the personality. This happens during the critical transition that every member of the tribe passes through at his initiation into the life of the community (e.g., among the Kurnai in S.E. Australia).

After the initiation-rites another 'self' has arisen. In totemism the members of the clan identify themselves with the totem-

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1 Thus Dr Van Baal in his work already quoted (pp. 60, 61) writes about the dema-belief of the Marind-anim of Dutch Southern-New-Guinea investigated by Wirtz: 'It is only to a certain extent that a distinction can be made between these personal demas which are the gods in the proper sense of the word and that universal all-pervading dema-power of which we spoke a moment ago. They are no more than special facets of one and the same thing, dema, which is now conceived in its specific form as a personal dema, now as a supernatural power operating in all things in general. How fluid this distinction between the two aspects is, can be clearly demonstrated by referring to the so-called dema-stones which are said to be the abodes of a dema. The shape of such a stone is decisive for the special dema incorporated in it: small round stones, e.g., are called coco-dema's. They cause the fruitfulness of the coconut-tree. Most dema-stones are found by accident, but there also exists a method to get possession of them deliberately. Only a messâv can manage this. When he thinks he has found a dema-place, he sets out for it, and knocks on the ground, whereupon the dema appears and tries to run away. The messâv seizes him and the dema changes into a stone in his hands.'


3 Cf. S. Howitt: The native tribes of South-East-Australia (1904) and P. W. Schmidt: Die geheime Jugendweihe eines australischen Urstamms (1923), pp. 26 ff.
animal or the totem-plant. They are storks, or kangaroos or coconut-palms, etc.¹.

This clearly shows how diffuse primitive personality-awareness is ².

The transcendental moral retrocipation in the restrictive structure of the aspect of faith.

Even in this restrictive structure of the aspect of faith we find the retrocipatory connection with the earlier law-spheres maintained. The retrocipatory meaning-moments share in the tran-

¹ We cannot agree with the explanation that BERGSON (op. cit., pp. 195 ff.), gives of totemism. In his opinion the identification of the members of the clan with the totem-animal or the totem-plant should neither be taken in the literal sense, nor in a purely symbolical meaning. Rather it should be interpreted in connection with the phenomenon of exogamy as the primitive sensory indication of the biotical species-character of the different clans. BERGSON takes no account of the pistic meaning of totemism, because of his vitalistic explanation of the entire 'static' primitive 'religion'. In this respect E. CASSIRER's striking criticism of DURKHEIM's explanation of totemism applies also to BERGSON in its full force (cf. CASSIRER's Philosophie der symbolischen Formen II (1925), pp. 237 ff.). DURKHEIM attempted to explain totemism as the outward projection of certain internal social clan-relations (cf. DURKHEIM's Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse). According to DURKHEIM totemism does nothing but transfer to the whole of nature the interindividual and kinship relations that man experiences immediately as a member of the clan. It simply depicts the social mikro-cosmos in the macrocosmos. The totem is then understood as an arbitrary sensory sign. CASSIRER rightly objects that this attempt at explanation rests on some ἄσαρκος ἀφάςας, in so far as it tries to infer totemism from the social organisation of the clan. And, besides, this theory leaves the particularity of the totem-symbol absolutely unexplained.

² CASSIRER has a striking remark in his Philosophie der symbolischen Formen II (1925), p. 226, on the identification of human beings and animals in totemism:

'In all this it appears that animals and human beings stand in a continuous magical coherence in the primitive view. Their magical activities continually merge and change into one another.

'But on the standpoint of mythical thought this unity of action would be impossible, if it was not based on some unity of essence. The condition of things obtaining in our theoretical division of nature into definite 'species' and 'classes' as distinct forms of life, is here reversed. The determining of the species is not founded on the empirical causal rules of generation. The idea of the 'genus' does not depend on the empirical coherence between the gignere and the gigni. The primary fact is the conviction of the identity of the genus as it develops on the ground of the mutual magical relations between man and animal. The idea of common 'descent' only indirectly fits into it.'
The General Theory of the Modal Spheres

The transcendental terminal character proper to the meaning-nucleus of \( \pi \sigma \varphi \zeta \). The pistic law-sphere is directly founded in the moral aspect. The restrictive meaning of faith, therefore, retrocipates on the primitive modal meaning of love in its rigid adhesion to the pre-logical-sides of reality.

The meaning-nucleus of \( \pi \sigma \varphi \zeta \) in its restrictive-transcendental function can only express itself in the cult. The worship of the good forces of nature and the exorcizing of the evil forces imply a moral analogy directly founded in the natural love of the revelation of the deity in the life-force, as well as in the natural hatred of the mysterious forces threatening the biotic existence of the primitive community, such as illness, death, barrenness, etc. The transcendental character of the cult as a necessary meaning-moment in the aspect of \( \pi \sigma \varphi \zeta \) is revealed in its relation to the deity.

K. Betti in his book Religion und Magie bei den Naturvölkern (1914, p. 208) rightly emphasized the fact that the cult is simply not found without the ethical moment. This was the very reason why he sharply distinguished the primitive cult from mere magic.

From this moral retrocipation the other retrocipatory spheres may be analysed. In the present context we do not wish to continue this transcendental analysis. We only wanted to set the restrictive revelational principle of this law-sphere in its true light.

§ 3 - CONTINUED: THE OPENING OF THE FUNCTION OF FAITH IN THE APOSTATICAL DIRECTION

The central problem demanding special attention at the moment lies in the opening-process of \( \pi \sigma \varphi \zeta \) in the apostatical transcendental direction. How is such an opening-process to be understood, and how is it made possible?

The answer to this question is also of supreme importance for the conception of the Idea of historical development. It is

\[1\] An ample analysis of the analogical moments in the modal structure of faith is to be found in the second Vol. of my Reformation and Scholasticism in Philosophy, which volume has not yet been published. Here I have shown that this analysis is highly important for theology insofar as it lays bare the meaninglessness of theological problems resulting from disregarding the analogical character of the theological basic concepts.
simply impossible to deny that in various religions after a period of a primitive and diffuse belief in nature there is an opening-process of πίστις in an apostatical direction.

This opening-process is immediately connected with the emergence of the respective peoples from a more or less primitive stage of civilization.

The aesthetic humanizing of Greek polytheism by Homer and Hesiod and the opening-process in the Greek cultural community.

Thus the peculiar aesthetic humanizing of Greek polytheism since Homer and Hesiod is doubtless based on a civilization that had been opened to a rather considerable degree. In his Theogony Hesiod had taught the Greeks how the younger gods of measure, order and harmony had conquered the older deities of indeterminateness (Uranos) and measurelessness (Kronos). He had related how the younger deities cleared the earth of ugly monsters and of measureless human beings and diffuse transitional beings. In the Homeric Epic these younger gods had arrived at individual-personal determinateness in their intercourse with each other and with men. In this way the pistic function is directed to the formation of personal cultural gods. Homer’s and Hesiod’s pistic conceptions of the world of the gods acquire a basis for historical power in the popular conviction. At the same time we see how the modal-historical norm of individualization begins to assert itself in the development of Greek civilization. This process is bound to the norms of differentiation and integration analysed in an earlier context.

Cassirer has also pointed out this evolution, although he started from a quite different point of view. First he makes the remark that in the primitive community in which e.g., totemism functions, all individuality of the members is entirely absorbed by the totality of the group. This is doubtless a strong exaggeration and generalization of the power of the primitive communal consciousness. Malinowski and other ethnologists of the so-called functionalist school have shown that this usual conception of the primitive mind does not agree with the social facts. In the common social relations within the group the individuality of the members is certainly not effaced or absorbed by the group-mind.

But if we restrict Cassirer’s statement to the pistic aspect of primitive social life it is doubtless right.

In an earlier context we have explained in what sense it may
be said that the individual in a primitive society lacks historical or cultural significance. The same restrictions and modifications should be applied to the sequel of Cassirer's argument.

He continues: 'As soon as in this group the religious consciousness \(^1\) rises to the thought and to the form of personal gods, the entanglement of the individual member in the totality of the group begins to disappear. Not before this stage of development does the individual get his independent peculiar character and his personal features in contradistinction to the life of the community. This direction to the individual is connected with a new tendency towards the universal — which fact seems to be contradictory, but is in reality correlated with it. For above the smaller unit of the tribe or the group now rise the more comprehensive social units. The personal gods of Homer are also the first national gods of the Greeks — and as such they have straightway become the creators of the general Hellenic consciousness. For they are the Olympians, the universal celestial gods, bound neither to one single locality or province, nor to a particular place of worship. In this manner the liberation to personal consciousness and the elevation to national consciousness are accomplished by one and the same fundamental act of religious formation' \(^2\).

Under the guidance of this Greek popular faith, whose mythical forms were created by Homer and Hesiod, and in whose religious basic motive the dialectical tension with the earlier natural religion was retained, Greek art rose to a great height in epic poetry, tragedy and plastic art. We see the social, juridical and moral law-spheres opening themselves \(^3\) and the Greek body politic pass through its classical period of efflorescence.

And in Greek philosophy which continued to be in contact with mythology (witness the influence of Orphism), it is not really philosophical thought as such which gradually undermines polytheistic popular belief. It is rather the transcendental direction of πνεύμα to deified theoretical thought, which leads the Greek mind to philosophical theological self-reflection. Philo-

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\(^1\) Cassirer, of course, does not recognize a modal aspect of faith and continually identifies religion with πνεύμα in the usual way.

\(^2\) Phil. der symb. Formen II, pp. 245/6.

\(^3\) In the formal principles of moderation and justice, the juridical and moral conceptions as they developed under the guidance of this popular faith, doubtless rise above the restrictive level of a kind of eudemonism that still clings to sensibility and to the biotic conditions of life. Even Plato and Aristotle started from this popular morality in their ethics.
The true character of the disclosure of faith in transcendental apostasy.

In the apostasy from the Divine Word-revelation, the whole of the normative opening-process is guided by a deepening of the apostate direction of faith, as the transcendental terminal aspect. This deepening can only be understood as a process in which man arrives at transcendental self-consciousness in his falling away into the absolutization of the relative.

The faith-aspect has no functional anticipatory spheres in its modal structure. The only thing \( \pi \sigma \zeta \) in apostasy can anticipate, is the religious root of temporal existence. The function of faith rises above its restrictive, rigidly closed state in the civitas terrena, as soon as apostate humanity becomes conscious of its freedom to transcend the merely foundational direction of time.

Then it realizes that it is free to anticipate the immanent revelation of the deity in the selfhood, in the root of human existence itself. But this revelation has been falsified in its religious meaning, because the human ego has been absolutized into self-sufficiency. This awakening of the tendency in the pistic function to anticipate the transcendent selfhood, is essentially a hopeless affair. It is the attempt of man to re-discover his selfhood, lost in the religious apostasy into the relative, by transcendental anticipation of a vain self-absolutization. In the primitive mana-belief the natural sense of the godhead is diffused among the mysterious forces of nature. These are still closed and incomprehensible to man, and to them the whole of temporal existence is rigidly bound. Man believes he is 'possessed' by them. But in the process of his rising to transcendental self-consciousness, apostate man discovers his freedom in faith to devise his idol in the image of the deified normative functions of his own personality. That which is typical for the deepening of \( \pi \sigma \zeta \) in the apostate direction, is invariably the search after the human selfhood in the image of cultural idols who give expression to man's elevation above the blind forces of nature.

Nevertheless, also in this disclosure and deepening of its apostate direction faith remains bound to a principle of Divine revelation in the order of creation. This is the innate tendency of the human ego to transcend itself in the central relation to
its Divine Origin, in order to discover itself in the image of God. It is this central revelational principle of creation which, isolated from the Word-Revelation, leads man in the state of apostasy to a disclosure of his pistic function and makes him aware of his elevation above the things of nature. So there is at the same time a positive and a negative aspect in this opening-process of the meaning of πίστις. We should remember this state of affairs when presently we return to the developmental Idea of history.

The transcendental freedom of πίστις, deepened in its apostasy, in devising idols. Cassirer’s critique of mythical consciousness.

The religious law of concentration of human existence retains its universal validity even in its apostate condition. All self-knowledge is dependent on knowledge of God. In the same way the apostate selfhood only arrives at self-knowledge through its idols, in which it absolutizes its temporal normative subject-functions.¹

This state of affairs has also struck Cassirer, who tries to explain it from the immanence-standpoint. In the second Volume of his important work Philosophie der symbolischen Formen he interprets every pistic conception of the human selfhood in its relation to that of Deity as a manifestation of mythical consciousness.

He wants to make a sharp distinction between this ‘mythical mind’ and critical ‘theoretical consciousness’. In a general sense he declares that the concentration of self-consciousness, above the diffuse idea of personality in the primitive belief in nature, is reached within the cadre of mythical consciousness only by projecting new images of the Deity.²

² Op. cit. II, p. 269: ‘Thus it invariably appears that man can only know and conceive his own existence insofar as he can make himself visible in the images of his gods. Just as he only learns to understand the structure of his body and his limbs because he forms tools and creates labour, he derives from his mental formations, his speech, his myth and his art, the objective measure by which he measures himself and through which he understands himself as an independent cosmos with characteristic structural laws.’ ["So bewährt sich immer wieder, das der Mensch sein eigenes Sein nur in soweit erfasst und erkennt, als er es sich im Bilde seiner Götter sichtbar zu machen vermag. Wie er nun dadurch, dass er
This happens when faith frees itself of the primitive deification of the natural forces connected with the biotic conditions of life, and assumes a normative moral content.

The selfhood, too, is identified with a normative function of the personality: in this function faith seeks the deeper unity of the human ego.

In the Egyptian texts of the pyramids we presumably find the oldest historical documents of a gradual rise of mythical self-consciousness to the normative juridical and moral functions of the personality. Here we see the ethical conception of the selfhood accentuating itself more and more strongly in the belief in immortality and the cult of the dead. This depends on the increasing tendency in the pistic conceptions to consider Osiris, the god of the dead, as the judge of good and evil. In earlier texts this god could only be compelled by means of magic formule to accord the soul of the deceased a favourable reception.

The same moral motive is found in the Iranian belief about the dead, and in the Vedic conception of the gods Varouna and Mitra, as the guardians of the rita, the astronomical world-order, which is at the same time the moral and the juridical order.² In comparison with the earlier, magical view of Vedic polytheism, this conception strikes a fundamentally new note.

In the development of the speculation of the Indian Upanishads about the selfhood we even find a more elevated conception of I-ness (atman). This is now conceived of as an absolutely abstract supra-temporal, actual centre of the contemplative intuition of essences. It transcends all that has the shape of a thing or bears a name, and it participates in the Brahman, the spirit of the world. But even this mystical speculative conception of I-ness in the Upanishads remains caught within the boundaries of the ‘mythical-religious consciousness’.

¹ In his concept of the ‘mythical consciousness’ Cassirer merges animistic and pre-animistic pistic ideas into one another.

In Cassirer's opinion it remains separated by an unbridgeable cleft from the theoretical -I- of transcendental apperception, from Kant's transcendental-theoretical cogito. The method by means of which religious mysticism penetrates to its conception of the selfhood, the unity in the personality, is entirely different from that of the critical analysis in the theoretical cognitive attitude of mind.

Mythos and Logos. The criterion for the distinction between mythical and non-mythical thought.

Theoretical self-consciousness, however, is also guided in the transcendental direction of time by πίσως as the terminal function. It finds its super-temporal concentration-point in the religious root of human existence. As soon as this insight is gained, the contrast made by Cassirer becomes very questionable.

From the immanence-standpoint it seems hardly possible to find a tenable criterion for distinguishing mythical and non-mythical consciousness. The current standard of such a distinction depends upon the idea of 'pure experience' and 'pure logos' in a theoretical-scientific sense. But this criterion is ambiguous to a high degree and becomes mythical insofar as it implies an absolutization of theoretical and especially of mathematical and natural-scientific thought. L. Ziegler speaks of the "Mythos atheos" of science.

In the last century it was current opinion that μῦθος is the primitive phantastic and magical-sensible form of a life- and world-view preceding religion. Religion, philosophy and science were supposed to have originated from it in a process of differentiation. But this was nothing but an evolutionistic speculation. We do not know any instance of a real myth which does not give expression to a religious motive. And it is not true that mythical thought is necessarily bound to a magic view of the world. We are only entitled to say that it always implies an interpretation of things from the viewpoint of faith which may be connected with magic representations. But not every view of the world in the mode of faith is to be ascribed to mythical consciousness. The mythical view implies an essential moment of fiction, but not in the same sense as a tale or a legend.

Mythical consciousness is by no means exclusively bound to

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1 L. Ziegler, Gestaltwandel der Götter (3rd ed. 1922).
a primitive stage of thought. It may have developed to a high degree of theoretic abstraction in a philosophic-theological speculation in which the viewpoint of faith is masked.

If the conception of ātman in the Upanishads is to be qualified as mythical, it is certainly not a primitive magical form of mythical thought. And if Cassirer's qualification of this conception is justified, it should also be applied to the idea of the transcendental-logical subject in Kant's epistemology. For our transcendental critique of this Kantian idea has shown that it has by no means resulted from a really critical analysis of the structure of theoretic human knowledge. Rather it appeared to depend on a Humanistic belief in the autonomy of theoretic reason and to interpret the structure of the logical aspect from the viewpoint of this belief.

The mythological character of this concept of the transcendental subject manifests itself in the Kantian circumscription that it is to be conceived as a logical unity without any multiplicity — an evident logical impossibility, but a possibility from the viewpoint of a mythical faith.

But we have observed that not every faith is to be qualified as mythical. The latter appeared to imply an essential moment of fiction. In what sense is this to be understood?

This question is all the more urgent since every real myth has the (not necessarily deliberate) tendency to reveal a religious truth which is essentially related to the modal function of πίσις and founded in a Divine revelation in the order of creation. In this respect it is sharply to be distinguished from a tale and a legend. Its time-aspect is that of faith, not that of aesthetic fantasy or history.

But mythical faith is characterized by its interpreting the natural Divine revelation in accordance with the fictitious conceptions of an 'autonomous' pistical fancy. This is the hybrid character of mythical consciousness by which it is sharply distinguished from the non-mythical. It is related to a truth which is necessarily misunderstood.

The 'mythical' is the pistic interpretation of the experience of the 'deus absconditus' in the apostate root of human existence.

Theoretical self-consciousness can no more avoid this than pre-theoretical self-awareness. Only in the opening of πίσις to the light of God's Word-revelation are the mystifications of mythology penetrated. In this disclosure the boundaries of 'mythical consciousness' are broken through by the transcendent
power of Divine Truth. Without this Divine illumination even theoretical self-consciousness retains the fundamental characteristics of mythology. Plato became aware of the unity of the selfhood. He sought this unity in the absolutized ‘thinking part of the soul’. But this conception of the self was due to his mythical idea of the pure divine Nous which had been conceived by deepened apostate faith. Not before the mythical idea of the ‘intellectus geometricus archetypus’ had been devised in the disclosed apostate ζήσιος, did the supposed root of human personality reveal itself to Descartes and Leibniz. They identified the selfhood with mathematical thought, as the image of the ‘Divine geometer’.

Kant’s philosophic thought assumed its transcendental direction to the super-sensory Idea of the homo noumenon (with which the apostate ego identified itself), only by the ‘faith of practical reason’ in the moralistic Idea of god.

Even the theoretical view of the coherence of temporal reality remains mythological under the guidance of faith in autonomous reason. ‘Mythological’ in this sense are both Hume’s psychologistic and Kant’s transcendental-idealistic conception of temporal reality.

The primitive-magical mythological conception of reality makes a fundamental separation between the sphere of the profane (or familiar), and that of the sacral (or the ‘mana’). The mystical conception of the Upanishads separates the brahman-ātman from maya. They are the counterparts of the dualistic separation in the cosmic meaning-coherence between noumenon and phenomenon in western metaphysical immanence-philosophy. All these dualistic views of reality in the last analysis originate in mythical consciousness.

The Platonic μὴ ὀν and ἀπειρον bear a distinctly mythical stamp, just as Leibniz’s πέγας in the sense of ‘metaphysical evil’. The disclosure of the nature-myth into the cultural myth in popular belief has its parallel in the history of modern immanence philosophy. There we see philosophers attain theoretical self-consciousness by ascending from a mythical belief in the deterministic image of nature devised by the classical science-ideal, to a mythical belief in creative human freedom in culture and morality.

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1 'Culture' taken in the indeterminate Humanistic sense of the complex of the normative aspects of temporal reality.
In naturalistic thought, guided by the faith in the self-sufficiency of natural science, the theoretical self-consciousness is dispersed in its pre-logical 'Gegenstände' (the modal aspects investigated). In transcendental thought the apostate selfhood reflects on its subjective, temporal, theoretical activity, identifying itself with those normative subject-functions of the personality that have been absolutized by the faith in self-sufficient reason. But only in dependence on the Idea of the Origin devised by Πίσια does the Idea of the selfhood reveal itself to philosophical thought.

It should, however, be borne in mind that the faith in reason as such, no matter whether it expands in a naturalistic or in an idealistic sense, is never a πίσια of a restrictive structure, as is the primitive faith in nature.

Rather it is always the manifestation of an extreme stage of the deepening of meaning in the apostasy of Πίσια. At the same time it reveals a refinement in the process of development of ἀπαθία which aggravates guilt.

Mythical consciousness under the guidance of the 'magical' faith in nature and of faith in reason. The problem of magical thought.

Faith in the sovereignty of natural-scientific thought guides both theoretical and pre-theoretical consciousness which is ruled by the Humanistic naturalistic science-ideal.

This faith also frees the mental attitude of naïve experience from its commitment to the magical-mythical ideas of the primitive faith in nature, at least, so long as this faith actually takes the lead in human life, which it never permanently does.

The only result, however, is that the mythical strangle-hold of the faith in the rational origin of the entire cosmic reality is tightened. We must bear in mind that, in contrasting rational faith and 'magical' faith in nature, and the two different ways in which these two control logical thought, magical thought must not be identified with naïve primitive thinking.

An essential feature in the 'mana' faith is the fundamental separation between what is ordinary, profane in reality and what is sacral, mysterious. The familiar can be understood in primitive thought by 'common sense'.

¹ The adjective 'magical' is not taken here in its strict sense but in the sense meant by CASSIERS, viz. 'mystical', opposed to scientific logic.
Only the *mysterious* is conceived by the mythical pistic imagination in a 'magical context of activities'. For this reason it is impossible to accept the well-known theory advanced by LÉVY-BRUHL. He holds that 'primitive thought' does not move in logical categories but in a pre-logical, mystical, collective-psychic sphere, lacking every kind of analytical character. The logical basic principles of identity, contradiction and sufficient ground are supposed to have been completely set aside. In the pre-logical sphere the collective representations are assumed to be ruled by the law of participation, which is indifferent to contradiction

CASSIRER'S view of 'magical thought' has been strongly influenced by LÉVY-BRUHL. Both identify the logical aspect with the theoretical logic of mathematical natural science. I suppose this is the reason why they have lost sight of some primordial states of affairs.

In the first place it is overlooked that primitive thought is not to be identified with the particular 'magical' way of thinking. But, in addition, 'magical' thought cannot function as such outside the primary structure of the logical law-sphere. As far as their logical aspect is concerned, the typically magical ideas are orientated to the primary logical principles

The ideas of a possible splitting up of personality and of the identity of the members of the clan with the totem are not illogical. For logic alone neither yields an idea of personality nor of the difference between man and animal. We are con-

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1 LÉVY-BRUHL: *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures* (Paris, 1922), p. 454: ‘The mentality of the inferior societies is of an essentially pre-logical and mystical character, ...... it is differently orientated from ours, ...... the collective representations are regulated by the law of participation, indifferent therefore to contradiction, and united by bonds and by preliminary connections disconcerting to our logic.” [“La mentalité des sociétés inférieures est de caractère essentiellement prélogique et mystique, ...... elle est orientée autrement que la nôtre, ...... les représentations collectives y sont réglées par la loi de participation, indifférentes, pursuite, à la contradiction, et unies entre elles par des liaisons et par des préliaisons déconcertantes pour notre logique.”]

2 How would the members of the clan otherwise be able to identify themselves with the totem-animal of their clan and distinguish themselves from the members of another clan? And how would they be able to express judgments of faith?
fronted here with typically pistological¹ ideas which consciously rise above the concepts of ordinary primitive life². They are meant to give a pistological interpretation of the divine mystery, which is inexplicable to ordinary primitive thought and manifests itself in the dark forces of nature which also rule primitive society. This interpretation is really of a primitive mythological nature, and falsifies the true state of affairs within the pistical aspect of reality.

But the faith in reason also falsifies reality when deifying subjective reason. This fact renders Cassirer's distinction between critical-theoretical and mythical consciousness extremely misleading³. His criterion appears to be inadequate.

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¹ 'pistological' means: according to a logical retrocipation of faith. In this case logical thought is made to follow the lead of some faith, and distinguishes according to the standards of this faith.


CHAPTER IV


§ 1 - THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE MODAL ASPECTS WITHIN THEIR OWN SPHERES

The sphere-sovereignty of the modal aspects of reality has its counterpart in the universality of each aspect within its own sphere.

The term 'sphere-universality' is intended to signify that the modal meaning-structure in each aspect gives expression to the entire coherence of meaning of all the law-spheres.

This is made possible by the retrocipations and anticipations in each meaning-modus. Immanence philosophy could not help misinterpreting this state of affairs, because of its failure to grasp this universality in relation to the modal sphere-sovereignty.

Why the different attempts at absolutizing seem to be acceptable.

The universality of each modal aspect within its own sphere may also explain the apparent success of the various absolutizations in immanence philosophy.

David Hume, e.g., resolves the whole of given reality in impressions of feeling, or 'perceptions'. He calls out: 'Let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never... can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions... This is the universe of the imagination'¹ (Italics are mine). In this exclamation we distinctly hear his conviction that he has discovered an undeniable state of affairs.

¹ A Treatise of Human Nature I, Part II, Sect. VI.
And indeed, whatever the critical transcendental philosophy might have to say against Hume, the thesis that in 'feeling' the universe expresses itself in the whole of the cosmic meaning-coherence is irrefutable. The analysis of the meaning-structure of the law-sphere of feeling in the retrocipatory and in the anticipatory direction of time confirms the universality of this meaning-modus in every respect.

This structural analysis of the psychical modality does full justice to the kernel of truth in Hume's psychologistic conception. At the same time it lays bare the fundamental error of his psychologistic absolutization, whereas the Kantian epistemological criticism touches the root of this absolutization so little that it becomes itself guilty of absolutizing the transcendental-logical structure of thought.

The universality of the modal meaning of feeling implies that the psychical law-sphere is not self-sufficient. This universality is only possible as a modal universality of the aspect within its own sphere. Its absolutization is equal to its theoretical cancellation.

Therefore, Hume's epistemological psychologism destroys itself if it is consistently thought out. The epistemological thesis that the whole universe is given us only in psychic 'perceptions' cannot be correct. For nothing is given in theoretical abstraction.

The modal meaning of feeling itself cannot be given "an sich" (in itself), i.e. apart from the cosmic meaning-coherence in which it can function only as psychical modus.

Psychologism may try to escape from the force of this argument by answering that here we are exclusively concerned with the problem whether or not we can be aware of anything outside our impressions of feeling. But the opinion that we are at least only conscious of our psychical perceptions, is equal to the denial of any possibility of being conscious of anything. This view results in a radical kind of epistemological nihilism. Being conscious of one's impressions of feeling implies the self-consciousness of the whole of the cosmic meaning-coherence. In this coherence, feeling only exists as a modal meaning-function that lacks self-sufficiency.

The appeal to a supposed absolute subjective pole of thought in the transcendental cogito cannot hit the heart of psychologism. In the Prolegomena we have disclosed the speculative trap in the conception of the self-sufficiency of the transcendental-
logical function of thought. At bottom this self-sufficiency is open to the same criticism as the psychologistic view. A genuinely transcendental epistemological criticism necessarily reveals the self-insufficiency of the transcendental-logical function of thinking, both in theoretical self-reflection and with regard to the temporal intermodal coherence between the experiential aspects. This coherence only makes transcendental logical thought possible.

The really radical criticism of the conception of the "Unbedingtheit" (the being unconditioned) of transcendental logical thought is the analysis of the structure of its universality of meaning within its own sphere. Such an analysis also explains the seeming plausibility of the transcendental-logicistic conception. But more about this later on.

In the same way we can show the fundamental error of historicism, aestheticism, mathematicism, biologism, etc., viz. by a structural analysis of the universality of each of the law-spheres absolutized by them.

The Divine irony in the history of apostate philosophy.

The universality of each of the law-spheres within its own boundaries can only be seen in its true structure from the Christian transcendence-standpoint.

Immanence-philosophy continually goes astray, because in its Archimedean point lurks a primary absolutization of meaning. This absolutization is due to a misinterpretation of the universality of each law-sphere within its own limits. There is a Divine irony in the development of apostate philosophy, since the temporal world-order at first seems to justify every kind of theoretical absolutization in an equal measure. When viewed from the immanence-standpoint, is not historicism as convincing as a logicistic or a psychologistical interpretation of empirical reality? Is not it an indisputable fact that in theoretical thought as well as in the life of human feeling is revealed the prevailing tendency of a special period of history? Is it not true that Hume's psychologism as well as Kant's transcendental philosophy bear the stamp of modern western culture? Hume asserts that the universe is given to us only in psychical impressions. Wherever we direct our gaze we are supposed to find nothing but 'perceptions'. But cannot this music be transposed with equal justice into the key of the historical aspect?

Hume thinks he can start from some permanent uniformity
of human nature. He places his epistemology outside the current of historical development. Is this not a false dogmatism when confronted with the indisputable universality of the course of historical development?

Indeed, historism cannot be dethroned solely with formally-logical arguments, no more than transcendental psychologism will capitulate to a logicistical transcendental philosophy.

Only the insight into the universality of the historical aspect within its own sphere reveals the fundamental error of historism and the grounds for its seeming plausibility.

The cosmic order passes an internal judgment on the theoretical absolutizations of immanence-philosophy, which invariably result in internal antinomies. We cannot interpret the Divine order on the basis of a self-sufficient and autonomous reason. Apart from the Divine Word-revelation, this order maintains the unfathomable silence of the Sphinx.

So long as \( \pi \iota \omicron \nu \zeta \) remains closed to this Word-revelation, theoretical thought remains under the ban of mythology. The Divine world-order begins to appeal to us only when our heart and our function of faith are open to the voice of God's Word. Then we become aware of the religious foundation of that wonderful universality of each of the modal aspects. For only in the disclosed insight into this profound state of affairs does the Christian see the true connection between temporal reality and the Christian religion in the theoretical cognitive attitude.

In the pre-theoretic attitude of thought he ought to experience this relation immediately in faith apart from any theory. Anyone who, as a Christian thinker, has seen through the modal sphere-universality, cannot fall back into the nominalistic dualism between believing and thinking, and between 'nature' and 'grace'. Every dualism of this kind makes the temporal modal functions self-sufficient with regard to their religious root. But there is nothing in time that can be set apart and by itself. The Idea of the universality of each aspect within its own sphere should be related to the process of disclosure in the temporal cosmic meaning-coherence in order to reveal its full import.

The new problem: The intermodal disharmony in the opening-process.

But at this very point Christian philosophy is once again confronted with the problem concerning the influence of sin on this process. If it were permissible for a Christian to choose a
purely eschatological standpoint with regard to our sinful cosmos, the Idea of universal meaning-disclosure would no longer hide any internal tensions and antitheses.

The Idea of the fulfilment of meaning in Christ undoubtedly implies that in the specific universality of each law-sphere the opening-process gives temporal expression to the full religious abundance of God's creation both on its law- and its subject-side. In this world, however, this sphere-universality cannot unfold itself perfectly in accordance with the guidance of the religious fulness of meaning. The development is affected by sin, otherwise the refraction of the fulness of meaning in time would nowhere be experienced as disharmony. If there were no sin, the harmony among the law-spheres would be fully realized, just as in a perfect work of art. In such a work the 'natural' sides of the material are subjected to the guidance of the aesthetic structural function to such a degree that they no longer obtrude themselves as a disconcerting resistance. In their individual deepening of meaning and 'spiritualization', they are a pure expression of the artist's conception. Reality is, alas, different. The deification of the temporal meaning-aspects of the cosmos in apostate faith, expanded to free striving leadership, causes a fundamental disharmony in the opening-process.

In the previous chapter this disharmony was only considered in its modal historical sense. But we have now to examine it in the intermodal coherence of the different aspects of the process of meaning-disclosure.

If apostate faith gains the functional guidance in the opening-process, the subjection of the latter to the Divine world-order is not thereby cancelled. The Creator of Heaven and Earth maintains the functional-structural law-conformity in the disclosure of the temporal modal aspects against any human arbitrariness. If the Divine order in the temporal cosmos were not kept intact and elevated above any kind of human ἀποκατάστασις, the manifestation of sin in time would not even be possible. For the whole of temporal reality would then burst like a soap-bubble. Does this mean that the effect of sin leaves the law-side of the creation entirely unaffected, and can only manifest itself on the side of the subject?

But such a view would be at variance with the structure of the cosmic order analysed in an earlier part of this work. For in all the normative law-spheres the νόμος has been laid down only in the form of a principle. These Divine 'principia'
have been left to human formation and positivizing in accordance with the modal structure of the law-spheres.

In the opening-process of the normative anticipatory spheres even the laws of the pre-logical aspects require this human intervention for their deepening of meaning. From the point of view of the structure of the temporal cosmos we can state that the disharmony in consequence of sin must necessarily also manifest itself on the law-side in the work of human formation and positivizing.

In this human interference the Divine structural principles are doubtless maintained and saved from human arbitrariness. Even the most impious law-maker or former of history can only form law or culture by the formation and positivizing of super-arbitrary principles founded in the order of creation. The formal abolishing of paternal authority by the first wave of the French Revolution was one of the many 'paper decrees' which, as an expression of human arbitrariness, were swept away by what is very inadequately termed the logic of the facts. By setting aside the normative principles of law, morality or culture human arbitrariness can create a social chaos; it cannot create juridical, moral or historical norms in this way.

The human work of formation remains unshakably bound to the Divine structural principles of the normative law-spheres. But in this very work of formation and positivization the process of opening of the temporal meaning on the law-side cannot be carried out harmoniously, when in apostasy it has lost its direction to the religious fulness of meaning. Disharmony on the law-side is then inevitable, because the opening-process invariably moves in the direction of the absolutizing of certain meaning-moments.

It would be an illusion to think that this disharmony would not appear if the work of formation and positivization were only in the hands of Christians. For on the one hand, a Christian remains a thoroughly sinful creature, no better in himself than others. And on the other hand, the Christian former is bound to the history of mankind as a whole. In keeping with the entire structure of the Divine world-order, he cannot escape his historical position in a society in which the power of the civitas terræna is clearly revealed.

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1 These principles are to be sharply distinguished from the subjective principles of political parties.
Within the opening-process of temporal meaning the position of genuine Christianity is one of restless struggle. In its temporary defeats and victories Christianity bears witness to the sinful broken state of its existence and that of the entire earthly creation; its position is only justified through faith in Christ. In Him the struggle for historical power in the opening-process may become a temporal blessing for a corrupted and broken world. The Christian Idea of the opening-process, guided by the faith in Christ as the Redeemer, cannot detach itself from sinful reality in an idealistic optimism. This Idea would then become false and worthless to temporal life. It must rather remain broken in character, in spite of its direction to the Root of reborn humanity, to Christ Jesus and to the Sovereign Creator, Who is willing to be our Father in Him. Only in its eschatological expectation of the ultimate full revelation of the Kingdom of God can Christian belief rise above this broken state without losing its relation to the sinful cosmos. For the same reason the Idea of the universality of each of the aspects within its own sphere cannot be conceived in a purely eschatological sense; it should also be related to our sinful cosmos.

This Idea retains its normative transcendental direction to the consummation of meaning in Christ. But at the same time it should give us an insight into the disharmony that the process of disclosure shows in apostasy. Only in this way can we arrive at a satisfying conception of the Christian Idea of cultural development.

Attention should first be directed to the disharmony in the opening of meaning on the law-side of the normative aspects due to apostate faith. This theme can only be treated in an exemplifying way. Our examination will restrict itself to an analysis of the influence of faith in the mathematical Humanistic science-ideal upon the opening-process in the different spheres. It stands to reason that this influence could not fail primarily to reveal itself in the domain of science.

§ 2 - The Guidance of the Faith in the Humanistic Science-Ideal in Its Mathematical Conception as an Impediment to the Full Disclosure of the Idea of Sphere-Universality

The Idea of 'mathesis universalis', propagandized since Descartes, has had an enormous historical influence. In its conception of the universal significance of mathematics Humanistic thought was led by faith in the mathematical science-ideal.
This Idea led Leibniz to the discovery of the differential and integral calculus, without which the enormous development of physics in the period immediately following would have been inconceivable. In its philosophical sense the Idea took a false direction, and because of the deification and logicizing of mathematical thought it showed a tendency to obliterate the modal boundaries between the law-spheres. But it is undeniable that, notwithstanding all this, it has considerably deepened the meaning of mathematical thought. The reason is that this Idea, though turned in a false direction by the subjective \textit{πίστεις}, was not a merely arbitrary creation of thought. It was \textit{determined} on the law-side by the Divine world-order, in which the modal universality within their own spheres of the mathematical aspects and that of logical analysis is founded. But for this point of contact in the modal sphere-universality the logicistic Idea of 'mathesis universalis' would have never arisen, or it would have remained a phantasm, without any perspective of fruitful theoretical application.

The Idea of the mathesis universalis could only be fruitful insofar as the thinkers, guided by it, followed the anticipatory spheres of the modal aspects of number, space and movement. In the differential and integral calculus this was really the case. Disclosed mathematical thought directed itself to the internal anticipatory coherence that was to be revealed in the modal aspects mentioned under the guidance of deepened theoretical analysis.

The internal rigidity in the Idea of the mathesis universalis due to the misinterpretation of the universality of the aspects in their own spheres.

But at the same time there arose an internal rigidity in the disclosure of mathematical thought. This increasing rigidity was caused by the apostate direction of the Idea of the mathesis universalis. The rationalistic science-ideal was from the outset orientated to mathematical physics. In the logicizing of the modal aspects of number, space and movement, mathematics orientated to physics was in reality taken as the basis. This was also done in the attempt to approximate justice, morality and beauty by mathematical methods.

Leibniz, as has appeared in Part II of the first Volume, sought to construe even the world-order as a metaphysical-mathematical \textit{lex continui}. This construction was oriented to the model of the
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infinitesimal calculus that was essentially bound to the analysis of a spatial or moving continuum. As a consequence, the unfolding of the insight into the true universality of the meaning of number, space, and movement within their own spheres was doomed to remain checked in the Humanist Idea of the mathesis universalis. Scientific thought, insofar as it followed the mathematical science-ideal, was not really free to conceive the transcendental Idea of the mathesis universalis in the sense of modal sphere-universality. The dogmatic faith in the sovereignty of mechanistically directed mathematical thought was bound to put arbitrary limits to the latter. It gave rise to the opinion that at this stage mathematics had reached its nec plus ultra.

This internal rigidity in the mathematical Idea is openly expressed in the period of the Enlightenment.

Diderot, for example, in his book De l'interprétation de la Nature (1759) makes the following statement: 'I venture the thesis that, before a hundred years have elapsed, there will not be three great mathematicians left in Europe. This science has reached its acme, and it will remain essentially at the level to which Euler and Bernouilli, d'Alembert and Lagrange have raised it. They have established the pillars of Hercules above which nobody will rise.'

It is true that the development of mathematics in a comparatively short time exceeded the limits put to it by Diderot. But its prevailing typically logicistical direction does not offer any perspective for a genuine theoretical disclosure of the universality of the mathematical meaning-modi within their own sphere.

Mathematical thought is isolating itself to an increasing degree within the boundaries of relational logic. As 'pure mathematics' it seemingly scorns any orientation to the inter-modal meaning-coherence between the mathematical and the non-mathematical aspects. And it cannot be denied that logicism has achieved, and is still achieving, very great things. There is a further systematical-logical and symbolical disclosure of the mathematical spheres of meaning, and a considerable expansion of the principle of the economy of thought in mathematics.

On the other hand the logicizing of mathematics has also led to the modern crisis in the foundations of mathematics. In addition, nothing has been done for a theoretical disclosure of the biotic and various later anticipatory spheres in the modal meaning of number, space, and movement. The logicistical interpretations falsify the meaning of the theoretical fields of inquiry.
The set-theory for instance which, in the hands of H. Weyl, has developed the pseudo-concept of the \textit{transfinite numbers} in the theory of ALEFS, has built the latter on a speculative-constructive basis. It has evoked the sharp protest of various prominent mathematicians\(^1\). And this protest was not unjustified.

The Humanistic Idea of the mathesis universalis and biology.

Is it too great a risk to say that in the modal meaning of number and in that of space there must exist a biotic anticipatory sphere, which has remained hidden from the classical Humanist Idea of mathesis universalis?

Permit me then to quote a pronouncement made by a prominent biologist, who has broken with the mechanistic conception of the modal field of his inquiry. In his oration: \textit{Die organische Wirklichkeit und ihre Ideologien}, delivered on the 3rd of February 1933, the Hamburg Professor Dr Meyer made the following remarks about the relation between biology and mathematics: ‘On the basis of mechanics it is quite impossible to gain a satisfactory theory of what is organic. The latter always presupposes a mathematical control of biological phenomena on the foundation of its own specific laws. This work cannot be accomplished by biologists only. The mathematicians must render them assistance, since the specific mathematics required for mathematicizing biological laws does not yet exist at present. It will be procured in the progress of our work, just as modern physics has had to create the new mathematics it required, entirely on its own account’\(^2\).

\(^1\) Cf. the judgment of the famous intuitionistic mathematician H. Weyl in his oration \textit{Die Stufen des Unendlichen} (1931), p. 14: ‘But we can now hardly believe that behind \textit{Cantor’s} theories there is anything tangible……. The criticism by H. \textit{Poincaré}, B. \textit{Russell}, \textit{Brouwer}, \textit{Skolem}, and others, have everywhere made scientists aware of the untenable logical positions from which the set-theory has started.’ [‘Aber wir können heute kaum noch glauben, dass hinter diesen Cantorschen Theorien etwas Fassbares steckt……. Durch die Kritik von H. \textit{Poincaré}, B. \textit{Russell}, \textit{Brouwer}, \textit{Skolem}, u.a. sind allmählich die Augen darüber aufgegangen, von welchen unhaltbaren logischen Positionen die mengentheoretische Methode ausgegangen ist.’]

\(^2\) “Auf mechanischem Boden kann somit niemals eine befriedigende
Meyer and Haldane, both representatives of the so-called holistic trend in biology, have tried to project such a biological mathesis. I am not competent to judge these projects critically. It seems that on the part of mathematicians they have met with little interest. But the attempt in itself is doubtless interesting from the viewpoint of the biotical anticipations in the mathematical aspects.

Biology should realize that physical methods of inquiry can only be sufficient for the investigation of the physical substratum of the organic-biotic aspect of reality. It will then with increasing emphasis insist on the desirability of a mathematics of specifically biological orientation.

The influence of the old mathematical-mechanistic science-ideal still prevents this insight from meeting with general recognition. From the standpoint of the so-called ‘pure mathematics’ it will be objected that the latter in any case can have nothing to do with such an as yet problematic kind of mathesis. Its task does not lie in the field of so-called ‘applied’ mathematics. But in this objection a fundamental misconception is expressed. It may be asked, how it was possible for the differential and the integral calculus, for the non-Euclidean geometries, the modern systematic set-theory etc., to be applied fruitfully in macro-physics, although they originated in the so-called pure mathematics. And why do they not offer any possibilities for a successful application in the specific domain of biology? The answer has to be: because the so-called ‘pure mathematics’ has been walled in under the guidance of the rationalistic-natural-scientific Idea of the mathesis universalis. It has been imprisoned in an absolutization and logicistic reduction of the mechanical, logical and symbolical anticipatory spheres in the modal meaning of number, space, and movement. It was even
The Humanistic Idea of mathesis universalis and the social and juridical anticipatory spheres of the mathematical aspects.

There can also be no question of any real disclosure of the social and juridical anticipatory spheres in the modal mathematical aspects, so long as scientific thought remains under the guidance of the rationalistic-Humanistic Idea of the mathesis universalis. The Humanistic doctrine of natural law started with the postulate of dealing with the jural sphere 'more geometrico'. It was tied down to an atomistic-mechanistic way of thought. As a result it could only construct the state and the other communities of human society according to a mechanistic mathematical schematism. The method started from a multiplicity of unconnected, atomistically constructed individuals in a hypothetical state of nature. Then came the mechanistic-mathematical construction of the civil state, as the totality of these individuals, instituted by means of contracts. This entire system of thought remains a document of the internal rigidity of the Idea of the mathesis universalis as it developed under the guidance of the naturalistic Humanistic science-ideal.

In recent times there have not yet been any symptoms of the mathesis universalis developing in a direction that would really be fruitful for juridical thought.

What HUSSERL's "reine Mannigfaltigkeitslehre" has yielded for juridical theory, e.g. in the phenomenological 'pure theory of law' advanced by FRITZ SCHREIER, does not exceed a barren kind of eidetic juridical logic. The latter is supposed to deter-
mine the extent of formal possibilities lying at the foundation of any legislation. This is done by explaining the formal structure of every positive legal norm whose fundamental conceptual elements are designed by letter-symbols. In this way four fundamental legal concepts are detected which are nothing but an arbitrary complex of analogical notions lacking any modal juridical determination. For the modal meaning-structure of the juridical aspect as such has been eliminated for the sake of turning pure legal theory into a branch of mathesis universalis. In accordance with Kelsen the positive legal norm is conceived as a logical proposition!

This entire trend of thought has taken over as a "Leitmotiv" (leading motive) the pronouncement made by Hermann Cohen, the founder of the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism: legal theory is the mathematics of the social-cultural sciences (Matematik der Geisteswissenschaften).

This sufficiently shows how little they have penetrated to the complicated problem regarding the inter-modal meaning-coherence between the mathematical and the juridical law-spheres. The reason why this is fatal to juridical thought is that legal theory can in no way do without the use of mathematical analogies. The lack of insight into the meaning-coherence between these analogies and the social and juridical anticipatory spheres of the mathematical aspects has led to fundamental errors in the juridical conception of social relations, in that of the legal person, the juridical object, subjective right etc.

The individualistic juridical theory that has asserted itself in

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1 Fritz Schreier, Grundbegriffe und Grundformen des Rechts (Wiener staatswissensch. Studien Neue Folge, Bnd. IV, 1924. Cf. his statement, p. 33: 'The juridical norm is an exact law, it is not on a level with the laws of physics but with those of mathematics.' ["Die Rechtsnorm ist ein exaktes Gesetz, sie steht nicht auf einer Stufe mit den Gesetzen der Naturwissenschaft, sondern mit den Gesetzen der Mathematik."]

2 This formal structure is circumscribed as follows: "Wenn der Tatbestand vorliegt, soll die Person bei Sanktion die Leistung erbringen" (op. cit., p. 70). [The facts of the case being present, the person concerned ought to pay his debt under guarantee of a sanction.]


3 In the same way the individualistic view of the ré's already led the
The Humanistic Idea of mathesis universalis in pure economics.

Doubtless, the mathematical science-ideal in its mechanistic orientation has had a seemingly convincing success in pure economics, especially in the theory of prices.

Economical theory owes it the first methodical reflection on the functional coherence of economic phenomena, and under its influence this theory has reached a high degree of systematical development. In monetary price, as an objective value-denominator, the numerical analogies of economic valuation and the economic anticipations of number present themselves in a pregnant way. And the mechanical analogies of price-movement and market equilibrium could not fail to give the mechanistic conceptions of pure economics a firm basis in the opinion of economists influenced by the classical Idea of mathesis universalis.

But on the other hand the one-sided mechanistic and logical orientation of this Idea has prevented pure economics from analyzing the very complicated structure of the mathematical and mechanical analogies in the economic aspect.

The modal boundaries between the relatively simple mechanical anticipations in the numerical, spatial, and kinematic aspects, on the one hand, and the extremely complicated kinematic and quantitative retrocipations in the economic law-sphere, on

Roman jurists into an impasse in cases where the multiplicity in the juridical subject-object-relations in which the same bodily res functions, had to be conceived. They started from the view that the res was entirely permeated by the subjective will of the subject which had full rights of property. Consequently, the jura in re aliena could not but cause insurmountable difficulties to this individualistic conception of the juridical subject and the juridical object. The individualistic theory got into difficulties especially when the object of a jus in re aliena is itself the object of another jus in re. But of this in a later chapter.
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the other, were lost sight of. This resulted in a pseudo-natural scientific conception of theoretical economics which has caused fundamental antinomies in economic thought and a continuous tension between the 'laws' of pure theory and the factual side of the economic aspect. Though in our days these antinomies and tensions are clearly seen, especially since Eucken's famous analysis, mathematical theory proves to be able to express only a mechanistic view of the economic aspect, and no other.

This unsatisfactory state of affairs is only accentuated by qualifying pure theory as a logic of economic choosing. Here, too, the Humanistic Idea of mathesis universalis proves its rigidity, caused by its exclusive orientation to the classical mechanical mode of thought.

The rigidity in the aesthetic Idea under the guidance of the faith in the science-ideal. French classicism.

The Humanistic Idea of mathesis universalis, guided by the faith in the mathematical science-ideal, also imparted an internal rigidity to the aesthetic Idea of Humanism in the time of French classicism. We have never denied that the Idea of the mathesis universalis has caused Humanistic mathematical thought to develop enormously. Neither have we felt inclined to detract from Leibniz's genius as the discoverer of the differential and integral calculus. And there is not any need for us to agree with the opinion pronounced by Taine, who cannot see anything but impoverishment in the spirit of classicism. From the point of view of a critical conception of the history of the fine arts, this view is superficial to a high degree.

Even though it is necessary to gain an insight into the internal restraints put on the development of the aesthetic Idea under the guidance of the Humanistic science-ideal, one should beware of passing such an unhistorical judgment. The insight into the cosmic meaning-coherence between the aesthetic and the historical law-spheres should prevent us from doing so. The aesthetic aspect of a work of art has its historical analogy in the moment of its style. The great artists are shapers of style. And classicism is nothing but a typical style giving aesthetical expression to the prevailing spirit of a particular period of western culture. A style as such is not decisive with respect to the aesthetic value of an artistic creation. In every style works of genius may be produced and the period in which classicism developed historical power can also show them.
internal rigidity we intend to demonstrate.

Descartes in his *Regulae ad directionem ingenii* had already extended the Idea of the mathesis universalis to music. The age-old conception of art as the imitation of nature, seemed to bridge the gulf between aesthetics and mathematical natural science. The basis of both nature and fine arts was sought in sovereign mathematical thought.

“Les arts ont cela de commun avec les sciences,” so Le Bossu in his *Traité du poème épique* (1675), “qu’ils sont comme eux fondés sur la raison, et que l’on doit s’y laisser conduire par les lumières que la nature nous a données”¹.

In Boileau's *Art Poétique*, published in 1774, the Idea of rationalistic classicism found its most representative expression, and the author was honoured as the 'law-giver of Parnassus'.

I will follow Cassirer's² plan to show this aesthetic Idea from its strongest side, though indeed I see this strong side in a different light. In his *Art Poétique* Boileau wants to give a general theory of the various forms of poetry, just as the mathematician aims at a general theory of curves. In the differential quotient, the differential and integral calculus shows us with respect to a definite function the whole of the law of the possible variations in the curve belonging to it. This method requires the ποδες of the modal aspect of movement in the transcendental direction of time.

In the same way Boileau wanted to discover the aesthetic basic law which lies at the foundation of all special forms of poetry. This law was supposed to condition tragedy and comedy, elegy and epic, satire and epigramme, with their special laws of form.

Guided by the science-ideal, classicist aesthetics succeeded by analysis in penetrating to the functional character of aesthetic meaning.

¹ Cf. Heinrich von Stein: *Die Entstehung der neueren Ästhetik* (Stuttgart, 1886), pp. 25 ff. and 64 ff: [The fine arts have this in common with the sciences that they, just like the latter, are founded on reason, and that it is not allowed to let oneself be guided by anything else but by the lights that nature has given us.].

It discovered the mathematical, logical and economical analogies in the modal aesthetic meaning-structure. It disclosed the aesthetic unity in multiplicity\(^1\), and aesthetic economy. The latter requires the artist to abstain from ostentation, burlesque, and precocity in the style; it demands clear simplicity in the aesthetic content, frugality, manifesting itself in a careful selection of the means of expression.

Moreover, classicism discovered that the aesthetic meaning cannot be lodged in the psychical-emotional aspect of feeling. But it by no means denied that a work of art should also appeal to the imagination and to feeling. It did not conceive of the aesthetic aspect in the rigid primitive commitment to its substrata in nature, but in the transcendental direction of time, i.e. in a relative deepening of meaning. But, in spite of this relative deepening of aesthetic thought, the aesthetic Idea of classicism became rigid, guided as it was by the faith in the Humanistic science-ideal. As a result the modal aesthetic aspect was not conceived in its universality and specific sovereignty within its own sphere. It was seen as a specific expression of the logical-mathematical ‘ground of being’, supposedly differentiated in various ways in the psycho-physical aspects of nature and in the aesthetic modality.

In this sense the beauty of a poetic expression coalesces with its truth.

“Rien n’est beau que le vrai, le vrai seul est aimable.
Il doit régner partout et même dans la fable:
De toute fiction l’adroite fausseté
Ne tend qu’à faire aux yeux briller la vérité” \(^2\).

In the rationalistic-mathematical line of thought the individuality of a work of art changes into a subordinate function of aesthetic law-conformity. The individual internal structure of an artistic product is levelled out in a one-sided functionalistic-

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\(^1\) Cassirer rightly points out (op. cit., 162 ff and 387) that the discovery of this mathematical analogy goes back on Leibniz who expounded it in great detail in his treatise *Von der Weisheit*.

\(^2\) [Nothing is beautiful but what is true; truth only is worth loving. It must reign everywhere, even in a fable. Of every fiction the dexterous untruth only tends to make verity shine forth.] Quoted by Cassirer, op. cit., p. 383.
and Stress' and to Romanticism. And above all, the increasing rigidity in the aesthetic Idea of classicism appears when it tries to define the limits of art. These limits are not sought in the internal meaning of what is aesthetic, but in the adequacy of the linguistic expression of the aesthetic conception. If once a certain artistic form has achieved its individual expression in such a way that in it all other possible forms of expression as to truth, clarity, sobriety and pregnancy have been surpassed, then this artistic form has attained to a 'non plus ultra', to its absolute limit of perfection. Aesthetic economy is almost identified with linguistic and logical economy, and the aesthetic Idea is deprived of its modal sphere-universality.

This is brought out most clearly in the nominalistic conception of Condillac, who seeks the connection between artistic expression and science in their common relation to language.

Belles-lettres and science substitute signs for things, and they are only distinguished by the use they make of these signs. Scientific theory can signify one and the same object with the aid of different symbols. But one of these modes of expression will after all reach comparative perfection, because the state of things concerned will have been represented by it in the simplest formula.

'The same 'simplicity' is elevated to an ideal in classicist aesthetics: simplicity is held to be the corollary to genuine beauty, just as it is the corollary and the criterion of truth,' Cassirer observes.

1 Cf. Gustave Lanson, Boileau (1892), pp. 131 ff. Cassirer tries to defend Boileau against the charge of having levelled the aesthetic individuality in favour of an abstract law-conformity. He apparently does not take offence at this restriction of the artist's originality to the form of expression only.

2 Op. cit., p. 390. We need not be surprised that Cassirer does not see the weakness of this theory in its principles but only in its elaboration. He has started from the mathematical science-ideal himself in his philosophical thought. "So paradox diese Behauptung auch erscheinen mag," he writes in this passage, "so lässt sich sagen, dass in dieser Hinsicht eine der wesentlichen Schwächen der klassizistischen Lehre nicht darin bestand, dass sie die Abstraktion zu weit getrieben, sondern viel mehr dar-
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The rigidity in the Idea of development in the philosophy of history of the 'Enlightenment'.

The Humanistic science-ideal, in the popular philosophy of the 'Enlightenment', underwent a shifting of accent during the eighteenth century. This made it possible for methodical theoretical investigation to turn to history too. It did so under the guidance of the faith in reason, which had shifted its point of gravitation in this sense. For the first time the philosophy of the Enlightenment formulated its philosophical Idea of historical development, which bore a perfectly secular stamp. It opposed this secular Idea of history to the Christian-Augustinian Idea of historical development that had prevailed up till that time. This secularized developmental Idea, mentioned already at an earlier stage of our investigation, will now be examined more closely in the light of the universality of the modal aspects, each in its own sphere. We shall point out the internal rigidity, bound to arise in the historical thought of the 'Enlightenment', because it was guided by the faith in the Humanistic science-ideal.

To recent investigations we owe wider and historically better-founded knowledge of the Enlightenment, supported by the documents, than was formerly possible under the influence of the haughty judgment passed on it by Romanticism.

While according full recognition to historical continuity, we have learned to pay attention to the difference between the 17th and the 18th centuries. In both the Humanistic science-ideal elevates 'reason' to the throne, but not in the same sense. We know now that the 'Enlightenment' of the 18th century cannot be accused of a lack of interest in history. In fact it broke new ground¹ for scientific historical research, on account of its

in, dass sie sie nicht konsequent genug festgehalten hat.” [Paradoxical as this view may seem, it may be said that the essential weakness of the classicist doctrine is not that it went too far in its abstractions, but rather that it did not stick to them consistently enough.]

In what does this lack of consistency consist? In this, that classicist aesthetics clearly 'slipped off from its scientific concept of the universal reason into the paths of a philosophy of 'common sense' which again and again based the ideal of reason on a 'purely empirical criterion'.

¹ Dilthey’s treatise: Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert und die geschichtliche Welt, first published in the Deutsche Rundschau of Aug. and Sept. 1901, now included in the Gesammelte Schriften, Bnd III (1927, pp. 209 ff,
faith in the sovereignty of natural scientific thought continued
to prevail. The ‘Enlightenment’ saw this science-ideal embodied
in NEWTON’S *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica*¹.
In consonance with this conception the philosophical Idea of
historical development of the Enlightenment found its classical
expression in VOLTAIRE’S *Essai sur les moeurs et sur l’esprit des
nations*². It was the Idea of the steady progress of mankind
through the evolution of scientific thought.
Reason is essentially uniform, super-temporal, and unchange-
able. But in its ‘psychical’ shape, in its manifestation in human
customs, morals and manners it passes through a *historical
process*. In this it can only gradually shake off the burden of
prejudices in tradition and ‘morality’. That’s why history cannot
be identified with the history of the states, a view still
held by DE MONTESQUIEU. It should be conceived of as the history
of ‘culture’ in the widest sense of the word. The meaning of
history is the attaining to self-consciousness of ‘reason’ in over-
coming all kinds of restraints caused by the prejudices of
tradition³.
This eternal unchangeable human reason is the science-
ideal, which, also in historiography, has to replace the theo-
logical-metaphysical search for final causes. Science has to ex-
plain historical phenomena from unalterable ‘empirical’ causes,
which can be traced by means of psychological analysis.
The developmental Idea of the philosophy of history is thus
shut off from the transcendental direction of time by the faith

has paved the way for a better insight into the importance of the ‘En-
lightenment’ for historical science. At present CASSIRER may be men-
tioned with due respect.
¹ Cf. POPE’s lines:
“Nature and Nature’s laws lay hid in night
    God said: ‘Let Newton be’ and all was light.”
² The entire historical science of the Enlightenment followed in the
path of VOLTAIRE. In France, e.g., TURGOT, CONDORCET, DUPUIS; in England,
ROBERTSON, GIBBON and HUME, while BOLINGBROKE’S *Letters on the Study
and Use of History* (1738) had been conceived in the same strain some
time before them.
³ Cf. CASSIRER’S: *Die Philosophie der Aufklärung*, pp. 293 ff.

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method. For NEWTON had replaced the one-sided constructive
method of mathematical thought in physics by a mathematical
analysis of the physical functions of empirical reality. Instead
of imposing arbitrary hypotheses on empirical reality, he had
proved the laws to be derived inductively from the physical
in the self-sufficiency of natural scientific causal thought. The victory of the faith in reason of the Enlightenment is elevated to the ultimate phase of historical development.

The typical culture of the Enlightenment is the 'non plus ultra', above which history can never rise. This is the deeper ground of the fierce struggle that the 'Aufklärung' waged against the Christian interpretation of the meaning of history, which related the Idea of development to the kingdom of Christ in the consummation of times. It may be agreed that in this struggle the Enlightenment was partially in the right, when contrasted with a constructive theological view of history, such as that of Bossuet. In the conception of the latter the modal boundaries between theology and historical science were really not observed. The truth was ignored that the knowledge of faith can never function as a stop-gap, but only as a guide to scientific historical research. On the other hand, the view of history held by the Enlightenment had been infected by the naturalistic-rationalistic mentality. That's why, in spite of its admirable attempt at a genuine analysis of historical facts, it could not grasp the meaning of history in the temporal meaning-coherence.

A naturalistic concept of causality, used as a means to explain historical events from psychological causes, and misinterpreted in a rationalistic way, is useless in historical science.

It does not grasp the historical facts in their internal meaning; it is in conflict with the normative Idea of development applied in the historical thought of the Enlightenment itself. The basic antinomy between the ideal of science and that of personality was gnawing at the root of this view of history.

Cartesianism, with its a priori mathematical way of thought according to which true science can only consist in the tracing of eternal truths, was not at all able to form an Idea of historical development. In it historical development had to be considered as an accident, as a 'phenomenon' lacking rational sense. The Idea of the matheesis universalis in the absolutism of Descartes' mathematical science-ideal left room exclusively for exact mathematical thought. The Enlightenment could only rise above Descartes because its science-ideal was no longer oriented to deductive analytical geometry but to Newton's new physical

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¹ Ephesians 1, 10.
² Cf. what Cassirer [op. cit., p. 335] says about the attempt undertaken by Voltaire in his Traité de Métaphysique (1734) to reconcile man's sense of liberty with the deterministic consequences of the science-ideal.
phenomena themselves. Historical research should be subjected to the same rules of scientific exactness.

Psychological analysis, carried out according to the methods employed in natural science, was to be the organon of the science of history. This science was to be freed of any kind of theological and metaphysical speculation. And psychological analysis was introduced as a 'pragmatic method', representing the equivalent of the analytical mechanical method of physics.

Individuals became the elements of history. Social groups were supposed to be constituted by their conscious, systematic, calculating psychical interaction. This causal explanation, doing away with miracles as well as with Divine Providence, was confronted with an infinitely complicated network of human motives and forces. The need was felt to relate these complicated causal processes to a small number of invariable basic principles, found in the ideas of modern Humanistic natural law, 'natural morality', and 'the natural faith of reason', as a precipitation of the uniform rational human nature¹.

Any deviations from these invariable principles in history were explained as due to craftiness, tyranny, and cheating on the part of priests, or to stupidity and ignorance². And all progress in the development of civilization was ascribed to the gradual victory of the critical understanding over affects and prejudices.

¹ Cf. VOLTAIRE’s statement in his Essai sur les moeurs, Chap. CXC VII, Oeuvres, XVIII, 425: “L’empire de la coutume est bien plus vaste que celui de la nature, il s’étend sur les moeurs, sur tous les usages, il répand la variété de la scène de l’univers; la nature y répand l’unité; elle établit partout un petit nombre de principes invariables; ainsi le fonds est partout le même, et la culture produit des fruits divers.” [The realm of custom is very much vaster than that of nature; it extends over morals, over all usages; it creates variety in the scene of the universe. Nature creates unity there; everywhere it establishes a small number of invariable principles. In this way the foundation is the same everywhere, and culture produces a diversity of fruits.]

² Cf. TROELTSCH: Die Aufklärung (included in his Ges. Schriften, Bnd IV) p. 353.

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Sophical Idea of historical development of the Enlightenment shows an internal rigidity that appeared to be disastrous to a real insight into historical connections. The Enlightenment was blind to the internal universality of the historical aspect within its own sphere, since it shut off its developmental
Bayle's method of critical analysis of the facts in historical research.

This idea of development, oriented to psychological analysis, was connected with Bayle's extremely shrewd critical method of establishing the facts. In his *Dictionnaire historique et critique* \(^1\) he had applied the Cartesian methodical doubt of every opinion to historical tradition. He had gained the insight that historical facts have not been *given* to scientific inquiry, but that science has been *set the task* to analyse them. In a truly exemplary way scientific accuracy in establishing these facts was elevated by him to the methodical postulate of all real historical inquiry. He was guided in this by the sincere conviction that the historian can serve truth only by detaching himself from any bias of faith, education, and nationality.

There was, however, one thing he forgot: it was precisely that which is essential to a truly historical method of thought, viz. that the historian, as such, is not concerned with the 'facts' in an unqualified sense. History is concerned with the essentially *historical aspect* of the facts. Because of his scepticism Bayle himself had no room for an idea of development in the proper sense of the word. But for this very reason he lacks any methodical standard to recognize the *historical meaning* of the facts established by his analysis. The result was that the scrupulous accuracy of his investigation really missed its aim and degenerated into an uncritical accumulation of antiquarian facts without any truly historical connection. That is why Cassirer's praise of Bayle as the 'the logician of modern historical science' \(^2\), cannot be accepted without considerable qualifications. It was only by a connection of Bayle's critical-positivistic method of establishing the facts with the rationalistic idea of progress that the historical thought of the Enlightenment could acquire its characteristic stamp. This connection was quite natural since the two factors mentioned were indeed internally related in the typical spirit of the 'Aufklärung'. And it cannot be denied that, guided by the science-ideal of the Enlightenment, historical thought developed in a critical direction as to the verification of facts. In a technical scientific respect it was superior to both the constructive-theological conception of historiography and to the diplomatic view. But, on the other hand, the philo-

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\(^1\) Published for the first time at Rotterdam in 1695 and 1697 in two volumes.
Idea in its faith in the supreme power of natural scientific thought. The universality of history here becomes a merely extensive, geographical matter. Voltaire strove after accuracy in the description of details in the forms of the family-life, handicraft, and art of the nations. He based his work on extensive preliminary studies. But he nowhere approximates the inner historical spirit of the periods to which the Humanistic science-ideal was a stranger.

In consequence the description of the conditions in such periods shows merely an external exemplary character. Contrary to Cassirer's opinion, this result was not caused by a defect in the execution of the theoretical programme of Voltaire's historiography. It was the fundamental defect in the programme itself; it was a vitium originis of the entire developmental Idea in the historical view of the Enlightenment.

The method of a critical examination of the facts, and the Idea of historical development, are indeed indissolubly connected in the conception of the Enlightenment. Historical facts cannot be analysed according to a natural-scientific method, apart from every Idea of historical evolution. For they function, as such, within historical coherences of meaning which disclose themselves only if the historian has a theoretic insight into historical development. This insight is always guided by an Idea, which, after all, also influences the theoretical analysis of the facts.

§ 3 - CONTINUED: THE DISHARMONY IN THE OPENING-PROCESS ON THE LAW-SIDE, GUIDED BY THE FAITH OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT.

The historical 'explanation' of the ideals of the Enlightenment, and the vicious circle in this attempt at explanation.

Under the influence of Historism it has become a habit in historical thought to 'explain everything historically'. Philosophical systems, theoretical ideas, the dogmas of the Church, political and economic principles and theories etc., everything is 'explained historically' after the manner of histo-
rism, or at least, everything is understood so, if the idea of causal explanation has been abandoned. When the Enlightenment is viewed in its entirety, and when its historical influence is considered, it has become a sign of 'good breeding' to look upon its ideas as mere results of a certain historical development. In an essay on the Enlightenment Troeltsch calls this movement the product of particular relations and circumstances, a product entirely historically determined, as is proved by its very difference from the Enlightenment of antiquity. 'The means of the latter are used by the moderns, but applied to a quite different material, so that quite different results are obtained.' And he continues: 'Its method has been determined by classical tradition and the new natural science; its contents by those elements of tradition which it considered to be the natural possession of every individual reason, which, however, were really the products of historical development' ¹.

And so powerful is the influence of Historism on modern historical science that such a view is in general simply accepted as the only scientific possibility.

A truly radical opposition to the historicistic method and its pre-suppositions is scarcely to be found even on the part of Christian historians. And yet this entire scientific view of history is founded in a prejudice, which must come into an implacable conflict with the really Christian attitude of scientific thought. The philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea strikes at the heart of the historicistic conception of history by laying bare its religious-philosophic pre-suppositions. Thus it deprives this view of the illusion of working in a purely scientific way, the illusion of being unbiased.

Even in the case of a scientific thinker like Troeltsch the historicistic prejudice leads to mythological mystifications in

¹ Troeltsch: Die Aufklärung: ['ein durch und durch historisch bestimmtes Erzeugnis bestimmter Verhältnisse und Lagen (wie dies gerade ihr Unterschied zur Aufklärung des Altertums zeigt, deren Mittel von der modernen benutzt, aber auf einen ganz neuen Stoff angewendet wurden und daher ganz andere Resultate ergaben)... Ihre Methode ist durch die antike Ueberlieferung und die neue Naturwissenschaft bestimmt, ihr Inhalt durch diejenigen Elemente der Ueberlieferung, die sie als selbstverständlichen Besitz jeder individuellen Vernunft ansah, die aber in Wahrheit Erzeugnisse der geschichtlichen Entwicklung waren."

The essay appeared in 1897 and is included in "Aufsätze zur Geistesgesch. und Religionssoziologie", herg. v. H. Baron 1925, in Bnd IV der Ges. Schriften, pp. 338 ff.
"The circumstances and the period necessitated this. The disagreement between actual political life and the requirements of revelation was either to be taken as the result of original sin, or was bound to lead to a restriction of the sphere of validity of revelation."

Consequently, the historical conditions have created the idea of the social contract. But what was it that called these historical conditions into being? The answer is: 'historical development'! By which the circle of mystification is completed. The insight into the sphere-universality of the historical aspect frees scientific historical thought of these mystifications. It brings home to us the fact that every truly historical problem points outside and above itself. In the functional structure of the normative opening-process the historical law-sphere is the foundation, but never the final completion.

The process of disclosure in the foundational direction of time could not start if it were not guided in the transcendental direction by essentially non-historical meaning-functions. In the last analysis it receives its religious direction from the struggle in the transcendent root of the cosmos.

We shall now briefly give an account of the contribution of the Enlightenment to the process of disclosure in western civilization, western economy, western juridical life, morality etc. From the outset one must be alive to the fact that the historical development of the power of the ideas of Enlightenment was only possible under the guidance of the Humanistic faith in the sovereignty of scientific thought.

Without faith not a single movement has ever succeeded in gaining formative power in history. We think we have sufficiently shown that πίστεως cannot itself be historicized.

The opening-process in the historical law-sphere guided by the ideas of natural law of the Enlightenment.

The development of the historical power of the individualistic ideals of natural law of the Enlightenment first claims our attention. For it is generally acknowledged that these ideas, together...
with modern natural science, have had the greatest influence on the development of western civilization.

The ideas of natural law were juridical ideas of meta-historical meaning, guided by the faith in the science-ideal and that of personality in its rationalistic individualistic form. They owe the development of their historical power to a complex of factors that had been undermining the old foundations of the ecclesiastically unified culture since the late Middle Ages.

In my series of studies: In de strijd om een Christelijke Staatkunde, I have investigated these factors. In this development it is always in the last instance a question of human formative activity within the coherence of the differentiating cultural spheres. That is why only a concept of causality conceived in a truly historical sense can be usefully applied in such investigations.

The mighty influence of the theme of innate human rights, conceived by Locke, then expanded in the theory of the rights of men and citizens by Rousseau and the French Revolution, gave western culture during the next period a rationalistic-individualistic form.

The historical norm of individualization was positivized in a one-sided rationalistic-individualistic spirit under the primary guidance of this complex of ideas and the final guidance of the Humanistic faith in reason. On this historical basis also the normative principles of human intercourse, economy, justice, morality and faith were positivized in an anticipatory individualistic direction. The Ideas guiding historical development in the transcendental direction of time are as such still merely subjective. Only in the struggle for historical power between progress and tradition are they cleansed of their arbitrary subjectivity. Then the historical basis is laid for the positivizing of certain super-arbitrary normative principles in the post-historical law-spheres, on the condition that the Ideas concerned are really related to such principles.

For instance, Locke's conception of absolute innate human rights pertaining to natural law, although it became a guiding motive in the development of the historical power of the Enlightenment, was in itself a subjective theory, and as such not susceptible of real positivation in the legal order.

¹ The entire conception of absolute rights of the individual is, as such, in conflict with the fundamental structure of any positive legal order. Every right is by nature relative.
Only after new forms of culture had been created under the guidance of the ideas of Enlightenment, but accommodated to the historical principle of continuity, could the foundation be laid for a genuine law-formation along the lines of the truly superarbitrary elements in the theory of natural law. In this the Enlightenment had to accomplish its own historical cultural task. In the legal field the opening-process was started by the rationalistic Idea of humanity stimulating the struggle for the recognition of the rights of man as such. Its contents had been derived from the Stoical idea of world-citizenship and from a secularization of the Christian ideas of freedom and personality. The medieval idea of the Corpus Christianum had fallen away from the truly religious meaning of the Biblical doctrine of the body of Christ. It identified the ‘Kingdom of God’ with an ecclesiastical organization encompassing the whole of Christianity and was given its death-blow by the historical development of the power of the Humanistic Idea of humanity, favoured by the increasing contact with non-Christian peoples. The idea of the natural rights of man definitively broke through the limits of the undifferentiated medieval conception of corporative law.

In this process Humanism could utilize the historical influence (formative power) that the ideas of the Reformation had gained in popular conviction. At this point the historical tendencies of the two great spiritual movements crossed each other; it is impossible historically to isolate the influence of the Enlightenment. But the typical direction that the process of disclosure takes under the predominating guidance of the Enlightenment, can certainly be indicated.

An individualistic and rationalistic utilitarian tendency penetrates into the codifications of the time of the Enlightenment under the influence of Christian Wolff \(^2\) and Locke. This tendency is evidently to be traced back to the guidance of the Humanistic science-ideal in the positivizing of the juridical

\(^{1}\) About this point we shall have to say more in the 3rd volume.

\(^{2}\) Especially in the “Preussisches Landrecht” (1794) projected by the Wolffian jurists Karl Gottlieb Suarez and E. F. Klein. The Austrian Civil Code of 1811 was more directly influenced by Kant.
principles. The juridical principles positivized here were not ‘sinful’ and neither a creation of human arbitrariness, nor even completely new. For example, the principle of the freedom of contract had already been positivized by canon law and had been taken over by modern Germanic law under its influence.

This principle means a necessary disclosure of the juridical aspect in the modern development of trade and traffic when compared with the restriction to fixed types of agreements valid in Roman civil law, and with the primitive commitment to rigid symbolical forms.

But in canon law this principle had been conceived in its immediate connection with the ‘natural ethical law’, with the moral demand of keeping one’s word. And for this reason the theory of canon law bound this principle to an elaborate doctrine of the ‘*justa causa*, which the Church, as the guardian of the ‘lex naturalis’, was supposed to have the duty of interpreting. Add to this the manifold ways in which juridical life was bound to the corporative forms of medieval society. It is true that, because of their undifferentiated character, the latter were doomed to dissolution as soon as the process of differentiation and integration of western society proceeded. They gradually became antiquated since the commencement of modern times, but they were not definitively liquidated before the French Revolution. From the outset the rationalistic personality- and science-ideal, expressed in the Humanistic theories of natural law, fought a bitter struggle against all these restraints of individual liberty. Already Hugo de Groot detached the principle of natural law *pacta sunt servanda* from the *justa causa*¹.

In Hobbes’ theory of natural law the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of the ‘*justum pretium*’ is entirely given up. The distinction between *justitia commutativa* and *distributiva*, whose implied recognition of the difference between inter-individual law and communal law De Groot already could not understand on account of his nominalistic attitude, was almost cynically set aside. Constitutional law and civil law alike are reduced to the formalistic contractual principle².

Under the guidance of the faith in the science-ideal the Idea of private law became formalistic. Its whole content was reduced

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² Cf. my *In den strijd om een Christelijke Staatkunde*, I, XIV (Antirevol. Staatkunde, 2e Jg. 1926, pp. 438 ff.)
arithmetical; the latter in proportion geometrical. Commutative, therefore, they place in the equality of value of the things contracted for; and distributive in the distribution of equal benefit to men of equal merit. As if it were an injustice to sell dearer than to buy; or to give more to a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted for is measured by the appetite of the contractors; and therefore the just value is that which they be contented to give. And merit besides that which is by covenant, where the performance on one part meritheth the performance of the other part, and falls under justice commutative, not distributive, is not due by justice; but is rewarded of grace only. And therefore this distinction in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is not right. To speak properly, commutative justice is the justice of a contractor; that is, a performance of covenant, in buying and selling; hiring, and letting to hire; lending, and borrowing; exchanging, bartering and other acts of contract.

The relative disclosure of the economical law-sphere; the disharmony of this process under the guidance of the faith of the Enlightenment.

In this entire process the modern Humanistic view of natural law has already sealed its union with economic individualism. It was to expand in a mercantilistic spirit as long as it turned into state-absolutism. But soon it turned into the classical-liberal idea of the state of law (Rechtsstaat), first formulated by Locke, according to which the political association in terms of the social contract had no other purpose than the organized protection of the natural rights of property and liberty. This individualistic liberal conception of the rule of law was allied with the political program of the classical school of economics. The latter propagated its adage "laissez faire, laissez aller", the unrestrained free play of the social forces in economic life. In this economic individualism economic life was strongly rationalized. The medieval forms of corporative life in the monopolistic guilds were shattered. They were calculated to fence in economic life, not to ex-

1 Leviathan I, Chap. XV.
Economic individualism gained its decisive victory under the leadership of the ideas of the Enlightenment and attained to theoretical reflection in the economic theories of the physiocrats and the so-called classical school of economics. By liberating the individual spirit of enterprise in the modern expansion of industry and trade it comes to mean a one-sided kind of meaning-disclosure of the inter-individual relations in the economic law-sphere at the expense of the communal relationships.

The economic law of supply and demand, which after the definitive abandonment of the medieval guilds was pos citivized as a basic norm for the economic determination of prices, was only a norm for the economic inter-individual relations in the modern freedom of exchange; just as the principle of contractual liberty was only adapted to the juridical inter-individual relations. But this economic norm oriented to a free market situation was presently to be denatured and absolutized¹ by the classical theory into an unalterable, pure, 'natural law'.

In it the economic aspect on its law-side opened out in anticipation of the individualistically conceived rights of man, of the utilitarian autonomous rational morality and of the faith in the science-ideal. But the process of disclosure here showed a poignant disharmony. The excessive individualizing and rationalizing of the formative process, guided by the faith in the sovereignty of mathematical and natural scientific thought, resulted in the idolatry of the abstract individualistic idea of the 'homo economicus'. And this idolatry also came to expression in the formation of the economic principles to positive norms. A hard-headed calculation of private profits became the only rule of conduct in economic life; it broke every bond with economic communal principles.

Just as the science-ideal was a continual threat to the personality-ideal, the individualistic rationalizing and technicizing of economic life was presently to reduce thousands of labourers to actual wage-slavery. Economic life had been delivered into the hands of the officially still 'Christian' bourgeois-mentality, permeated by the utilitarian spirit of the Enlightenment.

In the same way the individualistic principle of 'natural law' concerning liberty and equality in civil juridical intercourse,

¹ Even in our days liberal economic theory has not yet really detached itself from this naturalistic conception of economic laws oriented to the Humanistic science-ideal.
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The ultimate victory of the Kingdom of God in Christ, to Whom has been given the fulness of power in the religious fulfilment of history.
there can be no question of the inner antinomy that Humanism has to experience on seeing how human personality, claiming to be autonomous in its self-sufficient freedom, is being enslaved by its own rational creations. The Divine world-order is not itself antinomic when it avenges itself on every deification of temporal meaning by the disharmony caused on account of this apostasy in the opening process. No more is it antinomic when it causes philosophical thought to entangle itself in inner antinomies, as soon as this thought supposes it can ignore the Divine order.

This world-order binds the normative process of disclosure, in the foundational direction of time, to the historical formation of power. In the transcendental direction it binds the opening-process to the direction of faith, and at the same time the world-order points beyond and above all the temporal law-spheres to the religious radical unity of the Divine law. That is why truly Christian philosophic thought cannot discover any antinomy nor any paradox in the validity within a sinful world of the full religious demand of the Divine law. This law even remains in force in a world in which the temporal ordinances of the law-spheres through sinful human formation have been drawn away from their direction to the fulness of meaning of the Divine law. Holy and without any inner contradiction is the world-order, even when it binds the possibility of a defective positivizing of Christian principles to a historical basis of power and to the guidance of true Christian faith.

Holy and without inner contradiction is the world-order, when it avenges itself on the process of disclosure in which the civitas terrena has gained the power to direct the formation of history.

The defectiveness caused by sin in the root and the temporal refraction of meaning, has been expressed in our transcendental basic Idea itself in the struggle between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena. It must therefore also naturally find its expression in our Idea of historical development, in our economic Idea, in our Idea of justice, of morals, of beauty, etc.

The Christian Idea of cultural development cannot be guided by an optimistic faith in the steady progress of civilization. It cannot be sacrificed to pessimistic relativistic Historism either. It remains ruled by the religious basic motive of the struggle between the civitas Dei and the civitas terrena in the temporal course of history, though eschatologically it remains directed to
The functional structure of the opening-process, in connection with the modal universality of the aspects, each in its own sphere, provides us with the insight into the only possible method of using this Idea of development in historical investigations. Our analysis has yielded a univocal criterion to distinguish between primitive and disclosed cultural spheres, which criterion is a necessary \( \text{διάδοσις} \) for historical science proper. We saw further that a real opening of the historical aspect is possible under the guidance of an apostate faith, and that in this case the process of disclosure must show its disharmonious character also on the law-side of the aspects. We have frankly to acknowledge that apostate movements have their special task in history when they have gained the power to form and to positivize deepened cultural principles of development. But this entire view of history implies a radical rejection of Historicism. We have explained \(^1\) that any true meaning-disclosure of history points beyond and above this aspect and is only possible in the universal temporal meaning-coherence of all the modal law-spheres.

The Christian Idea of development, therefore, cannot be narrow-minded. It recognizes any relative meaning-disclosure of civilization, even though positivized by anti-Christian powers. Every spiritual movement, having the power of historical formation has to fulfil its own task as an instrument in the hand of God. Our developmental Idea has broken with any speculative philosophical or theological construction of periods in cultural development. And above all, it continues to observe the inner tension between sinful reality and the full demand of the Divine law.

This demand is terrifying when we consider how much the temporal ordinances labour under the destructive power of the fall into sin. Terrifying also, when it puts before us our task as Christians in the struggle for the power of cultural formation.

\(^1\) Cf. our analysis of the universality of the aspect of history in its own sphere.
For it makes a demand on us which as sinful human beings we cannot satisfy in any way. And it urges us, in the misery of our hearts, to seek refuge with Christ, from Whose fulness, nevertheless, a Christian can derive the confidence of faith to carry on the ceaseless struggle for the control of cultural development. This is the remarkable ‘nevertheless’ of Christian faith.

Christian philosophic thought has to fight shy of self-exaltation, because it is directed in its root to Christ. The whole struggle that positive Christianity has to carry on for the direction of the opening-process is not directed against our fellow-men, in whose sin we partake and whose guilt is ours and whom we should love as our neighbours. That struggle is directed against the spirit of darkness who dragged us all down with him in the apostasy from God, and who can only be resisted in the power of Christ.

As Christians we shall hate that spirit because of the love of God’s creation in Christ Jesus.
CHAPTER V

THE SUBJECT-OBJECT-RELATION IN THE MODAL ASPECTS

§ 1 - INTRODUCTORY FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM.

In our investigation of the functional modal structure of the law-spheres, each with its nuclear moment, retrocippations and anticipations, we discovered the correlation between the subject-side and the law-side of each aspect. Meanwhile we repeatedly came across a peculiar relation between subjectivity and objectivity manifesting itself both on the law-side and the subject-side of an aspect. For instance, it appeared that the optical picture of space in the cosmic coherence of temporal reality is a sensory objectivation of the original spatial aspect in the modal structure of the psychical law-sphere. This objective spatial analogy appeared to be only possible in its indissoluble connection with subjective spatial feeling. In the modal aspect of language we found the coherence between subjective symbolical signification and objective sign; in the historical aspect we found the coherence between subjective cultural activity and its object, and between subjective historical relations and the historical object-function of natural facts, etc.

This raises the question whether the subject-object relation discovered here is restricted to certain law-spheres, or whether it has a universal character and can be found in all the aspects of temporal experience.

If it should appear that the subject-object relation is not universal, we must inquire after the cosmic foundation of this relation in the temporal meaning-coherence of the modal aspects. In the present context the whole problem is kept within the cadre of the theory of the modal spheres, in which we are concerned with the functional analysis of the modal meaning-structures. This strong abstraction in our formulation of the problem is a methodological necessity because the modal, functional structures lie at

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the foundation of the individuality-structures of temporal reality. Consequently, the latter cannot be conceived apart from the former.

When in the third Volume we again have to examine the subject-object relation within the typical total structures of individuality, we shall have to refer to the results of our inquiry in the present chapter, in which the methodical basis is laid for later discussions.

§ 2 - THE SUBJECT-OBJECT SCHEME IN IMMANENCE PHILOSOPHY.

In immanence philosophy the problem concerning the modal structure of the subject-object relation has never been raised, and could never be raised in the sense intended here. Yet, this relation plays a central part in modern thought insofar as it is used as a schema for a first orientation in the cosmos. This schema has not been obtained from a truly cosmological analysis of the structure of human experience, it is rather imposed on reality in consequence of the immanence-prejudice.

The subject-object schema of modern immanence-philosophy has a confusing multivocality, which has already done a great deal of harm in philosophical thought. It originates in epistemology as a schema of ‘theoretical reason’, and it is also handled as a schema of ‘practical reason’.

Immanence-philosophy objectifies empirical reality either with regard to a cognitive or to a volitional subject. ‘Object’ is identified in this case with that to which our mental activity in thought or volition is directed.

The subject-object relation in Scholastic philosophy, and in modern pre-Kantian metaphysics.

Scholastic philosophy at least distinguishes the intentional object of cognition from the subjective reality of things.

‘Esse objective’, as a merely intended being (‘esse intentionale’), is opposed to ‘esse subjective, formaliter, in re, extra nostram mentem’ etc. ¹

DESCARTES, too, still holds to this distinction ² and in modern times F. BRENTANO applied the Scholastic doctrine of intentional objectivity to all psychical acts. In pre-critical philosophy the distinction between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective being’ was still

¹ Cf. e.g. THOMAS AQUINAS. In L. 1 Sentent. 23, 1, 3c; SUAREZ, Metaph. disputationes II, sect. 1, 1.
² Meditationes III, Princip. philos., I, 57, 67, 70, 199.
In this view the grammatical-logical subject-concept as that to which the predicates in a judgment refer, played an important rôle. The metaphysical subject was conceived as that which cannot become the predicate in a judgment, because the predicate can only refer to ‘accidentia’.

The subject-object relation as an epistemological schema and the identification of the object and the ‘Gegenstand’ of theoretical knowledge.

Not before Kant did the concept of the subject-object relation become a real epistemological schema. Kant conceived of the subject in an epistemological sense as the transcendental pole of thought to which the entire empirical world, inclusive of ‘empirical’ psychical subjectivity, is opposed in the counterpole of the objectivity to be determined by this subject. Since then we constantly find the identification of the ‘object’ and the ‘Gegenstand’ of knowledge in Humanistic philosophy. In Kant the things that we experience have objective ‘Gegenständlichkeit’ insofar as they are products of a formative process which connects transcendental thought and sensory intuition according to the rules of transcendental synthesis.

The transcendental subject, elevated above all empirical individuality, is the origin of all universal validity, objectivity, ‘Gegenständlichkeit’ in ‘empirical reality.

This ‘objectivity’ is identified with universal validity, law-conformity, and as such opposed to ‘empirical’, individual subjectivity.

In Fichte’s subjective freedom-idealism the object as the non-I, as the counterpole to the transcendental I, turns into ‘the sensualized material of our duty’. This subject-object schema appears in all possible manners of precision and variation in Humanistic philosophy. It may be interpreted in a (critical) realistic sense, so that a ‘thing in itself’ is assumed to exist behind the empirical object. It may be interpreted in an idealistic sense, in which case the philosopher breaks with the metaphysical ‘thing in itself’.

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§ 3 - THE COHERENCE BETWEEN THE MODAL SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATION AND THE RETROCIATORY MEANING-STRUCTURES OF A LAW-SPHERE. THE SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATION IN THE MODAL ASPECT OF FEELING
Starting from the so-called empiricist nominalistic tendencies that have been operative since Greek sophistic, the Humanistic subject-object schema can be taken in a psychologistic sense in which the ‘critical-transcendental’ view of subject and object is given up, etc. But in all cases it is serviceable to an obliteration of the modal structures of the different aspects of experience.

The only general distinction that is accepted in this scheme is that between cognitive and volitional objects. In an extremely subtle way this distinction has been adapted to the basic structure of the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea, by means of which philosophic thought on its own authority undertakes to construct the cosmos in accordance with the aspects of the science-ideal or the personality-ideal.

Immanence-philosophy must take an arbitrary starting-point when it embarks upon an inquiry into the subject-object relation. If the immanence-standpoint is to be maintained, it must eliminate from its pre-suppositions the cosmic order of time in which the subject-object relation is founded.

And thus there is no longer any possibility to get an insight into the rich modal varieties of meaning of the subject-object relation. In the old pre-Kantian metaphysics, as well as in nominalistic so-called ‘empirical’ psychologist, both in critical transcendental philosophy and in phenomenology, objectivity is only conceived in correlation with the immanent subjective cognitive and volitional functions.

In all these conceptions there is no room for the cosmological analysis of the different modal structures of the subject-object relation. The ‘object’ becomes a ‘general notion’ serving to level out the modal boundaries between the law spheres. The foundation for ‘objectivity’ can then only be found either in a metaphysical concept of substance, or in a transcendental-logical synthesis, or in an ethically necessary tension between ‘nature’ and ‘freedom’ in the ‘transcendental consciousness’ itself, or in a common root of subject and object in ‘being’. Such is the case, insofar as at least any attempt is made to give account of this foundation.

A radical break with this subject-object schema of immanence-philosophy is necessary, if we are to conceive the subject-object relation in the intermodal coherence of cosmic time.
The internal modal subject-object relation in contrast to the theoretical 'Gegenstand'-relation.

What is to be understood by a modal subject-object relation? An object in a modal functional sense is always an object to a modal subject-function coordinated with it within the same law-sphere. The modal subject-function, insofar as it is the transcendental correlate of the modal object, can no more be objectified in the same modal aspect than it is possible for the modal object-function to be a subject within the same modal sphere. The modal subject is the active pole on the subject-side of the modal aspect, whereas the modal object is the passive, merely objective pole.

From the Prolegomena we know that it is especially important not to confuse the modal object with the 'Gegenstand' of theoretical thought. That which is opposed to our theoretical-logical function of thought can never have the same modal meaning as our logical subjectivity.

Modal objectivity cannot be reduced to modal law-conformity.

Equally confusing is the prevailing identification of objectivity and universally valid law-conformity. This is done by the customary method of contrasting what is merely individual and subjective with what is universally valid and objective. In this way the insight into the modal structure of the subject-object relation is made impossible. In all the modal law-spheres in which this relation is to be found it has a subject-side as well as a law-side.

On the subject-side neither the subject nor the object can be reduced to universally valid law-conformity. On the law-side the subject-object relation functions in the sense of a rule of this relation which determines the subject- and the object-function only in general.

In the concrete actualized individuality-structure of reality, however, subject and object within the same law-sphere are both individual. That is why a sharp distinction should be made between the two sides of the subject-object relation even in its

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...
modal structure. For in its realization this modal relation has always individual relata on its subject-side.

A modal object-function, however, has a different individuality from that of a modal subject-function. That is why in general its individuality is indifferent to that of the modal subject. An individual modal object is an object to any subject whatsoever which in the same modal aspect has the same typical relation to it.

Nevertheless the relation itself can also assume an individual character. This is the case when the object is the result of the formative activity of an individual subject, or when the latter has acquired the exclusive use of the object. From this it appears that also the relation between an individual subject and an individual object cannot be reduced to a general or typical law.

In the present context this complicated matter cannot be further examined. It is necessary to abstract from the structures of individuality in order to gain an insight into the modal basic structure of the subject-object relation. Our enquiry is only concerned here with the functional structure of this relation in the intermodal meaning-coherence as it is determined by the cosmic order. In this examination the arbitrary starting-point, ruled out in the preceding section, should be avoided. The modal subject-object relation should be understood from the intermodal meaning-coherence of the law-spheres themselves.

If this meaning-coherence is kept in view, it is comparatively immaterial in which of the law-spheres we first examine the modal structure of the relation in question. A truly cosmological analysis of any modal aspect whatsoever remains strictly bound to the cosmic temporal order of the law-spheres and cannot deviate from this order in an arbitrary way. We propose to start with a subject-object-relation which occupies a central place in the psychologistic tendency of the Humanistic epistemology, viz. the subject-object relation in the modal aspect of feeling, manifesting itself in any sensory perception.

From the outset psychology has given special attention to the distinction between the sensory perception of the 'outer world', dependent on 'observation in space', and the 'inner' subjective experience of feelings which does not give us a spatial picture of objective phenomena. It is clear that the subject-object relation in the modal aspect of feeling can only be found in the relation between the subjective sensory aspect of percep-
made clean when it is contrasted with the objectively perceptible 'outer world'. The term 'outer world', and the terms "äussere" and "innere Sine", are evidently used for want of better words and cannot teach us anything with regard to a cosmological analysis of the psychical subject-object relation. The words 'outer' and 'inner' have an evident spatial meaning, and are therefore confusing, when one tries to express a contrast with spatial perceptions by means of the word 'inner'.

To gain a clear insight into the modal structure of the psychical subject-object relation, it is necessary to ask the question: 'What aspects of reality can be objectified within the psychical law-sphere in the sensory image to which subjective sensory perception is related?' This question cannot be framed correctly unless we break with the custom (originated in metaphysics) of turning the word 'psychical' into a collective noun signifying the whole of the concrete subjective activity of our consciousness. The provisional analysis of the modal field of research of psychology has shown that perception, representation, remembrance, volition etc. are concrete human 'acts', which as such cannot be enclosed in a modal aspect of reality, but have only a modal function within the psychical law-sphere. And the modal nuclear moment of the aspect of experience which we have called 'psychical', appeared to be 'feeling'. This term is to be taken not in the sense of a subjective phenomenon but as the qualifying moment of the modal structure of the aspect concerned.

The necessary functional coherence between a sensory subjective feeling of extension and an objective sensory image of space.

It appeared to be necessary to break with the mechanical view that 'outward' sensory impressions can be isolated from 'inner feelings' as if they were separate psychical elements lacking the modal meaning of 'feeling'.

The objective sensory space of perception functions in the modus of emotional sensibility and is fitted indissolubly into a functional-structural coherence with subjective emotion. But for
our subjective feeling of extension we could not perceive any objective sensory image of space. The space of sight, that of touch and the more rudimentary space of hearing (investigated by Brentano, Stumpf, v. Hornbostel; and by Katz-Engelmann in animal psychology) have a very different objective-sensory structure. Nevertheless it has been established as an undubitable fact that they function in a structural coherence with each other in the concrete sensory perception of space.

Physiology has shown that the organs forming the substratum for the feelings of vision and touch are connected in a functional-organic coherence, so that between the feelings of sight and those of touch there exists an innate association based upon the biotic coherence of the organs.

The optic objective picture of space, dependent on the impressions made by light, is a projective and limited spatial picture. In itself being two-dimensional, it becomes a three-dimensional complete sensory picture of space only when it is associated with the non-projective tactile image related to the feelings of touch and movement.

It is therefore impossible to resolve the sensory perception of space into merely passive impressions. The objective sensory picture of space cannot exist without its structural relation to our active subjective feeling of extension in its subjection to the universally valid laws of spatial sensory perception.

Now it appears that the possibility of objectification in the modal aspect of feeling is primarily bound to the retrocipatory structure of this modal aspect.

Implicit objectification in the modal aspect of feeling.

The subjective modal functions of number, space, movement, energy, and organic life can be psychically objectified in the (objective) space of sensory perception, because in the modal

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1 Cf. the inaugural oration of G. Revész: Het psychologische ruimteprobleem (1932).
2 i.e., the nerve cells of the motorial apparatus of the eye are connected with those of the ampullas of the semi-circular canals in the labyrinth of the ear. Flourens, Goltz and E. v. Cyon discovered that our sense of the directions of movement in the sensory picture of space is founded in this labyrinth.
4 Naturally this does not mean that the original meaning of number, space, movement, energy, and organic life may be sensory perceptible. It
The objectification of pre-psychical modal subject-object relations in the aspect of feeling.

The subject-object relations of the earlier law-spheres can also be objectified in the psychical aspect, viz. in the objective sensory image of a natural event. When I perceive with my senses how a mother-bird is feeding its young ones in its nest, the psychical modus of objectifying the biotic subject-object relation is also contained in the objective sensory image of such animal behaviour.

The biotic subject-object relation as such has been actualized in the concrete behaviour of the animals themselves with respect to their food. In my perceptual picture I really see the sensory analogy of this subject-object relation before me objectively. This entire objective sensory image is related to the possible subjective sensory perception of every observer. In the objective perceptual image I see the animals move and take food in their nest in an actual subjective way.

The sensory analogy of the biotic subject-object relation in its actuality is thus objectively perceptible by means of the senses.

This statement is correct in so far as one does not for a moment lose sight of the fact that this sensory perceptibility is only possible in the temporal interlacement of the actual subjective biotic and psychical functions. One should never try to resolve the biotic subject-object relation in its original modal meaning into sensory means only that in the objective sensory space there are objective analogies of them to be found which refer back to these original modal functions.
impressions, as is done by psychological empiricism. The original objective sensory image always refers back to actual pre-psychical subject- (respectively subject-object) functions objectified in the original sensory perceptual image. This is their essential characteristic.

Such an actual reference is absent in hallucinatory images, in those of the imagination and those of dreams. In the images of our memory this actual reference is only of a reproductive nature.

Besides, the dream-image and the pathological hallucination lack the sense of identity on the part of the subject.

The representational relation (Abbild-Relation) within the objective perceptual image. The pre-psychical aspects cannot be psychically represented and do not produce a psychical copy.

When in the objective sensory perceptual image, say of a real piece of cloth or paper e.g., some representations have been objectified, the psychical subject-object relation becomes still more complicated. In order to understand this intricate psychical object-structure modally, the original objective perceptual image must be sharply distinguished from its representation in sensory objectivity.

There can never be a representational relation between the original objective perceptual image and the actual pre-psychical subject- (and subject-object) functions. For a sensory representation (copy) pre-supposes a sensory original image, and as such the pre-psychical aspects of reality cannot occur. A representation, as such, is not originally objective; it is merely the optic copy of an individual perceptual image within another individual objective perceptual image, and always bound up with the latter in an optical-tactile way. Thus the objective perceptual image of a human being, an animal or a tree, has its inverted optic representation or copy on the retina of the eye.

It is optically perceived only on the condition that in its physico-biotic substratum the stimuli of the incoming rays of light, on the extreme ends of the optic nerves, are transmitted to the brain. The sensory perceptible object-structure of the inverted copy on the retina is obviously a different one from that of the original objective perceptual image.
other objective perceptual image in which it is objectified has an implicit and an indirect object-structure. These dependent, implicit object-structures may show all kinds of individual complications in the psychical aspect. They cannot be analysed by means of the modal concept of function. Only by analysing the individual thing-structure in which they occur can their nature become theoretically clear to us.

Is an objectification of post-psychical subject-functions and subject-object-relations possible in the objective sensory perceptual image? The modal sphere-universality of sensory perception in the objective direction.

It is not possible to objectify the post-psychical subject-functions and subject-object-relations in an objective sensory perceptual image in the same way as the pre-psychical.

I can perceive neither the subjective-logical function of thought nor objective logical characteristics (e.g., of a bird, or a tree) in the same objective-sensory way in which I can see the movements and spatial shapes of a human being, an animal, or a tree.

Neither is this the case with respect to the post-logical subject-functions and post-logical modal subject-object relations, e.g., that between subjective signifying and the objective sign or symbol, or that between a subjective right and its juridical object.

Does this mean that there exists no possibility at all to objectify them in sensory space?

In the first (Dutch) edition of this work I thought so. But on second thought I cannot maintain this opinion. Already in the third volume of this edition it was implicitly abandoned. If it were true, the sphere-universality of the psychical aspect would be lacking in the objective direction and would express itself only in the opened subjective functions of feeling.

But in this case there could not exist sensory subject-object relations of an anticipatory character, and in the objective direction human perception in its sensory aspect would not be fundamentally distinct from the animal manner of perceiving. Moreover, the objective sensory perceptual image of the human body

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the latter may be completely subordinated to that of the others.

Even human laughing and weeping in its objective sensory expression shows a rational trait by which it is radically distinct from animal expressions of pleasure or pain.

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anti-culture anticipations in the objective sensory
would lack in principle any expression of the logical and post-
logical subject-functions and in general of its human character. All these consequences are unacceptable.

The consideration of this problem must consequently be resu-
med from the viewpoint of the modal sphere-universality of the feeling-aspect in its subject-object relations.

Let us begin by establishing that in the retrocipatory direction of sensory perception the objective analogies of the pre-psychical functions of a thing or event are given in a natural way in objective sensory space, independent of any axiological moment in human sensory perception. This does not mean that in our actual subjective sensory impressions we have an adequate image of all the objective sensory traits of a thing perceived. It means only that there is given an objective image of the thing perceived whose sensory qualities are perceptible in principle to a normal human sensory perception, so that a one-sided per-
ception may be completed by regarding the other sides of the thing, or an inexact, superficial perception may be improved by a more exact sensory contemplation, etc.

Now it must be clear that, as to its anticipatory direction, sen-
sory perception cannot find in the objective spatial sensory image of a natural thing or event any trait in which an objectifi-
cation of logical or post-logical functions is actually given without any relation to human valuation.

If in this sensory image there is to be found an anticipatory objective expression of logical characteristics — and this must be so since the naïve concept formation is entirely bound to this image — this expression is only given potentially.

It must be actualized by subjective logical feeling under the direction of the analytical function of human consciousness in its subjection to logical norms. This means that the analytical anticipations in the objective sensory image are related to axio-
logical moments in the subjective sensory perception, and that they are not delimited in objective sensory space in the way of retrocipatory sensory qualities.

As to the subjective logical activity of thought, we must observe that it doubtless may find actual expression in the objective sensory image of the human face. But it is not the abstract logical function which is sensorily objectified in this way, but always a concrete act of human consciousness in which the logical aspect functions. These acts may have different structures of individu-
ality but they never lack the logical function, though the rôle of
image of a thing or event we meet with a new state of affairs which demands special attention. Everything that is given in nature has a potential object-function in the cultural aspect. But it cannot become a cultural thing proper without undergoing a transformation realized by human cultural activity according to a free project. In this case a new thing has been produced which was not given in nature, and which shows a typical structure of individuality differing radically from those of natural things. It must be clear that this structure of individuality cannot fail to express itself in its objective sensory image. The sensory perceptible shapes, combinations of colours etc. of a chair, a table, a lamp etc. are not found in nature. They betray the cultural characteristics of the things concerned, and these cultural anticipations are indeed realized in the objective sensory image, they are not only given potentially. Nevertheless they are not given to a restrictive subjective sensory perception, but only to an anticipatory perception in which the axiological moments have been disclosed.

Cultural things cannot be sensorily perceived without cultural feeling, anticipating the cultural aspect of human experience and being directed by it. They cannot be sensorily perceived without an anticipation of cultural norms in the implicit valuation of feeling. To animal perception, which is rigidly bound to natural vital needs, they must remain hidden.

Natural things as such can also get an actual object-function in the cultural aspect without being transformed into cultural things.

Plants or animals may be cultivated by man, just as the soil, the water etc. A special examination of these states of affairs from the viewpoint of the typical structures of individuality and their mutual interlacements must be reserved to the third Volume. In the present context we can only observe that the cultural qualities of cultivated natural beings and things must find an anticipatory expression in their objective sensory image and that these anticipatory sensory qualities are given in their realization by human activity.

It has appeared that also natural events can have an actual or an implicit character. Non-conventional is in general the sensory symbolism of original aesthetical means of expression. It is explicit for instance in the case of musical themes or motifs designating a dominant mental disposition, and implicit where sensory sound images of music
object-function in the cultural aspect as objective historical facts, for instance an inundation, or an earthquake, which destroys a considerable part of a cultural area. Since their objective function as historical facts is necessarily related to subjective cultural activity and its objective cultural results, this relation must also be expressed in their objective sensory image. The sensory perceptible image of the destruction of a cultural area by a natural catastrophe is perceived as a disaster, a calamity.

We cannot perceive it as a sensory objectification of a cultural disaster without an implicit valuation in our cultural feeling which anticipates cultural norms.

But it would be a false subjectivistic interpretation of this state of affairs if it were assumed that this anticipatory moment of valuation in human sensory perception lacks an objective correlate in the sensory image itself. For the latter differs in principle from the sensory image of a natural catastrophe which lacks the function of an objective historical event.

In all these examples of psychical subject-object relations the current conception shows its insufficiency because of its lack of insight into the modal structure of these relations.

Especially the view according to which the sensory aspect of perception is to be conceived outside of the modal meaning of feeling proves to be untenable.

The objectification of symbolical and post-lingual anticipations in the objective sensory image of a thing or event. Conventional and non-conventional, explicit and implicit symbolism.

The anticipatory moments whose objectification in the objective space of sensory perception has been examined until now are indeed perceptible without the intermediary of sensory symbolism. On the other hand the objectification of post-lingual anticipations in the sensory image of a thing or event is not possible without this intermediary. The objective sensory image of a courtesy implies a sensory symbolism anticipating its social signification in the normative aspect of human intercourse. In this case sensory symbolism has a conventional and explicit character so that it may vary considerably in different social circles and peoples at a different stage of cultural development or with a different cultural tradition.

But it is also possible that some sensory symbolism is of a non-conventional nature. In this case it may have either an explicit
The combination of the successive sensory symbolizes only an abstract aesthetical structure. It is evident that this sensory symbolism in the sound-images, and the aesthetic anticipations founded in it, are essentially related to symbolical and aesthetical anticipations in the subjective sensory perception. But also here we should guard against every subjectivistic interpretation of this anticipatory subject-object relation. If there were no perceptible symbolic and aesthetical anticipations realized in the sound-image of a musical work of art itself, the whole realizing objectification of the subjective aesthetical conception of the composer in its reproduction by the executing artist would be impossible. For without its sensory objectification this conception could not be realized at all. But this point can only be discussed in its full extent in the third Volume.

The lingual anticipation in objective sensory symbolism which has no natural coherence with the meaning signified. Abstract symbols.

In the present context we have still to pay special attention to sensory symbolism as such, in so far as it has no natural coherence with the meaning signified by the signs.

What does it mean that a symbolical function is objectified in the sensory image of a thing or event which, as such, is qualified as a symbol?

In this case one is always confronted with conventional symbols, since there do not exist natural things which have a typical symbolical qualification, though they doubtless may have an implicit objective symbolical function. They may be called abstract symbols, in contradistinction to things or events which are not qualified by their symbolical function. It is beyond dispute that the signified meaning of an abstract symbol cannot be objectified in its sensory image. It is the very function of such a symbol only to signify this meaning without any perceptible coherence between its sensory image and the meaning intended.

But how can this symbolical function itself be objectified in its sensory image? It must be clear that this indeed is not possible so long as the abstract symbols are only considered as separate

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of post-lingual functions which have no natural (or at least non-conventional) but only an abstract conventional symbolic foundation, is restricted to the symbols or combinations of symbols by which their meaning is signified.

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things or events. The objective optical, auditive or tactile image of an abstract conventional sign (for instance a letter or a numerical symbol, or a sound- or light signal, or a braille sign) is in itself arbitrary.

But let us consider the modal structure of the symbolical subject-object relation itself as it is given within the lingual aspect of experience. For its sensory objectification cannot be independent of the latter. The modal structure mentioned implies cultural, logical and psychical analogies of a retrocipatory character.

A genuine symbol, in contradistinction to a natural animal means of expression, always has a cultural and logical foundation. In the case of a natural symbolism which lies at the foundation of objective aesthetical relations in nature (for instance the objective beauty of a landscape) the objective symbolical, as well as the objective logical and cultural functions of the beautiful natural whole, are only given potentially in relation to human actualization by the corresponding modal subject-functions.

But a conventional and especially an abstract symbol is not found in nature; it is the product of human formation. An abstract symbol does not stand by itself but belongs to a rational system of signs, originated from a free project and controllable in free meaningful combinations, conformable to lingual rules, for instance, of a particular written or spoken language or of a general code language.

But it is also essential to an abstract symbol that its symbolical function is founded in an objective optical, auditive or at least tactile sensory image. So we may conclude that a sensory objectification of its symbolical function is only possible in a successive or simultaneous multiplicity of sensory images whose arrangement betrays an anticipatory coherence with a logical method of distinction and combination and with a controlling (cultural) mode of usage referring to a lingual intention of signifying. These anticipatory moments in the objective sensory total image of the symbolical combinations are naturally related to the corresponding anticipations in the subjective sensory aspect of the act of perceiving.

It has appeared that in the case of abstract conventional symbols, which as concrete perceptible things or events are typically qualified by their symbolical function, the possibility of sensory objectification of their intended meaning is excluded. This is the reason why the possibility of sensory objectification
This is the case with the greater part of ethical juridical relations, in a differentiated and disclosed human society. It hangs together with the disclosure of logical symbolism by which the analytical function of human thought is freed from its rigid dependence on sensory representations. In this way theoretical analysis may directly anticipate the meaning designated by abstract conventional symbols, whose sensory image has no natural coherence with what is signified by them.

But with respect to aesthetic functions, even in their differentiated and disclosed modal structure, the possibility of sensory objectification is not restricted in this way. The reason is that the specific combinations of symbols by which they are signified are themselves aesthetical means of expression. In their sensory aspect they must consequently be arranged in a sensory harmony which anticipates the original aesthetic meaning signified by their symbolical (lingual) function.

As to the forms of social intercourse it must be established that they can be objectified in the sensory image of human actions in which they are realized. But this is only the case insofar as their original modal meaning is not only signified by abstract conventional symbols, but by a symbolism expressed by the human body itself.

The same thing can be said with respect to the modal subject-functions and object-functions which in the faith-aspect are related to the cult.

An act of praying, for instance, may be perceptible to the eye of sense in the objective sensory image of the kneeling body, the closed eyes, the folded hands etc. The objective pistical qualification of things which have a typical objective destination in the cult (as temples, confessionals, altars etc.) must also in some way find anticipatory expression in their sensory image.

But in all these cases we once again touch upon complicated states of affairs which can only be sufficiently explained in the theory of the typical structures of individuality.
§ 4 - THE SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATION IN THE MODAL ASPECT OF SPACE

If our thesis is correct, that the modal subject-object relation is indissolubly connected with the modal retrocipatory spheres of an aspect, the following thesis is also true: The subject-object relation is to be found in all the law-spheres whose modal structures show retrocipations of earlier modalities, in other words, in all the law-spheres that come later in the cosmic order of time. This insight sheds light on many states of affairs that cannot be satisfactorily explained by immanence-philosophy.

The subject-object relation in the modal aspect of space.

A spatial point is obviously an arithmetical analogy in the spatial modus. A point may be said to function in the aspect of continuous dimensional extension, but it is not subjectively extended. Two non-parallel straight lines have their point of intersection in a plane surface, but this point can have no actual subjective existence in space. A subjective spatial figure is necessarily extended in dimensional continuity. A spatial point cannot be called a fiction. If it were a pure fiction, a two- or three-dimensional figure should also be called a fiction. Then spatial magnitude would be a fiction, and the whole of the spatial aspect of reality would be a fiction of thought.

Such a fictionalistic view would have to deny the entire intermodal foundation of the sensory picture of space and would rob itself of the insight into the modal coherence between the law-spheres. But apart from this, such a conception would have to admit that there can be no sense in declaring a spatial point to be the only geometrical fiction.

How is the spatial meaning of a point to be conceived?

The dependent existence of a point in space.

A spatial point is dependent on a subjective spatial figure. It cannot exist apart. The objective magnitude of the subjective spatial figure depends on points. A point is founded in numerical relations. It is an intensive objectification of number in space. A subjective spatial figure and an objective spatial point stand, consequently, in a modal subject-object relation. An infinitesimal series of numbers can be objectified in the points of a straight line. These points continue to depend on the subjective conti-
The simultaneous before and after in the objective spatial function of time has the meaning of spatial magnitude, which is founded in the arithmetical aspect.

The magnitude of two parts of a straight line that have one terminal point in common, depends on the distance between their second terminal point and the first they have in common. The point itself possesses no extensive magnitude in any spatial dimension. The two terminal points objectively determine the magnitude of the subjective spatial extension of the straight line they limit. In the deepened theoretical analysis modern arithmetic approaches the objective magnitude of a spatial extension between points in a series of 'real numbers'.

On the one hand, however, this real function of number is identified in an inadmissible way with a point, and on the other hand, just as inadmissibly, the irrational function of number is conceived of as an actual number. In the systematic theoretical disclosure of the anticipatory spheres of the aspect of number theoretical thought should be on its guard against misinterpreting the modal sphere-universality of the arithmetical aspect by a theoretical eradication of its modal boundaries.

In original space there can be no objective retrocipatory analogy of original movement. The genetic view of the spatial figures considers them as having arisen from the 'movement' of a point, a line, a plane. In this case the meaning of space is grasped in its anticipation both of original movement and of the movement of thought. But this view has to start from the spatial subject-object relation if it does not want to get entangled in antinomies, because a point in its purely objective spatial function has no meaning apart from a subjective spatial figure. It always pre-supposes the intersection of straight or curved lines, even in the so-called imaginary points of intersection.

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1 The statement that in the original static spatial aspect of time we must distinguish before from after is not self-contradictory. It would be so, if these terms were taken in the original modal meaning of movement.
The antinomy in the construction of the so-called 'continuum of points'.

There has never been given a real definition of a spatial point that did not pre-suppose continuous extension. That is why in the construction of the so-called 'continuum of points' there is an insoluble antinomy hidden. For in this case the spatial continuity is supposed to be constructed in all its relations of magnitude synthetically, or even in a 'purely analytical' way, with the aid of certain elements that have no extension themselves. These elements cannot be thought of as 'positions', i.e. as the points of intersection of curved or straight lines in a pre-supposed spatial continuum. They are called points without any attempt to determine the real meaning of the 'point-concept' theoretically.

This could be defended by the argument that the meaning of these elements is only to be defined from their relations established by the axioms. This argument, however, is only acceptable if these relations are conceived in the modal meaning of pure extension. But in this case the construction of space from points must be abandoned, because the latter appear to be determined by space itself. In fact, at least in the logistic way of deduction, the relations concerned are conceived in the logical sense of formal analysis. The continuity of the different series of points is supposed to be a result of the logical continuity of thought. The totality of points is thought of as continuous, without the points coalescing. As soon as this construction is interpreted in a spatial sense, the antinomy arises that points are made into spatial subjects, whereas they have only a dependent objective existence in the spatial subject-object relation. Making them into the infinitesimal origin of an extensive continuum by their integration into a logical 'all-ness' is tantamount to annihilating them. For an absolutely 'dense' set of points really means the cancellation of every spatial distance between them. This cancels the multiplicity of points at the same time, and also every separate point, and spatial magnitude.

In the differential and integral calculus this state of affairs can be recognized in the necessary correlation between differential and integral. A point conceived in the theoretical movement

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1 Ludwig Fischer, in his Die Grundlagen der Philosophie und der Mathematik, 1933, p. 82 ff. has analysed this antinomy in a very lucid way, without being able to define the relation between a point and a spatial figure. The analysis of the modal spatial subject-object relation is necessary for such a definition.
the expression of the continuity of a creative movement of logical thought, as the Marburg school thinks. It is only meaningful in its stringent correlation to subjective extension. This correlation makes it accessible to an approximation by the anticipatory infinitesimal function of number, in subjection to the cosmic order of the meaning-coherence. Spatial magnitude, viewed as a 'variable magnitude' in the differential and integral calculus, is conceived in an evident anticipatory function. In the continuity of the logical movement of thought, as the supposed 'origin and justificatory foundation of being', there is neither to be found the original meaning of number, nor that of original space or movement. The modal relation between a point and a spatial figure cannot be logicized. It must be understood by theoretical thought from the same cosmic meaning-coherence that makes thought itself possible.

§ 5 - THE SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATION IN THE MODAL ASPECT OF ANALYSIS AND THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN NOMINALISM AND REALISM.

We now turn to a subject-object relation whose misinterpretation played a central part in the conflict between Nominalism and Realism, viz. the subject-object relation in the logical law-sphere. From the outset Realism stuck to the reality of the universalia, either ascribing to them a hypostatized existence 'ante rem', or merely an implicit existence 'in re'. In realistic Christian Scholasticism the universalia were said to exist 'ante rem' in God's Mind, and to have moreover an existence in individual things. A merely 'intentional' abstract existence was assumed for the universalia in human concepts. Nominalism, on the other hand, in all its possible varities, denied the universalia any other existence but a purely intentional one 'in mente' (univer-

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1 Natörp, Die logischen Grundlagen der exacten Wissenschaften, 2e Aufl. 1921, p. 221: "Ursprung und rechtfertigende Grund des Seins".
2 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In sent. II, dis. III, q. 2, a. 2 and Summa Theologiae I, q. 85, a. 2 ad 2.
salia post rem), although it could acknowledge them very well as objective symbols or natural signs of reality.

Realism, in contrast with Nominalism, is often qualified as 'conceptual realism', which is not completely correct. Nevertheless it is true that — even in its moderate Thomistic form — it pre-supposes a final hypostasis in which the φωνή, as the φόνος φωνήως and as the divine origin, is separated from the temporal coherence of reality in an absolute χωρισμός.

That on this moderate standpoint not only an existence in re is ascribed to the substantial forms of temporal reality but, in addition, an existence ante rem in mente divina, was due to the accommodation of the Aristotelian metaphysics to the Augustinian doctrine of the Divine Logos. The universale in re remains the formal component of the metaphysical εἶδος (the essence) of things giving matter its form, to which matter owes actual being ('forma dat materiae esse', as it is formulated in Scholasticism). The extremely realistic conception of Plato's doctrine of the Ideas is rejected in orthodox Christian Scholasticism. Nevertheless, in the Scholastic doctrine of the 'formae separatae', the imperishable intelligences separated from all matter, the Platonic χωρισμός, the splitting up of reality into an independent noumenon and a material phenomenon, is again clearly revealed.

(Moderate) Nominalism is also based on a splitting up of the temporal meaning-coherence into a noumenon and a phenomenon. Seeing the great variety of forms it has assumed in the history of philosophical thought, it is extremely difficult to give a general characterisation of the nominalistic conception of the mutual relation between universale and real thing. We can only state that nominalism ascribes no other existence to the 'universale' than that of a concept in (human and eventually in divine) thought which lies outside the 'empirical reality' of things and can only be taken as a symbol of a set of individual things.

The scholastic doctrine of the logical intentional object.

In Scholasticism the logical subject-object relation has been paid great attention to in the theory of the intentional contents of concept and representation. The universalia post rem, as the essential forms, abstracted from things by logical apohaeresis, only have an 'esse intentionale' or 'esse objective' in moderate Realism. And then a sharp distinction is made between the in-
with the actus intelligendi. The logical subject-object relation proper is thus detached from the temporal meaning-coherence of reality, both in realistic and in nominalistic Scholasticism, and opposed to temporal things as that which is intended in logical thought. A purely intentional logical object as such is no part of reality, it is only 'the intentional content of thought'. In this manner the important scholastic theory about the intentional logical object is indissolubly joined to the realistic or nominalistic view of reality of Scholasticism, based on the immanence-standpoint. We have found it to be absolutely incompatible with our Christian transcendence standpoint. The (Aristotelian) realistic conception unavoidably leads to the 'Abbild-theorie' (the copy-theory) according to which the so-called 'intentio secunda' (i.e. the act of thinking exclusively directed to the abstract universal) grasps the logical copy of the materialized essential form of things in the intentional logical object. The moderately nominalistic conception of Occam, too, must have recourse to a copy-theory in order to head off absolute fictionalism. According to him the universalia as intended objects of thought can represent (supponere pro) an incalculable multiplicity of real individual things, only because they are no mere fictions of thought. They are rather images ('imago'), symbolical copies of the common features of things that show mutual resemblances. These resemblances must not be considered, however, as the 'substantial essential form' of things.

That is why we need not be surprised that after all Scholasticism could not conceive the 'Gegenstand' of theoretical thought in the correct way. It could not give an account of the limits

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1 William of Occam, Summa totius logicae ad Adamum, I, 12 ed. Venet. 1522, fol. 6 r. A.
2 In Sent. I, d. 2, q. 8 H.: 'Universale non est figmentum tale, cui non correspondet aliquid consimile in esse subjectivo..., non est figmentum, sicut chimaera vel aliquid tale'.
   Ib. E. 'Illud potest vocari universale, quod est exemplar et indifferenter recipiens omnia singularia extra, et propter illam similitudinem in esse obiectivo potest supponere pro rebus extra'. — and ib. F: 'Illud sit fictum... propter ista potest esse terminus propositionis et supponere pro omnibus illis, quorum est imago vel similitudo'.

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temporal reality. But also in this latency it remains possible logical objectivity for the logical subject-function under the universally valid logical law-conformity.

The limits of logical objectivity.
within which logical objectification is possible. In realistic Scholasticism the 'Gegenstand' is identified with the 'substance', and all the so-called 'transcendentalia': the concepts of being, of the unity, the good and the true, and the other 'transcendental concepts' of the 'philosophia prima', become objects of the actus intelligendi. The question what these logical concepts are the objectifications of, cannot arise here, because logical objectivity is not conceived of in the temporal meaning-coherence of reality. In nominalistic Scholasticism the intentional object and the 'Gegenstand' (ἀναστημένον) of the logical function of thought are even identified, which has become the rule in Humanistic epistemology.

The logical object-side of temporal reality. The content and the object of a concept are not identical.

A satisfactory insight into the logical subject-object relation can be gained only if we try to understand also this relation from the temporal meaning-coherence of the modal aspects. Temporal reality itself has a logical object-side. This is the first fact that should be grasped. The logical object cannot coalesce with the intentional logical content of a subjective concept. Logical objectivity is not the same thing as a being that is merely intended in the logical aspect of this concept. The intentional content of the concept in itself remains subjective and is not even always related to logical objectivity. Take e.g., the so-called reflexive concepts, from which every kind of objectivity is deliberately abstracted. But apart from this, exception must be taken to the scholastic and the neo-scholastic doctrine of the merely intentional existence of the logical object, because in it the logical object-side of temporal reality in its necessary structural relation to logical subjectivity is denied. Consequently logical objectivity cannot be grasped in its cosmically founded modal structure.

It may be that not every subjective logical concept is related to logical objectivity, just as not every subjective psychical feeling is directed to an objective sensory phenomenon. But the logical object-function of reality is certainly related to subjective logical thought; it has no metaphysical existence in a 'thing in itself', but only exists in the logical subject-object relation. It must be disclosed by logical subjectivity, and without this disclosure it remains latent, hidden in the meaning-coherence of

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1 Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS. Quaest. sup. Metph. I, IV qu. 1 (Opera Omnia, Paris): 'Primum objectum intellectus est ens ut commune omnibus'.
To which of the modal aspects of reality is logical objectivity related in the cosmic meaning-coherence? In the first place to those aspects that serve as the substratum for the logical modus and whose objective analogies must be found in the logical object-side of reality. The pre-logical aspects become logically thinkable only in logical objectivity.

But for the logical object-side of reality the so-called 'natural sides' of temporal reality would remain logically foreign to us; we should not be able to form a concept of them, because they are not logically founded. The pre-logical aspects of reality must primarily be objectified by logical thought, i.e., the logical object-side of reality must be made patent, manifest, if we are to attain to knowledge of these aspects. Logical objectivity is, however, not a creation of a 'transcendental logical subject', but it is fitted into the temporal world-order as the objective logical aspect of reality. Logical thought would not be able to objectify anything logically, if reality had not been given a logical object-side in the Divine order of the creation. Logical objectivity is the objective connectedness of logical multiplicity into modal logical unity comprised in the systatic meaning-coherence of reality. Outside of this meaning-coherence it could not exist. This objective logical systasis has no subjective analytical meaning, but it is the logical object of subjective analysis.

The element of truth in the so-called 'geistewissenschaftliche Methode'.

The limits within which it is possible to objectify anything logically are bound up with the retrocipatory structure of the logical law-sphere. This sheds a new light on the element of truth contained in the modern so-called 'geistewissenschaftliche' method in contrast with that of 'natural science'. Under the influence of Romanticism, and of Hegel, the demand was made on the so-called 'Geisteswissenschaften' to detach themselves completely from the 'spatial', objectifying way of thought custo-

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1 This term will be explained in the second part of this Volume (cf. p. 431).
2 Compare: Prologomena, Vol. I.
mary in the natural sciences. The reason was that 'socio-cultural phenomena' were supposed to be knowable only by reflexive dialectic thought. Dilthey replaced the latter by 'empathy'. In the light of our cosmonomic Idea this socio-cultural scientific method cannot be maintained. The element of truth contained in it, however, is this: the post-logical aspects of reality cannot be logically objectified in the same way as the pre-logical ones.

The post-logical subject-functions and subject-object relations have doubtless an objective logical foundation which is structurally related to subjective analysis. But it has already appeared from the analysis of the modal structure of historical facts that they are not given in the manner of natural events and that they lack a natural delimitation in the objective sensory space of perception. The historical identity and diversity of cultural facts appeared to depend on historical imputation. These logical analogies doubtless pre-suppose an identity and diversity in the original logical sense which can only be conceived in the logical object-function of the concrete facts in which the historical functions are realized. But the objective-logical characteristics of the facts which in their historical aspect are to be conceived as a unity, distinct from other events, are only to be found in the anticipatory direction of theoretical analysis. They cannot be established but under the direction of the historical viewpoint, not by seeking for a foundation in the objective sensory space of perception. And an analogical state of affairs is to be observed with respect to the objective logical characteristics of the post-historical functions of real facts.

It is therefore not true that the so-called 'Geisteswissenschaften' lack any logical objectivity. We may only say that their logical objectivity is quite different from that of the natural sciences.

In addition a sharp distinction should be maintained between the logical subject-object relation and the theoretical 'Gegenstand-relation'. It may be that the latter pre-supposes the former, but an identification of these relations would cancel the fundamental difference between theoretical and pre-theoretical thought.

§ 6 - THE SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATION IN THE JURIDICAL ASPECT AND THE PROBLEMS OF SUBJECTIVE RIGHT.

Finally we want to subject the important subject-object relation in the juridical law-sphere to a preliminary meaning-
jurists conceived of subjective right as essentially an individualistic subjective volitive power without giving account of the modal meaning-structure of the latter. Though recognizing the subject-object relation in subjective rights they tried to approximate the latter one-sidedly from the subjective angle. And, in an individualistic manner, they considered the juridical subject as an individuum. Only sporadically did they raise the problem of the juridical corporation (universitas) and inquired, how in the universitas a multiplicity of individuals becomes a subjective juridical unity. In order to solve this problem they had recourse to the Stoic construction of the universitas as a corpus ex distantibus (σῶμα ἐκ διστάτων) \(^1\) in which both the universitates rerum (a herd, a library, etc.) and the universitates personarum (the corporate juridical communities) were included.

This ‘universitas’ was looked upon as a multiplicity of individuals naturally existing without sensory-spatial points of contact as corpora singula et unita (σώματα ἴναμένα) \(^2\). But these individuals were supposed to be combined in thought into a unity by means of a fictitious juridical bond and named by one word (uni nomini subjecta) \(^2\).

Also the concept of the juridical object lacked a modal analysis of its meaning. According to the view held by the jurists the individualistic subjective power of the will determined the content of a subjective right in an entirely one-sided manner. This explains why the Germanic conception of an objective juridical sphere of things in which numerous subjective rights could be vested independent of the individual person entitled to them, was quite alien to the theoretically developed Roman ius civile and ius gentium.

\(^1\) Cf. e.g. POMPONIUS. 4. 30. D. 41. 3.
\(^2\) Cf. SENECA, Epist. 102 (lib. XVIII, 2): ‘Quaedam (corpora ex distantibus), quorum adhuc membra separata sunt, tanquam exercitus, populus, senatus, illi enim, per quos ista corpora efficiuntur, jure aut officio cohaerent, natura diducti et singuli sunt.’
The ‘thing’ concept with the Roman jurists.

Every sensorily perceptible thing capable of being the object of human volitional power was considered by the Roman jurists as a res, a corporeal juridical object. The fulness of right to this corporeal thing was the right of property, which was therefore often identified with the thing itself.

This primitive thing-concept was in the nature of the case insufficient to comprise the extremely differentiated juridical objects at a higher level of civilization. It already failed when a special right to a pars pro indiviso had to be understood.

For the res, — just as the juridical subject — was conceived as an isolated singularity without any internal multiplicity of juridical subject-object relations. Gierke points out that, strictly speaking, for this reason a thing could not be the object of various subjective rights at the same time. In fact, there was essentially only one direct ius in re, viz. the right of property. As the right of property included a thing in its totality entirely within the ‘volitive sphere’ of a juridical subject, it in principle excluded every other juridical will from the direct control over the same thing. Only as rights of a special (and at bottom of a fictitious) character the jura in re aliena did make their appearance. However, they could never wholly become direct jura in re, because the right of property continued to intervene between them and the thing. That is why these rights were always considered more or less as an anomaly.

In the case of personal rights, the subject-object relation could not be entirely eliminated either, but here the juridical object was, as much as possible, absorbed by the personal juridical connection between the juridical subjects concerned.

The distinction between corporeal and incorporeal things in Roman jurisprudence.

The difficulties were increased when juridical objects are successively related to a plurality of jura in re, e.g., in the case of a mortgage on an object of usufruct, whereas the usufruct itself rests on the object of property. Here the Roman jurists were confronted with a dilemma caused by the natural corporeal thing-concept used as the foundation for the concept of the juridical object: Should one deny the possibility of jura in re to

1 The origin of this exclusivistic conception of the dominium is doubtless to be found in the undifferentiated structure of the primitive Roman familia and the undifferentiated power of the pater familias.
In itself juridical 'constructions' cannot have a scientific sense. They are technical means serviceable to the practical task of law-formation. As such they are only to be judged according to their practical goal and to the requirements of the legal order.

But from the scientific viewpoint of theoretical jurisprudence they are to be subjected to a theoretical analysis in order to lay bare the real juridical states of affairs to which they give a technical legal form. When we confront the construction of rights to rights with the modal structure of the juridical subject-object relation we must ask the following question: Does the juridical subject-object relation, implied in every subjective right, permit itself to be made in its turn into a juridical object of another subjective right? If the modal subject-object relation does have a super-arbitrary structure which is founded in the cosmic-temporal order of the modal law-spheres, this question is inescapable. It will be examined in the next paragraph.

Legal theory has given very little attention to the problem mentioned. To my knowledge the famous German jurist Otto Gierke was the first to subject the construction of rights to rights to a critical analysis. But this criticism has found little adherence in legal theory and Gierke himself has not carried it through consistently.

In his analysis of the Roman construction of rights as rés incorporealés he observes that 'incorporeal things' can never be 'rights' as such but rather 'that part of the object-sphere of real things that has been affected by the right concerned and made into an object of the will' 1.

It is all the more astonishing that Gierke, notwithstanding this insight, has relapsed into the current construction of subjective rights as juridical objects without any further attempt to justify it. One does not speak of a right of mortgage to the right of property. Why then speak, e.g., of a right of mortgage to a claim

1 Genossenschaftsrecht II, p. 63: "...der von dem betreffenden Recht ergriffene und als Willensobjekt gesetzte Theil der Sachspeäre bestimmter Gegenstände". 

Hegel's theory of volitional power. Hegel conceived of subjective right as an individual volitional power. This theory, which had a great influence on the legal dogmatics of the 19th century, again starts from the conception of mechanical Roman jurists.
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for debt? This theoretical obscurity may lead in practice to unfair consequences. Every Dutch jurist knows this when he compares the jurisprudence of the Dutch High Court of Justice (de Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) with regard to the so-called ‘right of pledge on a claim for debt not made out to order’ with the social juridical sense of this form of security.¹

The conception of subjective rights in the theory of natural law.

On tracing the development of the dogmatics of subjective rights we are struck by the increasing confusion caused by the lack of a genuine modal analysis of the juridical subject-object relation. The Humanistic doctrine of natural law adapted its theory of subjective rights to its Idea of freedom. But this Idea of freedom shows a dialectical tension with the construction of the sovereign power of the legislator by means of the mathematical method of the science-ideal. This is the reason why the adherents of this doctrine direct all their attention to the relation between the subjective rights and the positive legal norms enacted by the legislator. They do not care for the cosmic structure of the juridical subject-object relation. The character of the juridical object is not even mentioned any more.

According to Hobbes, Pufendorff and Thomasius my own right is all that has not been forbidden me. Another view (already found in Grotius) holds that my own right is all that other juridical subjects in relation to me are forced to respect on account of the legal order. The theory of absolute innate human rights, which was started by Locke, really placed these rights as an ‘absolutum’ entirely outside of the legal order. As soon as it was consistently thought out, this theory was bound to be destructive to the recognition of positive law as an order of norms. These radical consequences were actually drawn by the young Fichte.

From this essentially un-juridical natural law conception are derived the notorious constructions of the rights to sleeping, to walking, to breathing, to living etc., which were taken quite seriously by the pandectists of the last century.

¹ Cf. Asser-Scholten: Zakenrecht, 7th edition, 1933, pp. 425 ff. According to the Hoge Raad the right of pledge on a claim for debt can only be realized by public sale of the claim. This means in fact a frustration of the right of pledge. In praxis this unacceptable consequence of the construction is escaped by stipulating in the pledge-contract an irrevocable authorization of the creditor to receive the amount of the claim directly from the debtor.
Like KANT, Hegel considers justice as having its anchorage in the super-sensory Idea of freedom. He gives a modal-historical content to this Idea in its realization in a legal order: with him justice becomes identical with the Idea of ethical power which is historically realized in the state as an ethical institution. In the legislative power of the body politic this Idea finds expression as a universal competence, and in subjective individual right as a particular will-power, as a private competence. Subjective right is the antithesis of morality, which antithesis is dissolved dialectically into a higher synthesis in the body politic as the incorporation of the true 'Sittlichkeit'. For the communal will of the state, in its conformity to the Idea of Justice, is at the same time the true will of its individual members, the citizens.

Just like KANT, Hegel excluded from the concept of subjective right the purpose to which the will-power in subjective right is made subservient, viz. the satisfaction of the needs and inclinations of man.

The element of interest is thus eliminated from the concept of subjective right. This view was adopted by the Historical School.

1 Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, §§ 29 and 41.
2 Hegel contrasts morality in its individualistic Kantian sense and "Sittlichkeit" as the ethics of the trans-personal community.
3 This elimination of the element of purpose from the concept of subjective right was of great consequence for the later theory of the abuse of rights. In the footsteps of the sociological legal theory of the French jurist Léon Duguit (a disciple of Durkheim) the French civilist Josserand defended the thesis that abuse of right is always present when a subjective right (not belonging to the 'droits non causés') is used in a way opposite to its social-economical purpose. This modern theory started from Duguit's conception of the 'droit social', which had no room for the classical idea of private civil law. It absolutized the specific juridical sphere of modern industrial law. Duguit maintained that civil law was to be transformed into 'social law'. Josserand's theory, inspired by Duguit, was accepted in the first paragraph of the bolshevist Russian code of civil law.

In sharp contrast to this theory Hegel defended the classical conception of civil law, according to which the positive determination of the specific purpose to which a subjective right is made subservient, is reserved to the private autonomy of man within the limits of the public interest of the body politic. If this conception is accepted the criterion of abuse of right can only be found in the absence of any rational in-
Von Savigny\textsuperscript{1} and Puchta\textsuperscript{2} both look upon subjective right as essentially the \textit{particular will-power of the individual}, apart from the interest served by it.

The elimination of non-juridical interests from the concept of subjective right in the \textit{theory of civil law} had indeed a good sense. But the Historical School also eliminated the \textit{juridical} element of interest which, as we shall see, as an economical analogy, is essential to the modal structure of every subjective right.

This was bound to result in a disconnection of the subject-object relation inherent in the latter. Subjective right was supposed to be concentrated in the subjective power of the will (whose analogical character within the juridical aspect was lost sight of) and the point of gravitation was sought in the juridical relations between one person and another.

Hegel could only recognize ‘unfree nature’ as an object. In its later development (Lenel, Schlossmann and Thon, and later on also Windscheid) the theory of will-power entirely relinquished the juridical object.

\textsuperscript{1} Von Savigny, \textit{System des heutigen römischen Rechts} I, p. 7: “Betrachten wir den Rechtszustand, so wie er uns im wirklichen Leben von allen Seiten umgibt und durchdringt, so erscheint uns darin zunächst die der einzelnen Person zustehende Macht: ein Gebiet worin ihr Wille herrscht und mit unserer Einstimmung herrscht. Diese Macht nennen wir \textit{ein Recht} dieser Person, gleichbedeutend mit Befugniss: Manche nennen es das Recht im subjektiven Sinn.” [When we consider the juridical condition as it surrounds and permeates us on all sides in real life, we first of all discover in it the power belonging to the individual person: a domain in which his will rules, and rules with our consent. We call this power \textit{a right} of this person, of the same meaning as competency: Many people call it a right in a subjective sense.]

\textsuperscript{2} Puchta, \textit{Cursus der Institutionen} I, § 6: “Wir gebrauchen das Wort Recht:

1°. für den allgemeinen Willen, den Willen der Gesammtheit;
2°. für den Willen des Einzelnen, sofern er jedem allgemeinen Willen entspricht, für die Herrschaft oder Macht, die der Person über einen Gegenstand gegeben ist.”

[We use the word right:
1°. for the general will, the will of a community;
2°. for the will of an individual insofar as it is in accordance with the general will, for the control (or power) given to the individual person over an object.]
earlier conception of the difference between *jura in personam* and *jura in re*.

*Von Savigny* still tried to find a basis for this distinction in the difference between the objects of right (not conceived in the modal juridical meaning):

‘Unfree nature’, according to him, is the object of *jura in re*; certain human actions are the objects of *jura in personam*. The juridical character proper of subjective right, however, he only found in the personal juridical relation as it is regulated by a juridical norm: ‘every juridical relation appears to us as a relation between person and person, determined by a juridical norm’\(^1\). The earlier theory of will-power had not conceived the subject-object relation in its modal juridical meaning. It was therefore only consistent in the later will-theorists to abandon this relation altogether, when they distinguished between *jura in personam* and *jura in re*. According to them a *jus in personam* was merely the volitive control over a person in consequence of a particular personal legal relation; a *jus in re* was such a control over any other than the person entitled to it. They simply identified *jus in re* and so-called *absolute right*, of which it was formerly held to be only a specimen.

The consequence of the elimination of the juridical subject-object relation is the cancelling of the concept of subjective right.

This elimination of the juridical subject-object relation was in reality only the result of a lack of theoretical distinction of its juridical meaning that had from the outset been characteristic of the theory of subjective right.

It now led to endless confusion between subjective right and juridical competence (in the sense of a juridical authority over persons), and in close connection with this obliteration of the boundaries, to a complete merging of subjective right into the law-side of the juridical aspect. The ultimate consequence was a radical abandonment of the concept of subjective right. This

\(^1\) *System* I, 52: “jedes Rechtsverhältnis erscheint uns als eine Beziehung zwischen Person und Person, durch eine Rechtsregel bestimmt.”
The conclusion has been drawn in recent times, though from a different methodological starting-point, by Kelsen and Duguit and their followers. They look upon the concept of subjective right as merely a metaphysical residue of natural law.

From the beginning this radically negative result was favoured by an inner antinomy in the will-power theory that wished not to merge subjective right into the law-side of the juridical aspect. For this theory really conceived of subjective right as a kind of private authority over other juridical subjects, even in the merely coordinate juridical interpersonal relations of private civil law in which these juridical subjects are related to one another in juridical equality. That is why this theory immediately got involved in this difficulty: How can the subjective will of a juridical subject obtain authority over the will of a juridical subject coordinated with him, and as such impose obligations on the latter.

The historicist view of law which is of an irrationalistic origin, always tried to reduce the law-side of the juridical aspect to the subject-side conceived as a community or a group. To this view law is originally the irrationalistically conceived 'general will of the people' which receives its juridical organization in the State. Nothing was thus more obvious than identifying the will-power manifested in subjective right with the will of the State as a juridical communal will.

In the beginning the will-power theory did not draw this conclusion from its starting-point. It rather maintained Hegel's point of view that the general will and the particular will, the will of the State and subjective right, remained dialectically distinguished from each other, although the latter was considered to form a dialectical unity with the will of the State. Kierulff, for example, a Hegelian, and not an adherent of the Historical School, defined subjective right as 'the concrete unity of the will of the State and the individual subjective will'.

This is to say that the private subjective will-power over persons can only create obligations insofar as the latter are consonant with the positive juridical norms (as the general will of the State).

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1 Theorie des gemeinen Civilrechts I, p. 154.
views ousted the idealistic-historical conceptions which at least had oriented volitional power to the normative Idea of freedom. A psychological idea of will was introduced into the theory of subjective right. So the latter got entangled in the familiar antinomies incident upon this concept of will with respect to the rights of new-born babies, madmen, sleeping people, and generally of those who acquire subjective rights without themselves knowing anything of them.

With the aid of fictions it was attempted to mask these antinomies. The positivistic theory of will considered both subjective right and the juridical norm to be a psychological imperative. But when thought out consistently this theory could not find any other commands in subjective right than those of the law-giver.

Thus Binding's pupil THON retained nothing of subjective right but the 'claim' that the law-giver grants to the individual by permitting other norms to be enforced (the so-called secondary or sanctionary norms) in case the primary norms that protect him are infringed. These secondary norms aim at the primary norms being complied with, or at obtaining something that is equivalent to this. If this reasoning was carried on in the same positivistic strain, there was no escape from resolving the pre-processual subjective right into the purely formal processual competence to bring in an action.

The theory of interests also eliminates the juridical subject-object relation.

Thus the volitional theory ultimately cancelled the concept of subjective right by eliminating the subject-object relation. The theory of interests introduced by Rudolph v. Jhering in the last period of his thought was no more able to resist the gradual theoretical merging of subjective right into a function of the juridical norm. With him this was due to an unjuridical conception of the interest-element.

2 Rechtsnorm und subjectives Recht, p. 218.
V. JHERING, in an earlier period an adherent of the Historical School and its theory of will-power¹, subsequently called interest a substantial or material moment in subjective right. This interest depends for its juridical definition on a formal moment, viz. the legal protection given to it by the legal order. Since this juridical delimitation is only of a formal character and lacks any material determination of the meaning of law, it is of essential importance to know in what sense v. JHERING understands the moment of interest. He puts it on a level with the ideas of utility, a good, value and pleasure. The standard by which the legal order measures these concepts is, according to him, by no means exclusively an economical criterion, which v. JHERING moreover identifies very arbitrarily with money and monetary value. Capital is not the only thing that must be safeguarded by the legal order. There are other values of a higher order, i.e., of an ethical nature, viz. personality, liberty, honour, the bond of kinship, all of them things without which ‘outwardly visible’ goods would be valueless². This means that v. JHERING turns ‘interest’ into a general concept which eradicates all modal boundaries of meaning. In addition, his theory of subjective right also eliminates the subject-object relation completely.

If one talks of a subjective right to personality, or to liberty, and denatures paternal authority (which is a juridical power over persons and not over objects) to a subjective right, as v. JHERING does, the concept of juridical object as a requisite for every subjective right is in principle given up. The legal order can in principle only protect retributive interests. A child has a moral interest in receiving its livelihood from its parents as a gift of love, and not merely as an object of its civil right. But the protection of this interest is something that in principle cannot be guaranteed by the legal order of the body politic, which v. JHERING considers as the whole of law.

V. JHERING, however, does not in any way define the meaning of his concept of interest. This defect has never been removed in the later so-called combinative theories which aimed at a compromise between the theory of volitional power and that of interests. Each of these theories has obliterated the boundaries between subjective right and competence (in the sense of a

¹ Geist des römischen Rechts II, 1e Abt. p. 143 ff.
² Ibid. III, 1, p. 339/40.
Competence does not belong to the subject-side but to the law-side of the juridical sphere. It is primarily competence to the making of law, and in general juridical power over persons. Competence necessarily has a juridical content, but in principle it lacks any relation to a juridical object.

The content and the object of a subjective right coalesce no more than do the content and object of a concept, or of a subjective sensory image of perception. The competence of government, that of voting, paternal authority, the competence to perform private legal acts etc., are fundamentally different from genuine subjective rights. They have no juridical object. The prevailing theories about subjective right lack a clearly defined juridical concept of object. This appears, e.g., clearly from the combinative theory of the famous German jurist Jellinek, who speaks of a subjective right of the sovereign to the juridical obedience of the citizens, thereby promoting a legal duty to the rank of a legal object. Once the fundamental boundaries between competence and subjective right are effaced, there are no longer any means to resist in principle the elimination of the concept of subjective right.

The volitional theory at first laid emphasis on the power of disposal on the part of the party entitled to it. By this it did not mean the disposal of the object of a subjective right, but that of this right itself. But this power of disposal cannot possibly be an integral part of a subjective right, let alone a subjective right as such, since the disposal of a right is really a private act of law-making.

The competence to transfer subjective rights is a competence to the autonomous formation of private law in concreto and has only its normal juridical ground and condition in the subjective right of the authorized party. It may be that in particular cases this competence is lacking, whereas the subjective right is doubtless present. In other words, competence and subjective right are different juridical powers which are normally connected with each other but are not identical.

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The identification of the juridical power to dispose of a subjective right as such with the power over the object of this right made it seem easy for THON to show that the faculty of disposition may also occur entirely detached from a subjective right.

He pointed, for instance, to the conveyance to a bona fide third party of fraudulently converted personal property. In virtue of an explicit provision of German private law this conveyance makes the third party the owner of the good. This argument was unsound\(^1\), it is true, but it did not fail to make some impression. If on the other hand the theory of interests emphasized the power of enjoyment of the entitled subject, the un-juridical view of the concepts of interest and enjoyment immediately took revenge, so that it was easy for THON to carry to absurdity the doctrine that the power of enjoyment is essential to a subjective right.

The consistently Hegelian view in the will-theory had eliminated the element of interest from the concept of subjective right, and therefore was obliged also to cancel the power of enjoyment contained in that concept. This is what KIERULFF, HAELENSCHNER and others actually did with the utmost rigour. Yet in the volitional theory, especially in WINDSHEID, this consequence was by no means generally taken\(^2\). THON, as an adherent of this theory in its positivistic psychologistic form, did so with great penetration\(^3\). His criticism of the view he combats was all the more effective as the latter conceived of the power of enjoyment as the natural freedom to enjoy anything freely that has not been forbidden in the positive legal order. This unjuridical view, already defended in HOBSES’ theory of natural law, had led to a great disturbance in the doctrine of subjective rights.

\(^1\) It mixes up juridical ground with juridical consequence (the causal analogy on the law-side of the juridical aspect). THON makes an attempt to prove the possibility of a private disposing power apart from a subjective right. This attempt can never be successful. The owner can convey the property on the ground of his subjective right. The person not entitled is exactly the one who possesses no competence to convey the property. If according to the Dutch Civil Code art. 2014 the property in a fraudulently converted movable is transferred to a bona fide third party who has got the possession, it is only in virtue of the law which applies the juridical principle of the protection of good faith to this case.

\(^2\) Pandekten, 167, 179, no. 5.

\(^3\) Rechtsnorm und subjektives Recht, pp. 288 ff.
The interest-theory was especially obliged to seek such a criterion, as its concept of interest was perfectly unjuridical.

A manufacturer may have an interest in an act increasing the import-duties on goods competing with those produced by him. But this does not mean that he has a mysterious subjective right to the execution of the act. In the elective public function no doubt personal interests are involved, but this does not make it a subjective right. Von Jhering, who was presumably the first to pay attention to the difference between subjective right and reflex-permission, sought the criterion in the legal protection (the action in a material sense).

But not every interest protected by an action is a subjective right! We may refer to the old actio popularis in Roman Law, to the administrative action ex art. 58 of the Dutch Civil Servants Act 1929 allowed to the official on account of "détournement de pouvoir" of his superiors (abuse of power), to the action for divorce, etc. Neither can one find a criterion in the restriction that the action must have been allowed in the preponderantly individual interest of the person concerned. In the case of the civil servant mentioned above his personal interest is no doubt involved in the administrative action in a preponderant way.

But where can one find a subjective right that would have been infringed in the case of a civil servant being transferred by his superiors to another department of the administration, not for reasons concerning the service but because of sheer personal rancour? And the conclusive proof that the above-mentioned criterion is wrong was already to be found in the interdicts of the Roman law of possession. These interdicts even protected the thief against any act of force undertaken by the subjectively entitled person on his own account. Possession as such, in contradiction to property, is not a subjective right at all. In every respect the theory of subjective right appears to come to grief, if it does not conceive of subjective rights in the juridical subject-object relation.

So I may now submit the synthetical formulae for the concept of the juridical aspect on its law-side and its subject-side, which should be taken in strict correlation with each other.

1°. The modal meaning of the juridical aspect on its law-side as consisting (the order) in the multiplicity of retributive norms.
§ 7 - THE JURIDICAL SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATION AND THE LIMITS WITHIN WHICH JURIDICAL OBJECTIFICATION IS POSSIBLE.

The modal meaning of the juridical object.

How are we to conceive the juridical subject-object relation? In the first place full emphasis should be laid on the fact that this relation is by no means exclusively bound to the figure of subjective right.

There are also 'objective juridical facts', such as, e.g., (the juridical aspect of) the burning-down of a house, the damage caused by a hailstorm, etc., which stand in a juridical subject-object relation to juridical subjects (e.g., the proprietor, the insurers and the insured). They are dependent juridical facts that have no juridical meaning outside their connection with subjective juridical facts (e.g., an insurance contract; a tort; etc.) Without this modal subject-object relation no juridical object-function is possible. In the juridical relation of a subjective right the juridical object is the object of a subjective legal power of disposal and enjoyment, and the latter is regulated by juridical norms on the law-side. It is of the utmost importance to conceive of a juridical object in a truly modal juridical sense as related to the subjective power of disposal and enjoyment of the subjectively entitled person. Otherwise one will not be able to avoid the errors discovered in the theories discussed in an earlier context. A juridical object can only be found in the juridical object-side of concrete reality. It can never be identical with the full reality of a thing, nor with an object of sensory perception, — a view held by the Roman jurists in their concept of the 'res corporalis'. The juridical object can only be conceived in the modal meaning of retribution. It is nothing but a modal function, and this function is determined by the modal structure of the juridical subject-object relation. This state of affairs does not detract from the fact that the modal object-functions and the juridical subject-object relations in which they function are individualized in the typical structures of individuality.

In previous examinations we have already referred to the arithmetical, the spatial, the kinematic, the physical, the psychical, the logical, the historical, the lingual, the 'social', the economic and the aesthetic retrocipations in the retributive aspect.

\(^1\) Cf. pp. 128 ff, 134 ff, 136 ff. of this Volume.
is: the unity (the order) in the multiplicity, positivized from super-arbitrary principles and having a particular, signified meaning, area and term of validity.

In the correlation of the inter-personal and the communal functions of the competency-spheres these norms are to be imputed to the will of formative organs, and they regulate the balance in a multiplicity of inter-personal and group-interests according to grounds and effects, in the coherence of permissive and prohibitive (or injunctive) functions by means of a harmonizing process preventing from any excess, in the meaning-nucleus of retribution.

2°. The modal meaning of the juridical aspect on its subject-side is: the multiplicity of the factual retributive subject-object relations imputable to the subjective will of subjects qualified to act, or per repraesentationem to those not so qualified. These subject-object relations are bound to a place and a time, in the correlation of the communal and the interpersonal rights and duties of their subjects. In their positive meaning — in accordance with (or in conflict with) the juridical norms —, these subject-object relations are causal with respect to the harmonious balance of human interests in the meaning of retribution.

In these definitions all the retrocipatory moments in the modal structure of the juridical aspect have been summarized and qualified by the juridical nuclear moment of retribution.

The juridical object in the legal subject-object relation is no arbitrary construction of thought. No more is the juridical subject, but both are modal functions strictly bound to the cosmic temporal order, and they can only be understood from the modal structure of the juridical modus whose two-fold theoretical definition is given above.

The cosmic boundaries of the possibility of juridical objectification. The economical and historical analogies in the juridical object-function.

Legal theory should in the first place be aware of the fact that the juridical object-function is strictly bound to an economical analogy. It is not true that everything can be made into the juridical object of a subjective right. This is only the case with
things which have the economic function of relatively scarce goods serviceable to human needs and therefore capable of frugal administration. Neither the free air, nor natural organic functions like breathing or sleeping can, as such, be objects of subjective rights. In the second place the historical retrocipation in the modal structure of the juridical subject-object relation implies a fundamental restriction of the juridical object-function. Things which in the present state of human culture are not controllable by cultural activity cannot function as juridical objects of human rights.

The juridical power of disposing is necessarily founded in the possibility of cultural control. Therefore Hugo Grotius in his famous book *Mare liberum* denied with good reason the claims of England to the propriety of the open sea, just as in his earlier treatise *De jure praedae* (ch. XII) he denied the same claims of Portugal. A subjective right implies a retributive interest of the entitled subject. But a claim to juridical power over the open sea which, as such, is neither controllable nor economizable by a single people exclusively, is excessive in a retributive sense. Consequently, it cannot be based upon a retributive interest; in international law it has never been acknowledged. This question is indeed to be discussed apart from political prejudices. It is susceptible of a scientific examination in the light of the modal structure of the juridical subject-object relation.

Apart from the figure of subjective right, the juridical subject-object relation is also bound to the economical and historical analogies in the case of objective juridical facts.

Natural events which have no actual objective function in relation to human culture and economic valuation, cannot function as objective legal facts in relation to juridical subjects.

The possibility of moral and pistical anticipations in the juridical object-function.

Particularly interesting is the question whether post-juridical modal subject-functions and subject-object relations may be objectified in the anticipatory spheres of the juridical law-sphere.

This philosophical problem has become of actual consequence in Dutch jurisprudence since in 1926 the Hoge Raad (High Court of Justice) decided that obligations of morality and decent behaviour may found a natural obligation in the sense of civil law. It is quite evident that there can be no question here of moral duties
financial support of our neighbour would be accepted as a natural obligation in the sense of civil law.

Apparently we are confronted here with moral anticipations in the juridical subject-object relation. There is question of morality in the anticipatory sense of retribution, so that its obligations remain subject to fundamental retributive principles of balance and harmony between the different interests of juridical life.

The object of a natural obligation participates in this anticipatory structure of the juridical subject-object relation, because its juridical meaning is dependent upon the subjective legal relation between the persons concerned in the obligation.

There also exist juridical obligations which are typically qualified by a moral relation of love. So for instance the natural juridical obligations between the husband and his wife, between parents and children, which exceed the boundaries of civil law.

In the same way juridical obligations may be typically qualified by a relation of faith. This is the case with the internal ecclesiastical legal relations. In all these cases the juridical subject-object relation shows an anticipatory structure.

The construction of rights to rights.

We shall now return to the question whether the subject-object relation, implied in every subjective right, in its turn permits itself to be made into the juridical object of another subjective right.

In my opinion, the construction of rights to rights, quite apart from the question as to what consequences ought to be connected with it by the legal order, may indeed correspond to real juridical states of affairs. When Gierke says that the real object of a right can only be the specific object-sphere of the res affected by this right, this is doubtless correct. But a *jus in re* may indeed be vested in an immovable in such a way that it is independent of the particular person entitled to it, and remains valid even when the latter is temporarily lacking. This state of affairs is found, e.g., in the so-called "Reallasten" of Germanic law.

It is doubtless true that, as long as the entitled subject is not determined, the right cannot be actualized.
But it remains inherent in the immovable. It is really objectified in the latter. There is nothing in the modal structure of the juridical subject-object relation which prevents the making of such an objectified right itself into the object of another right, for instance of a right of mortgage.

Both the cultural and the economical retrocipations are doubtless present in the "Reallast". It is indeed a juridical objectification of a cultural and economical interest and, as such, the incorporation of a retributive interest: it is an objective juridical sphere in the immovable related to the right into whose object it has been made.

In this objective sphere of juridical power the original juridical subject-object relation is maintained. This is not contradictory. It has appeared that also in an objective sensory perceptual image, subject-object relations may be implied, for instance in the objective perceptual image of a mother-bird feeding its young ones. The subject-object relation between the birds and their food is essential even in its sensory objectification.

It is true that we are confronted here in the first place with the sensory objectification of a biotic subject-object relation. But in this context we have referred to the implicit character of the objectification. In the instance concerned there is also a psychical subject-object relation between the birds and the food, which is implicitly objectified in the sensory perceptual image of the mother-bird feeding its young ones. In this image one can observe how the young birds perceive the food. In other words the objective sensory perceptual image also implies a sensory objectification of subject-object relations between sensory animal perception and the food as object of this animal perception.

So it appears that modal subject-object relations may even be objectified in the law-sphere in which they function. If this is correct there is nothing surprising in the fact that in the juridical law-sphere rights may become objects of other rights.

Our enquiry into the possibilities of juridical objectification can be continued by asking whether a competence implying juridical authority over persons is to be made into the object of a subjective right. This question is of great importance with regard to the problem of the so-called public rights.

In the undifferentiated state of the secular under-structure of

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1 Cf. p. 374 ff. of this Volume.
2 Cf. p. 373.
of a juridical authority over persons was a desired good.

Since the rise of the modern state, as an institution of public interest, as a res publica, connected with the general process of social differentiation, no single juridical authority over persons can be the object of a private right.

If there are public rights to be acknowledged, their subject cannot be a private person, but only the body politic and its parts.

In this respect there is no difference between states under monarchical and those under non-monarchical government. In a real state, in contradistinction to the undifferentiated feudal regnum, the person invested with the royal office cannot have a private right to this office notwithstanding the fact that the kingship may be hereditary and the succession to the throne is regulated in the constitution. The public office of kingship is never an object, neither of a private nor of a public right. The person who, according to the constitution, is called to the throne, has only a public claim to the kingship, which in principle lacks the character of a subjective right. But the person of the King has doubtless a subjective right to the royal income and to the use of the royal palaces, and these rights have a public as well as a private aspect.

In the object of public rights there must also be present a juridical objectification of cultural and economical interests, but these interests may not be of a private character. In this sense the state has a public right to taxes, to public rivers and roads etc. But it is meaningless to speak of a public right of the state to the obedience of its subjects, as does Georg Jellinek.

The legal duty of obedience does not function in a juridical subject-object relation, in which the obedience is the object of a legal duty and of a corresponding right.

Obedience as such is only subjective behaviour in conformity to legal norms. It is the content, not the object of a legal duty.

No more can the parental legal authority over infants in a differentiated society be a subjective right, nor the object of a subjective right of the parents.

It lacks, as such, a juridical object, and is only a legal relation between subjects, an office inherent in the institution of the
natural family. Quite different was the legal figure of the patria potestas in the ancient Roman domestic community, which was not a natural family but rather a primitive undifferentiated community. This undifferentiated domestic power of the paterfamilias was indeed at the same time an office and a subjective right of propriety implying the legal faculty to sell the children subjected to the patria potestas.

It cannot be explained from the natural structure of the family, and should be sharply distinguished from the natural legal authority of the parents over their infants. Therefore it is very confusing that the latter is usually conceived by legal theory as a subjective right.

It should always be borne in mind that in the subject-object relation implied in a right the object can only be a juridical objectification of a cultural and economical interest. This gives the concept of subjective right its natural restriction.

The cosmic boundaries of the possibility of juridical objectification and the juridical meaning of slavery.

This is also important for a true insight into the meaning of slavery. Never can the full personality of a human being, or even his subjective moral and faith-functions as such, be juridical objects. On this the Christian Church has laid emphasis from the outset, also when it could oppose the institution of slavery only indirectly 1.

For this reason STAMMLER'S opinion that slavery makes human personality as such a juridical object, is untenable even in a juridical sense.

The juridical object in itself is no more a cultural and an economic interest than an objective psychical perceptual image is identical with the pre-psychical aspects of a thing perceived. But a juridical object, such as the object of a subjective right, cannot

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1 Cf. e.g. LACTANTIUS, Div. Inst. 5, 15: 'nam cum omnia humana non corpore, sed spiritu metiamur, tametsi corporum sit diversa condicio, nobis tamen servi non sunt, sed eos et habemus et dicimus spiritu fratres, religione conservos." [for, since we judge of whatever is human by spiritual and not by bodily standards, they are no slaves to us. And although their bodily condition may be different, we not only hold them to be brothers in a spiritual sense, and fellow servants in religion, but we call them so too.]

In his De benef. 3, 20 ff also SENECa had declared himself against the extension of slavery to the 'spiritual'. But in other writings, he speaks in a quite different strain! (e.g., De ira 3, 10, 4; 3, 37, 2).
with respect to objects that are 'characterized by a special kind of subject-object relation. For, quite unlike the property rights, they are related to the individual personality of their subject.}

This is no reason to proclaim the personality itself the object of these rights. It is not even a reason to split copyright and the right to a patent into two dissimilar subjective rights, viz. an 'individual right' to one's own personality, and a 'right to immaterial goods' in the sense of a real right to a creative idea or invention. This is what the famous German jurist Kohler does. But he overlooks the fact that the objectified product of the mind is the only possible object of a copyright or a right to a patent, and remains indissolubly bound up with its individual maker or inventor, in contradistinction to other juridical objects. It remains his creation or invention, although others may make use of it on certain conditions, and even acquire real rights to it. It must be immediately granted that modern civil law protects the individual personality in the 'personality rights' in a special way. But the special legal protection of the personality as such, without any demonstrable real juridical object, does not require
an impossible subjective right to personality. This appears from the way in which the Dutch Civil Code accords protection to a person’s reputation and to his life. The same course might be taken to protect a person’s name, portrait etc. while dropping the requirement of guilt on the part of him who encroaches upon this protected sphere of personality. In this way there is not any need of the construction of a subjective right.

The theory of personality-rights tries to make the personality itself an object of subjective rights. This idea is merely inherited from the doctrine of the innate fundamental rights of man, one of the most famous chapters of Humanistic natural law since Locke and Christian Wolff. But, as remarked above, this natural law construction of subjective right lacked any orientation to the juridical subject-object relation.

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1 Cf. e.g. Gierke's definition: ‘Personality-rights we call rights safeguarding their subject the control of a part of his own personality-sphere. By this name they are designated as ‘rights to one's own person’, and consequently distinguished from all other rights by referring to the peculiarity of their object.’ [“Persönlichkeitsrechte” nennen wir Rechte, die ihrem Subjekte die Herrschaft über einem Bestandteil der eigenen Persönlichkeitsphäre gewährleisten. Mit diesem Namen werden sie als “Rechte an der eigenen Person” gekennzeichnet und somit durch den Hinweis auf die Besonderheit ihrer Objektes von allen anderen Rechten unterschieden”] (Deutsches Privatrecht, p. 702).

Cf., however, also op. cit. p. 765 where Gierke admits with respect to copyright that the objectified “Geisteswerk” (intellectual product) is an object proper, insofar as it remains the personal property of its maker (Persönlichkeitsgut seines Schöpfers). A younger adherent of Gierke’s theory, Reinhardt, however, in his inaugural oration, delivered in the University of Cologne on: Das Persönlichkeitsrecht in der geltenden Rechtsordnung (1931) considers the object of such rights as copyright and the right of patent to be the characteristic of man’s personality in contradistinction to ‘goods of the outerworld’. According to him it is not the objectified work of an author or of an inventor that is the true object of copyrights and rights of patent, but the essence (Wesenheit) of the originator (“Urheber”) which expresses itself on its account. I would modestly ask where in this case the subject of these rights must be sought. Perhaps outside of the “Wesenheit des Urhebers” (the originator’s essential being)?
CHAPTER VII

THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUALITY WITHIN THE MODAL CADRE OF THE LAW-SPHERES.

§ 1 - THE MODAL FUNCTIONS OF INDIVIDUALITY AND THE GRADATIONS OF THE MODAL INDIVIDUALITY OF MEANING.

The problem of individuality is a fundamental question of empirical reality and as a structural problem it cannot be discussed before the third volume. In our analysis of the modal structure of the law-spheres, however, it appeared necessary to consider the modal individuality of meaning, because in its functional character it belongs to the theory of the modal-spheres. In the structure of the law-spheres the problem of individuality presents itself as the problem of the functional or modal individuality of meaning. There would be no internal connection between the theory of the modal spheres and that of the typical structures of individuality, if the modal-structure of the former did not itself refer to the structures of individuality. In that case our philosophic inquiry would fall asunder into two absolutely separate parts. But our earthly cosmos does not consist of two separate worlds, one of the modal law-spheres and one of individual things.

The modal-structures lie at the foundation of the structures of individuality and are individualized by the latter. But how is it possible for the modal meaning of a law-sphere to express itself in such a wealth of functional individuality, whereas it is always the same modality in all kinds of individualization?

The distinction of juridical facts according to the modal structural moments of juridical meaning.

For instance, the primary modal meaning of the juridical law-sphere is always the same in all juridical norms, on the law-side, as well as in all subjective and objective juridical figures, on the subject-side. And yet, this modal meaning is expressed in an incalculable number of meaning-individualities within the legal sphere. This will appear from a comparison of the various analogy of the juridical aspect on its law-side, in its insoluble coherence with juridical competency. In our summary analysis of the historical aspect we have seen that this moment can be discovered on the law-side of all the post-historical spheres and is typically interwoven with the subject-side.
subjective juridical facts according to their juridical-functional content. Juridical systematism tries to classify this modal individuality according to a gradually descending scale from general to more particular concepts. This exterior method of classification at any rate pre-supposes some gradation in juridical individuality itself.

A method derived from the theory of the modal spheres should start from the modal structural moments of the juridical sphere itself.

We have seen that the modal subject-object relation requires the distinction between subjective and objective juridical facts, the latter always functioning dependently. A fire caused by a stroke of lightning, e.g., can obviously function in the juridical aspect of reality only as an objective dependent juridical fact. It can only be attended by juridical consequences in connection with the legal relations between juridical subjects.

As such it is a dependent incomplete juridical fact, as its objective juridical meaning always depends on possible subjective juridical relations.

On the other hand a contract of sale or a marriage settlement are undeniably subjective complete legal facts; in the former juridical subject-object relations are contained from the start.

In this general fundamental distinction the modal individuality of meaning does not yet play a part. No more is it relevant to the distinction between lawful deeds and delicts.

This distinction is oriented to a logical analogy (lawfulness and unlawfulness) in the modal meaning of the juridical sphere.1

Also the distinction between law-making volitional declarations and such that have merely a subjective legal content (as for instance serving a summons upon a certain person), is no more than a modal structural distinction. It is apparently intended in the German general theory of law in the strange opposition of "Rechtsgeschäfte" and "Rechtshandlungen"; but here the real legal states of affairs to which the distinction refers, is fundamentally misinterpreted. In fact, a law-making volitional declaration is related to a particular retrocipatory moment in the modal structure of the juridical law-sphere, viz. that of law-formation.2 The formative moment is found in the historical

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1 We have seen that this distinction ultimately refers back to the principium contradictionis in the analytical modus.

2 In the positivistic general theory of law this distinction lacks a
The typical structures of juridical facts in which the modal distinctions are individualized.

Things are quite different when theoretical jurisprudence and the legal order itself start classifying the juridical facts after specific types, e.g., criminal delicts in manslaughter and murder, arson, theft, perjury, etc. and then try to include these types under more general heads (crimes against bodily security, crimes against property, etc.). At this point we are face to face with the modal meaning-individuality. It may be that the latter is determined by the modal meaning-structure of the juridical aspect, but the meaning-individuality is not to be inferred from the modal structure in an *a priori* way. It is clear that typifications and classifications like those mentioned above can never hit off the absolute individuality of a *juridical casus*. They are founded on a theoretical abstraction that is only possible at a higher historical level of culture in which law-making is really in need of a scientific juridical foundation.

In any case the individualizing of the modal sphere appears to show gradations. It tends to the pole of complete subjective individuality where no two juridical facts are the same.

When this pole has been attained, we become definitively aware of the impossibility of reducing the factual subject-side of the juridical aspect to the law-side.

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*The General Theory of the Modal Spheres*

Indeterminateness is of no consequence for philosophy. If primacy was ascribed to the matter-motive, individuality was conceived as a guilt which must be reconciled by the dissolution of individual beings.

Matters are entirely different in the light of our Christian
True structural concepts of individuality can never be acquired by means of the current method of gradual abstraction.

The classificatory method exemplified here, in which one makes use of generic and specific concepts, remains within the cadre of the concept of modal function.

But it is no more possible to acquire true structural concepts of individuality by means of the current procedure of gradual abstraction which neglects the cosmic order of time than we can obtain theoretical insight into the modal structures of the law-spheres in this way.

Hence: In a merely functional concept of meaning-individuality, acquired by a procedure of gradual abstraction, one cannot grasp the structural individuality of reality according to its juridical aspect. Neither can the individualization which a modal aspect shows within a (typical) structure of individuality be inferred from the modal meaning-structure. Where then can we find the bridge leading from the modal meaning-structure to the immense wealth of the modal individuality of meaning?

This problem has a strong appeal to philosophy and at the same time it has great profundity.

§ 2 - THE ELIMINATION OF THE MODAL MEANING-INDIVIDUALITY IN THE FORM-MATTER-SCHEME OF IMMANENCE-PHILOSOPHY.

The problem could not be solved, if the modal structures and the typical structures of individuality had no common root.

The old problem of scholastic rationalistic metaphysics in its ‘realistic’ attitude, viz. the question: What is the principium individuationis? is insoluble and internally contradictory. This metaphysics started from the dialectical Greek form-matter motive which prevents the insight into the radical individual concentration of temporal reality in the human I-ness.

So the dialectical problem was born as to whether individuality originates from the essential form or from the matter of natural substances. If the latter solution was accepted the form in its pure essence was conceived of as a universale which can be only individualized by matter. But this individualization contradicted its ideal character. If the first solution was chosen the form seemed also to be deprived of its ideal nature.

In Greek metaphysics individuality was depreciated in principle. If religious primacy was ascribed to the form-motive individuality was conceived of as an apeiron, which in its ultimate
cosmonomic Idea. According to the latter there cannot be in
creation any dialectical tension between the universal and the
ultimate individuality of things and events. The universal is
inherent in the law-side, the ultimate individual is essential to
the subject-side of our earthly cosmos, in a strict correlation of
these two sides of creation. This correlation is maintained in the
religious root of our empirical world. Consequently there can be
no question of a depreciation either of the individuality of factual
things and events or of the universal trait inherent in the
Divine order of laws.

In Christ, the root of the reborn creation, the transcendent
fulness of individuality has been saved. The ‘corpus Christianum’ in its radical religious sense is not a colourless conceptual abstraction without any individuality. Rather it is, according to
the striking metaphor used by St. Paul, a religious organism in
which the individuality of its members is ultimately revealed in
all its fulness and splendour. Individuality, in other words, is
rooted in the religious centre of our temporal world: all temporal
individuality can only be an expression of the fulness of individuality inherent in this centre. However obfuscated by sin, it springs from the religious root. If the modalities of meaning are
temporal refractions of the religious fulness of meaning, then
the fulness of individuality must also be refracted prismatically
within the modal aspects, and temporal individuality must be
diversified in all the meaning-modalities.

The modal meaning-structure can only function in the tem-
poral coherence of the law-spheres. Therefore the modal in-
dividuality of meaning can only be understood from the tem-
poral coherence of all the modalities of individuality.

The insight into the transcendent-religious root and the im-
manent cosmic meaning-coherence of the modalities of individu-
alility necessarily implies that there is not a single law-sphere
that may be considered as the exclusive origin of individuality.
The cosmonomic Idea also here proves to be of universal and
fundamental importance to the sense in which philosophical
problems are understood.

On the immanence-standpoint it is impossible to recognize the

The General Theory of the Modal Spheres

tic views on individuality in detail in our treatise on the Thomistic substance-concept and the idea of the structure of individuality, published in the review Philosophia Reformata\(^1\). In
the present context we restrict ourselves to giving a short outline of the views concerning individuality in the cadre of the
modal all-sidedness of individuality. It is immaterial whether in a rationalistic way individuality is degraded to a phenomenon, or, conversely, whether it is absolutized in one of its aspects (e.g., the psychical, historical, aesthetic, ethical modus) in an irrationalistic conception. In both cases the insight into the radical sense of individuality and into its true relation to the universal character of law is lost sight of.

Nominalism in its older as well as in its more modern varieties may assert that all things are individual in themselves and on their own account, and that the universal is only a subjective abstraction in the human mind. But Nominalism must do the same thing as Realism did, though in the opposite direction, viz. it must eliminate the cosmic coherence of meaning and enclose the true reality of things in certain meaning-aspects. On this standpoint the insight into the modal all-sidedness of individuality is equally impossible.

The ultimate cause which prevents immanence-philosophy from doing justice to individuality is always to be found in the dialectical character of its religious basic motives. Not only the Greek form-matter motive but also the modern Humanistic motive of nature and freedom are involved in a dialectical tension between the individual and the universal in the point of departure of the philosophic view of reality.

Thus in all immanence-philosophy the richness of meaning of individuality revealed in the modalities of the law-spheres has to suffer from a process of schematic impoverishment.

This impoverishment is most clearly manifested in the metaphysical and in the modern critical form-matter-scheme.

According to Aristotle the substantial form of a natural being, as such, lacks individuality and must be combined with matter into a σώμα (τὸ δὲ τί). The ‘principium individuationis’ is only to be found in ‘matter’ in its quantitative potentiality ¹.

Thomas Aquinas seeks the principium individuationis in a ‘materia signata vel individualis’ ² a conception that frankly contradicts his scholastic Christian view of individual immortality of the rational soul as form and substance. In order to save the latter he had to take refuge in the hypothesis of formae separatae that were individualized by their having been created in proportion to a material body. We have discussed the scholas-

¹ Met. XII 8, 1074 a. 33.
² Summa Theologiae III, qu. 77, 2.
Individuality in Kant's form-matter-scheme.

Kant seeks the seat of individuality in the sensory matter of experience. The schematized logical forms of thought only determine the latter in a universally-valid and formal way. Only a divine 'intuitive' intellect (Leibniz's 'intellectus archetypus') could know a priori the specification in the reality of nature.

Material creation of reality by the intellect and teleological creation are one and the same according to Kant. For what the understanding creates, it creates in teleological adaptation to its concepts. The view of nature as the work of a divine intellect is thus necessarily teleological.

Already in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft Kant inquires after the transcendental structure of individuality when he discusses the regulative use of the theoretical Ideas. He tries to find this transcendental law, which he calls the 'law of specification', on the basis of the ancient logic of subsumption, i.e. by descending from the abstract universal to the more and more specific (genus, species). Logic expresses this as the relation between the extension and the contents of concepts. The principle of specification is then viewed as a regulating rational principle of the systematic unity of theoretical thought. It requires the understanding continually to particularize its notions and to penetrate to the remaining diversities from which abstraction was made in the higher generic and specific concepts.

This transcendental principle of specification as such (Grund-satz der Varietät des Gleichartigen unter niederen Arten) 2 is connected with two other regulative principles viz. that of homogeneity or the principle of the similarity of the manifold (individual) under higher genus concepts, and the rule of the continuity of the forms resulting from the combination of the former two principles.

The principle of the continuity of the forms results from the

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1 Phil. Ref. 15, Year 1950, p. 66 ff.
2 i.e., the rule of variety in the similar among the lower kinds.
completion of the systematic coherence in the Idea both in ascending to higher generic notions and in descending to lower specific concepts. Then all individual multiplicities are interrelated insofar as they originate from one single highest genus through the total of all the degrees of further determination \(^1\).

In the *Krit. d. teleol. Urt.Kr.* this view is worked out in detail (cf. our critical analysis of this view in Vol. I, p. 385 ff.).

Summarizing, we can say that **Kant** seeks the seat of individuality in the sensory matter of our experience which, in accordance with his ‘Copernican revolution’ of philosophic thought, supersedes the metaphysical ἀλήθη of Greek and scholastic thought. He tried to adapt this ‘empirical’ functionalistically conceived individuality to the forms of ‘transcendental thought’, by means of the regulative rational principles of homogeneity, specification and continuity. So it is understandable why, in his ethics, **Kant** considered all individuality as ‘empirically determined’ and why he has no room for it in the normative sphere of his practical Ideas.

**The Baden School and the problem of individuality.**

The neo-Kantians of the Baden School try to combine **Fichte**’s philosophy of history (developed in his fourth period) with the critical formalism of the Kantian transcendental philosophy. They subsume meaning-individuality under the subjective teleological viewpoint of the method of cultural science.

Individuality as such continues to be of a sensory empirical character, originating from the ‘matter’ of experience. According to **Rickert** the only genuine ‘individual’ is that which occurs only once in this definite place in (sensory) space and time \(^2\). But this individuality is related to super-sensible ‘values’ by the method of cultural science. Then individuality is considered as ‘empirical uniqueness related to values’, as *meaning*-individuality, whereas the method of natural science is ‘blind to values’ and works in a generalizing way.

What is the result of such efforts to force individuality into the form-matter-scheme?

Not only do they eliminate all genuine structures of individuality of temporal reality, but they misinterpret the modal, functional individuality of meaning as such fundamentally.

If individuality really belongs to the sensory matter of ex-

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\(^1\) *Kr. d. r. V.* (Groszh. Wilhelm Ernst Ausg.), p. 503/4.

\(^2\) *Die Grenzen der naturw. Begriffsbildung*, p. 244 ff.
logical rational principle. It furnishes the understanding with a regulator to determine individuality in a logical series of degrees, from the more general to the more particular. For the Baden School real individuality remains a sensory 

meaning-individuality by means of a subjective judgment relating it to values. But then it is meaning-individuality only in the (modally indeterminate) general notion of 'culture'.

The consequences for jurisprudence of the distortion of individuality because of its subsumption under the form-matter scheme.

In scientific thought the application of the critical form-matter scheme must lead to a fundamental misinterpretation of all modal individuality of meaning and to endless formalism.

Thus in the 'reine Rechtslehre' the juridical modus is reduced to an empty form of thought. Anything in the juridical field of vision that cannot be inferred from the 'transcendental juridical categories' is reduced to the 'matter' of experience. It has juridical meaning only in the abstract form of juridical thought. The form of thought itself can only be specialized logically.

Formalism knows nothing about individualizing the modal meaning of law. The 'form of thought' must be conceived as 'pure', i.e. apart from the temporal coherence of the law-spheres. But that which does not originate from 'transcendental a priori thought' is the entire inter-modal temporal meaning-structure of reality which alone makes thinking possible. Formalistic rationalism in legal theory necessarily entails the denial of a modal juridical aspect of the full temporal empirical reality. The whole subject-side of the juridical aspect is thus reduced to the law-side, which is misinterpreted formalistically.

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1 'Abstufung'.
2 'wertbeziehend'.
The consequences of the form-matter schema for the view of individuality show that this schema is not capable of accounting for the real states of affairs.

When the modal meaning-aspect has been denatured to a ‘form of thought’ and, consequently, cannot be individualized, it is also impossible to account for the material diversity of ‘content’ found within the law-sphere under examination. The consequences of this misrepresentation of the modal individuality of meaning lead to the grotesque.

For example, is the individuality of REMBRANDT’s Nightwatch to be attributed to its sensory matter in the objective impressions of its paint? and is its proper aesthetic meaning without individuality? Or is this a question of merely sensory individuality subjectively related to a universal ‘aesthetic value’?

Is the individual difference between intercourse in marriage and that in a club something outside the meaning of social intercourse, and is it only derived from the sensory matter of our societal experience?

Must we attribute the individual character of juridical facts only to the sensory aspect of experience? And is their juridical structure as such without any individuality because it is a mere transcendental form of thought?

The problem of the modal individuality of meaning cannot be solved in the cadre of the form-matter schema. It must necessarily be ignored in such a frame of thought. This fact again proves the impotence of this schema to account for the real states of affairs with which philosophy is confronted.

§ 3 - ORIGINAL, RETROCIPATORY, AND ANTICIPATORY TYPES OF MEANING-INDIVIDUALITY WITHIN THE MODAL STRUCTURE OF THE LAW-SPHERES.

Modal meaning must be individualized if it is ever to express itself in the fulness of temporal reality. It is not an abstract form added to individual matter and remaining intrinsically alien to it. Meaning is the creaturely mode of being, and possesses the fulness of individuality in its subjective religious root.

The process of individualization, however, does not affect the fundamental functional structure of the modal aspect. This structure is determined by the cosmic temporal order, and is the very condition of all modal individualization. For the modal
The pole reached by modal individualization in the full temporal reality on its subject-side, is the complete or a-typical individuality of the modal meaning. This individuality remains controlled and determined by the laws of the sphere within its fundamental structure.

The modal structures of the law-spheres with their original meaning-nucleus, their retrocipatory and anticipating moments, continue to express themselves in the individualizing of modal meaning. In the third Volume it will appear that in this very state of affairs the inner coherence between the modal structures and the structures of individuality is clearly revealed.

In the first place we distinguish the original or nuclear types of modal meaning-individuality. As types they are not founded in original modal types of earlier law-spheres. As an example one may consider the sexual type of propagation and the blood-relationship connected with it in the organic biotic aspect of experience. It is true this biotic type necessarily has its substrata in physical-chemical, kinematic, spatial and numerical types. But these substrata are no original types of modal individuality. They are only constituted in their functional anticipation of the sexual biotic type. We will call them anticipatory modal types. They are not to be found in the foundational direction of time in their respective law-spheres. The nuclear type of individuality to which they refer lies outside of their own modal sphere.

On the other hand the typical juridical relations between parents and their children as well as their typical moral relations of love are doubtless biotically founded modal types, in which the general modal meaning of the juridical and that of the moral aspect are individualized. It is undubitable that as modal types they lack an original character in these aspects, though, as such, they have certainly a typical juridical and ethical meaning. The typical legal competence and obligations and the typical moral duties implied in these modal types can never be reduced to the typical biotical blood-relationship in which they are characteristically founded.

In the psychical law-sphere sexual feeling, the feeling of blood-relationship etc., are undoubted biotically founded types of feeling.

The General Theory of the Modal Spheres

In the opened structure of this modal type all subjective types of aesthetical projects are founded. This does not alter the fact that the objective works of art in which these projects are realized, have typical objective foundations. For the subject-object relation plays an essential part in the modal types of
Anticipatory modal types of individuality are to be found in a rich diversity in the numerical, spatial and energy-aspects. Physics and chemistry have detected many typical numbers in nature which are only to be explained from their anticipatory coherence with typical physical and chemical relations. As examples may be mentioned the typical constant $h$ in quantum-mechanics, the typical numerical relations between the particles of the chemical elements, the typical atomic weights, the so-called Loschmidt-number $N^1$ etc. In biology we are confronted with typical numerical relations between the particles of the cell, the typical numbers of chromosomes etc.

Anticipatory types of individuality in the spatial aspect are to be found in great diversity in the spatial forms of living beings which can only be explained from their anticipatory coherence with typical organizing bio-impulses.

Crystallography has detected 32 possible spatial form-types of crystallization qualified by physical-chemical effects.

We shall return to these interesting states of things in the third Volume.

In the energy-aspect we meet with many anticipatory modal types, related to original modal types in the biotic or the psychical aspect. We refer, for instance, to the typical albumen formations of the different biotic species.

In general it may be said that in the mathematical aspects we find only anticipatory types of modal individuality. The reason is that no single structure of individuality is typically qualified by a numerical, a spatial or a purely kinematic modal function.

The subject-object relation in the modal types of individuality.

In the psychical law-sphere there is, e.g., an original type to be found in sensory phantasy, which in a restrictive function, is also seen in animal psychical life. Even in this 'undisclosed meaning', and although rigidly bound to the organic vital function, this original type of sensory feeling-activity is not at all typically founded in the biotic function. Rather it is exclusively characterized by the internal psychical fact that the sensory function of imagination produces its phantasms in merely intentional objectivity, entirely apart from the sensory objectivity of real things.

\[1\] This is the typical number of molecules in a cubic centimetre of gas at a temperature of 0 degrees and a pressure of one atmosphere (760 mm Hg).
meaning-individuality.

Take, for instance, the objective modal-aesthetic typicalness of a picture in comparison with that of a sculpture, or the objective juridical types of movables and immovables, or the subjective-objective typicalness of the servitutes praediorum rusticorum as compared with that of the servitutes praediorum urbanorum etc.

These states of affairs, however, cannot be accounted for by the theory of the law-spheres alone. We now touch a point where this theory naturally passes into that of the typical structures of individuality.
PART II

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM
IN THE LIGHT OF
THE COSMONOMIC IDEA
This group of problems originated from the theoretical breaking-up of the cosmic meaning-coherence of the full temporal reality. On the one hand was placed the phenomenon related to the sensory perceptive function, and on the other hand the phenomena which could already be described by 'theoretical' thought.
CHAPTER 1

§ 1 - THE WAY IN WHICH THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM IS POSED ON THE IMMANENCE-STANDPOINT AND THE METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CRITIQUE OF COGNITION ROOTED IN THIS STANDPOINT.

The inter-modal systasis 1 of meaning as the condition for all theoretical synthesis.

The functional modalities of meaning guaranteeing the different aspects their sphere-sovereignty are integrated into the cosmic coherence of time. In this cosmic temporal coherence they show an *intermodal systasis of meaning*. The modal aspects do not owe their existence to theoretical synthesis, although without theoretical disjunction from one another they cannot be articulately distinguished. Anyone who ignores the cosmological priority of meaning-systasis to theoretical synthesis, cannot even properly pose the epistemological problem.

The fundamental mistake made by the critique of knowledge rooted in the immanence-standpoint was that it had not grasped the cosmological meaning-problem implied in the theoretical cognitive attitude as such.

This critique was led astray by the prejudice of the self-sufficiency of theoretical thought, and tried to isolate the human cognitive faculty within certain immanent functions of consciousness.

From the outset this critique of knowledge was founded in a group of problems raised by a metaphysics that had burdened immanence-philosophy since the time of the Eleatics.

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1 Translator’s note: This obsolete word is used here in a special sense to distinguish the natural coherence of our integral experience of reality from the theoretical attitude implied in the word ‘synthesis’.
noumenon which could only be grasped by theoretical thought (considered to be intuitive or not).

This metaphysics centred in the problem of substance, i.e. the problem about a permanent being of things, hidden behind the sensory phenomena and, as such, independent of human consciousness. The epistemology based on this metaphysics took the functionalistic view that human knowledge is due either exclusively to sensory perception, from which also logical thought must take its content, or that it originates from the cooperation of the logical and the sensory function, or that logical thought is an independent source of knowledge of the noumena. Epistemological criticism then inferred that the ‘substance’ is either cognizable or not.

Since Kant the ‘substance’ in this metaphysical sense was called the ‘thing in itself’. In ultra positivistic nominalism the existence of a substance behind the sensible phenomena was flatly denied.

So the main problem of this critique of cognition became: Is it possible for us to get adequate knowledge of true reality, i.e. of the ‘Ding an sich’, behind the sensory phenomena, from the (isolated) functions of consciousness which are to be accepted as the exclusive sources of human cognition? If intuition (intuitive evidence) was supposed to play a part in the cognitive process, it was either identified with the inner certainty of the psychical function of feeling, or intuition was elevated above the sensory and analytical functions, as a superior rational organ to apprehend the noumena. It was sometimes also reduced to the immediate evidence of the logical fundamental concepts and basic truths of thought.

Until Hume and Kant, epistemology generally held to the view that the real ‘Gegenstand’ of human cognition transcends the phenomenon and must be sought in the true reality behind the sensory phenomena. Kant asserted that his conception was a ‘Copernican revolution’ in epistemology. As we know, his ‘transcendental-idealistic’ view regarded the ‘Gegenstand’ of knowledge as the product of a universally valid subjective formative process. In this a ‘given’ chaotic sensory experiential material is arranged by the ‘transcendental consciousness’ into a syn-
thesis of logical categories and forms of sensory intuition. Thus
the functionalistic attitude of Humanistic epistemology based
on the immanence-standpoint became even more emphatic.
From the outset Kant derives human knowledge from only two
origins: sensitivity and logical thought. From the latter function
of consciousness every intuitive factor was explicitly eliminated.
And following the steps of English 'empiricism', he starts from
the dogmatic supposition that the 'datum' in experience is of a
purely functional sensory character. This datum is supposed
to contain nothing but the sensory impressions as yet lacking
any kind of order. Everything in the empirical world of things
that is beyond the un-arranged sensory impressions must conse-
quently be the product of some "gegenständliche Synthesis",
starting from the transcendental logical subject.

This view is absolutely contrary to the true character of naïve
experience, which does not know of a 'Gegenstand' in anti-
thetical relation to the logical function of thought.

The erroneous identification of the datum in cog-
nition and that which has been theoretically isolated.

In this functionalistic attitude epistemology simply took for
granted that which should be the chief problem of any critique of
knowledge, viz. the abstraction of the sensory and logical func-
tions of consciousness from the full systasis of meaning of the
modal aspects of human experience. Our transcendental critique

1 This fundamental error is also inherent in an epistemology like that
of Driesch or Volkelt, though it assumes the possibility to trace its sup-
posed 'datum' behind the logical and psychical functions of consciousness,
behind every abstraction of a 'transcendental' epistemological subject.
This supposed 'datum' is in reality the theoretically isolated empirical
fact of the self-assurance of the individual subjective consciousness.
Volkelt's argument is typical. He asserts that this 'reine empirische
Selbstgewissheit' is a datum, which is absolutely free of thought and has,
therefore, an a-logical character: 'It is essential', he argues, 'to conceive
the self-assurance of consciousness in its purity. Assertions made on the
ground of this assurance should not be interwoven with anything derived
from thought. In ordinary life, as well as in the sciences, this self-assurance
is usually more or less mixed with some thought. This should be elimi-
nated.' (Gewissheit und Wahrheit, 1918, p. 64).

I merely ask: Is it possible for 'pure self-assurance' (conceived by
Volkelt in the sense intended by the functionalistic immanence view)
to separate itself in this way from the meaning-coherence into which
consciousness has been fitted? It is theoretical analysis alone that can
from the other modal-functions of experience. The real datum of human experience precedes every theoretical disjunction. It has an absolutely systematic character.

The assumption that certain functions of consciousness, theoretically isolated in the synthetic act of cognition, are the *datum*, was nothing less than the cosmological capital sin. And on the basis of this pseudo-datum the attempt was made to formulate the epistemological problem. Thus a critique of knowledge, born out of a false metaphysics, was proclaimed the gateway to philosophy, before it was realized that there is a cosmological meaning-problem pre-supposed in the theoretical isolation of certain functions of consciousness. All modal structural relations were eradicated by means of the subject-object schema of this epistemological theory, thus camouflaging its cosmological petitio principii.

In this respect the so-called critical trend in epistemology became the model of all cosmological dogmatism.

It is true that the great Königsberg thinker was very far above the uncritical ‘dogmatism’ of many of his epigones. In his doctrine of the theoretical Ideas he was certainly led by a truly transcendental motive. But the starting-point of his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* remains a dogmatic one in the sense that he does not realize the problems involved in his pre-suppositions. Ancient, scholastic and pre-Kantian Humanistic metaphysics, called dogmatic since Kant’s criticism, were more critical, *in this respect at least*, than their great antagonist. They gave an account of the cosmonomic Idea on which their epistemology was based. They did not make the mistake of tackling the epistemological problem before founding their epistemology in a theory of

perform this abstraction. In other words the *supposedly* ultimate empirical fact itself proves to be a theoretical abstraction in which thought can in no way be eliminated. It is not a genuine *datum*. It remains something beyond my understanding how a thinker of Volkelt’s rank can be unaware of this simple truth. Or rather — it is only understandable from the absolutization of the primary theoretical synthesis in which the immanence-standpoint is founded.

The primordial question should be: What do we abstract from the real datum of experience in the fundamental antithetical relation of theoretical thought which gives rise to the problem of the ‘Gegenstand’? And only in an unbreakable union with this primary question should the problem be
the cosmic coherence in which the gnoseological relation is fitted (be it a metaphysical theory, viz. the theory of 'being').

In recent times the isolation of the critique of knowledge has again been recognized in various quarters as a piece of dogmatism. The need has been felt of an ontological foundation for epistemology in the cadre of a phenomenological description of the intentional acts of human cognition. This fact doubtless means a deepening of philosophic thought. But on the immanence-standpoint the primary theoretical synthesis, contained in the theoretical attitude of knowledge as such, and thus also in the phenomenological attitude, cannot become a problem. For, as explained in the Prolegomena, immanence-philosophy stands or falls with absolutizations, made by means of theoretical logical thought. They can no longer be recognized as such, because in the cosmonomic Idea theoretical thought has been declared self-sufficient. This transcendental basic Idea of immanence-philosophy with its primary absolutizing of theoretical synthesis is the source of all uncritical dogmatism in epistemology in whatever varieties it may present itself.

§ 2 - THE CRITICAL FORMULATION OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM. MEANING-SYSTASIS, LOGICAL SYNTHESIS AND INTER-MODAL SYNTHESIS OF MEANING.

In opposition to this really dogmatic attitude in epistemology it should be first acknowledged that what has been theoretically isolated is never the 'datum'. On the immanence-standpoint this 'datum' has been falsified. The real 'datum' is the systatic coherence of meaning. In mature naïve pre-theoretical experience reality is grasped in the full systasis of its modal functions. In this systasis the psychical and the logical functions prove to be bound up with all the other modal functions of human experience in an insoluble temporal meaning-coherence.

Here it is necessary to resume the first and the second transcendental basic problem, formulated in the Prolegomena, with respect to the theoretical attitude of thought.

The epistemological problem only arises in deepened thought, in which the logical function by means of a theoretical abstraction is opposed to the non-logical aspects of experience as its theoretical resistant. The fundamental question of epistemology should, consequently, not be formulated: How is universally valid experience of the 'Gegenstand' (i.e., the resistant to the logical function of thought) possible?
ence W1111 tills primordial problem be raised: How can the theoretical antithesis between the logical function of knowledge and its non-logical 'Gegen-stand' be reconciled by an inter-modal theoretical meaning-synthesis?

By the first fundamental question the epistemological problem is intrinsically connected with its cosmological pre-suppositions which alone give it meaning.

The necessity of distinguishing between analytical synthesis and inter-modal theoretical synthesis of meaning.

At this point it is necessary to introduce an important distinction generally unknown in immanence-philosophy. This distinction is indispensable in order to place the epistemological problem on a correct cosmological basis.

There are two different kinds of synthesis:

One is the logical functional mode of uniting, implied in the analytical structure of meaning; the other is the inter-modal, inter-functional meaning-synthesis. The latter has no transcendental-logical character, but is based on a theoretical disjunction of the cosmic systasis of meaning.

Every theoretical cognitive synthesis is an inter-modal synthesis of meaning. On the other hand, the logical synthesis, found also in pre-theoretical naive thought, is an indispensable element in the empirical meaning-systasis. To this subjective analytical synthesis is related the objective systasis of logical characteristics implied in the logical object-side of empirical reality (cf. p. 389 ff.).

Considered according to its analytical aspect, every subjective concept, including the theoretical one, is a synthesis of a multiplicity of analysed conceptual moments.

ARISTOTLE speaks of a σύνθεσις τις νοημάτων ὡσε ἐν ὤντων. He does not, however, realize the difference between analytical synthesis and theoretical meaning-synthesis. This distinction de-

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1 This meaning-synthesis is fundamentally different from KANT's supposed 'transcendental synthesis', as will appear in the sequel.
2 De anima III, 4, 430 a 28.
pends on the insight into the cosmic systatic meaning-coherence, lying at the foundation of theoretical thought. In principle it cannot be understood on the immanence-standpoint. In order to grasp the real meaning of this distinction, it is necessary to break with that peculiar hypostasis of theoretical thought, inherent in the immanence-standpoint in all its variations. It is this hypostatization which makes the insight into the meaning-structure of naive experience impossible.

§ 3 - THE KANTIAN DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS.

We must now consider, whether or not there are judgments containing an exclusively analytical synthesis. This question touches the well-known distinction, made by Kant in the Introduction to his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, between analytical and synthetical judgments. On this distinction Kant’s entire epistemology is based; with it his view stands or falls. He defines analytical judgments as those sentences in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity. In synthetical judgments this connection is supposed to be thought without identity. Synthetical judgments are thus supposed to add a predicate to the concept of the subject not previously contained in the latter, so that this predicate cannot be inferred from the subject by analyzing its elements.

Kant gives the following example of an analytical judgment: ‘All bodies are extended.’ He then adds: ‘For I need not go beyond the concept which I connect with ‘body’ in order to find extension as bound up with it. I have merely to analyze the concept, that is, to become conscious of the manifold which I always think in that concept, in order to meet with this predicate: it is therefore an analytical judgment’.

On the other hand the judgment: ‘All bodies are heavy’ is assumed to be synthetical in character, because the predicate has not been implied in the concept of the subject.

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1 Kr. d. r. V. (Groszh. W. Ernst Ausg., Bnd. III, p. 42): “Denn ich darf nicht über den Begriff, den ich mit dem Wort Körper verbinde, hinausgehen, um die Ausdehnung als mit demselben verknüpft zu finden, sondern jenen Begriff nur zergliedern, d.i. das Mannigfaltige, welches ich jederzeit in ihm denke, mir nur bewusst zu werden, um dieses Prädikat darin anzutreffen; es ist also ein analytisches Urteil.”
The copula forming the linguistic relation between that of which something is said in a signifying way, and that which is expressed in the predicate, is of central importance. But KANT does not realize this. The word 'is' by no means always signifies a logical relation of identity. Symbolic logic must be credited with having pointed this out emphatically, especially De Morgan and B. Russell. On the other hand these thinkers are also guilty of confusing the logical and the linguistic question by attributing an original symbolic signifying function to the concept as such (‘notion’ as a ‘denoting’ term in Russell).

The word ‘is’, connecting the so-called ‘linguistic subject’ with an adjectival predicate, never means a relation of identity according to the logical aspect of a judgment. As to the logical state of affairs it only signifies what might be called an analytical implication of that which is predicated in that about which we predicate something. (The term ‘implication’ is used here in the sense of analytical inherency.) It is simply impossible to identify the concepts body and extension logically. For the present the relation between the logical and the linguistic structure of a judgment must be left alone, because the linguistic structure as such is not at issue here. We only want to answer the question whether the concept ‘extension’ is implied in

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1 De Morgan, Formal Logic, pp. 49, 50.
2 B. Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, Vol. I, p. 64 observes: ‘The word ‘is’ is terribly ambiguous, and great care is necessary in order not to confound its various meanings. We have (1) the sense in which it asserts Being, as in ‘A is’; (2) the sense of identity; (3) the sense of predication, in ‘A is human’; (4) the sense of ‘A is a man’, which is very identity. In addition to these there are less common uses, as ‘to be good is to be happy’, where a relation of assertions is meant, that relation, in fact, which, where it exists, gives rise to formal implication.’

Lask has very emphatically warned against confounding the linguistic and the logical senses of the copula in his Die Lehre vom Urteil” (1912).

Russell apparently gives the analytical relation of implication a narrower sense by distinguishing it from a predication. I do not see a sufficient ground for this in the logical aspect. In itself a predication is a linguistic figure. As to its logical meaning it can only denote that the predicate is analytically implied in the concept denoted by the linguistic subject of the sentence.

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All ‘empirical judgments’ are synthetical according to KANT. In the light of his dogmatic prejudice concerning the ‘sources of our knowledge’ this means: all judgments based on the sensory aspect of human perception are synthetical. Their ‘predicate’ is not implied in the concept of their ‘subject’. From
the concept ‘body’, according to the logical aspect of the concept, and whether that of ‘heaviness’ is not.

Now the question becomes very urgent: What does KANT mean after all by the concept of a body?

Apparently he anticipates his views expounded in detail in his Transzendentale Aesthetik, when he considers extension to be logically implied in the concept ‘body’. He conceives of space as an *a priori* form of sensory intuition: ‘That bodies are extended is not an empirical judgment, but a proposition which holds *a priori*. For before turning to experience, I already have in my concept ‘body’ all the requisite conditions for the judgment. And I have only to extract the predicate from the concept in accordance with the principle of contradiction. Thereby I become conscious of the necessity of the judgment; a necessity which I could never learn from experience’.

By implication KANT’s argument admits that the concept ‘body’ is not purely analytical in meaning. But why does not ‘heaviness’ belong to this concept then? If the matter is considered in an objective-logical way, the assertion that the notion ‘heaviness’ is not implied in the concept ‘body’ (of course he means *material* body, otherwise the predicates ‘extension’ and ‘heaviness’ would not refer to the same subject) does not rest on any tenable ground.

Rather it appears that the concept ‘heaviness’ is necessarily implied in an objective logical sense in the concept ‘material body’. Also in the subjective-logical aspect of the judgment the concept ‘heaviness’ should be implied in the concept ‘body’, in accordance with the analytical principium contradictionis.

For in the logical object-function of empirical reality the original subjective energy-effect of matter, in its subjection to the law of gravitation, has been analogically objectified. This alone entitles us to attribute the characteristic of gravity to the general concept ‘material body’.

Again we ask: What does KANT really understand by the concept of a ‘body’ in which the predicate ‘heaviness’ is supposed to be not implied?

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1 "Dasz ein Körper ausgedehnt sei, ist ein Satz, der *a priori* feststeht, und kein Erfahrungsurteil. Denn ehe ich zur Erfahrung gehe, habe ich alle Bedingungen zu meinem Urteil schon in dem Begriffe, aus welchem ich das Prädikat nach dem Satze des Widerspruchs nur herausziehen und dadurch zugleich der Notwendigkeit des Urteils bewusst werden kann, welche mir Erfahrung nicht einmal lehren würde."
This it follows that in Kant's argument all 'empirically' established 'predicates' in a judgment (according to its logical aspect) should be excluded from the concept of the 'subject'. This conclusion, however, is obviously contrary to the truth that, with regard to its logical aspect, every judgment is subject to the analytical principium identitatis and the principium contradictionis.

In an affirmative judgment of a logically correct structure the predicate can never contain an element which is not analytically implied in the concept of the 'subject'. In other words: Viewed from their modal logical aspect all judgments are necessarily analytical. Also theoretical judgments, originating from an inter-modal synthesis of meaning, have necessarily an analytical structure according to their logical functional aspect. This truth is so little open to refutation that it is almost a tautology. In the arithmetical judgment: \(2 + 2 = 4\), the notion \(2 + 2\) must be implied according to the logical aspect in the concept \(4\). This holds even though the logical implication, in its subjection to the principia identitatis and contradictionis, can only be verified in an inter-modal theoretical synthesis of meaning. For it is inherent in the number \(4\) that it consists of the sum of smaller units, which is therefore implied in its concept.

Or, to use another example of a 'synthetical judgment a priori' given by Kant himself: In the judgment: ‘Everything that happens, has a cause'; causality must belong to the concept of happening, if the judgment is not to be obviously false in a logical sense.

The distinction between 'formal object' and 'material object'.

There is another objection to the above argument. It has been raised by Alexander Pfänder. In a note, published by Reicke ¹, Kant observes:

'In an analytical judgment the predicate is concerned with a concept; in a synthetical judgment it is concerned with the object

¹ Reicke: Lose Blätter aus Kant's Nachlass (1889).
of a concept, because the predicate is not contained in the concept”

RIEHL paraphrases this as follows: ‘Synthetical judgments are cognitive judgments, judgments about objects’

Of course, he means that ‘synthetical judgments’ are judgments about ‘Gegenstände’, but analytical judgments are not.

In his Logik PFÄNDER has elaborated this famous Kantian thesis in a way deserving our attention.

KANT ignored the real modal-logical subject-object relation. PFÄNDER, whose conception is phenomenologically oriented, has given it prominence in favour of KANT’s distinction. This is, however, not the logical subject-object relation in the sense of our analysis, but in the well-known scholastic sense of the relation between the intentio (the subjective intention in the concept) and the intended or supposed ‘Gegenstand’ to which the concept refers. The ‘Gegenstand’ intended in the concept is sharply distinguished by PFÄNDER as a ‘formal object’ from the ‘Gegenstand an sich’, which he calls a ‘material object’.

It is possible that the ‘Gegenstand’, intentionally related to a certain concept, as ‘material object’ has more determinations than those attributed to it in the concept. But these determinations do not belong to the ‘Gegenstand’ insofar as it is only the intentional correlate of the concept. Let us say, e.g., that the concept ‘triangle’ does not intend anything else but a plane figure bounded by three intersecting straight lines. Then the intentional object of the concept ‘triangle’ does not imply, e.g., that this figure has three interior angles. In PFÄNDER’s own words:

‘In the concept triangle, so determined, there is no angle intended at all. It is, consequently, not at all possible to infer from the concept ‘triangle’, mentioned above, that a triangle has three interior angles, because this fact is not at all implied in the concept of a triangle. Rather it is necessary to pass on to the intended object ‘triangle’ as such in order to obtain the knowledge independent of this concept that a triangle, so defined, has three interior angles. Everything else knowable about the intentional object does not belong to it, insofar as it has not been intended in the concept of it’
Löwenstein is indeed the intentional object of the concept of a 'Gegenstand', and the content of this concept with the sum of the characteristics of the 'Gegenstand'. By means of the distinction made in this manner between subjective concept, intentional object (formal object) and 'Gegenstand an sich' (material object), it does not seem difficult any longer to find a tenable sense in Kant's distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments. Kant's judgment: 'All bodies are extended', is an analytical judgment insofar as in the concept 'body' an extended 'Gegenstand' is intended.

Pfänder terms this an Attributionsurteil, viz. insofar as in the concept of the subject 'body' extension has been implied as an attribute. The concept 'extended' is then partly identical with the concept 'body'. Then, of course, all judgments not implying the predicate in the concept of their subject, are synthetical propositions.

To this Pfänder adds another interesting distinction. He says that there are synthetical judgments in a purely logical sense which must be regarded as analytical from the point of view of ontology. And by the side of these there are judgments which both logically and ontologically must be qualified as synthetical.

The first class of judgments do not intentionally imply their predicative concept in the concept of their subject, but the predicate can be immediately found by an analysis of the essence of the 'Gegenstand an sich': 'So what leads to the judgment here, is not the analysis of the concept of the subject, but that of the Gegenstand of the latter, and of all that belongs to its essence'.

IV (1931) p. 273/4: "Im so bestimmten Begriff des Dreiecks liegt durchaus keine Intention auf Winkel. Man kann also durchaus nicht aus dem angeführten Begriff des Dreiecks erkennen, dass das Dreieck drei Innenwinkel hat, weil dies gar nicht "im Begriffe des Dreiecks liegt." Man musz vielmehr zu dem gemeinen Gegenstand Dreieck, wie er an sich ist, übergehen, um die von dem Begriffe des Dreiecks unabhängige Erkenntnis zu gewinnen, dass das so definierte Dreieck drei Innenwinkel hat. Alles, was man über den intentionalen Gegenstand noch weiter erkennen kann, gehört nicht zu ihm, soweit es nicht in dem Begriff von ihm schon gemeint ist."

1 op. cit., p. 339: "Nicht also die Analyse des Subjekts begriffs, whereas in an ontological respect, (in relation to the full essence of the 'Gegenstand') it must be regarded as analytical, is untenable. The objective logical properties of a "Gegenstand" are as such of an analytical character. But they are never "purely analytical", no more than the property 'extension' is in the
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In other words, the ontological analytical judgments which are logically synthetical, are founded in the analysis of the ‘Gegenstand’ itself, and not in that of the concept.

PFÄNDER gives an example of such a judgment: ‘The plane triangle has three interior angles.’

These judgments are said not to be subjected to the principium identitatis, because their predicative concept is neither wholly nor partly identical with the concept of the subject of the judgment. The judgments which are synthetical both in a logical and an ontological sense, coalesce with KANT’s ‘empirical judgments’, which are all a posteriori.

Criticism of PFÄNDER'S theory about analytical and synthetical judgments.

Has PFÄNDER succeeded in making the Kantian distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments plausible?

It is obvious that his argument stands and falls with his conception of the modal logical subject-object relation. The distinction between subjective concept, logical object and ‘Gegenstand’ is doubtless correct in itself. But the fundamental error in PFÄNDER’s theory lies in his subjectivizing of the logical object (the so-called formal object) into something that is entirely formed by the subjective concept in the intentio, something that is ‘entirely left to the mercy of the subjective concept’, to use PFÄNDER’S own words.

This subjectivizing is equal to denying the logical object-side of reality. It results in denying all logical objectivity in its proper sense. Our distinction between ‘Gegenstand’ and logical object is not affected by PFÄNDER’s criticism of the mixing up of the concept with the ‘Gegenstand’ itself. A correctly formed subjective concept of the ‘Gegenstand’ must in its logical aspect necessarily intend the full logical objectification of the ‘Gegenstand’.

The logical object cannot depend on the mercy of the subjective theoretical ‘intentio’. An incomplete subjective concept is an incorrect concept since it does not correspond to the objective logical state of affairs. For this reason PFÄNDER’S thesis to the effect that in a logical sense, a judgment may be synthetical,
PFÄNDER's thesis that the so-called 'ontological-analytical judgments' are not subjected to the principium identitatis, is doomed to fall with his erroneous subjectification of the 'logical object'. The principium identitatis is deprived of its logical meaning, when it is eliminated from the temporal meaning-coherence which alone makes logical thought possible.

In whatever way we look at the matter, it cannot be reasonably contested that every judgment must have a logical (i.e. analytical) aspect. In accordance with this analytical aspect it is per se subjected to the basic principles of logical thought.

According to the intentional meaning of the judgment: 'all bodies are heavy', the logical characteristic of 'weight' refers in the logical aspect-structure of the sentence to the pre-logical aspects of a thing, and the judgment expresses a universally valid law-conformity. If this is so — and it appears from the formula signifying the judgment — then it follows that the concept of the body is itself also related to the pre-logical aspects of that thing.

It is logically untenable to say that in a true so-called synthetical judgment the concept of the property of a thing functioning as the grammatical predicate does not belong to the concept of that thing. The subjective intentio in such a judgment should never be separated from the really logical objectivity, if we are unwilling to substitute logical arbitrariness for logical law-conformity in our concept-formation.

SIGWART'S and SCHLEIERMACHER'S interpretations of KANT's distinction.

From an angle, quite different from PFÄNDER's, SIGWART had already tried to subjectify the distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments. SIGWART thinks that in speaking of the concept of the subject (in a judgment) KANT does not mean the objective concept containing all the logical properties, but a purely subjective preliminary concept. From causes that are accidental with regard to the essence of a thing, only a part of the logical characteristics really inherent in that class of things

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KANT's dualistic cosmonomic Idea as the background to the distinction.

It is only due to the metaphysical fundamentals of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft that KANT keeps up this distinction. His cosmonomic Idea demands the ascription of indepen-
have been summarized in such a subjective concept and employed for signifying this class. Only on the ground of the subjective meaning of the word 'body' (which meaning is only universally valid in a factual respect, or presupposed to be universally valid) we can say, that the judgment 'all bodies are extended' is analytical, and the judgment 'all bodies are heavy' is synthetical.

Schleiermacher, starting from the same subjective interpretation of Kant's distinction, also declared the difference between analytical and synthetical judgments to be purely relative, because a concept in a subjective sense is always in the state of becoming. The same judgment, e.g., 'Ice melts', may be an analytical judgment and a synthetical one. It is analytical, when the formation of the ice and its disappearance caused by changes in temperature, have been included in the concept 'ice'. It is synthetical, when this is not the case. The difference lies in the various phases of the subjective process of concept-formation.

Although Kant's own exposition of the synthetical character of all experiential judgments might occasion such a purely subjective interpretation, this explanation is untenable with respect to his a priori synthetical judgments. The distinction between analytical propositions and synthetical judgments a priori forms the basis of Kant's entire critique of knowledge. This critique does not deal with subjective individual knowledge, but with its universally valid pre-requisites. What Kant really meant by his 'synthetical judgments' can only be inferred from his transcendental conception of synthesis a priori which will be examined in greater detail below.

The distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments becomes more and more problematic in Kant's own line of argument. Repeatedly the great philosopher conceived of the 'transcendental synthesis' expounded in his theory, as the prerequisite of logic itself. By transcendental synthesis he meant the a priori reference of the logical unity of thought to time as a form of sensory intuition. According to Kant synthesis generally precedes analysis, insofar as only the former makes the latter possible. This view, essentially based on an absolutization of theoretical meaning-synthesis, seems to knock the bottom out of the contrast between analytical and synthetical judgments.

1 Logik I, 106.
2 Dial. 308, p. 264.
In this connection Kant does not answer the question: What entitles us to attribute the property of weight to all material bodies? He does seem to suggest that he seeks the ground for attributing weight to all bodies in the sensory aspect of experience. For he writes: "From the start I can apprehend the concept of..."
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This shows how everything is made into a muddle owing to the lack of a proper analysis of the modal aspects. And from the outset Kant has favoured this confusion.

Can Aristotle's theory of the categories have influenced Kant's distinction?

In this connection it is worth while to consider the possibility of Aristotle's theory of categories having influenced the Kantian distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments. The Aristotelian theory of categories was influenced both by metaphysical and linguistic considerations. The categories are basic forms of predication about the existent. At the same time they are qualified as the highest concepts under which the existent can be subsumed.

Among these categories that of substance (οὐσία) is given a special position. As the concept of the ὑποκείμενον (subjectum) it is the highest; it denotes that which cannot be predicated of anything else. It can be only the grammatical subject in a judgment. Compared with the substance all other categories are ἀναφερόμενα (accidentia). In his Met. IV, 30, 1025 a 14 Aristotle, for instance, calls 'being white' an accidental quality of 'man'.

Kant adopted the distinction between substance and accidentia in a modified form. 'Substance' he considers theoretically to be a transcendental category, related only to sensory experience. The 'accidentia' he defines as 'the determinations of substance which are nothing but its special modes of existence' 2.

It is not unlikely that Kant's conception of 'empirical' synthetical judgments was influenced by this. For he remarks: "So it is experience which is the foundation of the possibility to perform a synthesis between the predicate 'weight' and the concept 'body'. For both concepts, although the one is not contained in the other, still belong together (only contingently, however), as parts of a whole, namely, of an experience which itself is a synthetic combination of intuitions" 3. (Italics are mine).

Beispiel ist streng richtig, wenn vorausgesetzt ist, das mit dem Worte Körper immer Jedermann das Merkmal ausgedehnt, niemand je das Merkmal schwer verbindet."

1 κατηγορία, γένη τῶν κατηγορίων.
2 "Bestimmungen einer Substanz, die nichts anderes sind als die besonderen Arten derselben zu existieren."
3 Kr. d. r. V., Einleitung IV: "Es ist also die Erfahrung, worauf sich
body analytically through the characteristics of extension, impenetrability, shape etc. all of which are thought in this concept. But now I extend my knowledge, and looking back on experience from which I had abstracted this concept of body, I find weight invariably to be connected with the above characteristics."

(Italics in the last sentence are mine)

But it is a priori hardly believable that KANT should make the gross mistake of calling a series of sensory perceptions — apart from their inter-modal coherence with the original energy-aspect of experience — the logical foundation of the absolute universality of a judgment. In his own opinion the senses furnish us only with ‘contingent’, individual impressions. The logical concept ‘all’ implies super-individual necessity in the sense of logical law-conformity. In the above judgment this law-conformity can be no other than that of the logical implication of the objective concept ‘weight’ in the objective concept ‘body’ qua talis, an analytical law-conformity only given in the cosmic inter-modal systasis, and therefore not ‘purely analytical’.

In the Transzendentale Logik KANT seems to revert to the question regarding the objective validity of the judgment ‘all bodies are heavy’. This is, however, only seemingly so, because in the formula the crucial word ‘all’ has been omitted.

In the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, § 19, KANT writes: ‘But if I investigate more closely the relation of the given modes of knowledge in any judgment, and distinguish it, as belonging to the understanding, from the relation produced according to the laws of the reproductive imagination

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In the passage quoted it is again repeated that the judgment regarding the weight of material bodies has an empirical, contingent character. KANT now cancels the word “all” in the formulation of the judgment. In the context of the “transcendental question inquiring in concern is to find the logical (supposedly
(which has only subjective validity), I find that a judgment is nothing but the manner of bringing given modes of knowledge to the objective unity of apperception. This is denoted by the relational word ‘is’ in judgments, used to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. For this term indicates their relation to the original apperception, and its necessary unity. It holds good even though the judgment itself is empirical, therefore contingent, as for instance in the judgment “bodies are heavy” (italics are mine). By this I do not assert that these representations necessarily belong to each other in the empirical intuition, but that in virtue of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of intuitions they belong to each other, i.e., they belong to each other according to principles of the objective determination of all representations, insofar as knowledge can be acquired by means of these representations. These principles have all been deduced from the fundamental principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. In this way alone can a judgment arise from this relation, that is, a relation which has objective validity. It can be adequately distinguished from a relation of the very same representations which would have only subjective validity — e.g., when they are connected according to laws of association. According to the latter I could only say: When I carry a body, I feel an impression of weight; but I could not say: “It [the body] is heavy”; for this latter statement would be equal to saying that both these representations are combined in the object, no matter what the condition of the subject may be, and have not merely been conjoined in my perception, (however often the perceptive act may be repeated)” 1.

1 ib., p. 130/1: “Wenn ich aber die Beziehung gegebener Erkenntnisse in jedem Urtheile genauer untersuche und sie als dem Verstande anehörige von den Verhältnisse nach Gesetzen der reproduktiven Einbildungskraft (welches nur subjektive Gültigkeit hat) unterscheide, so finde ich, dass ein Urteil nichts andres sei, als die Art, gegebene Erkenntnisse zur objektiven Einheit der Apperzeption zu bringen. Darauf zielt das Verhältniswörtchen ist in denselben, um die objektive Einheit gegebener Vorstellungen von der subjektiven zu unterscheiden. Denn dieses bezeichnet die Beziehung derselben auf die ursprüngliche Apperzeption und die notwendige Einheit derselben, wenngleich das Urteil selbst empirisch, mithin zufällig ist, z.B. die Körper sind schwer. Damit ich zwar nicht sagen will, diese Vorstellungen gehören in der empirischen Anschauung notwendig zu einander, sondern sie gehören vermöge der notwendigen Einheit der Apperzeption in der Synthesis der Anschauungen zu einander, d.i. nach Prinzipien der objektiven Bestimmung aller Vorstellungen, so
Kant's main concern is to transcendental form of all judgments, concrete empirical ones included. This logical form is the "objective unity of self-consciousness", which is also called the "transcendental unity of apperception".

In its relation to the transcendental form of sensory intuition "time", Kant ascribes to this logical form of self-consciousness the function of uniting in the concept of an object all multiplicity given in an intuition.

In the Kantian system, however, the objectivity of a judgment is only guaranteed by an a priori theoretical synthesis between logical forms of thought and the transcendental forms of intuition "time" and "space", originating from the transcendental unity of apperception. It is identified with "Gegenständlichkeit". Therefore in Kant's line of thought I may say: "all bodies are extended", because extension is an a priori form of sensibility. But I may not say: "all (material) bodies are heavy", because weight cannot be inferred from the synthesis of the forms of thought and of intuition. But then it follows from the Kantian principles that also the objectivity of the weight of a body is not really guaranteed. For according to these principles objectivity and universal validity are identical. The transcendental unity of apperception which must guarantee the objectivity of the judgment can never make a merely 'empirical' (and therefore, according to Kant, contingent) property of the body to a universally valid quality inherent in all bodies. In other words,

fern daraus Erkenntnis werden kann, welche Prinzipien alle aus dem Grundsatz der transzendentalen Einheit der Apperzeption abgeleitet sind. Dadurch allein wird aus diesem Verhältnisse ein Urteil, d.h. ein Verhältnis, das objektiv gültig ist und sich von dem Verhältnisse eben derselben Vorstellungen, worin blosz subjektive Gültigkeit wäre, z.B. nach Gesetzen der Assoziation, hinreichend unterscheidet. Nach den letzteren würde ich nur sagen können: wenn ich einen Körper trage, so fühle ich einen Druck der Schwere; aber nicht: er, der Körper, ist schwer, welches so viel sagen will, als: diese beiden Vorstellungen sind im Objekt, d.h. ohne Unterschied des Zustandes des Subjekts, verbunden und nicht blosz in der Wahrnehmung (so oft sie auch wiederholt sein mag) beisammen."

1 In Kant's line of thought an appeal to Pfänder's 'material object' is impossible, because the 'Gegenstand an sich' is unknowable.
it can only guarantee objectivity to the transcendental form, not to the empirical content of the natural laws. MAIMON must have considered this when in his later critical phase he denied the possibility of applying the Kantian synthetical judgments a priori to the contingent "matter" of experience.

Throughout his view of objectivity KANT's lack of insight into the analytical subject-object relation is fatal to him. If he had seen the logical object-side of the full temporal reality, he could never have entertained such confused notions about the concept "body". But if, as KANT assumes, nothing is given to us of the empirical reality of a thing but chaotic sensory impressions, there is no room left for the objective analytical systasis of the conceptual characteristics in its structural relation to subjective analysis.

The rationalistic conception of the analytical is in an impasse with regard to the criterion of the truth of concrete experiential judgments.

The Kantian conception of the analytical (which is essentially Aristotelian) gets entangled in an aporia¹ with regard to the concrete experiential judgments. When pronouncing the pre-theoretical judgment "This rose is red", this judgment claims universal validity. This is only possible if it has an analytical aspect, so that I can truthfully say that the quality of being red belongs to the individual objective logical systasis of this rose, which at this moment I perceive in its full individual reality. Should this judgment not have a concrete analytical aspect, it would not be subjected, as a concrete judgment, to the logical principium identitatis and contradictionis. It cannot be objected that the logical structure of the judgment is a merely "formal" one: "S = P" and that on account of this abstract structure it is certainly subjected to the fundamental logical norms (S is P and S is not P excluding one another logically). For — apart from the fact that the judgment S is P is not purely analytical — the issue is exactly the concrete structure of a judgment of reality, which in its formalization given above can in no case be the same proposition. If there is no concrete logical structure of a judgment, there can be no concrete truth, for every truth referring to the temporal horizon neces-

¹ i.e., insoluble difficulty; this Greek term has acquired a philosophical meaning since ARISTOTLE.
There must be an objective individual reality of “this rose at present in front of me”. Otherwise it can never be decided if, according to their logical aspect, two conflicting judgments like “this rose is white” and “this rose is red” really refer to the same rose. It is quite true that the individual analytical implication of the quality “redness” in the concept “this rose”, is given only in the inter-modal meaning-systasis of its concrete structural reality. To the latter also belongs the objective sensorily perceptual image related to the subjective sensory aspect of our perception. But in the modal sensory impression as such there is no logical identity. This impression cannot furnish a logical foundation for the application of the fundamental logical norms to the judgments formulated above.

That is why every conception which, in the rationalistic line of thought, only acknowledge concepts that lack individuality¹, lands in an insoluble impasse where concrete existential judgments are concerned. In KANT’s opinion individuality only belongs to the non-ordered, chaotic sensory matter of experience. The impasse resulting from this view is that the “universal validity” of a judgment can only be founded in the _a priori_ synthesis of abstract categories of thought and abstract forms of sensory intuition. For the _concrete_ truth of an experiential judgment there is consequently no criterion left.

§ 4 - THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS AND THE LIMITS OF MEANING OF LOGICAL FORMALIZATION

Husserl’s conception of analytical judgments as completely formalized propositions.

The distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments in the forms up to now examined proved to be untenable. But in his _Logische Untersuchungen_ Husserl has tried to distinguish

¹ KANT observes in his _Logik_ (Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen, hrg. v. G. B. Jäsche WW. (CASSIRER) VIII § 1 Anm. 2 p. 399: “Es ist eine bloße Tautologie, von allgemeinen oder gemeinsamen Begriffe zu reden.” [It is a mere tautology to speak of universal or common concepts].

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pretends it can operate with purely formal analytical basic concepts and axioms. We have seen in an earlier context that Russell and Whitehead even assume that it is possible to deduce the whole of mathematics in this purely analytical way. Husserl is of the same opinion.
between analytical and synthetical judgments according to a better criterion than Kant's. Husserl denies that the Kantian criterion is to be considered as 'classical' and sufficient.

By "analytically necessary judgments" Husserl understands those propositions (or rather "necessities in the form of a proposition") that possess a truth perfectly independent of the actual, material peculiarity of the "Gegenstand" intended in it, as well as of the factuality of the case, i.e. the validity of the possible natural view of the "Gegenstand" as actually existing; such propositions are consequently "judgments that may be completely formalized".

It is supposed that it would be possible to substitute every factual content by the logically empty form "something" and to eliminate everything "accidental" by a change of the factual form into the propositional form of unconditional universality.

An example of such an analytic judgment is: "The existence of this house includes that of its roof, walls and other parts." For according to Husserl, this judgment may immediately be transformed into a purely analytical proposition, by saying that the existence of a whole G (a, b, γ ... ) in a universally valid sense, implies that of its parts (a, b, γ ... ). The latter judgment is supposed to be the formulation of a purely analytical law-conformity, abstracting from every factual content of the proposition.

For the individual reality referred to by means of the word "this" in the example given has been eliminated by the change of the proposition into the "purely analytical form of the law". "And this is indeed an analytical law; it is composed exclusively of formal-logical categories and categorical forms."

In contrast to these, all judgments containing factual concepts that salva veritate cannot be formalized, and which are founded in a synthetical law a priori, are supposed to be of a synthetic character. The example: "this red is different from that green" contains an empirical specialization of a "synthetical law a priori".

The supposed purely analytical character of modern symbolic logic.

The formalizing spoken of by Husserl at once confronts us with the mental sphere of modern symbolic logic, which also

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1 "Sätze, die sich vollständig “formalisieren”.
Some of the fundamental relational concepts of the axiomatic-analytical system of symbolic logic are, e.g., that of the propositional function, in connection with the concepts judgment, variable, true, one, more, all; "negation" (not ...); "disjunction" (either ... or ...), whereas the concept of implication (if — then) can be inferred from that of negation and disjunction. Among the "purely analytical axioms" we find, e.g., the judgments: "That which has been implied in a true proposition, is true". "When \( p \) implies \( q \), then \( q \) is implied in \( p \)." "When \( p \) implies \( q \), and \( q \) implies \( q \); then \( p \) is implied in \( pq \)" etc.

The remarkable thing is that symbolic logic is capable of deducing all of modern arithmetic, and geometry with unerring certainty, and that it can do so, seemingly at least, without including any original arithmetical or geometrical meaning in its basic concepts and axioms.

Thus the whole of modern mathematics, however complicated it may be, appears to be a logicist creation. It seems to be nothing but the purely analytical discovery of the internal relations of the fundamental system of symbolic logic. This system only contains some basic concepts, such as "propositional function", "negation", etc. and some axioms of the above-mentioned kind. Its entire method consists in the deduction of new judgments and new concepts from the axioms and basic concepts.

In the *Principia Mathematica* by Whitehead and Russell the ancient idea that Leibniz developed in his conception of the "logical calculus" seems to have been realized in a masterly way.

We have repeatedly given expression to our admiration of modern logistic. But this does not mean that we can accept it as a system of a purely analytical character. In its supposed purely analytical method of developing concepts and judgments, symbolic logic renders itself guilty of shifting the meaning of the modal aspects. And this seemingly enables it to accomplish the feat of deducing arithmetical and geometry in a rigidly analytical way. In the general theory of the modal spheres some-

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1 cf. *Ideen I*, p. 135/6 where Husserl acknowledges the affinity of his conception of mathematics with that of Hilbert.
thing has been said about this point. A more detailed discussion
belongs to the special theory of the law-spheres.

A criticism of Husserl's conception of complete for-
malization. A cosmological meaning-analysis of the
analytical relation of the whole and its parts.

The tenability of Husserl's criterion stands and falls with the
purely analytical meaning of the basic forms qualified by him
as "purely analytical". He mentions: the whole and its parts;
independence and dependence; necessity and law; property;
relative nature; state of affairs; relation; identity; equality; set
(collection); number, genus and species; and also the categories
of signification (Bedeutungskategorien), i.e., the basic concepts
inherent in the essential nature of a linguistic judgment (apop-
phantsis) 1.

Beforehand Husserl has tried to safeguard himself from
an "empirical" interpretation of these concepts. "It is easy to
see," he remarks, "that the principal concepts treated by us in
this paragraph, i.e. "whole" and "part", "independence" and
"dependence", "necessity" and "law", will undergo a real change
of meaning if they are interpreted as empirical concepts, instead
of as essentialia, consequently as pure concepts" 2.

The purely analytical categories have been conceived in an
eidetical-logical way, as empty basic forms which as such have
not been obtained by generalizing species 3.

At this point we will submit the supposedly "purely analytical"
category "the whole and its parts" to an analysis of its meaning.
Husserl has devoted an elaborate exposition to it and has de-
developed a theory of its purely analytical forms and laws pro-
grammatically.

In Husserl there can be no question of such a meaning-analy-
thesis, if it were only on account of the exceptional "unconditional"
position he assigns to the "purely analytical" essential forms as
a consequence of the commitment to his Archimedean point.

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1 Ideen I, p. 22.
2 Logische Unters. II, 1, p. 256 note 2: "Man sieht leicht dasz die haupt-
sächlichen der von uns in diesen Paragraphen behandelten Begriffe: Ganzes
und Teil, Selbständigkeit und Unselbständigkeit, Notwendigkeit
und Gesetz, eine wesentliche Sinnesänderung erfahren, wenn sie nicht im
Sinne von W e s e n s vorkommnissen, also nicht als r e i n e Begriffe ver-
standen, sondern als empirische interpretiert werden."
As HUSSERL does not know of a cosmic temporal order, he cannot grasp the modal aspects in the structure of their meaning. His material “regions of being” delimited by material “synthetical categories”, are even devoid of an elementary meaning-analysis. For instance, he calls “material thing” and “soul” different “regions of being”\(^2\). But the general concept ‘material thing’ lacks any delimitation of its meaning. It is the result of an arbitrary method of conceptualization which eliminates both the modal structures and the typical structures of individuality to which every meaningful generic and specific concept is bound. How then could it correspond to a real ‘region of being’? No more can the undefined current concept of the ‘soul’ correspond to any real meaning-structure within the horizon of our temporal experience.

The whole of HUSSERL’S line of argument is governed by the contrast between the super-temporal “essence” \((\epsilonλδος)\) with its absolute essential law-conformity and “essential necessity”, on the one hand, and the “purely accidental”, “empirical fact”, on the other. This makes it \textit{a priori} impossible for him to get an insight into the temporal inter-modal coherence between the logical aspect and the other modal spheres. If the relation “the whole and its parts” is to be conceived in its modal analytical meaning, it cannot belong to the meaning-nucleus of the analytical law-sphere. It rather presupposes a subjective analytical synthesis and an objective analytical systasis respectively; for it is a logical unity in a logical multiplicity.

This dependent meaning-moment in the analytical aspect appeared to be a retrocipation originally founded in the modus of number. As soon as this inter-modal relation is broken, the logical “unity in multiplicity” loses every sense and becomes a “pure nihility”.

But the foundation of the logical relation between a “whole and its parts” is much more complicated than appears from the arithmetical analogy alone. In the metaphysical deduction of

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\(^1\) \textit{Ideen I}, ch. I, § 10.
\(^2\) \textit{Ideen I}, p. 32.
tion" of the whole of modern mathematics. HUSSERL tries to define the concept "whole" in a purely analytical way with the aid of the concept of "foundation" which is also supposed to be "purely analytical".

By a "whole" he understands a "set of formal kinds of content" which are "encompassed" by a uniform foundation, and that "without the support of any further kinds of content." A content of the class α is then founded in one of the class β, when according to its essence (i.e. in conformity to the law of its specific nature) there can be no α without the existence of a β, inclusive of the possible co-existence of some further kinds of content, viz. γ, δ, etc., all the same pre-supposed in α.

Then he presumes he can give a purely analytical division of the concept "part" viz. into pieces or parts in the strictest sense, and moments or abstract parts of the whole. Every part which is independent with reference to a "whole G" is called "piece", every part which is dependent on the same "whole" is a "moment".

When some whole can be divided into pieces in such a way that "essentially" the pieces are of the same lowest kind as the one determined by the undivided whole, HUSSERL calls it an extensive whole, and its pieces extensive parts.

All these supposedly "purely analytical definitions" clearly betray the intermodal meaning-synthesis with the modalities of number and space contained in them. And HUSSERL is guilty of undoubted modal shiftings of meaning when he includes original modal relations of the numerical and the spatial aspects in the analytical modus itself.

He admits that all the concepts and axioms formulated with regard to the analytical relation of "the whole and its parts" have been obtained from arithmetical, spatial and even sensorily perceptible relations. After this synthetical cognitive process HUSSERL proceeds to his "logical formalizing" in which he thinks he has eliminated every meaning-coherence with the non-logical aspects of experience. And then his "pure logic" is sadly led astray, because he ignores the modal structure of the analytical relations which is founded in the order of cosmic time.

He risks the statement that all totalities, except only the extensive ones which can be divided into pieces, lack "unifying

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1 Log. Unters. II, 1, p. 275.
2 op. cit. p. 267.
connective forms” (i.e. structural principles guaranteeing unity)  
and are only based on unilateral or mutual foundations of their parts”: “It is the relations of foundation that are only really 
unifying, we would like to say” ¹.

As a supposed universal essential truth, this pronouncement, 
of course, also bears on the typical total structures of individu-
ality (for instance the vegetable or animal structures, the struc-
ture of a work of art, of a social group, etc.), which as such can 
ever be grasped with the mere concept of a modal function 
alone. HUSSERL thinks he can deduce his thesis in a “purely 
analytical” way without any cosmological investigation of the 
different empirical types of totality-structures. This is no longer 
the firm ground of exact science ², but it is the sphere of the 
a priori dictates of logicism, which draws its vital saps from the 
Humanistic science-ideal with its absolutized mathematical logic.

The criterion of complete formalization is unable to make 
the possibility of purely analytical judgments plausible. What 
remains is: not a single judgment, and not a single concept can 
be “purely analytical”. There is only an analytical aspect of a 
concept and a judgment, which is present in every judgment and 
in every concept.

The cosmic limits of the possibility of formalizing in 
the formation of concepts.

HUSSERL’s concept of logical formalization induces us to con-
sider the cosmic limits of meaning of the possibility of formal-
izing concepts. For a moment I take over the questionable term 
“formalization” from HUSSERL. It is dependent on the form-
matter-schema of immanence-philosophy, so that it is necessary 
to delineate the meaning in which I accept it. I only understand 
by it the abstraction in the concepts from all meaning-individuality in the law-sphere concerned, including the generic and 
specific particularities. I agree thus with HUSSERL insofar as I 
sharply distinguish the abstracted modal basic concepts from all 
generic and specific notions. For the latter must derive all their 
modal determinateness from the former.

The concept “triangle”, for instance, is really a generic con-

¹ op. cit., p. 279: “Alles wahrhaft Einigende, so würend wir gerade 
sagen, sind die Verhältnisse der Fundierung.”

² HUSSERL considers his ‘eidetical pure logic’ as an exact science, just 
as his phenomenology.
in the Light of the Cosmonomic Idea

cept. But its meaning is limited by the original spatial modality whose structural meaning-moments are to be grasped in the modal basic concepts of geometry.

The cosmological limits of meaning set to the logical formalizing of concepts are found in the modal meaning-structure of the analytical law-sphere itself, in its indissoluble coherence with the modal structures of the other law-spheres.

The false formalism in the formation of concepts and the multivocality of formalistic notions.

When abstracting theoretical thought oversteps these boundaries, a false formalistic general concept arises. It is always characterized by the lack of any modal delimitation of its meaning and displays endless multivocality. This multivocality is then used by the theorist to obliterate the modal meaning-boundaries between the law-spheres.

Such false formalisms are e.g., the supposedly original basic concept “dimension in general”, serving to eradicate the limits between the analytical, arithmetical and spatial aspects; the concept “the whole and its parts” in the modally indeterminate sense intended by Husserl. Other examples are the concept “point” and the concept “continuum” as supposedly purely analytical notions whose analogical character is disregarded; the supposedly purely logical concepts of “arrangement”, “aggregate”, “class”, “value”; the supposedly “purely analytical” propositional form “there is” (es gibt), all belonging to the arsenal of the logicistic world of thought, etc.

But also the so-called “transcendental-logical categories” and forms of sensory intuition of Kantian epistemology lack a genuine delimitation of their modal meaning. The very lack of insight into their analogical character affects Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in its fundamentals.¹

¹ Cf. my treatise De analogische grondbegrippen der vakwetenschappen en hun betrekking tot de menselijke ervaringshorizon (Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks (1950).
§ 5 - THE PROBLEM CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF A SO-CALLED FORMAL LOGIC AS A SCIENCE.

The distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments should be replaced by that between theoretical judgments of an implicit and those of an explicit synthetical structure of meaning.

We have had definitely to reject the distinction between "(purely) analytical" and "synthetical" judgments and come to the conclusion that without any exception all theoretical judgments bear a synthetical character, just as without any exception they all have an analytical aspect. Even the judgment S is S can only be conceived in its analytical aspect in an inter-modal synthesis of meaning. As soon as we wish to know its analytical aspect, we must grasp its modal structure in its intermodal coherence.

One can indeed distinguish between theoretical judgments of an implicit synthetical structure and those of an explicit synthetical structure of meaning. This distinction has an epistemological character.

When e.g., our theoretical attention is exclusively directed to the correct linguistic formulation of universal modal analytical relations in the judgment, with abstraction from any meaning-individuality, the truly synthetical meaning-structure of the judgment remains merely implicit for theoretical knowledge. The intermodal meaning-synthesis does not enter our theoretical consciousness explicitly. Our theoretical knowledge remains purely formal insofar as it comprises merely the formulation of the logical relations.

It will not do to speak in this case of logical judgments 'an sich' falling entirely outside of the gnoseological relation and having a self-sufficient "objective-logical meaning". For the truth is that neither the linguistic formula nor the analytical relation signified by it have an objective character in an absolute sense. The logical meaning of the judgment has been (analogically) objectified in lingual symbols, which, however, only have a lingual sense in their indissoluble relation to the symbolically signifying subject. In the same way objective analytical states of affairs can only exist in relation to the subjective analytical function of human thought. And if "logical objectivity" is identified with "logical law-conformedness" it should be remembered that the modal analytical laws of thought are not valid 'in themselves', i.e. in an absolute sense, but only in the indissoluble relation to the thinking subject that is subjected to it. The theoretical logical subject-object relation and its linguistic objectification in the formula are not independent of the gnoseological "Gegenstand-relation". And this is why the real analytical
meaning signified by an objective theoretical propositional formula can only be grasped in a theoretical "explication" of the structural meaning-synthesis perhaps only implicitly intended in it.

The meaning signified is never the formula itself, and the formula is nothing without the subjective intention of signifying. Formalism in logic (which is not the same as the formalization of judgments) is always based on the absolutization of the formula.

The formulation of the judgment will remain extremely abstract and formal in this formalization. In the judgment $S$ is $S$ e.g., nothing is signified but the analytical identity of the logical unity in the duality of the terms related. The two terms of the analytical relation function in the formula as the so-called grammatical subject in any meaning-synthesis whatever. All that has been objectively implied in this judgment, according to its analytical aspect, [e.g., that logical identity is correlated with logical diversity] can only enter our theoretical consciousness explicitly in a further theoretical analysis and synthesis of meaning.

In Plato's dialogue Parmenides the Eleatic conductor of the discourse renders all these implications explicit in order to show that the analytical relation of identity may not be absolutized.

In this process theoretical thought is expressly directed to the coherence of the modal structure of its analytical aspect with that of the retrocipated and anticipated modal structures. Our theoretical attention then may remain concentrated on the analytical states of affairs themselves.

In other words, in the explicitly accomplished theoretical synthesis of meaning between the analytical function and those of number, space, motion, etc., the important thing for theoretical logic is not primarily the knowledge of the modal meaning-structures opposed to the analytical modus, but rather the explicit knowledge of the analytical states of affairs as such. This alone can be meant, without any internal contradiction, by the statement that in the "formalized judgments" resulting from a synthesis of meaning, we make abstraction from any "Gegenstand". Such a theoretical abstraction is indeed only possible in a theoretical analysis and intermodal synthesis of meaning. In these theoretical acts we oppose the analytical aspect to all that is non-analytical, e.g., in order to grasp the modal difference between logical and arithmetical multiplicity, logical and original extensiveness etc.

In other words, the theoretical abstraction of the analytical
The Epistemological Problem

from the non-analytical states of affairs should be the product of an intermodal synthesis of meaning in which we have grasped the limits of the modal analytical aspect in opposition to all the others. We shall presently return to this state of affairs.

The systatic structure of the non-theoretical judgments of experience.

The structure of the pre-theoretical judgments is systatic. It remains fundamentally different from the meaning-synthesis implied in the structure of all theoretical judgments. It is immaterial in this respect whether or not the latter are formalized.

A truly naive, pre-theoretical judgment of experience in principle lacks the abstraction proper to the intermodal theoretical synthesis of meaning. Thought in this case remains systatically integrated into the temporal meaning-coherence and has no "Gegenstand".

Is a theoretic logic possible as an independent science?

Our enquiry is now confronted with a fundamental problem which cannot be posed without ambiguity, unless it is recognized that the structure of a modal aspect can only be grasped in an intermodal synthesis of meaning pre-supposing a "Gegenstand". This problem reads as follows: Is logic possible as an independent science? If so, by means of what synthesis can the modal meaning of the logical law-sphere be opposed to subjective logical thought?

We came across this problem already in the previous paragraph, when demonstrating the hidden intermodal theoretical synthesis of meanings in Husserl's "formalization" of the judgments. It appeared then that the analytical aspect itself can only be grasped in an inter-modal synthesis by opposing it to the non-logical modal structures of the other law-spheres. But this statement cannot solve the problem. Intermodal synthesis and theoretical analysis of meaning mutually pre-suppose one another. In theoretical knowledge the modal analytical aspect is connected with the modal meaning of the law-sphere opposed to it in a way not yet explained.

The seeming paradox of the analysis of the analytical aspect.

It is, however, not yet clear how it is possible to subject the analytical aspect itself to theoretical analysis. At first sight
the following argument seems to be irrefutable: Every theoretical analysis of the analytical modality pre-supposes that which it wants to analyse, viz. the analytical aspect. It is also evident that the analytical aspect cannot be the "Gegenstand" of the analytical aspect itself. Consequently, an analysis of the modal analytical aspect is impossible.

We are now face to face with a paradox whose origin may be traced very accurately, even before we have embarked upon a more detailed inquiry into the character of the intermodal synthesis.

This origin lies in the resolution of the structure of theoretical synthesis into two isolated modal functions made independent of one another; and in the supposition that the (already abstracted) modal analytical aspect would have to analyse itself if we are to obtain theoretical knowledge of things analytical. This intrinsically antinomic supposition can only occur if one does not see that every theoretical analysis pre-supposes a cosmic systasis of meaning.

The theoretically grasped modal analytical aspect which can only be analysed in a synthesis of meaning, is not, and cannot be the actual analysis. In the actual analysis it is I who am operating theoretically. As a 'Gegenstand' of theoretical analysis the modal structure of the logical aspect is itself theoretically abstracted from the cosmic continuity of the cosmic temporal order. This structure as such is no more purely analytical than that of the other modal aspects. Even in its abstraction as a 'Gegenstand' of theoretical analysis it retains its cosmological character as a modal expression of the cosmic order of time. Not as an abstracted 'Gegenstand' of analysis, but in its actual inherence in this cosmic order, it is a transcendental condition of our analytical function of thought. Nevertheless we cannot acquire theoretical insight into this modal structure except by making it into the 'Gegenstand' of our analysis. This is the very reason why the distinction between transcendental reflexive thought and objectifying thought (identified with the attitude of natural science) is of no avail here, so long as the paradoxical basic thesis of transcendental immanence-philosophy is adhered to.

This philosophy assumes that the theoretical-logical function of thought in its abstract isolation can be actual, whereas the isolation is in reality the product of theoretical abstraction. The epistemological problem of the possibility of analyzing the analytical aspect itself cannot be satisfactorily solved before we have
obtained an insight into the fundamental problem of epistemology, viz. the inter-modal synthesis of meaning.

For the present only one thing can be accepted as an established truth: a true analysis of the modal analytical meaning can never have a "purely analytical" character, because such a conception leads to the obvious antinomy that has been discussed.

Is "formal logic" possible? What is to be understood by a Christian logic?

Is there any room left in our line of thought for "formal logic"? In the previous investigation it has been established that the conception of "formal logic" in the sense of a "pure analytics" destroys itself in internal antinomy. It is meaningless to speak of "purely analytical" when one has obtained an insight into the complex structure of the analytical modality in the cosmic meaning-coherence.

Every meaningful theoretical concept, every meaningful theoretical judgment, however highly "formalized", pre-supposes the intermodal synthesis and the cosmic systasis of meaning. A "formal logic" can only be a "formalized" logic in intermodal meaning-synthesis. It particularly examines the analytical aspect in this "formalization" whose limits are determined by the modal structure in its universal intermodal meaning-coherence. As remarked, all analytical modal individuality and all total structures of individuality are eliminated in this case. Such a formal logic belongs to the special theory of the law-spheres. It will be distinguished from the mathematical, physical, biological, psychological, etc., fields of research. In these latter our theoretical attention is not directed to the analytical aspect itself, but to the opposed non-logical aspects analysed in the theoretical synthesis, which are only analytically encompassed by the logical categories.

Even formal logic remains bound to the cosmological fundamental principles of modal sphere-sovereignty and sphere-universality. At this point a truly Christian logic \(^1\) differs essentially from the current logical theories rooted in the immanence-standpoint. This difference does not lie in unimportant corrections of traditional logic or of modern "formal" logic. And a

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fortiori it has nothing to do with the meaningless supposition that Christian thought should be subject to other logical laws than that of non-Christians.

It can only mean that formal logic ought to come under the control of our Christian cosmonomic Idea and ought to be made fruitful by the transcendental Idea of the "logica universalis" which does not find a rest in time but is irresistibly directed to Christ and in Him to the Creator of all things. A truly universal formal logic ought to be oriented to the philosophic basic Idea of the Origin, the meaning-totality, and the universal cosmic meaning-coherence, when it sets out to investigate the logical relations as such.
CHAPTER II

THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTER-MODAL SYNTHESIS OF MEANING AND ITS TRANSCENDENTAL AND TRANSCENDENT PRE-REQUISITES.

§ 1 - THE THEORETICAL CHARACTER OF THE "GEGENSTAND" IN THE SCIENTIFIC COGNITIVE PROCESS.

The fundamental epistemological problem with respect to scientific knowledge is concerned with the possibility of the inter-modal theoretical synthesis of meaning. But since this theoretical synthesis pre-supposes a theoretical antithesis, it implies the primordial question: What gives rise to the problem of that which is opposed to the logical function, i.e. the 'Gegenstand'?

In the Prolegomena (Vol. I) these problems have been raised and discussed in the general cadre of a transcendental critique of theoretical thought. But in their specific epistemological context they imply questions which could not yet be investigated in this provisional discussion. Therefore they ought to be resumed here in greater detail.

On the immanence-standpoint the problem concerning the theoretical antithesis cannot be posed in a really critical manner, even when behind Kant's critical inquiry the attempt is made to base epistemology on some type of metaphysics, on a "critical ontology" or on modern phenomenology.

Phenomenologists presume that the "Gegenstand" is no problem at all, since it is to be found as a phenomenological datum in the intentional relation of the act of consciousness. The "Gegenstand" is then nothing but the "intended correlate" to which the "intentional consciousness" is directed. The world, according to phenomenologists, is given us as "intended Gegenstand". This does not detract from the fact that in the opinion
Of EDMUND HUSSERL it is constituted by the transcendental consciousness itself, outside of which “nulla res potest existere”.

In the epistemology founded in pre-Kantian metaphysics the Αντικείμενο is regarded as identical with the subjective reality of a substance, supposed to be independent of human experience.

In Kant’s theory, as appeared in the preceding chapter, the “Gegenstand” is identified with the universally valid and “objective” of experience. In this case, too, the problem of that which is opposed to the logical function, in other words the problem of the possibility of the isolating act of abstraction, has not even been raised. This renders the multivocal concept of the “Gegenstand” handled in immanence-philosophy fundamentally useless to us.

A closer investigation into the primary basic problem of epistemology as it is formulated by us, should therefore be preceded by a more detailed explanation of the true character of the “Gegenstand” and of the structure of the theoretical synthesis of meaning.

Is it possible to speak of the ‘Gegenstand’ of knowledge?

It is usual to speak of the “Gegenstand” of knowledge, assuming that the “Gegenstand” is opposed to knowledge. But to what element in knowledge is the “Gegenstand” opposed? If one should say: it is opposed to the subject of cognition, this answer would be problematic in every respect. It does not become less so when one tries to be more precise by defining the “cognizing subject” as the “transcendental consciousness”, the transcendentally reduced “I think” (ego cogito). This has been shown in the Prolegomena.

Is then the “Gegenstand” opposed to our cognitive selfhood? We shall see in the sequel of our examination that such a view would make epistemology impossible.

In the Prolegomena it has appeared that the epistemological “Gegenstand” owes its origin exclusively to a theoretical disjunction of the cosmic temporal meaning-systasis. Our “selfhood” is not to be found in the latter. The correlate to the “Gegenstand” must consequently be sought within the temporal diversity of aspects, not in the I-ness. The resistance as such is due to an antithetical opposing act, which is essentially a theoretical act of setting apart the several aspects of the cosmic
meaning-systasis. This setting apart is only possible by means of analysis. For this reason the analytical modality must show a very special and indissoluble correlation with the "Gegenstand".

The enstatic and the antithetical attitude of thought.

The modal function of feeling meets with no resistance in an epistemological sense. The subject-object relation inherent in it cannot be interpreted as an essentially inter-modal opposition (in the theoretical analysis). The analytical function itself has no theoretical resistance as long as this function remains merely inherent in temporal reality. It is part and parcel of the cosmic meaning-systasis, an indispensable aspect of empirical reality, in which all the post-logical aspects are founded.

In the Prolegomena it has been shown that in naïve experience the analytical function of thought is fitted into temporal reality and operative in the cosmic meaning-coherence. That is why naïve, pre-theoretical experience does not know of an epistemological problem. Naïve thought has no "opposite" to its logical function and does not perform any inter-modal theoretical synthesis, but is operative in the full temporal reality in enstasis.

Naïve experience is a concrete experience of things and their relations in the fulness of individual temporal reality.

The analytical subject-object relation also has a merely enstatic character here. Even in the theoretical attitude of thought this relation has indeed nothing to do with the antithetical Gegenstand-relation. But here it can be opposed to non-logical subject-object relations. In addition its modal structure can be made into a 'Gegenstand' of analysis by abstracting it from the inter-modal coherence of cosmic time in its continuity.

The problem of meaning-synthesis is rooted in the problem of time, in the problem of the ἐνοχή from the continuity of the temporal cosmic meaning-coherence.

The epistemological "Gegenstand" cannot be cosmic reality itself, because the analytical function, even in its deepened theo-

1 This term, which has such a central function in Husserl's phenomenology, was by no means invented by him. It originates from Greek philosophy. There is no point in trying to find Husserlian motives behind my conception of the ἐνοχή. I exclusively use this term to signify an
Theoretical meaning can never break the bonds of its immanence in temporal reality. The analytical function cannot transcend cosmic time or be opposed to the cosmos. That which is abstracted in anti-theoretical theoretical thought appeared to be nothing but the continuity of cosmic time.

The basic problem of epistemological antithesis and inter-modal synthesis of meaning thus proved to be essentially rooted in the problem of cosmic time, viz. in the possibility of a theoretical \( \varepsilon \pi \nu \chi \bar{\eta} \) (refraining) from the temporal continuity of the cosmic coherence of meaning.

Varieties of "Gegenstände".

In the primary analytical \( \varepsilon \pi \nu \chi \bar{\eta} \) the "Gegenstand" may be conceived in a larger or lesser degree of abstraction. The absolute limit of "gegenständliche" abstraction is found in the functional basic structure of the modal aspects.

An entire law-sphere with its immanent modality of meaning can function as a "Gegenstand". Within such an abstracted law-sphere a whole field of mutually coherent particular "Gegenstände" reveal themselves. Finally it is possible to abstract a structural "Gegenstand" from a thing or event of naïve experience and from a typical total structure of social life. This structural "Gegenstand" is no longer merely modal, or functional, but displays typical structural coherences of an inter-modal character in the analytical \( \varepsilon \pi \nu \chi \bar{\eta} \). This latter kind of "Gegenstände" constitute the field of our investigations in the third volume.

§ 2 - THE RELATION BETWEEN INTER-MODAL MEANING-SYNTHESIS AND DEEPENED ANALYSIS. THE OBJECTIVE ANALYTICAL DIS-STASIS AND THE ANALYTICAL CHARACTER OF THE THEORETICAL \( \varepsilon \pi \nu \chi \bar{\eta} \).

The question may be asked: What is the reason why the deepening of analysis can only be accomplished in the inter-modal meaning-synthesis of thought? This question deserves close attention. Why cannot the deepening of meaning in the analytical aspect remain at rest in the cosmic meaning-systasis? Why should the opening analytical function abstract its "Gegenstand" from the full cosmic coherence of time?
The answer is: the analytical function itself cannot possibly abide by the mere meaning-systasis of cosmic reality because of the dynamics of its "universality within its own sphere". This universality can only reveal itself in the deepened meaning of analysis. It sets the modal structures of the law-spheres apart from each other by breaking up the continuity of the cosmic meaning-coherence into a logical discontinuity.

In its purely enstatic function the logical law-sphere can never approach the totality of meaning in its own modality. Enstatic logical analysis is restrictively bound to sensory perception and can only analytically distinguish concrete things and their relations according to sensorily founded characteristics.

The reason why the naïve concept of a thing cannot be based on an inter-modal synthesis of meaning. The analytical character of the ἐνοχή.

Naturally this does not mean that the naïve concept of a thing is founded in a synthesis of analytical and psychical meaning. Naïve, pre-theoretical thought is unable to isolate the psychical function as its "Gegenstand" from the full temporal reality.

The truth is that the naïve concept of a thing remains embedded in the full temporal systasis of naïve experience forming an indissoluble subjective component part of it. This is the reason why pre-theoretical thought is unable to analyse the modal aspects of the reality of a thing. Naïve analysis does not penetrate behind the objective outward appearance, and cannot embrace the functional laws of the modal spheres in an inter-modal synthesis of meaning. It has to be satisfied with pre-theoretical distinctions oriented to the praxis and more or less verifiable in the sensory aspect of experience. These distinctions are not arranged according to a systematical-methodical viewpoint.

But conformable to the transcendental Idea of the consummation of its meaning, the logical function requires the analytical comprehension of the totality of the modal functions with their law-conformities.

It is characteristic of this Idea of analysis not to leave the cosmic data alone, but to separate its own substratum- and superstratum-functions, and even the analytical modus itself, which is abstracted in the inter-modal meaning-synthesis. From the Prolegomena we know that this theoretical setting apart of the modal aspects is only possible by means of an analytical disjunction of their continuous coherence in cosmic time. It is
the continuity of the latter from which theoretical analysis has to abstract its ‘Gegenstand’, though this analysis can have actuality only within cosmic time.

The disclosure of the logical anticipatory sphere in the pre-logical “Gegenstand”.

In the first place the deepened analytical function can make the pre-logical law-spheres into its “Gegenstand” and concentrate on one of them in particular (that of number, space, movement, energy, organic life, or psychical feeling).

This concentration originates from the actual direction of theoretical attention, which cannot be explained in a purely modal analytical way. The result is that under its functional guidance the logical anticipatory sphere of the pre-logical “Gegenstand” is opened. The modal aspects of number, space, movement, etc., with their law-conformities, which have sovereignty in their own spheres, follow the lead of systematic analysis, thus revealing their meaning-coherence with the logical modality. The pre-logical law-spheres abstracted into the “Gegenstand” of theoretical analysis, reveal their “predisposition” to the systematic tendency of theoretical thought, their anticipatory appeal to logical systematics.

This state of affairs is fundamentally disregarded in the metaphysical conception of substance. For according to the latter the pre-logical properties of the “thing in itself” are supposed to have no relation whatever to human thought, although the latter is certainly related to the substance.

The deepening of the logical object-side of reality in theoretical thought. The objective-analytical distasis.

At the same time the logical object-side of reality is deepened in the subject-object relation. It changes from an objective logical systasis, merely embedded in temporal reality, into an objective logical ‘standing apart’, the objective dis-stasis of a functional multiplicity in the analytical aspect.

In theoretical scientific thought the modal concept of function discloses the logical object-side of reality. Analysis is no longer

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1 We have pointed this out already in the General Theory of the Law-spheres.
content with a sensorily founded distinction of things whose modal aspects have not been analysed, but it proceeds to the theoretical disjunction of these aspects themselves.

Only now are those aspects which precede the logical law-sphere distinctly objectified in the latter. And yet this objective analytical dis-stasis is no more a creation of theoretical thought than the objective analytical systasis is a creation of pre-theoretical thought. It belongs to the objective logical aspect of the full temporal reality, and is only made manifest by theoretical analysis. Empirical reality is doubtless not given in analytical dis-stasis; the latter can only function within the continuous coherence of cosmic time. But this dis-stasis is an objective possibility in the logical aspect of reality itself.

The \( \xi\omega\chi\) which is characteristic of theoretical thought, is made in deepened analysis. It functions within the logical law-sphere; but it is the theoretical meaning-synthesis that refers analysis to its "Gegenstand". Now that the modal meaning of the theoretical \( \xi\omega\chi\) has been explained, the possibility of the inter-modal synthesis of meaning demands our attention. The modal analytical aspect cannot explain this possibility, because it has been theoretically abstracted itself. This theoretical abstraction appeals to the inter-modal synthesis of meaning.

§ 3 - INTUITION IN THE CONTINUITY AND IN THE FUNCTIONAL REFRACTION OF COSMIC TIME.

The intermodal synthesis of meaning is a subjective cognitive act. Its super-individual universal validity depends on the cosmic temporal order, which makes it possible. As an actus it pre-supposes the transcendent super-temporal I-ness or selfhood which, according to the Archimedean point of our cosmonomic idea, shares in the religious root of the whole of temporal reality. In the direction of the meaning-synthesis to the selfhood, possible only in the transcendental direction of the cosmic temporal order, we discover the transcendental condition of the cognitive inter-modal meaning-synthesis. In the selfhood as the religious root of all cognitive activity, we find its transcendental condition. But while our theoretical reflection on the possibility of the synthesis of meaning chooses the transcendental direction, our attention is again drawn to the relation between the deepened theoretical analysis in which we have performed our analytical \( \xi\omega\chi\), and cosmic time, in whose con-
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...continuity this ἐποχή is brought about. The theoretical concept of the analytical aspect proved to be a theoretical abstraction. That which is abstracted from in order to grasp the analytical modality itself in the theoretical synthesis, proved to be the cosmic continuity of time, in the meaning-systasis of temporal reality.

Actual analysis exceeds the modal limits of the analytical law-sphere.

If this is so, actual analysis must be something more than the modal analytical function which we can grasp as the product of a synthetic abstraction. The excess lies in that which cannot be theoretically isolated in the analytical modus. It is that temporal bottom layer of the latter by means of which our analytical function of thought is embedded in cosmic time itself. Through this bottom layer our thought is in continuous temporal contact with all the other modal functions which our selfhood can claim in time as its own. This temporal bottom layer of actual analysis is our intuition. Since Plato every epistemology that wanted to reach greater depths has tried to shed light on this intuition. But its true character is bound to evade philosophy, as long as a priori the latter eliminates cosmic time from its epistemological reflection.

Our intuition cannot be theoretically isolated just because it has a continuous temporal character. The continuous meaning-coherence in the temporal refraction of meaning is immediately grasped by it behind all theoretical conceptual limits. Intuition is thus a cosmic intuition of time. Whoever thinks he can isolate it theoretically, turns it into a theoretical synthetical concept eliminating exactly that which is essential to intuition, viz. its being embedded in the temporal continuity of the cosmic meaning-coherence. In its temporal actuality, however, intuition is nothing without the selfhood transcending time.

In the transcendental temporal direction of theoretical intuition, our selfhood becomes cosmollogically conscious of itself in the temporal coherence and diversity of all its modal functions.

It is human personality that operates in cognition; it is not one or more of its abstracted modal functions. In its religious root this personality transcends its temporal acts and modal functions. This holds good no matter whether the cosmological self-consciousness, in the cognitive activity, is directed in Christ to the true Origin of all things, to the sovereign Creator and
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Heavenly Father, or, in sinful apostasy, seeks itself and the Origin in the temporal.

Self-reflection on the modal functions as being our own.

The modal aspects of temporal reality are not alien to us in the sense of transcending the human selfhood. They are cosmically our own. Apart from the religious root in which the creation finds its totality of meaning and in which our selfhood shares, they have no meaning. In the intuitive self-reflection on the modal functions, as our own in cosmic time, is revealed the possibility of our synthetic knowledge of the modal law-spheres. In our intuition, the analytical and non-analytical functions of experience come to an actual and conscious contact which does not affect their modal diversity. In this way our selfhood experiences the temporal coherence between the modal aspects of reality. In this experience the I-ness remains the central point of reference. Intuition, being bound to time, cannot transcend the modal diversity of meaning. So long as the analytical function has not been deepened in the transcendental direction of time, and remains inert in the foundational direction of the temporal order, our intuition does not arrive at a free synthesis of meaning. Then it remains at rest in the systasis of the datum. Or rather the other way round: it is by means of our intuition that the modal analytical function enters continuous cosmic time. So long as our intuition remains at rest in the foundational direction of the cosmic temporal order, the modal analytical function cannot unfold itself by deepening its meaning. Then we are not actually operating in the transcendental freedom of theoretical thought on the road to inter-modal meaning-synthesis.

The intuition which simply rests in the cosmic meaning-coherence, is typical of the attitude of thought in naive experience. All of us, no matter whether we are men of science or not, adopt the naive attitude as soon as we are not theoretically engaged. In the resting pre-theoretical intuition we have an enstatic conscious ‘Erleben’ of the full temporal reality as it presents itself in the typical structures of individuality and their relations. This conscious ‘Erleben’ or ‘Hineinleben’ into reality primarily unfolds itself in the integral experience of temporal reality to which any kind of theoretical meaning-synthesis is still alien. This integral experience of reality must not in any way be mis-
interpreted theoretically in accordance with the functionalistic view-points of immanence-philosophy (e.g., as something of a purely sensory psychical nature, or as a synthetical logical arrangement of sensory impressions). The conscious enstatic 'Hineinleben', as an entering into reality, although by no means detached from the analytical function of thought, lacks theoretical insight into the modal aspects of our experience. But theoretical insight, originating from antithetical disjunctive thought, and reading the disclosed and opened modal aspect as its "Gegenstand", cannot itself reveal this modality to us as our own. The true datum is never that which has been merely theoretically read.

Only as the disclosure, opening, and theoretical deepening of the real datum in pre-theoretical conscious 'Erleben', is theoretical insight possible. Conscious 'Erleben' is the temporal basic layer of all cognition.

The misconception with regard to the possibility of non-intuitive knowledge.

All theoretical knowledge rests on conscious insight.

It is a misconception to think that actual synthetical thought is possible without intuitive insight. The analytical law-conformity of thought must itself be known intuitively, if analysis is to be possible. And it is a fortiori an indispensable condition of scientific knowledge that we have an intuitive insight into the "Gegenstand".

As soon as my intuition is inoperative, I do not know anything. Neither the modal subjective psychical, nor the modal subjective logical function, without our theoretical intuition, can give us conscious insight into the sensory impressions or analytical coherences revealing themselves in it.

VOLKELT's incorrect contrast of logical necessity and intuitive certainty.

According to JOHANNES VOLKELT, the 'logical necessity of thought' does not refer to intuition as its source. He means to say that the knowledge of logical necessity is not objectively founded in intuition. For this statement he adduces the following reasons: "I am certain of logical necessity as of something purely objective, supra-personal, something that shows the inner coherence of ground and consequence; hence something
that forms a complete contrast with all intuitive necessity. When asked why I admit some logically necessary proposition, I do not answer: “Because I am intuitively certain of this statement”, or “because I am quite certain of this proposition intuitively”, but “because this proposition is objectively founded, because it follows from objective considerations, because it rests on proofs”.

Here Volkelt shows that he has not grasped the transcendental meaning of intuition in logical thought. The same lack of insight is seen in a note saying that intuition in itself is capable of psychological analysis. Intuitive certainty, especially with regard to the logical aspect, is assumed to be the “subjective form in which the objective compulsion of the logical manifests itself to me.” But how could objective logical states of affairs be known by us apart from subjective logical certainty, — which in the last instance is founded in the immediate in-sight of intuition. Apparently Volkelt has no insight into the logical subject-object relation.

His further argument, we are sorry to say, can hardly be taken seriously: “Intuitive certainty is, therefore, not the creator of logical truth, but only the way and character in which I become aware of the self-supporting truth. Consequently( !) we are not concerned here with a type of intuitive certainty that could be put on a level with moral, religious and aesthetical intuition”.

Of course it cannot be reasonably supposed that intuition creates truth. But does Volkelt mean to say that the moral, aesthetical or religious intuition creates that into which it gains an insight? And has intuition suddenly changed into something different when, instead of being directed to the moral and

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1 "Die intuitive Gewissheit ist also nicht die Erzeugerin der logischen Wahrheit, sondern nur die subjektive Art und Weise, wie mir die sich selbst tragende logische Wahrheit zu Bewusstsein kommt.

Es handelt sich hier also( !) keineswegs um einen Typus der intuitiven Gewissheit, welcher der moralischen, religiösen und ästhetischen Intuition an die Seite gestellt werden könnte."
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aesthetical law-spheres or to that of faith, it focuses on the logical states of affairs?

Is it perhaps only in this case of a subjective character, whereas in the other case it has an infallible objectivity?

VOLKELT’s meaning is clearer in an earlier context. There he contrasts two kinds of certainty, viz. the intuitive certainty originating from the “logical necessity of thought” and the certainty derived from the intelligible moral law. VOLKELT thinks he can characterize this contrast in such a way that the moral type has no other basis than our intuitive certainty, whereas logical truth is based on the “coherence of the understanding” which in our intuition can only be experienced subjectively.

Even sensory impressions can only be related to myself and to things by conscious intuition.

What does VOLKELT really mean by intuition? His answer is: “the immediate certainty of something that transcends experience”? And what does he mean by “experience”? Only its sensory psychical aspect! This explains his statement: “When I am immediately certain of the sensation of sweetness, this is not an intuitive certainty; when, however, according to KANT, we are certain of the moral law that is alive in our intelligible I, we have to deal with intuitive certainty”.

With this VOLKELT has in principle accepted the sensualistic conception of experience, prevailing in the so-called empiricistic trend of immanence-philosophy. This conception is meaningless insofar as the sensory-psychical aspect of experience has no experiential sense apart from the inter-modal coherence of meaning.

Experience is related to the human I-ness. It is fundamentally different from the animal awareness of sensations.

Ultimately VOLKELT appears to start from the same cosmonomic Idea that forms the foundation of KANT’s dualistic conception of the temporal world-coherence viz. that of the realm of sensory phenomena and that of the super-sensory noumena.

This in itself suffices to unmask VOLKELT’s demand for “an absolutely unprejudiced” epistemology. His argument loses its

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1 “Wenn ich der Empfindung des Süßen unmittelbar gewiss bin, so ist dies kein intuitives Gewisssein; wenn wir dagegen nach KANT der in unserem intelligibelen Ich lebenden Sittengesetzes unmittelbar gewiss werden, so liegt intuitive Gewissheit vor.”
foundation when it is admitted that restricting experience to sensory impressions is equal to cancelling the possibility of experience. For the psychical can only exist in the temporal coherence of experience together with all the other aspects. And on the other hand, we can not possibly have intuitive certainty about that which is fundamentally in-experienceable. How could I really be aware of a sweet taste, if I could not relate this sensory impression to myself, by means of my intuition entering into the cosmic stream of time?

I do not experience this sensory impression without some awareness of its objective or non-objective character. Only in intuition do I experience the coherence of a psychical impression with the pre-psychical aspects of empirical reality, in which the sensory subject-object relation is founded.

Only in this way am I quite sure that a so-called adequate sensory impression of sweetness is an intentional objective one, which every human being with a normally developed taste is bound to receive from the matter tasted, because in its psychical object-function sweetness belongs to the full reality of the matter tasted.

Man's experience of the sensory aspect of reality is never apart from his logical faculty of distinction, and only in our intuition is our logical subject-function in actual temporal contact with the other aspects of reality.

The supposed “pure sensation” is a theoretical abstraction destroying itself in contradiction. It is the product of an analytical hroxii, and for this very reason it cannot be “purely sensory”.

The inter-modal synthesis of meaning is only possible through the theoretical intuition of time.

The inter-modal synthesis of meaning appears thus to be possible only through the theoretical intuition. The latter is necessarily related to the transcendent selfhood. I cannot grasp the modal meaning of a law-sphere in a theoretical concept, if I lack temporal theoretical insight into the aspect opposed to the analysis. My intuition moves to and fro between my deepened analysis and its “Gegenstand” to bring them into actual contact in the inter-modal synthesis of meaning. In this process I become conscious of my theoretical freedom of thought. The actual syn-

1 “Empfindungen”.
2 “reine Empfindung”.
thesis of meaning accomplished in it can never be explained by means of the isolated functions of consciousness. Theoretical intuition is operative in deepened analysis itself, and only by its intermediary is theoretical thought able to analyse the "Gegenstand" in the intermodal synthesis of meaning. In this intuition I implicitly relate the intermodal meaning-synthesis to the transcendent identity of the modal functions I experience in the religious root of my existence.

But it is only in a transcendental reflection, led by our transcendental basic Idea, that this implicit relation can be made explicit to theoretical thought.

In its subjective subordination to the cosmic order of time, theoretical intuition is an absolutely transcendental condition of the cognitive meaning-synthesis. As such it can never be conceived in a category or a concept, but can only be approached in the transcendental Idea of temporal consciousness.

Only by the latter can our selfhood become cosmologically conscious of itself in its intuitive reflection.

The relation between theoretical and pre-theoretical intuition. Cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness.

Theoretical intuition, actualized in synthetical thought, is no more detached from pre-theoretical intuition, operative in enstatic thought, than the transcendental direction in the cosmic order of time is detached from the foundational direction. In the inter-modal synthesis and analytical disjunction of the modal aspects of experience our theoretical intuition is actualized in synthetical thought as insight. It can only be understood as a deepening of pre-theoretical intuition, to which it must always refer in the foundational direction of time.

In the composure of my pre-theoretical intuition I have an immediate enstatic experience of temporal reality as my own in my thought. In pre-theoretical thought our I-ness enters enstatically by means of its naïve intuition into the cosmic temporal coherence of experience.

And thus we have conscious experience of the modal diversity of meaning but without distinct knowledge of the modal aspects. In contrast with theoretical self-consciousness we can speak here of a pre-theoretical cosmic self-consciousness. In this the theoretical self-consciousness remains founded, in accordance with the cosmic temporal order. All theoretical reflection on the modal aspects of reality, and all intuitive insight is
founded in experience in identity, only deepened, but never cancelled in theoretical intuitive insight. It is only man who can have cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness because only man's cosmic temporal structure is founded in an individual religious root transcending time, viz. his selfhood. Only his selfhood is able to enter into the temporal cosmos by means of his intuition of time and to set apart and combine the modal aspects in theoretical thought. In contrast with those creatures that have no self-consciousness and are ex-statically absorbed by their temporal existence, man's selfhood is able to enter enstatically into the coherence of cosmic time.

Rejection of a separation between intuition and analysis.

We have approached intuition as the temporal bottom layer of the analytical function which it exceeds. This implies that we must reject any attempt to detach intuition from the analytical aspect and to contrast it to analytical thought as a mysterious metaphysical faculty.

Because of their inherent depreciation of methodical theoretical conceptual thought, such efforts will always cause the one-sided reaction of those who think they have once for all banished intuitive insight as an "asylum ignorantiae" from epistemology. According to Schelling's romanticism there exists a method of speculative thought characteristic of men of genius. The latter rise above the primary logical principles, in their "intellectual intuition". The idea of such a method is not only internally contradictory, but Schelling's "intellectual intuition" has a perfectly theoretical character; it is connected with a theoretical abstraction which cannot exist without an analytical ἐποχή.

The metaphysical psychologizing of intuition in Bergson.

In recent times Bergson in particular has introduced intuition as a metaphysical cognitive organ diametrically opposed to theoretical-logical analysis. To analytical, disjunctive scientific thought with its conceptual delimitation, he ascribes the function of a mere biological adaptation to matter. Similar to the pragmatist view he attributes merely technical utility to science with regard to human conduct. On the other hand he considers intuition to be an immediate subjective psychical 'empathy' penetrat-
ing with “intellectual sympathy” into the “durée”, i.e. the creative qualitative vital stream of time. Intuition alone can give us “metaphysical knowledge of absolute reality”. This irrationalistic psychologistic metaphysics lacks critical reflexion. It loses sight of the fact that the supposed isolation of an actual psychical “intuition” and “durée” can itself only be the product of an (erroneous) theoretical analysis and synthesis of meaning. For this intuition is supposed to be cleared of any connection with the other aspects of experience.

Every attempt to isolate intuition theoretically cancels itself. In spite of himself BERGSON feels obliged to connect intuition with concepts. He does so in an internally contradictory way by depriving the intuitively founded concept of every analytical delimitation. He misinterprets this concept as the fluid expression of “psychical empathy” which is supposed to lack the analytical essential to theoretical thought.

There can be no question of genuine philosophy, according to him, “unless it surpasses the conceptual, or at least unless it frees itself from rigid, ready-made concepts, and creates notions entirely different from those we habitually handle; I would say supple, mobile, almost fluid concepts, always ready to mould themselves in accordance with the fugitive forms of intuition” (italics are mine).

1 Introduction à la Métaphysique (now included in La Pensée et le Mouvant, 2ième edit. 1934, p. 213). “Certes, les concepts lui sont indispensables, car toutes les autres sciences travaillent le plus ordinairement sur des concepts, et la métaphysique ne saurait se passer des autres sciences.” [Certainly, the concepts are indispensable to it, for all the other sciences mostly work with concepts, and metaphysics could not do without the other sciences].

Cf. also: La Pensée et le Mouvant (2ième edit. 1934) p. 39: “l’intuition, comme toute pensée, finit par se loger dans des concepts: durée, multiplicité qualitative ou hétérogène, inconscient-differentielle même, si l’on prend la notion telle qu’elle était au début.” [Intuition, like every thought, at last gets deposited in concepts; duration, qualitative or heterogeneous multiplicity, unconscious-differential even, if the notion is taken such as it was at the beginning.]

2 “Elle (i.e. “la philosophie”) n’est proprement elle même que lorsqu’elle dépasse le concept ou du moins lorsqu’elle s’affranchit des concepts raîdes tout faits pour créer des concepts bien différents de ceux que nous manions d’habitude, je veux dire des représentations souples, mobiles, presque fluides, toujours prêtes à se mouler sur les formes fuyantes de l’intuition” (italics are mine). Introduction à la Métaphysique, op. cit., p. 213/214.
A little further on we read: “If metaphysics is possible, it can only be an awkward effort, even painful(!), immediately to place itself with a kind of intellectual dilation in the object that one studies, to pass from reality to the concepts and no longer from the concepts to reality”.

The facts are, however, as follows: If the analytical \( \varepsilon \pi \o x \eta \) from the continuity of cosmic time — which Bergson identifies functionalistically with the psychical duration of feeling! — is cancelled, we necessarily fall back in the merely enstatic intuitive attitude of the thought of naïve experience. It is exactly from this attitude that Bergson wishes to withdraw in his attempt to isolate intuition theoretically from analysis. There is, however, no third possibility between theoretical synthesis and pre-theoretical naïve experience, as far as human knowledge is concerned.

In Bergson's concept of “pure duration” we can clearly detect the theoretical synthesis of meaning with its analytical \( \varepsilon \pi \o x \eta \) — although in an apert irrationalistic turn of thought. For this “duration” has been obtained by him from the full temporal experience in a process of theoretical abstraction; and this is done with the aid of an intuitively founded analysis! Bergson does not see this, because he starts from the metaphysical prejudice that the absolute, full reality has been given us in the actual psychical stream of time.

In other words Bergson starts from a metaphysical absolutization in which the primary analysis and inter-modal synthesis of meaning remain hidden from him. The lack of really critical transcendental self-reflection appears clearly in his optimistic belief that, if his intuitive metaphysical method were generally accepted, the strife between the different philosophic movements would cease. For he thinks he can chiefly explain this strife by the fact that the methods of technical scientific thought, serviceable to practical utility, were forced on the disinterested manner of knowing reality, proper to philosophy.

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1 op. cit., pp. 21/2: “Si la métaphysique est possible, elle ne peut être qu'un effort pénible, douloureux même(!) pour se placer tout de suite, par une espèce de dilation intellectuelle, dans la chose qu'on étudie, enfin pour aller de la réalité aux concepts et non plus des concepts à la réalité.”

2 “Les difficultés inhérentes à la métaphysique, les antinomies qu'elle soulève, les contradictions où elle tombe, la division en écoles antagonistes et les oppositions irréductibles entre systèmes, viennent en grande partie de ce que nous appliquons à la connaissance désintéressée du réel les
Why theoretical intuition can never operate apart from the analytical function. Intuition and instinct.

Intuition cannot be isolated from analysis. Conversely, analysis can never function without intuitive insight. This has been convincingly proved by Henri Poincaré, in his *La Valeur de la Science* and in his *Science et Hypothèse*, to refute the idea of a 'pure analysis' in the mathematical sciences.

But is it not a fact that sometimes theoretical states of affairs are grasped intuitively at one glance by a truly original thinker, before they are theoretically analysed in all their details? Is not there after all such a thing as an actual intuition that can do without the aid of the analytical function? Does not a kind of intuition exist in men of genius which intuits directly, apart from any logical activity of thought? There is nothing so easy as this interpretation of the above-mentioned fact; but there is also nothing that is more confusing. A simple consideration can convince us of its untenability.

This intuition of men of genius, which for the rest is by no means *infallible*, can provide them with a real theoretical insight only when it *distinguishes* and *identifies* logically. In case this subjective analytical function is absent, at most some *animal instinct* but not a theoretical intuition can be operative.

It is quite possible, however, for theoretical intuition to grasp certain modal law-conformities synthetically in the free direction of its attention\(^1\) without a previous exhaustive analysis of the fundamental law-conformities in the modal field of research.

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procédés dont nous nous servons couramment dans un but d'utilité pratique. Elles viennent principalement de ce que nous nous installons dans l'immobile pour guetter le mouvant au passage, au lieu de nous replacer dans le mouvant pour traverser avec lui les positions immobiles...” [The difficulties inherent in metaphysics, the antinomies it evokes, the contradictions into which it gets involved, the division into antagonistic schools and the irreducible oppositions between the systems, are for a large part due to the circumstance that we apply to the disinterested knowledge of reality, the methods we usually employ for a practical purpose. They originate chiefly from our taking up a position in what is immobile in order to watch the moving in its passage, instead of placing ourselves in the moving in order to traverse the immobile positions with it.]

\(^1\) The *free* direction of our attention to abstract modal states of affairs is typical for *theoretical* intuition in contradistinction to the pre-theoretical, which latter in directing our attention is rigidly bound to *psychical* factors. With respect to the latter point cf. August Messer *Psychologie* (5th edit. 1934) p. 282 ff. For the rest his explanation is not free from
In this respect the so-called arithmeticizing of geometry is instructive. The general theory of functions, as it was founded arithmetically by Weierstrasz, was by no means discovered in a 'purely analytical' way, but, as Poincaré has shown, by an intuitive insight into the arithmetical law-conformities. We may add to this statement that the discovery was made under the guidance of the intuitive \( \upsilon \alpha \delta \varepsilon \varphi \) of the \( a \) priori modal aspect of movement, without which \( \upsilon \alpha \delta \varepsilon \varphi \) the insight into the mathematical concept of function would not have been possible.

Riemann, the second founder of the general theory of the mathematical functions, directed his intuitive theoretical attention to the spatial aspect. He was geometrically rather than arithmetically minded.

If analysis is identified with arithmetical analysis, one might be inclined to call Riemann an "intuitive thinker", and Weierstrasz an analytical one. In this way one would again introduce a false contrast between analysis and intuition. But then the true state of affairs has been misinterpreted.

Even pre-theoretical intuition cannot function without logical distinction.

The attempt to relate only theoretical intuition (with the various directions of its theoretical attention) to the analytical function, is another cause of a great deal of confusion. In this case pre-theoretical intuition is supposed to be entirely detached from our logical function.

But even pre-theoretical intuition can only inform us of pre-confusion. We refer for instance to the following remark: "Natürlich entstehen für uns durch unsere Aufmerksamkeit nicht bloß die Objekte unseres theoretischen Denkens und Erkennens; dasselbe gilt für die Gegenstände unseres Fühlens, Wertschätzens, Strebens und Wollens. Ja, diese a-theoretischen Kräfte in uns sind die wichtigsten Ursachen des Aufmerkens." [Of course it is not merely the objects of our theoretical thought and knowledge that originate for us from our attention; for the objects of our feeling, our sense of values, our striving and our volition, the same things hold good. These a-theoretical powers in us are even the most important causes of our attention.] This remark shows that the writer has not been properly alive to the characteristic difference between the free direction of theoretical (synthetical) attention and that of the pre-theoretical consciousness. Similarly his attempt to explain attention psychologically shows a lack of insight into its supra-functional intuitive depth. This defect affects all his interesting discussions of the connection between attention and theoretical analysis.
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theoretical states of affairs with the help of analytical distinction. However, it lacks the actual inter-modal synthesis of meaning in which analysis is deepened to scientific analysis.

§ 4 - THE LIMITS OF A CONCEPT AND OF A DEFINITION, AND THE SO-CALLED PHENOMENOLOGICAL ATTITUDE OF MIND.

Our conception of the theoretical (inter-modal) synthesis of meaning implies the impossibility of logicizing the modal meaning of any of the law-spheres opposed to theoretical analysis. It is not even possible to logicize the logical law-sphere itself, i.e. to grasp its meaning in a "purely logical" way.

If it were possible to logicize the "Gegenstand", there would not be any possibility of theoretical knowledge, no matter how paradoxical this thesis may appear to the logicist.

From this state of affairs we can infer the limits set to the formation of concepts and definitions about the modal structure of meaning. Once the modal meaning-nucleus, the modal reciprocations and anticipations of a law-sphere have been encompassed in the process of a correct theoretical synthesis of meaning, there is no longer any sense in asking a closer conceptual analysis of the nucleus of the meaning-modality analysed in this process. In the theoretical in-sight (actual in theoretical analysis) this nucleus is opened, laid bare. It is the task of theoretical thought to encompass the original modal meaning-nuclei in its concepts, deepened into Ideas, and not only the nuclei, but with them also their expression in the surrounding analogical meaning-moments. Only in the actual analysis founded in theoretical insight do they become capable of being read distinctly in the indissoluble correlation of the subject- and the law-side of the aspect concerned.

In this theoretical laying bare of the modal meaning we do not grasp a rigid έδως, an "absolute essential structure", a "Sache an sich", as modern phenomenology in its rationalist trend supposes it can do. The theoretical Idea of the modal meaning-structure will never attain to perfect static visibility in our theoretical insight. It will never reach the full realization of what has been subjectively intended in it. This is precluded already by the temporal structure of the modal aspect itself. In the transcendental Idea of number, space, movement, energy, organic life, psychical feeling, retribution, love, etc., true theoretical in-
sight is carried along with the movement of the entire process of meaning-disclosure.

And in this process a truly Christian philosophy will realize, with ever increasing clarity, that the fulfilment of meaning refracted in cosmic time into the various modalities, is not given us in an eidetic intuition but in the religious self-reflection on our part with Christ. The transcendental synthetical Idea of a modal aspect involves us in a gradual process of reading its meaning. It approaches the transcendental limits of a modality, but it cannot give us the fulfilment of meaning of the latter.

In the foundational direction of time the concept of a modal aspect may be anterior to the transcendental synthetical Idea of its meaning, but it depends on the latter for its own deepening. This deepened concept is a guarantee that the theoretical Idea cannot do away with the analytical ἐνζῷ from the continuity of cosmic time. In the Idea of a modal function we can do no more than grasp the specific character of the meaning-modus, analysed in the concept, in the anticipatory direction of cosmic time. In this way the modal concept is integrated in the dynamics of meaning.

So this Idea remains a limiting concept, although in a different sense from what Kant meant. It remains determined by the cosmonomic Idea as the ultimate τὸν θεόν of philosophical thought.

The internal antinomy in the idea of an adequate ἦνος 'Wesensschau'.

Suppose the Idea phenomenologically conceived of as the ἅπας of a modal aspect could be fully realized in theoretical insight, as the result of an adequate intuition of its essence, then this insight would have to grasp the fulness and the totality of meaning adequately.

It should not only intend this fulness and totality in the transcendental direction of time; a mere referring to it as to the transcendent root of all temporal meaning, would not suffice. It should possess this fulness as an immanent datum of phenomenal consciousness. But as soon as this condition had been fulfilled, the modal meaning, as such, would have been cancelled. For this condition can only be realized in the transcendent identity of all temporal modal meaning.

1 St. John 13:8.
But the identity meant by phenomenology in its "adequate intuition of essence" remains enclosed in the horizon of a particular aspect, whose meaning-coherence is incapable of seclusion. As theoretical, philosophical identity it is necessarily an identity in the analytical \( \varepsilon \pi \nu \gamma \eta \), performed in the inter-modal synthesis of meaning \(^1\).

For this reason also the theoretical insight into the transcendental meaning-coherence of a modal aspect, intended by us in the modal Idea, necessarily remains intentional. The modal "\( \text{Gegenstand} \)" as well as the analytical modus are themselves of an intending character because of their restless temporal mode of being which is incapable of seclusion.

I deem it of supreme importance for my readers to take account of this state of affairs in its deepest foundations.

Phenomenology is a more dangerous adversary of a Christian philosophy than any other variety of immanence philosophy.

I frankly admit that modern phenomenology is a much more dangerous adversary of a Christian philosophy than classical Humanistic idealism or naturalism. And this is owing to the fact that in its problems it has indeed penetrated to an \( a \text{ priori} \) level of philosophic thought which had never been seen so sharply in the earlier Humanistic views. This renders the semblance of its being unbiased all the stronger and all the more deceptive.

The scientialistic trend in phenomenology, founded by Husserl, unwilling to commit itself to any super--theoretical pre-supposition, will not leave the religious "facts of consciousness" alone. It only requires the philosophical investigator to attune himself to the acts of consciousness in the purely theoretical phenomenological attitude, to the adequate description of "the essence", the "pure datum" in all that is intended in them. It merely requires the philosophical investigator not to utilize a single "matter of

\(^1\) It has been proved by W. Ehrlich in his study \( \text{Kant und Husserl} \) (1923) p. 96 ff., that the phenomenological "Wesensschau", which according to Husserl (\( \text{Ideen I}, \ p. 144 \)) always moves in acts of reflexion (\( \text{durchaus in Akten der Reflexion bewegt} \)) cannot adequately grasp the essence of the "immediately experienced" ("schlechthin erlebte"). Husserl himself speaks of: modifications of experience through reflexion ("Erlebnis-modifikationen durch Reflexion"), p. 149.
fact", except in the phenomenological reduction\(^1\), in order to gain a complete view of the \textit{cod\text{ê}t}, the essence of this "fact", both as to its intentional noetic and its intended noematic sides.

That a concept and a definition are both restricted within certain limits will be readily assented to by the phenomenologist, although he means something quite different from what we have found. But he will stamp as an internal contradiction the statement that the "\textit{Wesensschau}" cannot be an adequate representation of the "essence" of what is intended.

For what could remain in the "matter of fact" that is incapable of apprehension by our insight, once its "essence" has been envisaged?\(^2\)

Immanent criticism of the "phenomenological attitude" is made extremely difficult because of the very different schools of thought into which the movement has split up, (compare only HUSSERL, PFÄNDER, SCHELER, N. HARTMANN, HEIDEGGER, HOFFMAN), which start each from a different type of cosmonomic Idea. That is why I must restrict myself to a general characterization of the "phenomenological attitude" as a definite type of the immanence-standpoint.

The phenomenological "\textit{Wesensschau}" is really founded in a special conception of the mode of being of what has been

\(^1\) Phenomenological reduction is the theoretical elimination of (the relinquishment of) the entire natural "view of the world" (Weltansicht) and of all normative appreciations as actual prejudices of the investigator, in order to make them into the "Gegenstand" of disinterested phenomenological research.

\(^2\) Cf. SCHELER in his \textit{Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie} (Schriften aus dem Nachlasz, Bnd. I, 1933) p. 288 (which treatise was written after his chief work on ethics), where he writes: "Absoluter Masstab jeder "Erkenntnis" ist und bleibt die Selbstgegebenheit des Tatbestandes, gegeben in der evidenten Deckungseinheit des gemeinten und des genau so wie gemeint auch im Erleben (Erschauen) Gegebenen." [The absolute criterion of every cognition is and remains the state of affairs as it presents itself, given in the evident coalescence of what has been intended and of what has been given in immediate experience (contemplation) exactly as it has been intended.] The reader will no doubt notice the erroneous identification of 'Erleben' and 'Erschauen'. "Etwas das so gegeben ist, ist zugleich absolutes Sein, und der Gegenstand der nur Gegenstand eines solches Seins ist, eines solchen puren Wesens, ist in idealem Masze adäquat gegeben." [Something given like that is at the same time an absolute being, and the \textit{Gegenstand} which is merely the \textit{Gegenstand} of such a being, of such a pure essence, is given adequately to an ideal degree.]
created. This conception is no longer accounted for by phenomenology as such; it is rooted in a deeper level of the \textit{a priori} than the merely immanent transcendental horizon of human consciousness\footnote{The different "levels of the \textit{a priori}" will be discussed in Part. II ch. IV of this Volume.}

Anyone who realizes the self-insufficiency of all meaning, and, in a Biblical sense, acknowledges that no meaning-modus is capable of seclusion, cannot adopt the phenomenological "attitude", because it is contrary to the truth.

The fundamental thesis of HUSSLER's phenomenology is that the transcendental ego as the ultimate subject of 'absolute phenomenology' or 'egology' has no horizon which could transcend its transcendental sphere of being and consequently render this ego relative\footnote{\textit{Cartesianische Meditationen} (ed. by Prof. Dr. S. STRASSER, publ. Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague 1950) p. 107: "die absolute Phänomenologie, die des transzendentalen ego, das eben keinen Horizont mehr hat, der es über seine transzendentale Seinsphäre hinausführen, es also relativieren könnte."}. This implies that the transcendental ego is elevated to the rank of a 'super-human being', and elevated above all meaning as the ultimate constitutive origin of the latter. It is this very primordial absolutization of the phenomenological attitude which determines HUSSLER's conception of the adequate intuition of essence. It is simply uncritical to suppose that this conception could be accepted apart from its pre-supposition which transcends the theoretical attitude of thought.

The phenomenological attitude in principle lacks a \textit{radical} transcendental self-reflection. This appears already from its demand that the "phenomenological reduction" shall also include the investigator's \textit{human selfhood}.

Anyone who has attained to real self-knowledge realizes the transcendental impossibility of the existence of "a pure essence" in the phenomenological sense. At the same time he will also see that it is impossible to arrive at a real equation between the fulness of meaning and the theoretical view which is only possible in the analytical \textit{εποχή}.

As to the modal aspects, the synthesis of meaning, and the actual theoretical insight into them, their \textit{essence} lies \textit{open} in the absolute relativity of the temporal meaning-coherence. Also this meaning-coherence possesses no "absolute essence" but points
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beyond and above itself to the fulness of meaning which transcends all transcendental boundaries of experience. In Christ alone the meaning of all that is finds its adequate fulfilment, because in Him it is directed to God in a perfect way, i.e. in the absolute self-insufficiency which is proper to meaning.
CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SYNTHESIS OF MEANING IN THE SO-CALLED CRITICAL TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF KANT.

§ 1 - THE DOGMATIC CHARACTER OF THE CRYPTO-RELIGIOUS ATTITUDE IN CRITICAL EPISTEMOLOGY.

It should now be clear that a truly critical epistemology is dependent on the self-reflection on the cosmonomic Idea from which the thinkers starts.

In the problem of the inter-modal synthesis of meaning the very possibility of theoretical thought is at issue. Every epistemology that supposes it can find its Archimedean point in transcendental thought and pose the epistemological problem apart from a transcendental cosmonomic Idea, is “dogmatism” in the objectionable sense of the word.

Such a theory may later on raise the problem of the possibility of the theoretical synthesis. But in its functionalistic attitude it takes no account of the possibility of the primary theoretic synthesis absolutized in its cosmonomic Idea, without which the isolation of the logical or the psychical functions would not be possible.

It is the dogmatic rejection of religious self-reflection that is typical of this doctrinaire attitude of theoretical thought. It refuses to carry thought in the transcendental direction to its utmost limits; not, because of purely theoretical motives, as it presumes, but precisely on account of its essentially religious postulate regarding the absolute self-sufficiency of the “Ver-

1 We should bear in mind that the attitude of thought, necessarily determined by the religious attitude of the self-hood, transcends theoretical thought, whose direction it controls. The identification of the supra-theoretical with the theoretical attitude of thought should be scrupulously avoided.
nunft” which it wants to save at all costs. And this attitude of thought is forced on us, in the tyranny of every theoretical dogmatism, as the only scientific one.

No one should now attempt to maintain this dogmatism with the old argument that philosophy qua talis cannot exceed the theoretical field.

Already in the Prolegomena it has been sufficiently explained that we do not wish to contradict this thesis for a moment. In truly critical-transcendental thought, however, the philosopher should at least theoretically take account of the transcendent and the transcendental conditions without which philosophic thought is impossible. In this respect the cosmonomic Idea as a theoretical Idea in no way exceeds the limits of philosophy, though we know that this Idea itself is always religiously determined. It is much rather the postulate of the self-sufficiency of theoretical thought that cannot be epistemologically accounted for. It has not been theoretically thought out in the transcendental direction of time and it forces its religious a priori on us in the disguise of a “pure theory”.

If with Theodor Litt one speaks of a lack of “logical integrity”¹, this epithet would sooner fit such a crypto-religious attitude of thought than the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea which tears off its mask.

The reason why in this context we do not discuss the doctrine of the transcendental Ideas of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft and base our exposition for the present on the second edition only.

We shall demonstrate in some detail that epistemology could not but get involved in an impasse on the immanence-standpoint. As an example we take Kant’s epistemology, on whose fundamental theses the so-called critical, transcendental-idealistic philosophy is still founded. For the present our exposition will be based only on the second edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. By so doing I need not yet fear the contradiction which might be inspired by Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft in its first edition. In the present context our sole purpose is to characterize the ‘critical method’ as such in its failure with regard to the central problem of all epistemology.

¹ By ‘lack of logical integrity’ is of course not meant an ethical, but only a theoretic-logical qualification.
HEIDEGGER is of opinion that KANT's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* has got nothing to do with epistemology, at least in its original conception, as it is found in the first edition. Its subject is supposed to be the possibility of an ontology. I think this hypothesis untenable, and intend to submit it to a special investigation later on. For the present I leave this recent controversy alone. Even if HEIDEGGER’s interpretation of KANT’s original meaning should be correct, nobody can reasonably raise objections to my discussing the second edition as the basic work for the critical method in epistemology. This procedure is safeguarded by the fact that HEIDEGGER himself acknowledges his peculiar interpretation to be inapplicable to the second edition.

KANT’s doctrine of Ideas, in which the transcendental direction in philosophic thought begins to manifest itself, is intentionally omitted here, since it has been discussed in an earlier context. This is no distortion of KANT’s critique of knowledge.

In the first place, I have definitely shown that KANT’s epistemology can be understood only on the basis of his Idea of human personality as the autonomous “homo noumenon”. And secondly, I have demonstrated that his doctrine of Ideas is really determined by his practical *a priori* “faith in reason”. These two points belong to the exposition of KANT’s cosmonomic Idea, discussed in the second part of the first volume.

For the posing and the solution of the problem regarding the cognitive synthesis KANT cannot appeal to his doctrine of Ideas. This is caused by the very nature of his dualistic cosmonomic Idea.

In the transcendental dialectic the theoretical Ideas make their first appearance. And this dialectic is only considered after a complete discussion of the cognitive synthesis and of the cogito, the supposed Archimedean point of KANT’s epistemology. Thus KANT himself suggests that his critique of knowledge has been composed apart from any religious attitude and is quite unprejudiced, as the product of “pure theoretical reflection”.

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1 Cf. especially the “Vorrede” of the 1st edition of the *Kr. d. r. V.* Here, entirely in the spirit of the time of the Enlightenment, KANT says: “Unser Zeitalter ist das eigentliche Zeitalter der Kritik, der sich alles unterwerfen muss. *Religion* durch ihre *Heiligkeit* und *Gesetzgebung* durch ihre *Majestät* wollen sich gemeinlich derselben entziehen. Aber alsdann erregen sie gerechten Verdacht wider sich und können auf unverstellte Achtung nicht Anspruch machen, die die Vernunft nur demjenigen bewilligt, was ihre freie und öffentliche Prüfung hat aushalten können.” (Our age is
And this suggestion was accepted by the whole of critical thought in the struggle against speculative metaphysics. It was raised as a bulwark to bar religious prejudices and 'Weltanschauung' from the domain of epistemology.

Kant's theory will prove to result in a stalemate and involve itself in intrinsic self-contradiction.

§ 2 - KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE SYNTHESIS AND OF THE UNITY OF OUR SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

In the first place it will be clear that the mere isolation of the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Logic is based on a fundamental misconception of the epistemological problem.

Kant did not realize that the doctrine of the sensory material of experience, in its primitive reception in the "transcendental forms of intuition of space and time", pre-supposes the theoretical analysis and inter-modal synthesis of meaning.

His thesis is that the "datum" in the "Gegenstand" is nothing but the chaotic sensory "Empfindungen" 1.

He adopted this thesis from Hume's psychologism uncritically, without being aware of its self-refuting character. How can the datum be the result of an analytical ἑξοχή, the product of theoretical isolation? Kant writes: "In the transcendental aesthetics accordingly, we shall first isolate sensibility, separating from it all that the understanding adds to it by means of its concepts so that nothing may be left but empirical intuition" 2.

Already at this point, and also in the "transcendental logic" Kant ought to have raised the problem regarding the possibility of the theoretical antithesis and the inter-modal synthesis of meaning.

It is typical of his dogmatic attitude with respect to theoretical

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the age of criticism, to which everything must be subjected. The sanctity of religion, and the majesty of legislation, may seek to exempt themselves from the examination of this tribunal.

But, if they are exempted, they awaken just suspicion, and cannot lay claim to the sincere respect which reason accords only to that which has stood the test of a free and open examination.]

1 impressions.

2 Kr. d. r. V. 2nd Edit. (Grosz. Wilh. Ernst Ausg.) p. 59. "In der transcendentalen Aesthetik also werden wir zuerst die Sinnlichkeit isolieren, dadurch dass wir alles absondern was der Verstand durch seine Begriffe dabei denkt, damit nichts als empirische Anschauung übrig bleibe."
thought as such that he did not sense an epistemological problem connected with the isolation of the sensory aspect of experience. Instead he thinks that after the theoretical isolating process nothing remains but a given “non-conceptual” sensory intuition, apart from any connection with the logical aspect of thought. Consequently KANT is not aware of the antinomy implied in the attempt at the theoretical isolation of a “pure” sensibility. Not before his *Transcendental Doctrine of the Faculty of Judgment* does he raise the problem, as to how to apply the isolated “categories of thought” to the sensory “matter” of experience.

But the primordial epistemological problem regarding the antithetical ‘Gegenstand-relation’ as such and the transcendental conditions of the possibility of a theoretic abstraction of the sensory and the logical aspects of experience, is not even taken into consideration. KANT was not aware of the cosmic temporal meaning-coherence between the modal aspects. If so, he would have seen that the theoretical abstraction of the sensory (psychical) function of experience remains bound to the modal structure of the latter. This structure expresses the inner meaning-coherence with the logical and all the other aspects. Therefore he would have realized that a *pure* sensibility is a contradiction in terminis, since its very nature is to imply the analogies of the other modalities of meaning.

The influence of the metaphysical substance-concept upon KANT's epistemology.

*It deserves special attention that in his transcendental logic KANT accepts an a priori reference of the categories to the sensory aspect of experience, whereas he does not acknowledge an a priori appeal of the latter to the categories.*

In § 13 of the second chapter of the *Transcendental Analytic*, entitled *Von den Prinzipien einer transzendenten Deduktion überhaupt*. KANT emphatically remarks: “for phenomena can certainly be given in the sensory intuition independently of functions of the understanding”\(^1\). It is true that in § 16 (in which

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\(^1\) op. cit., p. 123: “Daher zeigt sich hier eine Schwierigkeit, die wir im Felde der Sinnlichkeit nicht antrafen, wie nämlich subjektive Bedingungen des Denkens sollten objektive Gültigkeit haben, d.i. Bedingungen der Möglichkeit aller Erkenntnis der Gegenstände abgeben: denn ohne Funktionen des Verstandes können allerdings Erscheinungen in der Anschauung gegeben werden.”
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the Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception is discussed) it is said that “all the manifold of the sensory intuition is necessarily related to the ‘I think’ in the same subject in which this manifold is found.” But this reference does not include an appeal to the logical categories of thought as appears from the preceding quotation.

The reason is that Kant’s epistemology is in many respects influenced by the metaphysical concept of the ‘thing in itself’ (substance).

We remember that in Aristotelian metaphysics the ‘substance’ (οὐσία) was supposed to be quite independent of human thought. The latter, on the contrary, was supposed to be intrinsically related to the substances. This conception has been accepted by critical realism in contemporary philosophy. Although Kant’s critique of pure reason resulted in a transcendental idealism, he was of opinion that the ‘sensory matter’ of experience originates in a mysterious affection of our senses by the unknowable ‘thing in itself’. So it is quite understandable that he did not accept an intrinsic relation of the sensory function of experience to the transcendental forms of logical thought, but only an a priori relation of the latter to the former, to “Gegenstände der (sinnlichen) Anschauung”. This metaphysical view is bound up with his conception of the purely receptive rôle of the ‘Sinnlichkeit’ and the active and free spontaneity of the understanding. In a deeper sense this conception was determined by the dialectical Humanistic basic motive of nature and freedom. Kant did not know the modal structure of the logical aspect and its temporal meaning-coherence with the other aspects of experience. Consequently his thesis about the a priori reference of the categories to objects of sensory intuition required another foundation. This foundation was supposed to be provided in the famous chapter of the Transcendental Logic concerning the Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding (the categories). The demonstrative power of this chapter stands and falls with its presuppositions, which are not critical at all, but rather prescribed by the hidden starting-point of Kant’s epistemology.

Kant’s first discussion of the problem of synthesis.
His lack of distinction between the logical synthesis and the inter-modal synthesis.

The basis of the whole argument is to be found in his conception of the synthesis as ‘the combination of a manifold as
such' and its transcendental logical unity, guaranteed by the original synthetical unity of apperception. In advance of all investigation KANT proclaims that this synthesis is an actus of the spontaneity of the understanding (conceived of in the theoretical abstraction of a "pure" logical function). The only argument adduced for this thesis is that 'the synthesis of a manifold as such' cannot be ascribed to the senses. The latter are only receptive, and even the forms of sensory intuition are nothing but the way in which the subject is affected by the things in themselves.

In the preceding chapter (§ 10) containing an introductory discussion of the categories, KANT distinguishes synthesis as such from the function to conceive it in a conceptual form. The former is called the mere result of the power of imagination (Einbildungskraft), "a blind, though indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no knowledge at all, and of which we are nevertheless scarcely ever conscious". The function of conceiving the synthesis of imagination in a conceptual form is exclusively attributed to the understanding, which by this function provides us with knowledge properly so-called. This is indeed a dark point in KANT's argument which we shall discuss in detail later on. For the present we are entitled to eliminate it because it will appear from the sequel that it is of no consequence for KANT's epistemological conception of synthesis.

KANT himself emphatically states that all combination, no matter whether we are aware of it or not, is an act of the understanding.

This is to say that even the unconscious imagination can execute the synthesis only by means of the logical function of the understanding.

Since the theoretical abstraction of the sensory and the logical functions of experience does not imply an epistemological problem for KANT, this line of thought must result in the thesis that theoretical synthesis is the pre-requisite of all analysis:

"The reader will easily enough perceive that this act" (viz. the transcendental synthesis) "must be originally one and the same and of equal validity for every synthesis, and that its dissolution, viz. analysis, which appears to be its opposite, must, nevertheless, always pre-suppose it; for where the understanding has not previously combined, it cannot dissolve or analyse, since only as having been combined by the understanding can any-

\[1\] op. cit., p. 122.
thing that allows of analysis be given to the faculty of representation”\textsuperscript{1}.

Kant does not recognize the cosmic systasis of meaning as it is determined and arranged by the cosmic temporal order, and in which the analytical function itself can only function. Theoretical thought has to take over the task of the cosmic law-giver. And so Kant cannot understand that logical synthesis itself is under the law of the analytical meaning and can never be the pre-requisite of the analytical. The modal meaning of the law-spheres is erased by the absolutizing of the theoretical logical function. And this is another reason why the problem of the inter-modal synthesis of meaning in theoretical knowledge must remain hidden from Kant. He does not distinguish the latter from the functional logical synthesis. According to him all synthesis, no matter whether it is a combination of the manifold of sensory intuition or of a logical manifold of concepts, is a logical act of the understanding\textsuperscript{2}.

The lack of genuinely transcendental reflection culminates in Kant’s “Transcendental Logic” in the logicizing of the cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness.

His argument starts from the concept of combination which in addition to those of the manifold and of synthesis also presupposes that of unity. Kant has penetrated to the insight that the categories of thought as conceptual forms of synthesis pre-suppose the basic unity of self-consciousness:

“We must, therefore, look still higher for this unity (as qualitative)\textsuperscript{3} namely in that which contains the ground of the unity of diverse concepts in judgments; the ground, consequently, of the possibility of the understanding, even in regard to its logical employment”\textsuperscript{4}. (Italics are mine).

\textsuperscript{1} Kr. d. r. V., Transsz. Logik, ch. II § 15: “Man wird hier leicht gewahr, dass diese Handlung” (viz. the synthesis) “ursprünglich einig und für alle Verbindung gleichgeltend sein müsse, und dass die Auflösung, Analysis, die ihr Gegenteil zu sein scheint, sie doch jederzeit voraussetze; denn wo der Verstand vorher nichts verbunden hat, da kann er auch nichts auflösen, weil es nur durch ihn als verbunden der Vorstellungskraft hat gegeben werden können.”

\textsuperscript{2} ibid.: “alle Verbindung, wir mögen uns ihrer bewusst werden oder nicht, es mag eine Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung oder mancherlei Begriffe, und an der ersteren der sinnlichen oder nichtsinnlichen Anschauung sein, [ist] eine Verstandeshandlung.”

\textsuperscript{3} i.e. higher than in the quantitative category of unity.

\textsuperscript{4} op. cit., p. 123: “Also müssen wir diese Einheit noch höher suchen,
If Kant had not started from the dogma concerning the autonomy of theoretical thought, he might have acknowledged the necessary transcendence of self-consciousness (operating in theoretical thought) above the logical function. Now he has barred the way to this transcendental insight. The theoretically abstracted logical and sensory functions are assumed to be the only sources of our knowledge. The transcendental unity of self-consciousness cannot be found in sensibility: so it must be of a logical nature after all. Kant identifies it with the cogito as the form of the representation "I think". He explicitly calls the fundamental law of the necessary unity of apperception (i.e. the transcendental unity of self-consciousness) an "analytical proposition".

The transcendental unity of self-consciousness is the concept of the "cogito" that must be capable of accompanying all my different theoretical concepts, if they are to be my own concepts. It is thus made the mere transcendental logical pre-requisite for all theoretical categories of thought. In an epistemological sense, the selfhood is merged into the primary logical unity of thought:

"for the sole reason that I can comprehend the manifold of the representations in one consciousness, do I call them my representations, for otherwise I should have as many-coloured and diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious.

"Synthetical unity of the manifold in intuitions as given a priori, is therefore the ground of the identity of apperception itself which is a priori antecedent to all my determinate thought. Combination, however, is not found in the objects themselves; it cannot be derived from them through perception and then taken up into the understanding. On the contrary, it is a function of the understanding alone, which itself is no more than the faculty of combining a priori and of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception. This principle is the highest in all human knowledge".

nämlich in demjenigen was selbst den Grund der Einheit verschiedener Begriffe in Urteilen, mithin der Möglichkeit des Verstandes sogar in seinem logischen Gebrauche enthält." (Italics are mine).

1 Read: generated (with Vaihinger).

2 Op. cit., p. 125: "nur dadurch, dass ich das Mannigfaltige" (i.e. der Vorstellungen) "in einem Bewusstsein begreifen kann, nenne ich dieselbe insgesamt meine Vorstellungen; denn sonst würde ich ein so vielfärbiges verschiedenes Selbst haben als ich Vorstellungen habe, deren ich mir bewusst bin. Synthetische Einheit des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauungen, als a priori gegeben, ist also der Grund der Identität der Apperzeption selbst, die a priori allem meinem bestimmten Denken vorhergeht. Verbin-
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The internal antinomy in Kant's conception of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness.

The whole internal antinomy of the so-called critical transcendental epistemology is implied in nuce in this view of the cognitive selfhood as merely a logical form of the unity of consciousness. The deeper identity experienced in our self-consciousness is of a transfunctional and super-temporal character. It is knowing oneself to be one and the same in and beyond all cosmic temporal functions and knowing one's functions as one's own. If the thinking I-ness would be logical-functional, it would have to resist all non-logical aspects of reality, the psychical included, as not my own, not belonging to my selfhood. It would have to do so on the ground of the principium contradictionis. This would also cancel the possibility of a meaning-synthesis between the logical function of thought and Kant's sensory experiential material. In other words, Kant's critique of knowledge destroys itself by setting our cognitive functions apart and making them independent, and by identifying cognitive selfhood with the primary logical unity of the activity of thought. It is true, Kant qualified the original unity of apperception in the "pure self-consciousness" explicitly as a synthetical unity (in the sense of a form or law-conformity determining all experience). He considered it as the original a priori relatedness of a multiplicity (in intuition) to the cogito, the "I think", in the same subject in which this multiplicity is found.

It is true also that Kant founds the purely analytical "unity of apperception" — of which he assumes that it coalesces with

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1 Richard Kroner also realized this in his famous work: Van Kant bis Hegel, I (1921) p. 85. He defines this antinomy as follows: "Wird das Ich als Einheit lediglich im Gegensatze zum Mannigfaltigen (als Verstand im Gegensatze zur Anschauung, als Denken im Gegensatze zum Erkennen) begriffen, so kann es nie synthetisch erkennend werden, die Möglichkeit der Erfahrung ist dahin." [If the I is only conceived as a unity in contrast with the manifold — as understanding in contrast with intuition, as thought in contrast with cognition —, it cannot cognize synthetically, then the possibility of experience is gone.]
the representation (i.e. the concept) of the identity of consciousness in a multiplicity of given representations — in the *synthetical* unity of apperception. But all this does not concern the possibility of *inter-modal meaning-synthesis* in the transcendental unity of self-consciousness. *Kant* writes: “the manifold representations given in an intuition would not all of them be *my* representations if they did not all belong to one *self-consciousness*”. But if this self-consciousness is only the final *logical* unity of the activity of thought, it remains in an antithetical position towards sensibility, because of the theoretical isolation in which *Kant* conceives of it. Then the sensory representations cannot possibly be related to self-consciousness. In *Kant’s* functionalistic critique of knowledge the religious transcendence of the selfhood, the cosmic interlacement of the modal functions in time, and the theoretical intuition cannot possibly play a part.

The transcendental unity of apperception in *Kant* remains essentially a supposed ultimate formal unity of the logical function of thought.

The following quotations may be additional evidence for this statement:

“in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general, and also in the original synthetic unity of

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1 op. cit., p. 124, j°, p. 125 note.
2 “Die mannigfaltigen Vorstellungen, die in einer gewissen Anschauung gegeben werden, würden nicht insgesamt meine Vorstellungen sein, wenn sie nicht insgesamt zu einem Selbstbewusstsein gehört.”
3 According to *Kant* intuitive and at the same time creative thought is only proper to God, as the (hypostatized) intellectus archetypus. Human knowledge is explicitly denied any intuitive character. This is seen in the following passage:

“Der Verstand wurde oben blosz negativ erklärt: durch ein nicht-sinnliches Erkenntnisvermögen. Nun können wir abhängig von der Sinnlichkeit keiner Anschauung teilhaftig werden. Also ist der Verstand kein Vermögen der Anschauung. Es gibt aber außer der Anschauung kein andere Art zu erkennen, als durch Begriffe. Also ist die Erkenntnis eines jeden, wenigstens des menschlichen Verstandes, eine Erkenntnis durch Begriffe, nicht intuitiv, sondern diskursiv.” Op. cit., p. 96. [The understanding was defined negatively in the preceding section: as a non-sensory cognitive faculty. Now we cannot have any intuition apart from sensibility. So the understanding is not a faculty of intuition. Besides our intuition there is no other way to knowledge except by means of concepts. Therefore the knowledge yielded by understanding, at least by human understanding, must be by means of concepts — and so is not intuitive but discursive.]
apperception I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, but only of the fact that I am. This representation is a thought, not an intuition". A little further on we read: "I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination" etc., and Kant explicitly calls the objective unity of apperception "the logical form of all judgments", whereas repeatedly he emphasizes that thought in itself is nothing but "the logical function".

Summary of our criticism of Kant's conception of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness.

We can sum up the internal contradiction in Kant's conception of "the transcendental unity of apperception" as follows:

The synthesis of meaning pre-supposes a temporal coherence of meaning in the modal diversity, as well as the transcendent unity above the modal diversity. Kant assumes a final logical unity of thinking above logical multiplicity. To this unity all multiplicity both in thought and in intuition is supposedly related. Logical unity above logical multiplicity, however, cannot possibly exist, because the modal meaning of the logical only contains logical unity in logical multiplicity. In Kant's epistemology the super-logical unity of self-consciousness is precluded a priori by his dualistic cosmonomic Idea in which this epistemology is founded. The result is that Kant's logicizing of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness cancels itself in internal antimony.


2 op. cit., p. 141.

3 op. cit., the title to § 19, p. 129.

4 Compare for instance, p. 322: "Das Denken, für sich genommen, ist bloß die logische Funktion, mithin lauter Spontaneität der Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen einer bloß möglichen Anschauung" etc. [Thought, taken as such, is merely the logical function of synthesis of the manifold of a merely possible intuition etc.]

5 "Denn durch das Ich als einfache Vorstellung (read: concept) ist nichts Mannigfaltiges gegeben." [For in the I as a simple representation (— i.e. concept) no manifold content is given.]

6 In the first edition der Kr. a. r. V. (W.W. Gr. Wilh. Ernst Ausg. VI, 732) Kant even speaks of the "numerische Einheit dieser Apperzeption" [the numerical unity of this apperception], which is the a priori basis of all concepts.
The selfhood, as the unity above the diversity of meaning, can never be grasped in a concept, but only intended in a transcendental Idea. In KANT's transcendental logic the I-ness has become a formal concept, viz. the logical unity above logical multiplicity. This is nothing but a transposition of the metaphysical concept of the "soul" as a "simple substance" into the modal meaning of the logical aspect, where this concept is even more self-contradictory.

§ 3 - THE PROBLEM OF THE INTER-MODAL SYNTHESIS OF MEANING IN KANT'S SO-CALLED TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.

KANT speaks of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness in order to express that it is the pre-requisite of all a priori cognition. Self-consciousness is the Archimedean point in KANT's epistemology. He conceives it as the transcendental logical condition of knowledge determining everything else. But we saw that he had not even touched upon the primordial fundamental problems of epistemology in his doctrine of the transcendental unity of apperception (i.e. the logical form of self-consciousness).

This raises the inevitable question: What did he really mean by his distinction between transcendental and formal logic, fundamental to his entire critique of knowledge?

Although in critical philosophy this distinction is considered to be of extraordinary importance, it has not been very clearly defined. All are agreed that "transcendental logic" is concerned with "synthetical" cognitive thought.

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1 WINDELBAND, Gesch. der neueren Phil. II, S. 69 writes that it has been the greatest of KANT's discoveries, "dass es neben den logischen noch andere Formen der Verstandestätigkeit gibt, und dass in ihnen der Grund für alle notwendige und allgemeingültige Erkenntnis der Erfahrungs-welt zu suchen ist. Diese Formen, welche im Gegensatz zu den reinlogi-schen die erkenntnistheoretischen genannt werden dürfen, bezeichnete KANT als Kategorien." [by the side of the logical forms of intellectual activity there are other forms; in the latter we must seek the foundation of all necessary and universally valid knowledge of the world of experience. We might call these forms epistemological in contradistinction to the purely logical forms. KANT designates them as categories.] But WINDELBAND has not seen that the inter-modal synthesis of meaning was the only thing by which the categories as such could have acquired a more than logical character in KANT's critique of knowledge. But in KANT's cadre of thought it was impossible to conceive this synthesis. There is nowhere any indication that in the categories as such he saw a real inter-modal synthesis of meaning. As we shall show they remain of
It is not possible to doubt that by “transcendental logic” Kant meant the doctrine of “pure understanding”, in contradistinction to the so-called “formal logic” already discussed. By means of the “pure understanding” we think “Gegenstände” absolutely a priori, so that the a priori concepts of the “pure understanding” are related to “Gegenstände”. On the other hand general or formal logic is supposed to abstract from all relationships between thought and “Gegenstände” and only to concentrate on the “form of thought as such”.

The question, however, as to what cosmological character is attached to the “synthesis” brought about in transcendental thought, and in what cosmological sense we have to take the a priori relatedness of the categories of thought to the “Gegenstände” of cognition, has never been investigated, as far as I know.

In Kant’s transcendental categories the problem of the inter-modal synthesis of meaning has not been seen.

A close study of Kant’s exposition of the character of the transcendental logic with regard to the “pure categories of thought” will reveal that he especially thinks of the logical function as operative in the categories. In his ‘Lecture on Logic’ (Logikvorlesung) he calls the latter “Notionen” or conceptus dati a priori.

As sharply as possible he puts in the foreground that it is the same function which is active in formal analytical and in transcendental synthetical thought.

“The same function,” says Kant, “which gives unity to the various representations” (i.e. concepts) “in a judgment, also lends unity to the mere synthesis of the different representations in an intuition which is called a pure concept of the understanding.

“The understanding produces the logical form of a judgment in concepts by means of analytical unity. And it is the same understanding which by the same operations imparts a transcendental content to its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition. For this reason they are called pure concepts of the understanding, applying a priori to objects. This is a synthetic function beyond the power of general logic”.

a merely logical character. But then the distinction between “formal” and “transcendental” forms of thought does not carry us a step further.

1 W.W. (Cass.) VIII, 4, p. 401.

2 Kr. d. r. V. (Grossh. W. E. Ausg.) p. 104/5. “Dieselbe Funktion, welche den verschiedenen Vorstellungen in einem Urteil Einheit gibt, die gibt
And in § 20 of the *Transcendental Logic* we read: “That operation of the understanding, however, by which the manifold of some given representations (be they intuitions or concepts) is brought under one apperception, is the *logical function of judgment.*” (Italics are mine). “Consequently all of the manifold, in so far as it is given in a single empirical intuition, is determined in relation to one of the logical functions of judgment, by which it is brought into union in one consciousness. Now the categories are *nothing else but these same functions*” (Italics are mine) “of judgment as far the manifold of a given intuition is determined in relation to them”.

In Kant’s view “synthetical thought”, with its categories applied *a priori* to “Gegenstände”, is thus rooted in the same logical function as formal analytical thought. This is why he orientates the categories to the table of the formal logical judgments.

In Kant’s line of argument this orientation is not arbitrary. It is justified in principle because the categories (as to their modal meaning, we would say) are indeed of a logical nature. Consequently, it is confusing to contrast them with the purely logical forms of the theoretical activity of the understanding, as is done by Windelband and in the prevailing view. This would imply that with regard to their formal peculiar character they had a meaning different from the logical. Kant never meant this.

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1 “Diejenige Handlung des Verstandes (aber), durch die das Mannigfaltige gegebener Vorstellungen (sie mögen Anschauungen oder Begriffe sein) unter eine Apperzeption überhaupt gebracht wird, ist die logische Funktion der Urteile. Also ist alles Mannigfaltige, so fern es in einer empirischen Anschauung gegeben ist, in Ansehung einer der logischen Funktionen zu urteilen bestimmt, durch die es nämlich zu einem Bewusstsein überhaupt gebracht wird. Nun sind aber die Kategorien nichts andres als eben diese Funktionen zu urteilen, sofern das Mannigfaltige einer gegebenen Anschauung in Ansehung ihrer bestimmt ist.”

2 Kant cannot have meant a real deduction of the categories from the table of the judgments. On this point I agree with Heidegger. Kant himself does not call the table of judgments the “origin of the categories”, but only “the guide to the discovery of all the concepts of the understanding.”
He only distinguished them from all others as synthetic logical concepts *a priori* applied to possible experience. The synthesis in which the categories themselves are founded was not considered by *Kant* as an *inter-modal* but as a *purely logical* synthesis. The neo-Kantians of the Marburg School who raise objections to *Kant*'s supposed deduction of the categories of thought from the table of logical judgments, by no means wish to detract from the logical origin of the categories. Only those who abandon the elevation of the logos to the (pseudo) Archimedean point of philosophic thought can gain an insight into the real epistemological character of the inter-modal theoretical synthesis of meaning.

So long as the logical is taken to be the origin of all determinateness of meaning, the inter-modal synthesis of meaning as well as the modal meaning-structure drop out of the theoretical view. According to *Kant* the (theoretical) synthesis of a “multiplicity in sensory intuition” is of a logical functional character, though it doubtless implies a conjunction between two different modal functions of experience. It is even conceived apart from the theoretical intuition of time which only makes the inter-modal synthesis possible. It is “*a priori* related” to the sensory function of experience, but in *Kant*'s line of thought this relation is completely problematical. Its problematical nature renders it insufficient to accord a more than logical meaning to the categories. And *Kant* did not intend to do so. In his *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* he makes use of the table of the categories quite apart from any sensory experience; and in the first chapter of the *Transzendentale Doktrin der Urteilskraft* he emphatically states: “Indeed a meaning is left to the pure concepts of the understanding also after every sensory condition has been abstracted. But this is only a *logical meaning*” (Italics are mine) “of the mere unity of the representation to which no “*Gegenstand*” and consequently no meaning has been given that might produce a concept of the object. So, e.g., “substance”, after all sensory determination of stability has been abstracted, can only mean something that can be thought of as a subject without being a predicate to anything else. I can infer nothing from this representation, because it tells me nothing at all about the determinations of a thing that should be accepted as such a first subject. Consequently, the categories without schemata are only functions of the understanding for concepts, but do not represent an object. They derive the latter sense from
sensibility which realizes the understanding by restricting it at the same time”.

And in the 22nd paragraph on Transcendental Logic Kant writes that “the categories have their origin in the understanding alone, independently of sensibility.”

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Cf. also § 24, p. 135/6: "Die reinen Verstandesbegriffe beziehen sich durch den bloßen Verstand auf Gegenstände der Anschauung überhaupt, unbestimmt ob sie die unsrige oder irgend eine andere doch sinnliche sei, sind aber eben darum bloße Gedankenformen... Die Synthesis oder Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen in denselben bezog sich bloß auf die Einheit der Apperzeption und war dadurch der Grund der Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis a priori, so fern sie auf dem Verstande beruht, und mithin nichts alien transzendentental, sondern auch bloß rein intellectual.”

[The pure concepts of the understanding apply to objects of intuition in general, through the understanding alone, no matter whether the intuition is our own or any other, provided only it is sensory, therefore they are mere forms of thought... The synthesis or combination of the manifold in them merely relates to the unity of apperception and because of this it is the ground of the possibility of a priori knowledge in so far as the latter depends on the understanding, and consequently not only transcendentental but also purely intellectual.]

3 Cf. Ueber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik seit Leibniz und Wolff (W.W. Cas. VIII, 251): “Es ist aber wohl zu merken, dass diese Kategorien, oder wie sie sonst heissen, Prädikamente, keine bestimmte Art der Anschauung (wie etwa die uns Menschen allein mögliche) wie Raum und Zeit, welche sinnlich ist, voraussetzen, sondern nur Denkformen sind für den Begriff von einem Gegenstande der Anschauung überhaupt, welcher Art diese auch sei... Denn wir müssen uns immer einen Begriff von einem Gegenstände durch den reinen Verstand machen, von dem wir etwas a priori urteilen wollen, wenn wir auch nachher finden, dass es überschwenglich sei, und ihm keine objektive Realität verschafft werden könne, sodass die Kategorie für sich von den Formen der Sinnlichkeit, Raum und Zeit, nicht abhängig ist.”
In this last pronouncement it is especially the part italicized by Kant himself that is important. For it states emphatically that in his own view the category itself implies no inter-modal synthesis of meaning. It is true he never tires of asserting that a category cannot be used for cognizing things in any other way than by applying it to the objects of experience. But this confirms the statement that it is only the synthesis of the categories with the "transcendental form of sensory intuition" time that can have an inter-functional, inter-modal character in Kant's line of thought.

Criticism of Kant's table of categories.

At this very point, however, Kant's lack of a cosmological foundation for his epistemology is very evident. His prejudice that we can acquire knowledge from two "sources" only has no room for more than one kind of inter-functional synthesis a priori in cognition, viz. that between a logical category and a form of sensory intuition. In addition he could not call this a synthesis since he had bound himself to the prejudice that all synthesis is only a logical function of the understanding.

So Kant could not see that, if his categories were really to be transcendental conditions of mathematical natural scientific knowledge, they must already contain inter-modal syntheses of meaning.

The mathematical categories must combine original mathematical and logical meaning, the dynamical categories must contain original physical meaning in analytical abstraction, if they are to render mathematics and physics possible.

We have shown that unity, plurality and totality (Kant's categories of quantity) in the logical aspect are entirely distinct from the numerical unit, the numerical manifold, and numerical totality, as well as from the sensory analogies of the latter.

mind that these categories, or "predicaments" as they are also called, do not pre-suppose any definite kind of intuition (as, e.g., that which is only possible in man) such as space and time, which is sensible. But they are mere forms of thought for the concept of an object of intuition as such of whatever nature it may be... For we must always form a concept of an object by means of the pure understanding if we want to predicate something about the object, though later on we find that it is extravagant, and cannot be accorded any objective reality, so that the category as such does not depend on the forms of sensibility, space and time.

1 "keinen andern Gebrauch zum Erkenntnisse der Dinge (hat), als ihre Anwendung auf Gegenstände der Erfahrung."

2 Not some analogy of it in the psychical or in the logical modus.
KANT creates endless confusion when he ascribes the origin of number to a schematism of the categories of quantity by which the latter are supposed to assume an *a priori* sensible image in time as a form of sensory intuition. For lack of insight into the modal structures of meaning he was not aware of the analogical character of his supposed purely logical categories of quantity. His mathematical categories of "quality" (reality, negation, limitation) can have kinematical-mathematical modality only if (as categories of "intensive magnitude") they possess the complicated synthetical structure of meaning analysed in the general theory of the modal spheres.

The categories of quality must then comprise the logically disclosed modality of motion in a synthetical meaning-coherence with the logically disclosed arithmetical and spatial aspect. But KANT ascribes to these categories a logical meaning *a priori* related to sensory intuition.

He is not aware of the analogical character of the terms reality, negation and limitation in their logical use, and has not analysed their meaning as categories of intensive magnitude. In consequence the fundamental concepts of the kinematical branch of mathematics are misinterpreted as an *a priori* "synthesis of sensation (Empfindung) with the representation of time", in which sensation is conceived of as "content of time". KANT also says that they are *a priori* determinations of time after rules (viz. the categories of quality), with respect to the content of time.

Apart from their *a priori* reference to 'time' KANT's categories of quality, just as his categories of quantity, relation and modality, lose their supposed character as 'transcendental conditions of experience'. But his conception of time is the weakest point of his epistemology. We have seen that the origin of this conception is doubtless to be traced back to NEWTON's 'absolute time'. Apart from its metaphysical interpretation the latter was conceived in a kinematical-mathematical sense, this is to say in the modal meaning of pure uniform motion (tempus quod aequaliter fluit), in its abstraction from the energy-aspect. KANT has only substituted a transcendental-idealistic for a metaphysical interpretation by making time into a pure form of sensory

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1 Op. cit., p. 158: "das Schema der Qualität" (enthaltet und macht vorstellig) "die Synthesis der Empfindung (Wahrnehmung) mit der Vorstellung der Zeit oder die Erfüllung der Zeit..."

2 ibid.
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intuition. He has neither abandoned the kinematical-mathematical sense of Newton's concept of time, nor the absolutization of the kinematical time-aspect. The conception of the latter as a pure form of sensory intuition, in which the subjective impressions of the 'inner sense' are supposed to be received, must result in a fundamental confusion. Kant's epistemology has neither room for the modal diversity of the different aspects of time nor for the distinction between its law-side as temporal order and its factual side as duration, nor for the subject-object relation in the experience of time.

The impossibility of a really critical epistemology apart from a cosmological foundation is nowhere more convincingly demonstrated than in Kant's discussion of this most fundamental problem of philosophy.

It is of no avail to say that Kant's conception of time was oriented only to Newton's physics and its mathematical foundations. Even in this restricted sense the problem of time cannot be critically discussed without an insight into its integral cosmological character and the modal diversity of its different aspects. As soon as this state of affairs is lost sight of, every critique of human knowledge lands in a cosmological dogmatism.

Kant's mathematical categories of quantity and quality, as logical functions of the synthesis of a 'manifold in general', are related to the same confused idea of time, and by the intermediary of the latter to "Gegenstände überhaupt". It is impossible that these categories which in themselves are nothing but logical forms of judgments, could assume numerical and kinematical-mathematical sense as transcendental determinations of time if the latter is conceived as a pure form of sensory intuition.

The categories of quality correspond to the logical forms of affirmation, negation and limitation. The latter are nothing but analytical relations of identity, exclusion and limitation (S is P; S excludes Q, S excludes an infinitesimal series of non S). In an inter-modal theoretical synthesis with the kinematical aspect of experience these logical forms can have no other function than that of an analytical-synthetical determination of

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1 The reader should remember that the term 'cosmic time' is not to be understood in a natural scientific sense, but is used in contrast to the specific scientific concepts of time which refer only to particular modal aspects of temporal experience.
the kinematical-mathematical meaning inherent in the aspect concerned. This is what Kant cannot accept because of his prejudice concerning the two exclusive sources of experience and his elimination of the cosmic order of time. So he ascribes a mathematical sense to the categories of quality themselves. The logical function of synthesis must fulfil the task of an inter-modal meaning-synthesis.

The same thing occurs in the case of Kant's categories of relation (inherence and subsistence, cause and effect, and interaction between the agens and that which undergoes the effect). But from the logical point of view the situation is more obscure here than in the case of the mathematical categories. The latter correspond indeed to different forms of analytical relations. As to the third class of Kant's categories this correspondence is doubtful. It is entirely lacking with regard to the first and the third categories. The category of inherence and subsistence is taken over from the traditional Aristotelian logic. It was closely bound to the metaphysical concept of substance and to the linguistic relation of subject and predicate. From the strictly logical viewpoint it must be seriously doubted whether it corresponds to a particular form of analytical relation. Apart from the metaphysical concept of substance it can hardly be different from the analytical relation of identity. Kant supposes that it is the logical form of the categorical judgment. But he fails to demonstrate this assertion.

The category of interaction between the agens and that which undergoes the effect (which is also taken over from Aristotle) lacks any correspondence to an analytical form of relation. It can never have an analytical meaning since it implies the reference to energy and its effects. Kant pretends that it corresponds to the logical form of a disjunctive judgment. The ground of this assertion remains quite obscure.  

So it is only the second category of the third class, viz. that of causality, which has undoubted correspondence with a genuine form of analytical relation. Our provisional analysis of the modal

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1 Kant agrees that the correspondence of the third category of relation to the logical form of a disjunctive judgment is not evident at first sight. But he tries to indicate this correspondence by referring to the fact that the parts of a disjunctive judgment determine each other mutually (when a term of the division is assumed all the others are excluded; and conversely). But this analytical relation of reciprocal determination has nothing to do with interaction in its original physical sense.
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structure of the logical aspect has shown that the analytical relation of causality has an analogical character: it is necessarily qualified by the analytical nucleus of the logical aspect. As an analytical law of every logical conclusion, it is nothing but the principium rationis sufficientis. KANT has rightly observed that it is the logical form of a hypothetical judgment. Even in an inter-modal synthesis with the energy-aspect of human experience the logical function of synthesis implied in the analytical relation of causality cannot give more than an analytical determination to the genuine causal relation of energy. KANT, however, ascribes the meaning of physical causality to the category of causality as a pure concept of the understanding. This appears from his statement that the concept of energy (Kraft) and that of action and undergoing an effect are to be derived from the category of causality and dependence, and that, as “Prädicabilien” of this original notion, they have the same character of pure concepts of the understanding.

Thus KANT turns the (logical) principium rationis sufficientis into the “ground of possible experience”. The physical causal law is misinterpreted as the logical principle of the sufficient ground in its a priori relation to sensory phenomena in the succession of time.

The complex inter-modal synthetical structure of the fundamental physical concept of causality is not for a moment discussed. On KANT’s authority we must believe that it is nothing but a purely logical function of synthesizing a manifold given in the temporal form of sensory perception.

In the same way the three categories of modality are deduced (possibility-impossibility; actuality and non-actuality; necessity-chance). The conception of this class of categories is extremely typical of KANT’s epistemological standpoint. It has an interesting history in immanence-philosophy which cannot be examined here in detail.

ARISTOTLE’s conception of the relations of possibility and actuality (δυναμεις δν and ερευνεια) had its foundation in the metaphysical form-matter schema. In LEIBNIZ possibility was identified with the logically possible, the logically non-contradictory. The actual is taken to be identical with a selection from the logically possible realized by the deity, the “intellectus arche-

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1 Ibid., p. 107.
in the Light of the Cosmonomic Idea

typus”. This selection is the “compossible”, i.e. that which is compatible with all the rest and is the comparative best. In Kant, possibility, actuality and necessity become the logical categories of modality. As such they are alleged to be related a priori to sensory phenomena. Within the cadre of human experience only the sensory is supposed to be actual, in its formal determination by the forms of intuition and thought; but actuality itself is a category of thought. The dogmatical character of this conception and its untenability can only appear from a structural analysis of the pre-theoretical experience of reality. But Kant’s frame of mind causes him to ignore our pre-theoretical experience.

The problem of the inter-modal synthesis in Kant’s doctrine of the “transcendental imagination” (‘transszendentale Einbildungskraft’) 2.

In his “transcendental logic” Kant introduced the famous, but extremely obscure notion of the “transcendental imagination”. In the 24th section he discusses the application of the categories to “objects of sense in general”.

The “transcendental imagination” also plays a central part in the chapter on the schematism. And it should consequently be supposed that we can understand the transcendental meaning of the category only from “the transcendental schema”, which has its origin in this “productive faculty of the imagination”. But it will appear that nothing is gained in this way.

In the opening passage of § 24 Kant has again explained the purely logical character of the synthesis in the categories with great emphasis 3.

He then continues as follows: “But as there is a certain form of a priori sensory intuition in the mind based on the recepti-

1 as ‘Gegenstände’ of sensory intuition.
2 Translator’s note: The faculty of forming mental images; the word imagination is taken in its primitive sense here.
3 “Die reinen Verstandesbegriffe beziehen sich durch den blossen Verstand auf Gegenstände der Anschauung überhaupt, unbestimmt ob sie die unsrige oder irgend eine andere, doch sinnliche sei, sind aber eben darum bloße Gedankenformen wodurch noch kein bestimmter Gegenstand erkannt wird.” [The pure concepts of the understanding apply to objects of intuition exclusively through the understanding, and it is immaterial whether the intuition is our own or any other, so long as it is sensory; but they are for this very reason mere forms of thought by means of which no determinate object can be known.]
vity of the representative faculty (sensibility), the understanding, as spontaneity, can determine inner sense by means of the manifold of given representations in accordance with the synthetic unity of apperception. In this way it can think synthetic unity of the apperception of the manifold of sensory intuition a priori — that being the pre-requisite to which all objects of our (human) intuition are necessarily subjected. In this way the categories, in themselves mere forms of thought, obtain objective reality, i.e. application to objects that can be given us in intuition. These objects, however, are only phenomena, for only of the latter can we have an intuition a priori”.

And now with great emphasis KANT distinguishes this a priori “synthesis of the manifold of sensory intuition” as a “synthesis speciosa” or “figurative synthesis” from the merely logical synthesis (synthesis intellectualis). The latter is thought in the mere category in respect of the manifold of an intuition in general, and is called ‘Verstandesverbindung’ (combination through the understanding)².

The above mentioned figurative synthesis in its relation to the transcendental unity of apperception is called “transcendental synthesis of the imagination”, in contradistinction to the merely logical synthesis.

What does KANT understand by “imagination”?³.

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¹ op. cit., p. 136: “Weil in uns aber eine gewisse Form der sinnlichen Anschauung apriori zum Grunde liegt, welche auf der Rezeptivität der Vorstellungsfähigkeit (Sinnlichkeit) beruht, so kann der Verstand als Spontaneität den inneren Sinn durch das Mannigfaltige gegebener Vorstellungen der synthetischen Einheit der Apperzeption gemäß bestimmen und so synthetische Einheit der Apperzeption des Mannigfaltigen der sinnlichen Anschauung apriori denken, als die Bedingung, unter welcher alle Gegenstände unserer (der menschlichen) Anschauung notwendiger Weise stehen müssen, dadurch denn die Kategorien als blosse Gedankenformen objektive Realität, d.i. Anwendung auf Gegenstände, die uns in der Anschauung gegeben werden können, aber nur als Erscheinung bekommen; denn nur von diesen sind wir der Anschauung apriori fähig.”


³ The history of the theory of ‘imagination’ can be traced back to ancient and patristic philosophy. St Augustine distinguished a ‘productive’, a ‘reproductive’ and a ‘synthetic’ imagination. In Scholasticism we
In Hume's psychologistic critique of knowledge the imagination was considered to be the faculty that enables us to picture something not actually given in our sensory impressions. This imagination was conceived as subjected to the psychical laws of association only. Kant starts from this "empiricistic" conception of the "imagination" but only in order to show that the sensory phantasy itself is made possible only by the transcendental, figurative "synthesis of imagination".

What place does Kant assign to the "imagination" in his "transcendental logic"? Can this imagination perhaps elucidate the fundamental problem of epistemology, viz. the possibility of the inter-modal theoretical synthesis of meaning? Kant starts with defining the imagination as "the faculty of representing an object that is not present in our intuition." And then he says that on account of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the concepts of the understanding, it belongs to receptive sensibility.

And, on the other hand, in so far as its synthesis is an act of spontaneity, Kant characterizes the imagination as an operation of the understanding on sensibility. As such it is the first application of the understanding to the objects of possible intuition and at the same time the basis of the exercise of all the other applications of that faculty. This shows clearly that it is precisely the synthetical activity of the productive phantasy which is ascribed to the logical function of thought. This fact is also acknowledged by Heidegger with regard to Kant's conception of the 'imaginative faculty' in the second edition of the 'Critique of Pure Reason'.

In the "transcendental operation of the imagination" as a "figurative synthesis" Kant sees a synthetical influence of the understanding on the "inner sense" (Kr. d. r. V., p. 138) and the problem lies exactly in the possibility of this "influence". The "inner sense" is affected (affiziert) by the transcendental synthesis: "Now human understanding is not itself a faculty of intuitions, and cannot receive the latter, even if they are given in sensibility, into itself, in order to combine them as the manifold of its own intuition. Therefore its synthesis, considered in itself, is nothing but the unity of the act of which, as an act, it is aware even without the aid of sensibility. By means of the

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find explicit mention made of a 'vis imaginativa', as a separate faculty of the soul. Nicolaus Cusanus speaks of 'imaginatio' or 'vis phantastica'.

1 Heidegger, op. cit., p. 155/156.
unity of this act, however, our understanding is capable of determining sensibility internally with regard to the manifold which may be given to it according to the form of sensory intuition. Thus, under the title of a *transcendental synthesis of imagination*, the understanding exercises this action on the passive subject, whose faculty it is; and we are therefore justified in saying that the inner sense is affected by this”.

In contradistinction to psychological “empiricism” KANT very carefully distinguishes the synthetical unity of “transcendental apperception” from sensory intuition. The figurative synthesis, as a synthesis, takes its origin only in the understanding: “the understanding, therefore, does not find in this (i.e. the inner sense) such a conjunction of the manifold, but creates it by affecting this sense”.

In his doctrine of the “synthesis speciosa” KANT does not offer a solution of the basic problem of the inter-modal synthesis of meaning. He leaves it unsolved. Even if in his “transcendental imagination” KANT had in mind an original *systasis* of logical and sensory functions — a possibility that we intend to discuss later on — the inter-functional synthesis would only have been ascribed to the isolated logical function of thought. KANT’s conception of the synthesis, founded in the dogma concerning the formative autonomy of theoretical thought, left no room for any other solution.

So we may conclude that neither in his doctrine of the categories, nor in that of the “transcendental imagination” did KANT consider the real problem of the intermodal meaning-synthesis.

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1 “Weil nun der Verstand in uns Menschen selbst kein Vermögen der Anschauungen ist und diese, wenn sie auch in der Sinnlichkeit gegeben wären, doch nicht in sich aufnehmen kann, um gleichsam das Mannigfaltige seiner eigenen Anschauung zu verbinden, so ist seine Synthesis, wenn er für sich allein betrachtet wird, nichts anders als die Einheit der Handlung der er sich als solchen auch ohne Sinnlichkeit bewusst ist, durch die er aber selbst die Sinnlichkeit innerlich in Ansehung des Mannigfaltigen, was der Form ihrer Anschauung nach ihm gegeben werden mag, zu bestimmen vermögend ist. Er also übt unter der Benennung einer transzendenten Synthesis der Einbildungskraft diejenige Handlung aufs passive Subjekt, dessen Vermögen er ist, aus, wovon wir mit Recht sagen, dass der innere Sinn dadurch affiziert werde.”

2 “Der Verstand findet also in diesem (d.i. dem inneren Sinn) nicht etwa schon eine dergleichen Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen, sondern bringt sie hervor, indem er ihn affiziert.”
The doctrine of the categories does not belong to general epistemology but to the cosmological analysis of the modal meaning-structures.

To my criticism of KANT's doctrine of the categories I add a theoretical remark, the truth of which has already been established in the general theory of the modal spheres. That which the so-called critical epistemology treats in the chapter on the "categories of knowledge" really belongs to the cosmological analysis of the modal structures of the law-spheres. It cannot be discussed in the dogmatical way of KANT's transcendental idealism. It is not possible to carry out a structural analysis of the modal aspects of experience, unless the universality of cosmic time, overarching all the modal functions, has been discovered.

The theory of the modal spheres, which proposes to give this structural analysis, must not be deterred by KANT's dogmatic restriction of scientific knowledge to the sensory aspect of experience. It should proceed with the execution of its imperative task of applying the analysis of the modal structures of meaning to all the law-spheres in their mutual coherence in time.

The epistemological problem proper in its restricted sense is concerned only with the question of the possibility of the inter-modal theoretical synthesis in which we grasp a modal aspect distinctly. And it is precisely this genuine epistemological problem which is constantly avoided by KANT.

§ 4 HOW THE PROBLEM OF THE INTER-MODAL SYNTHESIS OF MEANING HAS BEEN AVOIDED IN KANT'S "TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGMENT".

Not before his "Transcendental Doctrine of the Faculty of Judgment" does KANT seem to go into the problem of the inter-functional synthesis of meaning. The solution he offers is not really a critical solution, for he avoids the problem precisely at the crucial point. To demonstrate how "pure concepts of the understanding" can be applied to phenomena at all, KANT formulates his well-known theory concerning the transcendental schematism of the "pure concepts of the understanding": "It is now clear," he observes, "that there must be a third something of a similar nature to the category on the one hand, and to the phenomenon on the other, which makes it possible to apply the former to the latter. The mediating representation must be pure (i.e. void of anything empirical) and yet both intellectual and sensible. Such a representation is the transcendental schema."
The concept of the understanding contains the pure synthetical unity of the manifold in general. Time, as the formal condition of the manifold content of the inner sense, and consequently of the combination of all representations, contains an a priori manifold in pure intuition. Now a transcendental determination of time is in so far of the same kind as a category (which constitutes its unity) as it is universal, and is based on a rule a priori. On the other hand it is in so far homogeneous with a phenomenon, as time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold. This makes the application of the category to phenomena possible by means of the transcendental determination of time which, as the schema of the concepts of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of the phenomena under the category” ¹.

Kant’s argument here simply contains a petitio principii. For the problem is: How is an inter-functional (inter-modal) synthesis between the logical categories and (psychical) sensory phenomena possible? The answer is: by means of the schema as the a priori (inter-functional) synthesis of a category and the psychological form of sensory intuition, time. But in this “schematizing of the categories of thought”, the inter-modal synthesis has apparently already been accomplished, just as it was pre-supposed in the transcendental imagination. We do not get any answer at all to the question: How is this inter-functional synthesis possible? In other words the possibility of the inter-functional synthesis between the logical category and the sensory phenomenon is explained by the inter-functional synthesis in the

a priori schematized category. But this constitutes the \textit{petitio principii}, since, on Kant's standpoint, the fundamental problem is exactly the "transcendental determination of time".

The inter-functional synthesis pre-supposes a \textit{temporal coherence} in the modal diversity of meaning, as well as a unity above the latter. Kant assumes an ultimate \textit{logical} unity above a \textit{logical} multiplicity in the "cogito".

From the chapter on the schematism it appears that Kant must have seen the insufficiency of his conception of the unity of self-consciousness to explain the inter-functional relatedness of "the categories of thought" to "sensory phenomena".

In his \textit{Der Philosophische Kritizismus} I, 478 (3rd ed.) Riehl observes: "The necessary combination of the pure concepts with the forms of intuition seems capable of demonstration without difficulty. Are not thought and intuition originally united in their common subject of consciousness?" \footnote{"Die notwendige Verbindung der reinen Begriffe mit den Formen des Anschauens scheint ohne Schwierigkeit bewiesen werden zu können. Sind nicht in dem gemeinsamen Träger des Bewusstseins Denken und Anschauen ursprünglich vereinigt?"}

Such an optimistic statement only proves that Riehl, who with regard to the conception of the cognitive synthesis perfectly agrees with Kant, has not realized the \textit{aporia} (impasse) in which Kant's view of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness is involved. Without any really critical investigation of the \textit{possibility} of an inter-functional meaning-synthesis he takes it for granted that as a matter of course the "cogito" (in the Kantian sense of the transcendental logical subject) is the ground of the unity of thought and sensory intuition \footnote{Only the transcendental logical subject can function as the "common subject of consciousness" in Riehl's Kantian cadre of thought; of course not the "empirical ego" which, according to Kant, is nothing but an individual phenomenon in time and space.}. Yet Riehl admits: "Between the cognitive concepts and those of a purely logical combination there is not any \textit{essential} difference, only one of \textit{application}. Their use in purely logical propositions is analytical, that in judgments of experience is synthetical. In the former it is without any relation to the universal form of intuition (viz. time), in the latter it is in relation to this form" \footnote{\textit{Der Phil. Krit.} I, 480: "Zwischen Erkenntnisbegriffen und den Begriffen einer reinlogischen Verknüpfung besteht keinerlei Unterschied des Wesens, sondern nur ein Unterschied der Anwendung. Ihr Gebrauch in rein logischen Sätzen ist analytisch, in Urteilen der Erfahrung synthetisch, in jenen ohne Beziehung auf die allgemeine Form der Anschauung, in diesen mit Beziehung auf diese Form."}.

Apparently Riehl did not see that in Kant's line of thought the same thing holds for the transcendental-logical unity of self-consciousness, and that it is precisely the relatedness of the latter to
sensory intuition which has been only \textit{dogmatically posited} by Kant. Riehl, too, fails to account for it in a truly critical consideration of the fundamental transcendental problem involved in the Kantian 'cogito'. Therefore, I believe Riehl has not understood that in the chapter on the schematism Kant's critical conscience has been roused. This chapter must not be explained from the dependence of the great Königsberg thinker on the traditional view of the universality of the concepts\textsuperscript{1}.

§ 5 - THE PROBLEM OF THE INTER-MODAL SYNTHESIS OF MEANING IN THE FIRST EDITION OF THE "KRITIK DER REINEN VERNUNFT" ACCORDING TO HEIDEGGER'S INTERPRETATION.

Meanwhile Martin Heidegger in his important work \textit{Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik} (1929) has made a remarkable attempt to show that in the first edition of the \textit{Kritik der reinen Vernunft} Kant indeed assumed a common root of thought and sensory intuition, in the "transcendental faculty of the imagination".

With this Heidegger again tackles a problem that has been of central importance in the whole of post-Kantian idealism. Heidegger calls this idealism rationalistic. To my mind, this is an error, and the reader may find the arguments for this opinion in the second part of Vol. I. Heidegger holds that the "\textit{productive imagination}" also functions as the root of \textit{practial reason} in Kant's system. This view strongly reminds us of Fichte's interpretation of Kant. But Heidegger's interpretation did not take its origin in German idealism and has developed in a different direction, viz. in that of the modern "philosophy of existence".

In the first edition of the \textit{Kr. d. r. V.} Kant twice speaks of \textit{three} subjective "sources" as the activities of the soul's faculties. From these the possibility of all experience is supposed to originate, viz. sense, imagination, and apperception (as "pure thought")\textsuperscript{2}.

\textsuperscript{1} Although in a quite different sense from what he intended I can agree with Heidegger's pronouncement (op. cit., p. 106) that the chapter on the schematism is "the central part of the whole work". Kant himself writes in 1797: "I consider this chapter as one of the most important." Handschr. Nachlass W.W. Bnd. V no. 6359. ["Ich halte dieses Capittel für eines der wichtigsten."]

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Kr. d. r. V.} 1st ed.: "Es sind aber drei ursprünglichen Quellen (Tätigkeiten der Vermögen der Seele), die die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit aller Erfahrung enthalten und selbst aus keinem anderen Vermögen des Gemüts abgeleitet werden können, nämlich \textit{Sinn, Einbildungskraft und Apperzeption}." [There are, however, three original sources (activities of the
To each of these faculties he ascribes a special kind of synthesis: the “synthesis of apprehension in intuition”, the “synthesis of reproduction in imagination”, and the “synthesis of recognition in concepts”. This is seemingly a contradiction of the thesis already posited in the “Introduction” (and repeated in the same context in which he distinguishes three faculties), according to which there are only two sources of knowledge. Here it is stated that we possess no others, although KANT mentions the possibility of a common root which is unknown to us¹.

In the second edition this seeming anomaly has already disappeared, and throughout we hear only of two cognitive functions whose common root is unknown to us.

And HEIDEGGER admits that “KANT recoiled from this unknown root. In the second edition of the Kritik d. r. V. the transcendental faculty of the imagination, which appeared in the passionate impulse of the first plan of the book, was pushed back and re-interpreted — in favour of the understanding”².

HEIDEGGER is of the opinion that in the second edition the “transcendental faculty of the imagination” has been maintained only nominally: “The synthesis is merely called “imagination” in so far as it is related to intuition, but at bottom it is the understanding”³.

This last assertion is indeed irrefutable. We have already faculties of the soul) that contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience and cannot be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely sense, imagination and apperception.]

¹ op. cit. Einleitung, Einteilung der Transzendentalphilosophie: “Nur soviel scheint zur Einleitung und Vorerinnerung nötig zu sein, dass es zwei Stämme der menschlichen Erkenntnis gebe, die vielleicht aus einer gemeinschaftlicher aber uns unbekannten” (Italics are mine) “Wurzel entspringen, nämlich Sinnlichkeit und Verstand, durch deren ersteren uns Gegenstände gegeben, durch den zweiten aber gedacht werden.” [Only so much seems to be necessary to say as an introduction and preface, that there are two stems of human knowledge which perhaps have one common root though unknown to us, viz. sensibility and understanding. Through the former, objects are given us; through the latter they are thought.]


³ “Die Synthesis heisst nur “Einbildungskraft” sofern sie sich auf Anschauung bezieht, ist aber im Grunde Verstand”, op. cit. p. 156.
shown this clearly. I would draw attention to Heidegger's admission: "If, as is done in the second edition, the transcendental imagination is cancelled as a special basic faculty; and if its function is transferred to the understanding as mere spontaneity, then there is no longer any possibility to understand pure sensibility and pure thought with regard to their unity in one finite human reason, or even to make this unity a problem".

This last remark perfectly agrees with the whole of my previous argument. In advance, however, I must warn against Heidegger's sharp (though unwarranted) distinction between the epistemological problem and that of the 'Sein des Seienden'. I must do so on the grounds given in the third part of the first Volume of this work. If Heidegger only meant to oppose the positivistic neo-Kantian tendency to deprive the transcendental motive in Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* of its depth, I might agree with Heidegger to a certain extent. At least, if he meant to emphasize the fact that the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* was really written for the sake of the metaphysics of practical reason. Any attempt, therefore, to lay the point of gravitation of Kant's critical philosophy in "theoretical reason" would be an intrinsic falsification of Kant's problems. Against such a background I am willing to agree that there is a kernel of truth in Heidegger's thesis that the *Kritik* has nothing to do with a "theory of knowledge", in the sense of a pure theory concerning the possibility of mathematical natural science. That is to say, I could agree with its basic intention, and that in spite of its exaggeration. The *Critique of Pure Reason* has doubtless an epistemological character. But its ultimate aim is not a mere epistemological foundation of mathematics and natural science.

Ultimately Kant's critique of the theoretical cognitive faculty is orientated to his idealistic conception of the super-temporal *noumenon*.

This is a fundamental theme of the traditional *metaphysica generalis*, which found the $\delta \nu \ddot{h} \delta \nu$, as the transcendent, immanent in the theoretical $\nu \ddot{h} \delta \nu$. Kant was the first to orientate this theme to the religious root of the Humanistic ideal of personal-

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1 "Wird jedoch die transzendentale Einbildungskraft, wie das in der zweiten Auflage geschieht, als eigenes Grundvermögen gestrichen und ihre Funktion dem Verstand als der blossen Spontaneität übertragen, dann schwindet die Möglichkeit reine Sinnlichkeit und reines Denken hinsichtlich ihrer Einheit, in einer endlichen menschlichen Vernunft zu begreifen, ja auch nur zum Problem zu machen."
ity. In his critical philosophy it can only be interpreted according to the dualistic cosmonomic Idea in which it is founded. The sharp contrast between phenomena and noumena, which he scrupulously maintains in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, is a proof that the great Königsberg thinker does not for a moment doubt the absolute transcendence of the practical Ideas above the temporal world. Accordingly as he rejects the claims of the speculative science-ideal to the province of metaphysics, he all the more clings to his unshakable rational faith in the *homo noumenon* elevated above all time. The decline of the Humanistic self-consciousness, manifest in the philosophy of existence, which originated from the problems of irrationalistic historism, is nowhere to be seen in Kant's philosophy.

**How Heidegger approaches Kant's critical transcendental philosophy.**

Heidegger wants to understand Kant from the very point of view of this modern state of decline. In this view the selfhood in our self-consciousness is interpreted with reference to its "innermost original essence" as "time itself". It is, however, hardly right to efface the whole (metaphysical) contrast between phenomena and noumena which is so fundamental in Kant's line of thought. Heidegger's maxim for the interpretation of a philosophical system cannot make this eradication acceptable. He lays down as a rule that a correct interpretation should not merely stick to what a thinker has really *expressed* in words, but should penetrate to "that which is implied in the words".

For although what Heidegger remarks is true, namely, that "the power and light of a guiding Idea should impel and lead the interpretation", this Idea should not be imposed on the system that is being investigated. It may only be the cosmonomic Idea which Kant himself has laid at the foundation of his Critiques, although he should not be aware of it. Heidegger, however, bases Kant's philosophic thought in an entirely different cosmonomic Idea, viz. the irrationalistic and historicistic basic Idea of his own existentialism. Thus he falls into an arbitrary hermeneutic method that he himself has erroneously elevated to a maxim of correct interpretation, when he remarks: "However, in order to extort from what the words say that which they

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1 “das was sie als noch Ungesagtes durch das Gesagte vor Augen legt…”
2 “die Kraft einer vorausleuchtenden Idee die Auslegung (musz) treiben und leiten.”
are intended to say\(^1\), every interpretation must necessarily have recourse to violence"\(^2\).

The result is then that the interpretation of Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* becomes an introduction to Heidegger's own philosophy of "Sein und Zeit", which no doubt is itself highly interesting.

According to Heidegger's interpretation the "transcendental imagination", as the supposed root of the two Kantian "stems" of knowledge, must be identical with "pure reason", both in its "theoretical" and in its "practical operation". It is identical also with the "pure finite selfhood" whose "Dasein" (i.e. existence) is rooted in time itself. Pure reason must then be conceived as "pure receptive spontaneity", as "pure sensory reason". The synthesis considered by Kant as the central theme of the entire *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, is reinterpreted by Heidegger as an ontological synthesis. According to him it must not be conceived as the mere conjunction into a unity of an isolated sensory intuition and isolated "pure concepts of thought", but should be understood as an *a priori*, non-empirical disclosure of the ontological structure of what is\(^3\).

The essential character of the finiteness of human knowledge, according to Heidegger, is that human understanding does not create its "objects" but receives them. For human life (das Dasein) is at the mercy of "das Vorhandene" i.e. given nature; human life is dependent on it and only rises superior to the "Vorhandene" because of its capability to understand that which is. For this purpose human "Dasein" *a priori*, and previous to all experience, designs an image of the being of what is. "Thus the question about the possibility of an *a priori* synthesis more and more concentrates on the problem: how can a finite being, which, as such, is delivered to what is (at hand) and is dependent on the reception of what is given, know the latter before any reception of what is, i.e. intuit it without, however, being its 'creator'?\(^4\)."

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\(^1\) viz. in the interpretation according to Heidegger's idea of man's finite existence.

\(^2\) "Um freilich dem, was die Worte sagen, dasjenige abzuringen, was sie sagen wollen, muss jede Interpretation notwendig Gewalt gebrauchen".

\(^3\) Heidegger op. cit. p. 35: "erfahrungsfreies Beibringen der Seinsverfassung des Seienden."

\(^4\) Op. cit. p. 35: "So verschärft sich die Frage nach der Möglichkeit der apriorischen Synthesis dahin: wie kann ein endliches Wesen, das als solches an das Seiende ausgeliefert und auf die Hinnahme desselben an-
HEIDEGGER'S conception of transcendence.

HEIDEGGER wants to read these problems also in KANT's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. The transcendence of the selfhood then remains of a *temporal character*. It is only the transcendence of the temporal finite human "Dasein" above the 'Vorhandene' (the sensible things that are given), but it is not an ideal transcendence above time itself. Time as "pure intuition", as "pure self-affection" is the essence of the finite human selfhood. If the selfhood, the I-ness is found in the "transcendental imagination", it is identical with "time" as "pure intuition". In the "transcendental imagination" must be sought the original essential unity of the "stems" of knowledge that KANT isolated at first, but which, as such, could not be fully grasped. These "stems" of knowledge are sensory intuition and logical thought. The "transcendental imagination" must be understood as the "formative medium" (*bildende Mitte*) of the two "stems of knowledge from which they originate as from the primitive original synthesis". HEIDEGGER here shows a much deeper insight into the real problems of the cognitive synthesis than KANT's most articulate modern followers. The latter simply eulogize KANT's discovery of "the synthetical character of all objective knowledge" and his "Copernican deed", without penetrating to the crucial questions implied in his transcendental idealism. Perhaps HEIDEGGER's superiority in this respect is due to the fact that, however much he may start from the philosophical immanence-standpoint, he approaches KANT from the modern state of decline of the Humanistic ideals of personality and science. In KANT these two still function as the unshakable pillars of his cosmonomic Idea. His faith in the autonomy of theoretical reason caused him to overlook the most fundamental problems of a transcendental critique of human knowledge. HEIDEGGER, who is no longer biased by this dogmatic prejudice, was confronted with the real problem of the inter-functional synthesis and tries to solve it in his own way, though he ascribes this solution to KANT himself.

HEIDEGGER's interpretation of KANT changes that philosopher's thought considerably both as to its foundation and its essence. And yet HEIDEGGER's book is extremely valuable as an attempt to think out the problems of KANT's *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* with regard to the fundamental chapter on the "synthesis".

gewiesen ist, vor aller Hinnahme das Seiende erkennen, d.h. anschauen, ohne doch dessen 'Schöpfer' zu sein?"
The Epistemological Problem

The problem of the primary (ontological) synthesis in Heidegger.

The question is: to what extent does Heidegger’s interpretation approach the fundamental problem regarding the possibility of the inter-modal synthesis of meaning?

For the answer we must first recall what Heidegger means by the fundamental synthesis. He seeks the primitive original synthesis in the transcendental imagination, i.e. in the formative medium between “pure thought” and “pure intuition”.

This shows that Heidegger is aware of the fact that every theoretical isolation of the “understanding” and “sensitivity” presupposes a primary inter-modal synthesis. We acknowledge this without implying that Heidegger has really understood Kant’s view. But has Heidegger also seen that we can only isolate a modal function theoretically within the fulness of the temporal meaning-systasis and by starting from it?

Only against the background of the primary cosmic temporal coherence of meaning can the fundamental problem concerning the possibility of theoretical synthesis be conceived in its true sense. If this primary temporal coherence of the modal aspects of experience is to be acknowledged as a basic fact, a philosopher must break with the immanence-standpoint.

For this standpoint is based upon an overt or hidden hypostasis of theoretical thought. Such a break is not to be expected from Heidegger who seeks the selfhood in the temporal (historically conceived) “Dasein”. He writes:

“The ontical only becomes accessible to a finite being on the basis of a preliminary willingness to let something take up a position as an entity opposite to us. Thus the ontical possibly presenting itself to us is beforehand drawn within the unifying horizon of a possible belonging together. This a priori unifying unity must anticipate that which presents itself to us, at the same time opposing itself to the latter. That which presents itself, however, has already beforehand been encompassed by the temporal horizon held up to it in pure intuition. The anticipating unifying unity of the pure understanding must therefore also beforehand have united itself with pure intuition. This a priori united whole of pure intuition and pure understanding ‘constitutes’ the scope of our willingness to let an entity take up a position opposite to us. In this scope all the ontical will be able to present itself to us. In view of this totality of transcendence the point is to show how — and this means at the same time
“that” — pure understanding and pure intuition are *a priori* interdependent”\(^1\).

What appears clearly from this quotation is that Heidegger also thinks reality is only accessible to the selfhood in the theoretical abstraction of that which is *opposed* to the logical function as a phenomenon (the “gegenständliche”). The fact that being only manifests itself to us as a phenomenon — which is identical with the “object” (“Gegenstand”) to Heidegger — reveals the finiteness, the temporal character of human knowledge which has been delivered to what is given (*das Vorhandene*) in nature. The “phenomenon” (the empirical “Vorhandene”) he considers as the Platonic \(\mu \xi \delta \nu\), the relative nothing, which only receives its *ontological* (not *ontic*) being through the “pure synthesis” of the transcendental imagination.

With reference to the first edition of Kant’s *Kritik d. r. V.*, Heidegger has raised the question: How is the primary *ontological* synthesis possible in which the image of the “Sein des Seienden” is planned? In his system of thought this question is as unanswerable as the fundamental problem regarding the *epistemological* synthesis was to Kant.

For Heidegger also eliminates the cosmic order of time and even merges the selfhood into time, to which, however, he does not ascribe its cosmic all-sided meaning. This distinguishes his view from Kant’s practical (ethical) metaphysics which maintained the selfhood as the super-temporal, super-sensory *noumenon*.

Nevertheless, Heidegger makes a serious attempt to explain the possibility of the primary (really theoretical) meaning-synthesis between “pure thought” and “pure sensibility”. He does

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so by “interpreting” Kant’s line of argument in the style of his own existentialistic philosophy. “Pure thought” and “pure sensibility” must be conceived as modi of the “transcendental imagination”, which in essence is time and selfhood. The three modi that Kant distinguishes in the cognitive synthesis, in the first edition of his Kritik der reinen Vernunft¹, are essentially no more than the threefold unity of time as the present, the past and the future. Thus the problem regarding the primary meaning-synthesis seems to have been solved at one masterly stroke.

Time and the “cogito” (as the transcendental unity of self-consciousness) are no longer opposed to one another as irreconcilable contrasts: they are identical:

“In laying the foundations of his metaphysics, Kant was the first to explain both time as such and the ‘I think’ as such transcendentally. He did this in such a radical way that he brought them together in their original identity, however, without explicitly considering this identity as such”².

For sensibility means finite intuition with Kant. Its transcendental form (“time”) is “pure receptivity”. The “inner sense” receives nothing “from without”, but everything from its own self. As time it is “pure self-affection”³, as Kant qualifies it. But, according to Heidegger, this “pure self-affection” is the transcendental basic structure of the finite ego itself, and the finite ego is nothing but the “pure understanding”, the “transcendental unity of self-consciousness” which as such must be understood as “pure sensuous understanding”, as “purely receptive spontaneity”.

Is this explanation a true solution of the central problem of the intermodal synthesis of meaning? Certainly not. Neither in Heidegger’s reasoning nor in Kant’s has the genuine kernel of the problem been conceived.

In Kant the real problem of the inter-functional meaning-synthesis only arises as an after-thought, after he had begun to

¹ Viz. the synthesis of apprehension in sensory intuition, the synthesis of reproduction in imagination, and the synthesis of recognition in concepts.
² op. cit., p. 183: “Kant hat durch den Radikalismus, mit dem er bei seiner Grundlegung der Metaphysik zum erstenmal sowohl die Zeit je für sich als auch das ‘ich denke’ je für sich transcendental auslegte, beide in ihre ursprüngliche Selbigkeit zusammengebracht — ohne diese freilich als solche selbst ausdrücklich zu sehen.”
³ “reine Selbstaffektion.”
absolutize the primary meaning-synthesis which had been the pre-supposition of his analysis of the sources of knowledge. **Heidegger**, whose penetration is deeper, acknowledges that in the isolation of the “sources” of knowledge, “pure synthesis” is already operative. But as soon as he is himself confronted with the problem, and has to account for the original meaning-synthesis, he makes both cognitive functions flow together into a supposed identity in time as “pure intuition”.

If the two cognitive functions **in time** are one and the same, the possibility of a real synthesis has not been explained. It has even been **cancelled**. In the cognitive theoretical concept the inter-modal synthesis of meaning pre-supposes the analytical $\varepsilonπ\chi\gamma$, the abstraction of the continuity of cosmic time. Even **cosmic** time guarantees only the **temporal coherence**, but never the **deeper identity** of the functions. How then can time as a ‘pure form of sensibility’ perform this task? Designating **Kant’s** “pure understanding” as “pure sensory understanding” will result in a kind of dialectic that **Kant** would certainly have rejected as emphatically as he could. The real issue is the possibility of a synthesis between logical and sensory modalities and **Kant** did not for a moment contemplate letting sensibility and understanding flow together **dialectically**. It is true, he did not pay due regard to the modal aspects as such, and in the first edition **Kant** still works with the “genus proximum” of thought and sensory intuition, viz. “representation in general” 1. But when **Heidegger** looks upon this fact as an indication of the internal affinity of the two “cognitive stems” 2, he forgets that the genus-concept applied to the modal aspects is of a logical origin.

**Heidegger’s** conception of the “transcendental imagination” as the root of the two abstracted “stems of knowledge” obtained in a theoretical analysis and synthesis of meaning, results in an undeniable dialectic. The cause is that it seeks this common root **in time**, apparently conceived here in the Kantian sense. It tries to solve the problem of the primary synthesis between “pure thought” and “pure sensibility” (= time) by proclaiming “pure sensibility” to be the origin of “pure thought” 3.

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1 "Vorstellung überhaupt".

2 op. cit., p. 20.

3 This way of “solving” the problem was already indicated by **Heidegger** on page 21 of his book. Referring to **Kant’s** statement: “Either of these two (intuition and thought), it is true, is representation, but not yet know-
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I pass by the internal contradiction into which HEIDEGGER gets

ledge," HEIDEGGER observes: "From this one may infer that between intu-
tuition and thought there exists a mutual relation of equal importance so
that with the same justification one may say: knowledge is intuiting
thought, hence at bottom judgment. But in contrast with this is necessary
to maintain that intuition is the real nature of knowledge and is really
the important thing notwithstanding all mutuality in the relation between
intuition and thought." ["Hieraus könnte man folgen dass zwischen An-
schauen und Denken eine wechselseitige und zwar völlig gleich-gewichtige
Bezogenheit bestehe, so dass man auch mit gleichem Recht sagen dürfte:
Erkennen ist anschauendes Denken, also im Grunde doch Urteilen. Dem
gegenüber muss aber festgehalten werden, dass die Anschauung das eigent-
liche Wesen der Erkenntnis ausmacht und bei aller Wechselseitigkeit des
Bezuges zwischen Anschauen und Denken das eigentliche Gewicht be-
sitzt."]

Unfortunately KANT's pronouncement quoted above has been taken
from his treatise *Ueber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik seit Leibniz und
Wolf* in an answer to the competition instituted by the Königliche
Akademie der Wissenschaften of Berlin in 1791. In this Treatise, repeatedly
quoted by HEIDEGGER, KANT so sharply opposes the central element of
HEIDEGGER's interpretation (the identification of the transcendental self-
consciousness with time "as pure sensibility") that I am astonished at
HEIDEGGER not even mentioning it. The following quotation may suffice in
this connection. (W.W. Cass., Bnd VIII, p. 148/9): "Wie es möglich sei,
dass ich, der ich denke, mir selber ein Gegenstand (der Anschauung) sein,
und so mich von mir selbst unterscheiden könne, ist schlechterdings un-
möglich zu erklären, obwohl es ein unbezweifeltes Faktum ist; es zeigt
aber ein über alle Sinnenanschauung so weit erhabenes Vermögen an,
(Italics are mine), "dass es als der Grund der Möglichkeit eines Verstan-
des, die gänzliche Absonderung von allem Vieh, dem wir das Vermögen,
zu sich selbst Ich zu sagen, nicht Ursache haben heizulegen, zur Folge hat,
und in eine Unendlichkeit von selbstgemachten Vorstellungen und Be-
griffen hinaussieht." [How the I who thinks can be an object of intui-
tion to myself and thus distinguish myself from myself, is simply im-
possible to explain, although it is an undoubted fact; it indicates, how-
ever, a faculty which is so much elevated above all sensory intuition
(Italics are mine), that, as the basis of the possibility of an understanding,
it entails our complete separation from the animals, and looks through
an infinity of self-made representations and concepts. For we have no
reason to ascribe to animals the power to say I to themselves.]

It is true KANT goes on to say: "Er wird dadurch aber nicht eine dopp-
pelte Persönlichkeit gemeint, sondern nur Ich, der ich denke und an-
schau, ist die Person, das Ich aber des Objektes, was von mir ange-
schaut wird, ist, gleich andern Gegenständen ausser mir die Sache." [By
this, however, we do not mean a double personality; but only, the I who
thinks and intuits is the person, but the I of the object intuited by me,
just like other objects outside of me, is the thing.]

But every attempt to infer an argument for HEIDEGGER's interpretation
from this last statement is made impossible by KANT's whole subsequent
in the Light of the Cosmonomic Idea

involved by first calling the selfhood the origin of time and then identifying it with time ¹.

I want only to lay strong emphasis on the fact that HEIDEGGER after all makes one of the “stems of knowledge” in its supposed “purity” into the origin of the other. He does so notwithstanding his search after a deeper root of “pure sensibility” and “pure thought” which was to make the inter-modal meaning-synthesis possible. He overlooked the fact that “pure sensibility” is at best a theoretical abstraction originating solely from the analysis and inter-modal synthesis of meaning, and unable to account for this synthesis. Even HEIDEGGER’S “existential time” is not cosmic time guaranteeing the continuous coherence between the modal aspects of experience. If he had had real insight into cosmic time, he would never have sought the transcendence of the selfhood in the inner experience of the ‘ex-sistere’, in the historical time-aspect with its anticipatory future. In time our selfhood only expresses itself in the refraction of meaning and the coherence reasoning. In this he explicitly identifies the “I” in the first sense with the “logical I” and at the end he writes:

“Das diesse so sei, davon kann uns jede innere, von uns angestellte psychologische Beobachtung zum Beleg und Beispiel dienen, denn es wird dazu erfordert, dass wir den inneren Sinn, zum Teil auch wohl bis zum Grade der Beschwerlichkeit, vermittels der Aufmerksamkeit affizieren..., um ein Erkenntnis von dem, was uns der innere Sinn darlegt, zuvörderst in der Anschauung unserer Selbst zu haben, welche uns dann uns selbst nur vorstellig macht, wie wir uns erscheinen, indessen dass das logische Ich das Subjekt zwar, wie es an sich ist, im reinen Bewusstsein, nicht als Rezeptivität, sondern reine Spontaneität anzeigt, weiter aber auch keiner Erkenntnis seiner Natur fähig ist.” (Italics are mine.) [Every internal psychological observation we make, can serve as a proof and an example that things are like this. For this purpose it is required that we affect the inner sense by means of our attention, partly sometimes with great difficulty... in order to have knowledge of that which the inner sense reveals in the first place in the intuition of our own self. In this intuition we are shown as we appear to ourselves, whereas the logical “I” indicates the Subject as it is in itself in the pure consciousness, not as receptivity, but as pure spontaneity. But this logical I is not capable of any further knowledge of its own nature.]

¹ HEIDEGGER, op. cit., p. 178/9: “Wenn die transzendentale Einbildungskraft als das rein bildende Vermögen in sich die Zeit bildet, d.h. entspringen lässt, dann gibt es von der oben ausgesprochenen These: die transzendentale Einbildungskraft ist die ursprüngliche Zeit kein Ausweichen mehr.” [If the transcendental imagination as the purely formative faculty creates time within itself, i.e. gives rise to time, then the thesis formulated above is inescapable, viz. the transcendental imagination is original time.]
of its modal functions. Time cannot be the deeper identity of the modal functions, not even in its cosmic continuity. It cannot contain the totality of meaning but refracts it in the modal and typical meaning-diversity.

Is there really a point of contact in the first edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* for Heidegger’s interpretation?

Is there really a basis to be found in the first edition of Kant’s *Kr. d. r. V.* for Heidegger’s interpretation? I think we should view the facts like this: Kant actually started from a primary formal unity of logical thought and sensibility, not only in the first edition but also in the second. The transcendental imagination can indeed have no other function in Kant’s argument than that of a connecting link between the two “stems of knowledge”. The assertion that Kant considered the imagination as the “hidden root” of both “stems” is already refuted by Kant’s critical starting-point. If it is a question of a hidden root, we can only formulate speculative hypotheses about it. And in the Preface to the first edition Kant rejects such hypotheses with great sharpness. I refer to the following utterance:

“And then certitude and clearness are the two indispensable requirements which the form of such an enquiry must answer, and which the author who risks such a ticklish job should try to fulfil. As regards certitude I have come to the conclusion that in this kind of studies it is in no way permissible to express a mere opinion, and that anything resembling an hypothesis is inadmissible... and should be removed as soon as it is discovered”.

In the same Preface Kant writes about the second chapter of the “Transcendental Analytics”. This chapter contains the passage quoted above concerning “sense”, “imagination” and “apperception” as the three original faculties of the soul. In the Preface Kant observes:

“The view taken here, which goes somewhat deeply into the sub-

1 “Noch sind Gewissheit und Deutlichkeit zwei Stücke die die Form derselben (i.e. of Kant’s investigation) betreffen, als wesentliche Forde-
run gen anzusehen, die man an den Verfasser, der sich an eine so schüpf f e r i gen Unternehmung wagt, mit Recht tun kann. Was nun die Ge-
wissheit betrifft, so habe ich mir selbst das Urteil gesprochen: dass es in
dieser Art von Betrachtungen auf keine Weise erlaubt sei, zu meinen und
dass alles, was darin einer Hypothese nur ähnlich sieht, verbotene Ware
sei, die auch nicht für den geringsten Preis feil stehen darf, sondern, so-
bald sie entdeckt wird, beschlagen werden muss.”
ject, has two aspects. The one is related to the objects of the pure understanding. It is intended to establish the objective validity of its a priori concepts and to render these intelligible, and for this reason it is an essential part of my work. The other aims at considering the pure understanding itself as regards its possibility and the cognitive faculties on which it rests, consequently from the subjective viewpoint.

“And although this latter orientation is very important with regard to my principal aim, it does not form an essential element in it (Italics are mine). For the principal question remains: what and how much can the understanding and reason know apart from any experience? and not: how is the faculty of thought itself possible? The latter question is as it were an inquiry into the cause of a given effect, and in so far resembles in some degree a hypothesis (although, as I shall show later on, it is not really so).

“Yet here I seem to permit myself the liberty to pronounce a mere opinion, and therefore the reader ought also to be free to hold a different opinion. In this connection I would remind the reader that in case my subjective deduction, contrary to my expectation, should not have fully convinced him, the objective deduction at which I chiefly aim in this work retains its full force” 1.

Consequently it is not in accordance with Kant's intention if the subjective way of deduction is played off against the objective method and is even made the centre of Kant’s problem.

The thesis of the twofold origin of all cognition (viz. sensibility and understanding) was considered by Kant to be so little contradictory to the other thesis about the three original sources

1 “Diese Betrachtung, die etwas tief angelegt ist, hat aber zwei Seiten. Die eine bezieht sich auf die Gegenstände des reinen Verstandes und soll die objektive Gültigkeit seiner Begriffe apriori, dartun und begreiflich machen, eben darum ist sie auch wesentlich zu meinen Zwecken gehörig. Die andere geht darauf aus, den reinen Verstand selbst, nach seiner Möglichkeit und den Erkenntniskräften, auf denen er selbst beruht, mithin ihn in subjektiver Beziehung zu betrachten; und obgleich diese Erörterung in Ansehung meines Hauptzwecks von grosser Wichtigkeit ist, so gehört sie doch nicht wesentlich zu demselben” (Italics are mine); “weil die Hauptfrage immer bleibt: was und wie viel kann Verstand und Vernunft, frei von aller Erfahrung erkennen? und nicht: wie ist das Vermögen zu denken selbst möglich? Da das letztere gleichsam eine Aufsuchung der Ursache zu einer gegebenen Wirkung ist und in sofern etwas einer Hypothese Ähnliches an sich hat (ob es gleich, wie ich bei anderer Gelegenheit zeigen werde, sich in der Tat nicht so verhält), so scheint es, als sei hier der Fall, da ich mir die Erlaubnis nehme, zu meinen, und dem Leser also frei stehen müsse, anders zu meinen. In Betracht dessen muss ich dem Leser mit der Erinnerung zuvorkommen: dass, im Fall meine subjektive Deduktion nicht die ganze Ueberzeugung, die ich erwarte, bei ihm gewirkt hätte, doch die objektive, um die es mir vornehmlich zu tun ist, ihre Stärke bekommen.”
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(functions of the soul) containing the pre-requisites of the possibility of all experience, that he immediately coordinates the second thesis with the first in the section entitled: *Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories*. It is contrary to the fundamental principles of a correct interpretation if a fundamental contradiction is supposed to exist here. The “transcendental power of the imagination” is not a *third “stem of knowledge”* in the first edition. Kant much rather ascribes it to the “pure sensibility”, which relates to the “transcendental unity of the apperception” (the logical form of self-consciousness), which only renders it *intellectual*. This is clearly seen in the “third section of the deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding” in which Kant tries to show the internal foundation of the *unity* of knowledge.

He had already discussed the three kinds of synthesis, and now he follows a line of reasoning that descends from the “transcendental unity of the apperception”. Next he follows a course of argument in the opposite direction by starting from the empirical phenomenon in observation and perception. Heidegger has investigated these two methods very minutely. Arriving at the end of the second method, Kant writes:

“For the constant and permanent ‘I’ (of pure apperception) forms the correlatum of all our representations in so far as it is at all possible to become conscious of them. The whole of consciousness belongs to an all-comprehensive pure apperception, just as all sensory intuition belongs to a pure inner intuition, viz. time. It is this apperception which must be added to pure imagination in order to render its function intellectual. For in itself the synthesis of imagination is at all times sensible though it is exercised *a priori*, because it connects the manifold only in the way it *appears* in intuition, e.g., the shape of a triangle”\(^1\).

*So, also in the first edition the “transcendental unity of self-

\(^1\) “Denn das stehende und bleibende Ich (der reinen Apperzeption) macht das Korrelatum aller unserer Vorstellungen aus, sofern es bloss möglich ist, sich ihrer bewusst zu werden, und alles Bewusstsein gehört eben sowohl zu einer allbefassenden reinen Apperzeption, wie alle sinnliche Anschauung als Vorstellung zu einer reinen innern Anschauung, nämlich der Zeit. Diese Apperzeption ist es nun, welche zu der reinen Einbildungskraft hinzu kommen muss, um ihre Funktion intellektuell zu machen. Denn an sich selbst ist die Synthesis der Einbildungskraft, obgleich *a priori* ausgeübt, dennoch jederzeit sinnlich, weil sie das Mannigfaltige nur so verbindet, wie es in der Anschauung *erscheint*, z.B. die Gestalt eines Triangels.”
consciousness" has decidedly not been conceived to be sensible.

And then follows KANT's definition of the "pure imagination" which is fundamentally identical with that of the second edition:

"So we have a faculty of pure imagination as the fundamental faculty of the human soul on which all knowledge is based. By its means we combine the manifold of intuition with the condition of the necessary unity of pure apperception. These two extremes, viz. sensibility and understanding, must necessarily hang together by means of this transcendental function of the imagination; ..."  

The question how the "transcendental imagination" was enabled to perform this mediating function was never answered by KANT, neither in the first edition, nor in the second. This leaves only one possible explanation of KANT's argument: KANT started from a necessary systasis viz. that of "pure sensibility" and "pure thought" (but not from the real meaning-systasis in cosmic time), and misinterpreted the primary meaning-synthesis from which he started as a systatic datum  

This is the dogmatic standpoint which from the start I have tried to point out in KANT's epistemology.

So long as the prejudice of the self-sufficiency of theoretical thought is adhered to, the transcendental and the transcendent conditions of all theoretical knowledge must necessarily be eliminated the cosmic temporal order, as well as the insight into this order and the transcendence of the religious selfhood above cosmic time. The primary synthesis between the understanding and sensibility was not recognized by KANT as a real problem in the chapter on the schematism. He only thought problematic the possibility of subsuming the so-called "empirical" phenomena under the pure concepts of the understanding. But he was unable to raise the deeper problem behind

1 W.W. (Grossherzog Wilhelm Ernst Ausg. VI, p. 744.

2 This is convincingly shown by our earlier quotation from KANT's: Ueber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik:

"Es wird dadurch nicht eine doppelte Persönlichkeit gemeint, sondern nur Ich der ich denke und anschau, ist die Person." [No double personality is meant by this, but only the I who thinks and intuits is the person.]

3 Cf. our earlier quotation: "Synthetische Einheit des Mannigfaltigen als a priori gegeben" (Italics are mine) "ist also der Grund der Identität der Apperzeption selbst." [Therefore the synthetic unity of the manifold as an a priori datum is the basis of the identity of the apperception itself.]
it, viz. about the conditions under which “pure thought” and “pure sensibility” can be synthetized. He could not ask this, because the mere raising of such a problem would have meant relinquishing the immanence-standpoint based on the faith in the self-sufficiency of “reason” in all theoretical epistemological questions.

In the supposedly “given” unity of pure thought and pure intuition the logical function remained the true law-giver and determining factor in Kant’s view.

Heidegger, approaching Kant from the modern state of decline of the Humanistic self-consciousness, saw the problem as an abyss. But he, too, was unable to pose it in a truly critical way. For he clung to the immanence-standpoint even more tightly than Kant had done. In proclaiming time to be “pure sensibility” and the very essence of the selfhood and hence the root of the Kantian “stems of knowledge”, he is blind to the truth that this “pure time” is itself a theoretical abstraction. It pre-supposes the inter-modal meaning-synthesis of which it is intended to render an account. In the supposed unity of pure thought and pure intuition he ascribed only a subservient position to the former. But he did not realize that in the last instance he, too, sought his Archimedean point in a theoretical synthesis.

A modal function can never be the root of all the functions. And it is never possible to demonstrate the possibility of the primary synthesis by means of an original “pure synthesis”.


In the relentless struggle against speculative metaphysics the Kantian conception of experience has become the shibboleth between the supposedly “critical” and the “dogmatical” trends of thought. This conception was precipitated in the so-called “Satz des Bewusstseins” (the thesis of consciousness) or the “Satz der Immanenz” (the thesis of immanence).

According to the transcendental-idealistic view of this “Satz” there is no possibility of any experience outside the limits of the transcendental consciousness. All that we have knowledge of is necessarily immanent in the transcendental consciousness.

Is not this thesis really a truism whose validity is so universal and elevated above any prejudice that every intelligent mind
has to admit it, no matter on what cosmonomic Idea his philosophy is founded?

It would be so, if it were not necessary for us to give an account of the meaning of our words. For, if anywhere, the bitter wisdom of MEPHISTO holds good here: "Mit Worten lässt sich trefflich streiten." [Words are admirably suited to carry on a debate.]

The meaning of the 'Satz des Bewusstseins' depends on the meaning which phenomenalistic and transcendental-idealistic immanence-philosophy ascribe to the words 'consciousness' and 'experience'. The philosophic sense of these words is determined by the starting-point of philosophical thought.

The influence of the Kantian conception of "empirical reality" in the normative special sciences.

The Kantian conception of consciousness has resulted in misinterpreting "empirical reality" in a functionalistic manner and in narrowing the limits of the possibility of experience in an unjustified (because sense-less) way. That is why MEPHISTO's scepticism is necessary with regard to the "Satz des Bewusstseins" just as much as with regard to every other "axiom" of immanence-philosophy.

Especially in the normative special sciences the functionalistic view of "empirical reality" as the synthetically arranged sensorily perceptible has become a deep-rooted pernicious prejudice. It is almost impossible to convey one's thoughts to one's colleagues in an intelligible way, if one has broken with this prejudice. Whatever does not belong to "empirical" reality in the sense mentioned is considered as a construction of thought. In such an "empirical" reality the "juridical person" has no place: it is therefore a construction of thought, a "form of thought". Only in this empirical "reality" does the law of causality hold. Causality is per se a "category of the experience of nature". In "empirical reality" the will is only a psychological a-normative factum. When jurisprudence can do nothing with the psychological concept of will, the juridical concept of volition is considered to be a technical construction of thought, or a "form of thought". The territory of the state is nothing but the sensorily perceptible land and water within its geographical boundaries. Anything that is not sensorily perceptible in it, does not belong to "empirical reality", but is a normative construction of thought, etc.
All the modal aspects of reality contained in the normative law-spheres are transformed into psycho-psyhical phenomena in behalf of this functionalistic conception of experience. The normative principles of these law-spheres are hypostatized into super-temporal ideas according to their super-subjective meaning, insofar as under the tyranny of naturalism they do not share in the fate of the subject-side of the aspects concerned. Or they are deprived of their true meaning and proclaimed normative "forms of thought".

For the benefit of the "Satz des Bewusztseins" naïve experience is fundamentally and essentially misinterpreted. In truth the Humanistic conception of experiential reality tyrannizes science by means of the prejudice of the Humanistic immanence-standpoint.

The "Satz des Bewusztseins", of course, also allows of other interpretations than the critical-Kantian one. In a coarser, psychologized sense it is found in the so-called "empiricistic-positivistic" schools of thought. In Husserl's phenomenology, as we know it from his posthumous writings, the thesis assumes a new transcendental-idealistic meaning freed from the Kantian exclusively natural-scientific conception of experience.

But in whatever shade of meaning this thesis may be pronounced from the immanence-standpoint, it is always oriented to a definite type of the cosmonomic Idea of immanence-philosophy. Kant's conception of empirical reality is entirely dominated by his dualistic Humanistic cosmonomic Idea. The normative aspects of reality fall outside of "experience", because the realm of experience is allotted to the mechanistic science-ideal, to which the autonomy of the free personality must not be sacrificed. For this reason it must be called a superficial procedure for Christian thought to assume that it can accept the "critical" conception of experience of Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft and at the same time reject his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. For Kant's ethics and his theory of experience form an indissoluble whole so that the one stands or falls with the other. The functionalistic restriction of experience to the horizon of Kant's transcendental consciousness does not simply mean its restriction to the "phenomena", but the complete theoretical destruction of all possibility of experience.

This thesis may seem to be strange at first sight. But it will no longer be so to anyone who has assimilated our previous expositions of the meaning-character of created reality.
Why is it meaning-less to restrict the datum of experience to the sensory matter of sensory impressions? Because this thesis is self-destructive, insofar as Kant's conception of matter is the product of theoretical abstraction. What has been abstracted can never be the datum. The sensory function of intuition has a modal meaning by which it is integrated into the full temporal reality and which offers an insurmountable resistance to any attempt to make the sensory aspect of experience theoretically independant. Such an attempt cannot be supposed to leave at least the sensory aspect of experience intact, but it cancels this aspect and lands us in "pure nothingness" (das reine Nichts). If the human selfhood is capable of consciously experiencing the sensory aspect of reality in its subject-object relations, it necessarily experiences this sensory aspect in the cosmic temporal meaning-coherence.

This conscious experience is a quite different thing from the subjective undergoing of sense-impressions found in animals. And if the human selfhood transcends cosmic time, not a single aspect of temporal reality can transcend the self-consciousness operative in all human experience.

Speculative metaphysics has invented the splitting up of temporal reality into a noumenon and a phenomenon. The phenomenalistic conception of human experience remains tainted with the (fundamentally religious) prejudice of this metaphysics which is recognisable even in the disguise of a positivism claiming to be free of all manner of preoccupation.

There is nothing in experience that has been given us without the psychical function of consciousness. But if nothing outside of this function had been given us, we should not have been given anything at all, not even the sensible itself.

This thesis is merely the counterpart of the thesis we have formulated in the Prolegomena: We cannot know anything without logical thought, but if we were not were able to know anything outside of logical thought, we could not know anything at all. For not a single aspect of experience can exist outside of the cosmic coherence of meaning, and where meaning ceases, there is an end of created reality and of all human experience.

Let the attempt be made to take the phenomenalistic conception of experience seriously and then to abstract everything that is of a non-sensory and a non-logical character in our naïve experience of reality. The experiment will appear to be impossible without a complexity of shiftings of meaning. By means of these
all kinds of things are supposed to be implied in the sensible and the logical that were not to be found in them originally.

But anyone who in the future wants to defend the phenomenolist conception of experience in all seriousness will at least have to give an account of the meaning of the sensory and the logical aspect.

This is certainly not done by means of the neo-Kantian argument that it is transcendental logical thought which determines all sensory matter of experience and in this way creates the meaning of the latter.

The "critical method" will have to become more critical, if it wants to maintain its claim to the self-assumed honour of being "critical".

CONCLUSIONS

Our expositions justify the conclusion that the "conception of experience" adhered to on the standpoint of the functionalistic "Satz des Bewusstseins" (the thesis of consciousness) must be rejected if the insight into the possibility of cognizing the modal functions is not to be precluded a priori. The conception of experience mentioned above is based on a fundamental misinterpretation both of the cosmic and the cosmological self-consciousness, of which the latter is founded in the former. Besides, the data of experience are also misconstrued. They have been given to our self-consciousness to which all modal aspects of temporal reality are related. They have not been given to the sensory function of this self-consciousness, and they are never of a functional but of a cosmic-systatic character.

The cosmic and cosmological intuition of time can never be identified with a supposed "pure sensibility", or with "a form of sensory intuition".

Human experience of temporal reality in principle has no specific functional boundaries, because in the root of self-consciousness it transcends time itself. All the modal aspects of temporal reality are at least in principle immanent in possible experience, immanent in the cosmological self-consciousness. In the last instance it is not some abstract functions of consciousness but the fulness of self-consciousness which experiences the modal meaning-functions in cosmic time as its own. This insight means the final liberation of epistemology from the prejudices of immanence-philosophy.

The assertion that our experience is restricted to the sensory
and logical aspects of reality, in other words, that we can have no experience of the other meaning-functions in their original character, is absolutely contrary to the datum of our cosmic self-consciousness.

It would be a matter for surprise that epistemology could so long accept this thesis as an axiom, if behind this prejudice we had not discovered the dualistic-Humanistic cosmonomic Idea with its polar tension between the science-ideal and that of personality.
CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURAL HORIZON OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE AND OF CREATED ‘EARTHY’ REALITY

§ 1 - THE A PRIORI MOMENTS IN HUMAN EXPERIENCE AND THE IDEA OF THE STRUCTURAL HORIZON OF EXPERIENCE.

Now that we have obtained a more detailed insight into the possibility of the inter-modal synthesis of meaning, it is reasonable to ask what is to be understood by the a priori moments in our experience and what they consist of.

Having given account of the distinction between theoretical and pre-theoretical knowledge, there is no longer any obstacle in our way to a more comprehensive formulation of this problem. Its restriction to the theoretical attitude may therefore be cancelled. For we are now safeguarded against the misconception that all cognitive activity is exclusively based on a theoretical synthesis of inter-modal character.

The meaning of the word “a priori” in immanence-philosophy.

What is to be understood by the a priori? As is generally known, the word a priori, in contradistinction to a posteriori, originally had a metaphysical-ontological sense.

Aristotle considered “the universal” as the metaphysical “ground of being” of individual things. The universal, the metaphysical essential form in this sense is to him the πρῶτερον φύσιν but at the same time the ὑπόεκδικος πρὸς ἡμᾶς, that which comes later in cognition. In scholasticism (Albert of Saxony, Suarez) mention is made of an “a priori demonstration”, concluding from causes to effects, in contrast with the “demonstratio a posteriori” which proceeds from effect to causes.

Here, too, the a priori has a clearly metaphysical sense. Since

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1 Cf. Suarez, Disp. met. XXX, 7, 3.
the rise of Humanistic philosophy the \textit{a priori} has been preferably taken in an \textit{epistemological} sense; in recent times also in a \textit{phenomenological} signification. As such it is contrasted with the `empirical'.

In the former sense those cognitive elements are referred to which do not stem from sensible “experience”. In pre-Kantian rationalism the \textit{a priori} in this sense was identical with the universally valid, and with logical necessity in thought. It was identified with that which exclusively derives from “pure mathematical (logical) thought”.

In \textsc{Kant's} system the epistemological contrast between \textit{a priori} and \textit{a posteriori} or “\textit{empirical}" coalesces with that between the universally valid transcendental forms (creating the possibility of experience) and the (sensory) \textit{matter} of our knowledge. A \textit{priori} in this sense are all synthetical judgments of universal validity which cannot be founded on (sensory) experience.

In \textsc{Husserl's} phenomenology the term \textit{a priori} acquires an entirely new meaning. In the first Volume of his \textit{Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie} (1913) he avoids the words \textit{a priori} and \textit{a posteriori} as much as possible because of their ambiguity and “their connection with ill-reputed philosophical doctrines” \footnote{Op. cit., p. 6.}. But in his later work \textit{Cartesianische Meditationen} (1929) he calls his phenomenology emphatically ‘the total science of the \textit{a priori}’. By \textit{a priori} he means the ‘universal Logos of all thinkable being’ which is immanent in the constitutive possibilities of the transcendental phenomenological subject (ego) and the transcendental intersubjectivity of the egos.

This total science of the \textit{a priori} is the ultimate foundation of all genuine sciences of facts (Tatsachenwissenschaften) and of a genuine universal philosophy in its Cartesian sense: a universal science of the factual being \textit{considered in its absolute foundation}. For all rationality of the factual is implied in the phenomenalogical \textit{a priori} as the system of all ideal “\textit{Wesensmöglichteiten}".

Phenomenology has to construe \textit{a priori} — but in strict intuitive ‘\textit{Wesensnotwendigkeit}’ and essential universality — the forms of all thinkable worlds, and the latter in the cadre of all thinkable forms of being as such and their systems of stages
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(Stufen). It has to do so in correlation with the constitutive \textit{a priori}, i.e. the subjective \textit{a priori} of the intentional phenomenological acts by which the transcendental consciousness constitutes these worlds as its ‘\textit{Gegenstand}'. In this sense phenomenology, as the universal science of the \textit{a priori}, is the ultimate critique of knowledge founded in a radical and universal self-reflection of the transcendental ego on its constitutive intentional acts and their constitutive essential possibilities. It has to describe these essential possibilities in the logical form of an intuitive eidetic system\(^1\).

So \textsc{Husserl} appears to lay particular stress on the rational character of the phenomenological \textit{a priori}. The “\textit{Wesensanschauung}” (intuition of the essence) with him is an intuition of the logical \textit{eidos} of the noetic and noematical\(^2\) contents of the intentional acts of consciousness.

The \textsc{Kantian} categories must also be made into the object of this intellectual intuition in order to lay bare the whole of their intentional meaning and ‘intentional horizon’.

Phenomenology does not permit itself to accept any realities and concepts of realities as given beforehand. It has to derive all its concepts from the original subjective phenomenological source and in this sense also to render completely clear and distinct all fundamental concepts of the positive sciences which are handled here in a naive way without an insight into their real meaning. As a fundamental inquiry into the ‘transcendental constitution of a world’ phenomenology has to make clear in a radical way the meaning and origin of the concepts \textit{world, nature, space, time, animal being, man, soul, body, social community, culture} etc.\(^3\). \textsc{Husserl} calls this universal \textit{a priori} science a ‘universal concrete ontology’, a concrete ‘\textit{Wissenschaftslehre}’ or ‘concrete logic of being’ (\textit{Konkrete Logik des Seins}).

The metaphysical problems which \textsc{Husserl} identifies with the ‘ethical religious’ questions should also be treated in this way, i.e. on the phenomenological basis of an intuitive eidetical in-

\(^1\) Cf. \textit{Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge} (ed. and introduced by Prof. Dr S. \textsc{Strasser}, the Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), p. 178 ff.

\(^2\) Translator’s note: \textit{noetic} is related to the subjective components of the mental processes. \textit{Noematic} refers to the intended objects as intended.

sight into their transcendental constitution by the transcendental inter-subjectivity of the egos or the phenomenological ‘monads’. For, according to him, this is the absolute primary being which precedes all objectivity of the world and is the origin of its meaning.

A different view of the phenomenological a priori is defended by Scheler. With him the rationalist conception of Husserl is for a great deal replaced by an irrationalist view, viz. with respect to the phenomenology of values. This is due to the influence of Dilthey who attributed to feeling (empathy) a fundamental epistemological function with regard to the so-called ‘Geisteswissenschaften’, and whose irrationalistic historicism left no room for an eidetic logic of values. This is why Scheler sharply distinguishes between the realm of ‘pure logic’ and that of ‘pure axiology’.

As phenomenology of values the latter has to investigate the intentional contents of ‘emotional acts of valuation’ such as feeling, hating, loving etc.

With Scheler a priori means the whole of all ideal ‘Bedeutungseinheiten’ and sentences which by means of the content of an immediate intuition of the essence, come to be ‘given in themselves’ (zur Selbstgegebenheit kommen). In this sense the phenomenological a priori encompasses the whole realm of ‘essences’. An ‘essence’ as such is neither universal nor individual. Only from the reference to the things in which the essence makes its appearance, does the difference result between its universal and individual meaning. An essence comes to be universal when it makes its appearance as the identical in a plurality of things which for the rest differ from one another. It may, however, also be the essence of an individual which is not to be found in other individuals.

Just like the whole of phenomenology, Scheler emphatically rejects the Kantian identification of the a priori with the formal, as well as that of the material with the sensory-empirical. But he also rejects Husserl’s identification of the a priori with the logical eidos or the rational.

According to him also feeling, preferring, loving and hating have their own a priori content, just as independent of “inductive

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1 units of signification.

2 Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (3rd edition), p. 43.
experience” as the “pure laws of thought”. And this a priori can be grasped — without the intermediary of the logical function — in a “pure intuition of the essence”, applied to the “acts and their matter, their foundation and their coherence” 1.

In the last instance he considers the a priori in love and hatred as the ultimate common foundation both of the a priori knowledge of “being” and that of “a priori volition”.

In the footsteps of Husserl, Scheler no longer opposes the a priori in this wide sense to “empirical facts”. The contrast between a priori and a posteriori is rather that between two kinds of experience: viz. pure and immediate experience, related to the pure “facts” of the intuition of the essence, and experience which is dependent on the sensory natural organism of the real “Aktträger” (bearer of the acts) 2.

Why the contrast between a priori and “empirical” is useless to us.

The contrast between “a priori” and “empirical” is also useless in the light of our cosmonomic Idea. For the conception of the “empirical” in pre-phenomenological immanence-philosophy is tainted with the metaphysical separation between noumena and phenomena. Our conception of human experience is radically different from that of this immanence-philosophy, which absolutizes the theoretical meaning-synthesis and consequently has to conceive of experience in a functionalistic sense. But also the phenomenological conception of pure or immediate experience and factual sensory experience does not agree with our view of the human experiential horizon which will be explained presently. In our opinion there does not exist a pure phenomenological experience of a ‘super-human’ nature. This whole conception is based upon a primary absolutization of the theoretic-phenomenological attitude of thought in an ‘absolute transcendental subject (ego)’.

The reason why Scheler’s conception of experience is useless to us.

As to Scheler’s conception of experience in particular, we admit that in it, just as in Husserl’s, there is a break with the identification of the empirical with the functional-sensory. But

2 Ibid., p. 47.
we have to raise the same fundamental objections to it — and, for that matter, also to Husserl's more intellectualistic conception, — that we have alleged against the phenomenological standpoint as such.

Another objection is concerned with the misinterpretation of the theoretical-analytical character of the \( \psi\varphi\chi\varphi \) in its phenomenological sense, giving rise to the error that in this "epoché" nothing of the true datum of experience gets lost.

It is supposed then that this datum can be grasped adequately in the "intuition of the essence", an opinion which has been criticized already earlier \(^1\). In Scheler the 'cosmos' is exhausted in its pre-logical aspects. And in this abstraction he conceives of it as of a "natural world of things" related to our cognitive activity. In perfect agreement with the metaphysical-dualistic conception he thus opposes the 'cosmos' to the domain of the absolutized normative "mental functions". For this very reason Scheler's conception of experience is totally different from ours. He cancels the whole of the linguistic aspect of the cosmos in the datum of the meaning-coherence. He even commits the error of presuming that ethics is capable of grasping the originally a priori content of the "emotional mental acts" entirely independent of logic \(^2\). He maintains "pure logic" as well as "pure axiology", both of which are incompatible with the Idea of the all-sided cosmic meaning-coherence.

The structural and the subjective a priori in human experience.

Yet there must be some truth in the old ontological view as well as in the modern epistemological conception of the a priori, in spite of the fact that both of them are unacceptable to Christian philosophy, both as regards their exclusiveness of each other and their own foundation and elaboration. To account for this element of truth, we shall have to introduce a distinction in our epistemology which will prove to be of essential importance, but which in this sense is unknown in immanence-philosophy.

\(^1\) Cf. Part. II, Ch. II, § 4 of this Volume.

There is an \textit{a priori} complex in the \textit{cosmological} sense of the \textit{structural horizon of human experience}. This \textit{a priori} as such has the character of a \textit{law}. And there is also a \textit{merely subjective} \textit{a priori complex} in the \textit{epistemological sense of the subjective \textit{a priori insight into that horizon}}. We can distinguish the two \textit{a priori complexes} simply as the \textit{structural} and the \textit{subjective \textit{a priori}}. Only the subjective \textit{a priori} can be \textit{true} or \textit{false} in an epistemological sense. As it is \textit{subjective insight} expressing itself in judgments, it necessarily remains enclosed within the cosmological \textit{a priori} horizon of human experience. In other words, the subjective \textit{a priori} always remains determined and delimited by the \textit{a priori structure} of all human experience. It can never be the self-sufficient foundation of truth which critical epistemology considers it to be. The structural and the subjective \textit{a priori} principles are related as the \textit{law-side} and the \textit{subject-side} of \textit{a priori} human knowledge.

The horizon of human experience.

In the light of our cosmonomic Idea there can be no doubt that all human experience is bound to some horizon which makes this experience possible. We repeatedly mentioned the transcendental and the transcendental conditions of our knowledge.

This horizon of experience is not a subjective cadre within which reality appears to us only in a phenomenal shape (determined by a supposedly creative synthesis) and behind which the fundamentally inexperienceable dimensions of some “thing in itself” (“Ding an sich”) are situated.

It is rather the \textit{a priori meaning-structure of our cosmos itself} in its dependence on the central religious sphere of the creation, and in subjection to the Divine Origin of all things. The horizon of human experience is that of our ‘earthly’ cosmos as it is given in the Divine order of the creation.

This is a truly super-individual and law-conformable cadre which is constant, in contrast with all change in actual subjective experience.

The identity of the horizon of human experience and that of our ‘earthly’ cosmos is not to be interpreted in the sense of a transcendental idealism.

We must emphatically warn against every transcendental idealistic interpretation of our thesis concerning the identity of the horizon of human experience and that of our ‘earthly’
Transcendental idealism stands and falls with the acceptance of a transcendental-theoretical consciousness which 'constitutes' the world as its 'Gegenstand', and eventually constitutes itself.

This is why it is bound to the immanence-standpoint with its primary absolutization of the theoretical synthesis. Our thesis, on the contrary, is founded in the Divine Revelation concerning the creation of man in the image of God. Since God has created the 'earthly' world in a concentric relation to the religious root of human existence, there cannot exist an 'earthly' 'world in itself' apart from the structural horizon of human experience. But it is excluded on this standpoint to accept the Husserlian opinion that the "world" is the result of a constitutive process of synthesis originating in the transcendental ego and the transcendental inter-subjectivity of the egos, conceived of as mental monads. Nor is it possible to accept Husserl's (Fichtean) conception of the self-constitution of the transcendental ego. It is this idealistic opinion which lacks a radical critical self-reflection; and so does Husserl's opinion that the phenomenological reuction and the eidetical intuition guarantee an absolute freedom from prejudices.

The obfuscation of the horizon of human experience by sin. The necessity of the light of Divine Revelation.

The fall into sin has obfuscated our experiential horizon by closing it to the light of Divine Truth. In the light of Divine Revelation the horizon of human experience is opened again and extricated from the prejudices of our obfuscated understanding. The depth of its religious dimension becomes transparent. This horizon is not \textit{a priori} in the Kantian sense of non-empirical.

\footnote{According to Husserl (\textit{Cartesianische Meditationen}, p. 118), phenomenology is \textit{eo ipso} transcendental idealism. Not in the sense of the Kantian idealism, which at least as a limiting concept leaves room for a world of 'things in themselves'. But in the sense of an idealism that is nothing but the "self-interpretation of my ego as the subject of every possible knowledge with respect to every possible meaning of being." This categorical statement should be a warning against any neo-scholastic attempt to accommodate Husserl's phenomenological method to the Christian standpoint in philosophy. For Husserl emphatically establishes that this transcendental idealism also should control the ultimate questions of religion. This is to say that it is incompatible with the Christian transcendence-standpoint and with the Christian basic motive of philosophical thought.}
It belongs implicitly to human experience in so far as it constitutes its *a priori* determining element. This implicit experience is only made explicit in the transcendental and in the radical religious self-reflection, of which the former is based upon the intuitive insight into the cosmic order of time.

If we had no experience of this horizon, how should we ever be able to *know* of it, and how could we give account of it philosophically? It can only be called an *a priori* structure insofar as it is the constant meaning-structure of all human experience and of all temporal reality.

KANT's so-called categories of modality.

In this connection we must return to the Kantian "categories of modality": possibility, actuality, and necessity. These categories are supposed to have the peculiarity of not adding anything whatever to the concept (whose "predicate" they are), as "determination" of the object. They only express the relation of the object (intended by the concept) to our cognitive faculty. KANT formulates their function as follows: "If my concept of a thing is complete, I can still ask whether this object is merely possible or also actual; or, if the latter, whether it is not also necessary. By this the object itself is not more definitely determined in thought. The only question is in what relation this thing (together with all its determinations) stands to the understanding and its use in experience, to empirical judgment, and to reason (in its application to experience)".\(^1\)

If we compare these so-called "categories" with each other, we are struck by the fact that "possibility" and "necessity" in their very application to "Gegenstände" (i.e. in theoretical, synthetical usage) can be conceived of in every abstracted meaning-modus. On the other hand actual (cosmic) reality can never be enclosed in an abstract modal meaning.

A state of affairs may be possible and even necessary in a

\(^1\) *Kr. d. r. V.* (WW. Grossherzog Wilh. Ernst ed., Vol. III, p. 213/4: "Wenn der Begriff eines Dinges schon ganz vollständig ist, so kann ich doch noch von diesem Gegenstände fragen, ob er bloss möglich oder auch wirklich, oder, wenn er das letztere ist, ob er gar auch notwendig sei? Hierdurch werden keine Bestimmungen mehr im Objekte selbst gedacht, sondern es fragt sich nur, wie es sich (samt allen seinen Bestimmungen) zum Verstande und dessen empirischen Gebrauche, zur empirischen Urteilskraft und zur Vernunft (in ihrer Anwendung auf Erfahrung) verhalte?"
mathematical, a psychological, a physical, a biological, a ling-
guistic, an aesthetic, a juridical sense. But it can never be actual
in its theoretical abstraction. There is a logical, a psychical, a
biotic, a juridical, etc., possibility and necessity; there is no
abstract logical, psychical, biotic, juridical, etc., actual reality.
Functionally speaking, the aspects here intended are only
meaning-modi of the full temporal reality. Every law-sphere has
its modal horizon, its necessary law-conformable structure, con-
stituting the boundaries of possibility within the aspect of reality
concerned.

The truly transcendental Idea of possibility and
necessity is related to the horizon of the full actual
reality.

The horizon of the full actual reality overarches every modal
horizon. For this very reason actual reality cannot be a syn-
thetical category. It cannot be grasped in a concept at all, it can
only be approached in an Idea. The horizon of human experience
and of empirical reality contains the entire constant structural
law-conformity given in the Divine order of the creation of our
‘earthy’ cosmos.

Naturally, possibility and necessity can also be conceived in
the transcendental meaning of the horizon of reality. Then they
are conceived in the cosmonomic Idea, and not in the modal
speciality of an abstract aspect. Insofar as possibility and neces-
sity are used as theoretical-synthetic categories, they must be
delimitated in their specific ‘gegenständliche’ modal meaning.
But insofar as in epistemology they are related to the horizon of
the fullness of reality and experience, they can only function as
limiting concepts, i.e. as transcendental Ideas.

These Ideas become speculative-metaphysical as soon as they
absolutize the horizon of human experience into an eternal
rational order founded in the Divine Essence, and to which the
sovereign God is supposed to be bound.

As transcendental Ideas, possibility and necessity are related
to the horizon of the fulness of human experience, and as such
they belong to the creaturely meaning, and not to the Divine
Being. Necessity then is related to the horizon of both reality
and experience according to its structural law-conformity. Possi-
bility refers to the free scope left to concrete, subjective individu-
ality in its structural determination by this horizon.

The transcendent dimension of the horizon of experience. The religious a priori.

In a transcendent sense the horizon enclosing all human experience is formed by the communal structure of the religious root of human existence. Our selfhood which experiences, is under the law, is a subject, limited and determined by the law in its central religious sense. This very creaturely character of our selfhood makes it impossible for human experience to be detached from the religious attitude of the I-ness.

According to the cosmic order of the creation all human experience is at bottom religiously determined, either in its direction to God or in an apostate direction. In this sense we can speak of the necessary religious a priori of all human experience both in its structural and its subjective sense. This transcendent dimension of the horizon of experience is of course not recognized on the immanence-standpoint: it does not play a recognized rôle here as a necessary pre-supposition of cosmology and epistemology.

The transcendental dimensions of the horizon of experience. The a priori of the temporal meaning-coherence.

When descending to the transcendental dimensions of the horizon of human experience, we first come upon cosmic time. According to the Divine order of the creation all our experience of reality in its modal and typical diversity is cosmically bound to time. Not to time in a specific (theoretically isolated) aspect, but to time in its cosmic all-sidedness: to the time which is the foundation of all the modal law-spheres, and which maintains them in their continuous meaning-coherence.

Time in this cosmological sense is the absolutely transcendental a priori of all human experience.

It stands to reason that also this dimension of the horizon of human experience cannot be recognized on the immanence-standpoint, because on this standpoint the universal temporal meaning-coherence of the cosmos is bound to be misinterpreted.

Consequently we have to descend to a lower level of the structure of human experience if, at least to a certain extent, we want to establish contact with that which is called the a priori by immanence-philosophy. In the first place we shall then have to consider the functional structure of the modal aspects. For it may
be that on the immanence-standpoint it is not possible to understand the modal meaning-structures as such in their unbreakable coherence founded in the cosmic order of time; but it has appeared that the functionalistic view of empirical reality and the absolutization of the experiential aspects pre-suppose the structures concerned which are only misinterpreted in this view.

The horizon of the *a priori* modal structures of human experience.

The meaning-modalities guaranteeing the specific sovereignty of the law-spheres within their own limits, actually *determine* all *individuality of meaning* within the law-spheres.

An original individual spatial figure is only possible within the structural horizon of the spatial modality. An objective individual sensible picture of perception, e.g., that of an apple-tree in blossom in my garden here, is only possible within the structural horizon of the psychical meaning-modus. A servitude of prospect vested in an individual building can only exist within the structural horizon of the juridical aspect, etc.

The modal aspects in their functional structure are consequently the determining, necessary conditions of all modal individuality in which temporal reality reveals itself within the law-spheres concerned.

For this reason they can be called the *modal a priori* conditions of all individuality of meaning. This cosmic state of affairs is founded in the temporal world-order, which also *determines the possibility of our experience*.

We can *experience* the modal aspects both in the pre-theoretical and in the theoretical attitude only in their temporal coherence, according to the foundational and the transcendental direction of time. But within this cosmic coherence the modal aspects (according to their structure) are the *a priori* conditions of all experience of individual reality. And this is true independently of the question whether we have become distinctly aware of these aspects in the transcendental reflection on the intuitive theoretical synthesis of meaning, or whether they are experienced indistinctly in the pre-theoretical consciousness. The cosmological *a priori* character of the modal aspects, in contradistinction to all modal individuality of meaning, is manifest in its structural stability in contrast with all that is variable in temporal reality. As these aspects, in their temporal meaning-coherence, constitute
The functional structure of our cosmos, they cannot be transitory in time.

The individual sensory impression of a sunset that I experience at this moment, may pass away in time, but the psychological modus in which this impression is objectified cannot be transitory in this sense.

For this modality belongs to the functional structure of reality, and, as such, also to the a priori horizon of all human experience. When we discussed the problem of the modal meaning-dislosure we have shown that the stability of the modal horizon is not identical with rigidity. It is, however, a fundamental error to restrict the modal a priori in human experience to the psychological and the logical aspects. The modal horizon is founded in the horizon of cosmic time, which embraces all the law-spheres without any exception.

The synthetical a priori of theoretical experience.

The structure of the inter-modal meaning-synthesis is the cosmological a priori of theoretical knowledge as to its law-side. This structure forms the horizon of all true theoretical knowledge. It remains enclosed by the cosmic horizon of time and by the religious horizon of the self-hood. We only gain access to it in a subjective-theoretical way in the actual transcendental self-reflection.

The insight into this horizon is the subjective-fallible apriori of all epistemology. Again there is no reason to reserve the subjective a priori character for some specific theoretical meaning-syntheses and to deny the a priori character of all other possible syntheses.

And the subjective synthetical a priori in our theoretical knowledge, as far as the law-spheres are concerned, does not reach further than the theoretical insight into the structure of the modal aspects according to their law-and their subject-side under the hypothesis of the cosmonomic Idea. In this Idea theoretical thought is directed both to the religious dimension and the temporal dimension of human knowledge. Of course the insight into the law-conformable coherence of all types of individuality within each separate theoretically embraced law-sphere, is also of a subjective a priori character. The reader was already confronted with this state of affairs in the third part of Vol. I.

Thus e.g., physics tries to reduce all individual functional effects within the physical field to one and the same modal deno-
minator (viz. energy) in order to find the functional coherence between these effects.

In the same way legal theory investigates the functional juridical coherence between the typical legal spheres of constitutional law, civil law, non-civil industrial law, ecclesiastical law, international law, etc., which differ so widely from each other in their typical structures of individuality. In both cases this systematic tendency can find its epistemological justification only in the a priori insight into the modal structure of the law-sphere concerned, which keeps all the types of individuality presenting themselves within its cadre, in the functional coherence of the modal aspect.

Usually mathematics and so-called formal logic are mentioned as entirely a priori sciences. The latter has been sufficiently discussed by us, and we have seen that it always pre-supposes the theoretical synthesis of meaning. Its a priori character only concerns the modal horizon of the logical law-sphere in its synthetical coherence with the modal horizon of the other law-spheres. The mathematical sciences can be of a subjective a priori character only in the theoretical embracement of the modal horizon of the numerical, the spatial and the kinematical law-spheres with the functional law-conformities founded in them.

As soon as the determination of the typical functions of number, or those of the spatial or kinematical relations of reality (say e.g., Planck's quantum \( h \)) is involved, we find ourselves in the domain of the structures of individuality of natural things and events. The former can never be established in a subjective a priori way only oriented to the functional structures of the aspects concerned. They can only be discovered by means of a factual research of empirical reality in its typical structural functions, within the specific scientific field of investigation.

The synthetic a priori, too, is not to be understood as a constructive creation of the human mind.

The word a priori stands in bad repute in special science (with the exception of logic and mathematics). And rightly so. For the word is badly tainted with the rationalistic prejudices of the Humanistic science-ideal, which ascribed a creative logical function to human consciousness. It was supposed that the structure of given reality should be first methodically eliminated, after which the a priori constructive order of "creative" thought had to be imposed on it.
Even Kant's so-called formal "Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes" (the principles of the pure understanding) had been inspired by this science-ideal. They proved incapable of standing the test of the progressive development of natural-scientific thought. The constructive view of the subjective a priori elements of our knowledge, based as it is on the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea, is in reality a consequence of the vater, of the pride of man, who in his supposed self-sufficiency of thought refuses to submit to the Divine world-order. From the outset we have rejected this view, as we have broken with the cosmonomic Idea in which it is founded. The cognitive subject does not create the horizon of his experience himself. The law-conformable structure of his experience does not originate from a sovereign "transcendental subject". The modal structure of the law-spheres abstracted in the theoretical synthesis of meaning must be carefully read from the horizon of the full temporal reality created by God. And in the carrying out of this task of the modal analysis of meaning a philosophy which orients itself to the Christian cosmonomic Idea, is by no means infallible.

The system of the law-spheres is an open one.

In fact the system of the law-spheres designed by us can never lay claim to material completion. A more penetrating examination may at any time bring new modal aspects of reality to the light not yet perceived before. And the discovery of new law-spheres will always require a revision and further development of our modal analyses. Theoretical thought has never finished its task. Any one who thinks he has devised a philosophical system that can be adopted unchanged by all later generations, shows his absolute lack of insight into the dependence of all theoretical thought on historical development. All this, however, does not detract anything from the truth that theoretical thought remains bound to a modal horizon which has a constant determining character as to all the changing concrete facts. Nor does it derogate anything from the necessity of a subjective a priori insight into this horizon as a pre-supposition of special science.

If an arbitrary construction is to be avoided, the function-concept of special science must be oriented to this modal horizon, which is necessarily a priori, for the very reason that it determines the functional structure of all individuality of meaning within the law-spheres. The analysis of the modal meaning
being a philosophical task that cannot be accomplished without the hypothesis of a cosmonomic Idea, all special scientific thought necessarily has a philosophical foundation, even though the special science-theorist does not take account of this fact.

The horizon of the structural principles of individuality.

Besides those mentioned above, the horizon of human experience has another dimension which is of essential importance. It plays a dominating rôle in naïve, pre-theoretical experience, but it also has an important rôle in theoretical knowledge. We mean the dimension of the structures of individuality. It manifests itself in concrete things and events, and also in the typical structural relations of human society in their inner irreducible nature and their mutual interlacements, as they are created by God and realized in changeable forms by man.

It has appeared that these typical total structures of individuality in principle function at the same time in all the modal law-spheres. And it is really a question of structural principles, not one of the factual individuality of the things that are determined by these principles. We are here confronted with structural types of laws, which, just as the structural modi of laws, are founded in the cosmic temporal order. As such they are not changeable in time, since they determine the inner nature of perishable factual things, events and social relationships functioning within their transcendental cadre. Here we come upon a new level in the structural a priori, which forms a component part of the horizon of human experience. Although the systematical discussion of these structures of individuality is reserved to the third volume, we cannot omit making mention of them in the present context.

In comparison with the levels of the a priori discussed previously this new level shows several peculiarities. In the first place the typical structures of individuality pre-suppose all the dimensions of the horizon of human experience mentioned above except that of theoretical synthesis.

The plastic character of the horizon of the structures of individuality.

In the second place these structural principles are strongly plastic in character because of their more concrete nature. This lends an extremely rich and varied aspect to this dimension of the experiential horizon. The modal dimension encompassed by the cosmic temporal horizon is the same for all things. But the
plastic horizon of structural individuality is varied according to *types* which are different for each of the various groups of things, and in which things in turn appear, change their forms, or are changed in form, and vanish.

Ancient and medieval metaphysics tried to approach this plastic dimension of the horizon of experience with the doctrine of the substantial *essential* forms of things. **Aristotle** elaborated this theory in great detail and tried to adapt the rigid metaphysical form-matter-schema to the plasticity of the structures of individuality. He conceived of form as a dynamic principle of development which is immanently operative in the ‘matter’ of natural substances. And he conceived of the *lower* essential forms as ‘matter’ with respect to a possible *higher* formation.

This plastic motive was again lost in modern times. It was replaced by the rigid-static conception of the “world of pure essences” (*die Welt der reinen Wesen*) in **Husserl's** eidetic logic, though in his later phenomenology this conception was relativized by the motif of the active and passive constitutive genesis of the intentional contents of the acts. But the Aristotelian theory, rooted in the metaphysical immanence-standpoint, is also unable to do justice to the structural individuality of temporal reality. This level of the horizon of human experience can no more be grasped on the immanence-standpoint than the others can, because it pre-supposes the latter.

The complex interlacements of these typical structural principles.

The plastic character of the structural principles of individuality is especially evident in their typical interlacements and coherences capable of formation. In these they realize themselves in variable, individual things (events and social relationships). Owing to this the dimension of our experiential horizon that is turned to the inexhaustible wealth of individuality does not show a rigid, atomistic character, but presents itself in a continuous dynamic-structural coherence. The plastic dimension of the horizon of experience and of reality is of a very special *a priori* character.

The fact that the typical structures of individuality can be in no way *construed a priori* by human thought is nothing specific in comparison with the modal horizon of our experience. But what is indeed remarkable in the plastic horizon is that the structural principles themselves show different types of indivi-
dual meaning. Moreover, they only reveal themselves to theoretical insight in the structural analysis of the variable reality of things, events and relationships of human society that change their forms continually in time. Without the structural principles of individuality there could not be any real experience of concrete things, facts and social relations. A functionalistic Kantian or neo-Kantian epistemology with its abstract constructive form-matter-schema can never really give account of the possibility of concrete experience, because it must eliminate the structural character of individuality. The latter pre-eminently belongs to our experiential horizon and the horizon of the full 'earthly' reality in accordance with the Divine order of the creation. The things of concrete experience are not the products of the synthetic formation of a chaotic sensory matter by means of abstract forms of thought and intuition. The wisdom of God as the Creator has adapted the horizon of human experience to the individuality of things, and this structural plastic side of our experiential horizon belongs to the horizon of 'earthly' reality itself. It is a priori in the sense that it determines the experience of the variable individuality of things and alone makes it possible.

Remark on the so-called "universalia ante rem" in God's Mind.

The a priori horizon of human experience is thus the Divine order of the 'earthly' creation itself, in which man and all things have been given their structure and order in the cosmos.

Before the foundation of the world this order of the creation was present in God's plan 1. The Christian synthesis-philosophy 2 in patristic and scholastic thought has adapted this truth of revelation (which is beyond all human understanding) to Greek philosophy and changed it into the speculative ideas of a realistic metaphysics.

This turned the order of the creation into a lex aeterna founded in Divine reason. And the Divine principles of the creation became the universalia ante rem (in Divine reason) and in re (in temporal things). After all that we have had to say about this, it will be clear that we unconditionally reject such a metaphysics, because fundamentally it sets the Divine order of the creation aside to replace it by an absolutized reason.

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2 Translator's note: The author applies this term to a philosophy which tries to combine and reconcile non-Christian and Christian motives of thought.
The Epistemological Problem

The perspective structure of the horizon of experience. The dependence of our knowledge about the cosmos on our self-knowledge and on our knowledge of God.

The different levels of the *a priori* we have discovered in the structure of the horizon of human experience as the horizon of 'earthly' reality are not placed side by side in an arbitrary way. They are integrated into a perspective coherence in accordance with the Divine order of the creation. In the order among them, and in their coherence, they form the perspective in which we experience the cosmos.

All human experience, both in the pre-theoretical and in the theoretical attitudes, is rooted in the structure of the transcendent unity of self-consciousness. The latter partakes in the religious root of the creation directed to God, or, in the case of apostasy, directed away from God. This religious horizon is the transcendent horizon of the selfhood, and encompasses the *cosmic temporal horizon* in which we experience the insoluble coherence and the modal and typical refraction of meaning. The *temporal horizon* encompasses and determines the modal horizon both in its theoretical (analytical and synthetical) distinction and in its pre-theoretical systasis.

The temporal horizon encompasses and determines also the plastic horizon of the structures of individuality, which in its turn implies the modal horizon.

From this it follows that all temporal knowledge rests on a religious or pseudo-religious foundation, and is restricted and made relative by the temporal dimensions of the horizon of experience and of reality. For this reason we are the victims of an illusion, if we hypostatize the structure of human knowledge, or proclaim the human cognitive apparatus self-sufficient. For the transcendent horizon of the selfhood, radiating through all human experience perspectively, has no rest in itself, but only exists in the creaturely mode of *meaning, which is nothing in itself*, i.e. nothing apart from its reference to the Origin.

The religious meaning of the created world binds the true knowledge of the cosmos to true self-knowledge, and the latter to the true knowledge of God. This view has been explained in an unsurpassable and pregnant way in the first chapter of the

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1 This is the radical difference between the Christian view of self-knowledge as the condition of a radical critical knowledge of the world and Husserl's transcendental phenomenological egology. The latter makes
first book of Calvin's *Institutio*. It is the only purely Biblical view and the alpha and omega of any truly Christian epistemology. Theoretical truth, limited and relativized by the temporal horizon, is in every respect dependent on the full super-temporal Truth. If we hypostatize theoretical truth, it is turned into a lie. For there does not exist a self-sufficient partial truth. We cannot truthfully know the cosmos outside of the true knowledge of God. But like all human experience in this earthly dispensation, our knowledge of God, although directed to the absolute Truth, is also restricted and relativized by (but not at all to) our temporal cosmic existence.

The restriction of our human experience of the religious fulness of meaning by time is no restriction to time.

This means that in the Christian experience the religious fulness of meaning remains bound up with temporal reality. Every spiritualistic view which wants to separate self-knowledge and the knowledge of God from all that is temporal, runs counter to the Divine order of the creation. Such spiritualism inevitably leads to an internally empty idealism, or to a confused kind of mysticism, in spite of its own will or intentions.

In the order of this life — that of the life beyond is still hidden from us as to its positive nature — all human experience remains bound to a perspective horizon in which the transcendent light of eternity must force its way through time. In this horizon we become aware of the transcendent fulness of the meaning of this life only in the light of the Divine revelation refracted through the prism of time. For this reason Christ, as the fulness of God's Revelation, *came into the flesh*; and for this reason also the Divine Word-revelation came to us in the temporal garb of human language.

But if our experience were limited to our temporal functions of consciousness, or rather to an abstractum taken from our temporal complex of experiential functions, as is taught by the critical and the positivistic epistemologies, it would be impossible to have true knowledge of God, or of ourselves, or of the cosmos. And in the apostasy in which falsehood (and not truth) rules, we have no such knowledge. This also applies to the πρωτον ἑνδος the knowledge of God dependent on the phenomenological self-inter-pretation of the transcendental ego.
in which the entire epistemology of immanence-philosophy is founded. For it is based on the self-destructive hypostatizing of the theoretical synthesis of meaning, and on a fundamental misconception of the structure of human experience. In the transcendent religious subjective a priori of the cosmic self-consciousness the whole of human cognition is directed either to the absolute Truth, or to the spirit of falsehood. In this cosmic self-consciousness we are aware of temporal cosmic reality being related to the structure of the human selfhood qua talis.

In its universally valid law-conformity this structure is essentially the structure of a religious community into which the individual ego has been integrated. Any theoretical displacement of the human selfhood from this central position in experience is due to the lack of a radical philosophical self-reflexion.

But man cannot attain to true self-knowledge without true knowledge of God, which cannot be gained outside of the Divine Revelation in Christ.

At this point, many a reader who has taken the trouble to follow our argument will perhaps turn away annoyed. He will ask: Must epistemology end in a Christian sermon or in a dogmatic statement? I can only answer by means of the question as to whether the dogmatic statement with which the supposed autonomous epistemology opens, viz. the proclamation of the self-sufficiency of the human cognitive functions, has a better claim to our confidence as far as epistemology is concerned.

Our philosophy makes bold to accept the "stumbling block of the cross of Christ" as the corner stone of epistemology. And thus it also accepts the cross of scandal, neglect and dogmatic rejection. In the limitation and weakness of the flesh, we grasp the absolute truth in our knowledge of God derived from His revelation, in prayer and worship. This knowledge in the full sense of the word contains the religious principle and foundation of all true knowledge, and primarily has a religious enstatic character. It no more rests primarily on a theoretical meaning-synthesis than does the cosmic self-consciousness.

The knowledge about God in which religious self-knowledge is implied, is not primarily gained in a so-called theological way. That which is very inadequately called "theology", is a theoretical knowledge obtained in a synthesis of the logical function of thought and the temporal function of faith. It is a knowledge

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1 Cf. 1 Corinthians 1-23. The twentieth Century New Test. has: obstacle.
which itself is entirely dependent on the cosmonomic Idea from which the thinker starts. The true knowledge of God and of ourselves is concerned with the horizon of human experience and therefore also with that of theoretical knowledge. It rests on our trustful acceptance of Divine revelation in the indissoluble unity of both its cosmic-immanent sense and its transcendent-religious meaning; an acceptance with our full personality and with all our heart. It means a turning of the personality, a giving of life in the full sense of the word, a restoring of the subjective perspective of our experience, enabling us to grasp reality again perspectively in the light of Truth. This does not mean a kind of mystical supernatural cognitive function, but it refers to the horizon that God made for human experience in the cosmic order created by Him. The subjective perspective has been obfuscated by sin and distorted and closed to the light of the Divine Revelation.

True self-knowledge opens our eyes to the radical corruption of fallen man, to the radical lie which has caused his spiritual death. It therefore leads to a complete surrender to Him Who is the new root of mankind, and Who overcame death through his sufferings and death on the cross. In Christ's human nature our heavenly Father has revealed the fulness of meaning of all creation\(^1\), and through Him according to His Divine nature, God created all things as through the Word of his power\(^2\).

The primary lie obfuscating the horizon of human experience is the rebellious thought that man could do without this knowledge of God and of himself in any field of knowledge, and could find the ultimate criterion of truth in 'autonomous', i.e. absolutized theoretical thought.

The law-conformable structure of human experience in the transcendent horizon is originally a law of freedom.

The law-conformity of the structure of the horizon of human experience was maintained after the fall into sin, but the rebellious selfhood can no longer of itself acquire an insight into this structure. It supposes it can create the horizon of its experience from its own resources and has abused its religious freedom and delivered itself up to the bondage of darkness.

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\(^1\) Ephes. 1:10.

\(^2\) Hebr. 1:2, 3.
The Epistemological Problem

For the law-conformable structure of human experience, according to its transcendent dimension, is a law of freedom, which in its fulness of meaning determines all temporal dimensions of the horizon of experience.

When this fulness of human freedom was lost subjectively, through the fall into sin, the human selfhood fell away into the temporal horizon.

Insofar as it still sought for a fixed point of support, the human selfhood tried to hypostatize an abstract part of the temporal horizon to a transcendence that lacks the character of meaning. This is also the apostasy from the fulness of meaning of the Truth that alone makes all temporal truth possible.

The standing in the Truth as freedom in the transcendent horizon of experience.

Christ as the fulness of God’s Revelation is the Truth. Standing in the Truth, as the sharing in the fulness of meaning of the cosmos in Christ, is the indispensable pre-requisite for the insight into the full horizon of our experience.

This means that we have once and for all given up the illusion of possessing the norm of truth in our own fallen selfhood. We have arrived at the self-knowledge that outside of the light of Divine Revelation we stand in falsehood.

Any one who grasps this Divine Revelation with all his heart abides in the Truth. Abiding in the Truth frees our insight into the horizon of human experience from the prejudices of immanence-philosophy, and it also enables theoretical knowledge to be directed to the Truth. At the same time it cuts off at the root the overestimation of synthetic scientific knowledge, which remains bound within the temporal horizon.

The problem concerning the relation between reason and faith.

The knowledge about God, which transcends the temporal horizon in our selfhood, nevertheless remains bound to our temporal function of faith according to the Divine order of the creation.

The function of faith, as the leading terminal function in the entire process of disclosure within the temporal meaning-coherence, leads theoretical thought. For the concrete act of theoretical thinking necessarily includes its faith-aspect. The nominalistic separation between faith and reason is a patent
impossibility in the light of a Christian cosmological Idea, and always testifies to a lack of radical critical self-reflection in philosophic thought. Insofar as it is determined by the immanence-standpoint, it is to be understood as a hidden or an avowed hypostatizing of synthetical thought.

Of course the function of faith can no more than any other non-logical function be substituted for the logical aspect, which gives the act of theoretical thinking its typical qualification.

The modal meaning of the temporal function of faith is different from that of the logical function of thought. For this very reason the former can "lead" theoretical thought, and at the same time leave the sphere-sovereignty of the modal aspects intact.

§ 3 - THE PERSPECTIVE STRUCTURE OF TRUTH

The decisive battle against the idea of the religious neutrality of philosophy will have to be fought in the field of the problem of truth. This was already made clear in the Prolegomena to the philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea.

The neutrality postulate stands or falls with an Idea of truth which considers theoretical verity to be self-sufficient. But at all times the very problem of truth has proved to be the Achilles' heel of immanence-philosophy. As long as the only issue was the logical aspect of truth, with the formal criterion of the principium contradictionis, it seemed an easy task to refute relativism and scepticism. This logical self-refutation of every denial of an absolute truth has been sufficiently discussed in the Prolegomena.

But it is evident that nothing has been gained by this argument for the idea of a universally valid neutral philosophy. Even the question: 'What is to be understood by universally valid truth?' cannot be answered by logic alone. More than that: the logical criterion of truth owes its logical meaning exactly to the structure of the entire horizon of human experience in all its different levels. And this structure cannot possibly be grasped independently of a cosmological Idea. Up to now Christian philosophical thought which followed the paths of scholasticism has failed to produce a Christian Idea of truth of its own; — of course, I mean that the philosophical Idea of truth of this Christian thought has not really been fed by its Christian religious root. The synthesis with immanence-philosophy ultimately maintained the deep cleft between the revelation concerning the 'super-natural truth', on the one hand, and the theoretical criterion of 'natural'
truth, on the other. For scientific thought the latter was simply taken over from immanence-philosophy.

The synthesis in question could consequently not produce a truly Christian Idea of truth. Its highest aim was the accommodation of theoretical thought, as it was rooted in the immanence-standpoint, to the Scriptural revelation. But this accommodation was bound to detract from both. The true relation between Christian religion and Christian philosophy can only be an inner penetration of the latter by the former. The same relation must exist between the revealed fulness of Truth and the theoretical Idea of Truth.

Truth as the agreement between thought and being in realistic metaphysics.

As is generally known, the traditional realistic answer to the question "What is truth?", was: the agreement between thought and being, the "adaequatio intellectus et rei", as Thomas Aquinas formulated it.

In its scholastic formula this view goes back to Aristotle and is based on the confusion of the "Gegenstand" (ἀντικείμενον) with a real ‘thing in itself’ (substance). According to it, true knowledge is the pure conceptual form of the material substance which is primarily given to sensory perception and whose essential form is to be abstracted by the intellectus agens; in all true knowledge there exists a relation of adequacy between the conceptual form and the essential form of the ὁντία. True knowledge consists in an assimilation, an ὁμοιοσία, an adaptation of the active intellect to the real being on the basis of the innate faculty of the soul to receive a material image of the material substance through the senses. Actual knowledge is identical with the ῥητία. The Aristotelian homoioois, or the assimilation of realistic Scholastics, is the foundation of the adaequatio, i.e. the agreement between thought and being, as the essence of truth. By means of the vis cognitiva (the cognitive faculty) and the vis appetitiva (the faculty of desiring) the human soul can adapt itself to the ‘essence of things’.

This is why Thomas Aquinas calls the true and the good as transcendentalia: convenientia entis ad animam. He writes:

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1 Aristotle: De Anima, 418,3: τὸ ὁμοιοσίᾳ δύναμι ἐστιν οὖν τὸ ὁμοιοσίᾳ ἵνα ἐνθελέχθη, καθάπερ ἔρχεται. πάσης μὲν οὖν ὁμοιοσίᾳ ἐν, πεπονθῆς δ’ ἐμφαίνεται ἑπιστήμη.

2 Ibid. III, 430 a 19: Τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ ἐστιν ἡ καὶ ἐνάγχειν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι.
"Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum. Omnis autem cognitio perfectur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam... quae quidem correspondentio adaequatio rei et intellectus dicitur" 1.

It is not difficult to find the reason why ARISTOTLE and THOMAS AQUINAS accepted a "convenientia entis ad intellectum". That reason lay in their cosmonomic Idea, in their Idea of the world-order as a metaphysical-teleological rational order founded in the divine Nous. In this system truth is one of the primary "transcendental determinations" of that metaphysical being which is assumed to be of a "noumenal" character.

This traditional Idea of truth was called a mere "explanation of a name" by KANT. This is quite understandable. For him, just as for the whole of Humanistic philosophy, the teleological cosmonomic Idea of Aristotelian-Thomistic Scholastics had lost its meaning. That is why he observes:

"We are not concerned here in the explanation of the word truth according to which it is the agreement between knowledge and its object; this nominal definition is assumed as granted. But we want to know what is the universal and sure criterion of the truth of any and every knowledge" 2.

Has KANT's criterion of the transcendental truth really been brought to light by a religiously unprejudiced critique of knowledge? We know that it is not so. It is really KANT's typically dualistic-Humanistic cosmonomic Idea which is the basis of his critique of knowledge, and of his Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, as well as of his Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft.

The criterion of truth in KANT.

From his Humanistic cosmonomic Idea KANT puts the question how the adaequatio of thought and reality (as an "object", i.e. in KANT as a "Gegenstand") is possible.

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1 Quaestiones de Veritate. Qu. 1. art. 1c. [This word true expresses the agreement between the being and the intellect. Now all cognition arises from the assimilation of that which knows to the thing known... which correspondence is called an adequate correspondence between a thing and the intellect.]

2 Kr. d. r. V. (ed. cit.), p. 89: "Die Namenerklärung der Wahrheit, dass sie nämlich die Übereinstimmung der Erkenntnis mit ihrem Gegenstande sei, wird hier geschenkt und vorausgesetzt; man verlangt aber zu wissen, welches das allgemeine und sichere Kriterium der Wahrheit einer jeden Erkenntnis sei."
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In a typically nominalistic way he seeks the epistemological criterion of truth in the *a priori* synthetical activity of the transcendent-logical ego with respect to the sensory matter of experience as it is received in the pure forms of sensibility. Thus he not only restricts the meaning of truth to the *a priori* theoretical horizon, but also to the sensory phenomena.

What is, according to Kant, the guarantee of the correspondence between *a priori* human knowledge and "Gegenstände überhaupt"? This guarantee consists in the constitutive rôle of the *a priori* synthetical judgments with respect to objective experience. This *a priori* knowledge is the very transcendental condition of this experience, since it "contains nothing but that which is indispensable to the synthetical unity of experience in general". In this sense the synthetical judgments *a priori* are true *a priori*, i.e. strictly universally valid and necessary. Therefore Kant calls them the "Quell aller Wahrheit" (the source of all truth) before experience, although they are not themselves founded in experience.

"Empirical" truths, on the other hand, he calls relative. They are always involved in the process of theoretical cognition (i.e. "experience" in Kant) within the horizon of transcendental truth. This "experiential process", however, is directed towards an absolute ideal, an ultimate end which natural science will never attain, it is true, but from which the latter derives its real and final meaning. This ideal is the perfect "correspondence between the representations in the object". Kant has tried to define the horizon of theoretical truth on the basis of his cosmomonic Idea. He rightly rejected the supposedly transcentent, speculative metaphysical Idea of truth. It considered the adaequatio between thought and being as a metaphysical agreement between the conceptions of thought and the "things in themselves". From his critical immanence-standpoint Kant had, however, no insight into the true structure of the horizon of human experience; so the transcendental structure of theoretical truth was bound to remain hidden from him. His constructive nominalist criterion of truth founded in a Humanistic cosmomonic Idea was bound to lead to the denial of the possibility of other theoretical knowledge than that which is the aim of mathe-

1 "nichts weiter enthält, als was zur synthetischen Einheit der Erfahrung überhaupt notwendig ist."

2 "Übereinstimmung der Vorstellungen im Gegenstand".
in the Light of the Cosmological Idea

mathematics and mathematical natural science. But especially by
hypostatizing that which he called “transcendental truth” he
undermined every trans-subjective ground of the validity of
theoretical verity.

The phenomenological conception of the transcendental horizon of a priori theoretical truth.

In KANT the “transcendental subject” itself is the indubitable
immanent seat of transcendental truth.

But his view of the empirical ‘world’, as the objective correlate
of the ‘transcendental-logical ego’, was determined by the classical
Humanistic science-ideal, which in its mechanistic determinism
doubtless aimed at the elimination of human subjectivity.
This caused an inner antinomy in KANT’s conception of the
horizon of theoretical truth. His epistemology works with un-
clarified presuppositions which do not agree with his transcendental subjectivism. And the practical metaphysics of his criti-
que of practical reason caused him to restrict the horizon of
theoretical truth to an ‘empirical-sensible world’, which in prin-
ciple was conceived in an objectivistic manner, notwithstanding
his conception of its transcendental constitution by the thinking
ego.

His faith in the self-sufficiency of a non-intuitive transcen-
dental analysis of the ‘sources of human knowledge’ was the
reason why he supposed that the a priori forms of sensibility and
understanding, and the original synthesis of the ‘cogito’ were
immediately accessible to transcendental thought.

In modern phenomenology the situation is fundamentally
different. In his last unfinished work Die Crisis der Europäischen
Wissenschaften und die transcendente Phänomenologie, pub-
lished after his death in 1954, HUSSERL charges KANT’s transcen-
dental subjectivism with a lack of radicalism. According to him
genuine transcendentalism is the radical opposite of ‘objecti-
vism’ as the general meaning of the scientific ideal that all
pre-phenomenological thinkers strove for. KANT failed to make
the hidden transcendental dimension of consciousness accessible
to immediate experience, to grasp it in the view of eidetic intu-
tion.

This is why HUSSERL calls the Kantian a priori forms of sensi-

\footnote{Op. cit., p. 103 ff.}
Hility and understanding ‘mythical constructions’\textsuperscript{1}. That which \textsc{kant} still considered to be unproblematical, viz. the accessibility of transcendental truth to the cognitive selfhood in its transcendental reflection, has become the very basic problem of \textsc{husserl}'s phenomenology.

In radical transcendental subjectivism all constitutive forms of possible being must be made into ‘phenomena’, into the immanent intentional contents of the constitutive acts of the transcendental ego, conceived of in the phenomenological reduction, and made accessible to pure experience through an eidetic intuition. So the transcendental horizon of \textit{a priori} theoretical verity becomes in truth ‘universal’, encompassing the universe of essential truths valid as to the essential correlation between the transcendental ego and all its possible ‘worlds’. \textsc{husserl} emphatically remarks that the universal transcendental synthesis of the ego, as a hidden or ‘anonymous’ \textit{a priori} act of consciousness made immediately visible by phenomenological analysis, also constitutes the whole world of pre-theoretical experience\textsuperscript{2}. This is to say that the theoretical phenomenological horizon of \textit{a priori} truth encompasses all dimensions of human experience. Consequently it also embraces the religious dimension which in this way loses its transcendent character and is denatured into an immanent horizon of intentional phenomena, constituted by a synthesis of the transcendental ego.

Transcendental truth is now conceived as the adaequatio (in the sense of “coalescence”) of the intended in the phenomenologically reduced act, with that which has been immediately given in the \textit{a priori} intuition of the essence\textsuperscript{3}. The hypostatizing of the horizon of the transcendent theoretical truth occurs in even a sharper form in \textsc{husserl} than in \textsc{kant}, because of the all-

\textsuperscript{1} Cf. \textit{Die Crisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften}, § 30: “Der Mangel einer anschaulich-aufweisenden Methode als Grund für die mythischen Konstruktionen Kants.” [The lack of an intuitively detective method as a foundation for the mythical constructions of \textsc{kant}.

\textsuperscript{2} Op. cit., p. 114 (§ 29): “Die Lebenswelt ist erschliessbar als ein Reich ‘anonym’ gebliebener subjektiver Phänomene.” [The world of daily life can be disclosed as a realm of subjective phenomena that have remained ‘anonym’.

\textsuperscript{3} Cf. \textsc{scheier}, \textit{Der Formalismus in der Ethik} (3rd edition), p. 46: “In der Deckung von “Gemeintem” und “Gegebenem” wird uns der Gehalt der phänomenologischen Erfahrung allein kund.” [Only in the coalescence of the intended and the given, can we become aware of the content of phenomenological experience.]
embracing character of the phenomenological horizon, according to Husserl's conception.

The perspective structure of truth.

The definition of truth as “adaequatio intellectus et rei” was not taken exception to by Kant. But it was oriented to the hypo-
stasis of theoretical thought, characteristic of all varieties of immanence-philosophy, no matter whether they are of a specu-
lative-metaphysical, a critical, or a phenomenological nature.

In the light of the Christian cosmonomic Idea it is not mean-
gless to inquire into the a priori structure of truth in connection
with the horizon of human experience. But then this structure
must be conceived in its full richness, which is only possible
theoretically in the Christian Idea of verity. This Idea is direc-
ted to the fulness of the meaning of Truth. In the meaning-
structure of the horizon of human experience truth will prove
to have the same perspective character as this horizon. The
a priori structure of truth cannot be understood from the abso-
lutized (and therefore misinterpreted) theoretical-synthetical
horizon. It can only be approached from the transcendent hori-
zon made transparent by the religious fulness of meaning of
the Divine Revelation.

From this Revelation the light of truth shines forth through
the temporal horizon into human experience, and into human
theoretical knowledge. The religious fulness of Truth also liberates the horizon of human experience: “The truth shall
make you free” 1. The transcendent, religious fulness of Truth,
which alone makes all truth within the temporal horizon possible,
does not concern an abstract theoretical function of thought. It
is concerned with our full selfhood, with the heart of the whole
of human existence, consequently also the centre of our theore-
tical thought.

The meaning of the word truth in Holy Scripture.

My colleague Prof. Vollenhoven has informed me that he has
instituted an investigation into the meaning of the word “Truth”
in Holy Scripture and has come to the surprising conclusion
that, in the majority of cases, it means steadfastness, certainty,
reliability.

In my opinion this gives the expression “stand in the truth”

1 St. John 8, 32.
The Epistemological Problem

is full, pregnant meaning. The truthful a priori attitude of thought has for its primary pre-requisite the standing of the thinking selfhood in the Truth, because of our heart’s accepting Divine Revelation.

The latter enters our temporal horizon only through our function of faith, our full confidence in the reliability of God’s Word. God is the origin and source of all truth. Christ, as the perfect Revelation of God, is the fulness of the meaning of Truth. Apart from this transcendent fulness of Truth, the a priori temporal dimensions of truth have no meaning, no validity. Only its transcendent religious dimension, which touches the heart, lends to all temporal truth its stability, and certitude. The “standing in the Truth” directs our subjective insight into the temporal horizon. I do not deny at all that sin again and again obfuscates the Christian’s insight. Nor do I deny that many thinkers who start from a non-Christian attitude have discovered relatively true states of affairs within the temporal horizon. But there is one thing that a truly Christian philosophy should never doubt, viz. that all relative truths, within the temporal horizon, are only true in the fulness of Verity, revealed by God in Christ. Any hypostatizing, i.e. any absolutizing of that which is relative, turns truth into falsehood.

Even the judgment: $2 \times 2 = 4$ becomes an untruth, if the law-conformable state of affairs, expressed in it, is detached from the temporal world-order and from the sovereignty of God as the Creator. It becomes an untruth, if it is absolutized into a “truth in itself” (“Wahrheit an sich”). Creaturely reality itself has a perspective horizon which mocks at any absolutizing of its temporal structure. A superficial (essentially apostate) resting in a temporal horizon of experience that is supposed to be firm in itself, is contrary to truth, contrary to the structure of our selfhood. Any one in the apostate attitude who clings to the temporal horizon in the supposition that it is self-sufficient, clings to a Fata Morgana.

The whole of my book is intended to illustrate my fundamental thesis that the Christian Idea of truth can and should permeate scientific thought from root to crown. The idea of a Christian pursuit of science is something quite different from an edifying confession of faith which leaves the immanent course of scientific investigation untouched.
The *a priori* temporal dimensions of truth.

Descending to the temporal horizon of truth we find its essentially transcendental *a priori* structural dimension, to which the theoretical Idea of truth also belongs. The question arises: Cannot we at least say that transcendental verity consists in an "adaequatio intellectus et rei"? In the light of our cosmonomic Idea we must answer: No, we cannot. For the definition intended by this traditional formula, viz. the accordance of thought with reality, remains founded in a false Idea. It implies that thought, in its transcendental *a priori* function, transcends the reality enclosed within the temporal horizon. But from the truly transcendent horizon of truth we know that our logical function of thought can only have meaning and existence in the temporal meaning-coherence.

It appears that the logical law-sphere has its *a priori* modal horizon, just like all other law-spheres: They are all interrelated and interwoven in the temporal horizon. Therefore I will give another description of the transcendental *a priori* structural level of truth, which is oriented to the Christian cosmonomic Idea:

According to its transcendental *a priori* dimension truth is: *the accordance between the subjective *a priori* knowledge enclosed by the temporal horizon, as expressed in *a priori* judgments, and the *a priori* structural laws of human experience within this temporal horizon. The latter is open (as to its law- and subject-sides) to the light of the transcendent Truth in Christ.*

In this description, comprising both the pre-theoretical and the theoretical dimensions of transcendental truth, two things are of primary importance.

In the first place the insight that within the transcendental temporal horizon truth (according to its *a priori* structure) is always dependent on a normative relation between our subjective cognition and its *a priori* structural laws. Not a single subjective, transcendental *a priori* in itself can be a guarantee of truth and universal validity.

In the second place the transcendental structure of truth is *not self-sufficient* and only finds its pure expression in the openness of the temporal horizon to the transcendent light of the Divine revelation. In contrast to Kant's transcendental-idealist view, we now see that universally-valid, transcendental truth is not guaranteed by subjective synthetical judgments *a priori.*

The "transcendental subject" is not the "law-giver" of experience, nor the origin of the transcendental dimension of truth.
The Epistemological Problem

It is true that the transcendental structure of human self-consciousness has a super-arbitrary law-conformable character. But within this temporal structure is maintained the transcendental subjective freedom of human self-consciousness. And hence it remains possible for the latter to misinterpret the a priori horizon of experience. In other words, the law-conformable structure is no guarantee for the correctness of our a priori subjective insight. A false a priori insight also remains within the transcendental structure of human experience and is only possible in this structure. The entire Kantian view of transcendental truth as the universally valid, necessary a priori in human experience, labours under a basic epistemological defect. It dogmatically ignores the problem of the subjective access to the transcendental a priori of human experience.

The a priori structure of experience is then confounded with a specific subjective a priori synthesis. No further account is given of the meaning-structure of the latter.

Since the fundamental fallibility of our subjective epistemological insight is not taken into account, the subjective, constructive-idealist insight into the transcendental horizon of experience is forced on us as the universally valid criterion of truth.

But we have shown that philosophical insight into the transcendental, temporal horizon (and therefore into the transcendental a priori dimension of truth) is absolutely dependent on the investigator's Archimedean point. In order to gain a true insight into this horizon, it is necessary for us to give up the apostate immanence-standpoint altogether. A philosopher is unable to relinquish this standpoint, however, so long as his heart has not been conquered by the Divine Truth revealed to us in Christ. Then the transcendental horizon of his experience is opened and liberated from the prejudices of immanence-philosophy. No compromise with this fundamental truth is possible in Christian philosophical thought. Too often such a compromise has been attempted, but this basic truth must be accepted in full. The same thing applies to the immanence-standpoint. This does not bear a compromise either. It must be rejected or accepted in its entirety. Any demand for logical, incontrovertible proof of this thesis would only show that the nature of truth, or the meaning of logical demonstration, is not clear to the questioner.

Immanence-philosophy insofar as it maintained its scientific character has up to now assumed that a philosophical thought which appeals to Revelation, can be safely laid aside as unscien-
tific. The dogmatic argument was that philosophy is not a question of faith, but a strictly scientific affair.

The philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea, however, makes it impossible to maintain the self-sufficiency of philosophic thought as a scientific postulate. In the future immanence-philosophy will have to become aware of the subjective character of its own cosmonomic Idea. The new problems raised by our philosophy will have to be seriously considered on the immanence-standpoint. If this should be thought unnecessary, there would be no possibility for immanence-philosophy to answer the charge of dogmatism made against it on account of its neutrality-postulate.

It would be a dogmatism in the sense of a philosophical attitude which refuses to reflect on its deepest foundations.

The Idea of transcendental-theoretical truth.

The transcendental structure of truth is not identical with that of theoretical truth. The latter may be defined, in relation to the modal horizon, as: the correspondence of the subjective a priori meaning-synthesis as to its intentional meaning with the modal structure of the “Gegenstand” of theoretical thought. This synthesis is actual in our a priori theoretical insight, and is expressed in theoretical a priori judgments. The modal “Gegenstand” is included in its all-sided inter-modal coherence within the temporal horizon. This coherence exists both in the foundational and in the transcendental direction of time and is dependent on the transcendent fulness of the meaning of Truth.

This somewhat lengthy description is indispensable, if we do not wish to omit a single moment in the transcendental structure of theoretical truth. In our definition the theoretical Idea of truth finds real expression in relation to the modal horizon of our experience.

Kant's “Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes” (principles of pure understanding) cannot hit off the truly transcendental structure of theoretical truth. This is already impossible because they are not oriented to the transcendental direction of time. In a functionalistic way they isolate two aspects of the theoretical horizon of experience in rigid forms which, in their absolutization, have been abstracted from the transcendental meaning-coherence of our temporal horizon.
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The criterion of transcendental theoretical truth in this Idea of verity.

It is now necessary to enter into details about the importance of this transcendental Idea of truth (as related to the modal horizon of our experience), and trace its bearing on scientific thought. This Idea has been made use of in all that has up to now been said in the theory of the modal law-spheres. We have seen that it must result in a fundamentally new method of forming modally defined basic concepts, which has also to lay the foundation for special scientific thought.

We shall now give a special account of the a priori criterion of theoretical truth, indicated by this Idea.

In special science the problem of the criterion of scientific truth has been obscured by the contrast between "a priori" and "empirical" sciences. This makes the impression that the different special sciences handle entirely different criteria of truth. The mathematician supposes he can be an intuitionist, a conventionalist or a logicist as to theoretical truth; the positivist historian, or the empirical psychologist hold to "empiricism"; physical scientists put their faith either in a pragmatical or in a "realist" conception of truth; logic may handle a formalistic or an intuitionist view of verity, etc. With regard to aesthetics, ethics and theology (in so far as these are not merged into "empirical sciences" like sociology, psychology or history) the situation is hopeless from a positivist viewpoint, since positivism denies in principle that it is meaningful to speak of truth with respect to 'normative judgments', or even denies the possibility of real judgments implying 'values'. It must be stated that there is a general lack of a transcendental criterion in these conceptions of verity.

We have seen that no single special science is possible without an a priori theoretical synthesis of meaning, in which the modal horizon of the law-sphere forming the "Gegenstand" has been intended theoretically. Even if a special scientist does not critically take account of this subjective a priori synthesis, he must handle it implicitly. Otherwise he is unable to conduct investigations in the domain of his special science. Mathematics in itself cannot fix the modal horizon of the physical law-sphere theoretically. Neither can ethics define the horizon of the juridical aspect, or psychology that of the aesthetic sphere. As to the a priori theoretical foundations of all special sciences whose field of research is delimited by a particular aspect of experience, one and the same criterion of theoretical truth is valid: the accor-
dance between our subjective *a priori* meaning-synthesis and the modal structure of the "*Gegenstand*", in the all-sided coherence of the temporal horizon of our experience, and in relation to the religious fulness of Truth.

The demand that the *a priori* theoretical insight shall be justifiable in the forum of the Divine world-order.

Any theoretical judgment which ignores the modal horizon of its "*Gegenstand*" and denies the specific modal sphere-sovereignty of the aspects within the temporal horizon, is false *a priori*. Any theoretical judgment is false *a priori* if in principle it denies the all-sided temporal meaning-coherence of the "*Gegenstand*" in the specific synthesis of meaning. Any theoretical judgment in which a relative *a priori* theoretical truth is absolutized to "Truth in itself" ("Wahrheit an sich"), is false. Any theoretical judgment in which the process of disclosure in our modal horizon of experience is implicitly or explicitly denied, and in which theoretical thought is assumed to be independent of the transcendental fulness of Truth, is false.

Not only the so-called *a posteriori* theoretical insights must be justified, viz. in a process of factual theoretical experience. But the transcendental insights must also vindicate their claim to relative truth, viz. in a process of transcendental experience in the forum of the Divine world-order. For in the latter are founded the structural states of affairs which are undeniable when they have been laid bare to theoretical insight. It may be that no true philosophical insight can be gained into the Divine world-order, if our cognitive self-hood does not abide in the full religious Truth of Divine Word-Revelation. But the structural states of affairs founded in this order urge themselves upon everyone who is seriously confronted with them.

This does not, however, detract from the fact that our theoretical Idea of truth is dependent on our Christian cosmonomic Idea, just as the conception of theoretical truth in immanence-philosophy is based on an other cosmonomic Idea.

Only the acceptance of the perspective structure of truth can break the spell of subjectivism in philosophic insight.

But it will be objected that the structure of theoretical truth cannot be dependent on our subjective insight. My answer is that it is not dependent on this insight in the sense of being deter-
mined by it or subjected to it. But without my subjective insight into theoretical truth, its structure will remain hidden from my cognitive selfhood. No philosophy can do without a subjective Idea of truth. Our subjective insight itself functions in the full structure of our horizon of experience and theoretical truth is meaningless without its relation to our cosmological self-consciousness. As soon as we touch this very point, the perspective structure of truth shows its full pregnancy. At the same time it becomes clear that the Idea of truth of immanence-philosophy nowhere rises above subjectivism.

It is according to the Divine order of the creation that the structure of verity is of a perspective character. In its transcendental fulness of meaning it seizes our selfhood, or it is rejected by the latter. Only in our religious standing in the Truth is the spell of apostate subjectivism broken. From the transcendent horizon, liberated by Christ, the light of Truth can shine through our temporal horizon, and reveal the transcendental theoretical verity to our subjective insight.

Immanence philosophy, however, remains under the spell cast by apostate theoretical thought. It lacks the firm ground of truth, because it does not come from the Verity, it does not stand in the Truth. Its Idea of truth in its subjectivity is not rooted in the fulness of Verity. Nowhere is immanence-philosophy more subjectivistic than in the hypostatizing of its Idea of verity to the absolute super-temporal Truth. This hypostatization acquires its most fascinating and deceitful form when, as a 'super-temporal value' or Idea, it is considered to be even absolutely independent of subjective theoretical thought.

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In the light of the full revealed Truth the Idea of the transcendental theoretical truth confronts our cognitive process with an enormous task. In the temporal horizon this task can never be completed. It does not permit theoretical thought to become rigid; it does not allow us to rest in temporal meaning, in a supposedly absolute theoretical "form of truth".

The transcendental horizon of theoretical truth itself is by no means rigid, but exists in the restless mode of meaning. This meaning can nowhere be shut off from its Origin and made into something firm and self-sufficient in itself.

The Idea of the modal universality of the aspects of experience
within their own spheres is conceived in the perspective nature of the transcendental structure of truth.

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The accordance with the principium exclusae antinomiae as the primary criterion of transcendental theoretical truth.

Our a priori theoretical insight must be justified in the process of the modal analysis and synthesis of meaning in the forum of the Divine world-order. This order passes judgment on theoretical thought by entangling it in internal antinomies at every infringement on the modal sphere-sovereignty of the aspects within the transcendental temporal horizon. The conformance of the results of our transcendental inquiry to the principium exclusae antinomiae proved to be an eminently suitable criterion of transcendental theoretical truth. The logical test of the principium contradictionis appeared to be only a dependent aspect of the cosmological criterion. The truly synthetical antinomy is always the result of a theoretical misconception of the modal horizon of our experience, and of the misinterpretation of the cosmic coherence of the modal aspects within the temporal horizon. It reveals a deviation from the transcendental truth in our theoretical insight.

Antinomy appeared to vitiate immanence-philosophy to its very root, it vitiates semi-Christian synthesis-philosophy to a still higher degree. This is a criterion of the transcendental untruth of both of them.

The second criterion of transcendental theoretical truth.

The transcendental theoretical dimension of verity has a second criterion: Philosophic theory must enable us to give an account of the structure of temporal reality given in naïve experience. This cannot be done by any philosophy that absolutizes the theoretical meaning-synthesis and functionalistically spirits away the plastic structure of reality in the continuous, uninterrupted meaning-coherence of the temporal horizon. The transcendental theoretical dimension of truth remains bound to its pre-theoretical transcendental dimension in the temporal horizon, and to the modal horizon and the plastic horizon encompassed by the latter.

Theoretical thought should not explain away the pre-theoretical datum in the meaning-systasis of the horizon of expe-
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trench. If it does so, it contradicts transcendental theoretical truth, which, as we know, does not exist in itself ("an sich"). It is contrary to transcendental theoretical truth, e.g., if the internal individuality-structure of the state, as an organized community of a typical character, is identified with the theoretical functional system of the legal norms (cf. Kelsen's pure theory of law).

The current epistemological conception of naïve experience as a naïve-realist copy-theory is also in conflict with transcendental theoretical verity. Any metaphysical tearing asunder of the temporal horizon of reality into the realm of phenomena and that of noumena, contradicts transcendental theoretical truth. For all these *a priori* theoretical views start from a fundamental denial of the plastic horizon of human experience without which no human experience of concrete reality is possible. So it appears that every description of the transcendental truth as the universally valid, the necessary, and that which alone makes experience possible, is no better than a nominal definition of this dimension of verity. Critical epistemology lays great emphasis on the words "universal *a priori* validity and necessity". Thus it wants to bring home to us the absoluteness of its view of theoretical truth. But any one who has assimilated the critical attitude of thought required by the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea, can no longer be blindfolded by these words. The subjectivist *a priorism* of critical transcendental-idealistic and phenomenological immanence-philosophy is based on a primary hypostasis of the subjective theoretical meaning-synthesis. It is incompatible with the truly critical demand to subject the *a priori* subjective insight into the transcendental theoretical horizon to the *process of justification* in the court of the Divine world-order. Its self-sufficient 'transcendental ego', with its supposed constitutive original *a priori* synthesis, is nothing but a 'mythological construction', a critical disguise of the dogma concerning the autonomy of theoretical reason. It is to be made visible as a disguise by means of a truly radical transcendental critique of its dogmatic presuppositions.

The dynamical character of so-called experimental truth in the theoretical process of the disclosure of temporal reality.

The transcendental structure of truth has a dynamic meaning-character which restlessly refers outside itself to the transcendent dimension of human experience. Its theoretical transcendental
A natural scientific theory, it is said, must demonstrate its truth by means of experiments. Now it is undeniable that an experiment appeals to the sensory aspect of our experience. Can we therefore say that the experimental criterion of truth, in mathematical-natural science is to be found in the correspondence of our theoretical concepts with some concrete natural reality in itself ("an sich"), as it is depicted in the sensory impressions? Certainly not. There is no such thing as a "natural reality in itself". And the pre-psychical aspects of reality cannot be depicted in the sensory image of perception. This has been proved in our discussion of the modal subject-object relation. What then? Should one interpret an experiment, in Kant's 'critical' way, as a purely sensory datum received in the forms of space and time, and apperceived in the synthetical unity of apperception by means of a schematism of the categories of understanding?

This interpretation of the meaning of an experiment is contrary to transcendental truth, as has been explained in great detail in an earlier context. There is nothing that can be called a
"purely sensory" datum. But what I wish to emphasize is this: the objective sensory aspect of our experience to which an experiment in its theoretical intention makes appeal, must itself first be disclosed by theoretical thought. Its meaning must be deepened, if it is to be called in as a witness in the process of justification of a scientific hypothesis. In this theoretical disclosure the sensory object-side of empirical reality itself is deepened. Or does not naïve pre-theoretical experience have a sensory object-side? Why then cannot a scientific experiment simply appeal to this sensory object-side of experience which has not been theoretically opened? Because the sensory aspect as long as it has not been disclosed theoretically does not yet have anything to say to theory. We measure temperatures and gas-pressure; we investigate theoretically abstracted physical and biological micro-events with the aid of scientifically constructed instruments. In this way we make objectively visible that which was not yet objectively visible in pre-theoretical experience. Thus we theoretically open the sensory aspect of the full temporal reality by means of its modal deepening of meaning.

And in this process we at the same time open naïve experience theoretically, and we do not demolish it. The theoretical disclosure of the objective sensory aspect of reality pre-supposes the theoretical disclosure of the pre-psychical aspects. The latter objectify themselves in the theoretically deepened perceptive picture (analogically). The process of theoretical disclosure of temporal reality is only possible in the cadre of the Divine world-order. This order mocks at the Humanistic postulate of the self-sufficiency and sovereignty of theoretical thought. An apostate former of history can really form the development of civilization only insofar as in actual practice he capitulates to this world-order, which he does not recognize subjectively. An apostate scientist can only disclose reality theoretically, and discover relative theoretical truths, insofar as he again and again capitulates to the temporal Divine order. This is true, although the apostate scientist supposes he can exclude this Divine order from his vision.

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1 I deliberately say: "theoretically abstracted physical and biological events" to express that in this case the theoretically opened physical and biotic aspects of reality are concerned.
§ 4 - THE INDIVIDUALITY OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE IN SCHELER'S
PHENOMENOLOGY.

When we examined the perspective structure of the horizon of human experience, we referred to the plastic horizon of structural individuality. The *structure* of individuality, of course, is not individuality itself. In epistemology it is necessary also to discuss the individuality of human experience. We put in the foreground that Kantian and neo-Kantian epistemology have fundamentally failed in their discussion of this side of the epistemological problem. For they have dogmatically qualified the individuality of experiential activity as a psychological matter which did not concern epistemology as such. This prejudice must be traced to its religious root.

In the first place transcendental theoretical truth was emancipated from the religious horizon of experience. This supposed emancipation resulted in the hypostasis of the so-called transcendental consciousness to the (super-individual) subject proper of theoretical knowledge. Together with the really cosmic self-consciousness, the *actual* cognitive activity was eliminated from epistemology, and with the actual cognitive activity also the individuality, inherent in the subject-side of all our experience, as well as in the subjectivity of our theoretical knowledge. The *factual* subjectivity of the actual insight into the transcendental horizon of our experience had to be camouflaged. For it implied fallibility, and was, consequently, an obstacle to transcendental idealism, which proclaimed the “universal validity”, necessity and self-sufficiency of its subjectivist construction of the transcendental horizon of experience. Then psychology was entrusted with the task of examining the subjectivity of actual insight. As an “empirical science” psychology was not able to endanger the “*a priori* epistemology” of transcendental idealism. Suppose, this psychology should make bold to raise a doubt of the ‘critical’ construction of the “transcendental consciousness”! Then it could be put in its place with the ‘critical’ statement that this doubt was a betrayal of its own “transcendental foundations”. On the immanence-standpoint the subjectivist *a priorism* of the rationalist Kantian epistemology had to be outbid by an irrationalist *a priori* view of the experiential horizon, if subjective actuality in *a priori* experience was to be accorded a place worthy of its importance.

Husserl’s phenomenology with its “adequate intuition of essences” proclaimed itself the philosophical basic science which
was also to found epistemology. It placed the "acts of consciousness" ("Bewusstseinsakte"), with their intentional content, in the centre of investigation. And in advance it guarded itself from every psychologist misinterpretation of its method of inquiry on the part of Kantian epistemology. But, after all, HUSSERL only substituted the Kantian construction of the "transcendental logical ego" by the phenomenological construction of the "pure actual I" ("reines aktuelles Ich") with its intentional acts of consciousness. This "pure I" was a residue of the methodical "destruction of the world" ("Weltvernichtung"). And in this phenomenologically conceived "transcendental consciousness" there was no room left for true individuality either.

It is true that in his Cartesianische Meditationen HUSSERL accepts a monadic conception of the transcendental ego which in its pure intentional acts has to constitute the 'world' as well as its 'alter-egos' and their 'worlds'. This is to say that he follows DESCARTES in his initial solipsistic self-reflection. But this by no means implies an abandonment of the rationalist conception of phenomenology, no more than the Cartesian solipsist self-reflection turns into an irrationalist hypostatizing of subjective individuality. HUSSERL's monadic conception of the ego and its alter-egos is taken from LEIBNIZ, whose monadology was of a strongly rationalist character. In Cartesianism the solipsist isolation of the monadic ego is broken through by the 'universally valid' character of the innate ideas. In an analogous way it is broken through in HUSSERL's phenomenology by the 'universally valid' character of the constitutive syntheses of the transcendental ego which is abstracted from any individuality by means of the phenomenological reductions.

SCHELER'S theory concerning the individuality of absolute truth as "truth of personal validity" ("personalgültige Wahrheit").

In the phenomenological circle SCHELER was the first to break radically with the hypostatizing of the "transcendental universally valid consciousness" to the absolute experiential subject, the "unconditional" ("unbedingte") subject of knowledge.

1 OSWALD SPENGLER, also influenced by DILTHEY, breaks much more radically with the construction of the universally valid epistemological subject from his irrationalistic-historical standpoint. This is nothing remarkable in itself, since SPENGLER has nothing to do with transcendental
in the Light of the Cosmological Idea

His thesis was that every individual person has his own individual cosmos in which he has conscious experience of himself. The absolute truth about the cosmos necessarily bears an individual, personal character, so that it must have a different content to each separate personality. These thoughts made an almost revolutionary impression. Scheler rejected the neo-Kantian criticism beforehand, which objected that with this personalistic view of the actual self-consciousness and of absolute truth, he was moving in subjectivistic and sceptical paths. He reproaches inversely the critical transcendental philosophy with a subjectivistic falsification of truth, reality and the "Gegenstand". For it is bound to sublimate the totality of the cosmos to a subjective Idea of reason, and it denatures the "Gegenstand" to a necessary and universally valid synthesis of representations, whose determining form has been created by the subject itself.

Scheler himself holds to the phenomenological view of a transcendental intentional consciousness, but he is aware that the cognitive personality is not contained in it. This merely intentional transcendental consciousness only gives us the "Gegenstand" as a supposed or intentional one. Here the cosmos itself has not been actually given us. A purely intentional world lacks "Selbstgegebenheit".

The full "essence" of personality, experiencing itself consciously only in "spiritual acts", is sharply to be distinguished from the merely "psychical I". It comprises the full spiritual individuality.


In his philosophy of historical life he lapses into a perfect relativism, and epistemological scepticism. For, unlike Scheler, he does not believe in the constancy of the "a priori essential structures adequately given in the intuition of their essence".

Cf. op. cit., p. 227: "Und deshalb gibt es so viele Welte als es Menschen und Kulturen gibt, und im Dasein jedes einzelnen ist die vermeintlich selbständige und ewige Welt — die jeder mit dem andern gemein zu haben glaubt — ein immer neues, einmaliges, wie sich wiederholendes Erlebnis." [And, therefore there are as many worlds as there are men and cultures. In the life of each individual the supposedly single, independent and eternal world — which every one of them thinks he shares with the others — is an experience that is always new and unique, as if it were repeating itself for ever.]

1 Der Formalismus in der Ethik, etc., p. 408 ff.

2 According to Kant the cosmos as 'universe' has not been given to the transcendental consciousness; it is only an Idea, a theoretical limiting concept.
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I subjoin an extensive quotation from Scheler:

"As an example I will take only one of any person's concrete acts. In this act are implied all possible act-essentials and in its objective correlate are implied all the essential world-factors. So, e.g.: I-ness, individual I, all the essential constitutive elements of psychical life; equally extra-mental being, spatiality, temporality, the bodily phenomenon, thing-ness, working, etc. All these components together show a law-conformable structure which is valid for all possible persons and all possible acts of every person without any exception, and not only for the actual world but for all possible worlds. In addition, however, the above-mentioned act implies a final peculiarity inconceivable by means of essential concepts referring to universal truths. It is an original essential trait, only characteristic of the 'world' of this particular individual, and of no other. But the fact of its existence is not empirically met with. Nor is it this a priori individual essence itself. Rather it is still a universal essential characteristic of all possible worlds. Let us therefore reduce all that a concrete person has been 'given' to the essential phenomena that have actually been given him in pure self-evidence, i.e. to facts that are purely what they are. "In this reduction all still abstract qualities, forms, intentional directions and all that is in any way separable in the acts enter into the phenomenological datum-sphere in respect to the pure and formless act of the person. Then here alone we retain an absolutely existing world, and we find ourselves in the sphere of the "Sache an sich".

And conversely, so long as there exists one single world for different individual persons which nevertheless is considered to be both actually given in "self-evidence" and "absolute", the uniqueness and sameness of this world is necessarily an illusion.

In fact, only the objective spheres are given whose existence is related to some kind of bearer of a concrete personality (e.g., a living being, a human being, a race).

Or, we had rather say "the world", i.e. the one concrete world, has been given, comprising all concrete worlds — however, it is not given as actual but merely as "intended". This means that in this case "the world" becomes a mere "Idea" in the Kantian sense (but not with his reality sign before it). For Kant supposed he could reduce the essence of "the world" itself to an "Idea". But the world is not an "Idea" at all. It is an absolute being, everywhere concrete and individual. The intention directed to this world becomes an Idea that is in principle incapable of fulfilment, only insofar as we want it to be "given" to any plurality of individual persons and moreover to be given as "actual". It also becomes only an Idea, so long as we suppose we can make the "universal validity" of the establishing and determining of its being and content by means of general concepts and sentences, the pre-requisite of its existence and of that of any kind of existence. For such a determination of the world is essentially never possible 1.

1 Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik, etc., pp. 408/9: "Nehme ich
In this view of Scheler's we are struck by the remarkable individualization and personalization of the Husserlian transcendental (phenomenological) consciousness. Great emphasis is

von einer beliebigen Person nur einen ihrer konkreten Akte, so enthält dieser Aktus nicht nur alle möglichen Aktwesen in sich, sondern sein gegenständliches Korrelat enthält auch alle wesenhaften Weltfaktoren in sich, z.B. Ichkeit, individuelles Ich, alle wesenhaften Konstituenten des Psychischen, desgleichen Auszerweltlichkeit, Räumlichkeit, Zeitlichkeit, Leibphänomen, Dinglichkeit, Wirken usw. usw. Und dies nach einem a priorisch gesetzmäßigen Aufbau, der ohne Ansehung des besonderen Falles für alle möglichen Personen und alle möglichen Akte jeder Person gilt und nicht nur für die wirkliche Welt, sondern für alle möglichen Welten. Ausserdem aber enthält er auch noch ein letztes Eigenartiges, in Wesensbegriffe die auf allgemeine Wahrheiten gehen, nie Faszbares, einen originalen Wesenszug, der nur und nur der “Welt” dieser Person und keiner anderen eignet. Der Tatbestand aber, dass dies sei, ist nicht ein empirisch vorgefundener, und ebensowenig ist er dieses individuelle apriorische Wesen selbst; er ist vielmehr selbst noch ein allgemeiner Wesenszug aller nur möglichen Welten. Reduzieren wir also alles, was einer konkreten Person überhaupt “gegeben ist, auf die phänomenalen Wesenheiten, die ihr rein selbst gegeben sind, d.h. auf Tatsachen, die vorkommen sind, was sie sind — so dass alle noch abstrakten Aktqualitäten, Formen, Richtungen und alles nur an Akten Scheidbare in die Gegebenheitssphäre für den reinen und formlosen Akt der Person eingeht — so haben wir hier allein eine daseins— absolutes Welt, und wir befinden uns im Reiche der Sache an sich. Und umgekehrt gilt: So lange noch für verschiedene individuelle Personen eine einzige Welt besteht, die gleichwohl als “selbstgegeben” und als “absolut” angesehen wird, ist diese Einzigkeit und Dieseligkeit jener Welt notwendig Schein und es sind faktisch nur Gegenstandsbereiche, die daseinsrelativ zu irgendeiner Trägerart der konkreten Personalität (z.B. zu Lebewesen, Mensch, Rasse usw.) sind, gegeben; oder es ist zwar “die Welt”, d.h. die eine, alle konkreten Welten umfassende, konkrete Welt “gegeben” — aber sie ist nicht “selbstgegeben”, sondern nur gemeint: d.h. “die Welt wird in diesem Falle zu einer bloszen “Idee” im Sinne (aber nicht mit dem Realitäts-vorzeichen”) Kant’s, der ja das Wesen “der Welt” selbst zu einer “Idee” herabsetzen zu dürfen glaubte.

“Die Welt” ist aber durchaus keine “Idee”, sondern ein absolutseiendes, überall konkretes, individuelles Sein, und die Intention auf sie wird nur zu einer prinzipiell unerfüllbaren Idee, zu einem blosz gemeinte, sofern wir fordern dass sie einer beliebigen Mehrheit von individuellen Personen “gegeben” und dabei “selbstgegeben” sei; oder auch so lange wir eine “Allgemeingültigkeit” der Feststellung und Bestimmung ihres Seins und Inhalts durch allgemeine Begriffe und Sätze zur Bedingung ihrer und jeder Art von Existenz machen zu dürfen meinen. Denn eine solche Bestimmung ist wesenhaft nie über die Welt möglich.”

Scheler himself prefers to speak about “consciousness” only in a psychological sense.
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led on the *individual-personal essential* character of experiential activity. Truth is held to be of an individual nature. If we speak of *concrete* thought, or *concrete* volition, we simply take the whole individual personality (as the “totality” of the mental activity) for granted. Without this individual personal only an *abstract* essence of the act (*Aktwesen*) is meant: “Concreteness, however, itself belongs to the essence — not only to the positing of reality”.

SCHELER conceives of *cosmic reality* in a naturalistic sense, isolating it in its psycho-physical aspects. Consequently he is obliged to hypostatize the theoretical cognitive activity contained in the temporal horizon to a personal “mental (spiritual, not psychical) activity”, independent of all cosmic reality. Therefore the actual theoretical meaning-synthesis in the intuition of the essence must be denied its cosmic character.

What place does SCHELER assign to individuality in our experience of the cosmos? Every individual person has his absolutely individual cosmos, his “personal world”.

This “personal world”, as the correlate of the individual personality (only living in mental “acts”), is conceived by SCHELER as a *microcosm*. And now he asks whether “the idea of a single identical real world — transcending the a priori essential structure which binds “all possible worlds” — has its phenomenal realization, or if there are no other worlds than the plurality of the personal ones”.

If there is such a *macrocosm*, our microcosm must be a part of it, while retaining its “cosmic totality”. One thing is not strange to us in the Idea of a macrocosm, according to SCHELER, namely its a priori essential structure which is fixed by phenomenology. For this “essential structure” holds for all possible worlds, because it holds for the “universal essence”, world. The personal correlate to this macrocosm would then be the Idea of an infinite and perfect spiritual person whose “acts” are given us according to the “law-conformity of its essence” in the “phenomenology of the acts” which examines the actual structures of all possible persons.

But this personal correlate of the macrocosm would have to

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1 p. 412.

be concrete in order to answer merely the essential requirement of its reality. Thus the Idea of a God has been given together with the unity, identity, and uniqueness of the cosmos in consequence of a phenomenological coherence of essences.

SCHELER'S conclusion is: "Every unity of the world" (and so all varieties of monism and pantheism) "without an essential regression to a personal God, and also every kind of "substitution" ("Ersatz") of the personal God (by a "universal World-reason", by a "transcendental rational I", by a "moral regulator of the world" (KANT), by an "ordo ordinans" (FICHTE in his first period), by an infinite logical "Subject" (HEGEL), by an impersonal or a would-be "super-personal unconsciousness", etc.) — is a contradictory hypothesis, also in a philosophical sense. For they contradict evident essential coherences that can be laid bare".¹

And from this he infers: "All 'amare, contemplare, cogitare, velle' is therefore intentionally bound up with the one concrete world, the macrocosm, as primarily an 'amare, contemplare, cogitare and velle' in Deo".²

Thus SCHELER'S Idea of individual-personal consciousness culminates in his Idea of God. He observes, however, that this Idea can only be experienced as real in a concrete revelation of God to a person. From this he finds his way to an inter-individual essential community (Wesensgemeinschaft) among individual persons which is founded in their communion with God as the correlate to the macrocosm. All "other communities of a moral or a juridical character" have this possible communion with the personal God for their foundation.

¹ "Jede "Einheit der Welt" (und damit alle Spielarten des Monismus und Pantheismus) ohne einen Wesensregresz auf einen persönlichen Gott, desgleichen jede Art von "Ersatz" des persönlichen Gottes, sei es durch eine "allgemeine Weltvernunft", durch ein "transzendentliches Vernunft-ich", durch einen "sittlichen Weltordner" (KANT), durch eine "ordo ordinans" (FICHTE in seiner ersten Periode), durch ein unendliches logisches "Subjekt" (HEGEL), durch ein unpersönliches oder soidisant "über-persönliches Unbewusstes" usw. sind auch philosophisch "widersinnige Annahmen". Denn sie wiederstreiten evidenten Wesenszusammenhängen, die aufweisbar sind."

² "Alles amare, contemplare, cogitare, velle is (mithin) mit der einen konkreten Welt, dem Makroskosmos, erst als ein amare, contemplare, cogitare und velle "in Deo" intentional verküpf." This conclusion proves that in this period of his phenomenological philosophy SCHELER was strongly influenced by the French thinker MALEBRANCHE.
SCHLER’s Idea of “God” and that of “person” bear the stamp of a neo-scholastic speculative metaphysics. He combines with them the possibility of a “macrocosm” and that of common human experience.

The speculative character of these ideas is intensified in the thesis that the “actual personality of God”, as the “Person of all persons”, is subject to the same “essential phenomenological law-conformities” (Wesensgesetzmässigkeiten) as human personality.

The essential individuality of the latter must be distinguished from the individual -I- so that a moment later the final hypostasis to a divine person may be possible. For the human selfhood as an individual “I-ness”, pre-supposes the “essential necessity” of the existence of a “thou”, a “body” and an “outer world”. “They are exactly those things which it is a priori self-contradictory to predicate about God.” In other words, because the “Idea” of a personal God does not allow of any bond with a cosmic reality and with a community of “I’s”, human personality must also be hypostatized above its “individual -I-ness”. The latter is conceived of as an ‘object of inner perception’, whereas the ‘spiritual person’ and its acts are never to be made into an object (SCHLER identifies ‘object’ and ‘Gegenstand’).

All these ideas are mere speculations. They are the natural results of theoretical thought trying to overstep the critical boundary-line of the temporal order of the creation, which sets an insurmountable limit between the absolute Being of God and His creation, whose meaning is absolutely dependent on Him.

Criticisms of SCHLER’s conception of the individuality of personal experience and of absolute truth.

What can be said about SCHLER’s conception of the individuality of personal experience and that of absolute truth? Christian thought should be very much on its guard against such a thinker as SCHLER.

At the time when he wrote his principal ethical work his thought was penetrated by the spirit of a new scholasticism which aimed at a synthesis between Augustinism and the recent trends of thought in phenomenology and irrationalist philosophy of life. Insofar he can be compared with the Roman Catholic French philosopher MAURICE BLONDEL. But the method and contents of his philosophy are very different from those of the
famous thinker of Aix en Provence (who was not a phenomenologist), and the Christian impulse of BLONDEL's thought was, in my opinion, much stronger than that of SCHELER's. In addition, SCHELER's indubitable genius and prophetic personality could not fail to make a deep impression upon those who sought for a philosophy combinable with Christian belief.

This is why in the Roman-Catholic period of SCHELER's life the pitfalls of his immanence-standpoint in philosophy were easily overlooked. His appeal to a concrete Revelation of the personal God at the critical point of the realization of his Idea of the Origin in human experience seemed to break through this immanence-standpoint. This makes a radical transcendental criticism of his course of thought all the more necessary. Such a critique resulting in laying bare the scholastic religious pre-suppositions of SCHELER's ethics may be left to the reader who has become familiar with the method explained in the Prolegomena. In the present context we must restrict our criticism to the inner conflict between SCHELER's irrationalist personalism and the Husserlian traits in his phenomenology.

If we understand SCHELER aright, he conceives of individuality itself as the absolute pre-requisite (Bedingung) in the "concrete essential structure" of human experience, or, to express it in accordance with our own standpoint: in the transcendental horizon of experience, in which SCHELER also seeks the transcendent religious horizon in his speculative way. This is characteristic of the irrationalistic standpoint, because in this manner individuality is ultimately elevated above the law. Then, of course, the fulness of the meaning of truth must be also something that is not placed under a law.

Law-conformity becomes some abstract 'Wesensgesetzmäsigkeit'. The individual person, on the other hand, is isolated in his absolutely individual microcosm and the metaphysical Idea of God must be introduced in order to avoid the consequences of solipsism. In this entire view SCHELER's conception of individual personality (first person singular) is the real issue.

The Idea of God depends on the concrete phenomenological insight of the individual mental person, which as such remains

1 In the final stage of his thought, for which his little book *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* is representative, SCHELER has abandoned the Christian religion.

2 i.e. essential law-conformity.
bound to his closed microcosm. But this Idea cannot be resorted to as a "deus ex machina" to pave the way again to a macrocosmic experience. The walls of the absolutization of personal individuality have no windows.

This spiritualist metaphysics sprang from an irrationalistic root. With this metaphysics the Husserlian view of the transcendental possibilities and essential necessities (which Scheler has not abandoned) is in remarkably strained relations. For this view is as rationalistic as possible, and has an inner affinity with Leibniz's Idea of the "vérités éternelles" (eternal truths); in fact, it is a phenomenological transformation of the latter.

Speaking of all possible worlds and all possible personalities (outside of human beings) is an indication of the attempt to hypostatize in a speculative metaphysical way the theoretical transcendental horizon of our human experience of reality. This Idea of the possible is meaningless, because we cannot speak of the cosmos except in its temporal horizon, fixed in the Divine order of the creation. And for the same reason there is no sense in speaking of all possible personalities outside of humanity. The personality of God and that of the angels is not a question of 'transcendental possibility and essential necessity'.

The Christian speaks with awe about the living personal God, Who in His mercy and grace has revealed Himself to fallen man. But also in the communion with this God in Christ, the Christian remains within the human creaturely limits of the possibility of experience. Then every theoretical Idea of a "phenomenological possibility of being" of God as the "person of all persons" becomes a manifestation of human ἔθετς. This pride wants to bind God to the creaturely boundaries of the human horizon of experience, after having hypostatized the transcendental dimension of the latter.

§ 5 - THE INDIVIDUALITY OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE WITHIN THE STRUCTURAL HORIZON OF EXPERIENCE AND THE VIEW OF MAN AS A MICRO COSM.

The view of man as a microcosm is unserviceable. The contrast between a microcosm and a macrocosm, handled by Scheler, is in principle unserviceable in Christian philosophy. The origin of this contrast can be traced back to the pre-Socratic philosophy of nature. From Greek philosophy (Plato, the Stoic, Philo, neo-Platonism) it passed into medieval Scholasticism.

Pervaded by the new Humanistic personality-ideal the idea of
man as a microcosm (monad, mirror of the macrocosm) penetrated into the philosophy of the Renaissance and into the mature philosophy of Humanism. Then it assumed all the nuances of the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea (from Bruno, via Leibniz, to Herder, Goethe, Schopenhauer, Schelling and Lotze). The Idea of a cosmos from which immanence-philosophy starts in all its nuances, also in its medieval synthesis with Christian faith, is incompatible with the Biblical revelation concerning creation, and so is its Idea of man as a microcosm.

Man, in his *full selfhood*, transcends the temporal 'earthly' cosmos in all its aspects, and partakes in the transcendent root of this cosmos. He cannot be a self-contained and isolated microcosm, a mirror of a so-called macrocosm. Nor can he be what Scheler calls the 'personal correlate of an absolutely individual cosmos'. This idea of a microcosm is dominated by the radically irrationalistic personalistic view of the transcendental horizon of human experience. The subjective individuality determines this horizon, making it both *individual* and *cosmic*, and "essentially and necessarily" different in each person. Even absolute truth becomes absolutely different for each individual person. Scheler's "Idea of God", is only "realisable" by an individual revelation. This Idea remains a merely intentional, theoretical hypostasis for any one who has not received this individual, most personal revelation. From this hypostasis the possibility of a *real experience* of the "macrocosm" can never be understood.

Our first objection to this Idea of a microcosm is that subjective individuality can never *determine* the structural horizon of human experience and of the cosmos.

This horizon is a structural order, the Divine order of the creation itself. It comprises in its *determining and limiting structure* the individuality of human personality, its religious root as well as its temporal existence. Creaturely subjective individuality cannot determine and limit itself, but is *a priori* determined and limited by the Divine order.

By this we do not rationalistically proclaim this structure to be a so-called "transcendental subject" of human experience. The subject of the full human experience, i.e. human selfhood, remains individual and this individuality remains inherent in the experiencing subjectivity *within the temporal horizon*. But the transcendent and transcendental *structure* of this subjectivity cannot be *subjectively* individual itself. But for its super-indi-
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individual law-conformity, individual subjectivity would be an *αμφορικ* a meaningless *indeterminateness*.

The possibility of subjective experience would be cancelled, if the *horizon* of human experience were subjectively individual. The cosmic self-consciousness in which all *cosmological* knowledge remains founded, is not an experiential entrance into the absolutely individual horizon of some "personal world", of a "microcosm". It enters into the full, unique *cosmos* created by God within the temporal horizon, in the full meaning-coherence of all its modal and plastic structures. Naïve experience, the great primary datum of all epistemology, does not know anything of a cosmos as a "personal world" supposed to be identical with countless other "personal worlds" in an abstract, universal, merely intended essential structure alone. This is already precluded by the subject-object relation in the modal horizon, and by the same relation in the plastic horizon of human experience. Man experiences his individual existence within the temporal horizon exclusively in the one and only *cosmos* into which he has been integrated together with all creatures. He also experiences his individuality in the various structures of the temporal societal relationships.

And within the temporal horizon man's self-consciousness does not from the outset have a static individuality. Rather it becomes more and more individual. This takes place in a process of development which is also historically determined. The cosmos itself cannot be called individual. It is not an actual being. Its only temporal meaning-coherence is rather the structural framework within which the individuality of temporal things, events and societal relationships are only possible.

The societal structure of human knowledge within the temporal horizon.

The individuality of human experience within the temporal horizon has a *societal structure* excluding any possibility of a hermetically closed "microcosm". This societal structure is in no way founded in Scheler's speculative Idea of God.

My individual cognitive activity, both in a theoretical and in a pre-theoretical sense, is borne by an immensely more comprehensive and specialized subjective knowledge on the part of human society. This knowledge has been acquired by the successive generations of mankind.

It is in the possession of human society and is not equal to the
in the Light of the Cosmological Idea

sum of actual knowledge of all individuals together in the present and the past. Nor does it cancel all personal individuality and genius in cognitive activity.

The theoretical knowledge of mankind has for the greater part been objectified in a structure that makes it independent of the momentary actual individual insight of individual human beings.

But it remains fitted into the temporal horizon of human experience, as an objective structure in a necessary relation to a possible subjective cognitive activity. It has received a symbolically determined objective societal structure, which we can only analyze with the aid of the thing-concept in our third volume.

One thing is certain, the knowledge of mankind, objectified in a symbolical structure of individuality, can never be contained in its totality in the actual knowledge of the individual human beings.

SCHELER thinks that the “intuition of the essence” gives us the essence in an a-symbolical way. From his standpoint the symbolical structure of the theoretical knowledge of mankind must be a sure sign that it cannot belong to the concrete cosmos of “absolute existence”\(^1\). But this view deprives the cosmos of an essential aspect of its full temporal meaning. It is therefore in conflict with transcendental truth, which is bound to the modal horizon of our experience.

Without this symbolical aspect human experience would in principle be impossible. We know that the sphere of social intercourse, the economic, the aesthetic, the jural, the moral spheres, and that of faith, have their symbolical foundation in the Divine world-order. In the transcendental direction of time all the earlier law-spheres have their modal anticipations of the symbolical sphere of language. The inter-individual societal experience of mankind, showing its extremely dynamic, mobile, procedural character, is doubtless not of a microcosmic nature. Within this societal structure of human experience the individual insight of genius plays a leading part in the theoretical opening-process. In the acquisition of theoretical knowledge by far the greater part of scientific workers have to be content with assimilating and elaborating the discoveries made by the leading personalities in the scientific world. KANT could only assign a place to individual genius in the field of artistic creation. But

\(^1\) “daseins-absoluten Kosmos”.
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we acknowledge God's sovereignty in the distribution of talent and disposition, also in the domain of science.

We do not mean to say that these special gifts are merely functional psychical facts which do not concern epistemology. They are a cosmic datum, founded in the religious individuality of personalities. Epistemology cannot ignore them with impunity. For the subject of human experience, which cannot be made a "Gegenstand", may not be functionalistically sublimated to an abstract form of universal validity. It is, and remains, the full individual selfhood in the societal structure of its cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness.

Again about the criterion of Truth.

An epistemology that empties this full subject rationalistically until it has become a formal 'transcendental consciousness' necessarily falls into the trap of overlooking the rôle played by subjective insight into epistemological questions. The lack of critical transcendental self-reflection, revealed by such a "critical" epistemology, leads to the tyrannical elevation of one's private subjective insight to universally valid absolute truth. Such an insight refuses to submit to the test of the Divine world-order. Our transcendental a priori knowledge remains subjective and must always be put to the test of the Truth. Within the transcendent horizon of experience we must trace its deepest root. The philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea demands that the whole of transcendental philosophic thought re-consider the problem of the criterion of truth with respect to subjective transcendental knowledge. This demand is scientifically imperative, no matter from what standpoint the thinker starts. We have clearly shown the subjectivism of the immanence-standpoint. The perspective structure of truth has been revealed. It has appeared that the transcendent, and the transcendental structure of human experience is a law of freedom. This law makes subjective error possible (also in a transcendental respect) and even inescapable on the immanence-standpoint. No epistemology is possible without the ἐπίσημος of a cosmonomic Idea which attains the full clarity of self-reflection only in the religious horizon of our experience.

But the cosmonomic Idea itself also demands a criterion of

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1 Of course not a law of freedom in the sense of the possibility for the cognizing subject to act outside of the structure of its subjectivity.
in the Light of the Cosmological Idea

Modern phenomenology has realized the lack of a laying bare, a making visible of transcendental theoretical truth in the so-called critical as well as in the psychological epistemologies. The transcendental a priori structure of the horizon of our experience became the ideal “Gegenstand” of subjective a priori intuited insight. In this way “epistemology” in its usual Humanistic sense was given a phenomenological foundation. But this view remains caught in subjectivism to such a degree that infallibility is ascribed to the subjective a priori “intuition of the essence” which clearly bears the stamp of the immanence-standpoint.

We are thus left without a genuine criterion of transcendental theoretical truth. The demand for such a criterion is even called un-phenomenological in principle. The “intuition of the essence” implies the absolute evidence of truth. Phenomenology haughtily rejects the action about the justification of its “essential insights” in the forum of the Divine world-order in the light of the fullness of truth.

1 Scheler’s statement in his Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie (Schriften aus dem Nachlass, Bnd. I, 1933), pp. 268/9 is characteristic: “Nur etwas vom gleichen Sinn des Wortes “wahr” gibt es noch, das über den Gegensatz wahr-falsch, der allein der Satzspäre angehört, noch erhaben ist: das ist die Selbstgegebenheit eines Gemeinten in unmittelbarer Anschauungsevidenz. Das allein ist jene Wahrheit, von der SPINOZA das grosse und tiefe Wort spricht: “Die Wahrheit ist Kriterium ihrer selbst und des Falschen, und die er seiner Erkenntnis durch Intuition vorbehält”... Selbstgegebenheit und Evidenz (Einsicht) sind also Erkenntnis-ideale, die der Wahrheit und Falschheit vorhergehen. Natürlich fragt der Mensch des Kriteriumstypus wieder: “Welches Kriterium besteht denn für Selbstgegebenheit?”... Aber schon die Idee eines “Kriterium der Selbstgegebenheit” ist widersinnig, da alle Frage nach Kriterien ihren Sinn erst da gewinnt, wo die Sache nicht “selbst”, sondern nur ein “Symbol” für sie gegeben ist.” [There is still something of the same meaning as the word “true”, which is elevated above the contrast true-false which only belongs to the sphere of a (linguistic) sentence. We mean the actual datum of what is intended in the immediate evidence of intuition. This only is the truth to which SPINOZA refers in his great and profound utterance. “Truth is its own criterion and that of falsehood”, and which he reserves for his cognition by means of intuition... Actual datum and evidence (insight) are thus epistemological ideals which are anterior to truth and falsehood. Of course the man of the criterion-type will ask again: What is then the criterion of the actual datum?... But already the idea of a criterion of the “actual datum” is self-contradictory, because any inquiry after a criterion is only meaningful if the matter has not been given “itself”, but only its “symbol”.

This is a very clear statement. The phenomenologist’s subjective in-
For this reason we have laid such a great emphasis on the demand to make the subjectivity of our cognitive insight the centre of the epistemological problems. Never must the (subjectively constructed) law-conformable structure of the cognitive subject itself be made the subject in an epistemological sense. This substitution of their respective roles is the πρωτόν ψεύδος of dogmatic subjectivism in epistemology. It leads to a dogmatic rejection of any criterion of transcendental theoretical truth which really submits subjective insight to the test of verity.

Epistemology should disclose the transcendental temporal horizon of our experience to us theoretically. In this opening process the experiential horizon is deepened from a pre-theoretical to a theoretical horizon (founded in the pre-theoretical one). And we should reflect philosophically on the pre-requisites of this opening-process given in the Divine order of the creation.

Then we shall be freed from the rationalistic illusion that epistemology has been drawn up in a theoretical horizon which is rigid and self-contained. The transcendental horizon is never at rest and irrepressibly points above itself to the transcendent religious horizon of our selfhood, and there is no stability of Truth to be found but in the Divine Revelation.

sight into what is the εἰδος, the essence and its structural coherence, is the end of all dispute.

There is indeed an end of our inquiry concerning the criterion of truth. It is when we are seized hold of in our hearts by Truth itself.

But this end does not lie within the transcendental theoretical horizon of human experience, nor in a subjective theoretical "intuition of the essence", rooted in the immanence-standpoint which has fallen away from the Fulness of Truth.